How do you adapt to changing security threats in object-oriented design?

Encapsulation does not increase security. It's easily bypassed. In most languages, you can get around encapsulation from simple techniques like casting, and that's to get around the compiler. Most threats attack at run-time, and encapsulation is enforced by the compiler or interpreter. It's a useful concept to aid in designing self-contained components, but it's important to understand that your data is not protected by it.

One of the earliest fundamental motivations for OOD is that data should be responsible for it's own validation. In the context of modern security concerns, this principle can be extended to employing encapsulation to make the data also responsible for it's own protection. Depending on the application, that could include use of encryption, or error detection and correction techniques.

Conceptually Encapsulation is to hide internal details but access modifiers is to enforce access to certain properties which requires restrictions from direct access. Access modifiers are part of any language but not directly part of OOP concepts

I think this question is poorly phrased. Saying there are security risks unique to OOD is incorrect. Intercepting data or manipulating memory are vulnerabilities to any paradigm. It would be absurd to say that OOD needs to leverage good patterns and practices, but other paradigms do not.

I believe that incorporating the encapsulation concept is essential in any object-oriented design. However, achieving complete security is a more complex task. Encapsulation can help validate data and restrict unauthorized access to data. However, any errors in configuring the setters or getters can lead to significant security breaches. Encapsulation serves as a tool to prevent unwanted access from unauthorized users, but it is not enough to provide complete security for the entire project.

The security principle of least privilege aligns well with the SOLID-design interface segregation principle. Employing role-based security in conjunction with interface segregation provides a great foundation for the principle of least privilege.

The principle of least privilege serves as a foundational concept in both Object-Oriented Design and security. Think of it as ensuring that every door has precisely the key it needs—no extra keys lying around. This approach not only lowers the chances of security breaches but also promotes cleaner, more manageable code. It's all about striking that ideal equilibrium between functionality and security!

An exciting example of using the POLP is when designing REST API. Developers should be aware of the usage for each endpoint and how to eliminate unwanted access to it. Implementing privileges to users of REST API should be monitored and continue to be under testing till apply the principle of least privilege for users. This will eliminate the malicious actors from reaching out to the backend.

I would suggest to follow Least Privilege Design Patterns: Apply design patterns and architectural principles that promote the principle of least privilege, such as the Proxy pattern, Facade pattern, and Adapter pattern. Use these patterns to control access to resources and functionality and enforce access restrictions based on the principle of least privilege.

Agreed it's a good idea to use design patterns. Use them properly and not just to gild the lily. Remember to be very careful if attempting to write and use a bespoke Single Sign On code as it's easy to write but difficult to make secure. Also watch out for any vulnerabilities and fix as the security chain is only as strong as the weakest link

Design patterns have evolved over time and have become industry standards. They are the result of collective knowledge and experience, which ensures that you're following best practices in your software design. Utilising design patterns and frameworks can save you considerable development time. You're not reinventing the wheel; instead, you're building on established solutions. This allows you to focus more on the specific security needs of your application. Design patterns and frameworks are designed to be scalable. This means that as your application grows, your security measures can grow with it, ensuring that your system remains secure even under increased load.

1. Always validate input data from external sources, including users, APIs, and databases, to prevent injection attacks such as SQL injection, cross-site scripting (XSS), and command injection. 2. When interacting with databases, use parameterised queries or prepared statements to prevent SQL injection attacks. 3.Implement strong authentication mechanisms, such as password hashing, multi-factor authentication (MFA), and session management. 4.When outputting data to web pages, emails, or other output streams, escape special characters to prevent XSS attacks. 5. Implement proper error handling and logging mechanisms to handle exceptions and errors gracefully without exposing sensitive information.

I've used SonarQube and Snyk as part of the DevOps build chain for years and found them invaluable. If code is not kept up to date, it can become almost impossible to update a lot of code at once (these products can found great many errors that need to be fixed and afterward everything needs to be tested on top of what was being done already.) if an organization changes from low security to high security in the light of what is going on in the world. this can be a wake up call for everyone working there

Addition to that development team needs to be security aware by using latest frameworks. It is better to use tested utilities rather than creating new on their own. Proper code review is also essential.

Maintenance of software is particularly important. It is not just the software that people in an organization write themselves but dependencies such as nuget/node packages that can render even the best software design/implementation completely wide open to attack. As successful hacking attempts continue and every organization is effectively on its own, all 3rd part software needs to be addressed as part of the product. I was horrified to read that Moq, a widely distributed library on the NuGet software registry, was found to be harvesting hashes of developer email addresses on machines it was installed on. This started last week, after Moq's developer bundled his controversial SponsorLink dependency within the project and without notice.

Remember that there is no such thing as testing exhaustively for non-trivial software. There will be combinations and corner conditions that tests will not reach. Consider techniques such as design-by-contract and defensive programming to make the software more robust.

Read what you need. Send what is must. One of the common practices is to read the data in its entirety. As in full database row, pass a bean with all attributes, etc. This sure makes it easy to reuse the models. However, it also causes to propagate the data that is not even needed. This makes more sense when models contain more PII or sensitive data. One of the techniques is data masking or anonymization. Basically, break and separate out the sensitive data such that a single piece doesn't hold much value. Taking a crude example, instead of keeping UserName and Password together, break it as UserId-UserName and UserId-Password. This way one chunk is not as valuable as the full set of it.

The title says "changing security threats" yet the topics just talk about how to write code that is, somewhat, secure. It doesn't talk about changing security threats and, in particular, the area about frameworks might be one of the main issues. Many frameworks introduce security issues by the simplest mistakes... I already worked on a case where an ICO file that said it was much bigger than it really was allowed to either read or write much more memory than it was supposed to... I think the ideas was say that the ICO was giant while the file size was small and, because there was no check on that, old memory that was not cleared up would be read and "shown" as an image.

Before writing a single line of code or writing a design document, start by thinking of security. Think of how what you are creating could be exploited. Even after securing the obvious entry points, stay vigilant by frequently considering how someone could exploit the code as the execution moves deeper in. Never assume upstream code or design will have prevented a bad actor from making to what is assumed to be a safe area. As code and systems are becoming more compartmentalized or broken into micro-services, it creates more attack vectors that need to be considered and secured.