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Americans Remain Critical of China

Many see China as increasingly influential and consider limiting its power a top priority

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How we did this

Pew Research Center conducted this study to understand Americans' opinions of China, its role in the world and its impact on the U.S. economy. For this analysis, we surveyed 3,600 U.S. adults from April 1 to April 7, 2024. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center's American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP's methodology.

Here are the questions used for this analysis, along with responses, and its methodology.

Americans Remain Critical of China

Many see China as increasingly influential and say limiting its power is a top priority

For the fifth year in a row, about eight-in-ten Americans report an unfavorable view of China, according to a new Pew Research Center survey. Today, 81% of U.S. adults see the country unfavorably, including 43% who hold a *very* unfavorable opinion. Chinese President Xi Jinping receives similarly negative ratings.

Most Americans hold an unfavorable view of China

% who have a(n) __ opinion of China



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024. Q4b.
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Still, many Americans agree that China's influence in the world has been getting stronger in recent years (71%). This sense is accompanied by concern about how China interacts with other nations: 61% of Americans are at least somewhat concerned about China's territorial disputes with neighboring countries. *(For more U.S. views of China's role in the world, go to Chapter 1.)*

When it comes to China's relationship with the United States, few see China as a partner (6%) and most Americans instead label it a competitor (50%) or an enemy (42%) of the U.S. They are likewise critical of China's impact on the U.S. economy, describing its influence as large and negative. Roughly half of Americans think limiting China's power and influence should be a top U.S. foreign policy priority, and another 42% think this should be given some priority. *(For more assessments of China's relationship with the U.S., go to Chapter 2.)*

According to the Center survey, which was conducted April 1-7, 2024, among 3,600 U.S. adults, Republicans are more wary of China than Democrats are.

Republicans and Republican-leaning independents are about twice as likely as Democrats and Democratic leaners to hold a very unfavorable view of China and to consider China an enemy of the U.S. They are also more likely to say that China has recently become more influential.

Conservative Republicans are very unfavorable toward China and most likely to see China as an enemy

% who have a/say that ...



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024. Q4b, Q53a & Q55.
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Republicans also have wider ideological differences within their party, and **conservative Republicans stand out on many measures**:

- Conservative Republicans are 25 percentage points more likely than moderate and liberal Republicans to express a *very* unfavorable view of China (68% vs. 43%). There is no difference between liberal Democrats and moderate and conservative Democrats on this question.
- Conservative Republicans are also 31 points more likely than moderate and liberal Republicans to see China as an enemy of the U.S. No ideological difference is present among Democrats.
- While 83% of conservative Republicans say China's influence in the world has been getting stronger in recent years, 68% of moderate and liberal Republicans say the same. The latter is similar to the shares of moderate and conservative Democrats (67%) and liberal Democrats (69%) who hold this view.

Older Americans are generally more critical of China. A 61% majority of adults ages 65 and older have a *very* unfavorable view of China, compared with 27% of adults under 30. Adults ages 65 and older are also more than twice as likely as those ages 18 to 29 to see China as an enemy of the U.S. For their part, younger adults are more likely than older ones to label China as a competitor and as a partner.

Negative views of China are more common among older Americans



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024. Q4b, Q53a & Q55.
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Older Americans also perceive more growth in China's international influence. Roughly three-quarters of adults ages 65 and older say China's influence has been getting stronger in recent years, while about two-thirds of adults under 30 say the same.

Americans with a sour view of the U.S. economy have more critical opinions of China. Those who say the current U.S. economic situation is bad are more likely to hold an unfavorable opinion of China and to say China has a great deal or fair amount of negative influence on the U.S. economy. They are also more likely to see China as an enemy when compared with those who see the economy positively.

1. Assessments of China and its role in the world

Americans have overwhelmingly negative opinions of China, a nation they see as becoming increasingly influential. This image of China is accompanied by concern about its relationship with its neighbors and widespread distrust in its president.

Unfavorable views of China prevail

U.S. views of China have not changed significantly since last year. Most Americans still hold an unfavorable view of the country (81%), including 43% who say their opinion is *very* unfavorable. In contrast, only 16% see China favorably. China has been seen unfavorably by three-quarters or more of U.S. adults since 2020.

Age and education

Unfavorable views of China are more common among older Americans, especially those ages 65 and older. Among this group, 61% report a *very* unfavorable view of China, while only 27% of adults under 30 say the same.

Though Americans of all education levels see China unfavorably, views are more negative among those with more education. Some 87% of Americans with a four-year college degree have a negative opinion of China, compared with 78% of adults without a college degree.

Party and ideology

Republicans and Republican-leaning independents view China more unfavorably than Democrats and Democratic leaners do (90% vs. 77%). Conservative Republicans are particularly critical: About seven-in-ten (68%) hold a *very* unfavorable view of the country.

China's image especially negative among older adults, college graduates and Republicans

% who say they have a __ opinion of China



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024. Q4b.
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Economic attitudes

At least three-quarters of Americans hold unfavorable views of China regardless of how they rate the U.S. economy. Still, unfavorable views of China are more common among those who say the U.S. economy is doing poorly. Among Americans who think the current economic situation is bad, 84% have an unfavorable view of China, including 48% with a *very* unfavorable view. In comparison, 75% of those who think the U.S. economic situation is good see China unfavorably.

China's international influence

How Americans evaluate China is tied to how they see China's role in the world. Unfavorable views of China are more common among those who think China's influence has grown in recent years (85%) than among those who think China's influence has waned (72%) or stayed about the same (75%). Similarly, Americans who think China has at least a fair amount of influence on the U.S. economy are more negative on China than those who see not too much economic influence or no influence at all (84% vs. 71%).

China's role in the world

Roughly seven-in-ten Americans (71%) think China's influence in the world has been growing in recent years. This is a modest but significant increase from the 66% who said the same in 2022.

China's economic influence

Americans' evaluations of the change in China's global influence are related to their ratings of its economic influence on the U.S.: 75% of those who say China has at least a fair amount of impact on the U.S. economy see China's general influence in the world getting stronger. In comparison, 51% of Americans who do not see a significant economic impact on the U.S. say the same.

Age, gender and education

A number of demographic factors play a role in evaluations of China's influence. Older Americans – those ages 50 and older – are more likely than those ages 18 to 49 to say China's influence has grown recently (75% vs. 67%). A greater share of men than women hold this view, and *older* men stand out in particular. Eight-in-ten men ages 50 and older say China's influence is on the rise, compared with 71% of older women and 72% of

Growing share say China's influence is increasing

% who say China's influence in the world has been __ in recent years



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024. Q53a.
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younger men. For their part, women ages 18 to 49 are least likely to say China's influence has been growing (63%).

Americans with a four-year college degree are also more likely to believe China's global influence has recently gotten stronger. Roughly eight-in-ten say this (77%), compared with 68% of adults without a college degree.

Party and ideology

Republicans are 10 percentage points more likely than Democrats to say China's influence in the world is getting stronger (78% vs. 68%).

This opinion is notably concentrated among *conservative* Republicans: 83% say China's influence has been getting stronger in recent years, compared with 68% of moderate and liberal Republicans. In fact, moderate and liberal Republicans are about as likely as conservative and moderate Democrats or liberal Democrats to hold this view.

Conservative Republicans most likely to say China has been getting stronger

*% who say China's influence in the world has been **getting stronger** in recent years*



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024. Q53a.
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China's territorial disputes

We also asked Americans how concerned they are about territorial disputes between China and its neighboring countries. Roughly six-in-ten say they are at least somewhat concerned, including 20% who describe themselves as *very* concerned. About a quarter (24%) are not too concerned or not concerned at all, and 14% of Americans say they are not sure.

When this question was last asked in 2015 – as part of a phone survey – 72% were at least somewhat concerned with China's territorial disputes, including 30% who were very concerned.

Age

Age plays a significant role in Americans' level of concern about territorial disputes between China and its neighboring countries. Adults ages 65 and older are more concerned than any other age group: About eight-in-ten older Americans are concerned, compared with no more than roughly seven-in-ten in younger age groups.

Most Americans are concerned about China's territorial disputes

% who are __ about territorial disputes between China and neighboring countries



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024. Q63.
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Party and ideology

While concerns about territorial disputes are roughly equal among Republicans and Democrats, there are ideological differences within the Republican Party. Seven-in-ten conservative Republicans are at least somewhat concerned about China's territorial disputes, including 30% who say they are *very* concerned. By comparison, 56% of moderate and liberal Republicans are concerned, including only 18% who are *very* concerned.

Americans lack confidence in Xi Jinping

About eight-in-ten Americans have little or no confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs (79%). Only 9% report some or a lot of confidence in Xi, and another 10% say they have never heard of him.

Age and education

Confidence in the Chinese president is lower among older Americans. A majority of those ages 65 and older have no confidence at all in Xi (59%), compared with 36% of those ages 18 to 29. Young adults are nearly four times more likely than those in the oldest age group to say they have never heard of the Chinese president (18% vs. 5%).

Americans with at least a four-year college degree report less confidence in Xi than those without a college degree. Among adults with a college degree or more education, 51% have no confidence at all in Xi; 44% of those without agree.

Party and ideology

Republicans express less confidence in Xi than Democrats do. About six-in-ten Republicans have no confidence at all in Xi (57%), more than the 39% of Democrats who say the same. Among Republicans, conservatives are significantly more likely than moderate and liberal Republicans to have no confidence whatsoever in Xi (65% vs. 43%). There is no significant difference between conservative and moderate Democrats and liberal Democrats on this question.

Older adults, conservative Republicans most likely to have no confidence in Xi

% who have __ in Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024. Q8c.
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2. China's relationship with the U.S.

When asked about the state of U.S.-China relations, Americans offer mostly negative assessments: A substantial share consider China an enemy of the U.S., and most think limiting China's power and influence should be a top foreign policy priority for the U.S. About two-thirds of Americans think China is having a great deal or fair amount of negative influence on the U.S. economy.

Americans increasingly see China as an enemy

Around four-in-ten Americans (42%) say China is an enemy of the U.S. This is fewer than the 50% who describe China as a competitor but a slight increase from the 38% of Americans who described China as an enemy last year. **It is also the largest share who have described China as an enemy since we began asking the question.**

Rising share of Americans label China an enemy

% who say China is a(n) __ of the U.S.



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024. Q55.
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Age

Older Americans are more likely than younger ones to describe China as an enemy. A majority of those ages 50 and older (55%) describe China as an enemy, including 61% of those ages 65 and older. Among adults under 50, three-in-ten say the same – including around a quarter (27%) of adults under 30.

Party and ideology

As has been the case in recent years, Republicans and Republican-leaning independents are significantly more likely than Democrats and Democratic leaners to describe China as an enemy (59% vs. 28%). **Among Republicans, this share has increased 6 percentage points since 2023**, from 53%. Among Democrats, views did not change significantly over the past year.

Conservative Republicans (69%) are particularly likely to describe China as an enemy relative to moderate and liberal Republicans (38%), conservative and moderate Democrats (30%), and liberal Democrats (25%). Aside from conservative Republicans, roughly half or more in each group describe China as a competitor.

Republicans mostly see China as an enemy of the U.S. while Democrats primarily view it as a competitor

% who say China is a(n) __ of the U.S.



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024. Q55.
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Economic attitudes

Assessments of whether China is an enemy, competitor or partner of the U.S. are related to views about the U.S. economy. For example, Americans who think the U.S. economy is currently in poor shape are significantly more likely than those who think it is in good shape to call China an enemy (48% vs. 29%).

Additionally, people who think China has a great deal or a fair amount of influence on economic conditions in the U.S. are much more likely than those who think it has less influence to call China an enemy (45% vs. 25%).

Limiting China's power and influence

When asked to prioritize 22 possible long-term foreign policy goals, limiting the power and influence of China is given top priority by 49% of Americans. Another 42% say this should be given some priority, and 8% say limiting

About half of Americans say limiting China should be a top foreign policy goal

% who say limiting the power and influence of China should be given __ in U.S. long-range foreign policy

Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024. Q51f.
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China's power should not be a priority at all in U.S. foreign policy.

As with the sense that China's influence has recently grown stronger, **the desire to limit China is more prominent among older Americans and Republicans**:

- About seven-in-ten Americans ages 65 and older (72%) say limiting China's power and influence should be a top priority. That share decreases significantly as the age group surveyed gets younger, with just 28% of those ages 18 to 29 giving this top priority.
- A majority of Republicans (59%) say curbing China's influence should be a top priority, compared with 42% of Democrats.

Since 2018, the share who prioritize limiting the power and influence of China has grown more than the share prioritizing any other foreign policy goal we asked about. Most of this increase occurred between 2018 and 2021, when American views of China grew precipitously less favorable.

Since 2021, Americans' prioritization of this foreign policy goal has changed little, but the partisan divide on the issue has shifted. Today, Democrats give more priority to limiting China than they did in 2021 (+6 points), while concern among Republicans has stayed about the same over that period. This brings what was once a 27-point gap between Republicans and Democrats down to 17 points.

Republicans give more priority than Democrats to limiting China, but the partisan gap is shrinking

*% who say limiting the power and influence of China should be given **top priority** in U.S. long-range foreign policy*



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024. Q51f.
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China's economic influence on the U.S.

A large majority of Americans (82%) think China has at least a fair amount of influence on economic conditions in the U.S., including 28% who say it has a great deal of influence. Another 14% say it doesn't have much influence, and only 3% say it has no influence at all.

Among those who think China has at least some influence on economic conditions in the U.S., a large majority (79%) think that that influence is *negative*, while 18% say it's positive.

Roughly two-thirds of Americans think China has a large – and negative – impact on the U.S. economy

% who say, among those who think China is having __ (of) influence on U.S. economic conditions, that this influence is positive or negative



Note: Reflects responses to two questions. Those who said China is having no influence at all on U.S. economic conditions were not asked the second question about whether the impact is positive or negative. In the other categories, only those who answered both questions are shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024. Q59 & Q60.
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Taken together, roughly two-thirds of Americans think China has a great deal or a fair amount of negative influence on U.S. economic conditions. Far fewer think it has a great deal or fair amount of *positive* influence on economic conditions (13%). And small shares see it having limited positive impact (4%) or limited negative impact (10%).

Age

Older Americans are far more likely than younger ones to say that China has a large amount of negative influence on the U.S. economy. Around three-quarters (76%) of those ages 65 and older take this position, compared with only 53% of adults under 30. And, while still a minority position, adults under 30 are significantly more likely to say China has a large *positive* influence on the U.S. economy, with 19% saying this.

Older Americans are more likely to see China's economic impact as negative

% who say China is having __ on U.S. economic conditions



Note: Reflects responses to two questions. Those who said China is having no influence at all on U.S. economic conditions were not asked the second question about whether the impact is positive or negative. In the other categories, only those who answered both questions are shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024. Q59 & Q60.
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Party and ideology

Republicans are more likely than Democrats to say China has a large negative influence on the U.S. economy (78% vs. 58%). This is particularly true for conservative Republicans (83%), relative to moderate and liberal Republicans (69%). Among Democrats, conservatives and moderates (57%) and liberals (61%) largely agree on this issue.

Economic attitudes

Americans who think the U.S. economic conditions are poor are more likely than those who think conditions are good to say China has a large negative influence on America's economy (72% vs. 55%).

Personal economic circumstances are also tied to how people see China's influence on the U.S. economy. Americans with upper incomes (71%) and middle incomes (73%) are more likely than those with lower incomes (55%) to say China has a large negative impact on the American economy.

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Methodology

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Overview

The American Trends Panel (ATP), created by Pew Research Center, is a nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. Panelists participate via self-administered web surveys. Panelists who do not have internet access at home are provided with a tablet and wireless internet connection. Interviews are conducted in both English and Spanish. The panel is being managed by Ipsos.

Data in this report is drawn from ATP Wave 145, conducted from April 1-7, 2024, among a sample of ATP members who had previously completed both of ATP Waves 132 and 143. It includes an oversample of non-Hispanic Asian adults, non-Hispanic Black men and Hispanic men in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population. A total of 3,600 panelists responded out of 3,776 who were sampled, for a response rate of 95%. The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,600 respondents is plus or minus 2.1 percentage points.

Panel recruitment

The ATP was created in 2014, with the first cohort of panelists invited to join the panel at the end of a large, national, landline and cellphone random-digit dial survey that was conducted in both English and Spanish. Two additional recruitments were conducted using the same method in 2015 and 2017, respectively. Across these three surveys, a total of 19,718 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 9,942 (50%) agreed to participate.

In August 2018, the ATP switched from telephone to address-based sampling (ABS) recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover as much as 98% of the population, although some studies suggest that the coverage could be in the low 90% range.[1] Within each sampled household, the adult with the next

[1] AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. "AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling."

birthday is asked to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.[2]

We have recruited a national sample of U.S. adults to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an "oversample") to boost sample size with underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

American Trends Panel recruitment surveys

Recruitment dates	Mode	Invited	Joined	Active panelists remaining
Jan. 23 to March 16, 2014	Landline/ cell RDD	9,809	5,338	1,390
Aug. 27 to Oct. 4, 2015	Landline/ cell RDD	6,004	2,976	831
April 25 to June 4, 2017	Landline/ cell RDD	3,905	1,628	404
Aug. 8 to Oct. 31, 2018	ABS	9,396	8,778	3,844
Aug. 19 to Nov. 30, 2019	ABS	5,900	4,720	1,386
June 1 to July 19, 2020; Feb. 10 to March 31, 2021	ABS	3,197	2,812	1,438
May 29 to July 7, 2021; Sept. 16 to Nov. 1, 2021	ABS	1,329	1,162	731
May 24 to Sept. 29, 2022	ABS	3,354	2,869	1,449
April 17 to May 30, 2023	ABS	686	576	433
	Total	**43,580**	**30,859**	**11,906**

Note: RDD is random-digit dial; ABS is address-based sampling. Approximately once per year, panelists who have not participated in multiple consecutive waves or who did not complete an annual profiling survey are removed from the panel. Panelists also become inactive if they ask to be removed from the panel.

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Across the six address-based recruitments, a total of 23,862 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 20,917 agreed to join the panel and completed an initial profile survey. Of the 30,859 individuals who have ever joined the ATP, 11,906 remained active panelists and continued to receive survey invitations at the time this survey was conducted.

The American Trends Panel never uses breakout routers or chains that direct respondents to additional surveys.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the U.S., including Alaska and Hawaii. It featured a stratified random sample of active ATP members who completed both ATP Wave 132 and Wave 143. Among the panelists who met these criteria, Hispanic men, non-Hispanic Black men and non-Hispanic Asian adults were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the

[2] Email pewsurveys@pewresearch.org.

greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with Ipsos. The web program was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the Ipsos project management team and Pew Research Center researchers. The Ipsos project management team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or a gift code to Amazon.com or could choose to decline the incentive. Incentive amounts ranged from $5 to $20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was April 1-7, 2024. Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset of ATP panelists with a known residential address on April 1.[3]

Invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on April 1. The ATP panelists chosen for the initial soft launch were known responders who had completed previous ATP surveys within one day of receiving their invitation. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on April 2.

All panelists with an email address received an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. All ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages received an SMS invitation and up to two SMS reminders.

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3 Postcard notifications are sent to 1) panelists who have been provided with a tablet to take ATP surveys, 2) panelists who were recruited within the last two years, and 3) panelists recruited prior to the last two years who opt to continue receiving postcard notifications.

Invitation and reminder dates, ATP Wave 145

	Soft launch	Full launch
Initial invitation	April 1, 2024	April 2, 2024
First reminder	April 4, 2024	April 4, 2024
Final reminder	April 6, 2024	April 6, 2024

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Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, the Center's researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing clear patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, one ATP respondent was removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a multistep process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of selection for their initial recruitment survey. These weights are then rescaled and adjusted to account for changes in the design of ATP recruitment surveys from year to year. Finally, the weights are calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

American Trends Panel weighting dimensions

Variable	Benchmark source
Age (detailed) Age x Gender Education x Gender Education x Age Race/Ethnicity x Education Black (alone or in combination) x Hispanic Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans Years lived in the U.S. Census region x Metropolitan status	2022 American Community Survey (ACS)
Volunteerism	2021 CPS Volunteering & Civic Life Supplement
Party affiliation x Voter registration	2022 CPS Voting and Registration Supplement
Party affiliation x Race/Ethnicity Frequency of internet use Religious affiliation	2023 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on noninstitutionalized adults. Voter registration is calculated using procedures from Hur, Achen (2013) and rescaled to include the total U.S. adult population.

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Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 2nd and 98th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. This trimming is performed separately among non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic Asian, Hispanic and all other respondents. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Sample sizes and margins of error, ATP Wave 145

Group	Unweighted sample size	Plus or minus ...
Total sample	3,600	2.1 percentage points
Rep/Lean Rep	1,487	1.7 percentage points
Dem/Lean Dem	1,952	1.7 percentage points

Note: This survey includes oversamples of Hispanic men, non-Hispanic Black men and non-Hispanic Asian adults respondents. Unweighted sample sizes do not account for the sample design or weighting and do not describe a group's contribution to weighted estimates. See the Sample design and Weighting sections above for details.

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Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates

Final dispositions, ATP Wave 145

	AAPOR code	Total
Completed interview	1.1	3,600
Logged on to survey; broke off	2.12	29
Logged on to survey; did not complete any items	2.1121	9
Never logged on (implicit refusal)	2.11	135
Survey completed after close of the field period	2.27	2
Completed interview but was removed for data quality		1
Screened out		0
Total panelists sampled for the survey		**3,776**
Completed interviews	I	3,600
Partial interviews	P	0
Refusals	R	173
Non-contact	NC	2
Other	O	1
Unknown household	UH	0
Unknown other	UO	0
Not eligible	NE	0
Total		**3,776**
AAPOR RR1 = I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO)		95%

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Cumulative response rate as of ATP Wave 145

	Total
Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys	11%
% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited	71%
% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 145	45%
Response rate to Wave 145 survey	95%
Cumulative response rate	**3%**

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Topline questionnaire

Pew Research Center
Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey
May 1, 2024 Release

Methodological notes:

- Survey results are based on national samples. For further details on sample designs, refer to the Methodology section.

- Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%. The topline "total" columns show 100% because they are based on unrounded numbers.

- Prior to 2024, combined totals were based on rounded topline figures. Going forward, totals will be based on unrounded topline figures, so combined totals might be different than in previous years.

- Since 2007, Pew Research Center has used an automated process to generate toplines for its Global Attitudes surveys. As a result, numbers may differ slightly from those published prior to 2007.

- The U.S. survey was conducted on Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel. Many questions have been asked in previous surveys on the phone. Phone trends for comparison are provided in separate tables throughout the topline. The extent of the mode differences varies across questions; while there are negligible differences on some questions, others have more pronounced differences. Caution should be taken when evaluating online and phone estimates.

- Not all questions included in the Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey are presented in this topline. Omitted questions have either been previously released or will be released in future reports.

		Q4b. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of ...? b. China							
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2024	16	81	1	14	38	43	3	100
	Spring, 2023	14	83	1	13	39	44	2	100
	Spring, 2022	16	82	2	14	42	40	2	100
	Spring, 2021	21	77	1	19	37	39	3	100
	March, 2020	19	79	2	17	44	35	2	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		Q4b. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of ...? b. China							
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Summer, 2020	22	73	3	19	31	42	6	100
	Spring, 2020	27	66	3	23	33	33	7	100
	Spring, 2019	26	60	4	22	37	23	13	100
	Spring, 2018	38	48	5	33	32	15	14	100
	Spring, 2017	43	47	5	39	33	14	10	100
	Spring, 2016	37	55	6	31	36	19	9	100
	Spring, 2015	38	54	4	34	33	21	8	100
	Spring, 2014	35	55	7	28	34	21	10	100
	Spring, 2013	36	51	7	30	32	20	12	100
	Spring, 2012	41	40	6	34	25	15	19	100
	Spring, 2011	52	36	12	39	22	14	12	100
	Spring, 2010	49	37	10	39	24	12	14	100
	Spring, 2009	49	38	9	41	25	13	13	100
	Spring, 2008	40	42	9	30	26	16	19	100
	Spring, 2007	42	40	8	34	25	14	18	100
	Spring, 2006	52	29	12	40	19	10	19	100
	Spring, 2005	43	35	9	34	22	13	22	100

		Q8c. Tell me how much confidence you have in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs – a lot of confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence, or no confidence at all. c. Chinese President Xi Jinping								
		TOTAL Confidence	TOTAL No confidence	A lot of confidence	Some confidence	Not too much confidence	No confidence at all	Never heard of this person	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2024	9	79	1	7	33	46	10	2	100
	Spring, 2023	8	77	1	7	30	47	13	1	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		Q8c. Tell me how much confidence you have in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs – a lot of confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence, or no confidence at all. c. Chinese President Xi Jinping							
		TOTAL Confidence	TOTAL No confidence	A lot of confidence	Some confidence	Not too much confidence	No confidence at all	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Summer, 2020	18	77	2	16	22	55	5	100
	Spring, 2020	22	71	2	20	26	45	8	100
	Spring, 2019	38	49	2	35	27	23	13	100
	Spring, 2018	39	50	5	34	27	23	12	100
	Spring, 2017	31	60	2	29	29	31	9	100
	Spring, 2014	28	58	2	26	26	32	14	100

		Q53a. Thinking about each of the following countries, would you say its influence in the world in recent years has been getting stronger, getting weaker or staying about the same? a. China				
		Getting stronger	Getting weaker	Staying about the same	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2024	71	9	17	3	100
	Spring, 2022	66	10	22	2	100

		Q55. On balance, do you think of China as a partner of the U.S., a competitor of the U.S. or an enemy of the U.S.?				
		Partner	Competitor	Enemy	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2024	6	50	42	3	100
	Spring, 2023	6	52	38	3	100
	Spring, 2022	10	62	25	2	100
	January, 2022	9	54	35	2	100
	Spring, 2021	9	55	34	2	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		Q55. On balance, do you think of China as a partner of the U.S., a competitor of the U.S. or an enemy of the U.S.?				
		Partner	Competitor	Enemy	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Summer, 2020	16	57	26	2	100
	May, 2012	16	66	15	3	100

		Q59. How much influence do you think China is having on economic conditions in (survey country) – a great deal of influence, a fair amount of influence, not too much influence, or no influence at all?							
		Great deal/Fair amount	TOTAL Not too much/No influence	Great deal	Fair amount	Not too much	No influence at all	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2024	82	17	28	54	14	3	1	100

		ASK IF "GREAT DEAL", "FAIR AMOUNT", OR "NOT TOO MUCH" IN Q59: Q60. Right now, is China having a positive or negative impact on economic conditions in (survey country)?				
		Positive	Negative	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2024	18	79	4	100	3495

		Q63. How concerned are you, if at all, about territorial disputes between China and neighboring countries – very concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned or not at all concerned?								
		TOTAL Concerned	TOTAL Not concerned	Very concerned	Somewhat concerned	Not too concerned	Not at all concerned	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2024	61	24	20	41	18	6	14	0	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		Q63. How concerned are you, if at all, about territorial disputes between China and neighboring countries – very concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned or not at all concerned?							
		TOTAL Concerned	TOTAL Not concerned	Very concerned	Somewhat concerned	Not too concerned	Not at all concerned	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2015	72	25	30	42	15	10	3	100
	Spring, 2014	68	31	27	40	21	10	1	100

		U.S. Party ID with Leaners			
		Reps and Rep Leaners	Dems and Dem Leaners	DK/Refused/ No lean	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2024	45	47	8	100