
I International Military Education and Training: An Assessment

John A. Cope



***A popular Government,
without popular information or the means
of acquiring it,
is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy;
or perhaps both.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance;
And a people who mean to be their own
Governors,
must arm themselves with the power
which knowledge gives.***

**JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY
August 4, 1822**

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING An Assessment

JOHN A. COPE

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

An Assessment

TO ENHANCE SECURITY

Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies, and our interests.¹

The strategy enunciated in President Clinton's *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* stresses three primary objectives: enhancing security, promoting prosperity at home, and promoting democracy worldwide. The United States employs a range of policy instruments in their pursuit. Among them is International Military Education and Training (IMET), one of the foreign assistance programs overseen by the Department of State but implemented and managed by the Department of Defense. The IMET program traditionally has been a relatively small, low-cost and low-risk appropriation with sound legislative support. As U.S. foreign aid continues to collapse under strong congressional pressure to economize, this "bonsai" appropriation in the vast forest of security assistance programs has gained in standing, potency and importance to national security far surpassing that envisioned by its political framers in 1976.

The grant IMET program has received little scrutiny since the end of the Cold War and passage of the 1991 legislative amendment expanding its mandate. Congressional interest in foreign education and training has never been significant, but in today's international security setting, concerned as it is about fragile democracies, ineffective governance, and a range of nontraditional, transnational concerns, the glimmer of hope

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offered by IMET should receive greater attention. More needs to be known about how the Defense Department educated foreign military students in the past, IMET's effectiveness in supporting U.S. policy interests, and its prospects for the future.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) of the National Defense University recently organized a special study team of military and civilian specialists with extensive backgrounds in international military education and training to address these issues. The INSS team—cognizant of the changing international security environment, in particular, the altered purposes, missions, and requirements that political and economic changes worldwide have been imposing on the IMET program—believes the following factors to have a significant influence:

- Restored political democracy in many regions of the world and growing internal dialogue with military institutions on relevant roles, missions and structures are the scenarios of the future.
- Renewed emphasis on professional military training in a new security context—worldwide—is reinforcing efforts to promote democratic political systems.
- The United States is generally viewed by governments as a model to be emulated in establishing a political-military relationship in which civilian authority is effectively developed.
- Challenges and upheavals in the form of internal wars, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism are generating requirements for international intervention in the form of multinational forces.

The INSS study group assumed that U.S. collaboration with other participants in ad hoc military coalitions formed for peace and humanitarian assistance is facilitated when uniformed professionals shared familiar operational doctrines, command and control procedures, and logistic arrangements. In the existing post-Cold War environment, the IMET program can and does provide a foundation for mutual understanding and enhanced interoperability in a wide range of activities, including supply of medicines and foodstuffs to refugee communities, rescue of embassy and United Nations personnel, and

enforcement actions exemplified by Operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*.

The study team's framework for analysis was the extent to which IMET serves U.S. interests. In assessing IMET, the group focused on five basic questions:

- Has the program facilitated access to senior military and political leaders and promoted communication between the United States and recipient countries?
- Does IMET provide an effective introduction to and understanding of U.S. political values, particularly as they relate to democratic society and respect for human rights?
- Do military education and training experiences funded by IMET contribute, as Congress desires, to improving political-military relations in recipient countries and fostering the efficient management of their defense establishments?
- Does this military program serve as an important asset for interoperability in coalition peace and humanitarian assistance operations?
- Is familiarity with U.S. military equipment and the doctrine for its employment a useful byproduct of the IMET program?

Using its own questionnaire to guide discussion, the INSS team interviewed U.S. Government officials with program-related responsibilities, reviewed past studies and relevant literature, conducted two workshops bringing together experts from agencies of the Departments of Defense and State and several nongovernmental organizations, and queried all unified commands and most of their subordinate security assistance offices, as well as service agencies that implement IMET programs and many of the schools and institutes participating in them. The team found in more than 60 responses from around the world, in the assessments of every person with whom the team had contact, and in every response to the questionnaire, over 100 people, unanimous endorsement of IMET and strong support for continuing the programs.

The team found a sound vision guiding IMET that reflected a blend of two traditional preferences in U.S. foreign policy, a mixture of pragmatism and liberal idealism. The IMET program

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is based on the belief that many officer-graduates will rise to positions of prominence within their armed forces and, in all probability, also within their governments and business communities. The United States desires access to these future leaders and wishes them to have a sound understanding of the United States and its history, culture, and traditions. In this regard, the IMET experience also encourages others to learn more about a form of democratic governance and civil society that the United States believes is best for the individual and the community. Such immersion includes learning more about the role of a military institution in a democracy.

The issue of political-military relations lies just below the surface of the U.S. approach to educating international officers. In the Cold War years of the IMET program, careful efforts were made to present the American democratic system in a nonpropagandistic, nondoctrinaire framework. The rationale was that foreign students should voluntarily experience the environment of an open society to best ensure the U.S. message about democracy was palatable and credible. This open and unforced approach disappeared in the 1990s. Today advocacy of the U.S. model for political-military relations in a democracy is emphatic and uncompromising.

In the pages that follow, the INSS team's analysis of IMET's effectiveness is organized in five parts:

- The legislative roots of the program and its relationship to foreign military sales
- The structure of IMET in FY 1995, emphasizing the importance of IMET's original synergy of English language training, a professional course of instruction conducted in the United States, and DOD's Informational Program
- An assessment of the effectiveness of international military education and training made possible by IMET and other funding options
- Contributions toward (1) achieving regional stability over the long term; (2) improving multilateral cooperative military relations with the United States; (3) supporting U.S. diplomatic interests overseas and economic interests at home
- Making a good program better.

LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

The 94th Congress separated military training from the highly controversial Military Assistance Program (MAP) 19 years ago.² With the International Security Assistance Act of 1976, Congress established a new grant assistance program under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, entitled International Military Education and Training (IMET), to help countries unable to purchase U.S. military training under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Act meet their needs.³ Hearings held by the House International Relations Committee clarified fundamental congressional intent. Congress wished to help allies and friendly countries pursue their interests with an initiative that was practical, economical, and focused on the future. It saw military training as the most effective vehicle within the former grant military assistance program and wanted to sustain it without losing legislative control.⁴ Senior Defense officials at the time endorsed the new program as a better way to identify budgetary costs and program objectives, while still providing a means of maintaining military ties and strengthening the military potential of our friends and allies.⁵

The legislative history of IMET has remained remarkably calm for two decades, with only two major adjustments having been made. The original Congressional intent was twofold:

- (1) to encourage effective mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of goals of international peace and security; and
- (2) to improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defense articles and defense services obtained from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries.

The first amendment to IMET, in 1978, expanded the program's initial purpose to "increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries participating in such [military education and training]

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activities of basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights.”⁶

In 1991, after confirming aspects of its earlier mandate, Congress modified the scope of the program. This legislative amendment, entitled Expanded IMET (E-IMET), focused on:

- Responsible defense resource management
- Greater respect for and grasp of democracy and civilian rule of law, including the principle of civilian control of the military
- Military justice systems in a democracy
- Better understanding of internationally recognized human rights.

Legislation between 1991 and 1993 also enlarged the candidate population to include civilian personnel from non-defense ministries, officials in the legislative branch who deal with military matters, and personnel from nongovernmental agencies having defense-related interests. To ensure the initiative was taken seriously, Congress established a minimum funding level for this element of the overall IMET program—\$1 million in FY 1991. It is the intent of the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) to have this amount increased annually by \$1 million (e.g., to \$5 million in FY 95). The SAC also directed the Defense Security Assistance Agency in September 1993 to “actively and continuously review its traditional IMET program for opportunities to shift funds more rapidly into expanded IMET initiative courses and training.”⁷

THE STRUCTURE OF U.S. FOREIGN MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

The IMET program is not the only funding source for U.S. professional military education and technical training. Others include a recently introduced grant program in the State Department’s counternarcotics account, as well as the traditional option to purchase instruction through Foreign Military Sales (FMS). In essence, the United States implements a dual track strategy of selling foreign military training to wealthier states and providing grant aid to those unable to afford such training.

For the first group, countries use FMS, often at lower rates, to purchase technical training relating to the operation, maintenance, and management of equipment purchased from the Army, Air Force, and Navy (including Marine Corps and Coast Guard programs). Interest in proficiency training is less prevalent today; many states now have their own technical schools or have purchased military systems and material from countries other than the United States and use their training programs. The purchase of U.S. professional military education for junior and middle-grade officers with leadership potential has increased significantly, however. Courses on defense resource management are heavily enrolled. Over the last 7 years, the Foreign Military Sales alternative has been the more heavily traveled path in strengthening bilateral military relations with friends and allies. Table 1, for example, indicates that over 50 percent of visiting Army students receive instruction funded by FMS. (The percentage of Navy and Air Force students is even higher—over 80 percent.)

The second track, grant International Military Education and Training, with annual guidelines developed by authorizing and appropriating committees, provides direction for the management of all foreign training through the Defense Security Assistance Agency's (DSAA) *Security Assistance Management Manual*.⁸ As a result, the term IMET has become both the acronym for an important formal grant program and a commonly *misapplied* designator for the entire foreign training program (e.g., as a designator for the FMS component). For purposes of evaluation, it is difficult to isolate IMET-funded experiences from other programs. The only identifier is the limited financial resources of countries chosen by the State Department to receive IMET assistance. This standard is unreliable, however, because, for reasons of policy, some states receive a small allocation of funds in order to purchase reduced-cost training. The principal programs—IMET and FMS—accomplish comparable objectives, sometimes for the same country. Students attend the same courses, experience U.S. culture together, have comparable opportunities to apply their training, and rise to positions of prominence later in life. As this study suggests, U.S. policy

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successes stemming from access to U.S. military education are the results of the entire U.S. foreign military education and training system. To avoid confusion, this report uses “foreign military education and training,” “security assistance training,” and “foreign military education” as terms for the larger system of which IMET is a part.

TABLE 1. International military student training spaces annual total, FY 1988-1994: U.S. Army

<i>Fiscal Year</i>	<i>Foreign Military Sales</i>	<i>IMET Funding</i>
1988	\$5051 (50%)	\$4998
1989	5297 (54%)	4594
1990	4488 (51%)	4350
1991	4812 (54%)	4172
1992*	3815 (57%)	2889
1993	3875 (58%)	2776
1994	5825 (75%)	1971

*The drop between FY 1991 and 1992 reflects a reduction in the IMET appropriation and a temporary reduction in the number of foreign training spaces and U.S. military courses offered during and immediately after Operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*.

Along the spectrum of bilateral foreign policy instruments, IMET, and only IMET, fills a specific, narrow, multifaceted niche. There are five aspects unique to this program:

- It is the sole source of assistance for countries that cannot afford to purchase professional military education, technical training, or E-IMET’s political-military courses for their military institutions.
- The program helps support three special schools at which instruction for Latin American and U.S. students is in Spanish: the U.S. Army School of the Americas, the Inter-

American Air Forces Academy, and the Naval Small-Craft Instruction and Technical Training School.

- IMET funds essential language training in the United States at the Defense Language Institute, English Language Center (DLIELC) and English-language laboratories, all of which are used extensively to prepare students for assignment in the U.S., as well as to maintain proficiency upon their return.
- It provides a preferential pricing policy that allows countries such as Spain, Greece, Bahrain, Finland, Austria and Singapore to purchase expensive training at reduced rates in conjunction with purchases of major military systems.
- IMET provides funding for a series of new courses offered by various defense and service schools to further the objectives of Expanded IMET legislation. Congress has stipulated that, in FY 1995, twenty percent (\$5 million) will be used for E-IMET instruction.

Currently, IMET funding provides Professional Military Education (PME) and Technical Training in English for foreign officers, enlisted and selected civilian personnel at U.S. military schools (other than service academies), and various training facilities. Foreign students normally attend the same courses and work side-by-side with U.S. students. (Programs in some countries, such as France and Taiwan, segregate foreign students.) There are a small number of special programs offered at civilian schools and institutions and some technical training conducted for all-international military student classes, usually for a particular weapons system.


Congressional appropriations for IMET since 1976 have fluctuated, reflecting trends in U.S. foreign policy and the climate of executive-legislative relations. Table 2 and figures 1 and 2 show the annual IMET appropriation between 1976 and 1996, the number of participating countries in the same time frame, as well as the number of IMET students each year. During the first 5 years of enactment under economy-influenced legislative controls, a median IMET budget of \$27.3 million covered an average of 44 countries. The student population decreased during this period by roughly 50 percent (7,000 to

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TABLE 2. IMET annual appropriations and country programs, FY 1976-FY 1996 (dollars in thousands; students in hundreds)

Fiscal Year	Appropriated	Number of Countries*	Number of Students
1976	28,750	42	70
1977	25,000	46	48
1978	30,000	41	44
1979	27,900	40	38
1980	25,000	52	36
1981	28,400	62	50
1982	42,000	72	62
1983	46,000	80	66
1984	51,532	86	60
1985	56,221	91	66
1986	54,490	96	62
1987	56,000	96	63
1988	47,400	98	56
1989	47,400	95	53
1990	47,196	94	45
1991	47,196	97	49
1992	44,573	99	44
1993	42,500	105	45
1994	22,250	103	21
1995	26,350	114	28 (estimate)
1996 (planned)	39,781	113	

* This column identifies the number of countries that funded IMET programs during a particular fiscal year. The 1996 figure represents those countries programmed to be funded, subject to legislative and policy considerations that might restrict planned programs from being funded.


FIGURE 1. *IMET students and number of countries*

3,600). In succeeding years, both dollar levels and foreign participation increased dramatically, averaging \$48.5 million and 92 countries between 1982 and 1993. The IMET student population reached a peak of 6,700 in 1985, and then declined steadily until 1994, when it bottomed out at 2,100. Over the last 2 years, reflecting renewed budget cuts in all security assistance programs, the median appropriation level fell significantly to \$24 million.⁹ However, the number of established and newly democratic countries receiving small amounts of IMET funding jumped to a record 2-year average of 108 states. Since FY 1991, over 26 new country programs were initiated, primarily in Central and Eastern Europe and Africa.

The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) estimates that, between FY 1976 and FY 1994, over 98,000 students from 105 countries have received instruction at more than 150 military schools and installations throughout the United States and abroad, including U.S. Coast Guard facilities, under the IMET grant program.¹⁰ They have received formal instruction selected from over 2,000 courses, on-the-job training, observer training (such as for foreign medical personnel), and orientation tours (e.g., for senior defense officials). On occasion, specialized

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FIGURE 2. International military education and training, by region



instruction by a Service “mobile training team” (MTT) has been conducted outside the United States.

In reviewing these data for U.S. foreign military education and training, it is easy to miss the singularity of the highly successful FMS and IMET programs. There is no comparable historical example of so many diverse sovereign states augmenting the professional development of their armed forces by entrusting so many potential national leaders to the education and training of another state. While other countries such as France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Israel, Taiwan and Canada have offered similar forms of security assistance, and still do, the global scale undertaken by the United States continues to be unprecedented. The U.S. approach also is exceptional for a second reason. Both programs, IMET and FMS, facilitate the only educational opportunities available through the U.S. Government in which military and civilian students share confidence-building experiences, which lead to greater mutual understanding.

FOREIGN MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN FY 1995

This section of the study looks at trends today in the U.S. model for security assistance training. Foreign military education and training goes well beyond merely attending one of more than 2,000 courses. The approach for this experience combines three educational opportunities in the United States. Synergy is essential if the original intent of Congressional legislation is to be fully realized. The first element is formal instruction at a U.S. military school. Ideally, the course lasts for at least 8 weeks, the minimum length of time needed for a sound parallel experience—exposure to a DOD-managed Informational Program (IP). This is a specialized activity designed to assist foreign students to acquire an understanding of U.S. society, institutions, and values, including an awareness of U.S. efforts domestically to respect human rights and the importance the United States places on the role of the armed forces in a democratic society. The final element is English language training to assist those international military students who lack the language qualifications necessary to fully benefit from the course work. This training also provides a strong introduction to North American culture with an emphasis on human rights. There are many variables within these three elements that influence the outcome of each visitor's experience. The length of the course and strength of its curriculum—for example, the quality of teaching, design of the local Informational Program, mind set of U.S. and foreign students in a class, and other factors—make U.S. foreign military education and training inexact in structure, unpredictable in ultimate outcome, yet genuine in intention and far-reaching in possible results.

Context for the FY 1995 IMET Program

Congress appropriated \$25.5 million for the International Military Education and Training program in FY 1995, augmented by an \$850,000 transfer from funding for peacekeeping operations (total: \$26.35 million). DSAA expects to finance the instruction of approximately 2,800 students from 114 countries with these funds. Using a 6-year average, 1988 to

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1993, as a benchmark for comparisons, the FY 1995 appropriation is a 43 percent reduction from the 1988-1993 median funding level of \$46.1 million. The IMET program during that period supported an average of 4,900 students from 97 countries.

Attraction of U.S. Professional Military Experience

The principal category of instruction requested by foreign countries in FY 1995 is Professional Military Education, with 64 percent of students (primarily officers) accounting for 70 percent of program costs (predominantly for programs related to language training). Technical Training encompasses 32 percent of the students, and 18 percent of program costs. By comparison, the statistics for FY 1988 indicate a reverse emphasis on proficiency training in technical areas—48 percent of students and 45 percent of program costs went to Technical Training, and only 32 percent of the students and 53 percent of program costs to Professional Military Education.

There are several reasons for the recent increase in foreign interest in U.S. Professional Military Education, especially in the areas of leadership, management, command and staff, and war college courses. Political *and* military authorities in many new democracies are contending with the need for institutional adjustments to create a different political culture that emphasizes increased interaction with civilian authorities. Political leaders want to expose promising military officers to the professional education and practices associated with the U.S. democratic system. Leaders within the armed forces often have a similar objective in the face of internal questioning of traditional military values, missions and organization.

On an operational level, there continues to be a desire to gain greater insight into U.S. military performance in combat and during humanitarian assistance operations. Perhaps on the part of some senior military, there is a wish to become part of the global security community by association with the United States. An Australian officer, responding to the study group survey conducted in preparation of this report, captured the essence of this new professional orientation, a view shared by many

respondents: “I don’t think we seek ‘expertise’—its more education, exposure, and breadth of understanding. Nonetheless, the management skills discussed . . . and the intellectual exposure . . . *must* make students *much* better [officers].”¹¹ Other comments, particularly from respondents familiar with Latin American military schools, stress the attractiveness of the freedom to explore alternative ways to solve operational and strategic problems in U.S. professional courses, instead of rote memorization of approved solutions.¹²

The current, expanded U.S. foreign and security policy agenda, covering such issues as democracy, drugs, arms control and peacekeeping, is shared today by many governments. And, instead of occasional qualms about accepting the conditions associated with security assistance training from the United States, preferring the less intrusive approach of the French, Israeli, or Taiwanese military, allies and friends now are seeking exposure to U.S. training and professional standards with growing enthusiasm. For example, Malian officers who were former IMET students recently approached the U.S. embassy in Bamako for support in developing a training course for noncommissioned officers similar to that in the United States. The Malian officers understood the importance of professional development programs for noncommissioned officers and other enlisted personnel in instilling discipline and gaining their support for the country’s new democratic government under civilian control.¹³

Maturation of Expanded IMET

DSAA has launched an intensive effort to reinforce several of its programs in response to Congressional directives enlarging the purpose of IMET. A number of new training initiatives have been introduced, and planning for additional curricula is underway based on recent clarifications by Congressional staff. From a listing of nine established courses in 1992, E-IMET’s core program has grown to 35 over 3 years, with an additional 18 courses taught abroad by Mobile Education Teams (METs) and another 43 capable of meeting E-IMET standards when attended by IMET-funded civilians. DSAA has retained postgraduate

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programs that are no longer available under IMET.¹⁴ The Defense Resource Management Institute (DRMI) and a new Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR), both in Monterey, California, and the International Training Detachment of the Naval Justice School (NJS/ITD) in Newport, Rhode Island, manage the principal programs. The strength of Expanded IMET at present is to be found in its concentration on resource management and military justice (human rights), particularly courses taught outside the United States by METs from DRMI and NJS/ITD.¹⁵ These short courses, usually no longer than 2 weeks, are effective in bringing civilian and military officials together on neutral ground and within their own culture, often for the first time, to discuss fundamental political-military issues. Mobile education teams have been well received by both host governments and U.S. missions, as is reflected in growing numbers of countries desiring to participate in these programs.

Two schools of thought concerning Expanded IMET have emerged among recipients of security assistance training. The smaller group likes the focus of E-IMET instruction and its encouragement of civilian participation. These countries, primarily from Central Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Africa, tend not to have had previous experience with IMET's professional military courses and have few preconceived views about the program. The governments are rebuilding defense establishments and have an abiding interest in resource management and military justice programs. The new emphasis on civilian participation in IMET-funded education, however, has a downside even among these ardent supporters. The Czech Republic is typical of many new democracies. A U.S. embassy official in Prague told the INSS team that the government simply has "run out of Czechs who are qualified and can be spared from their current duties during the course of a single year . . . English language is a critical limiting factor . . . the Czechs agree that they should send 'the right person' to the IMET course, not just 'the best English score available.' That's easier said than done. It's tough to build a boat while you're careening down a white water river."¹⁶ In many democracies, government service has limited prestige and appeal, resulting in serious shortages of civilians interested in the defense and national security sectors.

The study team also found a need for caution. The motivation of some civilians who are attracted to IMET-funded programs should be checked to avoid inadvertently supporting conservative ultranationalists, for example, or business opportunists. Under these circumstances, heavy U.S. pressure for civilian participation in IMET instruction in the United States is considered self-defeating in several countries.

The larger school of thought includes governments long accustomed to participating in PME and Technical Training courses. Respondents to the study group survey representing these countries find Expanded IMET less productive. These governments regret the reduction in IMET funding and consider the new program, with its congressionally mandated funding floor and DSAA's intent to designate more IMET dollars for E-IMET programs, a challenge to a pattern of financial assistance that over time had become routine. They prefer concentration on professional military education and expanded opportunities for officers in lieu of civilians. In many of these countries, there is no tradition of using military funds to train civilians (and vice versa) and no bureaucratic process to do so. In some cases, members of this group believe that E-IMET is part of a veiled policy to do away with military institutions and replace them with police.

To manage implementation of the Expanded IMET amendment, DSAA has assumed responsibility for the education of foreign defense civilians through close review and approval, as appropriate, of all courses presented for inclusion in the E-IMET program. DSAA's efforts have introduced sound academic standards. The content and pedagogy of professional military education and technical proficiency training, on the other hand, have long been considered the prerogative and responsibility of the military departments. DSAA lacks qualified staff and has not made an effort to oversee them.

The Informational Program—Still a Strong Influence

The Defense Department's Informational Program (IP), inaugurated by an internal directive in 1965, is experiential education intended to provide foreign students with an awareness

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and functional understanding of internationally recognized human rights and the American democratic way of life. The IP has been and continues to be, in the view of the INSS team, the central and most influential factor shaping attitudes and knowledge about the United States. Like successful exchange activities run by other government agencies, such as the Fulbright Program and USIA's International Visitor Program, the Informational Program's operating philosophy is simple and direct—to really understand American life, you must participate in it.

For over 30 years, each of the armed services has been required to provide an educational opportunity, concomitant with their professional instruction, that ensures foreign military students return home with a useful and balanced appreciation of U.S. culture, values, and the responsibilities of government at all levels, military institutions, and citizens to protect, preserve, and respect the rights of every member of society. To avoid any stigma of “forced indoctrination,” the program has been voluntary, but participation is strongly encouraged. The Informational Program is not included in a school's formal training schedule as a block of instruction or an elective. Normally, it is fitted around the existing curriculum. Guided now by a 1994 handbook that suggests teaching material and offers lessons learned from previous interactions with foreign students, International Military Student Offices (IMSO's) at each training installation implement decentralized programs they have designed to appeal to their foreign visitors.¹⁷ IMSO's organize events and activities related to 12 areas of basic Americana. The topics include: the Constitution and Bill of Rights; local, state, and federal government institutions; civilian and military judicial systems; political processes; news media; American family and community life; ethnic and other minorities; industry, environmental protection, and agriculture; economy (local free enterprise system); labor and labor-management relations; education; and public and social welfare.¹⁸

The IP's central focus is on democracy and human rights. Whether preparing for a cultural event or exchanging views later, a IMSO representative is required to guide a discussion among participating students of pertinent human rights aspects. The

activities noted in Figure 3, provided by the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School in Savannah, Illinois, are typical and demonstrate the depth of this program and how it works today.

FIGURE 3. Example of IP Activities

The U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School (USADACS), in Savannah, Illinois offers 26 courses for IMET-funded students. Each course combined formal classroom instruction in with the DoD Information Program (IP), which USADACS considers to be the vital ingredient in educating foreign students. Some of the local activities which support the IP objective of promoting democratic values are as follows:

1. Program at local college featuring Mr. Elie Wiesel, Holocaust survivor, author, and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1986. His message was one of peace and human dignity. Students from Ecuador and Zimbabwe attended.
 2. Program at local Martin Luther King Center to pay tribute to Dr. King on his birthday (national holiday). Members of the U.S. Army, a representative of the local member of Congress, local government officials, and school children made speeches and presented essays. Event recognized Dr. King's philosophy of social change and military cooperation at a local level. Program provided an opportunity to discuss respect for values of freedom, liberty and justice for all people. Students from Oman, Jordan, and the Philippines attended.
 3. Attendance at a political debate between a male and female candidate running to the U.S. Congress. On election day, the same group of students went to the polling place to witness the election process. The events provided an opportunity to discuss free speech, running for public office, and the electoral process. Students from Korea, Jordan, and Malaysia attended.
 4. A tour of the county jail during which a student asked where political prisoners were kept. Event provided an opportunity to discuss free speech and the political and judicial processes. Students from the Philippines attended.
 5. A tour of a large newspaper company. This facilitated discussion of who owns the media and freedom of the press. Students had difficulty comprehending media not controlled by the government. Students from Korea and the Philippines participated.
 6. Trip to Carroll County Fair, during which awards were presented to owners of seven "Centennial Farms," farms owned by the same family for at least 100 years. It was announced that there are 50 such farms in the county and 5,000 in Illinois. Event offered the opportunity to discuss property rights. Students from Jordan, Kenya, Niger, Korea and the Philippines attended.
 7. Attend a small town parade involving political candidates, Boy and Girl Scout groups, local chapter of Veterans of Foreign Wars, the County Mounted Patrol, church floats, and school bands. The parade facilitated discussion of right to assemble, freedom of speech, separation of church and state, and separation of military from law enforcement, which was a difficult concept for many foreign students to grasp. Students from Haiti, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, and the Philippines attended.
 8. Tour of Illinois State Capital. This event provided an opportunity to talk about state government as well as President Abraham Lincoln and his role in U.S. history. Springfield was one of Lincoln's homes. Students from Burma, El Salvador, Indonesia, and the Philippines attended.
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The Informational Program forms an integral part of the educational experience at more than 150 military schools and installations and in surrounding communities.¹⁹ DSAA manages the policy and monitoring office. Funds for the IP are derived from IMET and FMS course tuition costs, which average between \$20 and \$30 per student per training man-week.²⁰ DSAA does not currently consider the Informational Program eligible for funding as an E-IMET program. Considerable effort

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goes into ensuring that the foreign students, and their families, are properly received and integrated into military and civilian communities. They routinely have both a military and a civilian sponsor. Local civic, church and, in some locales, ethnic groups also participate. (Several Central European groups are active.) After students depart, IMSOs attempt to maintain contact through newsletters and other forms of correspondence.

The INSS survey developed for this report found overwhelming support for the IP. Responses from former IMET and FMS students and embassy officials in frequent contact with graduates are replete with praise for the Informational Program. A comment from a student departing from the United States is representative: "We can get the academic information from books and handouts, but what we will take back to our country with us and always remember are the people we met and the experiences we had on the IP tours."²¹ For a faculty member at the Naval Command College, the IP is the "heart and soul" of the training program: "I know this for a fact from two years of traveling . . . with officers representing forty-five (45) different nations."²²

Language Instruction Supports Human Rights Awareness

The full effectiveness of U.S. military education and training, as well as the Informational Program, rests on English competence. Much of language enhancement occurs during home country preparation for the assignment in the United States. However, a substantial percentage of foreign students require additional intensive language instruction prior to beginning their courses. Each year approximately 3,000 students complete instruction at the Defense Language Institute-English Language Center (DLIELC) after being immersed initially in an English-language-only environment. The Center recently has incorporated E-IMET-related topics into its curriculum, with emphasis on the precepts of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Subjects such as civil-military relations and human rights are not taught *per se* but are introduced as vehicles to develop English language proficiency through group discussion.

Criticism of IMET and the U.S. Army School of the Americas

Foreign education and training plays a valuable role in promoting mutually beneficial relations and broadening understanding between the United States and its allies and friends. It also improves interoperability among armed forces at the operational level and fosters greater respect for civil authority and human rights. Yet, in spite of perceived benefits at a low cost, IMET and the counterdrug grant training program have lost some Congressional support and funding in the current period of budget limitations. One important reason for the diminution of legislative backing is the perception that U.S. grant programs have been ineffectively used to educate many of the most notorious antidemocrats and human rights violators worldwide, associating the United States with their abuses. The main target for this criticism is the U.S. Army School of the Americas, one of the few U.S. training facilities and by far the largest in which Spanish-speaking military personnel are not integrated into regular U.S. military training courses.

Critics claim that the School of the Americas is a Cold War relic that no longer serves American interests. Over the last 5 years, however, their shrill argument has become less impassioned and more sophisticated. Initially, opposition attacked the school's existence and the courses of instruction taught there, portraying it alternatively as a "School of Assassins," the U.S. Army's "coup school," and a "School for Dictators."²³ After Congressional amendments to close it were soundly defeated in 1993 and 1994, critics modified their approach. One tack currently used by the Americas division of Human Rights Watch is to suggest, "It's not our impression the School of the Americas is training people to become murderers and dictators. They don't need to come here to learn how to become thugs. But clearly the school gives them more prestige and gives them more power when they go home."²⁴ A second line of argumentation, used recently by Congressmen Kennedy and Dellums in a letter urging President Clinton to eliminate funding for the School in the FY 1996 Appropriation Bill, does not question the "good values and the commitment of the U.S.

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personnel at the School.” They make two points: the “continued operation of the School of the Americas, with its history and tradition of abusive graduates, stands as a barrier to establishing a new and constructive relationship with Latin American militaries after the Cold War. And it continues to associate the United States with those abuses.”²⁵ The Department of the Army vigorously disputes these allegations, finding them factually wrong and deliberately misleading.

The catalyst for the opposition’s change in rhetoric appears to be the realization that the professional program at the School of the Americas has evolved in harmony with U.S. and regional security priorities as well as congressional mandate (in the 1991 Expanded IMET legislation). For example, the school’s revised mission—to provide doctrinally sound military education and training to the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean; promote democratic values and respect for human rights; and foster cooperation among the multinational military forces—now reflects an emphasis on the proper role of military institutions in democratic societies. Since 1990, the School of the Americas has become the only U.S. Army academic institution where human rights instruction is incorporated into every course. The 37 offerings in FY 1995 focus on developing professional military thought processes and technical skills, consistent with U.S. Army doctrine, in such fields as peace operations, democratic sustainment, counterdrug operations, and natural disaster response, in addition to standard U.S. infantry and aviation instruction.

For the School of the Americas, no less than for other institutions of learning, it is impossible to guarantee that all graduates will live up to the positive values to which they were exposed in the classroom. During the past 49 years, the School has graduated almost 59,000 military students. Only a very small number of them, less than one-half of 1 percent have been guilty of subsequent misconduct. To portray their atypical conduct as the norm or to imply that U.S. Army schooling encourages, teaches, or supports inhumane behavior and nondemocratic values is not only incorrect and unfair but intellectually dishonest.

It is important to note, furthermore, that most of the reputed “IMET failures” tend to have two characteristics:

- The course they attended at the School was technical (e.g., parachute rigging or communication) and very short, often only 1 or 2 weeks in duration, affording little time to become acquainted with and interact with U.S. instructors and counterparts.
- The School of the Americas was in Panama when they received instruction. The program moved to Fort Benning, GA, in 1984 when Fort Gulick, in the Panama Canal Zone, reverted to the Panamanian Government in accordance with the Panama Canal Treaties.

While located overseas, the benefit of DOD’s three-part synergy in foreign military education (course work, IP, and language training) was not realized. There was no opportunity for students to leave a familiar Latin culture to experience Americana through the Informational Program. Nor were they introduced to U.S. cultural values through English language instruction. The Canal Zone, symbolizing for some Latin Americans U.S. imperialism and exploitation, may have inadvertently reinforced attitudes antithetical to our institutions, ideals, and way of life.²⁶

A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING IMET’S EFFECTIVENESS

Since its inception during the Cold War, even as the international environment changes, foreign military education and training programs have been guided by two sets of interests:

- U.S. security interests—promoting stability within and among allied and friendly states by improving their self-defense capabilities
- U.S. diplomatic interests—strengthening bonds of mutual understanding.

These original objectives remain relevant; only U.S. efforts to achieve them have changed. For example, policy engagement today still tries to strengthen self-defense capabilities of other states, but the United States now advocates responsibility sharing, urging regional cooperative defense arrangements, to promote mid- to long-term stability. Washington’s aggressive

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efforts to promote and support democracy since the Cold War ended, furthermore, have given new impetus and life to the 1976 aim in the IMET legislation of strengthening mutual understanding between the United States and its friends and allies.

The INSS team drew no hard and fast distinctions between U.S. enduring security and diplomatic interests. Both have relevance and both are essential. The team also avoided efforts to weigh relative importance to the U.S. among candidate countries using grant and FMS funding. The study group concentrated instead on assessing, from a U.S. national perspective, the effectiveness of the education and training that IMET and other programs make possible in three areas drawn from the above mentioned sets of interests. These include the program's contribution to achieving long-term stability worldwide, improving cooperative military relations with the United States, and supporting U.S. diplomatic interests overseas and economic interests at home.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO LONG-TERM REGIONAL STABILITY

Many governments wishing to supplement national military instruction rely on the United States to assist in educating future key professionals—presidential advisors, senior commanders, principal staff officers, educators, and trainers. Promising officers assigned to the U.S. program represent an investment by their government and military institution in their country's future security and defense. Graduates do rise to positions of considerable prominence. The experience of the Naval Command College (NCC) is illustrative of the importance attached to U.S. schooling, the quality of foreign students, as well as the contribution of DOD's educational efforts. Since 1957, 53 percent of international students (641 of 1219) from 77 countries have risen to flag rank; 19 percent of these officers have become chiefs of service. Five percent of graduates between 1977 and 1991 (23) currently hold this position. At the U.S. Army War College, 54 percent of its foreign graduates (241 of 449) from 85 countries have attained general officer rank.

Today, 3 percent, 7 officers, hold the highest position in their army or a cabinet-level billet. (There are no data yet on the initial civilian students.)

For its part, Washington also considers these international officer graduates, and now civilian professionals, to be an important investment in U.S. security by virtue of the roles they will play in establishing or sustaining local and regional stability worldwide. This U.S. interest is pursued through foreign military education and training in several ways, as the INSS team details below.

Access and Subjective Ties

The International Military Education and Training program today is often described as an “instrument of influence,” able to affect a wide range of U.S. interests from human rights performance to military interoperability. This notion of “influence,” however, requires close examination. In one traditional view, IMET and other forms of security assistance are presumed to accord the provider leverage vis a vis recipients. As one experienced observer noted in describing this Cold War mentality, it was believed to be self-evident that “the United States is able to affect the internal and external policy behavior of recipient military institutions and governments in a manner congenial with U.S. foreign policy interests.”²⁷ This perspective pervades the 1975 and 1976 HIRC hearings on international security assistance that produced the IMET legislation.

The study team found that almost all of today’s proponents of foreign military education and training contacted during its research recognize that IMET offers no guarantee of far reaching capacity to alter recipient institutional values or governmental behavior. Practitioners speak instead of access, rapport, and ease of communication, terms used by some synonymously with “influence.” Former and current attachés, security assistance officers, and IMET graduates themselves noted in response to the INSS questionnaire and during its workshops that security assistance education and training “gives you access that you wouldn’t or couldn’t have without difficulty,” that is, “access at the senior ranks of host country military establishments.”²⁸

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Describing an experience with a Commandant of the Bolivia Infantry School, a retired Special Forces officer wrote: "We had instant rapport as professionals having attended the same schools. As you well know, in that part of the world (as well as others) the 'chemistry' factor is the single most important in establishing an environment for the exchange of ideas."²⁹ "IMET students do act differently from their fellow officers who have not visited the United States," noted a Defense Attaché in an African state. "They seek out contact with U.S. representatives, are more friendly, and have a wider range of understanding to our way of thinking and acting."³⁰ Diplomatic missions find this friendly opening "incredibly useful." In Maldives, for instance, IMET is the means of access to and interaction with the closed world of the National Security Service.³¹ For several African countries, this is the only foreign assistance the United States provides.

The foreign military education and training experience in the United States builds what retired LTG William E. Odom, USA, has called "subjective ties" with future military and often political leaders in other states. In 1993 Congressional testimony he recounted a personal experience:

Another kind of desirable influence through IMET is demonstrated by US-Pakistani relations immediately after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. General Zia, the President of Pakistan, was being urged by his foreign minister to scorn US offers of assistance in favor of coming to term with Moscow. Because Zia had attended two US Army schools, and because he had made extremely close friends with ordinary American citizens during those two years, he was subjectively inclined toward the US offer. As a party to the meeting with him in Pakistan when he made the decision to accept the US offer, tying his policy to US strategy for Afghanistan, I gained the impression that his IMET experience was a critical factor in his decision.³²

It is difficult to measure the degree to which a former IMET or FMS student officer or civilian is favorably inclined toward the United States. A graduate may not have made it a part of his judgment until an issue arises that forces him to make a decision. More than likely, IMET is just one component of a complex

decision process, such as President Zia's. But it is a factor, and personal exposure to U.S. society, institutions, and values could be the decisive influence. During a September 1991 crisis in Zaire, a general officer-IMET graduate faced such a policy decision and made the difference in getting 450 Americans evacuated from a closed national airport under his control.³³

On the other hand, the IMET experience may have adverse or no affect. Clearly, a country's own culture, political and institutional traditions are significant influences on the attitudes and conduct of military and civilian leaders. There will always be powerful leader-graduates with no subjective ties and no interest in U.S. values after the academic or training experience.³⁴ Available data, however, suggests that this group of atypical former students is very small in number. They often have spent only a few weeks in the United States or, as the pre-1984 example of the U.S. Army School of the Americas in Panama suggests, have not experienced democratic culture.³⁵

Better Bilateral Understanding

The opportunity for professional development in the United States is an important symbol of a sound bilateral relationship in a world where the potential for misunderstanding between states is ever present. Graduates of U.S. military programs depart with a better appreciation of American cultural reference points and style of public debate. As one survey respondent put it: "Walk a mile in my shoes and you'll probably better understand and react with me in the future."³⁶ Research revealed that former student-officers often help behind the scenes to correct misinformation or place an issue in its proper context. Undoubtedly, officers who have attended courses in the United States will be in important command, staff and academic positions where their observations carry weight, even when they are junior officers. "The main contribution of the IMET graduates has been the diminishing of emotional and uninformed reactions [within the military institution] against the U.S.," observed a senior civilian Brazilian survey respondent with extensive government service. "Even if the formal declarations sound aggressive, IMET programs have created very effective

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informal channels that help to clarify sensitive situations, such as a deep suspicion at the Brazilian War College that the U.S. has a plan to seize the Amazon Basin because of its environmental importance.”³⁷

Another dimension of bilateral understanding is crucial in a crisis—the existence of high-level, unofficial channels of communication that allow friends to interpret events from their perspectives and thereby improve the accuracy of reporting and depth of analysis. During the Malvinas/Falklands War in 1982, shared U.S. educational experiences produced at least two unauthorized channels of communication between senior Argentine and U.S. officer-classmates.³⁸ In quickly planning and coordinating Operation *Provide Comfort* in 1991, both the State and Defense Departments benefitted from close relationships among several U.S. foreign service officers, U.S. military officers, and their Turkish military counterparts, all of whom had met as students at U.S. war colleges.

Neutral Ground Upon Which Neighbors Meet

There are, in reality, few opportunities for officers from neighboring countries to meet, exchange views in a not-for-attribution environment, and become acquainted with one another. U.S. security assistance training provides such an opportunity and encourages such interaction. International students at a U.S. installation, often small in number, tend to become a close knit family during a professional military course. Experiences are exchanged and bonds of friendship and trust are often formed. DOD’s Informational Program plays a key role in this process. Its activities bring the foreign students together regularly for special events and tours, and in this and in many other ways help them to get to know each other outside of the classroom. Case in point, several years ago a senior Chilean air force officer observed that “relations with the Peruvian Air Force had never been better because his Peruvian classmate from undergraduate pilot training in the United States had also risen to an equally important position in his air force. They had remained friends for more than 20 years and were in regular

contact. The Chilean added that 'there is nothing that we cannot work out between us.'"³⁹

CONTRIBUTIONS TO BUILDING COOPERATIVE MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS

Foreign military training is designed to improve the professional qualities and performance of international students who, in turn, often become instructors within their parent organizations. There usually are language difficulties and a considerable disparity in professional experience among U.S. and foreign students at the commencement of a course. By graduation, however, these gaps either have been bridged or ways to work around language, doctrinal, or other differences have emerged. This experience, not unlike solving practical problems in a foreign area of operation, has reinforced the ability of the U.S. armed forces to engage successfully in multilateral operations with participants from other countries. Several other benefits come to the fore.

Sharing U.S. Professional Education and Standards

The agreement to provide IMET-funded training to a foreign country stipulates that graduates be utilized in the national military education and training system for at least two years upon return home (three for highly technical training). This helps the United States to justify the expense of the grant program by ensuring that the learning experience is passed on quickly to others. By and large, parent military institutions honor this arrangement, with most officers being assigned as instructors upon their return or shortly thereafter. Graduates often return again several years later to positions of prominence and influence in their national military education and training system. In the Portuguese Armed Forces in 1994, for example, former recipients of IMET-funded education held the top positions at the Naval Academy, Air Force Academy, the Institute of Advanced Military Studies, and the NATO Defense College. At the same time in Lebanon, graduates of U.S. military schools commanded the Military Academy, the Command and Staff College, the Army's Training Institution, and the Air Force School. Officers

in such important positions frequently have attended two or three service programs in the United States.

Military school systems worldwide tend to be conservative and tradition bound, often unwilling to move quickly to adopt new ideas unless under pressure to do so. Change takes place slowly, but over 80 percent of the responses to INSS's research survey indicate that at some point in their careers graduate-officers have been instrumental in the professional development of their armed forces along U.S. operational, tactical, and management lines. Many respondents mentioned the Persian Gulf War as proof of U.S. influence. "One reason we had so much cooperation from our Middle Eastern counterparts," wrote one IMSO chief, "was because most of the high ranking [officers] had attended military training in the U.S. and understood how to work with us."⁴⁰ Many former students personally played key roles in the coalition the United States formed while others were instrumental in developing and training the forces which ultimately operated together under the U.N. flag.

The study team found other examples of former foreign students in the United States influencing military thinking within their services. A case in point involves three Argentine graduates of the U.S. Navy's Command Course who prepared their country's naval strategy based on their study of the U.S. Navy's counterpart document, . . . *From the Sea*. In Greece, a recent graduate of the U.S. Army War College returned to head the Tactics Department at the Greek War College. While in the position, he was instrumental in reorienting tactics instruction along U.S.-NATO lines. The improved curriculum for the Costa Rican National Police Academy was developed by several graduates of U.S. military schools. On an operational level, the U.S. Coast Guard has had considerable success in using IMET programs to assist counterparts in the Caribbean Basin, Estonia, and across the Pacific to establish and realize Western standards for cooperative law enforcement at sea. At the national level too, in countries such as Portugal, Greece and Turkey, students funded by IMET have risen to positions of influence in their Services, and often the ministry of defense, and refashioned

organizations, doctrine, management systems, and, on occasion, decision making processes after the U.S. defense model.⁴¹

Foreign military institutions, under pressure to adapt to the demands of a democratic political system, have shown interest in the U.S. approach to defense education and management. Over the last three years, the National Defense University has received visitors from over fifty countries interested in its organization, academic philosophy, and role in a democracy's military education system. The Defense Resource Management Institute has assisted several countries—for example, it helped Honduras to establish a National Defense College in (1991) at Colombia to formulate its 1996 defense budget.⁴² There have been numerous other instances of foreign military schools modifying their curricula (including instruction on human rights and rules of engagement), adopting course materials, and adapting teaching techniques based on contacts with DOD institutions.

Often junior officers and those who have attended multiple schools in the United States are profoundly influenced by issues of professional proficiency and personal values. One instance was found in a daily situation report from a multinational training exercise organized by U.S. Southern Command in November 1994:

Among the outstanding exercise participants is Captain R. from El Salvador. Captain R. is only 35 years old, yet his career includes fifteen years experience . . . Captain R. has attended the U.S. Army Infantry Officer Basic and Infantry Officer Advance Courses as well as short courses in Washington, DC, sponsored by [the] Department of State. The questions and points [he] brought to the exercise, [which stressed rules of engagement and respect for human rights] . . . are indicative of a clear understanding of the problems associated with peace operations. Captain R. has been recognized as a leader in the [Task Force] staff . . . [He] is a success story in the making and represents everything the IMET program is intended to do.⁴³

Most respondents to INSS's survey who are assigned overseas mentioned the striking difference between former international student officers and contemporaries who remained home. In Bolivia, for example, the U.S. mission rates the units

commanded by graduates of the School of the Americas as the best trained in the country: "These units think and act differently, allowing qualified NCO's to teach courses, [which in Latin America is] a rare practice."⁴⁴ A theory that seems validated is that professionalism can breed professionalism.

As a Force Multiplier

From a U.S. perspective, foreign officers attending U.S. military schools, particularly staff colleges, gain valuable insights into our operational and tactical mind set and procedural approaches. They also learn first hand the capabilities and limitations of a wide array of U.S. military equipment. Students work side-by-side with American counterparts in numerous classroom and field exercises, building mutual trust, effective communication in English, an understanding of interoperability, and familiarity with our military doctrine. Such combined experience has facilitated coalition operations in various parts of the world. In Turkey, during Operations *Desert Shield* and *Provide Comfort*, for example, the planning and execution of complex operations at the national level, as well as combined special forces activities along the border with Iraq, were facilitated by many Turkish officers having been assigned in the United States as international military students.⁴⁵ A second example is the composite battalion from the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) serving with U.S. forces in Haiti. The technical competence of the Eastern Caribbean soldiers, which has been praised officially by U.S. Atlantic Command, can be directly attributed to exposure of its officers to U.S. tactical, logistical and leadership training.⁴⁶

Interoperability in U.N. Peace Operations

In a number of countries, officers assigned to international staffs or as liaison officers to them, or often as attachés are invariably graduates of U.S. military training programs. They tend to have a working fluency with English, have maintained U.S. contacts, and share common professional education. These qualifications are now in demand for a variety of U.N. peace operations. The assignment of a recent Polish graduate of the U.S. Army War

College to be the Chief of Staff of UNPROFOR's Sector North in Croatia is typical. The headquarters provides command and control to Danish, Jordanian, Ukrainian, and Polish battalions. The lingua franca is English. Its staff and operational procedures within the headquarters are from the United States or its close procedural relative, NATO standard agreements.⁴⁷

Professional military education in the United States, including language instruction, provides a shared experience for officers from many of the countries contributing forces to U.N. peace operations. With this experience as a base for standardizing operating procedures and establishing standards of conduct, many U.N. commanders begin to build unit cohesion and improve the performance of their multinational force. Governments recognize that their capacities to assist in peace operations depend on an ability to interoperate with the United States; increasingly, they seek training in U.S. schools to enhance the capabilities of their forces.

Benefitting from the Expertise of Others

The INSS team found that instructors from several U.S. senior service and staff colleges maintained that U.S. students benefitted significantly from contact with colleagues from other countries. The latter's presence brings provocative non-U.S. perspectives, and varied professional expertise into U.S. military classrooms. They provide an invaluable counterweight to blind acceptance of U.S. military doctrine and cultural biases on national security issues. These students frequently frame a discussion or a solution to an operational problem in ways which U.S. participants have not considered and offer unique insights into other alternative courses of action which may not be readily apparent. As a result, U.S. officers are forced to think through and defend their views, with benefit to all. Because it finds the contributions of its international students so valuable, the National Defense University is expanding the number of foreign officers in its colleges. "In this day of coalition warfare, we need this exposure," argued one faculty member.⁴⁸ The current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) policy on military education underscores the importance of maintaining

international student programs which “contribute to professional broadening of attending U.S. officers.”⁴⁹

CONTRIBUTIONS TO U.S. DIPLOMATIC INTERESTS OVERSEAS AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS AT HOME

Political and economic liberalization, which have yielded democratic elections and free market economies in many parts of the world, also nurture anxiety within impatient electorates and conservative national institutions. Questions of leader integrity and the perceived inability of governments to reduce poverty and correct long-standing social inequities have led to urban and rural violence in a number of nations. The strategic interests of the United States are served by working with elected officials to encourage social stability, ensuring the sustainability of the progress already made, and helping them travel the difficult road still ahead. As this process unfolds, military institutions also have begun to reexamine their roles, missions, organizations, and institutional values. Many are trying to reconcile traditional corporatist thought and the relatively new liberal thinking. Many also are trying to rethink the customary relationship between the military and political sectors of their society. From a U.S. perspective, this is an opportune time to stress the important contributions that professional education in the U.S. and contact with Americans can make, not only for military officers but also for civilian officials.

Learning About Liberty in the United States

International military students have played positive supporting roles in remarkable national political transformations over the past five years. These officers were among the pro-democracy forces in Mali, for example, when the 23-year old military dictatorship was overthrown in 1991. They had a key role in rallying pro-democracy Thai protesters in 1992 and championing the cause of human rights and representative government in Thai politics. Graduates commanded the Army units that successfully put down Venezuela’s two attempted coups in 1992 and played important roles in Guatemala when their institution opposed the

President's attempted *autogolpe* (self-coup) in 1993. And in many other less dramatic and visible ways, they have helped sustain liberty's momentum that Washington praises today.

What these officers share in common is an experience in the United States that changed their thinking about democracy. Many of the military officers involved in the events above attended service schools in the United States during the 1980s. Trying to explain their willingness to promote and defend democracy, the INSS team found that U.S. professional military education and technical training, designed for U.S. students, generally offer little formal instruction, other than resource management, on the liberal political tradition in this country, the role of the armed forces within this tradition, and other democracy-related subjects. Even after the 1991 Expanded IMET legislation prompted new offerings of instruction on human rights and governance issues in courses on military justice and in programs such as the School of the Americas and the Defense Resource Management Institute, the core Service schools have changed little in their curricula. For U.S. officers, graduates of service academies and civilian universities, who have been taught to understand this country's unique history and culture of civilian control of the armed forces, nothing in civil-military relations has changed.⁵⁰ Not surprisingly, the content of professional military and technical courses for junior officers and, to a lesser extent, at command and staff colleges, is quiet on human rights and democratic governance. The curricula at war colleges are more broadly based, paying attention to defense and service resource management, military operations, and national security policy making, which includes domestic and legislative considerations affecting security decisions. Civil-military relations in the context of intergovernmental teamwork in the execution of policy is a current issue of interest; topics on human rights usually are not. Informal discussions about the military's role in American society occur among U.S. and foreign classmates, often stimulated by an experience in the installation's Informational Program, such as a visit to a high school or college ROTC program, a National Guard armory, or a service recruiting office.

By and large, foreign students in the 1980s and 1990s gained an understanding of liberties enjoyed in this country from experiences outside the professional education or technical courses they were attending. Perhaps an occasional class, maybe discussions with U.S. officers (classmates and sponsors), but certainly contact with the American way of life shape their attitudes. An example from Mali, provided by a Foreign Service Officer who was assigned there between December 1990 and February 1994, illustrates the process and influence of this immersion.⁵¹

[T]hose officers who had benefitted from IMET training tended to support the transition to democracy and civilian control of the military. In addition, many of them had a heightened sense of the professionalism ... and how it related to human rights issues and support for democracy, even though they had not been in courses specifically designed to address these issues. (This was just before E-IMET was created.) Some of them spoke often about the importance of their IMET experience both for professional development and for what they learned about how a professional military acts in a democracy. Some of them emphasized that this came not only from the course, but also from contact with U.S. military and civilians, and from just living in the U.S. for a year.⁵²

The study team discovered that, of all the experiences which foreign military students remember, contact with the American culture stands out. As mentioned earlier, this comment is made time and again in the responses to the INSS survey. The role of DOD's extracurricular Informational Program (IP) is frequently singled out. Curiosity about the United States and how a free market democracy functions today is greater than ever. The IP tries to nurture and focus this interest, as well as the natural tendency of visitors to compare cultures, to ensure that students have insightful encounters with democracy in action and that the significance of each is not lost. The original 1976 legislation creating IMET encourages "understanding between the U.S. and foreign countries." INSS found that this goal is best served by combining an assignment at a U.S. military school with participation in the IP and incidental contact with Americans and their way of life.

Helping to Bring Civilian and Military Leaders Together

The Expanded IMET program is uniquely able to bring civilian and military personnel together for a common educational experience, in many cases, for the first time. At present, this occurs most effectively outside the United States, using a Mobile Education Team (MET) from either the Naval Justice School's International Training Detachment, the Defense Resource Management Institute or the Center for Civil-Military Relations to present an in-depth seminar or course of instruction. Such occasions provide the U.S. ambassador the opportunity to bring together a large number of senior government officials, legislators, representatives from the media and other nonmilitary groups to stimulate dialogue and enhance mutual understanding. "Just being the 'event' that brings all parties together is significant," observed a participant of several MET's on military law. "Moreover, working groups, follow-on classes, combined training, . . . spurred by the E-IMET training, have continued and improved communication."⁵³ The Chairman of the Defence and Security Committee of the Malawi National Assembly recently was one of 38 participants in a seminar conducted in Zomba by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations. His letter to Defense Secretary Perry underscores the power of a mobile education team to assist high-level democratic authorities in ways that would not be possible in the United States:

The thirty eight participants in the seminar included the full spectrum of Malawi leadership in the Armed Forces, the Legislature, the Media, the Ministry of Defence and other key ministries.

My colleagues and I found the Seminar extremely interesting and useful. We were able to discuss problems that have never been examined in an open manner in Malawi before. We were also able to analyse how other democracies have resolved their problems in civil-military relations, and plan to use this analysis to address our own challenges in the areas of Ministry of Defence Organisation, Defence Policy Formulation, Roles and Missions of the Army and Police as related to internal and external threats, the relationship between the Press and the Military, the role of

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Legislative oversight and the appropriate role for military personnel in relation to political activity.⁵⁴

Because it is explicitly designed to address human rights and democratic institution issues, E-IMET has a more direct and measurable impact on these questions. “Let’s not just measure bodies, but rather changes in statutes, in procedures,” argued a military lawyer in one of INSS’s workshops. In many African and Central European countries, military justice codes are being re-written. Many of the new codes are modeled on the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice as a result of the Naval Justice School’s efforts. A program in Senegal is typical. “After showing a [civilian] military judge for Senegal . . . our system of court procedures emphasizing the accused’s rights and the need to make sure the accused understood them, the judge significantly changed his . . . procedures and adopted the U.S. model virtually verbatim.”⁵⁵ In the Czech Republic and other Central and Eastern European countries, E-IMET programs complement other programs—multimillion dollar programs—sponsored by the Committee for Eastern European Legal Education (CEELE), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the American Bar Association and others. These efforts focus on the judiciary, commercial codes, and legal practices. Few, if any, have contact with the military. Only E-IMET does. The programs work well together, but only E-IMET provides a venue for civilians and military to meet on neutral ground.

Improving National Defense Management

In their ongoing period of economic reform and constrained resources, governments have expressed considerable interest in developing expertise in the field of resource management. IMET and E-IMET programs fund military and civilian/military participation respectively at a wide range of different defense and service schools in this field. It is significant that the first U.S. Army War College graduate from one of the new Eastern European republics recently headed the commission which planned the restructuring of his country’s armed forces.⁵⁶ The Defense Resource Management Institute, however, has the most

experience with these programs. Since 1965, the Institute has conducted professional education courses in analytical decision making, resource management, and civil-military relations in defense planning and budgeting for roughly 12,000 U.S. military and civilian officials and over 8,200 personnel from 125 other countries. Since E-IMET was launched in 1991, DRMI has averaged about 225 international students per year attending its resident courses. The Institute also has conducted 8 to 10 mobile education courses abroad each year which add another 350 to 400 participants.

DRMI has increased its activities, and influence, overseas. It currently teaches an annual 2-week seminar on resource management at the Honduran National Defense College (the Institute helped design the curriculum in 1991). Mobile Education Team's have visited Argentina, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and several countries in southern Africa over the last 4 years. The Argentine military has integrated its MET instruction into curricula at their National Defense School and Superior Studies Course. An early December 1994 visit by the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, resulted in the Institute immediately conducting a special 2-week course for a high-level delegation of eleven deputy cabinet ministers from executive departments in Ukraine. The Czech Republic is planning a similar program. Case studies based on the DRMI curriculum are used at the Venezuelan Naval War College. And the Colombian Minister of Defense has recently asked for assistance with the formulation of his country's next defense budget.⁵⁷ Colombian graduates of DRMI resident courses are working in the Ministry of Defense planning office and other resource management positions. Two METs have worked with a cross section of Colombian ministries that are involved in the defense planning process. In addition to 38 Colombians attending the March 1995 mobile course, there were two Bolivians, two Costa Ricans, and one participant from El Salvador.⁵⁸

Buying USA

Exposure to a wide variety of U.S. military systems and related material is a powerful incentive for foreign students to recommend that national leaders “buy USA” after their return home. These officers have not only planned for the use of U.S. weapons and equipment in the classroom and actually practiced with them in the field, but they also have a good understanding of their operational abilities and limitations, logistical requirements, and employment doctrine. Often as the result of continued U.S. professional training and education, the national military leadership in wealthier countries adopts a pro-U.S. defense equipment mind set. The sustained effectiveness of U.S. training programs for Spain’s F-18 fighter pilots, for example, contributed immeasurably to the government’s decision to purchase 24 additional USN F-18S aircraft. The procurement of the HAWK missile system as the Spanish Air Defense system can be attributed to the number of senior officers involved in the decision process who attended the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.⁵⁹ The Portuguese, Greek, Turkish, and Ecuadoran armed forces have reorganized and modernized using U.S. equipment, tactics and operational doctrine. Material recommendations in these institutions frequently are made by panels of officers who share the common experience of attending the same U.S. military staff or war college.⁶⁰

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IMET: ADDITIONAL FINDINGS

Historian Barbara Tuchman once observed, “One needs to step outside a phenomenon in order to see its shape, . . . to be able to look back and say, ‘*There* was the turning point.’”⁶¹ From its vantage point, the INSS study group believes that the 1991 Expanded IMET amendment provides International Military Education and Training with its first turning point. This legislation both reaffirmed and challenged the successful 1976 program. In particular, it reaffirmed the program’s two original aims. The United States first wanted to help countries utilize their resources more effectively, improving military doctrine, technical and tactical competence, and defense management

skills in order to increase national self-reliance in security matters. Second, the United States used the medium of military education to advance understanding of U.S. culture, institutions and values, especially as they relate to human rights. These two objectives remain relevant, useful and worthy of funding support, and the rightness of the program's focus—military officers—continues to be upheld.

In addition, Congress in 1991 recognized that the changing international security environment poses an expanding set of non-traditional requirements for this military program, such as assisting armed forces to adjust to new democratic norms and exploring the challenging demands associated with coalition peace operations. But Congress went beyond professional military education and competency training and gave the IMET program a political-military task—to help educate several categories of civilian officials in how to oversee, manage and work with national military establishments. The U.S. legislators also challenged the foreign aid community to find ways to adapt to the evolving U.S. domestic security context. In the future, IMET will operate with fewer resources, be subject to closer interest group and Congressional scrutiny, and respond to greater international requirements for U.S. security assistance training.

The INSS team found today's IMET program, and foreign military education and training in general, in a state of transition from the old methods of Cold War vintage toward a new approach that is still taking shape. Congressional action in 1991, the recognition by unified commanders that low-visibility defense instruction has exceptional value in promoting both democracy and military cooperation, plus emotional criticism of the U.S. Army School of the Americas by media and religious activists have thrust IMET into the policy limelight. While progress has been made in adjusting to current circumstances, International Military Education and Training has had to become many things to different constituencies and, consequently, its center of gravity has been lost. In an effort to help chart the best course for the future, the study group went beyond an examination of IMET's effectiveness as a policy instrument and looked at two other aspects of the program: foreign military

education and training today, and contemporary pressures on the IMET system.

The Nature of Foreign Military Education and Training Today

Misleading terminology. The considerable success that the United States has enjoyed with its foreign military education and training programs relies on three different funding sources: the modest grant appropriation in the security assistance budget (IMET);⁶² Foreign Military Sales for training, which regularly funds over 50 percent of international students; and a small counterdrug grant initiative funded by the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. Lacking a term that consolidates the different categories of foreign military education and training, the practice today is to misleadingly refer to all three collectively as IMET.

The investment. DOD has long viewed foreign military education and training as a valuable investment in future bilateral and multilateral defense and diplomatic relations. Experience has shown that most visiting junior and middle-grade officers will move into national decision-making hierarchies. Thus far, the investment has paid substantial dividends in such areas as access to military and political leaders, resource management, procurement, doctrine development, and training practices.

There also is a second, less visible, near-term investment. It is derived from DOD's efforts to improve human rights awareness among foreign military and civilian students. The immediate objective is to positively influence personal behavior after graduates return home, possibly saving lives in the extreme. This investment is akin to an accident prevention program that relies heavily on awareness and a willingness to follow guidelines. Success with such a program is very difficult to measure accurately in quantifiable ways. It is defined largely after the fact in terms of what has not occurred, e.g., no accidents, military coups, or violations of human rights. Observers are hard pressed to determine how many incidents were avoided as a result of this educational experience, but

clearly, as critics attest, the United States is held accountable for the failures.⁶³

Education in three parts. The Defense Department's traditional approach to foreign military education and training is poorly understood, even within DOD. The method combines three elements: English language training (as required); a course of instruction in the service, joint or defense education system conducted in the United States (ideally more than 8 weeks long); and DOD's voluntary Informational Program (IP).

Whether visiting military and civilian students understand the United States, admire it, and want to identify with its values and overseas objectives, or cooperate militarily with it, may hinge directly on the quality of experience they have while undergoing training in this nation. Integrating all three elements shapes the experience, creating a positive environment that affects the knowledge and attitudes about the United States and its Armed Forces these visitors carry back home. English language training and the Informational Program are the unseen and underappreciated variables in the IMET experience. INSS's research, however, finds them to be the most influential elements, constituting the core of DOD's approach to human rights awareness.

Unavoidable tradeoffs have been made in the quality of this experience, diminishing the DOD program's full impact. The use of Mobile Training Teams to teach short courses outside the United States often are the only and best option to provide the technical instruction that a country needs. A few courses in the United States are so brief that students cannot participate in an IP. DOD's Spanish-language schools are examples of a compromise, as are the main components of today's E-IMET program.

Emergence of a separate E-IMET experience. Responding to Expanded IMET legislation, the immediate Defense response was to adapt it to the original IMET experience and gradually introduce new courses. Initially, it was assumed that routine procedures could be followed to satisfy E-IMET's guidelines. Civilian defense officials, for example, would simply join military counterparts in established country IMET programs. However, finding sufficiently qualified civilian students has

proven more complicated than expected and highly disruptive in many newly democratic countries with a limited number of candidates. Recently, Congress expanded civilian participation to include legislative and nongovernmental personnel involved in defense matters, with a corresponding growth annually in the percentage of the IMET appropriation “fenced” for this purpose (\$5 million in FY 95). The expansion of IMET to training civilians, which is a “strongly encouraged” but not mandated requirement (officer education can use E-IMET funds for specific courses), does have a negative impact. It still eliminates, for example, a significant amount of the professional military education sought by foreign governments and limits the restoration of programs, especially in Africa, that were gutted by earlier reductions in funding and shifts in policy interest to Central and Eastern European programs. The E-IMET initiative also further reduces funding support for English language training and the Informational Program at a time when these two important components are most needed.

With a better appreciation today for the problems associated with civilian governance in new democracies and a clearer understanding of their political-military requirements, the Defense Department is beginning to increase the number of short, tailored courses conducted overseas. The use of mobile education teams (MET) is sensitive to foreign cultures and institutions, focuses on helping governments educate their small pools of civilian officials, provides confidence-building opportunities at senior levels in both civilian and military sectors that are impossible to achieve outside the participating countries, improves the image of the U.S. mission, and minimizes negative aspects of E-IMET (e.g., civilian officials gone for extended periods, inadequate English language proficiency). The emerging MET formula suggests that rather than trying to further modify, and possibly distort, the original model for IMET-funded education, Expanded IMET can provide its own unique professional experience—one that concentrates on affecting change in the near-term as well as investing in the future, is less dependent on English language proficiency and travel to the United States, and brings a sample of Americana to the participants.

A second and more troubling dimension of the E-IMET experience is the introduction of a trend toward shifting more funds from traditional IMET programs into expanded IMET initiative courses and training. The sources of the trend are statements explaining congressional intent in appropriation committee reports in 1992 (House) and 1993 (Senate). It is not yet clear whether or not new Republican leaders in these committees share the intent of the Democrats. The trend, however, continues. Each year since its inception in FY 1991, an additional \$1 million has been obligated for E-IMET (\$5 million in FY 1995), based on report language. There is no indication of an upper limit for this annual occurrence. When combined with the directive to "shift more funds from traditional IMET programs," the future organization of foreign military education and training is in question. How will PME offerings be balanced with education in the "softer" aspects of military science—resource management, civilian control and human rights? The Military Departments manage the traditional programs; DSA'A manages the E-IMET initiative and oversees the entire security assistance training opportunity. The trend, if it continues, is to progressively pull military instruction away from professional education.

Democracy and human rights. The INSS research team found that, with the exception of DOD's three Latin American schools, there is generally little consideration for a supplemental democracy and human rights curriculum in mainstream professional military education designed for a U.S. student population. Opposition to incorporating these topics into standard command and staff and war college courses, beyond instruction on leadership, discipline and military law, seems to stem from a negative predisposition of U.S. faculty and students who do not see the relevance of these subjects to U.S. officers and the traditional "battlefield." The strong workhorses in foreign military education on issues of democracy and human rights continue to be the Informational Program, which recently has been strengthened internally and made uniform across the services, and English language training, which now incorporates the two themes in its instructional material as well as in courses taught at Lackland AFB. The Latin American program presents

a different situation. The U.S. Army School of the Americas actually incorporated democracy and human rights in its curriculum in 1990 before passage of the E-IMET amendment; the smaller Air Force and Navy programs followed suit. All these programs have continued to refine their instructions.

Post-graduation contact program. There is a promising fourth element of foreign military education and training—a program to reinforce the U.S. experience by maintaining contact with graduates. Today, the program is ad hoc and highly personalized. Each military school has its own approach, and the degree of effectiveness varies. Some attempts have been made to share current professional literature. The Naval War College, which may have the most successful program, has been able to hold periodic, small group reunions of Command Course graduates in various foreign countries. A large part of the difficulty in postgraduation contact is maintaining current locator data. Embassies are irregular in keeping information on students trained under the IMET or FMS programs—recordkeeping too often depends on individual motivation. The INSS team found no record of embassy initiatives to keep in contact with officer-graduates in a manner similar to that accomplished for other foreign education programs, such as the Fulbright program. DSAA does not have complete or adequate historical records on IMET graduates other than an annual report on positions of prominence (undefined) attained by former students.⁶⁴ There are no data on officers educated with FMS funding. Also incomplete is information on the accomplishments of graduates, which might suggest “subjective ties” to the United States attributable to foreign military education. The INSS study group found general agreement that the advent of E-IMET programs, particularly for civilians, offered a promising opportunity to institute a common program designed to maintain contact with foreign students throughout their careers. DSAA recently started work to develop a computer database to track students trained in the United States.

Contemporary Pressures on the IMET System

Internal trends. While the level of foreign interest in U.S. professional military education and, to a lesser degree, technical training is at an all time high, in practice fewer military students from more countries are funded with progressively less money. This situation, extending from FY 1986 forward, underscores several findings about foreign military education and training:

- The IMET dollar today buys less military training than at any other time. Course and living costs are high, particularly for multimonth professional military education programs.
- As the reduction of the Defense Department continues, the number of spaces in U.S. military classrooms made available for international students also is decreasing. All forms of security assistance training have begun to feel this pinch.
- As the number of U.S. officers in school declines because of personnel reductions and budget cuts, greater attention needs to be given to finding a balance between service quotas for foreign students at military schools stemming from Defense policy interests and requirements for U.S. seats in these schools. There currently are no instructions (OSD or Joint Staff) to the U.S. military education community that would guide the gradual reduction in the number of seats reserved for foreign enrollment or, perhaps, set minimum standards. At this time, the Services are supportive of international training requirements, but under fiscal pressure their continued goodwill is not assured.
- Today 20 percent of IMET funding supports the E-IMET program. This has created considerable, unnecessary tension within the foreign military education and training system. Initiatives to develop professional military skills and strengthen civil-military relations now vie for funds. Embassy officials find themselves seeking loopholes in DSAA's guidelines to get credit for "strongly encouraged" civilian and mandatory participation in E-IMET courses while still responding to the host government's desire for professional military education, instead of using E-IMET

and IMET experiences in complementary ways. A greater use of METs can help in this regard.

- U.S. professional military education is becoming more technology-oriented, placing most international students, unaccustomed to a high degree of technical sophistication, at a disadvantage in the classroom. Many schools have successfully addressed this issue by providing basic computer training during the preparatory portions of their international programs.

- U.S. policy interests today encourage the assistance of newly democratic governments, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. Reduced funding levels and the high cost of military education gut programs in other regions. Africa is the perennial target. Continuing to provide most countries an IMET allocation, without regard to the reduced funding, does not necessarily best serve U.S. interests. When resources are scarce, funds could be managed more effectively if there were a prioritization of countries designated to receive IMET funding within regions and minimum standards for IMET support to foreign governments.

English language training (ELT). The INSS research team found repeated evidence that ELT programs overseas are limited and often ineffective in their preparation of students for U.S. military schools. Problems are related to insufficient funding in support of a policy requiring English language education, and they take several forms. In some countries, the United States has provided language labs and training materials under IMET, but governments have decided to “save” decreasing IMET funds by underutilizing their ELT capability. In recently established U.S. programs in Central and Eastern Europe, where governments are investing heavily in ELT, the problem is one of rapidly growing student populations and insufficient resources. Central and Eastern Europe need additional funding to expand their ELT programs, train more English language instructors, and increase training materials. The FY 1996 IMET request includes funds to develop these programs.

Spanish-speaking countries in the Hemisphere present a different problem. These governments need to revitalize

languishing ELT programs and make greater use of the Defense Language Institute, but there is no incentive to do so. Many Latin American officials continue to depend heavily on Spanish-speaking schools like the U.S. Army School of the Americas instead of participating in English-language programs. This is the only region for which the U.S. Government deviates from one of IMET's basic principles—professional military development is accomplished by training alongside U.S. military and civilian personnel. Many officers from across the Americas view these programs with suspicion and characterize them as a second-class education because top U.S. officers do not attend them. The INSS study group believes that the continuing importance and utility of Spanish-language courses for middle-level and senior officers in this era of interoperability should be reexamined. The maximum benefit of the foreign military education and training experience, furthermore, can only be realized with language proficiency. Regional governments are beginning to agree. Argentina and Guatemala now demand proficiency in English for officers to progress in rank. Guatemala has recently introduced a language standard for promotion to general officer.

Program management. The worth of international military education and training as a diplomatic and defense policy instrument is generally underappreciated across the U.S. Government, and its effectiveness is underestimated. IMET's management history is in large measure responsible for this view. Unfortunately, this inappropriate situation will continue unless there is both a more useful, flexible, and reliable vision to guide the contemporary program and a more responsible and responsive overall management system.

In Washington, IMET is important twice a year—when the government submits its budget to Congress and when the Department of State allocates the program's appropriation. Otherwise, there is no constituency for, little interest in, or understanding of this “military” program in the department that, by law, owns it. For example, there have been no guidelines for embassies in selecting military and civilian students and screening them for past human rights abuse. Overseas, IMET has traditionally been a minor foreign and security policy tool

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managed in embassies by junior military or foreign service officers or foreign nationals. State's senior leadership and ambassadors still view the program as "pocket change" to be used to show immediate interest in foreign military and U.S. goodwill. Such a gesture—the offer of orientation tours for senior officers—was made recently to the Bosnian Federation. Ambassadors need to be educated about the deeper value of the IMET program beyond language training and orientation tours. They need to understand what is expected of them in terms of recruiting, reporting, and follow-up. In sum, more active participation by ambassadors is necessary if country IMET and E-IMET programs are to fulfill their potential.

State's ambivalence toward IMET is reflected in the Department's propensity to use this grant program in short-range "carrot and stick" diplomacy. The Defense educational experience has not been viewed in the same light as equivalent civilian programs run by USIA and USAID; their programs are not curtailed, suspended or conditioned to signal U.S. displeasure with the government. IMET is treated as the expendable program. Research revealed that DOD often is not consulted in advance when a country program is suspended or terminated. Unified Commands have little confidence in State's willingness to engage Congress heartily to increase funding levels for IMET or to defend individual country programs when scrutinized.

Nor has the Office of the Secretary of Defense shown serious policy interest in a program that it manages—until last year. As the collapse of foreign aid begins to eliminate options, IMET has assumed new importance. The program traditionally has been a relatively small, low-cost and low-risk appropriation with sound annual Congressional support—a "bonsai" program in DOD's security assistance forest. The Department's policy interest and involvement with State in allocating IMET funds, beyond DSAA's input, have been minimal. Similarly, when Congressional committees have asked about specific country IMET programs, OSD and Joint Staff officials, other than DSAA's staff officers, have usually kept a low profile. Comments from Unified Commanders in support of these programs most often are passed to State to bolster its arguments in defense of this assistance. OSD has often played no role.

Policy makers in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including DSAA, have taken little interest in the academic dimension of the foreign military education and training experience—what the United States is teaching foreign officers and how it is being taught. The educational process has remained decentralized, without any sense of shared responsibility among OSD, Joint Staff, and military departments. DSAA and the Joint Staff today provide only administrative manuals and regulations to guide training program management. The Agency, however, has taken a more all-inclusive role in overseeing the Expanded IMET program.

The 1991 legislation focuses on four classic areas of interest for the Office of the Secretary of Defense: the military's role in a democratic society, defense resource management, military justice systems, and education of civilians to oversee and work with the military institution. DSAA is moving forward in response to congressional directives, but it does so without guidance on how senior officials in OSD view their responsibilities for educating their civilian counterparts in these four areas. The Secretary's staff has not addressed several issues:

- The impression made on foreign students if instruction to empower foreign civilian defense and security managers only takes place in military schools
- Whether the education of civilians be a primary task for OSD-sponsored programs, such as courses offered by the Defense Resource Management Institute and the National Defense University
- What can be learned from the preparation of U.S. officials for their roles in the executive and legislative branches of government that can benefit foreign counterparts
- Where the focal point within OSD to oversee issues related to the complex role of the defense establishment in a democracy ought to be.

MAKING A GOOD PROGRAM BETTER

The INSS research team's framework for analysis was the extent to which IMET serves U.S. foreign and defense policy interests.

The study group found several problems in policy direction and overall management of IMET that, if forthrightly addressed, might clarify responsibilities for the program and improve the effectiveness of foreign military education and training. There are two areas of serious concern—the program’s management structure and the vision guiding foreign military education and training today—and two shortcomings—implementation standards for country-programs and deteriorating English language capabilities overseas.

Streamline Program Management and Responsibility

The INSS study group found that pressing concerns have arisen in the United States and overseas about the IMET program’s policy direction and overall management system. By law, IMET is a Department of State foreign assistance program, overseen by Congressional International Relations authorizing and Foreign Operations appropriating committees. State determines whether grant international military education and training support would further U.S. security interests in particular countries and at what level of funding. The Defense Security Assistance Agency administers day-to-day implementation worldwide. With the exception of E-IMET programs, which DSAA closely supervises, most foreign military students attend courses in the United States designed and directed by the military departments to train members of the U.S. Armed Forces.

The apportionment of responsibilities—system oversight (State), program management (Defense), program implementation (military departments primarily), and program requirements (unified commands, country teams, and foreign governments)—is not geared to meet the U.S. Government’s broadening policy interests in today’s changing security environment. “There is no synergy here,” observed a representative of a major unified command during one of INSS’s workshops.⁶⁵ The arrangement is inherently dysfunctional, creating the impression that IMET is a program without long-range benefit, one well suited only for near-term displays of U.S. attention and associated “carrot and stick” diplomacy. This leads

many in the U.S. Government to conclude that IMET is an expendable program.

Unified commanders affect country military assistance programs by commenting on the Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance (AIASA) prepared by the U.S. country team, but otherwise have secondary roles. Their concerns about the effectiveness and responsiveness often fail to resonate within this disordered management system. These leaders may desire long-term strategic IMET programs for countries in their regions, but they are unsuccessful in acquiring sufficient resources "for their regions." Typical of IMET's diffuse management arrangement is the unified command's annual report to Congress. The Senate Armed Services and National Security Committees receive the Command's posture statement and hear the Commander's explanation of his strategic concerns and requirements, which invariably include IMET-related issues, but these committees have no oversight interest in the foreign assistance program.

Although international military education and training is a diplomatic-defense, or political-military, instrument of national security policy, INSS's research found substantial agreement that the DOD has the greatest interest in and commitment to the IMET program. For the last 19 years, the State Department has dominated the process while remaining ambivalent toward it, whereas Defense, without active sustained interest by staff principals, generally has deferred to State. Research showed strong agreement that overall responsibility for this policy instrument is not the unique purview of a particular department of government; it could and should be transferred. There is some support for this position in the Senate Armed Services Committee, which considered authorizing DOD to use up to \$20 million from its Operations and Maintenance account for the IMET program in FY 96 legislation.

In today's international security environment, and as Defense adjusts its role in it incorporating the demands of peacetime engagement, basic IMET relationships need adjustment. Placing the IMET account in the department which has the greater interest and investment in foreign military education would produce a more centralized and coherent program arrangement,

facilitate program and budget planning, and restore confidence in the program's future at a time when alterations in the organization and allocation of the foreign policy community's budgetary resources are clearly coming. The original legislation intended for State and Defense to share responsibilities for the planning, development and use of education and training programs. The starting point for this arrangement can be in either department. Just as unified commanders and ambassadors must work together on issues of mutual interest, including IMET and E-IMET, Defense and State must cooperate on foreign military education. It is time for the department with the greater interest and commitment to take the lead in this partnership. This complex issue is currently under DOD review.

The INSS study group recommends the transfer of the budget account from State (Foreign Operations) to the Defense Department (Operations and Maintenance). To provide sustained, collaborative policy direction and implementation oversight, INSS also recommends the creation of a permanent Interdepartmental Review Committee on Foreign Military Education, co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. Representation on the Defense side would include DSAA, the Joint Staff, the services and the U.S. Coast Guard, and the five regional unified commands. The State Department side would include all regional bureaus; International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL); and the U.S. Agency for International Development (democracy issues). Advisors from both departments specializing in legal affairs and congressional relations would participate. This standing group would provide the coordinated, high-level defense and diplomatic attention missing in the current management arrangement by becoming the forum to address the following major interdepartmental issues on foreign military education:

- Coordinating (1) the annual budget request for IMET that State would forward to Congress and (2) the allocation of the Congressional appropriation
- Reallocating funds between regions when required

- Recommending the administration's position on suspending, freezing, conditioning or cancelling country programs
- Commissioning and overseeing investigations of allegations against any aspect of Foreign Military Education
- Reviewing the educational content and quality of professional military education and technical training courses
- Providing overarching policies to guide Foreign Military Education
- Developing congressional support for the IMET appropriation.

Broaden the Vision for Contemporary Foreign Military Education

The Defense Department's vision for the education and training of foreign students, as stated by DSAA, is to assist friends and allies in establishing an effective foreign defense establishment that is organized and operates in a manner consistent with U.S. democratic values. DSAA's concept for achieving this goal recognizes the necessity of addressing several elements: sound doctrine, technical warfighting capability, effective resource management, and the proper role of a military within a democratic society. The concept uses U.S.-funded and U.S.-directed IMET (including the E-IMET program) to ensure that students receive sound professional military education and instruction in the "softer" aspects of military science—resource management, civilian control, human rights—in which foreign governments might not otherwise invest to the extent that the U.S. desires. DSAA's approach relies primarily on country-financed, country-directed FMS training for the "harder" technical, warfighting skills to which foreign defense establishments generally accord priority. Finally, the concept encourages countries to purchase PME and E-IMET through FMS, which many do, although DSAA recognizes that the best leverage for these courses resides with the U.S.-funded IMET program.⁶⁶ Unfortunately, this game plan has not been broadly

communicated in Defense policy-guidance documents for a larger government and nongovernment audience.

Analysis by the INSS study group suggests that DSAA's general concept is sound and workable as far as it goes. Going a step further, the INSS team believes that DOD's approach to the education and training of foreign students must: (1) demonstrate a more comprehensive understanding of OSD's policy needs to use this instrument in its peacetime diplomacy to promote U.S. security interests, and (2) give greater emphasis to getting the best return on the investment of defense resources.

Among the policy needs for more effective defense diplomacy in today's security environment is the necessity to move beyond the traditional U.S. military mind-set about educating international students. As described in the current CJCS Military Education Policy Document: "Services should maintain international officer programs that best meet the objectives of the colleges and contribute to professional broadening of attending U.S. officers."⁶⁷ The approach is more what can they do for us rather than what can we gain and what do we want them to take away. The current perspective has not changed since the Cold War. It is paternalistic, does not advance the "peacetime engagement" component of the National Military Strategy, nor satisfy legislative requirements. The mind-set carries over into professional military curricula for US students by giving minimal or no attention to issues of human rights or the promotion of democracy. A second issue is the need to adopt a simplified frame of reference. Defense should have a framework that clarifies past confusion with terminology (all foreign military education and training is not IMET), acknowledges the existence of separate educational experiences, and recognizes the importance of integrating them. The INSS study recommends *Foreign Military Education* as the umbrella term (table 3).

To get the best return on its "grant" investment, Defense should make a clear distinction between IMET and E-IMET within the dictates of legislative language. The INSS study advocates focusing Foreign Military Education for military officers on PME with an emphasis on interoperability. The "softer" aspects of military science should be more visible in

PME curricula. Participation in the DOD Informational Program should shift from voluntary to obligatory, and this program should receive greater recognition and support. The explosion of new courses in the United States catering to resource management, civilian control and human rights is not necessarily the best use of IMET resources. The main thrust of E-IMET should be overseas through an expansion of Mobile Education Teams and similar initiatives. These high- impact and relatively low-cost programs already are providing unprecedented assistance to new governments working to resolve their problems of civil-military relations and defense management. The challenges for E-IMET are to find ways to broadcast its positive messages more widely and to sustain new dialogue with limited resources. The INSS study recommends program refinements in four areas to broaden the contemporary vision of Foreign Military Education: the role of OSD and the Joint Staff; the distinction between IMET and E-IMET; the educational concept supported by IMET funding; and the expansion of E-IMET.

Role of OSD and Joint Staff in Foreign Military Education. In the view of the INSS research team, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff need to be more visible in shaping a unified vision for Foreign Military Education generally and, in particular, overseeing the academic development of their counterparts from other countries. In today's global security environment, DOD's ability to provide a range of professional educational opportunities to international military and civilian students gives the U.S. a proven instrument of policy. For almost 20 years, however, OSD and the Joint Staff have shown minimal interest in the small, uncontroversial IMET program. During the Cold War, DSAA filled the void at the defense policy level, when required, as well as managed the detailed implementation of the program. In the post-Cold War era, resources to support foreign policy are in short supply and the use of defense diplomacy in peacetime is increasing. The new U.S. foreign policy agenda includes democracy, governanced and other non-traditional security concerns. U.S. civil-military relations have become an important model for other governments at least to understand. Policy direction by OSD and the Joint Staff would help guide Foreign Military

Education in today's changing security environment in at least four areas:

- **Academic Guidance:** OSD may desire to have specific policy-relevant themes supporting the National Security Strategy included in curricula for professional military education courses attended by foreign students or to have schools design special "electives" for international attendance. A notional list of subjects for visiting officers might include: human rights in operations other than war, comparative civil-military relations, multinational peace operations, crisis management, and inter-governmental cooperation.
- **OSD's Role in Developing Counterparts:** OSD should consider assuming primary responsibility for overseeing the education of foreign defense civilians, using existing programs for defense civilians and including joint and military department resources when necessary.
- **Validation of Curricula:** OSD should form a small commission of knowledgeable civilian officials and retired military officers to review periodically the structure, curricular content and student activity of all educational programs under Foreign Military Education and make recommendations, as required, for improving them.
- **School Quotas for Foreign Students:** OSD should consider establishing minimum levels of international attendance at different military schools within the U.S. military education system as the U.S. student population is reduced.

IMET and E-IMET: equal parts of foreign military education. Traditional foreign military education supported by IMET funding should continue to have three professional courses over eight weeks in length, an Informational Program and English language instruction if English skills are not sufficient. The program would remain in the United States as an investment in future bilateral and multilateral relations based on the original premise that many officer graduates will rise to positions of prominence within their country's armed forces and, in all probability, also within their governments and business communities. The premise has been proven to be correct. The

TABLE 3. Foreign Military Education

<i>IMET</i>	<i>E-IMET</i>	<i>FMS/Other</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ U.S.-funded and directed ▶ 80% of appropriation ▶ Professional Military Education (PME) ▶ In United States ▶ Courses 8 weeks or longer ▶ English language ▶ Informational Program ▶ Mobile Training Teams ▶ Concessional rates ▶ LATAM schools continue; modified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ U.S.-funded and directed ▶ 20% of appropriation ▶ Resource management, democracy, civil-military, military justice and human rights ▶ Emphasize Mobile Education Teams ▶ Overseas and U.S. ▶ Most courses under 8 weeks; exceptions ▶ English interpretation ▶ Civilian and military students ▶ Funds civilians at PME; military students in E-IMET courses 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Country-financed and directed technical training and PME ▶ In United States ▶ Course length can vary ▶ Master's degree programs ▶ Pilot training ▶ For PME, IMET guidelines apply

Expanded IMET experience should continue to emphasize what it does well. It already is focused on near-term as well as long-term impact in the area of national governance and political-military relations. It has demonstrated exceptional results from its short, specialized courses for civilians (primarily) and military officers, which are conducted effectively overseas.

The IMET and E-IMET programs in foreign military education should not compete and should be transparent. Beginning with funding levels, the ultimate size and focus of E-IMET should be known. The current annual creep of funds to be obligated as Expanded IMET and the gradual shift of IMET dollars into E-IMET courses and training should be stopped for

two reasons. First, it is contrary to principles of sound resource planning which Congress and DOD advocate. The funding for E-IMET should be apparent, not open-ended as it is now. The INSS study group suggests an annual fixed ceiling of 20 percent of IMET funds be devoted to E-IMET. This should be sufficient to develop and sustain a program with its distinct focus. Second, the original 1976 Congressional mandate is still operative. The primary focus of IMET is on professional military education, which with today's emphasis on interoperability and operational proficiency is even more important. As mentioned above, steps can be taken to improve education in the E-IMET aspects of military science in PME courses and their support Informational Programs. It also is not clear to the INSS study group the extent to which OSD and the Joint Staff desire to expose military and civilian students to resource management, civilian control, and human rights at the expense of traditional professional military education. This issue needs to be addressed. Uncertainty about the balance between IMET and E-IMET continues to have a corrosive effect on foreign military education. Senior OSD officials may also want to discuss this issue with members of the appropriation committees.

Contemporary concept for IMET-funded instruction.

IMET should fund attendance only at professional military education courses for officers and senior enlisted personnel. The principal courses of instruction for officers would be traditional command training, command and staff, and war college. Limited IMET funding precludes sending students to 2,000 courses. Selection of courses eligible for IMET students would be based on contributions to interoperability, regional stability, and the realization of U.S. diplomatic and economic interests.

Technical training, which tends to be cheaper and of shorter duration, should be purchased through FMS with monetary concessions built in so that it is affordable. DSAA has in place concessional pricing policies based on law for all IMET recipients and a number of other allies. The agency currently is minimizing IMET-funded technical training to emphasize PME and E-IMET and encourage countries to purchase their technical training through FMS. The focus of this instruction would be on training the trainers, especially at the junior officer and enlisted

grades. Ideally, followup training and technical assistance to graduates should occur overseas, as required, using Mobile Training Teams.

Professional military education at Latin American Schools should be consistent with the three-element IMET experience and emphasize English instruction in the classroom at the advanced course and command and staff levels. Increased participation by U.S. officers is necessary. Courses for cadets, junior officers and lower enlisted grades would be purchased as technical training and be taught in Spanish.

Some countries may still want to take advantage of previous IMET options such as sending their pilots here to train or sending engineer officers to the Naval Postgraduate School. These opportunities should be purchased with monetary concessions built in.

Expansion of E-IMET abroad. One of the most successful aspects of E-IMET is the use of Mobile Education Teams overseas to conduct seminars bringing together a wide range of military officers and civilian officials to discuss issues of military justice, human rights, defense resource management, and civil-military relations. While DSAA is trying to expand this facet of E-IMET, Mobile Education Teams, by themselves, cannot possibly satisfy the requirement for this education in each IMET-recipient country, let alone sustain it over time. This can only be accomplished by: (1) institutionalizing E-IMET-related instruction in foreign military education systems, which has started in a few countries, as well as in selected civilian academic programs; and (2) encouraging attendance by both military and civilian students at both venues.

Looking beyond the METs, DOD needs to adopt a "train the trainer" approach in interested countries. This might include collaboration between DOD's educational institutes teaching E-IMET-related courses and foreign military and civilian faculties to offer related academic programs to military and civilian students. In some countries, the program might also provide assistance to national academic institutions in the development of international relations, national security studies, and public administration curricula. Such cooperation would help expand the potential pool of civilians interested in security and defense

issues and improve the caliber of government and legislative staffs focused on security and defense issues.

Correct Shortcomings in the Program

Establish New Standards. Embassies need to be given clear guidance, and be reminded annually, about student eligibility for IMET or E-IMET funded programs. Countries receiving funding for Foreign Military Education should have positive human rights records or be acknowledged as working to correct past practices which violated the international code. If the host country is eligible, the U.S. embassy is expected to screen and clear candidates nominated for all Foreign Military Education programs, including training purchased under FMS. The criteria should be well known in the recipient government and its military institutions, implicitly making a statement about the importance the U.S. attachés to personal accountability for past actions. A common set of clear, approved U.S. standards would be a useful tool for embassies. To reinforce U.S. credibility in this matter, the mission also must ensure that candidates for U.S. schooling are chosen for the correct reasons—not to curry political favor, to be the only person able to pass the language test, or simply to be left to default.

After graduation, embassies have to begin systematically tracking all former students, not just those funded by IMET, as a matter of priority and develop procedures to maintain contact with them either officially or socially as an important way to continue the U.S. experience.⁶⁸ Of particular importance to the Foreign Military Education program is determining how prominent officers have used their U.S. education—are there instances when any graduate, under the press of circumstances, has responded in a way that demonstrates a favorable inclination toward his U.S. educational experience? The database for tracking former students would be kept in the embassy.

Revitalize English Language Training. The framework of Foreign Military Education properly emphasizes the importance of English language training, particularly as the emerging common language for coalition peace operations. However, this step must be matched by improved funding and a

policy that reinforces at every opportunity the importance of English language education and the use abroad of the labs, in-country language training detachments, and materials made available through IMET programs.

In summary, IMET is one of the few foreign-aid initiatives Congress continues to consider relevant, useful, and worthy of funding—and for good reason. The program promotes U.S. interests now and for the future. It is the most successful program of its kind, having educated more than 100,000 students from 114 countries since 1976. And it yields a high return on a small investment by promoting long-term stability, encouraging military cooperation in coalition operations, and fostering the growth of democracy and human rights worldwide.

This paper proposes certain evolutionary changes to improve an already good program:

- A single frame of reference, Foreign Military Education, to consolidate and simplify this policy instrument
- A shift of the IMET account from State (150) to Defense (050), with a permanent interdepartmental committee for shared oversight
- A decision to make the currently voluntary Informational Program mandatory
- A fixed annual ceiling for E-IMET of 20 percent of the IMET appropriation
- A need to end paternalism in IMET's view of foreign students
- A refocus for E-IMET toward the capability to deploy effective, low-cost, mobile educational teams overseas with the flexibility to offer academic assistance to new governments
- A revitalizing of the role U.S. missions should be playing in foreign military education, especially in followup contact with graduates of the program.

NOTES

1. President William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 1995), 2.

2. The foreign relations oversight committees include two authorization committees, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee, and two appropriations subcommittees, the respective foreign operations subcommittees of the SAC and HAC. Funding issues, such as the annual foreign assistance budget or a routine request to reallocate appropriated IMET money must successfully pass all four bodies. This oversight constituency interacts routinely with officials of the State Department. It does not often engage Defense officials other than representatives of DSAA.

3. Between 1961 and 1976, military education and training was consolidated within the Military Assistance Program (MAP) authority in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA/61). In its Fiscal Year 1976 Congressional Presentation Document, the Executive Branch requested funding for a separate IMET program in a new Chapter 5 to Part II of the FAA/61. Spiro C. Manolas and Louis J. Samelson, "The United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program: A report to Congress," *The DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management* 12, no.3 (Spring 1990): 8.

4. In the report of the HIRC, its leadership was emphatic on two points. *First*, there was no intent to terminate the military education and training portion of MAP, although several members tried. And *second*, there was a strong desire to retain control of IMET. The alternative to a grant program was foreign military sales over which the committee had poor oversight and little influence. FMS, furthermore, was beyond the means of most of the countries which the committee wanted to continue assisting. House, Committee on International Relations, *International Security Assistance Act of 1976*, H.R. 11963, 94th Congr., 1976, 419.

5. House, Committee on International Relations, *International Security Assistance Act of 1976*, H.R. 11963, 94th Cong., 1976, 145-46.

6. Manolas and Samelson, "A Report to Congress." 9. The IMET legislation is found in Section 543 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

7. Senate Appropriations Committee Report for FY 94, September 14, 1993. Source: DSAA-Plans-PGM briefing slides.

8. The chapter on "Training Program Management" in the Defense Security Assistance Agency's *Security Assistance Management Manual* (SAMM) (DOD 5105.38-M), with Change No.6, dated 10 May 1994, provides general guidelines for the whole program and specific directions for IMET and FMS training. Substantive guidance, such as the policy

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objectives and areas of emphasis for foreign military training, is only addressed in the section devoted to International Military Education and Training. The "principal emphasis in international training, particularly IMET-funded training," according to this section, is on:

- a. Training that demonstrates the proper role of the military in a civilian-led, democratic government.
- b. Training that promotes effective military justice systems and emphasizes an understanding of internationally recognized human rights.
- c. Training that promotes effective defense resource management.
- d. Training of individuals likely to hold key positions in government.
- e. Training that promotes military professionalism. (p. 1001-1)

9. Congress appropriated only \$22.25 million in FY 94. This represented a 52 percent reduction from the preceding 6-year average of \$46.1 million. The reductions in FY 94 and 95 stemmed from a concern in one of IMET's Congressional oversight constituency, the House Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, that a new Defense program, the Military-to-Military Contact Program (MMCP), duplicated IMET. The subcommittee chairman, Rep. Obey, also wanted MMCP under his jurisdiction instead of the HAC's Defense Subcommittee. Unable to resolve the issues, IMET funding was halved in FY 94. (MMCP ultimately received only a fifth of its request level.) Rep. Obey ultimately succeeded on the jurisdictional matter in FY 95, but confusion between IMET and MMCP continued. The Defense Department has dropped MMCP for FY 96. The importance and value of the IMET program were never an issue during the jurisdictional debate.

10. The phraseology used since at least 1983 to describe the size of the program in congressional presentation documents, security assistance literature, and internal department information papers is as follows: "Since 1950, IMET and its predecessor [grant] programs have furnished education and training for over 500,000 international military [and civilian] students." This number is misleading for, as the 1974 edition of *Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts* reports, 428,476 students, over 80% of this number, trained under MAP between 1950 and 1973. The grant program that has emerged after 1976 is very different than its predecessors. The rationale for using this phraseology appears to be a desire to suggest a relationship between number of students and size of influence abroad, which in practice has been very difficult to demonstrate. The number also suggests to an economy-minded Congress, without any idea how many students participated before 1976, that a great deal of money has been spent on the IMET program since its inception, perhaps too much.

11. Response to INSS's research survey, "Effectiveness of International Military Education and Training," (hereafter referred to as INSS Survey) (Newport, RI: U.S. Navy War College Feb. 21, 1995).
12. Round table discussion, Department of State, April 6, 1995.
13. Response to INSS Survey, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Department of State, Washington, DC, Feb. 2, 1995.
14. The Defense Security Assistance Agency, "Report to the United States Congress: Implementation of the Expanded IMET Initiative," 1 August 1992 and 1 May 1993, and *Expanded International Military Education and Training Handbook, 1995*, in final draft, 30 January 1995.
15. The English-language program on civil-military relations developed at the Naval Postgraduate School and taught there as well as overseas is just getting off the ground.
16. Response to INSS Survey, Prague, EZ, Feb. 3, 1995.
17. See Fred A. Coffey, Jr., "Best Dollar Spent: A Look at the Informational Program for Foreign Military Officers," National Defense University, 1985. At the time he wrote this article, Mr. Coffey was a senior Foreign Service Officer with the U.S. Information Agency who was assigned to the faculty of the National War College between July 1982 and June 1985.
18. Joint Security Assistance Training (JSAT) Regulation, Chapter 11, Department of Defense Informational Program and Representational Activities, 1994, Section 11-1.
19. Trips, with the exception of a short tour of Washington, DC, are limited to 500 miles round trip. Exceptions to this policy can be obtained, but only after all local IP possibilities have been exhausted.
20. U.S. Army School of Americas, Public Affairs Guidance, April 29, 1994, 25.
21. U.S. Army, Security Assistance Training Field Activity flier, "Security Assistance Training" (Fort Monroe, VA: HQ TRADOC, 1994).
22. Response to INSS Survey, U.S. Navy Command College, Newport, RI, Jan. 24, 1995.
23. "School of Assassins" is an 18-minute video, narrated by Susan Sarandon, produced by Maryknoll World Productions in 1994. The Center for Defense Information also produced a video entitled "School of the Americas: At War with Democracy."
24. Statement by Anne Manuel, the deputy director of the Americas division. Quoted in Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Army Academy for Latins: School for Killers?" *International Herald Tribune*, April 4, 1995.
25. Letter to the President, April 3, 1995, signed by Joseph P. Kennedy II and Ronald V. Dellums. There are 84 co-signers from the House of Representatives.

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26. For a balanced presentation, see Herbert and Mary Knapp, *Red, White and Blue Paradise: The American Canal Zone in Panama* (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1984).

27. Gabriel Marcella, "Security Assistance Revisited: How to Win Friends and Not Lose Influence," *Parameters* XII, no.4 (Winter, 1982-83): 50.

28. Margaret Daly Hayes, "Workshop Report," 3.

29. Response to INSS Research Survey, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, Jan. 26, 1995.

30. Response to INSS Survey, Abidjan, Cote D'Ivoire, Feb. 2, 1995.

31. Memorandum for Director, DSAA, U.S. Embassy Responses to 50 Percent Cut in the IMET Appropriation, Oct.1, 1993.

32. LT GEN William E. Odom, USA, Retired, "US Military Assistance After the Cold War," Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans and Environment, Jun. 16, 1993.

33. State Department participant at the Feb. 1, 1995 INSS workshop.

34. Many of the controversial Latin American leaders who received training under IMET at the U.S. Army School of the Americas did so before the school moved to the United States and became involved in DOD's Informational Program. As a young officer, General Noriega, for example, never left his native culture in Panama. Responses to the INSS survey underscore the importance of the combination of military instruction and exposure to the American democratic way of life.

35. Only the U. S. Navy's Naval Small-Craft Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS) for Latin American students remains in the former Canal Zone in Panama. It offers relatively short basic and advanced courses for junior officers and, primarily, enlisted technicians. The faculty has adapted Expanded IMET guidelines to their program, stressing responsibility for people and equipment through officer and non-commissioned officer professional development and resource management courses.

36. Response to INSS Survey. Security Assistance Training Field Activity, Fort Monroe, VA, undated.

37. Response to INSS Survey, Washington, DC, Jan. 30, 1995.

38. Response to INSS Survey, Miami, FL, Feb. 3, 1995.

39. Ibid.

40. Response to INSS Survey, Fort Bragg, NC, Jan. 27, 1995.

41. Multiple responses to INSS survey.

42. Response to INSS Survey, Defense Resource Management Institute, Monterey, CA, Jan. 26, 1995.

43. Commander, Coalition Task Force, Memo for CINC, U.S. Southern Command, Daily Situation Report (SITREP) on Fuerzas Unidas Central America (FU CENTAM) '95, November 24, 1994.

44. Cable, American Embassy La Paz, Bolivia, 161857Z May 1994, subject: Saving the School of the Americas.

45. Response to INSS Surveys, Ankara, Turkey, Feb. 2, 1995; "SATFA International Military Training News" 8, no. 2 (April 1992), 6.

46. Responses to INSS Surveys, Bridgetown, Barbados and Kingston, Jamaica, Jan. 25/26, 1995.

47. Correspondence with International Fellows Program, U.S. Army War College, Feb. 8, 1995.

48. National Defense University participant at the Feb. 1, 1995, INSS workshop.

49. Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff Memorandum (CM) 1618-1993, Military Education Policy, 23 March 1993, III-7.

50. A.J. Bacevich, "Civilian Control: A Useful Fiction?" *Joint Force Quarterly* 6 (Autumn/Winter 1994-1995): 76-77.

51. The IMET program in Mali at the time was small, an average of nine officers per year attended PME courses between 1983 and 1990. Most Malian military personnel went to the Soviet Union.

52. Response to INSS Survey, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Department of State, Feb. 2, 1995.

53. Response to INSS Survey, Naval Justice School-International Training Detachment, Newport, RI, Jan. 25, 1995.

54. Letter to William Perry, 30 June 1995, from F. V. Mayinga Mkandawire, MP.

55. *Ibid.*

56. U.S. Army SAFTA flier.

57. Response to INSS Survey and related correspondence, Defense Resource Management Institute, Monterey CA, Jan. 25-26, 1995.

58. DRMI Cable, 211200ZMAR95, Subject: DRMI MET to Colombia.

59. Response to INSS Survey, Office of Defense Cooperation, Madrid, Spain, Feb. 9, 1995.

60. Responses to INSS Survey, Office of Defense Cooperation, Athens, Greece, Feb. 7, 1995; Office of Defense Cooperation, Ankara, Turkey, Feb. 3, 1995. It is interesting to note that every Greek Army officer who has attended the U. S. Army War College eventually became a general officer—a comment certainly on the quality of the officers selected but also on the importance attached to attending this professional military school by the Greek Army's leadership.

61. Barbara W. Tuchman, "Generalship," in *Practicing History: Selected Essays* (New York: Knopf, 1981), 282.

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62. In the FY 1996 Congressional Presentation Document, the IMET request is \$40 million out of a proposed budget for security assistance of \$6 billion.

63. Response to INSS Survey, Miami, FL, Feb. 3, 1995.

64. This inadequate data are due, in part, to incompatibility of hardware systems and unavailability of personnel to input data. The former problem should be overcome shortly when a new computer comes on line.

65. Comment by USPACOM representative at the workshop conducted on February 1, 1995.

66. Memorandum, Director, DSAA to Director, INSS, 16 June 1995, Subject: INSS International Military Education and Training (IMET) Study, A4.

67. CM 1618-1993, III-7.

68. Dr. Herbert Y. Schandler, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, has proposed the creation of an IMET Alumni Association to further military education and training of graduates. He suggests funding an overt nonprofit association which would have as its major functions the establishment and maintenance of regular and continuous links with foreign military personnel who have participated in the IMET program in the United States. This would be accomplished initially by developing and maintaining lists and current addresses of IMET alumni and forwarding to them periodically material made available by the training institution with which they were associated in the United States. Other activities designed to achieve the purpose of the association would be developed as time and resources permitted.

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
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