Unseenlabs’ Post

I wrote a new blog on how the shipping industry (and us as hashtag #osint analysts) need to adapt to the new normal of constant maritime conflict. https://lnkd.in/eyCTUU7Z

Interesting read on the challenges facing maritime OSINT as shipping companies respond to attacks in the Red Sea.

I got a lot of new followers this weekend, I assume from Trace Labs so here are a few quick things about me: - My team The Federal Bureau of OH SHINT won Trace Labs and the MVP at Defcon 29 - I began my OSINT journey in 2019 after pivoting from Graphic Design which I did for 15 years. I am a Penn Stater and I have just applied to Master's Intelligence programs for the fall. - I was President of the Penn State tech club and we developed a weekly cadence of virtually interviewing amazing people in the tech community which is how I was able to network with so many cool people like 🤗Jayson E. Street🤗 and Phillip Wylie - I work as a senior OSINT analyst and I love the hunt. Making large link charts and uncovering illicit networks is my favorite thing to do. Maritime research is my main focus but I am not a one trick pony. - I wrote a general OSINT book for Wiley tech called Deep Dive: Exploring the Real World Value of Open Source Intelligence. It's great for beginners and seasoned analysts as I believe it touches on topics (like maritime) that many other books don't. It's less tools and more about what, why, and how you search for a thing. https://a.co/d/9MIRMF4 - My good friend Espen Ringstad and I developed an immersive OSINT training platform called Kase Scenarios (kasescenarios.com) to help fill the gap in the industry of hands on training. - I spend most of my extra time (what extra time?) volunteering for various OSINT related organizations looking for missing people, hunting for predators, and trying to free falsely imprisoned people. - I fully believe if you support your community they will support you. Of course my success thus far is due to hard work but it is also due to meeting and learning from amazing people within the community who are smarter than I am. - Check out this recent blog I wrote on the state of the shipping industry and how it must adapt to the constant geopolitical tension controlling the waters.

GPS Jamming: A Technological Sword of Damocles Over Global Shipping Celestial navigation has given way to GPS as the guiding force behind modern maritime commerce. However, a sophisticated threat undermines this reliance – state-level actors wielding GPS jamming as a strategic weapon. This deliberate electronic interference casts a long shadow with potentially severe consequences for the safety and efficiency of global shipping. The disruption of GPS signals renders entire fleets vulnerable. Precise positioning falters, increasing the risk of collisions, navigational errors, and even exploitation by opportunistic actors. The cascading effects on global supply chains and interconnected economies are alarming. The motivations behind these actions likely extend beyond maritime disruption. It's a display of technological prowess, a potential tool for coercion or misdirection in complex geopolitical maneuvering. The concerning silence often surrounding these jamming incidents underscores their gravity. The ability to manipulate a critical navigational system on this scale signifies a disturbing new frontier in technology-driven power plays. The shipping industry, and indeed international bodies concerned with maritime safety, must confront this evolving threat with urgency and a focus on both technological resilience and diplomatic countermeasures. https://lnkd.in/dF59hFfD #GPSJamming #MaritimeTechnology #NavigationSecurity #Geopolitics #InternationalCooperation #GhostShips #GPSJamming #ElectronicWarfare #Geopolitics #GlobalTrade #MaritimeSecurity

A new danger to international shipping has emerged in recent years: uncrewed aerial devices aimed at ships that are simply going about their lawful business. The UN have outlined how this is impacting the global shipping industry in the article below. Read more | https://lnkd.in/gkMXyRvN

OFACs HAT-TRICK .... The third time in as many months and the subject is again the Maritime Industry. The guidance again talks clearly about the the ways and lengths that bad actors will go to to circumvent sanctions at Sea & once again shows the US regulator & other agencies and partners intentions around enforcing these. Another layer of complexity here is added by the ever increasing number of vessels that are Spoofing/ manipulating their GNSS & falsifying their locations which is prolific in the Tanker sectors. Windward s solution to this is not only our unique ability at capturing these spoofing activities as they happen globally but also adding photographic evidence when you need it from Satellite imagery ... which, in case you missed it, was in the previous Quint Seal Guidance from the same Folks!!

Vessel ownership opacity, #Houthi due diligence ineptitude compromising maritime #shipping security  Maritime shipping’s transparency deficit threatens to torpedo far more than ocean carriers’ multibillion-dollar energy transition ambitions and freight movement efficiency imperatives. Its operational and ownership opacity is a serious threat to crew safety and business stability. Exhibit A: Continued Houthi rebel attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. The Iran-backed Houthis are targeting ships they claim are heading to or from Israel or have ownership in countries supporting Israel’s war on Hamas. But they are either inept at identifying vessel ownership or unable to find accurate ownership data. Consider the March 11 missile attack on what the Houthis described as the “US ship Pinocchio.” The MV Pinocchio has no U.S. ownership. The 4,900 TEU container ship is operated by Singapore-based SeaLead Shipping and owned by Singapore’s Om-Mar 5 Inc. A March 12 SeaLead press release stated that none of the ships it operates in the Red Sea-Suez Canal trade lane are owned by “any United States or United Kingdom company or entity.” It added that no SeaLead ships are owned or managed by Israelis or service any ports in Israel. Meanwhile, three sailors were killed in a March 6 Houthi missile attack on the MV True Confidence. No U.S. or U.K. ownership there either. The cargo ship is Greek owned and was en route from China to Saudi Arabia. So, in addition to their other disagreeable qualities, the Houthis are bad at research.  But in the vessel ownership identification game, they are not alone. It is an opaque maritime shipping world out there. And, as noted in my post about the Dark Fleet of rogue oil tankers keeping Russia’s oil flowing and the country’s war machine afloat, vessel ownership opacity is how the underbelly of maritime cargo movement rolls. As Richard Meade, editor-in-chief of #Lloyd’s List Intelligence (LLI), noted during a March 7 LLI geopolitical risk webinar, outdated open-source vessel ownership information and other data being used as the basis for Houthi attacks is an issue that should be raising concern well beyond the Red Sea crisis. Meade consequently put this question to Eric Orsini, LLI’s head of compliance and regulatory affairs: “… do you think the rest of us need to be more worried about [shipping’s lack of] transparency?” Orsini nodded. “Without more transparency, there will be no accountability when it comes to punishing Dark Fleet operators and anonymous beneficial owners of the ships in that fleet,” Orsini said....” So, I guess with my white hat on, I think you will see a shift in the shipping industry towards more transparency because the risk of non-compliance could be catastrophic.” [email protected] @trenshaw24.bsky.social @timothyrenshaw https://lnkd.in/gcZFPbPH

How 27 vessels moved roughly 59 million barrels of oil since 2023, according to The New York Times Tankers were mainly involved in a practice known as “spoofing” in which vessels broadcast fake route information to hide their true locations. In other cases, tankers conducted ship-to-ship transfers, exchanging goods with another vessel at sea. To detect irregularities in the AIS paths that may be signs of deceptive practices, The New York Times used data on spoofing ships provided by Spire Maritime. 🔍 To read more about the investigation: https://nyti.ms/4bKU4Ek #SpireMaritime #MaritimeData #NewYorkTimes #NYT #Spire #AISdata

#SEE_Me_FEEL_Me - Pricing this on an "all the time basis" -- the result of a "monitoring posture" -- an active and proactive campaign would be ....how much? Considering transparency and an opportunity to focus on the end reality -- funding for ongoing active "observances" or full-time monitoring as the promise suggests. It's location agnostic as it's based on a fixed $ per sqkm/resolution/sensor equation with your preferred ortho level at 30CM to 50CM and / SAR at 40-50CM ...A quick check-in with my SkyFi account looks like $1,035 an acquisition ORTHO min 25sqkm SAR set at 16sqkm -- so you get a sweet spot -- Is daily possible? @ 30 X $1,035 = $372,600 a year, if you can get a usable image from each or both on each day. Ortho runs generally about 60%-80% of the days and can offer a usable image acquisition opportunity (cloud percentage) -- I guess the SAR unit is available 365 days a year .. You would likely have to plonk down .25 million to secure the opportunity ... based on the 16 sqkm denominator of the SAR image -- that is ~$14,000 a sqkm .... and you have to have internal differential change and or segmenting/time-series processing capability and a portal to visualize these dynamic change$ $erially .... Perhaps not a reach for re$ources at this level in the maritime trade ....