

Lua in WAFs

An Examination of Lua's Use in ModSecurity
And Other Web Application Firewalls

Overview

- Review - WAFs
- FOSS Implementations
 - ModSecurity
 - DSL
 - Features
 - Lua Extensibility
 - Nginx/OpenResty
 - WAF projects
 - Ideologies

Overview - WAF

- Web Application Firewall
 - Inspect Layer 7 / HTTP(S) traffic
 - Block/log malicious transactions
 - Manipulate request/response content
 - Deep inspection into client behavior

Overview – WAF Features

- “Required” Features
 - Access/manipulate request + response headers + body
 - Flexible, extensible configuration
 - Tunable (false-positives, app-specific use cases)
 - Anti-evasion mechanism
 - Persistent data storage
 - Turing-complete configuration language/extensions
 - Detailed, performant audit logging
 - != debug logging

ModSecurity

- Apache Module
- Unique DSL
- Request/response headers and body
- Extensible via custom C modules, and Lua scripts

```

SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "(?i:(j|(&#x?
0*((74)|(4A)|(106)|(6A));?))([\t]|(&(#x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(\tab;)|(\newline;)))*)*(a|(&#x?0*((65)|(41)|(97)|
(61));?))([\t]|(&(#x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(\tab;)|(\newline;)))*)*(v|(&#x?0*((86)|(56)|(118)|(76));?))([\t]|
(&(#x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(\tab;)|(\newline;)))*)*(a|(&#x?0*((65)|(41)|(97)|(61));?))([\t]|(&(#x?0*(9|(13)|
(10)|A|D);?)|(\tab;)|(\newline;)))*)*(s|(&#x?0*((83)|(53)|(115)|(73));?))([\t]|(&(#x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|
(\tab;)|(\newline;)))*)*(c|(&#x?0*((67)|(43)|(99)|(63));?))([\t]|(&(#x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(\tab;)|
(\newline;)))*)*(r|(&#x?0*((82)|(52)|(114)|(72));?))([\t]|(&(#x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(\tab;)|(\newline;)))*)*(i|
(&#x?0*((73)|(49)|(105)|(69));?))([\t]|(&(#x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(\tab;)|(\newline;)))*)*(p|(&#x?0*((80)|(50)|
(112)|(70));?))([\t]|(&(#x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(\tab;)|(\newline;)))*)*(t|(&#x?0*((84)|(54)|(116)|(74));?))
([\t]|(&(#x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(\tab;)|(\newline;)))*)*(:(|(&(#x?0*((58)|(3A));?)|(\colon;)))".) \
"phase:request,\
rev:'3',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.0.0',\
maturity:'8',\
accuracy:'8',\
id:941210,\
capture,\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
t:none,t:removeNulls,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,\
block,\
ctl:auditLogParts+=E,\
msg:'IE XSS Filters - Attack Detected.',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-xss',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',\
setvar:tx.xss_score+=%{tx.critical_anomaly_score},\
setvar:tx.anomaly_score+=%{tx.critical_anomaly_score},\
setvar:tx.%{rule.id}-OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS-%{matched_var_name}=%{tx.0}"


```

ModSecurity DSL

ModSecurity's DSL makes my baby cry



ModSecurity DSL



“Give it 2 or 3 years for the Stockholm Syndrome to kick in”

ModSecurity Rule Definitions

- Directive
 - 'SecRule', 'SecAction'...
 - Originally (still) available as Apache module directive
- Collection
 - What in the transaction to look for
 - Headers, query string, source/dest addr, file upload metadata
 - Single element, or string- or integer-indexed array

Rule Defs

- Operator
 - How to examine the collection
 - Regex, string equality, pattern-matching, numeric comparison, external script execution
- Action
 - Disruptive
 - Allow, deny, redirect
 - Nondisruptive
 - Chain, setvar, sleep, exec
 - Metadata
 - Version, maturity, severity

Example Rule

```
GET /index.php?foo=bar HTTP/1.0
```

```
SecRule \
  ARGS_GET:foo \
  "@streq bar" \
  "id:12345, \
  phase:2, \
  deny" \
```

ModSecurity Variables

- Key-value store based on type
- Store data per-transaction and per-client/session/user
- Per-transaction
 - TX
- Persistent
 - IP, session, etc
 - Stored on disk

ModSecurity Variables

```
SecRule ARGS foo  
"id:12345,setvar:TX.matched=12345,pass"
```

```
[...snip...]
```

```
SecRule TX:matched "@eq 12345" "deny"
```

ModSecurity Variables

```
SecAction "initcol:IP=%{REMOTE_ADDR}
```

```
SecRule URI "@streq /login.php" \  
    "id:12345,setvar:IP.login_attempt=+1"
```

```
SecRule IP:login_attempt "@ge 5" \  
    "id:12346,deny,msg:'Too many logins'"
```

Extending via Lua (1/3)

- Operator @inspectFile
 - Executes the given script for every collection element
 - Designed for file upload inspection
 - Any language
 - .lua extensions are executed internally

```
SecRule FILES_TMPNAMES  
"@inspectFile /path/to/inspect.lua"
```

Lua @inspectFile

```
function main(filename)
    local f = io.open(filename, 'rb')
    local chunk = f:read(1024)

    local ret = string.match(chunk, '<script')

    return ret
end
```


Extending via Lua (2/3)

- Non-disruptive `exec`: action
 - Runs on rule match
 - No provided parameters
 - Some environmental variables
 - Must write something (anything) to `stdout`
 - Lua detection

```
SecRule ARGS "@streq foo"  
"id:1234,exec:/path/to/script.lua"
```

Extending via Lua (3/3)

- Directive SecRuleScript
 - Executes Lua script with no target or operators
 - Optional actions

```
SecRuleScript "/path/to/script.lua" \  
    "id:12345,deny,..."
```

Extending via Lua

Simple Lua API

- `log()`
 - `getvar()`
 - `getvars()`
 - `setvar()`
-
- Exposed via module 'm'
 - Expects a function `main`

SecRuleScript

```
function main()  
    m.log(9, "debug message")  
  
    local user-agent = m.getvar("REQUEST_HEADERS.User-Agent")  
  
    local ret = string.match(user-agent,  
'base64_decode')  
  
    if ret then m.setvar("TX.match", user-agent) end  
  
    return ret  
  
end
```

Implementation

- apache2/msc_lua.c
 - 518 loc
 - First commit 2007
 - 3 globals
 - transaction and rule struct userdata
 - m for function register

```
> $ git log -c msc_lua.c | egrep -c 'commit [[:alnum:]]{40}'
```

```
> 34
```

Implementation – ModSec Vars

- Variables set on rule match
 - Unconditional set
 - Additional logic requires complex chaining
- Lua API
 - Set variables on a whim
 - Get/transform arbitrary variables

```
224 msre_var *vx = NULL,
225 msre_var *var;
226
227 /* Retrieve parameters. */
228 p1 = (char *)luaL_checkstring(L, 1);
229
230 /* Retrieve msr. */
231 lua_getglobal(L, "__msr");
232 msr = (modsec_rec *)lua_topointer(L, -1);
233
234 /* Retrieve rule. */
235 lua_getglobal(L, "__rule");
236 rule = (msre_rule *)lua_topointer(L, -1);
237
238 /* Extract the variable name and its parameter from the script. */
239 varname = apr_pstrdup(msr->msc_rule_mptmp, p1);
240 param = strchr(varname, '.');
241 if (param != NULL) {
242     *param = '\\0';
243     param++;
244 }
245
246 /* Resolve variable. */
247 var = msre_create_var_ex(msr->msc_rule_mptmp, msr->modsecurity->msre,
248     varname, param, msr, &my_error_msg);
249
250 if (var == NULL) {
251     msr_log(msr, 1, "%s", my_error_msg);
252
253     lua_pushnil(L);
254
255     return 0;
256 }
257
258 /* Resolve transformation functions. */
259 tfn_arr = resolve_tfns(L, 2, msr, msr->msc_rule_mptmp);
260
261 /* Generate variable. */
262 vx = generate_single_var(msr, var, tfn_arr, rule, msr->msc_rule_mptmp);
263 if (vx == NULL) {
264     lua_pushnil(L);
265
266     return 0;
267 }
268
269 /* Return variable value. */
270 lua_pushlstring(L, vx->value, vx->value_len);
271
272 return 1;
```

```

351 */
352 * \brief New setvar function for Lua API. Users can put back
353 * data in modsecurity core via new variables
354 *
355 * \param L Pointer to Lua state
356 *
357 * \retval -1 On failure
358 * \retval 0 On Collection failure
359 * \retval 1 On Success
360 */
361 static int l_setvar(lua_State *L) {
362     modsec_rec *msr = NULL;
363     msre_rule *rule = NULL;
364     const char *var_value = NULL;
365     const char *var_name = NULL;
366     int nargs = lua_gettop(L);
367     char *chr = NULL;
368
369     lua_getglobal(L, "__msr");
370     msr = (modsec_rec *)lua_topointer(L, -1);
371
372     lua_getglobal(L, "__rule");
373     rule = (msre_rule *)lua_topointer(L, -1);
374
375     if(nargs != 2) {
376         msr_log(msr, 8, "m.setvar: Failed m.setvar funtion must has 2 arguments");
377         return -1;
378     }
379     var_value = luaL_checkstring (L, 2);
380     var_name = luaL_checkstring (L, 1);
381
382     lua_pop(L,2);
383
384     if(var_value == NULL || var_name == NULL)
385         return -1;
386
387     chr = strchr((char *)var_name,0x2e);
388
389     if(chr == NULL) {
390         msr_log(msr, 8, "m.setvar: Must specify a collection using dot character - ie m.setvar(tx.myvar,mydata)");
391         return -1;
392     }
393
394     return msre_action_setvar_execute(msr,msr->msc_rule_mptmp,rule,(char *)var_name,(char *)var_value);
395 }
396

```


Use Case

- Shared hosting provider
 - Existing ModSecurity infrastructure
 - Zero-day patching, brute-force prevention
 - No current request upload inspection

- Requirements
 - Extended functionality
 - Performance
 - Fail-open

Use Case - Functionality

- Proactive backdoor/shell/malware prevention
 - Proactive security posture
- Pair with existing on-disk malware scanning functionality
- POSIX regex searching
 - Irexlib: binding for GNU, POSIX, PCRE regex libs

```
{  
"decoded" : "^\\s*send\\(\\s*flood,\\s*pack\\(.{1000}",  
"target" : "PERL",  
"action" : "disable",  
"type" : "flooder",  
"id" : "12345",  
}
```

Use Case – Fail Forward

- Don't allow a bad expression, or large file, to hamper user experience
 - Short circuit expensive processing
 - Log failures
- lalarm – Lua binding for system alarm()

```
-- throw an exception after one second
alarm(1, function() error("timeout") end)

-- do our search
local res, err = pcall(search_sig)
if not res then m.log(ERR, err) end

-- cancel the pending alarm
alarm()
```

Use Case - Performance

- Goal: < 250 ms induced latency
 - 100 POSIX expressions, 125 fixed string searches
 - Per uploaded file
 - Apache's prefork model
 - Shared hosting environment = minimal additional CPU footprint
- Result = ~60 ms induced latency

ModSecurity – Moving Forward

- libmodsecurity
 - v3
 - Platform-agnostic
 - No Lua support... yet
 - Soon ^TM

WAFs in Nginx

- ModSecurity
 - Unstable
- Libmodsecurity
 - Nginx Plus
 - Feature-incomplete
- Naxsi
 - Lightweight, but feature lacking
 - No anti-evasion, persistent storage, response analysis
 - New DSL

OpenResty

- Nginx + Lua
- High-performance proxy + app server
- Extended integration
 - Third-party modules
 - Shared libs via LuaJIT FFI

OpenResty WAF Implementations

- High-level DSL
 - Compile down to Lua
 - Sup Cloudflare
- quickdefence
 - First appeared Jan. 2014
- lua-resty-waf

lua-resty-waf - Overview

- FreeWAF
 - Free, open, scalable cloud reverse proxy
 - Did I mention free?
- FOSS development
 - Two years of on-off development
 - 6 contributors

lua-resty-waf – Project Goals

- ModSecurity compatibility
 - No new DSL
 - No new design paradigm
 - Functional/architectural limitations
- Performance
 - Minimize engine footprint
 - ~ 300 us latency
 - ~ 15000 req/s

lua-resty-waf – Project Goals

- Stability / Compatibility
 - Novelty is unnecessary
 - Quick feature request, bugfix turnaround
- Extensibility
 - Configurable function hooks
 - Back to flexible DSL
 - OPM integration

lua-resty-waf - Implementation

- Configuration inheritance
- Precalculation and memoization
 - Rule jumps
 - Collection transformation caching
- Extensive use of lookup tables

```
match, value = operators.lookup[operator](
    self,
    collection,
    pattern,
    ctx
)
```

lua-resty-waf – ModSec Translation

- ModSecurity DSL → JSON
 - lua-resty-waf reads JSON directly
 - Possible to implement our own DSL for additional features


```
./modsec2lua-resty-waf.pl < \  
/path/to/modsec.conf > \  
/path/to/rules/ruleset.json
```

lua-resty-waf – Persistent Storage

- ModSecurity
 - SDBM
 - Slow, double-disk read, subject to race conditions
- lua-resty-waf
 - Per-worker shdict, memcached, redis
 - Inheritance architecture allows for rapid development of new backend engine

lua-resty-waf – resty.core

- FFI API for ngx_lua
- Compatible with lua-resty-core \geq v0.1.5
 - Bugfix merged based on lua-resty-waf use case
 - FOSS ftw!
- Significant performance increase
 - ~ 450 us \rightarrow ~ 300 us
 - Still more to do

"resty_core_nolog"

Search



Distribution of Lua code pure execution time (accumulated in each request, in microseconds) for 10000 samples:

(min/avg/max: 279/334/1219)

value	-----	count
64		0
128		0
256	@@@	9523
512	@@	472
1024		5
2048		0
4096		0

lua-resty-waf – Third Party Libs

- libinjection
 - Small C lib
 - 608 → 544 bytes per instance (PR pending ;))
- lua-aho-corasick
 - @pm operator
- Community lua-resty-* libs
 - lua-resty-iputils, lua-resty-cookie

lua-resty-waf - Limitations

- Some rule limitations
 - Disruptive actions in phase 4
 - Same limitations in libmodsecurity
- No rule sanity checking on load
 - Yet!
- Not every collection/operator translated
 - Some architectural limitations, some not worthwhile

Resources

- <https://github.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity>
- <http://openresty.org/>
- <https://github.com/p0pr0ck5/lua-resty-waf>

Questions?