

Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh

I. OVERVIEW

When local elections were held in Aceh on 11 December 2006, conventional wisdom (shared by Crisis Group) was that candidates from the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) would not do well. They might pick up two or three of the nineteen district races, but the biggest prize – the provincial governorship – was almost certainly out of reach. The old Jakarta-linked parties would benefit from deep pockets, established structures and a split in the former insurgency's leadership. Polls just before formal campaigning began showed GAM's governor/deputy governor slate – Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar – virtually out of contention. But GAM won overwhelmingly, in what an analyst called “a perfect storm between the fallout from the peace accord and the failure of political parties to understand the changing times”. The challenge now is to govern effectively and cleanly in the face of high expectations, possible old elite obstructionism and some GAM members' sense of entitlement that it is their turn for power and wealth.

Against seven other slates, Irwandi and Nazar polled 38.2 per cent, more than double their closest competitors. They carried fifteen of the nineteen districts, not only GAM strongholds along the east coast but also areas not even ethnically Acehnese such as Simeulue, an island off the west coast; Gayo Lues; and South East Aceh. In South Aceh, against an entrenched machine, they polled 62 per cent. GAM also did far better than expected in the district races, winning six in the first round and one in a run-off, sometimes by extraordinary margins. In North Aceh, its slate for *bupati* (district head) and deputy *bupati* took 67 per cent. In the West Aceh run-off in early March 2007, the GAM team scored a remarkable 76.2 per cent.

How did they do it, especially with so few resources in a country where money seems to buy everything? At the provincial level GAM benefited from deep dissatisfaction with the old parties and their candidates, who were seen as serving the interests of a narrow elite. The district elections, however, demonstrated the effectiveness of GAM's network of former combatants and supporters, who got out the vote through an army of volunteer workers, appeals to Acehnese identity, a focus on poor and marginal areas that established parties ignored, and

in some cases – but probably not enough to make a difference to the outcome – intimidation. Many Acehnese saw maintaining the momentum of the peace process as crucial and voting for GAM a way to guarantee it.

This briefing is based on extensive interviews with all the major players and others involved in the campaign.

II. BACKGROUND TO THE POLLS

The 11 December 2006 polls were the first-ever direct local elections in Aceh, the first elections there of any kind after the August 2005 Helsinki peace agreement between the Indonesian government and GAM, and the first in Indonesia allowing independent (non-party-affiliated) candidates to stand. With the provincial and district races taking place at once, they were also the largest simultaneous direct poll held in the republic, a remarkable logistic feat given the massive population displacement after the December 2004 tsunami and the difficulty of registering voters.¹ All these firsts were the result of provisions in the peace agreement that the people of Aceh had the right to nominate candidates to contest all local offices at stake in elections to be held in April 2006 under the terms of a law, then still to be enacted, on the governing of the province.

The Indonesian parliament's delays in passing what became Law 11/2006, amid heated debates over many articles including those related to independent candidates, kept pushing back the election date. This probably helped GAM by giving it more time to organise. The law was finally adopted in August 2006 but not before a deep rift had developed within GAM over how to participate in the elections and whom to support. Ultimately the choice came down to running in alliance with existing parties or fielding independent teams.

¹ For earlier analysis of the peace process and political developments thereafter, see Crisis Group Asia Briefings N°57, *Aceh's Local Elections: The Role of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)*, 29 November 2006; N°48, *Aceh: Now For the Hard Part*, 29 March 2006; N°44, *Aceh: So Far, So Good*, 13 December 2005; and N°40, *Aceh: A New Chance for Peace*, 15 August 2005.

A faction dominated by the Sweden-based leadership-in-exile supported an alliance backing the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) slate of the non-GAM intellectual Humam Hamid, with a GAM running mate, Hasbi Abdullah. A second, backed by younger GAM leaders and most of the field commanders who had fought through the conflict, backed the independent team of Irwandi-Nazar. Officially neither represented GAM as an institution, and the movement's members were free to vote their conscience. Unofficially, the old guard exerted strong pressure on members, with the reluctant support of former guerrilla commander Muzakkir Manaf, to support the Humam-Hasbi ticket, known as H2O (for Humam-Hasbi Okay!).

But Irwandi and Nazar, after they declared their intention to stand in August 2006, could count on the combined structures of the former guerrilla armed forces, renamed the Aceh Transition Committee (Komite Peralihan Aceh, KPA), and SIRA, a student-led pro-referendum organisation that Nazar had chaired since its founding in 1999. By the time the two-week campaign officially began on 24 November, they had also persuaded Muzakkir Manaf to formally declare his neutrality. Since this meant withdrawing his support from Humam-Hasbi, it in effect was a boost for Irwandi.

To stand as independents, according to Law 11/2006 and a provincial regulation, Qanun No.3, candidates had to have the support of at least 3 per cent of residents spread out over at least half of Aceh's 21 districts.² District candidates had to show a similar level of support spread out over half their subdistricts. For the governor's race, this meant collecting some 120,000 photocopies of identity cards (KTPs), or other identification for submission to the independent election commission (Komisi Independen Pemilihan, KIP) – a process that itself served as a kind of mini-campaign.³ In addition to Irwandi-Nazar, two other teams stood as independents. One, led by former Aceh military commander Djali Yusuf, came in last. Altogether, eight pairs of candidates took part in the December polls.⁴ Had no ticket secured

25 per cent of the vote, a run-off would have been held between the top two – an eventuality many thought inevitable.⁵

Election day, in the words of an international monitoring team, was largely “transparent, peaceful and orderly”, as the campaign had been, with a few glaring exceptions.⁶ While the official results were not announced until the end of the month, a “quick count” sponsored by a coalition of NGOs called in results from all over the province, which were announced to a packed audience in Banda Aceh late on election night. With 86.9 per cent of voters registered and a turn-out of over 78 per cent, the contest was not even close: Irwandi and Nazar had walked away with it. According to Irwandi, the surprised analysts were looking at Aceh from a Jakarta perspective and did not understand how much the people wanted less control from the capital.⁷ But it was not that simple.

III. THE WINNING FORMULA

A number of factors explain why GAM won: its use of grassroots structures, a simple message that tapped into the desire for peace and fear of return to conflict, its appeal to Acehnese nationalism, and dislike of the old Jakarta-based parties.

A. THE KPA/SIRA STRUCTURE

The KPA served as GAM's main political machine for mobilising support in the district races and in selected areas in the gubernatorial election. Replicating the insurgency's old military structure with a presence in every district, it was set up in October 2005 to represent the interests of former combatants and ensure their re-integration.⁸ Most members had well-established roots in local communities. As local elections loomed, KPA geared up to follow the directive of GAM's top body, the National Council (Majelis Nasional), to develop a political base in the spirit of the Helsinki peace agreement.

² Aceh has 21 districts but only nineteen district elections were held, since in Bireuen and South Aceh districts the incumbents' terms had not expired.

³ In the end, Irwandi's team collected almost 200,000 KTPs.

⁴ The teams, in addition to Irwandi-Nazar, were the former acting governor, Azwar Abu Bakar, running as a candidate of the National Mandate Party (PAN), with Nasir Jamil from the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS); Malik Raden, former head of the provincial teachers association, running as Golkar, with the head of the Aceh provincial parliament, Sayed Fuad Zakaria; Iskandar Hoesin, running as the candidate of a coalition that included PBB, PDK and PP Pancasila, with Saleh Manaf, representing PNI Marhaenisme, PPD, PBSB and PKPB; Tamlichia Ali (another former military officer), representing

PBR, PPNU and PKB, running with Harmen Nuriqmur; Djali Yusuf, running with Syauqas Rahmatillah; and former parliamentarian Ghazali Abbas Adan running as an independent with Shalahuddin Alfata.

⁵ “Prediksi IFES: Pilkada Aceh Bakal Dua Putaran”, Suara Karya Online, 7 December 2006.

⁶ “Aceh Goes Peacefully”, European Union Election Observation Mission, 11 December 2006. One exception was the 22 November attack on Humam Hamid in Bireuen by Irwandi supporters.

⁷ Crisis Group interview, Irwandi Yusuf, 4 January 2007.

⁸ For more information on KPA, see Crisis Group Briefing, *Aceh's Local Elections*, op. cit., p. 2

It was the KPA that chose candidates, designed campaign strategies and, most importantly, recruited thousands of village-based campaign workers.

SIRA, Nazar's organisation, was neither as strong nor as well-organised as KPA but it played a significant role, focusing on urban areas while KPA worked the rural base. Most members are well-educated, with strong ties to the student movement and civil society groups. SIRA had a proven ability to organise mass rallies. If there was some question before the election whether that talent for mobilisation would turn into votes, the consensus afterwards was that the SIRA factor had been important. It helps explain the difference in East Aceh, for example, between two GAM slates, where the one with a SIRA member won more than double the votes, although it also started out with a stronger KPA base.⁹

The KPA structure is based on a strong hierarchical chain of command, with layers of authority running from the provincial down to the district, subdistrict and village levels. Top KPA leaders meeting in East Aceh in early August 2006 proposed Irwandi and Nazar as candidates, and a similar process took place at the district level, where local caucuses involving ten to 30 key KPA members selected candidates. In the fifteen districts that registered GAM candidates, the slates normally consisted of a senior KPA member with a running mate chosen from SIRA, the business community or the local pro-GAM support network. Many were picked at the last minute, sometimes to their own surprise. In East Aceh, the SIRA candidate for deputy *bupati* got a call from the KPA commander telling him to run.

In North Aceh, GAM's original candidate for district head, its former negotiator, Amni Ahmad Marzuki, failed the obligatory Koran reading test and was disqualified in mid-October.¹⁰ GAM members met on 18 October to consider three options: spoil the election, compromise with other parties or choose a new candidate. Local KPA supported the latter, and the three potential replacements were Tgk Zulkarnani, KPA commander for North Aceh; Tgk Juned, head of district operations; and Ilyas Pasee, deputy regional commander and political coordinator for the area covering North Aceh, Central Aceh, Gayo Luwes

and South East Aceh. Ilyas said: "We all backed out at first. But when one of our field commanders wanted to abduct the judges who disqualified Amni, I volunteered to stand".¹¹ Only days before the closing date for registering candidates, KPA leader Muzakkir Manaf issued an instruction designating Ilyas to head the ticket.

In East Aceh, a stand-off between the two GAM slates over which would stand was resolved only after Sanusi Muhammad (the local KPA leader), and senior GAM leader, Ridwan Abubakar (Nek Tu), insisted that both be allowed to compete.¹² In West Aceh, KPA members failed to agree on a candidate, and in the end a man named Ramli was proposed by his own brother, who happened to be the local KPA leader. When the KPA caucus agreed, he was given no option to back out.¹³

The grassroots campaign to elect Irwandi intensified in the final two weeks. It was Muzakkir Manaf's decision to stay neutral that allowed KPA to throw its support behind Irwandi, whose campaign coordinator, Sofyan Dawood, is probably the single most influential person in the GAM network.¹⁴ All KPA members were mobilised in planning for the elections, with close coordination among district commander (*panglima wilayah*), subdistrict commander (*panglima muda daerah*), village cluster commanders (*panglima sagoe*) on down to ex-combatants.¹⁵ The *panglima sagoe*, in particular, were key to enlisting village chiefs (*geuchik*) for the Irwandi-Nazar ticket.¹⁶

KPA expected each village to contribute campaigners. A village chief in Matangkuli subdistrict, North Aceh, said local KPA members called on him to provide active support for the GAM candidate, even though he was head of the allegedly neutral local election monitoring committee.¹⁷ When he refused, they demanded that he personally recruit six village "volunteers" as GAM

⁹ The KPA-SIRA team of Muslim Hasballah-Nasruddin Abu Bakar won 36.4 percent of the vote (53,104 votes), compared to 15.2 per cent (22,102 votes) for the other pair, Sulaiman Ismail-Zulkarnaini Matsyah, out of 145,866 votes cast.

¹⁰ A regulation passed by the Aceh provincial legislature, Qanun No.7/2006, requires all candidates for governor and deputy governor to be able to read the Koran. The test was conducted in public in Banda Aceh's main mosque, with the imam as chief examiner, and broadcast live on the radio. Three candidates failed. See "Calon Gubernur NAD Jalani Tes Baca Al Quran", *Kompas*, 8 September 2006.

¹¹ Captions from a videotaped speech of Ilyas Pasee at the ceremony declaring his candidacy.

¹² Crisis Group interview, Nasruddin Abubakar, deputy elected candidate for East Aceh, 10 February 2007.

¹³ Crisis Group interview, Ramli, successful GAM candidate for West Aceh, 6 January 2007. There were two other candidates from the KPA, Kiyai Nasir and Abu Mustafa, who in the end were not considered capable. Ramli was hesitant at first because he was only a primary school teacher with no money to back his campaign. His house was torched during the conflict, and he still lives with his in-laws.

¹⁴ Many in GAM apparently viewed Muzakkir Manaf as indecisive and used his neutrality to back away from the Humam-Hasbi ticket.

¹⁵ Crisis Group interview, Israruddin, Panglima Muda Daerah I North Aceh, 27 December 2006.

¹⁶ Crisis Group interview, Muhammad Nazar, 20 December 2006.

¹⁷ Crisis Group interview, Muhammad Yunus Yusuf, head of Ude village, Matangkuli subdistrict, 28 December 2006.

campaign workers, each of whom was given a specific role under the supervision of the *panglima sagoe*.

GAM relied on these workers, some of whom responded to a call from the leadership to sign up, some of whom volunteered on their own.¹⁸ In West Aceh, the KPA commander claims to have mobilised 25,000 people.¹⁹ A former *panglima muda* commander said that some were assigned to provide information to the public about GAM candidates, especially as the local media did not, while others were assigned to go door-to-door to talk to voters.²⁰ At the community level, many youth leaders had an emotional attachment to the KPA, and youth organisations in most villages were headed by GAM supporters, so there was no shortage of personnel.²¹ Through this army of workers, which no non-GAM candidates could hope to match, the KPA also had a network for monitoring any attempts to manipulate the election.

GAM concentrated on rural areas long before the official campaign began, using public discussions of the peace process as an entry point.²² In an effort to bind the movement to its constituents, volunteers went deep into rural hamlets and took part in religious rallies, community discussions and other public events. Coffee shops, an Acehnese institution where (mostly) men gather to chat, were centres of political discussion. Some KPA members spent all their time there, talking about their candidates.²³ KPA workers were tireless. Muhammad Nasir, an independent election observer of the People's Voter Education Network in Matangkuli, saw KPA campaigners promoting their candidates even during the "quiet period" – the three days before the election when no further campaigning was allowed. They would ride in groups on motorcycles from one polling station to another shouting, with reference to the ballot order, "Don't forget to vote for candidate No.1!"

¹⁸ Crisis Group interview, Israruddin, Panglima Muda Daerah I North Aceh, 27 December 2006.

¹⁹ Crisis Group telephone interview, KPA commander, 13 March 2007.

²⁰ Irwandi claimed that the media did not support the GAM candidates and even went out of its way to damage their reputations, spreading rumours at one point, for example, that he had accepted money from Yusuf Kalla not to run for governor. Because the GAM team saw the print media as biased, it relied much more on local radio stations to spread its message. Crisis Group interviews, Muhammad Nazar, 27 December 2006, and Irwandi Yusuf, 4 January 2007.

²¹ Crisis Group interview, T. Banta Syahrizal, deputy *bupati* candidate in Aceh Jaya, 21 December 2006.

²² Crisis Group interview, Amni Ahmad Marzuki, 26 December 2006.

²³ Crisis Group interviews, Ruslan, SIRA presidium secretary, 21 December 2006, and Israruddin, Panglima Muda Daerah I North Aceh, 27 December 2006.

Reliance on the KPA structure partly compensated for the fact that GAM campaigns were relatively poorly funded. For the provincial campaign, Irwandi put the total at no more than Rp.700 million (about \$70,000) as opposed to at least Rp.8 billion (\$800,000) reportedly spent by one competitor.²⁴ Among other things, the funds went for 700,000 name cards, 100,000 *imsakiyah* (fasting schedules, since Ramadan began in late October), 200,000 posters and twenty billboards. Nazar said these promotional materials were not a significant factor in the campaign, particularly compared with the coffee-shop discussions, and that while supporters made generous donations, his team got almost nothing from major contractors and businessmen, unlike H2O.

B. GAM'S MESSAGE: PEACE AND CHANGE

From the time the Helsinki agreement was signed, GAM took credit for the peace. If the government's "socialisation" of the agreement did not reach very far beyond the main towns and cities of Aceh, GAM's interpretation of events reached into the rural heartland.²⁵ For many GAM district candidates, the message was not only "We are the ones that brought you peace" but that the peace would be jeopardised if GAM did not win.

Ilyas Pasee, GAM candidate for North Aceh, told the crowd at a campaign rally:

If one of the other teams gets in, can they fight for the Aceh government law? And if they can, why haven't they done so up until now? What other candidates have a direct link to the Helsinki agreement? We laid the groundwork for the law on Aceh. Given the law that was passed and all the possible candidates, we should be chosen! We contributed to this struggle; no one else did. The group that struggled for self-government was the same that produced the law – and that's GAM!²⁶

Pasee said he frequently gave the Friday sermon at mosques, asking those present: "How many of you had your houses burned, how many of you lost children? Are you still willing to sell your votes for a little money and one

²⁴ Crisis Group interview, Irwandi Yusuf, 4 January 2007. A member of Azwar Abubakar's campaign team said he had reported Rp.2 billion (\$200,000) to the election commission but had actually spent about Rp.8 billion (\$800,000), although even that struck others as low. Crisis Group communication with member of Azwar success team, 8 March 2007.

²⁵ In Indonesia, the word "socialise" has come to mean "disseminate information about".

²⁶ Crisis Group interview, Ilyas Pasee, GAM candidate in North Aceh, 27 December 2006.

kilogram of sugar?"²⁷ The other parties were responsible for Aceh's suffering, he suggested, so vote for us.

During the campaign, Irwandi and Nazar called themselves the Struggle and Peace Team (Pasangan Perjuangan dan Perdamaian). Irwandi's name was not well known outside GAM circles before the Helsinki agreement but as GAM liaison to the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), the European Union-led body that monitored its implementation, he became publicly identified with the peace process.²⁸ Mohammed Nazar was better known, in part because he helped organise one of the largest mass gatherings in Aceh history – the SIRA-led rally for a referendum in November 1999 that drew hundreds of thousands to Banda Aceh. Organisers claimed over a million took part, and Nazar catapulted to fame. His two arrests, in 1999 and 2003, further enhanced his reputation. As independents, both were seen as men not in Jakarta's pocket who would stand up for Aceh.

The GAM candidates at the provincial and district levels tapped into a desire for change that was sometimes directly related to the poor quality of local government service. In North Aceh, one argument went:

We must vote for Candidate No.1. Look at the current government, it's already been eight months and they haven't issued our ID cards. What's the government doing? We can't trust them anymore. Let's put our trust in Candidate No.1; at least he's someone new.²⁹

While some GAM members claimed they won support for not making promises they could not keep, other candidates made extravagant claims. At one rally, according to an election observer, Ilyas Pasee claimed:

If the total annual budget is Rp.1.8 trillion, then each Acehnese should get Rp.16 million [about \$1,600] a month. For the first year we will give this out as cash for you to use as investment capital, to build houses and so on. For the second year, we will improve irrigation systems so you can increase your agricultural return, and we will build a port to export your commodities so we no longer need to go through Medan.... The third year I will go overseas and get foreign investment, so we will get a factory in this district. 80 per cent of the workers will come from North Aceh.³⁰

C. ACEHNESE NATIONALISM – A VOTE FOR IDENTITY

GAM candidates at both the provincial and district levels appealed to Acehnese identity (*keacehan*), culture and history. GAM candidates were "our people" – in Acehnese, *ureung getanyo* – in a way other candidates were not. This was symbolised by their decision to use traditional dress in the photographs on ballot papers, immediately setting them apart from all other candidates who, with the exception of the five women in the district races, wore suits and ties and the fez-like hat associated with Indonesian nationalism.

The idea of using traditional dress emerged during a discussion among SIRA leaders in Wisma Cendana on 20-21 August 2006 about symbols and colours. Irwandi thought it would be a distinctive way of establishing "Acehnese-ness" and make it easier for the people to distinguish GAM candidates. As KPA volunteers went around to villages, their message was: "Pick the ones wearing the Acehnese hat!"³¹ On the day he announced his candidacy, Irwandi appeared before the media in full Acehnese dress, with similarly attired GAM candidates flanking him.

While one candidate saw traditional dress as a sign of militancy against Jakarta, others saw it embodying an Acehnese saying that culture was a way of upholding Islamic law and traditional values.³² A vote for GAM would mean those values would be protected.

GAM's campaign used traditional stories (*hikayat*) expressing the heroic personalities (*ketokohan*) of its candidates and the emotional bonds between KPA and the people. In North Aceh, Tgk Imum Jon, a traditional singer, stood out. He went around from rally to rally, improvising lyrics to fit the location and moving his audience to tears. Irwandi recalled one of his songs, "Fate of the Freedom Fighter" (*Nasib Pejuang*). The lyrics, about fighters who died and those still alive, and about how they had to hide to avoid informers, touched every listener who had a relative involved in the independence struggle – as almost everyone had.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Crisis Group interview, Aguswandi, civil society leader, 22 December 2006.

²⁹ Crisis Group interview, Matangkuli, North Aceh, 28 December 2006.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ In Acehnese, "*Pilih bak kupiah meukeutob!*"

³² Crisis Group interview, Humam Hamid, the gubernatorial candidate representing PPP, 3 January 2007. The saying in question is *Adat bak Poteu Meureuhom, Hukum bak Syiah Kuala, Qanun bak Putroe Phang, Reusam bak Lakseumana*. This has become the motto of the Islamic court in Aceh and means cultural traditions serve as a guide to everyday life through the example set by religious scholars as heirs to the Prophet.

At the ceremony announcing Ilyas Pasee's candidacy for North Aceh *bupati*, Imum Jon sang:

This is a leadership, for better or worse, that always supports the nation.
Don't let the nation fall under oppression, even if it means living in the jungles.
Please brothers and sisters, understand that our struggle has not ended.
We haven't reached our destination; don't walk off while we are still midway.
It's important for a leader of our own to emerge.
Secure is the nation whose people are happy;
secure is the nation whose people are prosperous.³³

Other candidates used religious music (*musik gambus*) and local comedians, but they could not compete with the emotions raised by these appeals to nationalism.

D. THE NEGATIVE FACTORS

If many votes for GAM were based on assumptions that it would change existing policies or better represent Acehnese interests, there were also votes based on fear. Accusations of overt intimidation were particularly acute in North Aceh. Supporters of former *bupati* Tarmizi Karim were convinced that GAM sympathisers were behind some threatening text messages (SMS) they received.³⁴ According to an election observer from Matangkuli subdistrict, there were a few polling stations, such as Beauracan Rata and Bungong villages, where 100 per cent of the votes went to GAM; the feeling of some voters was: "If I don't vote for GAM, what will happen to me and my family?" GAM did not have to make overt threats; its presence was enough to make some people afraid. In his village, the level of GAM intimidation was intense, to the point that on election day, even the witnesses assigned by other political parties to monitor the polls voted for the former rebels.³⁵

³³ Crisis Group transcription from a videotape of ceremony, 20 October 2006. In Acehnese the words are:

*Nyoe keu pemimpinan, susah seunang sabee ngeun bangsa
Han neutem bangsa lam penindasan, walo pih badan udep
lam rimba
Beu jroh hai adeun ta peutimang, Perjuangan goh lom meu
akhee
Geutanyo goh trok bak tujuan, Bek sikhlan jalan geutanyo
crebree
Peunteung beulahee keu pimpinan droe,
Seulamat nanggroe rakyat bahgia, Seulamat nanggroe
rakyat sejahtra.*

³⁴ Crisis Group interview, Rajuddin, campaign team of Tarmizi Karim, 27 December 2006.

³⁵ Crisis Group interview, resident of Matangkuli, 28 December 2006.

Some villagers were worried that violence would erupt again if GAM did not win, and this was the only reason for their vote.³⁶ A former GAM commander acknowledged that Cot Girek, a remote Javanese transmigrant village, voted unanimously to elect Irwandi governor and Ilyas Pasee district head. Tarmizi Karim's campaign team was certain that only intimidation could have produced such a result; an election observer said GAM members were warning transmigrants: "If you want to still live here, don't vote for TK".³⁷

Some also voted for GAM because they believed it would lead to a significant reduction in *pajak nanggroe*, the often-resented "tax" that officially ended with the Helsinki agreement but is still extracted by GAM from residents and businesses in some areas.³⁸ Many senior GAM members now are in business themselves and have no need for the tax as income, so the collection may well be without their knowledge or endorsement.³⁹ But reports of extortion attempts by local KPA commanders seem to have increased since GAM's victory, prompting statements from elected officials, including Irwandi, that all illegal levies must be stopped.⁴⁰ The percentage GAM sought before the peace process usually amounted to around 12 per cent of aid and construction projects. Today, while some members said the requests are for little more than petty cash (*uang rokok saja*, cigarette money), there are reports, especially from North Aceh, of a return to demands on contractors for between 10 and 20 per cent of project value.⁴¹

IV. DISTRICT ELECTION OUTCOMES

The election dynamics at local level can be illustrated by two cases. West Aceh, a district battered by the 2004 tsunami, was not known as a GAM stronghold. GAM had a presence there in the early 1990s, after Aceh was declared an area of military operations (*daerah operasi militer*, DOM), but its military wing became active only after 1999, when its popularity grew with the call for Acehnese self-determination.⁴² Sabang had virtually no

³⁶ One said in Acehnese: "*Tanyo pileh awak nyan asai bek karu lee*" (We voted for them so there wouldn't be trouble again). Crisis Group interview, Matangkuli, 28 December 2006.

³⁷ Crisis Group interview, 28 December 2006.

³⁸ Crisis Group interview, M. Jafar, People's Voter Education Network (JPPR) volunteer in Matangkuli, 28 December 2006

³⁹ "Bisnis Mantan Pemanggul Senjakata", *Aceh Magazine*, August-September 2006.

⁴⁰ "Permintaan Stop Kutipan Pajak Nangroo", *Serambi Indonesia*, 10 March 2007.

⁴¹ Crisis Group interviews, Jakarta, 15 March 2007.

⁴² Then President Habibie's offer of a referendum to East Timor on 27 January 1999 led to calls for a similar referendum in

GAM base at all, to the point that when GAM had to turn over its arms in accordance with the Helsinki agreement, weapons were secretly transferred to Sabang from East Aceh, as if to show that GAM's base extended to the northern tip of the province.

A. WEST ACEH

In the first round in West Aceh, ten slates competed, and no candidate passed the 25 per cent threshold. The local KIP head reported that many from tsunami-affected regions had difficulty reaching polling stations, so that just over 20 per cent of registered voters took part. Bitter rivalry between some non-GAM candidates was so pronounced that two were reported to have come to blows even before the campaign began.⁴³

The top two, forced into a run-off, both stood as independents: the GAM candidate, Ramli, a primary schoolteacher and brother of the local KPA leader, with 24.6 per cent, and Iskandar, former head of the district's Sanitary and Environment Department, with 17.2 per cent. (He had been the Golkar district leader and was going to be its candidate until an internal party dispute forced him to run on his own.) The GAM pair took most of the first round votes from rural subdistricts, leaving Iskandar with mainly urban constituents. In the second round, on 4 March 2007, GAM thrashed the opposition, securing over 76 per cent.

GAM was always going to have a significant advantage with the rural vote. For example, on 7 January 2007, local *geuchiks* (village heads) invited the GAM candidates to a get-to-know-you gathering with tsunami victims from Cot Buloh IDP Barracks in Arongan Lambalek subdistrict even before the formal beginning of the second round campaign.⁴⁴ Speeches that started with a religious theme turned political, some focusing on the need to maintain the peace process, others criticising the failures of the previous administration and calling for Aceh self-governance. One highlight was an emotional address in Acehnese by GAM religious adviser Teungku Ali, who pointed to the movement's pivotal role in winning the peace and securing more revenue for the province through the Aceh government law. The GAM candidates told constituents they had little to offer and

could make no promises, a humility that seemed to sit well with the audience.

The first round went smoothly, with police reporting only two minor incidents.⁴⁵ This may have been due in part to a local NGO network set up in October 2006, the Alliance of Peaceful Aceh Local Elections (Jaringan Pilkada Aceh Damai, JPAD). Through leaflets, banners and local radio talk shows, it set out to educate the public on its rights and responsibilities and what factors should be considered in selecting candidates.⁴⁶ As it became clear that there would be a run-off election in West Aceh, JPAD dissolved itself. With only two slates, there was a greater risk of polarisation, and it feared it would be trapped between the two sides. On the one hand, its members were worried that Iskandar would consider it biased toward the Ramli slate, because Ramli's running mate, Fuadri, had an NGO background; on the other hand, it was concerned that any exposure of GAM intimidation might lead to retaliation.⁴⁷

Before the second round, several reports surfaced of military interference. European Union (EU) election observers said that on 26 February, local military leaders had invited village heads from Pante Ceremeun subdistrict to a meeting where they were advised on "how not to vote".⁴⁸ Local contacts expressed fears government intelligence agents might seek to prevent GAM from winning by bringing in members of anti-GAM organisations (Frontum and ForKab) to support Iskandar.⁴⁹ Muhammad Nur alias

Aceh; SIRA, Mohammad Nazar's organisation, was founded in early February 1999.

⁴³ Crisis Group interview, Miska, head of Yayasan Papan, 7 January 2007.

⁴⁴ Crisis Group visit to GAM's community interaction with tsunami affected community in Cot Buloh village, Arongan Lambalek subdistrict, West Aceh, 6 January 2007.

⁴⁵ Crisis Group interview, Miko, police chief of intelligence, 8 January 2007. The incidents involved allegations of improper use of money in the campaign from one candidate, Nasruddin, a former *bupati*, and a brawl during a debate between Nasruddin and Iskandar.

⁴⁶ The leaflets were designed in two formats, Acehnese and Indonesian. Among other things they warned against vote-buying, peer pressure and intimidation. They also urged voters to refrain from violence or demonstrations if their candidates lost. The core message was that winners and losers must work together in building a better Aceh.

⁴⁷ Crisis Group interview, Nyaksih Faisal, head of JPAD, 8 January 2007.

⁴⁸ "Elections in Aceh a Great Success Despite Interference", European Union Election Observation Mission Aceh 2006/2007, 9 March 2007.

⁴⁹ Crisis Group interview, Muhammad Nur, head of Frontum West Aceh, 8 January 2007. Frontum is an acronym for Front Anti Separatis dan Pembela Rakyat di Bumi Teuku Umar (Anti-Separatist Front and Defenders of the People from the Land of Teuku Umar). It was earlier known as Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Johan Pahlawan (Youth Communications Forum of Johan Pahlawan Community); after the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed in December 2002, the military changed its name to Frontum, apparently to conform to other anti-separatist fronts it was creating. After Helsinki, Frontum was dissolved and transformed into FPKKP (Forum Pengembangan Korban Konflik dan Pemeliharaan Perdamaian) since it was incorporated

Maknu, Frontum's leader, quoted the district military commander as saying:

The military is neutral in this election, but should West Aceh let GAM win? The result would be that Indonesia's flag will come down, and GAM's will rise. Do you want the Red and White to come down? If not, don't let them win. If you want the Red and White to fly, it's up to you to choose your methods.⁵⁰

According to Maknu, the commander hired 110 Frontum members for three days to provide security for the 11 December elections; he also promised to reward Frontum members with advanced hybrid fertilisers for their farms if they defeated GAM, suggesting that their role was to be more than just security.⁵¹

But in the complex politics of post-Helsinki Aceh, some Frontum members were more interested in defeating Iskandar than GAM, because they thought he was trying to steal their money. The issue stemmed from a decision by the Aceh Reintegration Agency (Badan Reintegrasi Aceh, BRA) in early 2006 to award reintegration funds not only to former GAM guerrillas but also, in the interests of social harmony, to former "defenders of the nation" – anti-GAM militias.⁵² Accordingly, the former head of Frontum, Teuku Hasyim, submitted a proposal to BRA to set up a logging company (*kilang kayu*). The money, Rp.10 million (roughly \$1,000) for each of Frontum's 220 members, would be put in a single account. Teuku Hasyim became Iskandar's campaign manager, and Frontum's treasurer worked with him. Frontum members believed Iskandar, with the connivance of his team, was trying to divert the money awarded by BRA to his campaign.⁵³

Before the second round, a senior GAM official claimed 1,000 Frontum and Forkab members would be used to influence voters, especially in Johan Pahlawan subdistrict, which has more than half of West Aceh's registered voters. These Frontum members, most from neighbouring Nagan Raya district, had infiltrated villages in October, the official claimed. The local KPA chief even issued a statement warning the public to beware of

fake GAM members demanding *pajak nanggroe* (taxation) and extorting local businesses to damage GAM's image.⁵⁴ In anticipation, local GAM commander Teungku Samsul alias Abu Pahlawan drew up plans to recruit 20,000 volunteers in urban centers before the second round, to be stationed in Johan Pahlawan, Kaway XVI, Samatiga and Meureubo subdistricts.⁵⁵ Additional KPA members from central command were on stand-by to prevent vigilantes from stirring up trouble.

As it happened, the only reported interference on the day of the run-off was from the military itself. The EU team issued a statement that it had photographed local military personnel collecting election material after the polls closed in Samatiga subdistrict.⁵⁶

But such moves had no impact on the outcome. By the second round on 4 March 2007, Irwandi was already confirmed as governor, which affected voters' decisions at the district level. Civil servants and other urban community leaders expected cooperation between the future *bupati* and the elected governor – what better way to ensure this than by choosing a GAM *bupati*?⁵⁷

Some voters also calculated that the likelihood of dividing Aceh into several new provinces would increase if Iskandar were to win. He supported the creation of Southwest Aceh (ABAS), a province that would absorb West Aceh. Not everyone in West Aceh backs the idea but ABAS could still become a political bargaining position later if local factions are unhappy with their newly elected officials' performance or they see significant disparities in district budget allocations.⁵⁸

Finally, Ramli made the smart move of bringing a senior academic into his campaign. Dr Burhanuddin Yasin, a first-round loser, was a well-known intellectual and seasoned bureaucrat. Anyone worried about Ramli's lack of experience or his credentials to set realistic policy goals would be reassured by Burhanuddin's presence on the

in the reintegration process, but Frontum is the name everyone uses. ForKab, short for Forum Komunikasi Anak Bangsa (Youth of the Nation Communications Forum), was created in 2003 and as of 2006 had about 880 members, mostly former GAM members who had surrendered to the Indonesian armed forces before the Helsinki agreement was signed.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² On problems with reintegration funds, see Crisis Group Briefings *Aceh's Local Elections* and *Aceh: Now For the Hard Part*, op. cit.

⁵³ Crisis Group interview, Muhammad Nur, 8 January 2007.

⁵⁴ Crisis Group interview, Tgk Yusaini alias Abu Yus, KPA chief for West Aceh, 7 January 2007. He told Crisis Group the KPA had received reports that fake GAM members had used threats of force to extort local contractors to support the campaign.

⁵⁵ As noted above, they claim in the end to have enlisted 25,000.
⁵⁶ "European Union Observation Mission: Elections in Aceh a Great Success Despite Interference", op. cit.

⁵⁷ Crisis Group interview, Nyaksih Faisal, head of JPAD, 8 January 2007. He stressed that once Irwandi was sworn into office, people of West Aceh would no longer hesitate to vote for Ramli.

⁵⁸ Ibid. Nyaksih said that based on listener feedback from a radio show he hosted in December 2005 about the peace process, many people did not support ABAS because they did not see themselves as distinct culturally from the Acehnese heartland.

team. In widely distributed leaflets, Ramli listed his priorities as preserving the Helsinki agreement, speedier rehabilitation and reconstruction for tsunami-affected regions, supporting Islamic law, rural development, increasing professionalism of public administration and improving the quality of education and health services. Tackling corruption and justice and human rights were close to the bottom; enhancing community participation in development came last.⁵⁹

B. SABANG

No one believed that GAM would or could win the *bupati* race in Sabang, an island of 28,597 people off the north coast of Aceh, known for its duty free ports, tourist resorts and a relatively secular society. But despite the fact that GAM was a relatively recent presence, Munawar Liza Zainal and running mate Islamuddin, neither from there, captured 35.5 per cent of the vote, comfortably ahead of Sabang-born Golkar candidate Husaini, a well-known private contractor and head of the local legislature, who got 29.5 per cent.⁶⁰

For the first twenty years of the conflict, there was no GAM base in Sabang. In 1998, a structure was set up under the command in Aceh Besar, the nearest mainland district. By the end of 2000 it was on its own, with a GAM governor, military commander (*panglima wilayah*), three subdistrict commanders (*panglima muda daerah*) and six village commanders (*panglima sagoe*), two for each of three zones. By 2003, GAM had 300 members, most recruited during the 2002-2003 peace process. Half became active fighters; the others fell under the civilian wing. During martial law, beginning in May 2003, most operations were shifted to a smaller nearby island, Pulau Nasi. Because there were few clashes with Indonesian forces on Sabang itself, fighters would sometimes be sent to help out in Aceh Besar. Most GAM members from Sabang who left during the conflict returned after Helsinki.⁶¹

GAM did not have much time to choose a candidate. A caucus of 25 local KPA members in late September failed to come up with any names, mostly because none of its own members had suitable qualities. It was then that the KPA approached Munawar and Islamuddin but it was not until mid-October that they formally endorsed his candidacy – two weeks before the closing date for registration. Munawar's decision to stand stemmed from an interest in strengthening GAM's political structure before the 2009 parliamentary elections.

Originally from Pidie, Munawar was educated at a well-known Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) in Gontor, East Java and at Cairo's prestigious Al-Azhar University, where he majored in Islamic and Arabic studies. He joined SIRA in 1999 and was active in the external campaign for Acehese self-determination. After being deported from Egypt at Indonesia's request, he fled to Thailand as a political refugee. He entered the U.S. in 2002 and established a SIRA representative office in Pennsylvania, where he actively supported the independence struggle. He was appointed GAM's deputy spokesperson in the wake of the 2005 Helsinki agreement and became a public figure as he toured the province, explaining the agreement's implications.

A local GAM official said that even though some local KPA members were not particularly popular, Munawar's appeal more than compensated.⁶² He dressed modestly and was exceptionally communicative, going out of his way to visit coffee shops to speak to villagers. He also won the support of religious-minded constituents by preaching spontaneously in local mosques.

The election was a battle of networks.⁶³ The KPA concentrated on the urban periphery and rural areas, while Golkar focused more on the city centre, mobilising the bureaucracy, national youth and student movements and private business to support Husaini. Even though civil servants were told to stay neutral, some of Husaini's key campaign team were active heads of departments; others were district-level legislators.⁶⁴ Unwilling to compete directly with KPA, Husaini said his campaign team's core focus was the better-educated voters in the major population centres.⁶⁵

⁵⁹ Crisis Group observation of leaflet campaign, 8 January 2007.

⁶⁰ Official sources from KIP and Panwaslih Sabang, 24 December 2006. The GAM candidate received 5,214 votes, Golkar's 4,320 from a total of 14,653.

⁶¹ GAM Sabang's first commander had been Abu Teungoh alias Teungku Puteh but he was killed by TNI forces in Banda Aceh in 2001 after he was abducted at his home. He was replaced by Nazaruddin alias Teungku Agam, who was arrested twice, in 2002 and 2003. A TNI deserter, Izil Azhar alias Ayah Merin, became the GAM commander until the Helsinki agreement was signed. Since then, he has managed KPA's local business – importing cars from Singapore through Sabang's duty free port. Tgk Agam, who was awaiting trial in the provincial police headquarters when the 2004 tsunami struck, escaped, only

returning to Sabang in 2005. He became Munawar's campaign manager.

⁶² Crisis Group interview, Sabang, 26 December 2006.

⁶³ SIRA was not as active a network in Sabang. Most of its volunteers are students who live in Banda Aceh. It does not have a representative office in Sabang.

⁶⁴ Crisis Group meeting with Husaini and his campaign team, 24 December 2006.

⁶⁵ Crisis Group interview, Husaini, runner-up candidate, 24 December 2006. He mostly sent canvassers into rural villagers and therefore had little personal contact with the people.

Golkar had always dominated elections but KPA succeeded in capitalising on the failure to deliver concrete benefits.⁶⁶ In the 2004 parliamentary elections, Golkar received 62 per cent of rural Sabang's vote. This time it had 15 per cent.

KPA proved more advanced in its preparation. Prior to the elections, ex-GAM commanders were sent to Malaysia and trained in establishing party structures, preserving peace and strengthening democracy and developing campaign strategies.⁶⁷ The exercise of compiling identity cards to register as independent candidates was an important step in winning the support of communities. The head of Jaboi village, Sukajadi subdistrict chose four sympathisers who went door-to-door evenings.⁶⁸ KPA members often passed through target villages or stopped in local coffee shops. In addition, they were extremely protective towards areas they regarded as their own, keeping their eyes and ears open in anticipation of election sabotage.⁶⁹ This vigilance may have prevented attempts at *serangan fajar* ("dawn attacks", last-minute efforts to influence voters through money, SMS messages or other tactics). Husaini confessed he felt intimidated whenever he went to rural areas because the GAM presence was so strong. During the local election campaign, the 300 GAM members under the KPA, along with the volunteers they recruited, proved decisive to Munawar's victory. The guerrilla structure that had existed during the conflict was revitalised, and members mobilised people to vote. The KPA spent only about Rp.140 million (\$14,000), which covered the cost of promotional materials, transportation, rental of sound systems, gasoline – and most importantly, mobilising the masses for rallies. Munawar said he and Islamuddin each contributed Rp.15 million of

their own funds and his close friends and relatives the remainder; he said they received no contributions from the private sector, in part because Husaini had it sewn up.⁷⁰

GAM campaigned on two themes: change and preserving the peace process.⁷¹ A young man in Seruway village, Sukakarya subdistrict reported that people in his area voted for GAM because its message was different.⁷² While Golkar and other party candidates promised the usual free health and education services, GAM pushed for clean government and economic opportunities through village-based development in trade, tourism, fisheries and agriculture.

But a senior police official said he thought most people chose GAM in a "trial and error" vote, a case of trying something different, not necessarily a ringing endorsement.⁷³ Local mosques that were normally empty suddenly were crowded with people curious to hear about GAM's program.⁷⁴ The focus on the peace process was popular. A villager said:

We aren't interested in local politics. We're too busy making a living. But what we want is for our (future) leaders to maintain the peace. Peace means we can carry on with our daily lives; we can farm our fields and our children can go to school.⁷⁵

GAM was eager to get the endorsement of Muslim religious scholars (*ulama*), particularly those from traditional boarding schools (*dayah*, the equivalent of *pesantrens* on Java). Prominent local cleric Tgk Mansur Abu Daud said that a number of *ulama* from the various districts were briefed by senior GAM members in Banda Aceh.⁷⁶ A

⁶⁶ Crisis Group interview, Muzakkir Harun, head of Panwaslih Sabang, 25 December 2006. GAM used indirect methods to damage Golkar's reputation and lure voters. One campaign slogan was: "Don't vote for us but also don't vote for those [Golkar winners of the election in 2004] who have cheated you!" This strategy seems to have been at least partly successful.

⁶⁷ Crisis Group interview, Munawar Liza, 23 December 2006. The Olaf Palme International Centre played an important role in preparing GAM, SIRA and other groups through a two-week training session in February 2006 that made use of modules developed for other settings. A month later a one-week training session was held for 25 Acehnese women. Another training session on party-building took place in Sweden in April 2006, before Law 11 was passed but in anticipation that local parties might be allowed in the 2006 elections. Subsequent meetings took place in both Banda Aceh and Stockholm. The basic content of the training is available at <http://www.palmecenter.org/>.

⁶⁸ Crisis Group interview, Khalil Akbar, head of Jaboi village, 25 December 2006. GAM obtained 151 votes (37 per cent) in Kelurahan Jaboi, Husaini 74 (18.3 per cent) out of a total of 408.

⁶⁹ Crisis Group interview, Zainal Arian, KPA spokesperson Sabang, 24 December 2006.

⁷⁰ Munawar said his team produced fifteen banners, six billboards and 5,000 large posters. Crisis Group interview, 23 December 2006.

⁷¹ Munawar had circulated 200 double-sided leaflets that were photocopied for circulation. They were titled: "If you want change, then vote for candidate No 5 (Munawar)!" The leaflets contained a detailed profile of Munawar and Islamuddin and their mission statement. They were targeted mainly for urban communities but they did find their way into village coffee shops as witnessed by local settlers in Jaboi village.

⁷² Crisis Group interview, community members of Seruway, Sukajadi subdistrict, 25 December 2006.

⁷³ Crisis Group interview, Armaeni, deputy chief of police Sabang, 24 December 2006.

⁷⁴ Crisis Group interview, Khalil Akbar, Jaboi village head, 25 December 2006.

⁷⁵ Crisis Group interview, Ahmadi, farmer in Seruway village, Sukajadi subdistrict, 25 December 2006.

⁷⁶ Crisis Group interview, Tgk Mansur Abu Daud, 25 December 2006. Other prominent *ulamas* briefed by GAM included Tgk Kamaruzzaman (Batee Sok, Sabang), Tgk Ibrahim (Balohan, Sabang), Tgk Muda Wali, Abu Dahlan (Wali Tanoh Abee) and Tgk Abi Lampisang.

particularly effective method of winning voters was attaching religious significance to the voting order of the GAM district candidates (no.5 on the ballot) and the Irwandi-Nazar slate (no.6). Preaching in local mosques and participating actively in community discussions, Tgk Mansur's set speech went:

If you truly believe in God's will, then pick the independent candidates from GAM. Look where they are in the voting order. See, GAM candidate no. 5 (Munawar) reflects the *Rukun Islam* (the five pillars of Islam) while candidate no. 6 (Irwandi) reflects *Rukun Iman* (the six pillars of the faith). So if you are devoted to Allah, then you should no longer hesitate over your choice!

This formula spread rapidly in discussions in local mosques, coffee shops and even households. Eight ballot sheets in Jaboi village, for instance, had to be discarded because illiterate elders crossed numbers for both the district and provincial races.⁷⁷

GAM consistently got a high turnout at rallies. During the official campaign, sites for mass rallies were determined by the local election commission. Each slate was permitted to hold four, and GAM made full use, unlike other teams that sometimes did not even bother to visit each site. (This was true elsewhere – Irwandi and Nazar covered more territory than any other team in the provincial elections.) In one rural area, Pasir Putih, only GAM campaigned and it won almost every vote. If other candidates limited their campaigning to areas they were confident of winning, GAM was willing to try its luck everywhere. Imum Jon, who had so captivated audiences in North Aceh, also visited and in Balohan sang an emotional poem describing the meaning of GAM's flag.⁷⁸

One election supervisor said he was astonished to see some people in the crowd overcome by emotion during the campaign in Ie Meulee and Balohan. GAM brought in outside speakers, many of whom recounted their bitter experiences during the conflict to great effect.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Crisis Group interviews, 25 December 2006.

⁷⁸ Crisis Group telephone interview, Tgk Yahya Muad, 15 January 2007. Tgk Yahya, the head of the law and human rights division of the Majelis Nasional, said Turkish envoys presented the flag as a gift to Aceh in 1630 during the reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda. The general meaning of the flag is *peudeung hak dan peu hanco yang bateu* (upholding rights and destroying evil). The red background represents the willingness to sacrifice blood to destroy evil; the five-point star represents the five pillars of Islam; and the crescent moon symbolises the light of faith. The white line represents holy war and the black the dark age of colonialism.

⁷⁹ GAM fielded orators (*juru kampanye*) from outside the district, including Teungku Ilyas Bada of Bireuen and Teungku Yusri

V. CONCLUSION

No single factor explains GAM's victory but the combination of the KPA-SIRA structure, the desire for peace, and the disillusionment with established parties was probably most important.

Most of the victors have already been sworn into office. Irwandi and Nazar were installed on 8 February 2007. Among the new district heads, Ilyas Pasee was installed in North Aceh on 5 March, Munawar Liza in Sabang on 12 March and Muslim Hasballah in East Aceh on 14 March. Now the challenge is making good on expectations, of both GAM members and the population more generally.

One question is how well GAM will govern. Irwandi, who is both a pragmatist and a politician with a real sense for what plays at the grassroots, is likely to prove a capable administrator, but there are genuine concerns about some of the newly elected GAM *bupati*, who have neither the experience nor know-how to set policies and oversee their implementation. They each will have to appoint a district secretary (*sekertaris daerah*, sekda), a career civil servant who must be approved by the district legislature. That choice is likely to be critical to local governance, and it will be interesting to see whether the new GAM *bupati* make merit-based choices.

Irwandi at the provincial level also has the atmospheric right – driving himself around without the ceremonial trappings of past governors – but not all those elected are as concerned with presenting themselves as clean and populist. If GAM-led governments at the provincial and district levels cannot do better than their predecessors in delivering basic services and raising income levels – and they have many obstacles to overcome, particularly given an unreconstructed civil service and local legislatures – they may lose the overwhelming good will they start with.

A second question is how GAM will use political office over the next two years to build a new political party to contest the 2009 parliamentary elections – and whether there will be any systematic effort by Jakarta-backed forces to stop it. Some in Aceh worry that intelligence operatives will try to split Irwandi and Nazar, so that GAM and SIRA form separate parties, thus weakening both. (SIRA on its own is already leaning toward forming a separate party.) Others suggest a stepped-up effort to split the province in two before 2009, which would require provincial parliament approval that at this stage seems unlikely. But it is worth remembering that none of the fears about security force sabotage or militia

and Teungku Hamdani of North Aceh, a tactic that proved very successful.

mobilisation materialised before or during the December 2006 elections, and worries about pre-2009 manipulation may also prove unfounded.

A third question is how well GAM will be able to control its own members. Tensions at the leadership level have abated, and a post-election meeting of Irwandi and Malik Mahmud papered over the pre-election rift, although Irwandi is clearly now more influential. Disputes have surfaced over distribution of reintegration funds, especially in Bireuen district, between the rank-and-file and their commanders; equitable distribution of those funds would be a headache for anyone, but GAM as an interested party will be under particular scrutiny. Whether its political leaders are willing and/or able to prevent extortion and skimming from public contracts remains to be seen. Some GAM members also expect their elected leaders to take a hard line toward Jakarta, and symbolic gestures count for a lot. That Irwandi allowed the Indonesian anthem to be sung at his inauguration was seen by some as a betrayal of the cause.

Finally there is the question of how GAM manages the issue of self-government. Its candidates clearly tapped into a sentiment of pride in being Acehnese and yearning to be free of Jakarta's yoke. Irwandi and his colleagues on the one hand, and President Yudhoyono's government on the other, need to show the Acehnese that self-government, post-Helsinki, is something manifestly different from pre-Helsinki special autonomy. If all this can be achieved, the peace agreement ending the conflict in Aceh could move from being a minor miracle to a major one.

Jakarta/Brussels, 22 March 2007

APPENDIX A

MAP OF INDONESIA



Base 802898AI (C00429) 11-02

Courtesy of The General Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin

APPENDIX B

MAP OF ACEH



APPENDIX C


VOTING RESULTS FOR ELECTION OF GOVERNOR AND VICE-GOVERNOR IN NANGGROE ACEH DARUSSALAM PER DISTRICT



PROVINCE

: Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam

VOTING RESULTS FOR ELECTION OF GOVERNOR AND VICE-GOVERNOR IN NANGGROE ACEH DARUSSALAM PER DISTRICT



A. VALID BALLOTS

	NAME OF CANDIDATES	KIP Kota Banda Aceh	KIP Kab. Aceh Besar	KIP. Kota Sabang	KIP Kab. Pidie	KIP Kab. Bireuen	KIP Kab. Aceh Utara	KIP Kota Lhokseumawe	KIP Kab. Aceh Timur	KIP Kota Langsa	KIP Kab. Aceh Tamiang	KIP Kab. Aceh Tenggara	TOTAL
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
1	Ir. H. Iskandar Hoesin, MH/ Drs. H.M. Saleh Manaf	1.932	4.168	390	18.687	2.011	12.230	1.625	8.679	4.708	8.782	3.811	67.023
2	H. Tamlicha Ali/ Drs. Tgk. Harmen Nunqmar	3.480	16.160	410	4.923	949	5.153	1.613	4.705	2.257	8.930	1.345	49.925
3	Drs. H. A. Malik Raden, MM/ H. Sayed Fuad Zakaria, SE	11.883	32.364	3.412	8.630	6.000	16.226	7.254	11.610	10.394	21.820	22.291	151.884
4	Dr. H. Ahmad Humam Hamid, MA/ Drs. Hasbi Abdullah, M.Si	14.426	16.111	1.455	118.884	46.820	20.496	6.816	15.162	4.895	14.447	8.120	267.632
5	H. Muhammad Djali Yusuf/ Drs. H.R.A. Syaugas Rahmatillah, MA	2.277	7.138	408	3.402	2.126	2.470	2.433	5.849	3.648	10.780	3.528	44.059
6	Drh. Inwandi Yusuf, Msc/ Muhammad Nazar, S.Ag	10.138	43.893	5.946	39.246	121.725	143.999	26.417	71.797	15.591	21.410	37.217	537.379
7	Ir. H. Azwar Abubakar, MM/ M. Nasir Djamil, S.Ag	13.709	19.337	1.899	13.242	7.599	11.512	4.952	4.586	7.787	16.930	13.096	114.649
8	Drs. H. Ghazali Abbas Adani/ H. Shalahuddin Alfata	7.690	8.782	650	32.734	8.925	25.536	14.526	24.849	7.774	7.266	1.152	139.884
	TOTAL	65.535	147.953	14.570	239.748	196.155	237.622	65.636	147.237	57.054	110.365	90.560	
TOTAL VALID BALLOTS													1.372.435

Note : *) Filled-in with the name of KIP per district
KIP = Komisi Independen Pemilihan (Independent Election Commission)

NO.	NAME OF CANDIDATES	Transferred from above table	KIP Per District											TOTAL VOTES	%
			KIP Kab. Gayo Lues	KIP Kab. Bener Meriah	KIP Kab. Aceh Tengah	KIP Kab. Aceh Singkil	KIP Kab. Aceh Selatan	KIP Kab. Abdy	KIP Kab. Simeulue	KIP Kab. Nagan Raya	KIP Kab. Aceh Barat	KIP Kab. Aceh Jaya			
			12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21			
1	Ir. H. Iskandar Hoesin, MH/ Drs. H.M. Saleh Manaf	67.023	4.111	7.583	8.773	9.404	1.149	1.635	1.674	3.980	5.650	571	111.553	5,54	
2	H. Tamlicha Ali/ Drs. Tgk. Harmen Nurigmar	49.925	1.783	3.824	6.276	4.518	2.153	789	1.368	3.689	5.321	681	80.327	3,99	
3	Drs. H. A. Malik Raden, MM/ H. Sayed Fuad Zakaria, SE	151.884	6.628	20.197	28.794	21.471	9.586	6.138	10.461	13.273	9.994	2.748	281.174	13,97	
4	Dr. H. Ahmad Humam Hamid, MA/ Drs. Hasbi Abdullah, M.Si	267.632	4.436	5.965	5.868	6.270	7.992	7.125	3.295	13.807	8.705	3.389	334.484	16,62	
5	H. Muhammad Djali Yusuf/ Drs. H.R.A. Syaughas Rahmatillah, MA	44.059	826	2.067	1.445	3.112	4.452	1.651	1.164	2.440	4.051	276	65.543	3,26	
6	Drh. Irwandi Yusuf, Msc/ Muhammad Nazar, S.Ag	537.379	15.695	10.558	12.132	7.240	61.180	29.806	13.985	22.843	33.946	23.981	768.745	38,20	
7	Ir. H. Azwar Abubakar, MM/ M. Nasir Djamil, S.Ag	114.649	6.324	9.222	22.358	12.072	10.217	8.995	8.336	7.965	11.731	1.697	213.566	10,61	
8	Drs. H. Ghazali Abbas Adan/ H. Shalahuddin Alfata	139.884	256	1.007	1.756	1.135	1.389	3.755	362	3.782	3.121	531	156.978	7,80	
TOTAL			40.059	60.423	87.402	65.222	98.118	59.894	40.645	71.779	82.519	33.874			100
TOTAL VALID BALLOTS													2.012.370		

Note : *) Filled-in with the name of KIP per district

B. INVALID BALLOTS

NO.	DESCRIPTION	KIP Per District										
		KIP Kota Banda Aceh	KIP Kab. Aceh Besar	KIP. Kota Sabang	KIP Kab. Pidie	KIP Kab. Bireuen	KIP Kab. Aceh Utara	KIP Kota Lhokseumawe	KIP Kab. Aceh Timur	KIP Kota Langsa	KIP Kab. Aceh Tamiang	KIP Kab. Aceh Tenggara
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1	INVALID BALLOTS	3.168	9.166	860	14.633	3.227	8.356	4.853	11.340	2.774	5.607	2.290
		KIP Kab. Gayo Lues	KIP Kab. Bener Meriah	KIP Kab. Aceh Tengah	KIP Kab. Aceh Singkil	KIP Kab. Aceh Selatan	KIP Kab. Abdy	KIP Kab. Simeulue	KIP Kab. Nagan Raya	KIP Kab. Aceh Barat	KIP Kab. Aceh Jaya	
		12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	
		2291	2697	4011	3681	2482	3214	901	2785	2218	1815	
TOTAL INVALID BALLOTS												158,643

APPENDIX D

VOTING RESULTS FOR ELECTION OF THE HEAD OF DISTRICTS AND TOWNS

1 Kota Sabang

No	Name of Candidates	Number of votes	Winning %	Political Party / affiliations
1	T. Zahirsyah dan H.M Amin Nyak Neh	1265		
2	Muhammad Nur, SH, M.Hum dan Rusli, SE,Msc	190		
3	H.Husaini dan Drs. H.Zulkifli, HS, MM	4320		
4	H.M Nasir, SH dan Drs. Azhari	2079		
5	H.Munawar Liza Zainal dan Islamuddin, ST	5214	35,58 %	Independent
6	Ir. H.Hirwan Jack, MM dan Drs.Muhammad Husin Ali	1585		
	Valid Ballots	14653		
	Invalid Ballots	778		

2 Kota Banda Aceh

No	Name of Candidates	Number of votes	Winning %	Political Party / affiliations
1	Drs.Sulaiman Abda dan drg.Saifuddin Ishak,M.Kes,PKK	10220		
2	Ir.Mawardi Nurdin,M.EngSc dan Hj.Illiza Sa'aduddin Djamal, SE	21588	32,95%	PPP, PBR,Demokrat
3	Ir.H.Teuku Alaidinsyah, M.Eng dan Anas Bidin Nyak Syech	9487		
4	Drs.H.Bachtiar Nitura, MM dan Ir. Nasruddin Daud, M.Sc	3101		
5	Drs. Sayid Fadhil,SH,M.Hum dan Nursalis	3103		
6	H.Raihan Iskandar, Lc dan Teuku Surya Dharma, SE.Ak	13774		
7	Muhammad Taufik Abda dan Akhiruddin Mahjuddin	4236		
	Valid Ballots	65509		
	Invalid Ballots	3110		

3 Kabupaten Aceh Besar

No	Name of Candidates	Number of votes	Winning %	Political Party / affiliations
1	Ir Musa Bintang, MM dan Drs. H. Munir Aziz, MPd	12507		
2	DR.Tgk H Bukhari Daud, M.Ed dan Anwar Ahmad, SE.Ak	37810	25,58%	PAN, PBR
3	DR. H.Mustanir M.Sc dan H. M. Ali Usman	24310		
4	Drs. Sayuthi Is, MM dan T. Raden Sulaiman	11430		
5	Drs. H Rusli Muhammad dan Drs. Muhammad Ali	22849		
6	Irwansyah dan Tgk. Usman Muda	29113		
7	Drs.H Zaini Zakaria Alwy dan Mahdi SE	3390		
	Drs. Zaini Aziz,MM dan H. Amiruddin Usman Daroy	6390		
	Valid Ballots	147799		
	Invalid Ballots	9374		

4 Kabupaten Pidie

No	Name of Candidates	Number of votes	Winning %	Political Party / affiliations
1	Mirza Ismail, S.Sos dan Nazir Adam, SE	134459	56,04%	Independent
2	Drs. H.Jalaluddin Harun dan Darul Irfan, S.Ag	24202		
3	DR.TGK.H.Gunawan Adnan, MA dan Drs.H.Abd.Salam Poroh	7009		
4	H.T Khairul Basyar, S.Sos, M.SP dan Drs.Abdullah Daud	43980		

5	IR.Faisal Saifuddin dan TGK.Yusri Puteh, SPd	5809		
6	IR.H.Abdullah Yahya, MS dan Drs.M.Yusuf Ishaq	19908		
7	Drs.H.Bustami Usman, M.Pd dan TGK.Anwar Yusuf, MA	4557		
	Valid Ballots	239924		
	Invalid Ballots	14420		

5 Kabupaten Aceh Utara

No	Name of Candidates	Number of votes	Winning %	Political Party / affiliations
1	Tgk.Ilyas A Hamid dan Syarifuddin, SE	163540	67,35%	Independent
2	Drs.Azwir, M.Si dan Tgk.H.Abdul Manaf	4957		
3	Ir.H. Tarmizi A Karim, MSc dan Tgk.H Amirullah M Diyah, Lc,M.Ag	50512		
4	Drs.Tgk H. Ghazali Mohd.Syam dan Terpiadi A Majid, S.Sos	23794		
	Valid Ballots	242803		
	Invalid Ballots	9710		

6 Kabupaten Gayo Lues

No	Name of Candidates	Number of votes	Winning %	Political Party / affiliations
1	H.Ibnu Hasim, S.Sos.MM dan Firdaus Karim	23857	58,13%	PGK, PPP, PAN, PSI, PD
2	Drs.H.Ramli, S.MM dan Irmawan, S.Sos, MM	15825		
3	Drs.H.Abdul Gafar dan Weri, SE,MA	1357		
	Valid Ballots	41039		
	Invalid Ballots	1129		

7 Kabupaten Aceh Timur

No	Name of Candidates	Number of votes	Winning %	Political Party / affiliations
1	Muslim Hasballah dan Nasruddin Abu Bakar, S.pd.I	53104	36,40%	Independent
2	Ir.Bachtiar Yusuf dan Drs. Nurdin AR	15212		
3	Ir. H.Zainal Abidin Bie,MM dan H.Zubir Ali Basyah, SH	13623		
4	Drs.H.Azwan Usmanuddin, MM dan Heldianasyah Z Mard, SE,MAP	21334		
5	DR.Ir.Amhar Abubakar, MSc dan H.Syarifuddin Malem S.Pd I	20491		
6	Sulaiman Ismail dan Zulkarnaini H.Matsyah, SPd	22102		
	Valid Ballots	145866		
	Invalid Ballots	12621		

8 Kota Langsa

No	Name of Candidates	Number of votes	Winning %	Political Party / affiliations
1	Drs.Zulkifli Zainon,MM dan Drs.Saifuddin Razali	23203	40,95%	P. Golkar
2	Drs.Ridwan Hanafiah, SH.,MA dan Drs.H.Anwar Hasan	2006		
3	Alibasyah Tanjung dan Tgk.Syech Muhajir Usman, SAg,L.Lm	5922		
4	H.M Jamil Hasan, SE dan Rahmadi Yahya, SE	3528		
5	Drs.Syahrir AKA, M.Si dan Dr.H.syafiruddin, MM	6297		
6	Drs.Abdullah Gade dan Zainal Abidin	15704		
	Valid Ballots	56660		
	Invalid Ballots	3041		

9 Kabupaten Aceh Barat*

No	Name of Candidates	Number of votes	Winning %	Political Party / affiliations
1	Dr.Drs.Burhanuddin Yasin, M.Ed dan Drs. Said Rasyidin Husein	5551		
2	M.Daud Manaf, SH dan Drs.Sofyan S.Sawang	13698		
3	Zulkarnaini dan Ir.Tgk.Babusallam Oemar	1868		
4	Suwanto,NG,SE,MSc dan Rosni Idham	2478		
5	Drs.H.Nasruddin, M.Si dan H.Syhabuddin, SE	9557		
6	Ir.Ibnu Abbas dan H.Amran Usman, S.Pdi	5697		
7	Ir.H.Iskandar dan H.Chudri Yunus, SH	14801	18,0%	Independent
8	H.Nyak Ali Umar, SH dan Dra. Hj.Tjut Suwami, M.Sc,Ed, MBA	7371		
9	Burhanuddin Mustafa dan Chairuddin FR	1122		
10	Ramli MS dan Fuadri, S.Si	20257	24,6%	Independent
	Valid Ballots	82420		
	Invalid Ballots	2624		

*Since there is no pair candidate gains 25% votes or more, the following two candidates with highest votes move for second round. Karena tidak ada pasangan calon yang memperoleh suara 25% atau lebih, maka dua kandidat dengan perolehan suara tertinggi maju keputaran kedua

10 Kabupaten Aceh Jaya

No	Name of Candidates	Number of votes	Winning %	Political Party / affiliations
1	Drs.H.Azwar Thaib, Msi dan T.Banta Syahrizal, ST	1908		
2	A.Malik Musa, SH, M.Hum dan Mustafa Ibrahim,S.Pd	4304		
3	Ir.Azhar Abdurrahman dan Zamzami A.Rani	21883	63,43%	Independen
4	Ir.Zulfian Ahmad dan Marwan, Sp,SH	6401		
	Valid Ballots	34496		
	Invalid Ballots	1193		

11 Kabupaten Aceh Barat Daya*

No	Name of Candidates	Number of votes	Winning %	Political Party / affiliations
1	H.Musfiari Haridhi, SE,Ak,MBA dan Drs.Ridwan Adami,MM	8982		
2	H.T.B Herman, SE,MM dan Tgk.Zulkifli Daiyan	2434		
3	Akmal Ibrahim,SH dan Ir.Syamsurizal,M.Si	13138	21,9%	PAN
4	Drs.H.Tgk.Burhanuddin Sampe,MM dan RS. Darmansyah,SE	4218		
5	Muhammad Ansar, SH dan Zulkifli	9623		
6	Ir.M.Fakhruddin dan Rajuddin,SPd,MM	9039		
7	H.Sulaiman Adami,SP dan H.Munir H.Ubit	12550	20,9%	PKB dan Partai Merdeka
	Valid Ballots	59984		
	Invalid Ballots	3117		

*Karena tidak ada pasangan calon yang memperoleh suara 25% atau lebih, maka dua kandidat dengan perolehan suara tertinggi maju keputaran kedua

12 Kabupaten Nagan Raya

No	Name of Candidates	Number of votes	Winning %	Political Party / affiliations
1	Moh.Alfatah,S.Ag dan H.Evendi Ibrahim	8876		
2	T.Asfan,SE dan Ika Suhanas Adlim	2157		
3	Drs.Asmadi Syam dan Ramli	6592		
4	Drs.T.Zulkarnaini dan M.Kesem Ibrahim,BSc	22596	31,42%	P. Golkar, P Patriot, PBB
5	H.Bustami Usman,SE dan T.Arsyad TRN,SP	4231		
6	Said Mustafa Usab dan Sayudin, ST	3012		

7	Ir. H. Tripoli, MT dan Ir. Fauzi	9063		
8	Drs. Said Mahdi dan Achmad Sachuri	6832		
9	Dr. Ir. H. Azhar Muslem, MS dan Drs. Syech Marhaban	8545		
	Valid Ballots	71904		
	Invalid Ballots	2697		

13 Kabupaten Aceh Singkil

No	Name of Candidates	Number of votes	Winning %	Political Party / affiliations
1	H. Makmur Syah Putra, SH, MM dan Drs. H. Khazali	24607	37,21%	P. Golkar
2	Drs. Salmaza dan Drs. H. Burhanuddin Berkat, SH	12744		
3	H. Syafriadi, SH Alias Oyon dan Drs. Ramlan	20049		
4	Drs. H. Aliamin Sambo, M. Si dan Ir. Amirtua Bacin	2477		
5	Dr. H. Syahyuril dan Harsoyo	6245		
	Valid Ballots	66122		
	Invalid Ballots	2746		

14 Kota Lhokseumawe

No	Name of Candidates	Number of votes	Winning %	Political Party / affiliations
1	Ir. H. T. Fachruddin dan H. Armia Ibrahim, SH	3989		
2	Drs. H. Marzuki M. Amin, MM dan Drs. H. Marzuki M. Amin, MM	14340		
3	Munir Usman dan Suaidi Yahya	25927	38,94%	Independent
4	Ir. H. Kasbani Kasim dan Dahlan A. Rahman, S. Ag, M. Si	4426		
5	Ir. H. T. A. Khalid, MM dan Drs. Tgk. Mursyid Yahya dan	12245		
6	DR. Ir. M. Nasir, MP, SH dan Nurdin M. Yasir, S. Ag	5646		
	Valid Ballots	66573		
	Invalid Ballots	3993		

15 Kabupaten Aceh Tengah

No	Name of Candidates	Number of votes	Winning %	Political Party / affiliations
1	Ir. H. Nasaruddin, MM dan Drs. Djauhar Ali	34167	38,87%	PBR, PAN, PKPI, P Patriot Pancasila
2	Mahreje Wahab dan H. Ibrahim Idris Gayo	21650		
3	H. Aspala Banta Cut, SE, MM dan Drs. H. M. Amin. R	3453		
4	Dr. H Darma Tapa Gayo, Sp.Rad dan Ir. Tgk. Mursyid	4066		
5	Drs. Abdul Mutholib Bantasyam dan Drs. H. Moeawiyah Sabdin	2217		
6	Ir. Syukur Kobath dan Kurniadi Nurdin Sufie	8648		
7	Tgk. Ligadinsyah dan Tgk. H Mude Hasan, SH	9456		
8	H. Mukhlis Gayo, SH dan Drs. Soewarno, S. Msi	4219		
	Valid Ballots	87879		
	Invalid Ballots	3534		

16 Kabupaten Aceh Tamiang

No	Name of Candidates	Number of votes	Winning %	Political Party / affiliations
1	Drs. H. Abdul Latief dan H. Awaluddin, SH, SpN, MH	18512	19,35%	PAN
2	H. T. Yusni dan Drs. Armand Muis	15125		
3	Drs. H. Mohd. Ilyas. WD dan Drs. T. Basyir	7154		
4	Ir. Rusman dan M. Darsah	16559		

5	H. Helmi Mahera Al-Mujahid dan H. Noekman Darsono, SH	6789		
6	H. Sofyan Efendi dan Ir. Nurman Syah	8660		
7	Syarifah Chadijah, ST dan H. Abul Hayat, SKM, M. Kes	3639		
8	H. Hamdan Sati, ST dan H. Iskandar Zulkarnain	19235	20,10%	
		95673		
	Valid Ballots			
	Invalid Ballots			

17 Kabupaten Aceh Tenggara

No	Name of Candidates	Number of votes	Winning %	Political Party / affiliations
1	H. Armen Desky dan H. M. Salim Fakhry, SE, MM			
2	H. Hasan Basri Selian dan Drs. Tgk. Saribun Selian			
3	Tgk. Appan Husni, JS dan Drs. H. Abdurrahim Sekedang			
4	Ir. H. Hasanuddin, B, MM dan Drs. H. Syamsul Bahri			
5	Muhammad Rido dan Supri Yunus, S. Pd			
6	Ir. Abustian, ME dan Djalidun Keruas			
7	Gandhi Bangko dan Rajadun Pagan, BBA			
8	Drs. H. Darmansyah, MM dan Kasim Junaidi, SE			
	Valid Ballots			
	Invalid Ballots			

18 Simeulue

No	Name of Candidates	Number of votes	Winning %	Political Party / affiliations
1	H. M. Sidiq Fahmi, SH dan H. Arya Udin	11184		
2	Erlly Hasyim, SH, S. Ag dan Drs. Saifuddin Samin	3899		
3	Drs. Darmili dan Drs. Ibnu Aban GT. Ulma	15102	36,83%	Parpol
4	Drs. Fachri Kasim dan Drs. Fajrian Hasan	1354		
5	Mohd. Daud Syah dan Hasdian Yasin Sarmadiah, SP	1855		
6	Ir. Mawardi, MM dan Sayuti Abas, BA	7616		
	Valid Ballots	41010		
	Invalid Ballots	795		

19 Kabupaten Bener Meriah

No	Name of Candidates	Number of votes	winning %	Political Party / affiliations
1	Drs. Aldar AB, MM dan Drs. H. Ridwan Qari	15153		
2	Ir. Tagore Abubakar dan Sirwandi Laut Tawar Smik, S. Sos	20566	33,63%	P.Golkar
3	Fauzan Azima dan Arhama	12120		
4	Ir. Misriadi, MS dan Ir. Sutrisno	13302		
	Valid Ballots	61141		
	Invalid Ballots			

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