

PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM

Volume VIII, Issue 5
October 2014

A JOURNAL OF THE

TRI **TERRORISM RESEARCH INITIATIVE**
Enhancing Security through Collaborative Research

Table of Contents

Welcome from Editor.....1

I. Articles

Say Terrorist, Think Insurgent:

Labeling and Analyzing Contemporary Terrorist Actors.....2

by Assaf Moghadam, Ronit Berger, and Polina Beliakova

News and Entertainment Media: Government's Big Helpers in the Selling of
Counterterrorism.....18

by Yaeli Bloch-Elkon and Brigitte L. Nacos

Making 'Noise' Online:

An Analysis of the Say No to Terror Online Campaign.....33

by Anne Aly, Dana Weimann-Saks, and Gabriel Weimann

German Right-Wing Terrorism in Historical Perspective. A First Quantitative Overview
of the 'Database on Terrorism in Germany (Right-Wing Extremism)' – DTG^{rwg} Project..48

by Daniel Koehler

II. Research Note

The Foreign Fighters' Threat: What History Can (not) Tell Us.....59

by Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn

III. Book Reviews

Fernando Reinares: ¡Matadlos!/ Quién estuvo detrás del 11-M y por qué se atentó en
España ["Kill Them! Who was Behind 3/11 and Why Spain was Targeted."].....74

Reviewed by Ely Karmon

Morten Storm with Paul Cruickshank & Tim Lister, *Agent Storm: My Life Inside Al Qaeda
and the CIA*.....76

Reviewed by Joshua Sinai

"Counterterrorism Bookshelf":

17 Books on Terrorism & Counter-terrorism Related Subjects.....78

by Joshua Sinai

IV. Bibliographies

Bibliography: Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Part 1).....84

Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

Bibliography: Domestic State (or Regime) Terrorism and Repression117

Compiled and selected by Eric Price

V. Op-Ed

The IS-Caliphate: What Should Be Done to Prevent it from Spinning out of Control?.....127

by Philipp Holtmann

VI. Announcement

TRI Award for Best PhD Thesis 2014: Call for Submissions..... 129

VII. Notes from the Editor

About *Perspectives on Terrorism*.....130

Welcome from Editor

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to announce the release of Volume VIII, Issue 5 (October 2014) of *Perspectives on Terrorism* at www.terrorismanalysts.com. Our free online journal is a joint publication of the *Terrorism Research Initiative* (TRI), headquartered in Vienna (Austria), and the *Center for Terrorism and Security Studies* (CTSS), headquartered at the Lowell campus of the University of Massachusetts (United States).

Now in its eighth year, *Perspectives on Terrorism* has almost 4,500 regular subscribers and many more occasional readers and visitors worldwide. The *Articles* of its six annual issues are fully peer-reviewed by external referees while its *Research Notes* and other content are subject to internal editorial review.

In this issue, you can find Daniel Koehler's overview of more than 50 years of right-wing extremism in the German Federal Republic, based on a new database. Two articles deal with media and (counter-) terrorism while the opening article by Assaf Moghadam and his colleagues looks at terrorist organisations' use of violence other than terrorism. A *Research Note* by Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn from the Netherlands questions some of the assumptions made about 'foreign fighters' returning to Europe. The Op-Ed by Philipp Holtmann focuses on the IS-Caliphate and what could be done about it. As usual, old and new publications are featured in the review and bibliographic sections.

This issue was prepared in the European offices of the *Terrorism Research Initiative* (TRI) while the last issue of 2014 will be prepared by the co-editor of *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Prof. James Forest, on the other side of the Atlantic.

Sincerely,

Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid

Editor-in-Chief

I. Articles

Say Terrorist, Think Insurgent: Labeling and Analyzing Contemporary Terrorist Actors

by Assaf Moghadam, Ronit Berger, and Polina Beliakova

Abstract

Terrorist groups are commonly understood to be groups that carry out acts of terrorism, and their actions viewed as terrorist campaigns. Yet, recent events are a reminder that the activities of even the most violent terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda or the Islamic State extend beyond the use of terrorist tactics. These actors usually employ classic guerrilla tactics as well, and their overall strategy combines both violent and political means. Furthermore, these acts of political violence do not merely constitute isolated campaigns of terrorism, but are usually part of a broader conflict such as an insurgency or civil war. The purpose of the present article is twofold. The first is to offer some empirical evidence in support of our claim that most major contemporary terrorist groups also employ other, non-terrorist, modes of warfare, notably guerrilla tactics. In the second part, we offer our reflections of these findings for theory and policy. Our main recommendation is for governments to adopt an approach that separates the official labeling of these groups from the analysis of their origins, conduct, and threat potential. While official policy statements might continue to label actors involved in terrorism as terrorist groups, we argue that the policy analysis informing these governments' pronouncements and decisions should adopt greater nuance by regarding most of these actors as insurgent groups. Such an approach can help policy analysts adopt and employ a broader array of intellectual tools to understand the complex nature of the threat posed by these groups, and arrive at more adequate, comprehensive, and longer-term solutions to the problems they pose.

Keywords: terrorism; terrorist groups; guerrilla; insurgency; counterinsurgency.

Introduction

When does an organization merit the name “terrorist group”? The answer might seem obvious at first: terrorist groups are groups that carry out acts of terrorism. What, however, if that group specializes in forms of political violence other than terrorism and uses terrorism only sporadically? This question has implications beyond theory and seems to apply to an ever growing number of terrorist groups. In the summer of 2014 in the Middle East alone, at least three prominent groups commonly classified as terrorist organizations have been engaged in significant combat operations that posed challenges to their enemies far exceeding the capabilities traditionally ascribed to these types of actors. The Islamic State (formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria, or ISIS) has been able to extend its stronghold in Iraq and create an imposing presence over large swaths of territory in both Syria and Iraq, while threatening other neighboring countries such as Jordan. The Lebanese Hizballah, dubbed by some analysts as “among the most skilled light infantry on the planet,” [1] continues to amass significant battlefield experience through its ongoing involvement in the Syrian civil war on behalf of the incumbent Alawite regime of Bashar al-Assad. Finally, in the Gaza Strip, the militant Islamist group Hamas, which since 2006 is the elected governing party in that territory, has posed formidable challenges to Israeli military forces and civilians using a combination of insurgent tactics.

These trends have applied to other geographic areas and even to the movement perhaps most widely acknowledged as a “terrorist group.” As a recent article by jihadism scholar J.M. Berger argued, even Al

Qaeda, broadly defined, conducts terrorism only “on the side.” Its primary focus at present is to fight wars and insurgencies.[2]

The above mentioned trends beg a series of questions. To earn the “terrorist” label, do groups have to rely exclusively on terrorist tactics? Might they use a variety of tactics as long as terrorism is the dominant form of violence? What if a group uses terrorism only rarely, when compared to other forms of political violence? Does the “terrorist” label then continue to have merit? If so, when and how should that label be employed? If not, what terms and concepts may be used that more accurately portray the nature of these groups’ activities?

The aim of this article is twofold. The first is to provide empirical evidence—based on data drawn from the Global Terrorism Database of the University of Maryland (GTD)—showing that nearly all terrorist groups listed in the GTD database use classic acts of terrorism only part of the time. According to the GTD, between 2002 and 2012 only a single outfit—the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)—limited its attacks to civilian targets, rendering that group a “terrorist group” in the strictest sense of the word. [3] All other groups aimed their attacks not only at civilians but also at government, police, and military targets—a modus operandi generally associated with guerrilla tactics.[4]

Our second aim is to then reflect on the merits of using the term “terrorist group.” Our finding that acts of terrorism constitute only a portion of these groups’ overall activities suggests that the common usage of the term “terrorist groups” to describe these actors is, technically speaking, only partially accurate. Such imprecise labeling could even lead to counterproductive policy choices if, by fixating on only one activity in these actors’ repertoire, counterterrorism scholars and practitioners de-emphasize or ignore other critical activities of these groups.

While other labels, especially the concept of “insurgent group,” offer a technically more accurate description of these groups’ activities, this article stops short of calling for the abandonment of the term terrorist groups, for three reasons. First, the authors accept the notion that, once a militant group decides to engage in indiscriminate violence against civilians for political ends, it crosses a certain moral threshold that sets it apart from other groups.[5] Secondly, “naming and shaming” such groups for their brutal and indiscriminate acts of violence can serve the important goal of undermining their ability to obtain popular support. Third, the use of the terrorism moniker to describe these groups can abet the curtailing of financial and material support they receive, and therefore help undermine their capacity to inflict harm.

That said, we believe that concepts drawn from insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) theory, and from the study of civil wars, can make significant contributions to the scholarly analysis of terrorism and the groups that utilize this tactic.[6] Closer correspondence and cross-fertilization between terrorism studies, the study of insurgency and counter-insurgency, as well as the literature on civil wars can offer a more lucid and dispassionate conceptualization of these groups; of the full range of their activities; and of the broader context in which they tend to operate. Such an approach, in turn, can improve policies to address the threat posed by these violent non-state actors.

The remainder of this article begins with a review of the existing literature on the relationship between terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and insurgency. We then provide some empirical analysis in support of our claim that the label of “terrorist group” lacks technical accuracy. Next, we discuss the potential harm to policy-making that can result from using the terrorism label as the sole frame of reference to understand the nature of these groups. We conclude that despite the technical inaccuracy of the “terrorist group” label, governments should continue to use the term in their policy pronouncements due to the moral and legal implications that have become associated with this label. At the same time, as far as the policy analysis

informing these pronouncements is concerned, we argue that it is imperative that policy analysts adopt a more nuanced approach in framing this problem set. Adopting concepts and practices from insurgency and counterinsurgency theory—including the term insurgent group as the framework of analysis—serves this goal. Such an approach can help policy analysts adopt and employ a broader array of intellectual tools to understand the complex nature of the threat posed by such groups, and arrive at more adequate, comprehensive, and longer-term solutions to this problem.

The Connectivity between Terrorism, Guerrilla, and Insurgency

The extant scholarship on the definition of terrorism suggests that terrorism is a phenomenon that is distinct from other types of political violence. The distinguishing features include such elements as the targeting of unarmed civilians, the use of extra-normal violence, the desire by the terrorists to instill fear in the target population, or the intent to influence a broader audience beyond the immediate victims of the terrorist attack. [7] Problematically, however, none of these attributions appear to be sufficient for the production of a consistent and clear definition of terrorist groups.

In order to approximate a more precise label, it is necessary first to acknowledge that on the ground, terrorism is usually entrenched in the broader context of violent political conflict. Consequently, a contextualized framework for understanding terrorism is likely to provide a more comprehensive theoretical perspective of the issue and could contribute to more effective policy design.

In particular, discussing the interrelationship between terrorism and insurgency can provide a more detailed picture of actors who utilize different forms of political violence, including terrorism. Common definitions of insurgency describe it as a struggle between a non-ruling group and a ruling government or authority, where the former uses a combination of political and military means to challenge governmental power and legitimacy, while striving to obtain or maintain control over a particular area.[8] Terrorism is usually mentioned as one of the tactics of insurgency, together with propaganda, demonstrations, political mobilization of constituencies, subversion, insurrection, guerrilla warfare, and conventional warfare.[9]

As far as definitions of the actor (terrorist groups/organizations vs. insurgents), as opposed to the action (terrorism vs. insurgency), are concerned, attempts to draw distinctions are generally made on the basis of the following features: Insurgents are usually described as using mixed violent/nonviolent methods; seeking high levels of popular support; enjoying a broader supply of manpower and often a richer resource base; and being capable of controlling territory, among other characteristics. Terrorist groups, in contrast, are said to function in a conspiratorial fashion. They tend to be smaller in size and to employ uncompromising violence. Conventional wisdom holds that the secret nature and small size of terrorist organizations generally prevents them from holding territory, while their focus on extreme violence prevents them from enjoying much popular support.[10] Bruce Hoffman, a leading authority in the field, thus states that terrorists “do not function in the open as armed units, generally do not attempt to seize or hold territory, deliberately avoid engaging enemy military forces in combat, are constrained both numerically and logistically from undertaking concerted mass political mobilization efforts, and exercise no direct control or governance over a populace at either the local or the national level.”[11]

Complicating this discussion is the fact that there is no consensus as to which of the various features that characterize either insurgent or terrorist groups prevails. Consequently, a group can simultaneously be categorized as a terrorist group based, for example, on the scale of violence it uses, and as an insurgent group based, for instance, on its ability to capture and hold territory.

Furthermore, some scholars argue that the qualitative differences between terrorist and insurgent actors may be due to uneven access to resources, as opposed to differences by design. Daniel Byman thus argues that the majority of the groups that do not hold territory and lack popular support, yet use terrorism as a tactic, can still be considered proto-insurgencies. These groups, Byman believes, are simply unable to attain the other features of insurgency due to numerical inferiority or lack of resources.[12] Along similar lines, Steven Metz states that “pure” terrorist movements are those that are simply incapable of exploiting the complete strategy of insurgency, so they have to resort to terrorism as a tactic in order to attract attention and galvanize potential supporters.[13]

We may infer from the analysis above that the quest for a comprehensive, thorough, and accurate label for groups utilizing terrorism—one that appreciates its multidimensional nature—requires considerations of the complex realities on the ground. A look at the Al Qaeda network exemplifies this complexity because Al Qaeda—the entity probably most widely regarded as a “terrorist group”—increasingly employs a variety of tactics, terrorist or otherwise. In a widely circulated essay published in February 2014 in *Foreign Policy*, jihadism scholar J.M. Berger argued that the present Al Qaeda movement conducts activities that go beyond acts of terrorism. The current Al Qaeda movement, Berger argued, is more akin to a “wide-ranging fighting movement” involved in numerous insurgencies. To that end, it raises funds while mobilizing local, regional, and foreign fighters in a variety of theaters. To be sure, the movement continues to carry out horrific acts of terrorism, but that effort is “secondary in al-Qa`ida’s portfolio.” Although terrorism made Al Qaeda what it is today, and continues to matter, “it is no longer the main line of business”.[14]

Berger’s point is well taken. From Africa across the Middle East and all the way to South Asia, Al Qaeda and its affiliates are busy fighting local regimes. Without a doubt, their self-described jihad features classic terrorist activities—acts of extra-normal violence against civilians or noncombatants in the service of political ends, designed to create fear and thereby influence a broader audience.[15]

“Terrorist groups,” however, regularly carry out guerrilla operations as well. Guerrilla attacks typically emphasize extended campaigns of assassination, sabotage, and hit-and-run attacks carried out by small and highly mobile paramilitary units. Like the tactics of terrorism, guerrilla warfare is described in the literature as a “weapon of the weak” designed to harass the enemy and gradually erode his will. Yet where terrorism is in essence an act of psychological warfare used in the hope of turning the targeted population against its own government, guerrilla operations primarily target their enemy’s capabilities.[16] Functioning as “small armies,” potent guerrilla forces are large and strong enough to seize and hold territory. Moreover, guerrilla tactics differ from terrorist tactics in terms of its main targets. While the prime targets of guerrilla fighters are the enemy’s armed forces, police, or support units, as well as general government and economic targets, the targets of terrorist groups are usually understood to be civilians and, at most, noncombatants.[17] As Alex Schmid notes in his magisterial *Handbook of Terrorism Research*, “in the dominant understanding among experts, the victims [of terrorism] are predominantly not members of an armed force.”[18]

Whereas terrorist groups have traditionally been considered as distinct from guerrilla organizations, many contemporary militant groups apply both terrorist and guerrilla tactics. As Robert Scales and Douglas Ollivant argue, a growing array of Islamist “terrorists” have turned into “skilled soldiers” who increasingly use a blend of traditional terrorist tactics and modern war-fighting techniques.[19] Contemporary militants continue to use terrorist tactics to intimidate potential supporters and enemies alike, but their modus operandi has evolved into skills that can pose considerable challenges to states and their populations. They now “maneuver in reasonably disciplined formations... and employ mortars and rockets in deadly barrages.” They rely on ambushes, roadside bombings, sniper fire, and other tactics that in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan have imposed considerable challenges and losses to U.S. forces. Groups such as the Islamic State,

Hizballah, and Hamas are able to handle second generation weapons such as Russian RPG-29 and possibly wire-guided anti-tank missiles, and build sophisticated underground tunnel systems.[20]

The above trends, which are highlighted by knowledgeable observers, indicate that in recent years a growing number of actors traditionally labeled “terrorist groups” are increasingly relying on a combination of tactics that fall squarely within the predominant understanding of both terrorism and guerrilla tactics.[21] In fact, these groups employ both tactics concurrently, sometimes on the same day.[22] The inescapable conclusion is that for a growing number of such militant groups, the terrorist and guerrilla labels apply equally well; these groups are terrorist and guerrilla actors at one and the same time.

The Targets of “Terrorist” Groups: An Empirical Analysis

In order to examine the extent to which the combined use of terrorist and guerrilla tactics applies to a broader array of contemporary “terrorist groups,” the authors conducted an empirical analysis. To that end, we examined one criterion by which to measure the growing crossover of terrorism and guerrilla tactics, namely the choice of targets. Specifically, our analysis examined the targeting choices of groups defined as “terrorist groups” by the Global Terrorism Database of START at the University of Maryland, one of the most extensive and widely employed databases available for the subject under consideration here. The authors examined all groups in the period between 2002 and 2012 that carried out at least six attacks—the minimum required to render the statistical analysis meaningful.[23] 2012 is the last year for which GTD data were available at the time of this writing, and we examined a period of more than ten years because a shorter period would have significantly lowered the number of groups that would have reached the set minimum of 6 attacks. Furthermore, focusing on this time period allows for the analysis of contemporary militant actors, thereby rendering our study more policy relevant. These scope parameters left us with 119 groups to analyze. For each group, we recorded the total number of attacks during that period and examined the distribution of target types, with a focus on attacks against civilians, general and diplomatic government targets, military targets, and attacks against the police.[24] We expected a sizeable portion of the targets of these organizations to be military, government, or police targets—a finding that would lend credence to our hypothesis that terrorist groups use a variety of tactics.

As the following analysis shows, the data strongly suggest that groups labeled terrorist indeed use a combination of guerrilla and terrorist tactics. Nevertheless, due to conceptual inconclusiveness on the one hand, and limitations inherent in the data on the other hand, our empirical analysis is of suggestive nature only. The first problem is conceptual: attacks against government and police targets can be plausibly regarded as either terrorist or guerrilla attacks. The second problem relates to issues inherent in the coding of GTD data. Problematically, the GTD’s definition of military targets includes attacks against both combatant and non-combatant military targets, with no possibility of ascertaining whether the military target was struck in a combatant or non-combatant context. Theoretically, therefore, if all military targets hit by a particular organization would be non-combatant targets, our assumption would lack empirical support. In our opinion, however, it is unreasonable to believe that all attacks against military targets carried out by the organizations included in this analysis were attacks against military forces in non-combatant situations. Most importantly, our aim in this article is relatively modest: to cast reasonable doubt on the claim that terrorist groups carry out terrorist attacks only. Hence, we believe that the empirical analysis provides qualified support for this article’s claim that terrorism is only a portion—and often a small portion—of these groups’ overall activities. [25]

The analysis first focused on data for the universe of groups active in that decade. For these 119 groups,

the average percentage of attacks against civilians is 32% (with a median of 28.6%). As Chart 1 shows, on average civilians are the favored target for these groups, but such attacks account for no more than a third of all attacks. A total of 16% of the attacks were aimed at military targets, 15.3% against government targets, and 13.4% against police targets. When combined, those targets generally considered typical for guerrilla operations—such as military, government, and police targets—are targeted in 44.7% of the cases—a significantly higher figure than that for civilians, the classic target of terrorism.




Chart # 1: Average Distribution by Target type, All (Source: GTD)

The analysis then focused on the ten most active jihadist groups of that period.[26] As the empirical analysis indicates, these groups do not appear to rely exclusively on terrorism either, and frequently appear to rely predominantly on guerrilla tactics. Still, the majority (6 out of 10) target civilians more than any other category, although only Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (LeT) does so in more than half of its attacks. Three of these jihadist groups target military targets more than any other, including civilian targets. For example, 45% of AQAP's attacks were aimed at military targets. The GSPC and AQIM also targeted military targets more than any other targets (33.7% and 32.3%, respectively). On average, these ten groups target civilians 30.2% of the time, military targets 21.5%, government targets 13.3%, and police targets 19.2% of the time. The median for these attacks shows a similar tendency. The median for attacks against civilian targets is 28%, for military 18.1%, for government 12.5% and for police targets 20%. Once again, the empirical evidence gathered for the period under review suggests that while civilian targets are the highest on average, non-civilian targets still comprise in total the most attacks with a combined average of 54.4% of the attacks.

While these figures seem to provide empirical support for Berger's hypotheses vis-à-vis Al Qaeda and its cohorts, the authors of the present article expanded the inquiry to non-jihadist groups as well. Of the 10 most active non-jihadist groups in the examined period [27], the authors surprisingly found that they targeted civilians more often, on average, than jihadist groups. Two of the groups, the LRA and the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, do so in more than 50% of their attacks (83.6% and 56.7%, respectively). Two of these groups targeted military targets more than any other targets (New People's Army with 24.6% and the PKK with 33.1%) and one group favored police targets more than any other target (ETA, with 19.6%).




Chart # 2: Average Distribution by Target Type, Jihadi (Source: GTD)

On average, the combined attacks of all groups in this category targeted civilians 38%, military targets 14.2%, government targets 9.8%, and police targets 13.6% of the time.[28] As the data show, non-jihadist movements actually target civilians more than all the other targets combined, with 38% targeting civilians compared to a combined average of 37.7% of all the other targets studied. Nevertheless, it is clear that even in this case, civilians are still targeted less than 50% of the time and that these groups employ terrorist and guerrilla tactics almost evenly.




Chart # 3: Average Distribution by Target Type, non-jihadi (Source: GTD)

In conclusion, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that if terrorist attacks are defined as attacks against civilian targets only, the common labeling of these groups as “terrorist groups” is, strictly speaking, only partially accurate. If that is the case, however, what explains the prominence and perseverance of a label that refers to only a portion of a given group’s activity?

The widespread use of the “terrorist group” label is likely due to a combination of psychological and instrumental factors. Psychologically, the use of this label provides a certain degree of emotional satisfaction to societies targeted by terrorism. Terrorism evokes repugnance and fear, thereby stoking an unequivocal rejection of terrorism’s means and agents alike.[29] Populations have been trained to reject compromise with terrorists, and want to believe that terrorists are unique in their “evilness,” therefore deserving a category of

their own. This explains not only why governments and societies targeted by political violence cling to the terrorism label, but also why they often fail to view “terrorism” as part of a broader violent conflict.

Instrumentally, a strong case can be made that “naming and shaming” groups that rely on the most brutal acts of violence can serve a number of goals designed to weaken these actors. Such labels can assist efforts of building an international coalition designed to oppose these groups through legal, political, economic, or militarily efforts. Moreover, repeated emphasis of the most unacceptably violent behavior of such groups can arguably serve the goal of curtailing public support for these groups among their potential constituents. For the purpose of policy pronouncements, therefore, the terrorism label has certain advantages. Despite this value, we argue that policy analysis—including those that directly affect policy formulation and strategic messaging—must adopt a more complex view that better accounts for the evolving nature of terrorist groups and their complex interaction with other tactics and modes of warfare, as well as their interaction with broader conflicts such as insurgency and civil wars.

“Insurgent Groups”: The Least Inaccurate Framework for Analysis

The trends emerging out of our data analysis confirm not only our own intuition, but also that of a growing number of other scholars that have begun to appreciate that terrorism is not a *sui generis* phenomenon. Scholars of terrorism, insurgency, and civil wars increasingly recognize not only that terrorism is a tactic frequently used in conjunction with other tactics, but that these violent tactics are employed as part of a broader spectrum of political activities. Boaz Ganor and Eitan Azani, for example, have developed useful models of “hybrid terrorist organizations” that describe the fact that groups such as Lebanese Hizballah or Hamas engage in terrorism and politics concurrently.[30] Cognizant of the challenges in differentiating between terrorist, insurgent, and rebel groups, scholars in the broader field of conflict studies have adopted alternative terms such as “violent non-state actors” or “armed groups.”[31]

We argue that an existing concept, that of the insurgent group, is most useful in describing the predominant contextual realities of terrorism.[32] The concept accounts for the generally observable interplay between violent and nonviolent (i.e., political) means of struggle; for these groups’ reliance on either single or multiple tactics; and for the fact that terrorism most often emerges in the context of a broader armed conflict such as civil wars.

The U.S. Army/ U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual offers a definition of insurgency that synthesizes the dominant view among insurgency and counter-insurgency (COIN) theorists. It describes insurgency as “an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”[33] Subversion and armed conflict—the interplay of political and violent means—are the two main ways in which insurgents seek to attain their goals. The concept of insurgency can help overcome the conceptual difficulties regarding the proper labeling of many contemporary militant groups because theorists of insurgency have long argued that insurgents typically rely on several modes of warfare at once. Although theoretically these modes of warfare do not have to include acts of terrorism—insurgents can rely, for example, on a combination of conventional and guerrilla tactics—they almost always do. Ariel Merari, for instance, observed that “whenever possible, insurgents use concurrently a variety of strategies of struggle. Terrorism, which is the easiest form of insurgency, is practically always one of these modes.”[34]

Viewing terrorist groups as insurgent groups should not be seen as an attempt to play down the fact that these groups frequently commit acts of indiscriminate violence. Yet it does help place these acts in a broader context of a more complex reality. Based on this understanding, even the most violent groups using the most

despicable tactics are likely to spend some or most of their time and energy doing something other than killing civilians—fighting regular troops and government forces and subverting their enemies by means of propaganda and other political means.

Of course, as the late terrorism scholar Paul Wilkinson noted, “it is possible to engage in acts of terrorism without mounting a full-scale insurgency.”[35] Self-standing campaigns of terrorism detached from broader conflicts, however, are becoming increasingly rare, and have always been the exception. According to Wilkinson, historically, acts of terrorism have been used as “part of a wider repertoire of struggle.”[36] Recent research on the interplay between terrorism and civil wars—the dominant type of warfare since World War II—confirms the ongoing relevance of Wilkinson’s assessment. According to data assembled and analyzed by Michael Findley and Joseph K. Young, most incidents of terrorism “take place in the geographic regions where civil war is occurring and during the ongoing war.”[37]

Implications for Theory and Policy

Analyzing the militant actors described above as insurgents while continuing to publicly refer to them as “terrorist groups” will allow governments to enjoy the benefits associated with the use of the terror label while significantly reducing the possible costs of this approach by avoiding some of the blind spots and pitfalls that often accompany the use of the terrorism moniker.

Considering violent, politically motivated groups that commit acts of terrorism within a broader framework of insurgency provides a more comprehensive perspective for the analysis of the goals, the means, and the context of the violent political struggle waged by these groups, with important implications for countering these actors.

Employing the “insurgency” lens, analysts can gain a better appreciation of the goals that the group is trying to attain by carrying out terrorist attacks, but also of the broader political objectives pursued by the group using alternate means. This approach will place terror attacks within the broader strategic framework of insurgency and can help avoid confusion between means (use of uncompromised violence to cause high level of destruction and human casualties) and ends (e.g., challenging governmental authority). In other words, the adoption of “insurgent groups” as an analytical framework can improve a government’s ability to recognize that these groups use terrorism as a means to actively try to engage governments in a competition aimed at the redistribution of power.[38]

Adopting the concept of insurgency also sharpens the analysis of the means of struggle in an additional way: It provides an opportunity to analyze the insurgent group in its early developmental stage, and to trace the process by which it adopts particular violent tactics of struggle, including terrorism. Moreover, considering terrorism as one of several possible tactics that insurgent groups can adopt can help governments to reach conclusions regarding the conditions that lead militant groups to choose certain tactics over others.

In terms of context, counterinsurgency studies can shed some light on the influence of political, economic and social conditions on the emergence and development of politically motivated groups that adopt insurgency as a strategy, and terrorism as a tactic to reach their goals. Specifically, embracing the “insurgent group” concept emphasizes that governments and violent, politically motivated non-state actors are engaged in dynamic relationships in the course of which governmental actions influence the patterns of the opponent’s political behavior—including his selection of tactics.[39]

Finally, considering the use of terrorism in the context of insurgency provides a clearer picture by considering

the role of other relevant actors that may have an influence on the conflict dynamics, including the local civilian population, armed gangs, oligarchs, clerics, and educational institutions, among others.[40]

Policy Implications

Adopting the framework of “insurgent groups” can shift the analytical focus away from an enemy-centric approach and towards a condition-centric approach. Such a shift is likely to have a tangible impact on policy making by expanding the scope of policy efforts; changing policymakers’ assessments of threats and opportunities; and granting more flexibility to governments in following a course of action. These three aspects will be discussed in turn.

On the issue of policy interest, as Metz has argued, American strategic culture has traditionally adopted an enemy-centric orientation. This approach implies that the conflict is caused by malicious challengers, and can be resolved by destroying the adversary’s military capabilities and eroding his will to fight. This focus, Metz believes, has substantially complicated all policy aspects regarding counterinsurgency. In particular, the enemy-centric approach has limited the U.S. security community’s ability to gauge the threat in a systematic way and to go beyond the perception that the conflict is induced by “evil people,”[41] and not by a broader set of conditions. That view implies that the physical defeat of the enemy is a main goal of operations, while political, social, and cultural aspects of insurgency are placed lower on the list of priorities.

In this respect, considering terrorism within the contextual framework of insurgency can help foresee complications and foster the formulation of governmental strategies in accordance with the complex nature of violent challengers. In particular, seeing terror as a tactic used as part of a broader insurgency requires resources to be allocated to population-centric activities aimed at separating the civilian population from the insurgent group and its infrastructure. This approach will aid the goal of undermining the recruitment networks and reducing the likelihood of new terrorist and other violent attacks.[42]

By conceiving of its opponents as insurgent groups, governments can also widen the scope of their policy efforts. Besides aiming at the tactical defeat of the adversary using military means, the insurgency framework highlights the necessity of simultaneously focusing on reestablishing governmental credibility and gaining popular support in problematic areas. In this regard, addressing the social grievances upon which the insurgents’ political agenda is based should move to the top of the policy agenda.[43] In other words, a strong case can be made that counterterrorism efforts should be subordinated to classical COIN concerns of winning the hearts and minds of the local civilians, while marginalizing the violent elements.

As far as the discussion of threats and opportunities is concerned, we argue that considering the rival as an insurgent group can uncover certain threats and opportunities that governments focusing primarily on combating terrorism might otherwise overlook. While terrorism is primarily perceived as a security threat, the threats posed by insurgencies are usually assessed more broadly. Well-organized and sustained insurgencies are considered to pose not only tactical security challenges, but broader strategic challenges such as attempts to undermine governmental legitimacy, power, and authority. Adopting the insurgency framework of analysis will lead policy analysts to better assess the potential strategic challenges posed by these groups, and therefore place certain groups—for example, those seeking to establish an alternative authority in particular areas—more prominently in governmental threat assessments.

Even in cases when the establishment of an actual alternative authority is not a major concern of the insurgents, popular support and mobilization may have significant ramifications for the government’s legitimacy and ability to enforce security.[44] By ignoring this strategic aspect of competition, governments

risk finding themselves waging an exhausting struggle to address more urgent, immediate threats, while losing focus on the political developments of their adversaries. At worst, the insurgents may not only control certain territories, but also gain broader public support for their cause in the local and international arena, and successfully delegitimize governmental counterterrorism efforts.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the evolution of Palestinian militant groups into politico-military actors highlight the costs of governmental neglect of the non-kinetic aspects of these groups' activities. Thus, while Israel's focus on battling urgent security threats in the course of the Al-Aqsa Intifada and the subsequent years resulted in a number of tactically successful military engagements, Israel failed to properly trace and manage the political deployment of Palestinian insurgent groups.[45]

In terms of opportunities, regarding an opponent as an insurgent group may broaden the range of governmental means of political influence over the challenger and his support base. Such strategies may include the delegitimization of the opponent's political cause (as opposed to the mere neutralization of the tactical military threat he poses); undermining the channels of legal and financial support to the insurgent; disruption of the enemy's educational networks; or the prevention of insurgent alliance formation with third parties. Alternatively, regarding the other side as an insurgency also provides opportunities for negotiating with moderate members of the group, including applying reassurance strategies for those who are willing to cooperate, and dealing with the provision of goods and services to the local population.[46] In addition, viewing the nature of the terrorist threat through the perspective of "insurgent groups" may help to foresee the possible impact of governmental actions on the nature of politically motivated violence adopted by insurgent groups—and thereby may help to avoid possible counterproductive policies from being enacted. Conceptualizing these groups as terrorist groups, in contrast, is likely to limit the perception of threats and opportunities to "hard security" domains.

Lastly, the increasingly complex nature of the adversary requires a more comprehensive and tailored policy toolkit on the part of governments. Viewing the terrorist threat as one emanating from "terrorist groups" can limit governmental actions to law-enforcement and military efforts. Adopting the "insurgent group" concept for the purpose of analysis, in contrast, broadens governments' flexibility in dealing with these challenges. [47] Such policies can be better used to address broader, but arguably no less important challenges, such as cutting popular support for these groups, reducing calls for revenge among the constituencies, decreasing the salience of the insurgents' political agenda, and ultimately hampering these groups' recruitment and fundraising capabilities.[48] Conceiving of these groups as insurgencies, in other words, can prevent governments from playing into these groups' hands by responding to their attempts of provocation with an overreaction that will ultimately backfire on the government.[49] In addition, conceiving of the enemy as an "insurgent group" will allow governments to apply carefully adjusted strategies to each type of primary and secondary conflict actor in order to reach a long-term sustainable solution.

It is also important to note that seeing terrorism as an insurgency-related phenomenon will require governments to adjust their counterterrorism policies to better handle the cultural peculiarities of insurgencies. For instance, the analysis of religious, ethnic and cultural underpinnings of insurgency may be crucial for formulating efficient policy options vis-à-vis global insurgencies in order to prevent terror attacks by applying deterrence, assurance or de-legitimization strategies.

Conclusion

In sum, the official use by governments of the "terrorist group" label to describe groups adopting terrorism as a tactic continues to be an important element in the struggle against terrorism. It can help delegitimize

the use of terrorist violence; reduce public support; and undercut financial and material support for terrorist entities.

At the same time, the use of this label must not obscure a far more nuanced reality that acknowledges a number of important caveats: First, terrorist groups use, almost without exception, terrorism in conjunction with other tactics, notably guerrilla warfare. Second, terrorist groups are becoming more sophisticated political actors, with some attempting to provide basic services to the population in an attempt to win over hearts and minds. Third, terrorism is rarely a self-standing phenomenon. Instead, most terrorism occurs in the context of broader armed conflict, typically an insurgency and/or a civil war.

We argue that governments should strive to preserve the benefits of applying the terrorism label while avoiding the label's potential entrapments. Perhaps the most dangerous potential pitfall is for governments to fall victim to their own rhetoric. At worst, such a rhetorical entrapment can lead governments to focus on policies designed to address only the specific threat of terrorism posed by these groups. As the above discussion has shown, however, the dangers emanating from these actors are far more variegated. A government policy that not only *labels*, but whose policy analysts also *examine* these actors through the narrow lens of "terrorist groups" loses sight of the overall challenges posed by these groups, thereby failing to enact the most adequate policy responses.

For that reason, we argue for an approach that separates the way in which these militant actors are referred to in official statements from the way in which they are examined by specialists and analysts—including those directly informing the government. Official policy statements, we believe, should continue to label actors involved in terrorism as terrorist groups. At the same time, policy analysis informing the government's policy pronouncements and decisions should adopt greater nuance when examining and conceptualizing these militant groups. We believe that in most cases, these groups are best understood as insurgent groups, and hence propose this label for analytical purposes as the most nuanced framework.

The analytical employment of the "insurgent group" concept can contribute to a deeper theoretical understanding of the power distribution challenge that insurgent groups pose to governments by using terror. In addition, the suggested label can be useful in explaining the adoption of both violent (including terrorism) and nonviolent means of political struggle, based on the present political, economic and social conditions on the ground. Furthermore, utilization of the label "insurgent groups" allows for a more comprehensive perspective on the dynamic relations between politically motivated violent actors that use terrorism as a tactic, governments, and other relevant actors. Finally, in terms of policy, the use of the suggested framework will provide a broader perspective of the insurgents' political development, a better grasp of its network of contacts and supporters, and it may also grant considerable flexibility to policy decision-making.

Theoretically, our conclusions also call for closer intellectual interactions between the terrorism and insurgency studies fields, as well as the study of civil wars. Closer correspondence between these related fields can help shed more light onto the political aspects of the campaigns in which terrorism occurs. There are already a number of promising examples of fruitful interdisciplinary efforts, such as the increasing prominence of "conflict studies" as a field that combines scholarship from the civil wars, social movement, insurgency, terrorism, and other related sub-disciplines; research centers dedicated to international security issues that offer fellowships to conflict scholars from a range of disciplines; or journals such as *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* or *Terrorism and Political Violence* that encourage submissions from terrorism, insurgency, and civil war scholars alike. These efforts are commendable, but disciplinary insularity is still the prevailing norm. Future steps towards intellectual plurality could include government research grants that encourage cross-disciplinary approaches to the study of international conflicts, or international conferences

devoted to the examination of contemporary political violence from multiple disciplinary angles.

Viewing terrorism as a phenomenon closely related to insurgencies and civil wars will allow analysts to pool the insights and best practices from academic fields that have thus far been treated separately. The study of terrorism, insurgency, and civil wars do not only suffer from a disconnect as far as the analysis of their causes are concerned; analyses of how these different phenomena might end are similarly compartmentalized. Insights from the study of the termination of civil wars and insurgencies, for example, are likely to inform future studies of the decline and demise of groups heavily reliant on terrorism, and vice versa.

About the Authors:

Assaf Moghadam is Associate Professor and Director of the MA Program in Government at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (IDC). He is also Director of Academic Affairs at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at IDC, and a Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.

Ronit Berger is a Ph.D. candidate at Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. Her dissertation examines how the interplay between external factors and internal group dynamics impact conflict transformation when insurgent groups sustain both a political and a military wing. She uses the Irish Republican Movement as her main case.

Polina Beliakova is an M.A. student at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at IDC. Her Master's thesis analyzes governmental deterrence and reassurance strategies for the prevention of political violence by non-state actors in the Israeli-Palestinian case.

Notes

[1] Scales, Robert H., and Douglas Ollivant. "Terrorist Armies Fight Smarter and Deadlier than Ever." *Washington Post* (August 1 2014). http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/terrorist-armies-are-fighting-smarter-and-deadlier-than-ever/2014/08/01/3998ae00-18db-11e4-9e3b-7f2f110c6265_story.html?wpmk=MK0000200 (accessed August 6 2014).

[2] Berger, J. M. "War on Error." *Foreign Policy* (February 5, 2014), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/02/04/war_on_error_al_qaeda_terrorism (accessed July 24 2014).

[3] According to the GTD, UNITA carried out six attacks in that period, all against civilian targets.

[4] The targeting of civilians is generally considered a key aspect of terrorism. On this point, see especially Ganor, Boaz. *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers* Transaction Publishers, 2005, 1-24. Most scholars, however, expand that category of victims to civilians as well as non-combatants. See Schmid, Alex P.(Ed.). *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*. London and New York: Routledge, 2013, 39-157. For a recent discussion of guerrilla tactics targeting primarily government targets and armed forces, see Boot, Max. *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present*. WW Norton & Company, 2013, xxii-xxiv. For a classic treatment of the topic, see Laqueur, Walter. *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study*. Transaction Publishers, 1976.

[5] Boaz Ganor, interview with the authors, Herzliya, Israel, 12 February 2014.

[6] See, for example, Khalil, James. "Know Your Enemy: On the Futility of Distinguishing between Terrorists and Insurgents." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 36, no. 5 (2013): 419-430; and Findley, Michael G., and Joseph K. Young. "Terrorism and civil war: A spatial and temporal approach to a conceptual problem." *Perspectives on Politics* 10, no. 02 (2012): 285-305, 286.

- [7] See Schmid, A.P. (Ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*; Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism* Columbia University Press, 2013; on approaches to definition of terrorist groups see Phillips, Brian J. "What is a Terrorist Group? Conceptual Issues and Empirical Implications." *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2014): 1-18; De la Calle, Luis and Ignacio Sa ́nchez-Cuenca. "In Search of the Core of Terrorism." Chap. 3, In *Killing Civilians Or Holding Territory? how to Think about Terrorism*, edited by Victor Asal, Luis De la Calle, Michael Findley and Joseph Young. Vol. 14, 475-497: Wiley Online Library, 2012.
- [8] See O'Neill, Bard E., *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*. Washington DC: Brassey's, 1990, 13; Kilcullen, David. "Countering Global Insurgency." *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 4 (2005): 597-617; Morris, Michael F. "Al-Qaeda as Insurgency," U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks (2005); Byman, Daniel. "Understanding Proto-Insurgencies." *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 31, no. 2 (2008): 165-200.
- [9] See O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, 23-27; Kilcullen, "Countering global insurgency," 603; Metz, Steven. "Rethinking Insurgency." In *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*. Edited by Paul B. Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn. London: Routledge, 2012, 38.
- [10] See Khalil, "Know Your Enemy: On the Futility of Distinguishing between Terrorists and Insurgents." For a traditional description of terrorist groups, see Crenshaw, Martha. "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism." *Orbis-a Journal of World Affairs* 29, no. 3 (1985): 465-489; See also Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Chapter 1.
- [11] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 35.
- [12] Byman, "Understanding Proto-Insurgencies," 170.
- [13] Metz, "Rethinking Insurgency," 38.
- [14] Berger, "War on Error."
- [15] Compare the definitions in Schmid, A.P. (Ed). *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*; and Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism, revised and expanded edition*. Columbia University Press, 2006.
- [16] For classic doctrinal formulations of guerrilla warfare, see Griffith, Samuel B., and Zedong Mao. *Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare*. Anchor Press, 1978; Che Guevara, Ernesto. *Guerrilla Warfare*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. See also: Taber, Robert. *The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice*. London: Paladin, 1970.
- [17] For a comparison of terrorism and guerrilla strategies, see O'Neill, Bard E. *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005; Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare*; Boot, *Invisible Armies*; and Merari, Ariel. "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 5, no. 4 (1993): 213-251.
- [18] Schmid, Alex P. and Albert J. Jongman. *Political Terrorism. A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Databases and Literature*. Amsterdam and New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1988.
- [19] Scales and Ollivant, "Terrorist Armies Fight Smarter and Deadlier than Ever."
- [20] Scales, *Ibid*.
- [21] Berger, "War on Error."
- [22] On 31 December 2012, for example, Al Qaeda in Iraq carried out 16 attacks. Of these, three were directed against government targets, five against police forces, seven against civilians and private property, and one against military forces.
- [23] The GTD database distinguishes between a large number of target types, but five of these were of particular significance to this project: civilians, diplomatic, government, military, and police targets. We chose a minimum of six attacks because if a group listed in the GTD database attacked each one of the target types included in the database, setting six attacks as the minimum would ensure that at least one target type was targeted more than the others. A lower cut off point would render the statistical analysis less meaningful.
- [24] As stated earlier, the GTD provides information about many other target types. However, these are of less importance to this project. Additionally, we eventually excluded one of the target types—attacks on (diplomatic) government targets—from our charts and the final analysis as this type of target was rarely struck when compared to the other target types; not used by most groups; the category lacked sufficient weight for the empirical analysis.
- [25] By using data that was collected, coded and reported by others, we have no control over the quality, validity and reliability of the data. Nonetheless, we find the data reported by the GTD to be valid and reliable enough for the purposes of this analysis.
- [26] The most active of the ten groups were the Taliban, with 2,431 attacks between 2002 and 2012. The least active was Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, with 90 attacks. The

other eight groups in that category, in descending order of activity, are Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Boko Haram, al-Shabab, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).

[27] In descending order of activity, as measured by numbers of attacks, this category includes the following groups: Communist Party of India (CPI), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), New People's Army in the Philippines, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), Hamas, Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA). It is important to mention that for all groups examined in this study, we did not confine the attacks to domestic ones, but considered all attacks, both domestic and international.

[28] The corresponding medians are 36 for civilians, 13.3 for military, 10.9 for government and 14.9 for police.

[29] See, for example, Silke, Andrew. "Cheshire-cat logic: The recurring theme of terrorist abnormality in psychological research." *Psychology, Crime and Law* 4, no. 1 (1998): 51-69.

[30] Boaz Ganor, presentation delivered at the "Terrorism and Governance" conference, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, 12 February 2014; and Azani, Eitan. "The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 36, no. 11 (2013): 899-916; See also Berti, Benedetta. *Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict to Integration*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013.

[31] We believe that the terms "violent non-state actors" (VNSA) or "armed groups," despite some benefits, are no panacea to the problem of labeling these militant group because they fail to account for terrorism's key characteristic as a form of political violence. Strictly speaking VNSAs or armed groups could be criminal organizations guided purely by greed, with little connection to actors driven by political motives.

[32] We are not the first authors to do so. For similar arguments, see for example Merari, "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency," David Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," and Khalil, "Know your enemy: On the Futility of Distinguishing between Terrorists and Insurgents."

[33] United States. Department of the Army. *The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: US Army Field Manual No. 3-24: Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5*. University of Chicago Press, 2007; This definition is similar to the definition in other classic texts on insurgency. Compare, for example, O'Neill, *Terrorism and Insurgency*; Galula, David. *Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964; Nagl, John A. *Learning to eat soup with a knife: counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. University of Chicago Press, 2009.

[34] Merari, Ariel. "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency." For a similar view, see also D. Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency."

[35] Wilkinson, Paul. *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*. 3rd ed. Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2011, 10.

[36] Wilkinson, Ibid.

[37] Findley and Young, "Terrorism and Civil War," 286.

[38] See O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*; D. Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency".

[39] See O'Neill, Bard E. *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*; D. Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency".

[40] Cassidy, Robert M. *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War*. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006, 13.

[41] Metz, "Rethinking Insurgency," 35.

[42] It is worth noting here that in some cases, "winning the hearts and minds" is not likely to be applicable due to cultural, ethnic and religious reasons. See Galula, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*; Fitzsimmons, Michael. "Hard Hearts and Open Minds? Governance, Identity and the Intellectual Foundations of Counterinsurgency Strategy." *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 31, no. 3 (2008): 337-365.

[43] Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," 612.

[44] Kilcullen, David. "Counterinsurgency: The State of Controversial Art." In *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*. Edited by Paul B. Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn. London: Routledge, 2012, 144.

[45] See Catignani, Sergio. "The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Gap between Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics during the Al-Aqsa Intifada." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 1 (2005): 57-75; and Catignani, Sergio. "The Israel Defense Forces and the Al-Aqsa Intifada: When Tactical Virtuosity Meets Strategic Disappointment." Fiesole FI, Italy: European University Institute (2008).

[46] See, for example, Kruglanski, Arie W., Michele Gelfand, and Rohan Gunaratna. "Detainee Deradicalization: A Challenge for Psychological Science." *APS Observer* 23, (2010): 1-3; De Mesquita, Ethan Bueno. "Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence." *International Organization* 59, no. 1

(2005): 145-176; Ross, Jeffrey Ian and Ted Robert Gurr. "Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and the United States." *Comparative Politics* (1989): 405-426.

[47] See Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," 605; Boyle, Michael J. "Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Go Together?" *International Affairs* 86, No. 2 (2010), 343.

[48] Byman, Daniel. "Understanding Proto-Insurgencies," 192; On popular backlash see: Boyle, "Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Go Together?", 343.

[49] Kilcullen, David. *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*. Oxford: University Press, 2009, 30.

News and Entertainment Media: Government's Big Helpers in the Selling of Counterterrorism

by Yaeli Bloch-Elkon and Brigitte L. Nacos

Abstract

This article explores how mass media depict overt responses to terrorism, such as military actions, and covert acts, such as the torturing of captured terrorists or suspected terrorists in the context of American politics and policymaking. Contrary to most studies of media and terrorism, this paper examines both entertainment and news media's depiction of counterterrorism and how this might affect public and elite perception of the government's responses to the threat of terrorism.

Keywords: *media, propaganda, counter-terrorism, United States*

Introduction

Mid-March 2014. A digital clock is counting down. Days, hours, minutes, seconds. 48:07: 45:09. Appropriate advertising for the return of the counterterrorism thriller series "24" and Jack Bauer, whose life as super-agent of a U.S. Counter Terror Unit was dramatized in 24-hour real time countdowns during each of its eight post-9/11 seasons. A few short trailers of the renamed new series ("24: Live Another Day"), available on the Fox.com site, depict horror scenes in burning London streets and Bauer, pistol in hand, trying "to thwart an unthinkable terrorist attack in London that could change the world forever." [1] If you want to be sure not to miss the new counterterrorism drama, you are invited to click the "Remind Me to Watch" button and provide contact information. The Fox Channel promises to alert you so that you don't miss the opening episode or subsequent shows. Eight weeks before Jack Bauer will return to the television screen, the search term "24: Live Another Day" produces more than 44 million results on Google.

While Hollywood embraced all along the notion that extraordinary events, including heinous crimes and terrorism call for extraordinary responses, this manifested itself in the dramatic proliferation of brutality and torture in prime-time network television following the 9/11 attacks. [2] Moreover, before 9/11 the bad guys were the ones displaying brutality, after 9/11 the good guys tortured for the common good in the so-called war against terrorism. FOX's "24" went particularly far in its frequent torture scenes. Typically, there was a ticking time bomb or some other kind of imminent attack and a captured suspect who knew of the plot. By torturing the villain, Bauer and his team would extract information that would be crucial in preventing another man-made catastrophe.

The action thriller *Zero Dark Thirty* about the daring raid by SEAL Team Six that killed Osama bin Laden in his hide-away in Pakistan was among the many Hollywood productions that contributed to the idea that torture works. Starting with the torture of a major Al Qaeda figure, there was up front the implication that information gained during that torture was instrumental in finding and neutralizing bin Laden. Among those who immediately protested against what they considered a non-factual association between information gained through torture and the capture of bin Laden were Senate Intelligence Committee chair Dianne Feinstein, a Democrat, and Senator John McCain, a Republican. When such controversies arise, movie-makers tend to defend themselves with the argument that Hollywood narratives are not real and that audiences know the difference between reality and fiction; but in her eloquent critique of "entertainment violence" (in motion pictures/TV shows/computer games) and "media violence" (especially in TV news)

Sissela Bok (1998, 37) rejected that argument. “A killing in a movie is watched by real people on whom it may have real effects.” [3] Similarly, one could argue that Jack Bauer and his brethren in their all-out fight against terrorists are watched by real people on whom it may have real effects.

The Propaganda Model and Hollywood

There is good reason to open our article with references to entertainment media and first discuss how Hollywood fiction has portrayed the fight against terrorism and terrorists before moving on to news media. After all, screen heroes like Bauer, their successful ways of “tuning up” terrorists, and the fictitious ticking-time-bomb scenario have influenced America’s post-9/11 debate about homeland security and in particular about the treatment of captured terrorists or suspected terrorists—perhaps more than news reports (Downing 2007; Kamin 2007; Nacos 2011). Commenting on a tidal wave of motion pictures “so viciously nihilistic that the only point seems to be to force you to suspend moral judgments altogether,” David Edelstein (2006) coined the term “torture porn” and recognized the possible impact of these sorts of movies in post-9/11 America. “Fear supplants empathy and makes us all potential torturers, doesn’t it?” he wrote. “A large segment of the population evidently has no problem with this. Our righteousness is buoyed by propaganda like the TV series *24*, which devoted an entire season to justifying torture in the name of an imminent threat: a nuclear missile en route to a major city. Who do you want defending America? Kiefer Sutherland [Jack Bauer] or terrorist-employed civil-liberties lawyers?”

With few exceptions (Entman and Rojecki 2000; Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2007) media and communication researchers tend to focus either on the news or on entertainment, not both in one and the same research project and topic. Yet, both observation and research findings suggest that film and television fiction are as potent as news media in affecting audiences’ understanding and views of public affairs. Nearly a century ago, based on his observations, Walter Lippmann (1997 [1922]: 61) hypothesized that links exist between film images and movie-goers perception of reality, when he wrote,

*The shadowy idea becomes vivid; your hazy notion, let us say of the Ku Klux Klan, thanks to Mr. Griffiths, takes vivid shape when you see *The Birth of a Nation*. Historically, it may be the wrong shape, morally it may be a pernicious shape, but it is a shape, and I doubt whether anyone who has seen the film and does not know more about the Ku Klux Klan than Mr. Griffiths, will ever hear the name again without seeing those white horsemen.*

Similarly, the Intelligence Science Board, a group of expert advisers to the U.S. intelligence community, noted in its extensive 2006 report on interrogation, “Prime time television is not just entertainment. It is ‘adult education.’ We should not be surprised when the public (and many otherwise law-abiding lawyers) applaud when an actor threatens the ‘hostile *du jour*’ with pain or mayhem, unless he or she answers a few pointed questions before the end of the episode.” [4]

Research confirms such observations. Michael Delli Carpini and Bruce Williams (1994: 793) found that participants in focus groups referred slightly more often to fictitious TV shows than news programs in political discourse about the environment. They concluded that “understanding the full impact of television on political conversations and on the public opinions formed during them requires expanding the definition of politically relevant television to include both fictional and nonfictional programming” because “when subjects draw on media in their conversations, they make few distinctions between fictional and nonfictional television.” Robert Entman and Andrew Rojecki (2000, 208) concluded, “Although we have distinguished between news, entertainment, and advertising, there is little reason to believe that such distinctions significantly shape people’s responses. The *overall patterns* of images and information establish the mental

associations, the schemas, used to process the social world. The most relevant differentiation is not between genres but between different patterns of communicated information and prototypes they construct.”

The blurred lines between entertainment and news in audience perceptions exist as well with respect to counterterrorism. Based on their research of post-9/11 television news and Hollywood entertainment like the American “24” and the British “Spooks” TV dramas Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin (2007, 148) reckoned that “it is not surprising that when our audiences talk about news and actual events in the War on Terror, they lapse into dialogue about movies and TV drama.”

The majority of Americans are not aware or do not want to admit that entertainment programs affect their understanding of public affairs, including terrorism and counterterrorism. A few months after 9/11, when pollsters asked survey respondents whether they “learn something about terrorist attacks or the war on terrorism from late night TV shows such as David Letterman and Jay Leno,” 17% answered “regularly” or “sometimes,” 23% “hardly ever,” and 63% “never.” Among 18- to 34-year olds the result was different in that 24% told pollsters that they learned regularly or sometimes from late night comedian shows about terrorism and counterterrorism, whereas 22% said hardly ever and 53% never.[5] Rejecting the conservative argument that Hollywood is “a den of leftist skills” Michael Parenti (2010, x) characterizes the films and TV productions of what he calls “make-believe media” as providing “political entertainment [that] makes political propagation all the more insidious” (Parenti, 1992, 3). Concentrated corporate ownership and the influence of Pentagon, CIA, NASA, and other government agencies on war movies in particular ensure according to Matthew Alford (2010a, 4) that “Hollywood generates considerable sympathy for the status quo and, indeed, frequently glorifies US institutions and their use of political violence.”

What Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2010) and others (e.g., Frank 2010; Westwell 2010) concluded after analyzing post-9/11 TV dramas and films is in part compatible with Alford’s (2010b) model that is borrowed from Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky’s (2002) propaganda theory designed for analyzing and explaining mainstream news media in the United States. After examining post-9/11 motion pictures Alford concluded that the propaganda model “is equally applicable to mainstream US cinema” and that, thanks to Hollywood entertainment “a cultural framework was laid for the war against terrorism that fitted neatly with the broader objectives and narratives of the US government” (2010b, 88).

That was reflected, for example, in America’s public debate about torture. The public bought to one degree or the other into the fiction that torture could be used for a good end, namely the extraction of information to prevent terrorism; merely a minority rejected torture categorically. Indeed, the public’s pro-torture sentiment was highest after bin Laden’s death (2011) and after the 2013 release of *Zero Dark Thirty* (see Table 1).

Even more important was that Jack Bauer was a hit with top decision-makers. John Yoo, for example, the lead-author of the Justice Department’s infamous “torture memos” wrote in defense of his role in the Bush administration’s war on terrorism, “What if, as the popular Fox television program 24 recently portrayed, a high-level terrorist leader is caught who knows a nuclear weapon in an American city. Should it be illegal for the President to use harsh interrogation short of torture to elicit this information”(Yoo 2006, 172)? His and the administration’s answer, as reflected in the “torture memos” was in favor of torture, not “short of torture” although they called it “enhanced interrogation techniques.”

Or take U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Scalia. In a 2007 panel discussion on terrorism and the law in Ottawa, a Canadian judge said, “Thankfully, security agencies in all our countries do not subscribe to the mantra ‘What would Jack Bauer do?’ Scalia disagreed and argued forcefully, ‘Jack Bauer saved Los Angeles . . . He saved hundreds of thousands of lives. Are you going to convict Jack Bauer? Say that criminal law is against

him? Is any jury going to convict Jack Bauer? I don't think so!"[6]

Table 1: Torturing Terrorists and the Public

Do you think **the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information** can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?*

		Often Justified	Sometimes Justified	Rarely Justified	Never Justified	DK/ Refused
Date	Source	%	%	%	%	%
2004	PEW	15	28	21	32	4
2005	PEW	15	31	21	30	5
2006	PEW	18	28	19	32	3
2007	PEW	16	31	23	28	3
2008	PEW	17	31	20	30	2
2009	PEW	17	32	19	27	5
2011	PEW	19	34	18	24	4
2013	AP/NORC**	18	32	22	25	3

Source: Authors.

*When the question was asked more than once per year by Pew, we present a yearly average (for 2005, 2007 and 2009);

** AP/NORC question's wording: "How do you feel about the use of torture against suspected terrorists to obtain information about terrorism activities? Can that often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified? "

Indexing, Propaganda Model, and Counterterrorism News

Although we devoted the opening section of this article to entertainment media, we certainly do not discount the importance of the news media as important source for public affairs information. Just as the news media, in spite of terrorists' use of the Internet, continue to be central to the terrorist publicity calculus (Nacos 2007), governments in democracies depend on the news media for enlisting public support for their counterterrorism policies. Because of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of press and expression, the American press has been characterized as an extra force or branch in the governmental system of checks and balances between the administrative, legislative, and judicial branches. Indeed, the American Society of News Editors (formerly the American Society of Newspaper Editors), the professional organizations that pioneered codified journalism ethics, declares in its "Statement of Principles" that "freedom of the press belongs to the people" and, most important, that "the American press was made free not just to inform or just to serve as a forum for debate but also to bring an independent scrutiny to bear on the forces of power in the society, including the conduct of official power at all levels of government."[7]

Contrary to those ideals which are shared by other journalistic organizations, the mainstream media do not always exercise their declared freedom and independence when reporting on public affairs. Recognizing this, W. Lance Bennett's (1990) "indexing" approach speaks to the media's tendency to make news decisions based on their assessments of the power dynamics inside government, especially, as these dynamics can be discerned at the major news beats in the administration (the White House, Departments of Defense and State) and in Congress. Decisive here is that the levels of agreement or disagreement among Washington's

most influential officials will be reflected in the news. While the “indexing” theory recognizes the influence of government insiders to frame the news, shape mass-mediated policy debates, and ultimately policies themselves, it does not go as far as the propaganda or hegemony model. The latter explains the American news media as an instrument of the power elite, among them the upper crust in politics, business, and the military. In C. Wright Mills’ (2000 [1956], 215) view, the media are important instruments of power in the hands of the powerful with some in the media either part of those elites or in prominent roles among their hired hands. In their initial explanation of the “propaganda model” Herman and Chomsky (2002, xi) write that “among their other functions, the media serve, and propagandize on behalf of, the powerful societal interests that control and finance them.” While the indexing theory is more nuanced than the propaganda model and the two schools of thought emphasize their differences, both recognize decision-makers’ influence on the media agenda in major foreign policy matters and especially during foreign policy crises.

Media scholars tend to distinguish between news of foreign/international politics and policies on the one hand and domestic politics and policies on the other. In the age of globalization the once distinct domestic-international demarcation has become increasingly blurred in a multitude of areas, including trade, environment, health, and financial markets (Deese 1994; Huntington 1997). This convergence of the domestic and international spheres has been particularly compelling with respect to transnational terrorism and counterterrorism—even before the beginning of rapid globalization processes in the 1990s. Thus, whether we consider the wave of anti-American terrorism incidents in the 1980s or the catastrophic attacks of 9/11, the actions by transnational terrorist groups and American reactions to those had dramatic effects on U.S. domestic politics and policies as well as on international relations and foreign policy. For this reason, the propaganda and indexing models or a synthesis of both seem suited to examine counterterrorism reporting, to what extent this news takes its lead from government insiders, and how this is reflected in public opinion data.

Counterterrorism: Limited Military Deployments

In the face of an international crisis that involves the United States and challenges the president, Americans tend to rally around the flag and their president in what seem nearly automatic reflexes of patriotic passions. But scholars (Mueller 1985; Brody and Shapiro 1989; Hugick and Gallup 1991) found that not all such crises trigger “rallies-‘round-the-flag.” Even quite similar incidents, for example the 1968 seizure of the USS Pueblo by North Korea and the 1975 seizure of the SS Mayaguez by the Khmer Rouge resulted in different reactions by the American public. While President Lyndon Johnson’s approval dropped after the Mayaguez incident, President Gerald Ford’s public approval increased. After studying such discrepancies Richard Brody and Catherine Shapiro (1989; Brody 1991) explained that rallies occur when the news reflects that “opinion leaders,” such as administration officials and members of Congress, support the president or refrain from voicing criticism. However, when the news reflects disagreement on the part of “opinion leaders,” the public will not rally. To be sure, leading media voices qualify as opinion leaders as well and thus contribute to news content that determines public reactions in this respect.

The rally phenomenon is most likely in the face of a major national security crisis, such as the events of 9/11, wars, and limited military deployment. Scholars suggest a range of minimum approval increases in the first post-incident surveys to qualify as rallies with percentages between 3% and 5% (Edwards 1983; Hugick and Gallup 1991). Moreover, robust rallies require further approval gains in the second poll after the particular event. In the following, we examine three cases in which Presidents Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama deployed the U.S. military for quick strikes abroad against transnational terrorists and terrorist sponsors in the name of counterterrorism:

The 1986 Bombing of Libya: Immediately after taking office in January 1981 and with an implicit reference to the just resolved 444-day Iranian Hostage Crisis, President Reagan warned, “Let terrorists beware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution.”[8] In the following years, as terrorist attacks against Americans increased, especially in the Middle East, there was no “swift and effective retribution.” By the mid-1980s, the Reagan administration was eager to respond. While the Lebanese Hezbollah was involved in a wave of bombings, hijackings, and kidnappings, Washington did not target its sponsor, Iran, but rather the not quite as strong Libya and its ruler Muammar Qaddafi. Indeed, Qaddafi was according to President Reagan and his administration’s propaganda what Osama bin Laden became in the wake of the 9/11 attacks for President George W. Bush, the world’s number one evil-doer. The opportunity to finally do something arose in April 1986, when a bomb exploded in a disco in Berlin, Germany, killing two U.S. servicemen. Claiming that Libyan agents were involved in the bombing, the Reagan administration had now “a smoking gun” against Libya. Expecting retaliatory strikes, American media organizations beefed up their presence in the Libyan capital Tripoli and were ideally situated to report live when the bombing raids on Tripoli and Benghazi began on April 14th. More importantly, media opinion was strongly in favor of the bombings although the victims were predominantly Libyan civilians. As the *New York Times* editorialized one day after the raids, “Even the most scrupulous citizen can only approve and applaud the American attack on Libya...” Another *Times* editorial noted that with the bombing America sent the message, “The tiger bites.”[9] News organizations reported also extensively about the overwhelming congressional support for President Reagan’s decision. Not surprisingly, Ronald Reagan’s general public approval increased from a solid 62% before the bombing to 67% thereafter while 70% or more Americans approved the bombing raids (Table 2).

Table 2: Presidential Approval and Military Counterterrorism – Three US Presidents

Reagan				Clinton				Obama			
Bombing of Libyan Targets				Missiles Strikes against Afghanistan and Sudan				Commando Raid that Killed Bin Laden			
1986	General	Incident Specific	1998	General	Incident Specific	2011	General	Incident Specific	2011	General	Incident Specific
Date	% change	%	Date	% change	%	Date	% change	%	Date	% change	%
4/11-14	62	-	8/6	70	-	4/25-27	47		4/25-27	47	
April 14/15 – Announcement of Air strikes on Tripoli and Benghazi				August 7 – Announcement of Missile Strikes				May 1—Pres. Reveals Raid on Bin Laden hideout			
4/17-18	67	+5	8/11-13	67	-3	5/2-3	57	+10	5/2-3	57	85
4/24-28	-	72	8/17	68	+1	5/5-8	54	-3	5/5-8	54	
4/30-1/5	68	+1	8/19-21	-	71	5/20	-		5/20	-	85
5/15-19	-	70	//////////	//////////	//////////	//////////	//////////	//////////	//////////	//////////	//////////

In the absence of oppositional voices among influential officials inside and outside the administration, the Congress, and within the media, the president's agenda was reflected in the news and a public very supportive of Ronald Reagan.

1998 Missile Strikes Against Targets in Afghanistan and Sudan: Two weeks after terrorists drove car bombs into U.S. embassy compounds in Kenya and Tanzania causing hundreds of deaths, the U.S. military targeted Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and what was described as a "chemical weapons related facility" in Sudan with 79 Tomahawk missiles. The counterterrorism strikes were launched three days after President Clinton had publicly admitted an affair with White House intern Monica Lewinsky. Opinion leaders, especially the president's adversaries in Congress, claimed that Clinton had ordered the strikes in order to draw attention away from his sex scandal. Not only were those political attacks covered by the news media, reporters, too, expressed skepticism about the president's motives. Characteristic for the media's stance was an exchange during a press conference at the Pentagon. Secretary of Defense William Cohen was asked by one reporter whether he was familiar with the *Wag the Dog* movie in which an American president cooks up an imaginary war for the purpose of deflecting interest away from his sexual encounter with a teenage girl. "Some Americans are going to say this [the missile strikes] bears a striking resemblance to *Wag the Dog*," one reporter said. "How do you respond?" Cohen replied that "the only motivation driving this action today was our absolute obligation to protect the American people from terrorist activities." [10]

Along the lines of Brody and Shapiro's findings, the mass-mediated disagreement among opinion leaders was reflected in the news and not lost on the public. As Table 2 shows, President Clinton's general approval decreased slightly whereas his decision to strike back at terrorists and their supporters had solid public support.

Hunting Down Osama bin Laden: On 1 May 2011, shortly before midnight, it was already May 2 in Pakistan, President Obama stunned the nation and the world with the following televised announcement: "Good evening. Tonight, I can report to the American people and to the world that the United States has conducted an operation that killed Osama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda, and a terrorist who's responsible for the murder of thousands of innocent men, women, and children." [11] As the *New York Times* reported the next day,

The President "drew praise from unlikely quarters on Monday for pursuing a risky and clandestine mission to kill Osama bin Laden, a successful operation that interrupted the withering Republican criticism about his foreign policy, world view and his grasp of the office. Former Vice President Dick Cheney declared, "The administration clearly deserves credit for the success of the operation." New York's former mayor, Rudolph W. Giuliani, said, "I admire the courage of the president." [12]

A huge majority of the American public, 85%, expressed approval for President Obama's handling of the raid on bin Laden's secret compound and his general approval for his performance as president jumped 10 percentage points from 47% before the Al Qaeda leader's death to 57% thereafter (see Table 2). This was reason enough for Republican media figures and opinion-makers to wonder whether these approvals would translate in support for Obama in the 2012 presidential election. Before long, these circles made and repeated the claim that President George W. Bush deserved credit for the undoing of bin Laden. Their point was that the intelligence community would not have found the hideaway in Pakistan without exposing captured terrorists to "enhanced interrogation techniques." As Lanny Davis, a Fox News contributor told Bill O'Reilly, "I wrote today that we have to give credit to George Bush and those that used these techniques for getting information that directly or indirectly led to the death of Usama bin Laden. I don't think there's any way to deny that." [13] It was telling that President Obama's general approval dropped 3 percentage points in the

second post-raid poll. Two weeks after bin Laden's demise Fox News commissioned a survey that asked respondents, "Do you think President Obama has been personally taking too much credit for the killing of bin Laden, the right amount of credit, or not enough credit?" A majority of Americans (53%) thought that Obama had taken the right amount of credit, 31% said he had taken too much and 12% too little credit with 4% not voicing an opinion.

The commando mission against bin Laden became more of an issue during the 2012 presidential campaign. Just before the first anniversary of the raid to get bin Laden and before Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney won officially the Republican Party's nomination, the Obama campaign aired an ad that strongly implied that the presumptive GOP candidate would not have given green light for the operation, using Romney's own words against him. Romney fired back with the claim that "the decision to go after bin Laden was a clear one and that 'even Jimmy Carter would' have made the call." [14] In the end, it is impossible to figure out whether and to what degree the media's reporting on the bin Laden coup may have factored into President Obama's reelection.

Mass-Mediated Counterterrorism in the Post-9/11 Years

Nothing reinforces people's fear of terrorist strikes more than heavily covered threat warnings issued by government officials on the one hand and by known terrorists on the other, in the wake of major attacks. The months and years after 9/11 were a case in point. Besides around the clock coverage in television, radio, and the print media that highlighted the horrors of the attacks and the likelihood of more terrorism, there were many reports of threat warnings issued by administration officials and Al Qaeda leaders. Appearing before a Joint Session of Congress eight days after 9/11 President George W. Bush spoke about the threat against America. "Our nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack," he said. He told the nation, "I know many citizens have fears tonight and I ask you to be calm and resolute, even in the face of a continuing threat." Pointing to the enormity of what had "just passed," the president said that it was "natural to wonder if America's future is one of fear" before promising that "this country will define our times, not be defined by them." [15]

In the same speech, Bush announced the appointment of Tom Ridge to head up the Office of Homeland Security. First as head of that office and later as Secretary of the newly created Department of Homeland Security the former Governor of Pennsylvania became a key figure in what he himself characterized as "the politics of terrorism" but what was more precisely a politics of counterterrorism. [16] In this role, he and his staff disagreed repeatedly with other administration officials' eagerness to issue public terror alerts indicating that attacks were likely or even imminent. Central in such discussions was a color-coded terrorism alert system with five levels that Ridge introduced in early 2002 to the public. While confusing to the public, it was exploited by certain administration officials a useful prop in a threat manipulation scheme.

Before Memorial Day 2003, for example, Ridge and Attorney General John Ashcroft held press conferences on the same day. In response to questions about threats and security, Ridge told reporters that there was no reason to heighten the alert level. A few hours later, Ashcroft warned publically of an imminent, major attack on the United States by Al Qaeda. President Bush was not pleased with Ridge's assessment; in their next regular meeting in the Oval office he told the Secretary of Homeland Security that he wanted a united front (Ridge 2009, 228). Obviously, besides President Bush some of Tom Ridge's colleagues understood the usefulness of threat alerts in America's "war against terrorism."

When it comes to analyzing intelligence, reasonable people can differ about the meaning of often sketchy information and the credibility of sources. In discussing threat assessments on the part of those who fight

terrorism, Albert Bandura took note of the likelihood that such judgments can be influenced by the desire to justify counterterrorism policies. As Bandura (2004, 129) put it:

Lethal countermeasures are readily justified in response to grave threats that inflict extensive human pain or that endanger the very survival of the society. However, the criterion of “grave threat,” although fine in principle, is shifty in specific circumstances. Like most human judgments, gauging the gravity of threats involves some subjectivity... Assessment of gravity prescribes the choice of options, but choice of violent options often shapes evaluation of gravity itself.

Not surprisingly, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was a strong advocate of raising the threat level at any opportunity. Inside the Pentagon, Rumsfeld made no bones about his motives. In his so-called “snowflakes” memos to his staff the Secretary “wrote of the need to ‘keep elevating the threat’...and develop ‘bumper sticker statements’ to rally public support for an increasingly unpopular war” (Wright 2007, 1).

As Brigitte Nacos, Yaeli Bloch-Elkon and Robert Shapiro (2011) documented, the news media was something like a supporting cast in the selling of the administration’s formal terrorism threat alerts and the more frequent informal threat warnings. True to the media’s tendency to highlight disconcerting news, the three leading TV-networks ABC, CBS, and NBC broadcast all 23 announcements of increases in the national, regional, or local terrorism alert levels and all of them were reported as lead stories at the top of newscasts. But the three networks reported decreases in threat levels much less prominently, airing only 13% of such announcement as lead stories and 87% further down in their broadcasts. When the Bush administration raised the nationwide terrorism alert, the networks devoted an average of 5 minutes and 20 seconds to such reports; when the terror alerts were lowered, the average news segment lasted only 1 minute and 34 seconds. The difference was even more pronounced for regional or local alerts: the average airtime for raised threat levels in these cases was 2 minutes and 56 seconds versus only 20 seconds for segments reporting on the lowering the official alert level. When the three networks aired reports about threat advisories that did not involve changes in the color-code scheme, the average length of these stories was still fully 2 minutes and 20 seconds. In addition, the frequent threats from bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders received prominent and extensive coverage as well. John Mueller (2006, 26) warned that “the harm of terrorism mostly arises from the fear and from the often hasty, ill-considered, and overwrought reaction (or overreaction) it characteristically, *and often calculatedly* [emphasis added], inspires in its victims.” The media bought into the administration’s threat scheme and became the government’s helpers in keeping the American public’s fear of more terrorism alive (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro 2011, chapter 2). As David L. Altheide (2007) noted, “Notwithstanding the long relationship in the United States between fear and crime, the role of the mass media in promoting fear has become more pronounced since the United States ‘discovered’ international terrorism on 11 September 2001.”

Nisbet and Shanahan (2004) found in the post-9/11 period that people who paid “high level” attention to television news about national affairs and the war on terrorism were far more convinced that another terrorist attack would occur within the next 12 months than were “low level” and “moderate level” news consumers. Based on their experiments and survey analyses, Jennifer Merolla and Elizabeth Zechmeister (2009) demonstrated how perceptions of threat trigger authoritarian attitudes, lead to intolerance toward disliked groups, increase social distrust, curtail support of civil liberties, increase the likelihood of support for leaders dealing with the threat at hand, and affect opinions towards foreign policies. This is precisely what happened in the post-9/11 years, when the drum-beat of threat alerts and warnings by the administration and compliance by most opinion leaders inside and outside the media gave President Bush and his aides *card blanche* for their extreme counterterrorism policies from the USA PATRIOT Act’s curbing of civil liberties to the invasion of Iraq and human rights violations in the treatment of terrorists or suspected terrorists.

For the months and years immediately following 9/11, both the indexing and the propaganda model explain the mainstream media’s pertinent reporting. Indeed, during that period “officials in Washington— especially President Bush and members of his administration—were able to set the media agenda when that was their intention” (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro 2011, 183). When administration officials held news briefings, gave interviews, delivered speeches, and found plenty of other occasions to go public, TV-networks and other media provided them with ample opportunity to sell their agenda.

When, on the other hand, the White House and other administration officials did not make strong efforts to promote certain counterterrorism measures, the news reflected this low level engagement and offered other sources access, albeit without the prominence and frequency granted to top-Washingtonians. A systematic study of post-9/11 news about terrorist threat alerts and warnings, civil liberty policies, the selling of the Iraq War, terrorism prevention in the homeland, and preparedness for terrorist strikes showed the following (see Table 3): The president and high administration officials were crafty in using the media to publicize the terrorist threat and the need to invade Iraq in order to prevent terrorist attacks. In both cases, the TV networks “indexed” the news mostly within the narrow range of Washington opinion leaders as far as domestic sources were concerned. The administration was least active with respect to prevention of terrorism at home and preparedness for other terrorist emergencies. As a result, there was only a moderate amount of news about those important but rather complex and not particularly dramatic policy areas. Finally, the administration’s public engagement in issues arising from civil liberty restrictions in the name of security was less intensive compared to the hype surrounding the build-up to the Iraq War and the overblown messages about terrorist threat warnings but more rigorous compared to the modest selling and reporting of prevention and preparedness(Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro 2011, ch. 7).

Table 3: News Messages by Domestic Sources in TV-Networks’ Post-9/11 Terrorism Coverage

	Threat	Civil Liberties	Build-Up Iraq	Prevention	Preparedness
	%	%	%	%	%
President/Administration	21	18	26	8	5
Members of Congress	5	12	1	7	5
Experts	16	10	6	22	20
Local/State Officials	8	4	—	5	8
Other Domestic	9	23	6	6	17
Public/Public Opinion	9	7	—	15	3
Media	33	26	35	36	43

Source: Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, Shapiro, *Selling Fear: Counterterrorism, the Media, and the Public*. University Press of Chicago. –% = percentage of total sources (Note: because foreign sources are not included in the table, the listed sources do not add up to 100% in all cases).

Ever since 9/11, presidents, high administration officials, and the intelligence community left no doubt that the terrorist threat remained. Yet, they did not launch campaigns to urge the public to make sensible preparedness arrangements and seek information about their communities’ emergency preparations. The news rooms of leading media organizations were not interested either. Thus, in the three years from Jan. 1, 2010 to December 31, 2013, *The Washington Post* published 98 stories and *The New York Times* 84 about or mentioning both terrorism and preparedness; during the same period, the CBS Evening News aired 6,

CNN's "The Situation Room" 10 such segments. An analysis of those stories revealed that only a fraction of them were exclusively about the state of preparedness in the U.S. or some particular measures to prepare emergency responders and/or the general public for terrorist strikes. Yet another example that the news media, not all the time but to a large extent, follow the government's agenda: what is high on that agenda will be reported prominently, what is low will not be reported much or at all. As a result, a solid majority of Americans consider their communities' terrorism preparedness "inadequate" or are "unsure." [17]

Conclusion

After they examined some of the Bush administration's most drastic post-9/11 measures taken in the name of counterterrorism, Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston (2007, 137) concluded that "the administration assumed it could bend mass perception of reality even against massive evidence to the contrary, with only occasional challenges from the press and dissident sources." Indeed, the mass-mediated politics of counterterrorism policy was a case of news "indexed to power" (Ibid, 174) that also met the propaganda model's criteria of a power elite using the media to manufacture consent (Herman and Chomsky 2002). Eventually, major news organizations regained their footing, in the cases of *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times* admitting their failures. But neither a mea culpa nor the return to professional journalists' self-proclaimed ethics codes could turn back the time clock and undo the damage inflicted abroad and at home. Instead, the immediate post-9/11 era demonstrated that in crisis times the press must bark like a watchdog and not cozy up to the power elite like a lapdog.

Similarly, Hollywood's post-9/11 entertainment productions—not all but many of the most popular ones—spread the message that extraordinary threats require extraordinary responses. In this respect, films and television shows fit perfectly into Washington's counterterrorism propaganda built around the permanent and at times allegedly imminent threat of more terrorist attacks inside American borders.

About the Authors: **Yaeli Bloch-Elkon** is Associate Professor of communications and political science at Bar Ilan University, Israel, and an associate research scholar at the university's Begin –Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA), and at Columbia University's Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy (ISERP). She is co-author of *Selling Fear: Counterterrorism, the Media, and Public Opinion* (University of Chicago Press).

Brigitte L. Nacos is a journalist, author, and adjunct professor of political science at Columbia University, New York. Among her more recent books are 'Terrorism and Counterterrorism' (Pearson) and 'Mass-Mediated Terrorism' (Rowman & Littlefield).

References

- Alford, Matthew. 2010a. *Reel Power: Hollywood Cinema and American Supremacy*. London: Pluto Press.
- Alford, Matthew. 2010b. "Why Not a Propaganda Model for Hollywood?" Philip Hammond, ed. *Screens of Terror: Representations of War and Terrorism in Film and Television since 9/11*. Bury St Edmunds: Arima Publishing.
- Altheide, David L. 2007. "The Mass Media and Terrorism." *Discourse & Communication* 1(3).
- Bandura, Albert. 2004. "The Role of Selective Moral Disengagement in Terrorism and Counterterrorism." Fathali M. Moghaddam and Anthony J. Marsella, (Eds.) Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Association Press.

Bennett, W. Lance. 1990. "Towards a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States." *Journal of Communication* 40 (Spring): 103-25.

Bennet W. Lance, Regina G. Lawrence, and Steven Livingston. 2007. *When the Press Fails: Political Power and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bok, Sissela. 1998. *Mayhem: violence as public entertainment*. Reading, MA: Perseus Books.

Brody, Richard A. 1991. *Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Brody, Richard A. and Catherine E. Shapiro. 1989. A Reconsideration of the Rally Phenomenon in Public Opinion. Samuel Long, (Ed.) *Political Behavior Annual*, vol. 2. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Delli Carpini, Michael X. and Bruce A. Williams. 1994. "Methods, Metaphors, and Media Research: The Uses of Television in Political Conversation." *Communication Research* 21.

Deese, David A. "Making American Foreign Policy in the 1990s." David A. Deese, (Ed.), *The New Politics of American Foreign Policy*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Downing, John. 2007. "Terrorism, Torture and Television: "24" in Its Context." *Democratic Communique* 21 (2).

Edelstein, David. 2006. "Now Playing at Your Local Multiplex: Torture Porn. Why has America gone nuts for blood, guts, and sadism? New York Magazine. <http://nymag.com/movies/features/15622/>, accessed May 19, 2014.

Edwards, George C. 1983. *The Public Presidency*. New York: St. Martin's.

Entman, Robert M. and Andrew Rojecki. 2000. *The Black Image in the White Mind: Media and Race in America*. Chicago: University Press of Chicago.

Frank, Michael C. 2010. "Alien Terrorists: Public Discourse on 9/11 and the American Science Fiction Film." Philip Hammond, (Ed.) *Screens of Terror: Representations of War and Terrorism in Film and Television since 9/11*. Bury St Edmunds: Arima Publishing.

Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky. 2002. *Manufacturing the News: The Political Economy of the Press*. New York: Pantheon.

Hoskins, Andrew and Ben O'Laughlin. 2007. *Television and Terror: Conflicting Times and the Crisis of News Discourse*. Houndsmills: Basingstoke.

Hugik, Larry and Alec M. Gallup. 1991. "Rally Events and Presidential Approval." *The Gallup Poll Monthly*, June.

Kamin, Sam. 2007. "How the War on Terrorism May Affect Domestic Interrogations: The 24 Effect." *Chapman Law Review*, <http://www.chapmanlawreview.com/archives/1312>, accessed May 18, 2014.

Lippmann, Walter. 1997 [1922]. *Public Opinion*. New York: Free Press.

Merolla, Jennifer L. and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2009. *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Mills, C. Wright. 2000 [1956]. *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mueller, John E. 2006. *Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats*. New York: Free Press.
- Mueller, John E. 1985. *War, Presidents and Public Opinion*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Nacos, Brigitte L., Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, and Robert Y. Shapiro. 2011. *Selling Fear: Counterterrorism, the Media, and Public Opinion*. Chicago: University Press of Chicago.
- Nacos, Brigitte L. 2011. "The Image of Evil: Why Screen Narratives of Terrorism and Counterterrorism Matter in Real Life Politics and Policies." Philip Hammond, (Ed.) *Screens of Terror: Representations of War and Terrorism in Film and Television since 9/11*. Bury St Edmunds: Arima Publishing.
- Brigitte L. Nacos. 2007. *Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism*. Lanham: MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Nisbet, Eric C. and James Shanahan. 2004. "Restrictions on Civil Liberties, Views of Islam and Muslim Americans." *Media and Society Group*, Cornell University, December.
- Parenti, Michael. 1992. *Make-Believe Media: The Politics of Entertainment*. New York: St. Martin's.
- Parenti, Michael. 2010. "Foreword." Alford, Matthew. 2010a. *Reel Power: Hollywood Cinema and American Supremacy*. London: Pluto Press.
- Westwell, Guy. 2010. "In Country: Mapping the Iraq War in Recent Hollywood Combat Movies." Philip Hammond, (Ed.) *Screens of Terror: Representations of War and Terrorism in Film and Television since 9/11*. Bury St Edmunds: Arima Publishing.
- Wright., Robin. 2007. "From the Desk of Donald Rumsfeld..." *The Washington Post*, November 1.
- Yoo, John. 2006. *War by Other Means*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press.

Notes

- [1] Fox web site <http://www.fox.com/24-live-another-day/>, accessed March 18, 2014.
- [2] Whether dealing with terrorists or criminals, television drama series became far more violent and torture scenes far more numerous after the events of 9/11. In the four years before 2001 (1997 through 2000) there were 47 torture scenes in prime-time network television, in the four years after 9/11 (2002-2005) there were 624 such scenes according to Human Rights First. See: http://workersrights.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/primetime/index.asp, accessed August 3, 2010.
- [3] Bok, 37. Howard Gordon, the lead writer of "24," insisted, however, that people are able to differentiate between a television show and reality.
- [4] Intelligence Science Board. "Educating Information." May 2006, ix. The full document is available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/educing.pdf>, accessed August 10, 2010.
- [5] Survey by Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates, November 13–November 19, 2001 and based on 1,500 telephone interviews. Retrieved April 6, 2014 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html, accessed April 6, 2014.
- [6] Reported on the Wall Street Journal's Law Blog, <http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/06/20/justice-scalia-hearts-jack-bauer/>, accessed Feb. 12, 2009.
- [7] The statement is available at <http://asne.org/content.asp?pl=24&sl=171&contentid=171>, accessed May 18, 2014.
- [8] Quoted by David C. Martin and John Walcott, *Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism*. New York: Harper & Row, 1988, 43.

-
- [9] "The Terrorist and his Sentence." *The New York Times*, April 15, 1986, A30; "The Bombs of April." *The New York Times*, April 16, 1986, A26.
- [10] News briefing by William Cohen, Secretary of Defense, August 20, 1998, according to FDCH Political Transcripts.
- [11] "Obamas Remarks on Bin Laden's Killing." *The New York Times*, May 2, 2011, accessed May 5, 2014.
- [12] Jeff Zeleny and Jim Rutenberg, "Obama Finds Praise, Even From Republicans." *The New York Times*, May 2, 2011, accessed May 5, 2014.
- [13] The O'Reilly Factor, Fox News, May 5, 2011. Retrieved from the Lexis/Nexis electronic archives, May 4, 2014.
- [14] "Romney: 'Even Jimmy Carter' would have ordered bin Laden attack. *CNN*, April 30, 2012. See article at <http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/30/politics/campaign-wrap/index.html>, accessed May 6, 2014.
- [15] From President George W. Bush's speech before a joint session of Congress, September 20, 2011. The transcript is available at <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>, accessed May 6, 2014.
- [16] The U.S. Department of Homeland Security was established on November 25, 2002, by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. In his memoir, Tom Ridge writes extensively about the politics of terrorism and counterterrorism inside and outside the Bush administration, especially, in chapter six ("The Politics of Terrorism, Part I" and chapter 14 ("The Politics of Terrorism, Part II).
- [17] According to a 2011 poll commissioned by the Mailman School at Columbia University and conducted by the Marist Institute for Public Opinion. In early 2014, this was the last available poll about terrorism preparedness.

Making 'Noise' Online: An Analysis of the Say No to Terror Online Campaign

by Anne Aly, Dana Weimann-Saks, and Gabriel Weimann

Abstract

A consideration of terrorism as communication necessarily draws attention to the development of counter narratives as a strategy for interrupting the process by which individuals become radicalised towards violent extremism. As the Internet has become a critical medium for psychological warfare by terrorists, some attempts have been made to challenge terroristic narratives through online social marketing and public information campaigns that offer alternative narratives to the terrorists' online audiences. 'Say No to Terror' is one such campaign. This article reports on a study that examined the master narratives in the 'Say No to Terror' online campaign and applied concepts of 'noise' and persuasion in order to assess whether the key elements of the 'Say No to Terror' campaign align with the application of "noise" as a counter strategy against terrorists' appeal on the Internet. The study found that while the master narratives of 'Say No to Terror' align with suggestions based on empirical research for the development of effective counter campaigns, the campaign does not meet the essential criteria for effective noise.

Keywords: Narrative, counter-narrative, countering extremism, strategic communication

Introduction

Terrorism has often been described as a form of communication by weak actors using violence as an instrument of last resort for communicating their cause. While psychologists argue violence communicates internal conflict in the perpetrator [1] some scholars of terrorism studies argue that terrorism cannot be viewed as a matter of individual psychology. Rather, the use of violence by terrorist actors is a strategic choice to communicate, through violence, that problems exist.[2] Terrorists use violence as a communication strategy to provoke effects that are not necessarily directly connected to the victim population. The effectiveness of violence lies not in the violence itself (the capacity for destruction) but in propaganda generated through the act and through the various communication protocols adopted by terrorist groups to influence and coerce target audiences. Among those communication protocols, terroristic narratives that use the Internet to reach large and disparate audiences have attracted considerable attention. The role of Internet disseminated propaganda in the process of radicalisation has been questioned in prominent cases where it has been established that terrorist or extremist actors have been, at least in part, influenced by their online activities. Despite recognition that the Internet plays a role in the radicalisation process, there is still little evidence available to assess the assumption of causality between exposure to terroristic narratives on the Internet and radicalisation to violent extremism. A study by the RAND Corporation tested five assumptions in the literature with regard to Internet radicalisation and found that empirical evidence existed to support the assumption that the Internet creates more opportunities to become radicalised and serves as a space for individuals to find support for their ideas among like-minded individuals. The study also found that assumptions that the Internet accelerates the process of radicalisation and promotes self-radicalisation without physical contact were not supported.[3]

The body of work that examines terrorist activity online approaches the problem by examining both terroristic content (including the ways in which terrorist content appears online) and the ways in which the terroristic narrative appeals to certain groups of users. Though the first has been given far more consideration

in the literature, there is an emerging interest in understanding why and how terrorist narratives are so seductive to particular targets. Aly argues for an approach to understanding the appeal of Jihadi-Salafist terroristic narratives that recognises the role of the audience as active players in the process of message transfer, influence and indoctrination. She offers a model for understanding the appeal of the online narrative that takes into account how needs that are shaped by social roles are gratified by the attributes, content and the context of different media platforms.[4]

Weimann and von Knop posit that the social situation of diaspora communities that may be socially alienated, disenfranchised and in search of social bonding, creates a condition of emotional need that is served by the terroristic narrative. They identify several stages of engagement with terroristic narratives online: the searching phase; the seduction phase; the captivation phase; the persuasion phase and the operation phase. Understanding the process of engagement and radicalization allows for an identification of phases where the user is still vulnerable to ideas or messages that challenge those embedded in the terroristic narrative. Such counter messages can act as “noise” that interferes with or disrupts the process of radicalization.[5]

How Noise Works

In communication theory, noise is that which distorts the signal on its way from transmitter to recipient. Noise interferes with the communication process as it keeps the message from being understood and prevents it from achieving its desired effect. The concept of noise was first introduced in communication theory in the 1940's by Shannon and Weaver.[6] They were mostly concerned with mechanical noise, such as the distortion of a voice on the telephone or interference with a television signal producing “snow” on the TV screen. In the succeeding decades, other kinds of noise have been recognized as potentially important problems for communication:[7]

- Physical Noise is any external or environmental stimulus that distracts us from receiving the intended message sent by a communicator.
- Semantic noise occurs because of the ambiguities inherent in all languages and other sign systems.
- Cultural noise occurs when the culture or subculture of the audience is so different from that of the sender that the message is understood in a way that the sender might not have anticipated.
- Psychological noise results from preconceived notions we bring to the communication process, such as racial stereotypes, reputations, biases, and assumptions.

While the concept of noise was first perceived as relevant only to interference with the transmission of a message, it later became recognized as a crucial element in the communication process, potentially affecting each stage of the process. The concept of noise in communication theory and research has often been treated as a negative element, damaging the communication process. In fact, most empirical uses of the concept were directed at reducing or minimizing noises to improve the flow of communication. However, today noise is breaking away from the status of undesirable phenomenon bestowed upon it by traditional communications theory. No longer merely an undesirable element to be eradicated so as to retain the purity of the original signal, noise can be regarded as a more complex and even desired element. When it comes to the terrorist (or any other illegal, harming, and dangerous communication), one may question the instrumentality of creating noise that may reduce the communicator's efficiency and success. Creating and using semantic, psychological, cultural, and physical noises may describe a rich variety of counter measures and organize

them in a strategic framework. Thus, noise could become a key conceptual and theoretical foundation in the strategy of countering terrorism online.

Noise in Counterterrorism Communication

In their article “Applying the Notion of Noise to Countering Online-Terrorism”, Weimann and von Knop suggested applying various “noises” in counterterrorism campaigns.[8] Later, Weimann developed a strategic communication plan for the disruption of terrorist communication, based on the use of Mechanical/Technological Noises and Psychological/Social Noises.[9]

Applying Mechanical/Technological Noises refers to the technological disruption of the flow of communication. The mechanical/technological tactics include a rich variety of interventions from the damaging of websites and the defacing and redirecting of users to the spreading of viruses and worms, blocking access, hacking, and total destruction. These deviant measures can be adopted and used against online terror and to minimize their reach and impact. In the most severe cases, hacking the websites may be the most extreme measure, though not always the most efficient one in the long run. Such disruptive counter-attacks on terrorist online platforms are not new: Secretary of State Hillary Clinton revealed that the U.S. government has been hacking al-Qaeda websites in an effort to sabotage the terrorist group’s activities. [10] Such attacks have had very limited effects since the terrorists easily manage to re-establish their online platforms and re-emerge in cyberspace. A more sophisticated “mechanical noise” is the optional use of Trojan Horses, viruses, and worms against terrorists. The common distinction among the three is that a Trojan horse is a program that does something malicious when run by an unsuspecting user; a worm is something that replicates; and a virus is a worm that replicates by attaching itself to other programs.

Applying Psychological/Social Noises involves various psychological and social operations and counter propaganda. Different terms relate to Psychological/Social Noise: Information Warfare, Information Operation (IO), and the current doctrine of Military Information Support Operations (MISO). In 2010 the US Army dropped the Vietnam-era name “psychological operations” for its branch in charge of trying to change minds behind enemy lines, acknowledging the term can sound ominous. The Defense Department picked a more neutral name “Military Information Support Operations,” or MISO. MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.

As a communication medium and vehicle of influence, the Internet is a powerful tool for psychological campaigns. In many ways, terrorists launch their online campaigns in the same way legitimate political campaigns use the Internet. Both attempt to attract users, to seduce them by engaging them in a sensory experience, trying to manipulate their needs, suggesting the fulfilment of a goal, and inspiring and guiding the users to make a choice by providing a higher-level motivation. Campaigning via the interactive Internet often provides social bonding and replicates feelings of personal contact. These elements, frequent also in terrorist websites, can be used in counter campaigns too. However, before such campaigns are launched, the agencies involved should know the psychographic profiles of those susceptible to recruitment, and secondly, the messages that most likely affect them. They also need to understand how these individuals are influenced: what channels are meaningful to them, whom they listen to, the effect of peer networks, and how to reach them most effectively.

Counter Narratives, Noise and Persuasion

The reasons why an individual becomes radicalized are not yet fully understood. The fact that an individual embraces the terrorists' narrative does not necessarily mean he/she will join Jihad against the West and/or actually engage in any terrorist activity. Yet progress in counterterrorism appears to be related to both establishing a credible narrative and damaging the terrorist narrative. The role of narratives is relatively new to the examination and analysis of terrorism. Studies that have been undertaken have contributed to understanding how terroristic narratives are used strategically by violent extremists to establish and influence target audiences. Based on this knowledge, other studies apply understandings of the terroristic narrative to the construction of counter narratives that challenge the messages embedded in terroristic texts. Casebeer and Russell, for example, suggest that the most effective way to counter terrorism is by developing a 'better story' to replace "their" narrative. For this purpose, in Britain, a special communication unit, the Research, Information and Communication Unit (RICU) was set up in Whitehall in 2007. Its task was specifically to "use messaging to disrupt the al-Qaeda narrative".[11] In the US, a Presidential Task Force report also argues for "rewriting the narrative".[12]

The construction of a counter narrative to violent jihad should be seen as part of a long-term strategy to combat radicalization and recruitment into violent extremist groups. The counter narrative differs from a counter information campaign in that, more than simply maligning the enemy or challenging its message, it offers an alternative vision to which one opts in; a storyline that gives meaning to the actions it is requesting of the subscriber. This narrative, then, must discredit that of the jihadists—most importantly de-legitimizing the violence they promote—while at the same time making a compelling case for forms of non-violent activism and civic participation. In the United States much of the Internet-based campaigning that has appeared in opposition to the jihadi narrative has been negative, formulated by groups and organisations with an anti-Islamic agenda. The same can be said of the Australian context where anti-Islamic groups such as the Australian Defence League have established a web presence that is as problematic as those of the jihadists.

In her Op-Ed article on "Future Terrorists," Jane Harman argued that "we need to employ the best tools we know of to counter radicalizing messages and to build bridges to the vulnerable. (...) Narratives can inspire people to do terrible things, or to push back against those extremist voices." [13] To run such a strategy, a political Internet campaign against terrorism must use tactics which have proven to be successful and which can be applied to the counterterrorism arena. Finding such effective tactics was at the heart of discussions at the Riyadh Conference on the "Use of the Internet to Counter the Appeal of Extremist Violence." Co-hosted by the United Nations Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) and the Naif Arab University for Security Sciences in Riyadh in partnership with the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (January 2011),[14] the conference brought together around 150 policy-makers, experts, and practitioners from the public sector, international organizations, industries, academia, and the media. The conference focused on identifying good practices in using the Internet to undermine the appeal of terrorism, expose its lack of legitimacy and its negative impact, and undermine the credibility of its messengers. Key themes included the importance of identifying the target audience, crafting effective messages, identifying credible messengers, and using appropriate media to reach vulnerable communities.

There is an important source for counter-terrorist narratives: learning from those who have decided to leave terrorist organizations. As suggested by Jacobson, in order to determine what kind of counter-narrative might be effective among those seemingly hardened individuals already in terrorist organizations or those well along the path to radicalization, it is useful to study people who have voluntarily walked away from these paths.[15] Determining the reasons for such a change in perspective could help crafting messages designed to

pull people away from terrorist organizations.

Say No to Terror

Say No to Terror is a comprehensive communication campaign comprising a website, media and social media presence. The campaign uses a variety of mechanisms including short videos and posters for communicating a counter narrative to selected elements of the terroristic narrative. The website is entirely in Arabic and hosts information content (Mission Statement/ About Us) as well as videos, forums, posters and links to social media platforms (Facebook and Twitter). Users who register on the website can post comments about the videos as well as other material.

Say No to Terror is specifically aimed at a Muslim Arabic audience; this is underscored by the campaign's slogan "Terrorism. I am Muslim: I am against it" and its language of delivery. According to the website, "Terrorism is a criminal act targeting innocent people, and it deserves to be fought by all means and to have its claims and its devastating effects on our society disclosed."

The "About Us" section of the full website describes the website creators as believers in the justice of true Islam and defenders of the greatness of Islam. Their mission is to:

"expose the claims of terrorist agitators and unveil their crimes, to encourage all those who have a conscience to reject their criminal acts and destructive ideas and to fight them in order to protect our society from their wrongs and their destructive impact on all levels."

Attempts to identify the source of the website have not yielded any significant insights- a domain search reveals that the domain is shielded behind a Washington based anonymity protection service. The website is hosted in Montenegro in what may be an attempt by the creators to circumvent attitudes of mistrust of American-sponsored communication in the Arab world. However, a close analysis of the website content suggests that affiliations lie with or are at least sympathetic to Saudi Arabia. The campaign videos are also posted on YouTube and repeatedly aired as public service announcements on the Pan-Arab Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC) and Al-Arabiya channels, both Saudi-owned. Posts that refer to specific religious tenets or situations (such as the Syrian conflict) are consistent with Saudi Arabia's stated position on such matters. These posts give precedence to the Saudi Arabian monarchy, "The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques", as the legitimate authority in Islam and emphasise the monarchy's efforts to counter terrorism. In order to provide context and information about the website, a comprehensive translation and analysis of the website content was undertaken.

The methodology involved an initial translation of the website content and videos from Arabic to English. The translation was undertaken by one of the authors (Aly) and a bilingual research assistant. Aly's translations of the videos applied to both the visual elements (characters, setting, use of symbols) and the textual elements (spoken and written). This was followed by a qualitative content analysis of the written and visual texts to explore the content, structure and function of the messages embedded in the texts. The analysis was constructed around a grounded theory model, based on the one first developed by Glasser and Strauss.[16] This model involved an initial reading of the data to code for as many categories as possible. These categories originated in concepts borrowed from content analysis of terroristic narratives available in the literature (for example: *jihad*, *martyrs*, *caliphate*) as well as the researcher's own knowledge of the cultural and linguistic setting and the significance of particular concepts within this setting (for example: *zakat*, *takfir*, *sectarianism*). The initial open coding of the data [17] highlighted themes in the videos and posts for further analysis. The salient themes from the analysis of the videos and posters were then collated and integrated.

The final stage of the coding process produced four thematic categories or master narratives used in *Say No to Terror* to construct narratives about terrorism, its place in Arab society and its consequences. The master narratives, their attributes and the themes that comprise them are summarised in the following table:

Master narrative	Descriptive content	Themes
Terrorism is a dangerous threat	Terrorism destroys individuals and families. Those who join terrorist groups are misled and the terrorist lifestyle is damaging.	Jihad, Extremism, Sectarianism, Consequences of Terrorism.
Terrorists are the enemy	Terrorists are the real oppressors and attempt to brainwash children and youth. Muslims are suffering at the hands of terrorist criminals who kill other Muslims.	Takfir, Extremism, Manipulation and lies, “Enemies of Islam”.
Undermining terrorist leaders	Terrorists are liars and manipulators who use Islam to serve a personal agenda.	Takfir, Extremism, Jihad, Manipulation and lies, Enemies of Islam.
Muslim obligation	All Muslims have a duty to be vigilant against terrorist manipulators and to protect themselves and their families from the scourge of terrorism. Muslims have a duty to ensure that they are not inadvertently supporting terrorism. Those who support terrorism are also terrorists.	Extremism, jihad, Consequences of terrorism, Vigilance against terrorism, Manipulation and lies.

While there would also be value in a quantitative analysis of aspects that may serve as indicators of the campaigns reach and/ or effectiveness, a quantitative analysis was considered beyond the scope of this particular study. Rather, the task undertaken in this case was to identify the master narratives of the texts and the persuasive elements embedded in these narratives: the purpose being to evaluate whether and how the master narrative of *Say no to Terror* forms a counter-narrative to the al-Qaeda master narrative. Finally, the master narrative and related messages of *Say No to Terror* were analysed through the framework of noise proposed by Weimann and Von Knopp . It describes five elements of a successful noise strategy: credibility; terminology; traditions; partners; and act local, think global. As the website is constantly updated, the analysis included all 15 videos available for viewing on the website at the time of writing and a selection of website content during the period February thru August 2013.

Videos

The analysis of the 15 videos on the *Say No to Terror* website highlighted the following themes that appeal to either logic and reason (systematic persuasion) or habit and emotion (heuristic persuasion):

1. Consequences of joining terrorism;
2. Manipulation and lies;
3. The “enemies of Islam”;

4. Vigilance against terrorism.

Importantly, these themes are constructed around familiar concepts in traditional Arab/ Muslim culture. The videos use Quranic verses and popular *hadiths* to accompany images and rely on Arab/ Muslim traditions that value family and the collective good over individualism. In this respect, the videos present a narrative that mirrors elements of the terroristic narrative that construct the call to armed jihad as an altruistic obligation for all Muslims for the sake of the greater good.[18]

A salient theme in the website videos is that of exposing the agenda and manipulative techniques used by terrorist organisations. Several videos depict terrorist organisations as criminal and warn viewers against being manipulated by the terrorist narrative, while others use the testimony of former terrorists to expose “the enemies of Islam”. “The Misguided Terrorist” is presented as based on real events as a young man narrates an account of his arrest for terrorist activities. “The Enemy Within” picks up similar themes exposing terrorists for killing Muslims, while other videos such as “The Scream”, “I am Innocent of Your Crimes” and “No Life Flourishes where there is Terrorism” all draw on images of innocence juxtaposed against images of terrorism. These three videos use visuals of children and/or childhood symbols to draw attention to the injurious effects of terrorism. “The Road of no Return” is more explicitly focussed on sectarian violence, suggesting that the video is targeted at an Iraqi audience. The video exposes sectarianism as a vulnerability that extremists exploit: “Sectarianism makes you enter the prison of extremism, and so you become a prey for agitators seeking to achieve their political goals. It is not through sectarian extremism that you defend your religion, but you defend your religion through protecting it from sectarian extremism.”

Drawing on Arab/ Muslim social constructs of collective good, several videos urge viewers to be vigilant about terrorism and its influence. These include the video titled “An eye that watches is better than an eye that cries”, which warns viewers that “The Internet is a way to communicate and a gateway to knowledge. But the terrorists also see it as a window /path to our children, to brainwash their young minds and to convince them of their criminal principles. Our duty is to protect our children from danger and deception, not only in the schools and on the roads, but also within the sanctity of our homes. Terrorists are determined to mislead our children.”

“The Clowns” also calls for vigilance but targets public support for terrorism by encouraging viewers to speak out against terrorism. Two videos titled “*Zakat*” and “Good Charity/ Bad Charity” attempt to raise public awareness of terrorist financing operations posing as valid charities. Both videos call on viewers to take personal responsibility for ensuring that charitable donations and *zakat* (Muslim obligatory charity) do not end up funding terrorist activities.

Posts

While the website videos tend to avoid reinterpretation of religious concepts that challenge the Jihadi- Salafi ideology, the posts and other website content take a more direct approach either through the images posted or by means of links to articles and opinion pieces that challenge the Jihadi- Salafi construction of key Islamic concepts. An analysis of the website posts during the period of examination reveals four themes:

1. Extremism (mainly in a context marked by sectarianism)
2. *Takfir* (accusing other Muslims of apostasy)
3. *Jihad*

4. Terrorism

For each of these themes, the website posts present an alternative construction and a world view that counters that found in terroristic master narratives.

Sectarianism: The danger of sectarianism is regularly highlighted in the website with sectarian divisions a common theme. Sectarian strife such as in Iraq presents the ideal context for extremism to flourish and provides fertile ground for terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda to establish in a region /country.

Extremism: Extremism is described as the first step towards terrorism. Website posts aim to discredit extremists and their motives stating that extremists (specifically the Taliban and al-Qaeda) use jihad to justify killing innocent Muslims and non-Muslims. Specific posts denounce the hypocrisy of extremist Islamic scholars expressing cynicism of Sheikhs who issue *fatwas* about the obligation of jihad in Iraq and elsewhere and stating that their motives are financial gain among other things. A good example is the cartoon posted by the website administrators depicting a cleric telling his son “I will send you to the US to study and get a high-ranking job “ and then telling another young man “I will send you for Jihad in Syria so that God willing you get into heaven” (posted 23 July 2013).

Other posts denounce the misleading discourse of incitement to violent jihad by preachers of extremism and the influence mechanisms they use. Islamic extremists are the enemies of Islam (they hold the image of Islam as hostage) and they feed Islamophobia. The reference to Islamophobia is particularly interesting and suggests an attempt to re-construct an understanding of Islamophobia that turns a lens onto extremism.

An image posted on the website on 5 July 2013 shows terrorists holding Islam (represented by the image of a man dressed in traditional Arabic clothing) hostage. The cartoon bears the title *Islamic extremists are the real enemies of Islam* and is accompanied by the text “No one feeds Islamophobia with as much destruction and strength as do these Islamic extremists. They are the real Islamophobes.” The post links to an article published in the Opinion pages of *Al Hayat* news website that describes Islamophobia not as an attack on the teachings of Islam, but an attack on Muslims living in the West designed to limit their ability to actively engage with and contribute to the societies in which they live. As such, Islamophobia is most potently perpetrated by Islamist extremists who provide Western Islamophobes with justifications for their hostility towards Muslims. [19]

Takfir (accusing other Muslims of apostasy) is challenged through website posts, not through religious reconstruction or debate on the concept but by criticising its use to serve certain political agendas—namely those of Salafi groups. In the context of the Arab Spring, website posts makes some comment criticising authors supportive of political Islam movements who resort to *takfir* and who propagate al-Qaeda’s ideology.

Terrorism and Jihad: A consistent message in the website posts is the denunciation of terrorism as a manipulation of religious doctrine. Terrorists are constructed (both visually and discursively) as menacing figures who kill innocents, kidnap civilians and send the *Ummah’s* youth to perdition. The poster titled *Youth in the hands of preachers of extremism* is accompanied by the text: “Who are these people who are misleading youth? They are a category of people who mix, in their methods and rhetoric, between old means of agitation and new ones. Sometimes they try to hide behind religious or ideological slogans and sometimes behind popular claims or appeals or slogans, in order to justify terrorism and call for more of it and incite young people to practise it. It has become clear that the misleading discourse of incitement uses a set of means and mechanisms” (Posted 29 April 2013).

Master Narratives of ‘Say No to Terror’ and the al-Qaeda Master Narrative

Halverson et al introduced the concept of ‘master narratives’ that are employed by violent Islamist extremists in their ideological discourse. Unlike narratives, master narratives transcend localised differences, are deeply embedded in culture and, importantly, are constantly re-interpreted according to the historical context. According to Halverson et al, the violent extremist Islamist narrative commonly draws on sacred texts and Islamic history. One example is the Pharaoh master narrative which violent jihadists use to propagate their own struggles against regimes and to reinforce divine sovereignty. Similarly, the Battle of Badr, the first major battle between the Muslims and Quraysh, the most powerful tribe in Mecca, provides a powerful metaphor for contemporary conflicts reinterpreted as modern jihad.

A report by the Open Source Centre identified the following elements of the al-Qaeda master narrative:

- *War on Islam:* There is a war going on against Islam, and the West is a major enemy.
- *Agents of the West:* Muslim rulers are agents of the West.
- *The Nakba:* The establishment of Israel is a humiliation and an injustice that Muslims must rectify.
- *Violent Jihad:* Muslims have a duty to wage violent jihad in order to achieve justice.
- *Blood of the Martyrs:* Self-sacrifice is the route to victory.
- *Restoring the Caliphate:* Ending injustice and suffering requires restoring Islamic rule according to al-Qaeda’s version of Islamic law.[20]

Collectively, these six master narratives construct a salient argument that defines the problem, the solution and the required course of action. They employ both systemic and heuristic persuasion techniques appealing to emotion by constructing the problem as a gross humiliation and injustice to the Muslim world and to logic by drawing on historical evidence. Importantly, they also divert existing attitudes around issues such as the establishment of Israel into contemporary directions that call for action. This process known as “canalization”[21] which involves the channelling of existing motives, needs and values to new directions. According to Wallack, a communication campaign that calls for a change in behavior congruent with existing attitudes—or canalization—is more likely to succeed.[22]

The al-Qaeda master narratives “ emphasize themes of shared humiliation, injustice, faithful duty, and the promise of re-establishing a golden age. Further, they draw on a robust set of historical evidence — from the earliest days of Islam to today’s hot zones — applicable to diverse audiences and geographies, giving al-Qaeda communicators the flexibility they need to use these master narratives across varied strategic and communications fronts. Historical depth and geographic breadth makes these stories enduring, dramatic, and highly resilient.”[23]

Collectively, the four master narratives of *Say No to Terror* form a coherent argument for resisting terrorism tailored to an Arabic audience. These narratives emphasise themes of familial and national loyalty and social well-being, drawing heavily on cultural dimensions of the Arabic collective society.

As a counter marketing campaign, *Say No to Terror* employs mechanisms that communicate incentives and benefits for resisting terrorism that appeal to the cultural values of the target audience. These mechanisms are important for assessing how the campaign operates as a counter marketing strategy. Even more important is that master narratives in the campaign, like the violent Islamist narrative, are deeply embedded in Islamic cultural history and they challenges elements of the al-Qaeda master narrative by offering alternative

constructions and understandings of contemporary affairs.

The master narratives of *Say No to Terror* comprise elements derived from sacred texts. Quranic verses that directly or indirectly challenge violent extremist interpretations of key Islamic doctrines such as *jihad* and *takfir* are used to expose and undermine the political agenda of violent extremists. In doing so, this narrative reconstructs terrorists—not the West—as the most threatening enemy of Islam and attempts to manipulate the intersubjective world view of Muslims that positions the West as a force that is actively engaging in an ongoing war to undermine Islam. While the master narratives of al-Qaeda impose on Muslims a religiously sanctioned moral obligation to wage violent jihad, the master narratives of *Say No to Terror* impose a religiously sanctioned moral obligation to protect themselves and their communities from extremism and terrorism. While the master narratives of al-Qaeda construct Muslim rulers as agents of the West and call for a restoration of justice through the imposition of Islamic rule, the master narratives of *Say No to Terror* emphasise the ordained authority of “The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques”.

In constructing a counter narrative that primarily aims at challenging the validity of terrorism, the justification of violent jihad and the authority of terrorist leaders *Say No to Terror* presents a counter campaign that aligns with Jacobsen’s suggestions for the construction of an effective counter narrative. Drawing on lessons learned from cases of former terrorists, Jacobson suggested several motives for counter-narrative:

1. Undermine terrorist leadership: From the various terrorist dropout cases, it seems clear that a general lack of respect for a group’s leadership has often been a factor in dropping out of terrorist group or path. Thus, undermining terrorist and extremist leadership, should constitute one part of the tactic. Crafting messages that significantly detract from leaders’ authority and credibility is vital.
2. Highlight civilian/Muslim suffering, hypocrisy of the Islamist narrative: An effective counter-narrative should also demonstrate civilian and Muslim victimization by extremism and terrorism. Disillusionment with the terrorists’ strategy and actions has been found to play a major reason people have left such groups.
3. Portray terrorists as criminals: Many terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, are increasingly involved in a variety of criminal activities. These include a wide array of criminal activity, ranging from cigarette smuggling to selling counterfeit products, from identity thefts to production and selling of drugs. According to the [American] Drug Enforcement Administration, 19 of 43 U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist organizations are definitively linked to the global drug trade, and up to 60 percent of terrorist organizations are suspected of having some ties with the illegal narcotics trade. Painting terrorists as common criminals may help demonstrate the impurity of their motives, ideology and supposed religious conviction.
4. Focus on life as a terrorist: The reality of life for a terrorist has often driven people out of them. Through studying the personal stories of terrorist dropouts, it can be discerned that the individual operatives’ perceived lack of respect from leaders was influential in their decision to break from the radical group. If people are joining because the terrorist lifestyle seems glamorous or because they believe they are fulfilling some larger purpose, demonstrating the reality will help to dispel these myths. This may involve the use of former members that can describe their unsatisfying lives as members of a terrorist organization, emphasizing that it simply does not live up to the hype.[24]

Jacobsen’s model for developing counter narratives also comes with an important caveat: “Another critical element of devising a successful counter-narrative strategy is recognising that governments are not always the

most effective messengers for presenting the counter-narrative... There are many cases, however, where other actors may make more effective and credible messengers.”[25]

Say No to Terror as Noise

Analyses of the *Say No to Terror* master narratives or its persuasive elements do not necessarily yield any insights as to the effectiveness of the campaign as an online counter-terrorist narrative. An analysis of 281 YouTube comments in response to the campaign videos by Al-Rawi found that 60% were negative, characterised by anger, mistrust and threats against the campaign sponsors. While this finding cannot be considered indicative of the overall response to the campaign given that those most likely to comment are those who feel either strongly negative or strongly positive, it does provide some indication as to the kinds of responses the campaign elicits. According to Al-Rawi’s analysis, the negative response to the videos is largely driven by suspicion about the authenticity and motives of the sponsors. Al Rawi also suggests that the campaign may have motivated a wave of counter efforts on YouTube. Inspired by the campaign’s catchphrase, videos entitled or tagged “Jihad, I’m Muslim: I’m with it” and “Occupation, I’m a Muslim; I’m against it” now vastly exceed the number of *Say No to Terror* videos on YouTube.[26]

Weimann and Von Knop argue that an effective communication strategy should combine both hard and soft power elements. In terms of noise, mechanical noise such as hacking incorporates elements of a hard power approach while social and psychological noise are characteristic of a soft approach. Weimann and von Knop suggest five elements of a successful noise strategy: credibility; terminology; traditions; partners; act local, think global.[27]

Credibility of the source is a decisive factor for ensuring the persuasiveness of any communication. Terroristic narratives derive their authority from the master narrative that draws on sacred texts. Religious authority in Islam is, however, flexible and contentious, allowing for counter narratives to similarly draw on sacred texts to establish credibility—particularly on the Internet.

The fragmentation and decentralisation of religious authority in Islam has been noted by Eickelman and Piscatori. They argue that “the ulama no longer have, if they ever did, a monopoly on sacred authority. Rather, Sufi Shaykhs, engineers, professors of education, medical doctors, army and militia leaders, and others compete to speak for Islam.”[28] The Internet has both intensified and delegitimised traditional structures of religious authority creating a virtual marketplace of religious ideas and interpretations where epistemic authority in Islam is highly dependent on the perception and acceptance of authority by the social network. [29] Weimann makes this point in relation to the issuing of jihadist fatwas [religious edicts] on the Internet: “The authors of jihadist fatwas come from diverse backgrounds. Some are scholars, some are religious authoritative figures, and others are political leaders of radical movements who are not seen in the wider Islamic world as having authority to provide fatwas, but are accepted as authorities by their followers.”[30] Several authors have observed that the Internet has challenged traditional structures of religious authority[31] by creating a competitive market where individuals can access religious texts, assemble their own religious guides and accept the religious authority of online experts. As such, the construction of religious authority is as central to the terroristic narrative as it is to any attempts to counter this narrative.

In marketing, the practice of masking sponsors of a message in order to garner public support for a cause is referred to as astroturfing. Political astroturfing is often used to influence public opinion on issues that serve a particular political agenda by lending credibility to the source of the message.[32] Religious credibility in the *Say No to Terror* campaign should be established through the master narrative that draws on similar sacred text elements to the terroristic narrative but that also relies on damaging the credibility of the

terroristic narrative. As Weimann and Von Knop propose, an effective counter strategy involves undermining the terrorists' credibility while simultaneously introducing an alternative credible source.[33]

Terminology plays a significant role in the effective application of noise. A consistent theme of *Say No to Terror* is the undermining of terrorists' use of Islamic concepts like *takfir*. Interestingly, the campaign does not challenge the theological interpretations of key terminology, *takfir* and *jihad*, by replacing the terms with nonviolent interpretations. However, it criticises the use of the terms to serve the terrorists' violent agenda and exposing their manipulative uses. Specific posts for example openly denounce the hypocrisy of scholars and express cynicism towards sheikhs who issue fatwas about the obligation of violent jihad, ascribing their motives to financial gain.

Traditions form the basis of the violent extremist Islamic master narrative. Thus, a key element of a viable counter narrative campaign should also draw on solutions from within Islamic cultural and religious traditions, symbols and values. Effectively, the strategy of utilising existing cultural traditions, attitudes and shared values constitutes canalization. *Say No to Terror* does not impose unfamiliar knowledge or social constructs. Instead it canalizes existing attitudes towards the West and socially embedded understandings of religious and moral obligations to new directions that motivate desired changes in behaviour—most notably those associated with identification of the enemy as violent extremists, renewed confidence in the traditional authority of the Saudi Arabian monarchy and increased vigilance such as taking responsibility for ensuring that charitable donations do not fund terrorist activities.

Partners from within the target communities should be actively involved in online counter campaigns to ensure legitimacy and appeal to the target audiences. As mentioned, the source of *Say No to Terror* remains unidentified and anecdotal evidence suggests that there is some suspicion among Arab communities that the actual source and motive for the campaign originates in the United States. Though this suggestion requires validation, it is important to ensure that the legitimacy of the campaign is not undermined by such allegations and that, even if proven correct, the perceived affiliation with regional partners does not become perceived as an example of Western attempts to influence Arab affairs.

Co-opting additional agents of change in ways that promote the concept of “act local, think global” is a necessary measure for long-term success. Supporting actors include education institutions, social welfare groups and non-government organisations. There is no evidence to suggest that *Say No to Terror* has transferred from the virtual to the real world through any form of local activism. However, should the campaign continue to expand, there are opportunities for schools and universities both within the Arab world and beyond to utilise *Say No to Terror* as an education resource and a platform for engaging discussion.

Conclusion

The *Say No to Terror* website and web-based resources represent a novel attempt at disrupting online radicalisation by applying elements of social marketing to attitudinal and behavioural change objectives. From the perspective of noise, the campaign offers an opportunity to explore how noise strategies may be delivered through online counter narratives. A textual analysis of *Say No to Terror* offers some insights into how the elements that comprise a successful noise strategy may be applied in an online counter narrative campaign: credibility, terminology, traditions, partners; and act local, think global.

The master narrative of *Say No to Terror* reconstructs several key concepts that are central to the al-Qaeda master narrative in ways that challenge and undermine the Jihadi-Salafist narrative but that are also deeply embedded in Islamic cultural tradition. Theoretically, the salient themes in *Say No to Terror* comprise what

should be an effective counter narrative: undermining the terrorist leadership (and reinforcing tradition Islamic leadership models); highlighting the hypocrisy of the Jihadi-Salafist narrative; portraying terrorists as criminals (and highlighting that support for terrorist activity, whether witting or unwitting, is also criminal); and focussing on the negative lifestyle of terrorists. However, the obscurity surrounding the origins and motives for *Say No to Terror* detracts from an essential element of successful noise-credibility. Credibility remains critical to ensuring the effectiveness of any communication, yet it is becoming increasingly challenging in the context of new media technologies that have had a transformative impact on how religious authority is established. One of the most significant challenges to an effective counter narrative is that traditional structures of religious authority in Islam are increasingly undermined and delegitimized by the Internet. Religious authority therefore becomes a matter of individual agency as individuals are able to assemble their own religious guides accepting those that conform to a certain world view and rejecting those that do not.

Whether or not *Say No to Terror* is an effective communication strategy can only be determined through a long-term, measured assessment of the target audience responses (attitudinal and behavioural) to the campaign's embedded narratives. A consideration of the audience, their everyday lives and the contexts within which users engage with Internet-based content, has often been lacking in analyses of terroristic narratives. It should be a primary consideration in the development of effective counter communication strategies.

About the Authors:

Anne Aly is a Research Fellow at Curtin University, Australia and heads the Countering online Violent Extremism Research (CoVER) Program at the Department of Social Sciences and International Studies.

Dr. Dana Weimann-Saks is a Lecturer at the Department of Communication, the Yezreel Valley College, Israel. She is a lawyer and a social psychologist, studying the overlapping issues of these two domains – law and communication. Her work focuses on persuasive communication, social psychology in courts, formation and change of attitudes and cognitive processes.

Dr. Gabriel Weimann is a Full Professor at the Department of Communication at Haifa University, Israel. His research interests include the study of political campaigns, persuasion and influence, modern terrorism and the mass media. He published eight books and more than 160 scientific articles. His books on media and terrorism include: *'The Theater of Terror'*, *'Terror on the Internet'* and *'Terror in Cyberspace: The Next Generation'*.

Notes

[1] Blumenthal, S., "Violence as Communication", *Criminal Justice Matters* 66 (2006), pp. 4-5.

[2] Schmid, A. P., & de Graaf, J., *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media*. (London: SAGE Publications, 1982); Weimann, G. And Winn, C. *The Theater of Terror*. (New York: Longman, 1994); Nacos, B., *Mass-Mediated Terrorism*. (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003).

[3] Ines von Behr, Anaïs Reding, Charlie Edwards, Luke Gribbon, *Radicalisation in the digital era: The use of the Internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism*. (Brussels: RAND, 2013)

[4] Anne Aly, "The Terrorists' Audience: A Model of Internet Radicalisation." *Journal of Australian Professional Intelligence Officers*, 17 (2009), pp. 3- 19.

[5] Von Knop and Weimann, G. "Applying the Notion of Noise to Countering Online-Terrorism", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31(2008), pp.883-902.

[6] Their final model was published in Weaver, W. and Shannon, C.E., *The Mathematical Theory of Communication*. (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1963).

[7] Rothwell, D.J., *In the Company of Others: An Introduction to Communication*. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2004).

- [8] Von Knop and Weimann, G., op. cit.
- [9] Weimann, Terror in Cyberspace op. cit.
- [10] Hughes, D., "Secretary Hilary Clinton: We Hacked Yemen Al Qaeda Sites", *ABC News*, May 23, 2012. At <http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2012/05/secretary-clinton-we-hacked-yemen-al-qaeda-sites/>
- [11] HM Government, *The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism*, (London: Office for Security and Counterterrorism, 2009). At: <http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm75/7547/7547.asp>
- [12] Presidential Task Force. "Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization", March 2009. Accessed 10 February, 2014. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PTF2-Counterradicalization.pdf>.
- [13] J. Harman, J. "Future Terrorists", *Los Angeles Times*, January 6, 2014. At: <http://articles.latimes.com/2014/jan/06/opinion/la-oe-harman-terrorism-response-20140106>
- [14] At: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/CTITF-Use-of-Internet/html>
- [15] M. Jacobson, *Learning Counter-Narrative Lessons from Cases of Terrorist Dropouts*, (The Hague: The Netherlands' National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2010), at: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/4b7aaf56ca52e.pdf>
- [16] B. G Glasser and A. L Strauss, *The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research* (Chicago: Aldine, 1967)
- [17] A.L Strauss, *Qualitative Analysis For Social Scientists* (Cambridge: University Press, 1987), 28-32.
- [18] Aly, *The Terrorists Audience*; Aly, *Winning the 'War of Hearts and Minds'*
- [19] <http://alhayat.com/OpinionsDetails/529647>
- [20] Open Source Center, *Master Narratives, Al-Qaeda Master Narratives and Affiliate Case Studies: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Special Report*. (Open Source Center, Monitor 360, and Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, 2011).
- [21] P Lazarsfeld and R Merton, "Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organized Social Action" in Schramm W, Roberts D (Eds.), *The Process and Effects of Mass Communication*. (Champaign-Urbana, IL: University of Illinois, 1971)
- [22] L. Wallack, "Mass media and health promotion: Promise, problem, and challenge"; in: C. Atkin & L.Wallack, (Eds.), *Mass communication and public health: Complexities and conflicts* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1990), 41-51
- [23] Open Source Center, *Master Narratives, Al-Qaeda Master Narratives and Affiliate Case Studies: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb*, 7.
- [24] M. Jacobson, *Learning Counter-Narrative Lessons from Cases of Terrorist Dropouts*, (The Hague, The Netherlands: National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2010), at: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/4b7aaf56ca52e.pdf>.
- [25] M. Jacobson, *Learning Counter-Narrative Lessons from Cases of Terrorist Dropouts*, 78.
- [26] Ahmed. K. Al-Rawi, "The anti-terrorist advertising campaigns in the Middle East. *Journal of International Communication*, 19 (2013), pp. 182-195.
- [27] Weimann and von Knop, *Applying the notion of noise*.
- [28] D., Eickelman, & J. Piscatori, *Muslim Politics*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton, University Press 1996), 131.
- [29] Anne Aly, "An audience focussed approach to examining religious extremism online". *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Communication* 39 (2012), pp 1-17
- [30] G. Weimann, "Cyber-Fatwas and terrorism", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 34(2011), 765- 781, 768.
- [31] J. Meyrowitz, *No sense of place: The impact of electronic media on social behavior*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); S. Hjarvard, S., "The mediatization of religion: A theory of the media as agents of religious change", *Northern Lights* 6, (2008), pp. 9-26; Paul A. Soukup, "Challenges to evangelization in the digital age", *Catholic International* 15 (2004).
- [32] J. Ratkiewicz, M. D. Conover, M. Meiss, B. Goncalves, A. Flammini, F. Menczer, "Detecting and Tracking Political Abuse in Social Media", *Proceedings of the Fifth International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain, July 17 - 21, 2011* (Menlo Park, California: The AAAI Press, 2011).

[33] Weimann and von Knop, *Applying the notion of noise*.

German Right-Wing Terrorism in Historical Perspective. A First Quantitative Overview of the ‘Database on Terrorism in Germany (Right-Wing Extremism)’ – DTG^{rw} Project.

by Daniel Koehler

Abstract

This article presents a first quantitative overview of the findings of a private research project, which is running since 2011. The project aims at establishing a comprehensive database of German right-wing terrorist actors (groups, individuals) since the Second World War. It assembles data on incidents in order to gather as much information as possible about respective tactics, strategies, target groups, biographical backgrounds, connections and ideological legitimizations. As a first report and analysis, this article provides a quantitative analysis of right-wing terrorism in Germany, based on data relating to average group size, main target groups, length of existence and main tactics.

Keywords: *right-wing terrorism; Germany; database; quantitative analysis*

Introduction

Due to the discovery of the German right-wing terrorist group “National Socialist Underground (NSU)” in 2011, which allegedly assassinated at least 10 persons and committed two bombings over a period of almost 14 years undetected, right-wing terrorism has been brought back to nation-wide attention. In comparison to the 77 casualties caused in the same year by the lone wolf Anders Behring Breivik, and compared to Jihadist, national separatist or anarchist terrorism, the activities by the extreme right in Germany have been of a lesser order of magnitude. Only a very small number of academic studies have been focusing exclusively on the nature, tactics and structures of right-wing terrorism in Germany in the last decades. A few edited volumes have collected chapters on specific right-wing terrorist groups from different countries, but without looking at it in a comprehensive way and in any depth. We therefore possess few insights into the possibly distinctive characteristic of terrorism from the extreme right.

In order to establish a comprehensive database for terrorism research in Germany, to begin with in the German right-wing context, a unique private research project was started in 2011 by the author. Over the course of three years, the project collected as much information as possible on terrorist activities by right-wing extreme groups in Germany since the Second World War and merged it in one coherent data base. While still ongoing and constantly being updated, the material gathered so far allows the making a first quantitative overview regarding some basic structures of German right-wing extremist & terrorist groups. As a purely quantitative survey, this article will not focus on specific terrorist groups, incidents or strategic concepts. Rather it concentrates on some basic structures such as the typical group size, targeted groups, methods, lifespan, and communication strategies. In addition some insights into the historical development over the last 50 years will be provided, answering questions such as whether or not right-wing terrorist groups got smaller and more flexible over time (based on the “leaderless resistance” concept), whether the target groups or methods changed, or whether certain waves or phases of right-wing terrorist activities can be identified.

State of the Art

Within international research on terrorism, right-wing extremist terrorism has so far only received minor attention, compared, for instance, to Jihadi terrorism. Although some major publications in the last decades focused specifically on this topic [1], they only scratch the surface of the issue—usually with chapters introducing various right-wing terrorist groups or incidents—without an underlying general typology or concept. Most academic publications dealing with the extreme right either focus on parties and political processes such as elections and campaigns [2] or on various subcultural aspects of different right-wing groups which are not part of the more traditional contemporary political spectrum [3]. The formulation of a theory and typology of right-wing terrorism has been attempted by Ehud Sprinzak [4]. His theory of “Split Delegitimization” – differentiating between revolutionary, reactionary/reactive, vigilante, racist, millenarian, and youth counterculture right-wing terrorism – has, however, not found a wide resonance within academia due to a certain lack of empiric groundwork. Sprinzak suggested that for right-wing terrorist groups, the conflict with government would be “secondary” in comparison to “private wars against hostile ethnic communities” [5]. This does, however, not hold true for many right-wing groups and lone wolf actors (e.g. militias in the US, Breivik in Norway) who perceive democratic and multicultural governments as their main enemies. As Sprinzak’s typology was recognized as being “too simplistic” [6] to be applied to empirical analysis, his model remained relatively inconsequential.

Within international research publications, works on German right-wing terrorism are few; only a handful of academic studies can be identified [7]. From an academic perspective, most publications have been of a rather journalistic nature and lack scientific rigour [8]. On the academic level, only a handful of publications can be found [9]; they vary greatly both in terms of scope and quality. Partially due to lack of empirical data, some scholars have formulated theories that are surprising, for example, that right-wing terrorists prior to the NSU series of murders, never directly attempted to kill individuals from their target group and are therefore claiming that there is a ‘new generation’ of right-wing terrorists [10]. In short, with regard to forms and aspects of right-wing terrorism, the field is highly under-researched and under-represented within international and German academic studies of terrorism and political violence. Although some scholars have attempted to establish theoretical foundations for a study of right-wing terrorism, the sheer lack of comprehensive and detailed empirical data about right-wing terrorist actors, structures and tactics has essentially prevented the development of systematic analysis regarding this type of terrorism.

To improve this situation, the DTG^{rw} began building a knowledge base for the in-depth study of German right-wing terrorism in order to detect potential differences and commonalities with other forms of terrorism.

Methods, Sources, and the Database Project

The main goal of the initial DTG^{rw} project was to describe the development of ideologies, strategies, tactics, group structures and networks of German right-wing terrorism from a historical perspective. For the first time in research on German right-wing extremism, an attempt has been made to establish a database for right-wing terrorism that includes as much information as possible on the actors (groups and individuals), incidents, target groups, tactics, ideology, networks, lifespan, communication, effects of government measures, success of the terrorist groups, victims and other relevant data. As a notoriously inaccessible field for research, all available sources have been included: media reports, police investigation files, court documents, academic literature, autobiographies of former right-wing terrorists, verdicts, interviews with former terrorists, investigators and lawyers, intelligence reports (Verfassungsschutzberichte – reports from

the agency for the protection of the Constitution), government reports as well as internal documents of right-wing groups (e.g. strategy papers, books, training manuals). After an initial overview, the data was coded and analysed quantitatively and qualitatively, gathering as much information as possible for each identified actor or incident.

The DTG^{rw} consists of two main parts: incidents and actors. While the part on incidents includes acknowledged acts of violence committed by right-wing extremists (e.g. killings, arson and attacks with explosives, kidnappings and hostage takings) not all have a terrorist background; sometimes incidents attributed to right-wing extremists have a rather personal criminal background and can therefore not be included in an analysis about right-wing terrorism. In addition, many incidents, actors or purposes are simply unknown. Sometimes a right-wing motive has only been suspected by authorities. In our database, the part on actors only includes identified actors (groups and individuals) from the extreme right, who planned, prepared or executed coercive acts of violence for purposes identified in the revised Academic Consensus Definition of terrorism (2011), developed by Schmid [11]. Naturally there is a large difference between these two parts in terms of numbers and proportions. This article solely relies on the identified actors, while the database on incidents has to be analysed in a different way.

Although the analysis is still ongoing and the database is constantly updated, it has already become the largest accumulation of information on right-wing terrorism in Germany. Currently the DTG^{rw} consists of:

- 84 right-wing terrorist actors (groups and individuals) that could be identified since 1963, using the combined definition of Schmid (2011) and Wagner (2013).
- 123 right-wing terrorist attacks using explosives of some kind since 1971
- 2,173 right-wing arson attacks since 1971
- 229 homicides with a right-wing extremist background since 1971
- 12 kidnappings
- 56 cases of blackmailing
- 174 armed robberies

Of course not every arson attack, kidnapping, blackmailing or robbery can be related to right-wing terrorism, which is why every incident has to be qualitatively analysed and embedded within the database of identified actors. Sometimes one right-wing group for example commits an armed robbery to finance another group's terrorist activities, which was then counted as militant periphery (support structures, recruitment pool, radicalizing milieu). As the scope of the DTG^{rw} also aims to cover the militants' peripheral attacks (e.g. averted by police) that failed and plots that have been prepared but not carried out have been included as well.

Definitions

To gather information on right-wing terrorist actors and incidents in a database requires definitions adequately balanced to recognize the relevant phenomenon and to distinguish it from irrelevant data. As the German legal definitions both of right-wing extremism and terrorism was deemed far too narrow for this project, a combination of two main academic definitions have been applied to identify right-wing terrorist actors, groups and incidents. In addition, the project aimed to include the militant periphery of right-wing

terrorist actors as well. Regarding the definition of ‘terrorism’, which is in itself almost a sub-discipline of terrorism studies, Schmid’s revised academic consensus definition from 2011 was used:

“Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties” [12].

Right-wing extremism or radicalism is not less controversial as a concept. In an analysis of different studies of right-wing extremism, Mudde [13] arrived at twenty-six different ways to define the concept, which contained fifty-eight different criteria. In a similar examination of thirteen studies, Druwe [14] found ‘only’ thirty-seven different, partially-intersecting, meanings. In German research at least two definitions are widely used: the ‘consensus group’s and Heitmeyer’s definitions. As a collection of essential characteristics of right-wing extremism the ‘consensus group’ of social scientists defined right-wing extremism as an opinion based on inequality, the affinity to dictatorships, chauvinism, belittlement of National Socialism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia and Social Darwinism [15]. Wilhelm Heitmeyer, on the other hand, abstained from a collection of essential characteristics but identified as the core of right-wing extremism a combination of an ideology, which is based on inequality, and a basic acceptance of violence [16]. While Heitmeyer’s definition is far too broad to identify right-wing terrorism the consensus group’s definition with its focus on certain ideological characteristics (e.g. anti-Semitism) remains too narrow; it excludes certain right-wing groups or actors (e.g. Anders Behring Breivik, who would not be counted as a right-wing extremist under the consensus group definition due to his lack of anti-Semitism). Therefore this article and the research project applied the definition elaborated by Bernd Wagner [17] for the data collection:

“Right-Wing Radicalism is a term for a social reality referring to a family of ideologies, which create organizations, movements, mentalities, fashion, groups and scenes, united by the characteristic constraining of the individual’s freedom as ‘zoon politicon’ and of groups on the account of biological and/or ethnic-cultural reasons and criteria. In addition, these elements suspend freedom and dignity, as well as personal rights, in spirit and action, and introduce non-democratic forms of government. Right-Wing Radicalism aspires to create and maintain an order establishing prerogatives for biological and cultural chosen ones thought of as an ethnos, folk or race and to develop a distinctive culture of life, which is thought to be superior and to be established accordingly through morality and legal status, as well as force, ensuring the submission to this order of every participant.” [18].

In short the term right-wing extremism covers a broad range of ideologies that essentially see violence as a legitimate tool to combat a political and ethnic ‘enemy’ (including individuals with different culture, religion, nationality or sexual orientation) seen as a threat to the own race or nation. Both are entangled in an active state of war over future existence.

Main Findings

For a first analytical overview resulting from the DTG^{rw} project, the following categories will be highlighted in a comparative and quantitative perspective: group size, tactics (main methods), target groups, and lifespan.

Group Size

Regarding the typical group size of German right-wing terrorist actors an important research question is,

whether theoretical concepts such as “leaderless resistance” from 1983 [19] have effectively altered tactical formations in practice or whether merely an evolution of tactics (in terms of group sizes) can be found. For this analysis, five types of sizes have been used to cluster the right-wing terrorist actors: large associations with more than 100 members, large groups with 10 to 40 members, small groups with four to nine members, small cells with two to three members, and lone actors. To determine the size of a certain right-wing terrorist actor is sometimes challenging if not impossible due to several factors:

- In 12 cases no information about the group size was available.
- In five cases only differing estimations about the group size (e.g. 40-100, “a minimum of six”) were available. In these cases the lowest proven number was used.
- Almost all actors had no official membership status and thus a high degree of fluctuation over time. Members also had different functions, which makes it difficult to link some persons to a terrorist plot. Regarding time, the group size at the time of arrest, detection or disbandment was used. In some cases during investigation, trial and verdict the initial group was divided into categories by the authorities, which also complicates the analysis (e.g.: a group of ten was arrested for planning a bomb attack, six persons were charged, four persons convicted of explosives-related crimes, and two on weapons-related charges). In these cases, the number of identified individuals connected to the initial terrorist activity (including execution, planning, support) was counted.
- In some lone actor cases, there is still a debate going on whether or not other persons were involved. For example, the deadliest terrorist attack after the Second World War in Germany is the bombing of the Oktoberfest in Munich in 1980, causing 13 casualties and 211 wounded. It was perpetrated by an extreme right activist: Gundolf Köhler. Although he was a member of a large right-wing extremist organization (the “Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann”) courts and several investigations still claim that he acted alone, despite the fact that some contrary evidence has surfaced over the years. In this case, the DTG^{rw} follows current official police or court statements, meaning that the Oktoberfest bombing is counted as a lone actor perpetrated incident in the database.

Excluding from analysis all the actors about whom we do not yet have good information, it emerges that there were, in total 72 actors between 1963 and 2014. They came from:

- 6 large associations with more than 100 members
- 10 large groups with 10 to 40 members
- 26 small groups with 4–9 members
- 13 small cells with 2–3 members
- 15 lone actors

With 54.2% of perpetrators being part of small groups and small cells, this is by far the most common type of size of right-wing terrorist actors in the DTG^{rw}. Lone actors alone count for 20.8% of right-wing terrorist actors.

Small group sizes as a visible part of German extreme right terrorism can be dated back to 1963. At that time, a group of eight German right-wing extremists tried to attack infrastructure (power plants) in South Tyrol (Austria). In 1965, a group of three planned to assassinate the Federal Prosecutor General and execute a bomb attack against the German Office for the Prosecution of War Criminals in Ludwigsburg. However, to

the general public small scale right-wing terrorism became visible only in 1973 with the “Gruppe Neumann” (six members) and in 1978 with the “Wehrwolfgruppe Stubbemann” (three members). In fact most of the more or less widely known and lethal terrorist groups have developed small group or cell structures (e.g., “Gruppe Ludwig” [two members, killing 14 person in 9 attack between 1977 and 1984], “Deutsche Aktionsgruppen” [four members, killing two persons in nine attacks in 1980], “Hepp-Kexel Gruppe” [six members, perpetrating four attacks], and “Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund” [three members, killing 10 persons]). Based on the timeframe segmented into roughly four decades (1963-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, 2000-2014) and the distribution of small units (for small groups and cells) and lone actors, the following observations can be made:

- 1963-1979: eight small groups and cells, two lone actors
- 1980-1989: ten small groups and cells, five lone actors
- 1990-1999: four small groups and cells, two lone actors
- 2000-2014: 16 small groups and cells, six lone actors

Although this shows a clear increase of small units and lone actors since 2000, it has to be mentioned that most actors with unknown size are located in the early decades of the DTG^{rw}. Broken down into percentage (including small groups, cells and lone actors) of all known right-wing terrorist actors per decade the numbers are as follows:

- 1968-1980: 40%
- 1980-1990: 78.9%
- 1990-2000: 40%
- 2000-2014: 88%

Therefore, it can be argued that after a first zenith of small scale right-wing terrorism between 1980 and 1989, a clear orientation to small unit tactics by the extreme right terrorist milieu is observable since 2000.

Tactics

Tactics used by right-wing terrorist actors include methods of coercive violence, typically explosive and arson attacks, targeted assassinations, hostage takings and kidnappings. Again some qualifications are necessary. In a number of cases, no concrete tactics could be detected or was made public. In these cases, investigators or courts spoke of “severe crimes planned against the security of the state”, “militant plans” against politicians and civilians or simply used the term “terrorist plans”. Naturally, due to a lack of coherent definitions, standards and legal frameworks these cases occurred more often in the early decades of the DTG^{rw}. Moreover, groups that have been mostly active in supportive operations for other terrorist actors have not been included here. However, when a right-wing actor executed, prepared and planned an attack, using one of the above-mentioned methods, the actor was included. In many cases, actors used a mix of terrorist methods either simultaneously or in sequences. Each method executed or planned was counted. Thus the percentages below do not refer to absolute size of attacks in the real world but rather show a distribution of tactics in regard to preference by actors in theory and practice. They exclude actors committing acts of support or without a known tactic.

Decade	Targeted Assassination	Explosive Attacks	Arson Attacks	Hostage Taking, Kidnapping
1963-1979	25.9%	44.4%	22.2%	7.4%
1980-1989	22.2%	44.4%	33.3%	0%
1990-1999	12.5%	87.5%	0%*	0%
2000-2014	13.6%	63.6%	22.7%	0%

This table shows that in the early decades within the DTG^{rw}, a broad range of tactics was used by these actors, including hostage taking and kidnappings -tactics almost completely vanishing after 1980. Between 1980 and 1990, right-wing terrorist actors relied on three tactics: explosive attacks (mostly), as well as arson attacks and targeted assassinations. It would appear that a wave of explosive attacks between 1990 and 2000 was followed by another differentiation of tactics since 2000. Two special cases have been excluded but are worth mentioning:

- Between 1977 and 1978 the “Wehrsportgruppe Rohwer/Werwolf” attacked Allied and German military installations, patrols and barracks in at least four cases.
- In 2014 a young right-wing extremist was discovered in Munich with an arsenal of weapons, extensive combat gear, and explosives. While police attempted to enter his apartment he tried to detonate several bombs and killed himself.

A special reference is also necessary regarding the wave of right-wing arson attacks on asylum seeker homes in the early 1990s after the German reunification (1,499 incidents between 1991 and 1994). These attacks are part of the incidents database but could in most cases not been tied to a specific actor or to a specific strategy. Although it is proven that in some instances right-wing groups publically called for, and advertised, arson attacks against asylum facilities it is unclear whether these attacks can be included in an analysis of right-wing terrorism. This phenomenon will be treated differently and needs in depth qualitative analysis. It is very close to Sprinzak’s category of “youth counterculture terrorism” [20].

Target Groups

When it comes to targets of right-wing terrorism, again, a number of cases have to be excluded because no specific information was available or because actors attacked more than one target group. In addition, this categorization aligns with the target typology typically used by right-wing terrorist actors themselves. In many cases, the only evidence comes from statements or documents of the perpetrators outlining, for example, planned attacks against “foreigners” – a highly controversial term in the German context – without necessarily being more specific. This makes it difficult to analyze subcategories, such as right-wing terrorist violence against Muslims. Even most police and court documents do not differentiate the ethnic background of the target groups, but usually use terms like “immigrants” or “persons with an immigration background” are used. Due to this, the category “foreigners” as a target group mainly refers – in the eyes of the perpetrators – to individuals with non-German or ‘non-Aryan’ ethnical background. Right-wing terrorists very rarely seem to focus on a specific group of ‘foreigners’ or delineate what the category means exactly (e.g. Muslims born in Germany, mixed families).

The numbers reproduced below represent proportions of specific target groups. Subsuming any representative of the government or state structure, the ‘Government’ category includes targets such as police officers, judges, politicians, military personnel (German or other), as well as state prosecutors. ‘Infrastructure’ includes mainly buildings such as party offices (e.g. from the Social Democratic Party), court houses, police

stations, schools, but also railways, power supply networks, restaurants and other installations. To the extent that individuals or groups identified by the extreme right as “the Left” (communists, anti-fascists, social democrats not being part of the government) have been targeted, they were subsumed under the category “The Left”.

Decade	Jews	Foreigners	Government	The Left	Infrastructure
1963-1979	21.1%	0%	31.6%	21.1%	26.3%
1980-1989	9.1%	36.4%	45.5%	9.1%	0%
1990-1999	0%	16.7%	41.7%	33.3%	8.3%
2000-2014	28.6%	28.6%	14.3%	21.4%	7.1%

Surprising is the fact that the government always has been a major target of right-wing terrorists, which is contrary to the theory of Sprinzak [21]. In addition it could be expected before the German reunification that the presence of Allied and Russian Forces in Germany would, in theory, provide a basis for right-wing terrorist propaganda. After the reunification, a perceived weakness of especially East German authorities might have triggered attacks on government targets. After 2000 right-wing terrorists again chose different target groups, with a major focus on Jewish communities and persons.

Three special cases have been excluded and are worth mentioning in detail:

- The “Gruppe Ludwig” killed 14 persons in nine attacks between 1977 and 1984, mainly targeting discotheques, prostitutes, and catholic priests. The group’s agenda was to stop moral decay within the Christian-‘Aryan’ culture and society.
- Gundolf Köhler, the perpetrator of the Oktoberfest bombing, killed 13 persons and wounded 211, making it most severe terrorist attack in post Second World War Germany. Köhler planted the bomb at the main entry of the Oktoberfest, which allegedly detonated earlier than expected, killing Köhler. This is the only known right-wing terrorist act that targeted persons indiscriminately. It was obviously designed to inflict mass casualties.
- In 1981 a group of five right-wing extremists founded the “Kommando Omega”. They targeted dropouts (‘traitors’), judges and lawyers with explosives and assassinations.

Length of Group Activity (Lifespan)

To show the average length of a group’s active existence among Germany’s right-wing terrorist groups is more problematic. For one reason, it is simply impossible to determine when a group of individuals or lone actors have decided to form a terrorist cell or started preparing for an attack especially since this kind of activity is typically executed clandestinely. Although some court documents and media reports state facts like “have been preparing since...” or “formed a terrorist group in 2001 the latest”, it is completely unclear which criteria have been used to define or recognize the starting point of a terrorist group or act. In addition, media reports, investigation files, court verdicts and other sources might all use different criteria and have different perspectives on when a group was formed or an act prepared. Thus this overview of average time of activity before detection by authorities, arrest, and/or disbandment should be used with caution and as a rough indication only.

Excluding two cases without confirmed information about the actor’s lifespan, the vast majority of right-wing terrorist actors is active no longer than one year (73.2%) before either being detected and arrested by the authorities or before disbandment (sometimes to avoid arrest). It would, however, appear, that if an actor

'survives' more than one year, chances of long-term activity rapidly increase with 13.4% being active between one and five years and 13.4% more than five years. With 14 years of activity the "Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (NSU)" was the most successful German right-wing terrorist actor in terms of lifespan.

Communication

Probably one of the most surprising characteristics of right-wing terrorism is the form of communication chosen by right-wing terrorist actors in combination with their attacks. Although terrorism, due to the propagandistic and psychological effects, can always be regarded as form of communication in itself, some scholars have focused on media attention as a central goal of terrorists to gain a podium for their political or religious agenda [22]. Many (if not most) terrorist actors therefore use some form of public claim statement after attacks to connect their group, ideology, brand or statement with the incident. In case of German right-wing terrorism, however, only a small minority of perpetrators claimed in public credit for the attack (including to leave a note, statement, or other form of ideological identification at the crime scene). As a result of the absence of public claims of responsibility for their attacks, public and academia in Germany discuss whether right-wing attacks should be counted as 'terrorism'. While in theory the psychological effect (terrorizing the target group) can be achieved without specific claim statements (e.g., a bombing of a synagogue might be self-explanatory), the propagandistic effect of unclaimed attacks is much weaker, if present at all.

For this survey, only those right-wing terrorist actors who actually tried to execute attacks (including failed ones) were used. This accounts for 42.9% of all actors in the DTG^{rw}. Of those, only 19.4% made some form of public claims (e.g., letters, statements at the crime scene, media communiqués – almost one fifth of the attackers) to identify themselves as perpetrators and to spread their political or ideological agenda. As a special case the "Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (NSU)" did produce a video statement claiming the attacks. However, they sent them to different media stations, politicians, and civil society groups only after the group was detected in 2011. In general, public statements of right-wing terrorist actors only very rarely contain concrete political claims or programs. In most cases swastikas or similar symbols were left at the crime scene or the victims and target groups were scorned through the statements.

Conclusion

With this brief quantitative overview, the first step to a more comprehensive analysis of right-wing terrorism in Germany becomes possible. Taking key elements of known right-wing terrorist actors (size, tactics, target groups, lifespan, communication), this article allows to characterize right-wing terrorism in Germany for the first time empirically so that common traits as well as differences with other types of terrorism can be found. Most striking at this point appears to be the lack of typical forms of communication (e.g., communiqués, claim statements) after perpetrating attacks. This holds true for the majority of right-wing terrorist actors in Germany. This is an aspect worth looking into in future studies, showing how exactly (if at all) the propagandistic effect of right-wing terrorist acts is achieved and how the actors themselves think about this strategy (or lack thereof). In addition, knowing more about the targets of right-wing terrorists, what tactics they typically use and how long they usually survive, allows us to identify the atypical cases and subject them to in-depth analysis (e.g., the 'Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund', the 'Gruppe Ludwig', the 'Kommando Omega'). In addition the DTG^{rw} has aggregated a large amount of data regarding biographical backgrounds, reaction and effectiveness of police actions. The database also focuses on ideological explanations as well as strategic and tactical concepts. This will allow for a series of multiple, qualitative and quantitative studies,

focusing on German right-wing terrorism in the future.

About the Author: Daniel Koehler is currently the Director of Research at the Institute for the Study of Radical Movements (ISRM) in Berlin. He co-founded the first peer review journal on de-radicalization and publishes frequently on radicalization, de-radicalization and terrorism. He can be reached at daniel_koehler@freenet.de.

Notes

- [1] Bjørgo, T., *Terror from the extreme right*. (Cass series on political violence 1). London; Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 1995; Wilkinson, P., *Violence and terror and the extreme right. Terrorism and Political Violence*, 1995. 7(4): pp. 82-93; Hoffman, B., *Right Wing Terrorism in Europe*. Santa Monica: RAND, 1982; id., *Right-Wing Terrorism in West Germany*. Santa Monica, RAND, 1986; Michael, G., *Confronting Right Wing Extremism and Terrorism in the USA*. (Routledge studies in extremism and democracy). New York: Routledge, 2003; Pedahzur, A., *Struggling with the Challenges of Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism within Democratic Boundaries: A Comparative Analysis. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 2001. 24 (5): pp. 339-359; Taylor, M., D. Holbrook, and Currie, P.M., *Extreme right wing political violence and terrorism*. (New directions in terrorism studies). New York: Continuum International Pub. Group, 2013.
- [2] Braunthal, G., *Right-wing extremism in contemporary Germany*. (New perspectives in German political studies). Basingstoke, UK; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009; Golder, M., *Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties In Western Europe. Comparative Political Studies*, 2003. 36 (4), pp. 432-466; id., *Electoral Institutions, Unemployment and Extreme Right Parties: A Correction. British Journal of Political Science*, 2003. 33 (03), pp. 525-534; Ignazi, P. and Ysmal, C., *Extreme Right-wing Parties in Europe. Sonderheft des European Journal of Political Research 22 (1)*. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992; id., *The Re-emergence of the Extreme Right in Europe*, in: *Reihe Politikwissenschaft*. Institut für Höhere Studien, 1995; Jackman, R.W. and Volpert, K., *Conditions Favouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe. British Journal of Political Science*, 1996. 26 (4): pp. 501-521; Kitschelt, H. and McGann, A.J., *The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis*. 1996; Klandermans, B. and Mayer, N., *Extreme right activists in Europe: through the magnifying glass*. London/New York: Routledge, 2006; Mammone, A., Godin, E., and Jenkins, B., *Mapping the extreme right in contemporary Europe: from local to transnational*. (Routledge studies in extremism and democracy). London & New York: Routledge, 2012; id., *Varieties of right-wing extremism in Europe*. Routledge studies in extremism and democracy. Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2012; Merkl, P.H. and Weinberg, L., *Right-wing extremism in the twenty-first century*. 2nd rev. ed. (Cass series on political violence). London & Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 2003; Minkenberg, M., *The Radical Right in Europe—An Overview*. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008.
- [3] Blazak, R., *White Boys to Terrorist Men. American Behavioral Scientist*, 2001. 44 (6): pp. 982-1000; Borgeson, K. and Valeri, R., *Examining Differences in Skinhead Ideology and Culture Through an Analysis of Skinhead Websites*. Michigan Sociological Review, 2005. 19, pp. 45-62; Borgeson, K., *Culture and Identity Among Skinhead Women*. Michigan Sociological Review, 2003. 17, pp. 99-118; Brown, T.S., *Subcultures, Pop Music and Politics: Skinheads and "Nazi Rock" in England and Germany*. Journal of Social History, 2004. 38 (1): pp. 157-178; Burriss, V., Smith, E., and Strahm, A., *White Supremacist Networks on the Internet*. Sociological Focus, 2000. 33 (2): pp. 215-235; Virchow, F., *The groupuscularization of neo-Nazism in Germany: the case of the Aktionsbüro Norddeutschland*. Patterns of Prejudice, 2004. 38 (1): pp. 56-70.
- [4] Sprinzak, E., *Right-Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: the Case of Split Delegitimization*, in: Bjørgo, T. (Ed.), *Terror from the Extreme Right*. Frank Cass: London, 1995. pp 17-43.
- [5] *ibid.* p. 17
- [6] Bjørgo, T., *Terror from the extreme right*. (Cass series on political violence 1). London ; Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 1995. p.: 7.
- [7] Hoffman, B., *Right Wing Terrorism in Europe*. Santa Monica: RAND, 1982; id., *Right-Wing Terrorism in West Germany*. Santa Monica, RAND, 1986; Heitmeyer, W., *Right-wing terrorism*, in: Bjørgo, T. (Ed.), *Root Causes of Terrorism*. New York: Routledge, 2005, pp. 141-153; Horchem, H.J., *European terrorism: A German perspective*. In: *Terrorism*. London: Routledge, 1992. pp. 27-51; Malthaner, S. and Waldmann, P., *Terrorism in Germany: Old and New Problems*. In: v. Leeuwen, M. (Ed.), *Confronting Terrorism*. Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 2003.
- [8] Baumgärtner, M. and Böttcher M., *Das Zwickauer Terror-Trio—Ereignisse, Szene, Hintergründe*. Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2012; Fuchs, C. and Goetz, J., *Die Zelle: rechter Terror in Deutschland*. Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2012; Gensing, P., *Terror von Rechts. Die Nazi-Morde und das Versagen der Politik*. Berlin: Rotbuch, 2012; Röpke, A. and Speit, A., *Blut und Ehre. Geschichte und Gegenwart rechter Gewalt in Deutschland*. Berlin: Christopher Links Verlag, 2013.
- [9] Borstel, D. and Heitmeyer, W., *Menschenfeindliche Mentalitäten, radikalisierte Milieus und Rechtsterrorismus*. In: Malthaner, S., and Waldmann, P. (Eds).

- Radikale Milieus. Das soziale Umfeld terroristischer Gruppen.*, Campus Verlag: Frankfurt am Main, 2012; Jesse, E., *Rechtsterroristische Strukturen in Deutschland. Vergangenheit und Gegenwart.* Politische Studien. Orientierung durch Information und Dialog, 63 (May-June 2012); pp. 24-35; Maegerle, A., *Rechtsextremistische Gewalt und Terror.* In: Wagner, B. and Grumke, T. (Eds.). *Handbuch Rechtsradikalismus. Personen–Organisationen–Netzwerke vom Neonazismus bis in die Mitte der Gesellschaft*, Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 2002; pp. 159-172; Pfahl-Traugber, A., *Der Rechtsterrorismus im Verborgenen: Darstellung und Einschätzung der Besonderheiten des "Nationalsozialistischen Untergrundes"*. In: *Jahrbuch Terrorismus 2011/2012*, Opladen, Barbara Budrich, 2012; n.p.; id., *Geschichte des Rechtsterrorismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Eine Analyse zu Entwicklung, Gruppen und Vergleich.* Einsichten und Perspektiven. Bayrische Zeitschrift für Politik und Geschichte. München: Bayrische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit., 2012. 1; id., *Der NSU und der deutsche Rechtsterrorismus.* In: Backes, U., Gallus, A., Jesse, E. (Eds.), *Extremismus & Demokratie*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012, pp. 180-197; id., *Der Rechtsterrorismus im Verborgenen: Versuch einer Antwort auf zehn Fragen.* 2011; Available from: <http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/47832/der-rechtsterrorismus-im-verborgenem>; Rabert, B., *Links- und Rechts-Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1970 bis heute.* Bonn: Bernard und Graefe, 1995; Rosen, K.-H., *Rechtsterrorismus. Gruppen–Taten–Hintergründe.* In: Paul, G. (Ed), *Hitlers Schatten verblaßt. Die Normalisierung des Rechtsextremismus.*, Bonn, Dietz, 1989; Wagner, B., *Terroristische Tendenzen im militanten Rechtsextremismus.*, in: Backes, U., Jesse, E. (Eds.), *Jahrbuch Extremismus & Demokratie.*, 1993, Bonn Bouvier, 1993, pp. 156-168.
- [10] Pfahl-Traugber, A., *Der NSU und der deutsche Rechtsterrorismus.* In: Backes, U., Gallus, A., Jesse, E. (Eds.), *Extremismus & Demokratie*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012, p. 193
- [11] Schmid, A., *The Definition of Terrorism.* In: A.P. Schmid (Ed.) *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research.*, London & New York: Routledge, 2011, pp. 86-87.
- [12] *ibid.* p. 86
- [13] Mudde, C., *The war of words defining the extreme right party family.* West European Politics, 1996. 19 (2): pp. 225–248.
- [14] Druwe, U., *Rechtsextremismus. Methodologische Bemerkungen zu einem politikwissenschaftlichen Begriff.*, in: Winkler, J. W., Jaschke, H.-G., and Falter, J. W. (Eds.) *Rechtsextremismus. Ergebnisse und Perspektiven der Forschung.* 1996: Opladen:1996, pp. 66–80.
- [15] Decker, O., et al., *Die Mitte in der Krise. Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2010.* Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010, p. 18
- [16] Heitmeyer, W., *Rechtsextremistische Orientierungen bei Jugendlichen: empirische Ergebnisse und Erklärungsmuster einer Untersuchung zur politischen Sozialisation.* Jugendforschung. 1987, Weinheim: Juventa, 1997; Heitmeyer, W., et al., *Die Bielefelder Rechtsextremismus-Studie: erste Langzeituntersuchung zur politischen Sozialisation männlicher Jugendlicher.* Jugendforschung. 1992, Weinheim: Juventa, 1992.
- [17] Wagner, B., *Kriminalistische Grundlagen der Deradikalisierungsarbeit. Ein einleitender Beitrag zur ersten Ausgabe des Journal EXIT-Deutschland. Journal EXIT-Deutschland (JEX).* Zeitschrift für Deradikalisierung und Demokratische Kultur, 2013. 1(2013), pp. 1-16.
- [18] *ibid.* p. 3
- [19] Kaplan, J., *Leaderless resistance.* Terrorism and Political Violence, 1997. 9 (3): pp. 80-95.
- [20] Sprinzak, E., *Right-Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: the Case of Split Delegitimization*, in: Bjørge, T. (Ed.), *Terror from the Extreme Right.* Frank Cass: London, 1995. p. 35
- [21] Sprinzak, E., *Right-Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: the Case of Split Delegitimization*, in: Bjørge, T. (Ed.), *Terror from the Extreme Right.* Frank Cass: London, 1995. pp 17-43.
- [22] Nacos, B.L., *Terrorism and the media: From the Iran hostage crisis to the World Trade Center bombing.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1996; Soo Hoo, K., S. Goodman, and L. Greenberd, *Information Technology and the Terrorist Threat.* Survival, 1997. 39 (3); Weimann, G. and C. Winn, *The theatre of terror: Mass media and international terrorism.* New York: Longman, 1994.

II. Research Note

The Foreign Fighters' Threat: What History Can (not) Tell Us

by Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn

Abstract

Methodological questions around the determination how many of the foreign fighters going to Syria are likely to engage in terrorism upon their return are discussed. Two approaches are used in this Research Note to assess the threat posed by Western foreign fighters in the past. These serve to answer two questions: how many of the former foreign fighters became involved in terrorist activity (approach 1) and how many of jihadist-inspired terrorists were former foreign fighters (approach 2)? The research is based on three studies (Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia) and the data are presented in an Appendix. A typology of foreign fighters is presented in the text itself.

Keywords: *foreign fighters, Syria, Irak, jihad*

Introduction

The New York-based Soufan Group, an international consulting firm, estimated in June 2014 that 12,000 fighters from 81 countries have joined the civil war in Syria of which 2,500 originate from Western countries. [1] European Union Counter-terrorism Coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, in September 2014 spoke of no less than 3,000 Europeans who have gone to Syria or Iraq to fight.[2] However, most foreign fighters come from the Middle East and North Africa.

Table 1: Foreign Fighters in Syria from selected countries (as of September 2014) [3]

Country	Number of foreign fighters
Tunisia	3,000
Saudi Arabia	1,200 – 2,500
Morocco	1,500
Jordan	1,500
Russian Federation	800
France	700
United Kingdom	500
Germany	400
Belgium	300
The Netherlands	120
United States	100

This development has been unprecedented in both its scope and speed. Rallying cries to defend the *ummah* – the Islamic community – have been heard before, with thousands of fighters flocking to Afghanistan in the 1980s, Bosnia and Chechnya in the 1990s and Somalia, Iraq and Yemen in the last decade. Yet Syria has attracted more foreign fighters within a shorter time span.

The ongoing increase in the number of Western foreign fighters going into Syria raises security concerns. Many of these individuals are joining radical jihadist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and lately, the Islamic

State (IS, also known by the acronyms ISIS or ISIL).[4] Authorities are worried that these fighters will returned radicalized, battle-hardened and determined to launch terrorist attacks in Western countries. Given the high number of fighters, if only a small percentage of those who return would become involved in terrorist activity, it would lead to a handful (if not dozens) of serious terrorist plots in the period ahead.

The recent change in tactics taken by IS, including the beheadings of Western journalists, shows that the organisation understands psychological warfare. These beheadings are full of symbolism (e.g. the Guantanamo Bay-like jumpsuits, Westerners publicly defying their own governments) and they reach very large audiences around the world via social media. It appears to be a text-book example of what Brian Jenkins observed in 1974: 'Terrorists want a lot of people watching and not a lot of people dead'.[5] Jenkins revised this statement in 2006, saying that '[m]any of today's terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead'.[6] As such, IS has not shied away from mass atrocities either, as exemplified in the killing of prisoners of war.[7]

Given the current situation in Iraq and Syria, there is increased pressure on Western leaders to take forceful measures against foreign fighters. Some suggest stripping foreign fighters of their nationality, imprisoning them upon return or forbidding them to return at all.[8] Such suggestions, in turn, have invited fierce criticism. Richard Barrett, former MI6's Counter-Terrorism chief, noting the debate about presuming British foreign fighters are guilty of involvement in terrorism unless they can prove otherwise, responded that '(t) his fundamental tenet of British justice should not be changed even in a minor way for this unproven threat – and it is an unproven threat at the moment'.[9] However, an attack on a Jewish museum in Brussels in May 2014 by a former foreign fighter linked to IS and the statement of David Cameron that IS-linked militants had already attempted six attacks in Europe by September 2014 serve as indicators of the gravity of this threat.[10]

The aim of this Research Note (which is based on the author's Master's thesis) is to provide an assessment of the threat posed by foreign fighters in previous conflicts and relate this to the current threat posed by foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria. It must be immediately acknowledged that this is only of limited value when looking at the current situation in Syria and Iraq. Context and dynamics of each conflict are distinct. Nevertheless, when trying to understand current developments, it is helpful to look at similar events in the past. The outcome of this research can certainly not be extrapolated to the current situation in Syria and Iraq but can help to identify certain parameters that are likely to influence outcomes.

Methodology

Two approaches are used in this Research Note to assess the threat posed by Western foreign fighters in the past. These attempt to answer the following two questions: how many of the former foreign fighters became involved in terrorist activity (approach 1) and how many of jihadist-inspired terrorists were former foreign fighters (approach 2)? Three case studies were conducted focusing on foreign fighters in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia. In the results section, problems associated with the quantitative outcomes of such studies will be explained. Regarding the first approach, this Research Note explores the pathways of Western foreign fighters, resulting in a typology based on their post-conflict behaviour.

The second approach looks at the role of former foreign fighters in terrorist plots. It tries to complement the existing works on foreign fighters, especially the works of Thomas Hegghammer, David Malet, Petter Nesser and Aaron Zelin who have studied this issue.[11] Hegghammer's research is most directly related to this research question as he also explored how many foreign fighters became involved in terrorist activity in the West. In this Research Note, a different definition and methodology is used to offer another perspective on

the threat posed by former foreign fighters in the past.

Before proceeding to the results, a number of elements of the research question must be defined: 'to what extent have Western Muslim foreign fighters been directly involved in jihadist-inspired plots and attacks in Europe between 1979 and April 2013?'. The first element, Western foreign fighters, is defined in accordance to the definition used by David Malet as 'non-citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflicts'.^[12] In the qualitative part of this study – the three historical case studies – foreign fighters from Europe, the United States and Canada are included.^[13] In the second approach that investigates the presence of former foreign fighters in terrorist plots, the plots were limited to Europe. This made it possible to use the list of plots and attacks compiled by Petter Nesser.^[14]

Jihadist-inspired terrorism will be defined in accordance with the definition proposed by Edwin Bakker as 'the product of a combination of Islamist ideology and the idea of the jihad (...) in furtherance of the goals of Islam'.^[15] Direct involvement in jihadist-inspired plots and attacks excludes passive support such as the financing or mere facilitation of terrorist attacks. The focus is on those who pulled the trigger or detonated the bombs—in other words, those who posed the highest security risk.

Finally, the time span of 1979 – April 2013 needs further explanation. The year 1979 marks the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, signalling the beginning of one of the largest and best documented mobilisations of foreign fighters in history. It was in many respects the beginning of (Western) Muslim foreign fighting we are still confronted with today. Therefore, this conflict will serve as one of the three historical case studies in part I of this Research Note. The second approach relating to the 'foreign fighter: terrorist ratio' covers the period 1994 – April 2013, relying on the database compiled by Nesser.

The Two Approaches: Choices and Challenges

The second approach attempts to quantify the presence of Western Muslim foreign fighters in terrorist activity in the West. This has been done carefully by Thomas Hegghammer; he concluded that 1 out of 4 terrorists was a (former) foreign fighter. His research is extremely valuable as it is one of the rare attempts to collect empirical data on foreign fighters in the past. This Research Note, however, uses a somewhat different method of measuring this threat as will be outlined below.

One of the main problems with existing research on foreign fighters is the lack of conceptual clarity: what exactly is a foreign fighter? When do we call someone a foreign fighter and when do we call him a terrorist? Foreign fighting is just one form of militant Islamist action, which can take many forms and shapes. However, Muslim foreign fighting is often described by pundits and scholars as directly related to (jihadist-inspired) terrorism. This runs the risk of overlooking some of the complexities and differences between these two concepts. This conflation of foreign fighting and jihadist-inspired terrorism has been criticised by, amongst others, Barak Mendelsohn. In his article 'Foreign Fighters – Recent Trends' he remarks that '[u]sually the discussion of the significance of the foreign fighter problem also suffers from a tendency to bracket all foreign volunteers together'.^[16] He continues by saying that a foreign fighter is someone 'fighting in a local conflict that is not his own country's war' while a foreign *trained* fighter is 'a local who goes to another area, receives training only, and comes back to carry out attacks elsewhere, normally in his own country'.^[17]

The distinction applied by Mendelsohn can be difficult to maintain, especially with regard to the 'AfPak-region', where (former) Al Qaeda training camps such as Khaldan, al-Farooq or Derunta transformed from sustaining the insurgency against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s to real 'terrorist training camps' once Al Qaeda was established. Despite these difficulties, it is useful to put 'foreign activity' cases into one of the

two categories. Individuals who merely go to terrorist training camps but do not partake in civil conflicts are categorised as 'foreign trainees'.

A second choice made in this Research Note that differs from previous research is the inclusion of a definition of the term 'Western'. This Research Note tries to provide an answer to the question to what extent former *Western* foreign fighters are involved in terrorist activity. To answer this, it is important to distinguish Western fighters from non-Western foreign fighters. The scenario of an Algerian or Moroccan foreign fighter who eventually decides to travel to a Western country to be involved in a terrorist attack is different from that of a British, Dutch or French Muslim leaving to fight and then coming back to launch an attack.

The criteria that are used in this Research Note are as follows: a) being a citizen of a Western country by birth, b) having moved to a Western country before the age of fifteen, or c) having lived for at least ten years in a Western country prior to any terrorist activity. It must be immediately acknowledged that one can disagree with these criteria and that the empirical data for making such distinctions are uneven and often poor.[18] However, it is important to distinguish between the threat coming from 'within' and the so-called 'imported' threat. This is a first (and far from perfect) attempt to do so.

Thus, with these two modifications to existing methodologies – a distinction between fighting and training and the criteria qualifying 'Western' – a new database was built. This database consists of the 'Category 1' incidents included in Petter Nesser's database: incidents where 'the existence of hard evidence that a terrorist attack was planned, prepared, or launched; that an attack struck a specific target or that a target or a type of target had been identified by terrorists; and finally, that clearly identifiable jihadis were behind the planning and the attacks'.[19] The result is a new database consisting of 26 plots with 123 individuals involved.[20] This is admittedly a small database but it is hoped that it can serve as a representative sample of all (major) jihadist plots in Europe due to the inclusion of all 'Category 1' incidents.

The Results

As explained in the previous section, the first approach consisted of three historical case studies because there is a significant gap in empirical data, a gap which impedes us from quantifying the overall presence of terrorists in the foreign fighter population. There is no clear picture of how many individuals became foreign fighters in the first place. William Rosenau and Sara Daly observe that probably hundreds, if not thousands of American Muslims fought in conflicts in the 1980s and 1990s but that subject has not been properly studied. [21]

This gap in knowledge is reflected in the estimates given by authors, ranging from hundreds to thousands. One scholar who tried to address this lack of understanding is investigative journalist John M. Berger. In his book *Jihad Joe: Americans who go to war in the name of Islam* he estimated that at least 1,400 Americans participated in some form of jihad over the last thirty years.[22] For the European situation, it is again Hegghammer who provides some useful estimates of the size of the foreign fighter movements. Regarding the European foreign fighters in the 1990s, Hegghammer provides a conservative estimate of around two hundred individuals.[23] This estimate is based upon different reports that have completely different ranges. One report claims that several hundred Europeans fought while another one puts the number at 2,000 fighters. The total estimate of Western foreign fighters in the years 1990 to 2011 was estimated to amount to 945, according to Hegghammer a very conservative estimate. He used this number to calculate the proportion of foreign fighters involved in terrorist activity in the West. The author found 107 such cases, arriving at the conclusion that there is a 'one-in-nine-radicalization rate that would make foreign fighter experience one of the strongest predictors of individual involvement in domestic operations that we know'.

[24]

However, there are some reasons to question this. The most important one has been indicated by the author himself as he adds that this must be seen as a maximum rate.[25] This qualification is often overlooked by media, government agencies and scholars, who make this rate seem more ‘cast in stone’ than the author had probably intended.[26] As this is a conservative estimate, it is based upon continuous rounding down of the subtotals of foreign fighters. The low bar of inclusion for foreign fighters – including foreign trainees and not excluding non-Western foreign fighters – leads to a higher number of foreign fighters, which in turn also raises the radicalization rate. Since it has been estimated that, for instance, between 1,500 and 4,000 Britons have received training in terrorist camps[27], it is difficult to accept the number of 945 as a workable amount of all Europeans who have been trained or who have fought abroad.[28]

Unfortunately, there are not enough open-source based data with more reliable estimates of the total amount of foreign fighters. It can only be speculated that it must be multitudes of the current estimate used. Given this obvious limitation, how then can we get a better understanding of the involvement of foreign fighters in terrorist attacks compared to the overall number of foreign fighters? For this Research Note we looked at three cases, namely Afghanistan (1980s), Bosnia (1990s) and Somalia (2000s). The sample could have admittedly been larger if Chechnya, Iraq or Yemen had also been included. The result is a typology of foreign fighters’ post-conflict behaviour. There is no denying that it simplifies the complicated picture of foreign fighters. Nevertheless it provides a framework to structure analysis and to identify knowledge gaps in current research.

Results from Three Case Studies

In this Research Note, there is not enough space to discuss the complete results of these historical case studies. For that readers can turn to a recent ICCT-paper co-authored with Edwin Bakker.[29] One result discussed here is that foreign fighters, based on their post-conflict behaviour, can be divided in five types:

Table 2: Typology of Returned Foreign Fighters

- (i) **the martyr:** a foreign fighter who joins a conflict and is killed on the battlefield. The martyr will pose no further risk to the country of origin unless the martyrdom itself is used as recruiting tool.
- (ii) **the veteran:** an experienced fighter who continues fighting in other theatres of conflict. The veteran sees jihad as a way of life. While the veteran is a risk to people in conflict zones, he is no risk to the country of origin in the West.
- (iii) **the recruiter:** the recruiter is usually a former foreign fighter who returned home to recruit others to fight, often quite successfully because of his “street credibility”. However, it must be noted that the role of the recruiter has possibly somewhat changed in recent years.[30] Generally speaking, recruiters are not directly involved in terrorist activity but are frequently seen as spiritual guides to future terrorists. They are an indirect risk by constantly ‘feeding’ the local jihadist community.
- (iv) **the reintegrated fighter:** he is the one-time foreign fighter. After the conflict or his role in it has ended, the reintegrated fighter will return and resume his pre-departure life or will at least not be involved in terrorist activity.[31] Some of these fighters might have been driven by a genuine desire to help the oppressed or might have been motivated by the search for adventure, often without profound

knowledge of religion. This fighter might return home disillusioned because the conflict was not what he expected it to be. These fighters are usually no risk to the country of origin. It should be noted the fighter could also integrate in the country he fought in, as happened with some of the Bosnia veterans.

(v) the terrorist: when he comes into contact with terrorist networks in conflict zones, he becomes convinced that it is not only a priority to fight for the oppressed abroad, but also to target the country of origin. This type of foreign fighter – not infrequently converts to Islam–undergo the most fundamental shift in identity and norms and pose a direct threat to the country of origin.

Now that a typology of foreign fighters has been established, the question arises if it is possible to provide estimates of the proportions of these types. A first observation is that our knowledge of the different categories is uneven. Three of these five categories are better understood: the martyr, the terrorist and the recruiter. Cases of martyrdom are often reported by the foreign fighter movements themselves in online martyrdom notices. The terrorist is directly linked to an attack and can therefore be expected to gain high exposure. The recruiter is often under surveillance by intelligence authorities.[32] Much less is known about the veteran and the reintegrated fighter.

Despite the difficulty to give rough estimates about the number of foreign fighters, the anecdotal evidence that formed the basis of the three case studies suggest that the total number of martyrs, terrorists and recruiters comes nowhere close to the total number of foreign fighters. Simply put, thousands of Western Muslim fighters have fought abroad while only a few dozen of them became involved in terrorist activity at home. One tentative finding is that the ‘hard-liners’ are often not the ones who return but rather the ones who continue to fight somewhere else. They exhibit no motivation whatsoever to return because they have taken, as they say, the path of jihad. Another observation that was evident in all three case studies was the major influence of ‘recruiters’: foreign fighters who returned to recruit others. Many of the Afghanistan veterans who relocated to European cities like London were pivotal in subsequent foreign fighter mobilisations.[33]

Finally, it must be said that these categories are not fixed, unchanging nor the only options. Sometimes they might even overlap. However, they are useful for a better understanding of the different types of threats posed. Different types, in turn, ask for different approaches to counter it. Thus, they should be seen as lenses and not as a rigid depiction of an ‘empirical reality’.

Second Approach: Involvement of Foreign Fighters in 26 Terrorist Plots in Europe

As part of the second approach, a new list was compiled, consisting of 26 plots with a total of 123 individuals involved (see Appendix I). Of these 123 individuals in the database, just over half (68 or 55.3%) could be categorized as Western.[34] Employing the definition used by Hegghammer that includes both foreign fighters (those who fight in conflict zone) but also foreign ‘trainees’ (those who train at a terrorist training camp), we find 33 cases of a foreign trip plus two cases of individuals who tried to join a militant group but failed to do so and returned home.

This means that 33 out of 123 (26.8%) of all the individuals can be categorised as Western foreign fighters according to the common definition.[35] In other words, more than a quarter of terrorists involved in the most important terrorist plots in the West can be categorised as Westerners who went abroad either for terrorist training or fighting. However, if we look at the distribution between fighting and training, we see that 11 of them (33.3%) were foreign fighters who joined an insurgency in a conflict zone while 22 (66.7%) were foreign fighters who went to a training camp. These individuals almost exclusively went to training

campus run by Al Qaeda, mainly in Pakistan or Afghanistan, or are confirmed to have met with high-ranking Al Qaeda figures while abroad. Thus, according to the definition of foreign fighting used in this research project, only 11 out of 123 (8.9%) individuals can be categorised as Western foreign fighters. This would rather point to a rate of 1 out of 11.

There are some other ways of looking at this data that could be useful. In 13 of the 26 plots (50%), there was at least one individual who went abroad to either fight or train. In 5 of those 13 cases (38.5%) of individuals who went abroad, the motivation was because at least one individual joined an insurgency while in the other 8 cases (61.5%) it was because at least one individual went to a training camp. Therefore, 5 of the 26 plots (19.2%) had at least one individual involved who can be defined as a Western foreign fighter. 8 of the 26 plots (30.8%) had a link to a Western individual who went to a terrorist training camp.[36]

The Lethal Plots

A final calculation will look at the relation between lethal plots and foreign fighting or training. Of the plots in this database, 10 resulted in injuries or fatalities other than the perpetrators themselves.[37]. Of the 61 individuals involved, seven were Western foreign fighters or trainees (11.5%). This percentage is considerably lower than the 26.8% of Western foreign fighters and trainees in all the plots (33 out of 123).

Contrary to what is often argued, this could suggest that Western foreign fighters (and trainees) do not make more lethal operatives than non-foreign fighters. However, among these plots is an example reminding us of the danger of a link to foreign training: two of the four London Bombers, Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, trained in Pakistan prior to the attacks. While this plot clearly had a foreign link, both of these men cannot be categorized as foreign fighters but should rather be seen as foreign trainees. If we distinguish between foreign fighters and foreign trainees in all these ten plots, we see that all of these seven individuals went to training camps and none of them actually participated in traditional insurgencies. Therefore, not a single case of 'foreign fighting' as defined here has been involved in the most lethal attacks in Europe since 1994.

It must be noted that these findings should not be seen as the result of statistically significant data. This approach calculated the ratio of former foreign fighters involved only in the most serious jihadist-inspired terrorist plots and attacks in Europe since 1994. Further criticism on this database could address its limited scope (only Europe, only 26 plots), its reliance on newspaper articles and secondary literature (which might have led to wrong categorisations), and its working definition of 'Western'. That is why the presented rates should certainly not be interpreted as the 'true' rates, countering findings from previous works. It is, however, an attempt to further build on previous works and critically examine some assumptions that inform our current view on the issue.

Conclusion

The two approaches used in this Research Note show that the extent to which Western foreign fighters have been directly involved in terrorist activity in Europe in the past is rather limited. Again, it cannot be said often enough that this highly depends on the definitions used. In this Research Note, we summarized findings from three past instances of foreign fighting. The main conclusion from these three case studies is that there is no archetype of the foreign fighter. Rather, based on post-conflict behaviour, they can be divided into five categories: the martyr, the veteran, the recruiter, the reintegrated fighter and the terrorist. These are very simple categories and they do not say much about the motivation of individual foreign fighters nor can

they be used to predict who will end up in which category. Further research is necessary to try to understand why and how out of a large group of foreign fighters, some become terrorists while others peacefully reintegrate. A difficult question is to what extent this is caused by internal factors (motivation of the foreign fighter, religiosity, social alienation and so on) and what is caused by external factors (recruitment, radicalization, pressure, and obstructing factors that hinder reintegration). To answer that, however, is beyond the scope of this Research Note.

What this Research Note hopefully did show is that the presence of Western foreign fighters in the most serious jihadist attacks and plots in Europe since 1994 has been limited and is much lower than is often feared. When there is a foreign link, it is, in most cases, a link to a terrorist training camp rather than to actual foreign fighting *pur sang*: defensive jihads in Afghanistan or Bosnia where a civil conflict was already ravaging the country before the influx of foreign fighters (which often made it worse). In European lethal plots, this presence was even lower, which makes the assumption that foreign fighters have proved to be more lethal operatives than those who did not fight questionable. However, to build this database (see Appendix), much information on the included perpetrators was taken from open sources, such as newspaper articles (which are not very reliable). Thus, in order to be able to make any substantial claims on this issue, more in-depth research is needed. Again, a phase of refining the definitions, methodologies (a larger and more reliable database) and sources is needed to make any authoritative claims, especially when talking about proportions of foreign fighters subsequently involved in terrorist activity at home. However, this Research Note has pointed at some avenues for further research and has hopefully raised awareness that careful reconsideration of the assumptions that currently form the basis of our understanding of foreign fighters is necessary.

Finally, a number of observations with regard to the current situation in Syria and Iraq need to be made. As explained in the introduction, extrapolating the research outcomes to the current situation cannot be justified. The sole possibility is to assess the current situation in order to identify issues that require further research. The following observations should thus be carefully approached. The initial phase of the conflict in Syria appeared to share many characteristics with the cases that in this research have been labelled classical examples of foreign fighting: Afghanistan and Bosnia (more than Somalia). As Brian Jenkins explained in a testimony in November 2013, '(s)ome of the jihadists are determined to fight, but others seem to be little more than jihadi tourists who stay out of harm's way while taking photos of themselves and boasting to their friends back home on social media'.^[38] This clearly echoes stories about past conflicts in which foreign fighters were sometimes called 'Gucci soldiers' or only turned up for the fight during their summer breaks, like in Afghanistan.^[39] Until recently, these fighters in Syria were viewed as a greater problem than other former foreign fighters because of the proximity to the West and their volume ^[40], not because there was some kind of assumed 'qualitative' difference between those fighters and their historical counterparts. Jenkins continues by saying that 'Syria's jihadist groups may not be looking for a fight with Western countries, which are also opposed to Assad. This attitude could change if the West or Western-backed rebels move against the jihadists during a post-Assad civil war'.^[41]

Unfortunately, his prediction seems to describe what has happened in the summer of 2014. While Western governments initially supported the rebels and have not backed down from arming them, much has changed. ^[42] This culminated in US-led air strikes (backed by Arab nations) on IS-fighters in September 2014.^[43] This transformed the Islamic rebel groups into direct enemies of Western (and Arab) governments. On September 13, 2014, spokesman for the White House Josh Earnest declared that '[t]he United States is at war with ISIL in the same way that we are at war with al-Qaeda'.^[44]

The rhetoric used by rebel groups has also dramatically changed. Jabhat al-Nusra, which has mainly focused on Syria and rejected mergers with IS in the past, has now allegedly joined forces with the latter and

threatened the West to 'pay the highest price' for its actions.[45] Clearly, the terms of engagement on both sides have changed. This does not bode well for the future.

***About the Author:** Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn works as a Researcher at the Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism – The Hague. This Research Note is based on her Master thesis completed at Utrecht University in January 2014.*

Appendix I - the Database [46]

Legend:

Black: individuals who did not fulfill the criteria of ‘Western’ or could not be categorized as foreign fighters or trainees. **Green:** individuals who fulfilled the criteria of ‘Western’ and could be categorized as foreign fighters or trainees. **Blue:** activity of this Western individual can be categorized as training. **Red:** activity of this Western individual can be categorized as fighting. **Orange:** failed attempt by a Western individual to train/fight.

Plot #	Plot name	Year	Country	Death /injured	Individuals	Country of origin	Western?	Foreign 'trip'	Fighting/training?		
1	GIA Air France hijacking	1994	Algeria /France	3	Djamel Zitouni	Algeria	no	GIA member			
					Abdul Abdullah Yahia	Algeria	no	GIA member			
					x	Algeria	no	GIA member			
					x	Algeria	no	GIA member			
2	GIA group	1995	France		Khaled Keikal	Algeria - moved to France	yes	none			
					St Michel bombing	8/86	Ali Touchent	Algeria	no	GIA agent	
					Arc de triomphe bombing	0/17	Rachid Ramda	Algeria	no	none	
					Lyon railway bomb	plot not executed	Safe Bourada	France	yes	none	
					South Paris bomb	plot not executed	Karim Koussa	Algeria - moved to France	yes	none	
					Jewish school bomb	0/14	Abdelkader Bouhadjar	France	yes	none	
					Maison Blanche bombing	0/12	Nasreddine Slimani	Algeria - moved to France	yes	none	
					Paris train bombing	0/29	Farid Mellouk	Algeria	no	none	
					Lille marketplace	plot not executed	Ali Belkacem	Algeria	no	GIA agent	
					Lille G7 bomb	plot not executed	Boualem Bensaid	Algeria	no	GIA agent	
							Mohammed Drici	France	yes	none	
							Ali Ben Fattoum	Algerian	no	none	
							David Vallat	France	yes	Afghanistan	training
		Joseph Jaime	France	yes	Afghanistan	training					
3	Roubaix gang	1996	France	failed	Lionel Dumont	France	yes	Bosnia	fighting		
					Christophe Caze	France	yes	Bosnia	fighting		
4	Strasbourg Plot	2000	France	plot not executed	Salim Boukhari	Algeria - moved to France	no	Afghanistan	wanted to fight in Chechnya		
					Abu Doha Network operating from Khalden camp Afghanistan	Fouhad Sabour	Algerian	no	Afghanistan	training	
						Aeroubi Beandali	Algerian	no	Afghanistan	training	
						Lamine Marouni	Algerian	no	Afghanistan	training	
5	Beghal network	2001	France	plot not executed	Djamel Beghal	Algeria - moved to France	yes	Afghanistan	training		
						Nizar Trabelsi	Tunisia - moved to Germany	yes	Afghanistan	contact AQ	
						Kamel Daoudi	Algeria - moved to France	yes	Afghanistan	training	
						Jerome Courtaillier	France	yes	Afghanistan	training	
						Johan Bonte	France	yes	none		
						Abdelghani Rabia	Algeria	no	none		
6	Shoe Bomber	2001	UK	executed - 0	Richard Reid	UK	yes	Afghanistan	training		
7	Jewish targets in Germany	2002	Germany	plot not executed	Ashraf al-Dagma	Jordan - moved to Germany	no	none			
						Djamel Moustafa	Jordan - moved to Germany	no	none		
						Ismail Shalabi	Algeria - moved to Germany	no	none		
						Mohammed abu Dhess	Jordan - moved to Germany	no	none		
8	Heathrow plot	2003	UK	plot not executed	Andrew Rowe	UK	yes	Bosnia	fighting		

Plot #	Plot name	Year	Country	Death /injured	Individuals	Country of origin	Western?	Foreign 'trip'	Fighting/training?
9	Chechen Network	2002	France	plot not executed	Chelali Benchellali	Algeria - moved to France	yes	Bosnia	"humanitarian aid"
					Maamar Ouazane	Algeria - moved to France	yes	Chechnya (Pankisi Gorge Georgia)	fighting
					Menad Benchellali	France	yes	Chechnya (Pankisi Gorge Georgia)	fighting
					Merouane Benhamed	Algeria - moved to France	yes	Chechnya (Pankisi Gorge Georgia)	fighting
					Nouredine Merabet	Algeria - moved to France	yes	Chechnya (Pankisi Gorge Georgia)	fighting
					Said Arif	Algeria	yes	Afghanistan Georgia	fighting
10	Shoe Bomber 2	2003	UK	plot not executed	Saajid Badat	UK	yes	Pakistan /Afghanistan	training
11	Ricin plot	2003	UK	plot not executed	Kamel Bourgass	Algeria (illegal immigrant)	no	Afghanistan	training: unconfirmed
					Mohammed Meguerba	Algeria	no	Afghanistan	training: unconfirmed
12	Heathrow (Crevice) plot	2002	UK	plot not executed	Mohammed Khawaja	Canada	yes	Pakistan	training
					Omar Khyam	UK	yes	Kashmir	fighting/training
					Jawad Akbar	Pakistan - moved to Italy/UK	yes	Pakistan	training
					Salahuddin Amin	UK	yes	Pakistan	training
					Waheed Mahmood	UK	yes	Pakistan	training
Anthony Garcia	Algeria - moved to UK	yes	Pakistan	training					
13	Madrid	2004	Spain	191/1800	Jamal Zougam	Moroccan	yes	none	
					Otman el Ghanoui	Moroccan	no	none	
					Jose Emilio Suarez	Spain	yes	none	
					Abdelmajid Bouchar	Moroccan	no	none	
					Basel Ghalyoun	Syrian	no	none	
					Youssef Belhadj	Moroccan	no	none	
					Daoud Ouhnane	Algeria	no	none	
					Hasan el Haski	Moroccan	no	none	
					Fouad el Morabit	Moroccan	yes	none	
					Amghar				
					Mohamed Larbi Ben Sellam	Morocan	no	none	
					Rafa Zouhier	Moroccan	no	none	
					Antonio Toro	Spain	yes	none	
					Sergio Alvarez Sanchez	Spain	yes	none	
					Antonio Ivan Reis	Spain	yes	none	
					Hamid Ahmidan	Moroccan	yes	none	
					Mohamed Bouharrat	Moroccan	no	none	
					Rachid Aglif	Moroccan	yes	none	
					Saed el Harrak	Moroccan	no	none	
					Mahmoud Slimane Aoun	Lebanon	no	none	
Nasreddine Bousbaa	Algerian	no	none						
Jamal Ahmidan	Moroccan	yes	none						
Abdennabi Kounjaa	Moroccan	no	none						
Rachid Oulad	Moroccan	no	none						
Mohammed Oulad	Moroccan	no	none						
Serhane Ben Abdelmajid Fakhel	Tunesian	no	none						
Allekema Lamari	Algerian	yes	GIA?						
Asri Rifaat Anouar	Moroccan	no	none						
14	Hofdstadgroep	2004	Netherlands	1	Mohammed Bouyeri	Netherlands	yes	none	
					Ismail Akhnikh	Netherlands	yes	Pakistan	training?
					Jason Walters	Netherlands	yes	Pakistan	training
					Nouredine el Fahtni	Morocco	no	none	
					Redouan al-Issar	Syria	no	none	
Samir Azzouz	Netherlands	yes	Chechnya (failed)	training/fighting					

Plot #	Plot name	Year	Country	Death /injured	Individuals	Country of origin	Western?	Foreign 'trip'	Fighting/training?
15	Luton cell	2004	UK	plot not executed	Dhiren Barot	India - moved to UK	yes	Pakistan	fighting in Kashmir
					Mohammed Naveed Bhatti	UK	yes	none	
					Junade Feroze	UK	yes	none	
					Zia Ul Haq	UK	yes	none	
					Abdul Aziz Jalil	UK	yes	Pakistan	training
					Omar Rehman	UK	yes	none	
					Qaisar Shaffi	UK	yes	none	
Nadeem Tarmohamed	UK	yes	none						
16	Spanish National Court Pot Martyrs for Morocco	2004	Spain	plot not executed	Abdelkrim Besmail	Algeria - moved to Spain	no	(GIA)	
					Bachir Belhakem	Algeria - moved to Spain	no	none	
					Hoari Jera	Lebanon	no	none	
					Kamara Birahima Diadie	Mauritania	no	none	
					Mohammed Achraf	UAE	no	none	
					Mohamed Amine Akli	Algeria	no	none	
					Mohamed Boukiri	Algeria	no	none	
					Said Afif	Algeria	no	none	
					Mustafa Farjani	Morocco	no	none	
17	London	2005	UK	52/770	Mohammed Siddique Khan	UK	yes	Pakistan	training
					Shehzad Tanweer	UK	yes	Pakistan	training
					Germaine Lindsay	Jamaica - moved to UK	yes	none	
					Hasib Hussain	UK	yes	none	
18	London copycat	2005	UK	0-failed	Mukhtar Said-Ibrahim	Eritrea - moved to UK	yes	none	
					Yassin Hassan Omar	Somalia - moved to UK	yes	none	
					Ramzi Mohamed	Somalia	no	none	
					Manfo Kwaku Asiedu	UK/Ghana	no	none	
					Hussein Osman	Ethopian - moved to UK	no	none	
19	German train plot	2006	Germany	0-failed	Jihad Hamad	Lebanon	no	none	
					Youssef Mohamad El Hajdib	Lebanon	no	none	
20	Glasgow Airport	2007	UK	0-failed perpetrator died	Bilal Abdullah	UK	yes	none	
					Kafeel Ahmed	India	no	none	
21	Germany bomb plot	2007	Germany	plot not executed	Fritz Gelowicz	Germany	yes	Uzbekistan	training
					Daniel Schneider	Germany	yes	Uzbekistan	training
					Adem Yilmaz	Turkey - moved to Germany	yes	Uzbekistan	training
22	Attempted murder MP UK	2010	UK	0/1	Roshonara Choudhry	UK	yes	none	
23	Stockholm suicide bomber	2010	Sweden	0/2	Taimour Abdulwaha al-Abdaly	Iraq - moved to Sweden	yes	unconfirmed	
				perpetrator died					
24	US soldiers Frankfurt airport	2011	Germany	2	Arid Uka	Germany	yes	none	
25	Toulouse	2012	France	7/5	Mohammed Merah	France	yes	Pakistan /Afghanistan	training
26	Woolwich	2013	UK	1	Michael Adebolajo	UK	yes	Somalia (failed)	fighting
					Michael Adebowale	UK	yes	none	

Notes

- [1] Richard Barrett, "Foreign Fighters in Syria", *The Soufan Group*, 6 June 2014, <http://soufangroup.com/foreign-fighters-in-syria/>.
- [2] "Islamic State Crisis: '3,000 European jihadists join the fight'", *BBC News*, September 26, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29372494>.
- [3] Numbers based on an interview with Peter Neumann, expert at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence; in Edith M. Lederer. "Expert: over 12,000 foreign fighters in Syria", September 8, 2014, <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/expert-over-12000-foreign-fighters-syria>. Numbers on the Netherlands and the Russian Federation are from June 2014, in: Richard Barrett, "Foreign Fighters in Syria", *The Soufan Group* 6, June 2014, <http://soufangroup.com/foreign-fighters-in-syria/>.
- [4] Evan Kohlmann and Laith Alkhouri, "Profiles of Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq", *CTC Sentinel*, September 29, 2014, <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/profiles-of-foreign-fighters-in-syria-and-iraq>.
- [5] Brian Michael Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict," in: David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (Eds.), *International Terrorism and World Security*, London: Croom Helm, 1975, p.15.
- [6] Brian Jenkins, *The New Age of Terrorism*, RAND Report, 2006, p.119, http://www.prgrs.edu/content/dam/rand/pubs/reprints/2006/RAND_RP1215.pdf.
- [7] "ISIS militants post grisly images of mass killing in Iraq", *CBS News*, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/iraq-conflict-isis-militants-post-grisly-images-of-mass-killing/> June 14, 2014, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/iraq-conflict-isis-militants-post-grisly-images-of-mass-killing>.
- [8] See, for instance, the recently launched plan of British PM David Cameron, Patrick Wintour, "David Cameron shelves move to ban British jihadis returning to UK", *The Guardian*, September 1, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/sep/01/anti-terror-policy-legal-political-opposition-jihadis-uk>.
- [9] Josh Halliday and Andrew Sparrow, "Former MI6 counterterrorism-chief warns against rush to overhaul UK laws", *The Guardian*, August 25, 2014; <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/aug/25/counter-terrorism-laws-warning-mi6-chief>.
- [10] Macer Hall, "'Barbaric' Islamic State terrorists have already attempted SIX attacks in Europe", *Express*, September 9, 2014, <http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/508458/Islamic-State-terrorists-have-already-attempted-SIX-attacks-in-Europe>.
- [11] Thomas Hegghammer. 'Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists' Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 107, No. 1 (February 2013), pp.1-15; Thomas Hegghammer. 'The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad', *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Winter 2010/2011), pp.53-94; David Malet. *Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013; Petter Nesser. 'Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994-2007: Planned, Prepared, and Executed Terrorist Attacks', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 31, No. 10 (2008), pp. 924-946; Petter Nesser. 'How did Europe's Global Jihadis Obtain Training for their Militant Causes?', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 2008), pp.234-256; Aaron Y Zelin. *ICSR Insight: Up to 11,000 Foreign Fighters in Syria; Steep Rise Among Western Europeans*, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, December 17, 2013, <http://icsr.info/2013/12/icsr-insight-11000-foreign-fighters-syria-steep-rise-among-western-europeans>.
- [12] D. Malet, *Foreign Fighters*, p. 9.
- [13] Only focusing on Europe would have yielded too few results, given the fact that most foreign fighters in, for instance Afghanistan, came from the United States.
- [14] Petter Nesser. 'Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994-2007: Planned, Prepared, and Executed Terrorist Attacks', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 31, No. 10 (2008), pp. 924-946.
- [15] Edwin Bakker. *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: their characteristics and the circumstances in which they joined the jihad: an exploratory study*, The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2006, p.2.
- [16] Barak Mendelsohn. 'Foreign Fighters – Recent Trends', *Orbis*, vol. 55, no.2 (2011), pp.189-202, p.193.
- [17] B. Mendelsohn. 'Foreign Fighters – Recent Trends', op. cit., p.193. The distinction can also be found in the earlier mentioned work of Marc Sageman: *Understanding Terror Networks* (2004), who excludes 'Muslims fighting for the "liberation" of Kashmir or Chechnya, for these seem to be straightforward jihads, like the former Afghan or Bosnian jihads as defined by Azzam' from his 'global Salafi mujahedin' population. Sageman is right to point at a difference between terrorists and 'traditional' mujahideen. There is a clear difference in the target selection, the legitimacy and the modus operandi of both groups.

[18] Terms like 'Western', 'Westernised' and 'Western values' should normally be applied with due caution. Some even argue that there is no such thing as specific 'Western' as in 'Western values'. However, debates about the assimilation and integration of immigrants are not part of this research. The aim here is to understand the risk coming from Western foreign fighters, where 'Western' serves to point to 'those coming from within' rather than a threat coming from those who adhere to so-called 'Western values'. The criteria are therefore aimed at delineating what can be called 'within' and should not be regarded as pretending to say anything about the relative merit of cultural values, assimilation and other issues relating to (im)migrants or cultures.

[19] P. Nesser: 'Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994-2007', p.926. – Nesser's list of incidents was combined with information on the plotters as reported in the work of Edwin Bakker and Frazer Egerton; see Edwin Bakker, *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: their characteristics and the circumstances in which they joined the jihad: an exploratory study*, The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2006, and Frazer Egerton, *Jihad in the West: The Rise of Militant Salafism*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

[20] Although almost all the 'Category 1' plots of Nesser were included, I chose to exclude two plots and include one extra. The first excluded plot is the arrest of two French-Algerians by the French police in January 2004 that were claimed to plan to use ricin. These individuals are reported to be relatives of Menad Benchelali of the Chechen Network but their identities have not been revealed. Another excluded plot is the arrest of five persons in Rovigo, Italy, because the police found bombs during a regular raid looking for illegal immigrants. Maps of NATO bases and central London were found, but no real plot was discovered. One plot that I chose to include was the arrest of Kamel Bourgass in the United Kingdom, who possessed poison recipes and bomb-making instructions. During a police raid, Bourgass killed one police officer. Although Nesser has some doubts about the plot, calling it a Category 2 plot while saying it is difficult to assess the 'realities of this particular case', the plot is included in the databases of both Bakker and Egerton. Because Bourgass was responsible for the killing of a police officer, I chose to include the plot, although the fatality is not counted.

[21] William Rosenau and Sara Daly, 'American Journeys to Jihad: U.S. Extremists and Foreign Conflicts during the 1980s and 1990s', *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 3, No.8 (2010), pp.17-20, p.17.

[22] J.M. Berger, *Jihad Joe: Americans who go to war in the name of Islam*, Dulles: Potomac Book, Inc., 2011, pp.xi. – Berger conducted about one hundred interviews with a variety of actors: Muslims radicals, former jihadists and Al-Qaeda members, current and former intelligence, law enforcement, military and diplomatic officials, academics and relatives and associates of former jihadists.

[23] Th. Hegghammer, 'Should I Stay or Should I Go?', p.5.

[24] Idem, p.10.

[25] See, for instance, Hanna Nomm, *Foreign Fighters in Syria: A Danger to the West?*, The Henry Jackson Society, November 26, 2013, <http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2013/11/26/foreign-fighters-in-syria-a-danger-to-the-west/>.

[26] The author of this Research Note also first failed to stress that this was a maximum rate. Other examples are the United Kingdom Counter – Terrorism Home Affairs Committee, which stated that Hegghammer found "that on average, one in nine foreign fighters returned home to take part in a domestic terror plot". – The United Kingdom – Parliament, Counter-Terrorism Home Affairs Committee, *Foreign Fighters*, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmhaff/231/23105.htm>, May 9, 2014.

[27] This might, in turn, be a case of overestimating the numbers of UK residents who trained in terrorist camps.

[28] Ben Leapman, '4,000 in UK trained at terror camps', *The Telegraph*, July 15, 2007, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1557505/4000-in-UK-trained-at-terror-camps.html>.

[29] Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Bakker, *Returning Western Fighters: The case of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia*, ICCT Background Note, June 2014, <http://www.icct.nl/publications/icct-papers/returning-western-foreign-fighters-the-case-of-afghanistan-bosnia-and-somalia>.

[30] Prior to 9/11, these individuals enjoyed relative freedom but after these attacks their activities are more closely monitored and constrained.

[31] This is a group where psychological problems such as PTSD could occur. While these fighters form no security risk in the sense of involvement in terrorist plots and attacks, 'reintegrated' fighters could certainly pose a risk to themselves and their direct surroundings.

[32] Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD), *Recruitment for the jihad in the Netherlands: from incident to trend*, The Hague: AIVD, 2002.

[33] Mohammed Hafez, 'Jihad after Iraq: lessons from the Arab Afghans', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 32, No.2 (2009), pp. 73-94.

[34] Using the criteria as mentioned in the previous section and the definition of Western countries as the 28 EU member states, Western European states that are not member of the EU, the United States, Canada and Australia.

[35] Note that the 33 only related to Western cases.

[36] In the original research, two corrections were applied. Two plots disproportionately influenced the results: The Madrid Bombings and the Chechen Network. The Madrid Bombings accounted for almost a quarter of all individuals in the database (27 out of 133) of which none had fought or trained abroad. The Chechen Network, in turn, accounted for more than half of the entire number of Western foreign fighters in the database (6 out of 11). Thus, calculating without these two plots results in a number of 27 out of 90 (30%) having either trained or fought abroad, of which 22 went to training camps and only 5 (5.6%) can be categorised as Western foreign fighters. Applying these two exceptions results in a ratio of 1 out of 17.

[37] It should be noted that 10 out of 26 is not a reflection of the overall rate of jihadist plots that are successfully executed and result in casualties. Because the database only contained plots until 2007, I included five post-2007 plots that resulted in deaths or injuries. On the other hand, this does mean that the database contains at least the most dangerous/lethal plots that can be seen as the ones with the highest security risk. A second remark that should be made is that one of the perpetrators of plot 11 – Kamel Bourgass – killed a police officer when his house was being raided. That is, however, not counted as a fatal plot because this was no terrorist attack (or even premeditated murder) but lethal violence upon being arrested.

[38] Brian Michael Jenkins, *The Role of Terrorism and Terror in Syria's*

Civil War, RAND Office of External Affairs, November 2013, <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20131120/101513/HHRG-113-FA18-Wstate-JenkinsB-20131120.pdf>.

[39] See, for instance, Evan Kohlmann. *Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network*, Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2004, p.8 and Jason Burke. *Al-Qaeda*, London: Penguin Books, 2007 [revised edition], p.76.

[40] Brian Michael Jenkins, *The Role of Terrorism and Terror in Syria's*

Civil War, RAND Office of External Affairs, November 2013, <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20131120/101513/HHRG-113-FA18-Wstate-JenkinsB-20131120.pdf>.

[41] Idem.

[42] Ernesto Londoño and Greg Miller, "CIA begins weapons delivery to Syrian rebels", *Washington Post*, September 11, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-begins-weapons-delivery-to-syrian-rebels/2013/09/11/9fcf2ed8-1b0c-11e3-a628-7e6dde8f889d_story.html.

[43] Martin Pengelly, "Arab Nations join Syria strikes as Al Nusra front threatens retaliation", *The Guardian*, September 27, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/27/obama-us-isis-syria-iraq-coalition-kurds-jets-strike>.

[44] "US: We are at war with Islamic State group", *Al Jazeera*, September 13, 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/09/us-are-at-war-with-islamic-state-group-201491323051540963.html>.

[45] John Beck, "Syrian Al-Qaeda Leader Threatens Attacks on West", *Vice News*, September 29, 2014,

<https://news.vice.com/article/syrian-al-qaeda-leader-threatens-attacks-on-west>.

[46] Readers can request a list of sources by sending an e-mail to: < jeaninederoyvz@gmail.com >.

III. Book Reviews

Fernando Reinares: ¡Matadlos!/ Quién estuvo detrás del 11-M y por qué se atentó en España [“Kill Them! Who was Behind 3/11 and Why Spain was Targeted.”]

Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg/Círculo de Lectores, 2014. 320 pp. US \$ 15.14 (Price at Amazon.com).

Reviewed by Ely Karmon

Fernando Reinares, the prominent terrorism researcher at the Madrid Elcano Royal Institute, recently published the book, in Spanish, “Kill Them! Who was Behind 3/11 and Why Spain was Targeted”. It elucidates the circumstances of the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings, the most lethal jihadist attack in Europe in terms of fatalities and injuries.

Against the background of the growing threat from the current participation of thousands of Western and Muslim foreign fighters on behalf of al Qaeda-type insurgents in the civil wars in Syria and Iraq, as well as their involvement in the insurgencies in Libya, Somalia, Nigeria or the Sahel, Reinares’ book is an important tool to understand and prepare for this immediate threat of homegrown Islamist extremism in the West and its ties to such foreign conflicts. The author describes in detail the rise of jihadist networks in Spain, in the larger context of jihadist terrorism in Western Europe, Afghanistan and Pakistan. He provides a clear and concise historical background about the major organizations involved in the jihadist activity in Spain and Western Europe like al-Qaeda, the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) or the Islamic Cultural Institute (ICI) in Milan.

His dissection of the jihadist network responsible for the March 11 attacks follows the pattern of a criminal police investigation relating individuals to professional and terrorist contacts, movements across Europe, Pakistan, Afghanistan and beyond, based on a huge amount of juridical and police documents, personal interviews, journalistic and academic sources. This information is extremely important for understanding the complexity of the terrorist network and its mechanism, although it is at times difficult to digest for a more hasty reader.

The book raises several important operational issues connected to the activities of al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups: the importance of the reconquest of al-Andalus (Spanish territory under Muslim rule during the Middle Ages) in the strategy of northern African jihadist groups; the role of Tablighi Jamaat movement in the recruitment of young Muslims to terrorist organizations; the radicalization of Muslim criminals in prisons and their contacts with the local criminal scene.

Ten years after the tragic events of March 2004, Reinares convincingly demonstrates that the al-Qaeda Central command and not a loose ad-hoc local Islamist group was behind the Madrid attack, thereby challenging the “leaderless jihad” paradigm. According to the author, the decision to attack Spain was made not in direct response to the Iraq War, but instead was taken already in December 2001 by the Moroccan Amer Azizi, an important member of al-Qaeda’s Spanish Abu Dahdah cell which was dismantled after the 9/11 attacks. The Madrid bombing network began its formation in March 2002, more than one year before the start of the Iraq war. Azizi, who took refuge in Pakistan and became a senior figure in al-Qaeda’s military command, had a central role in the building of the Spanish jihadist network and the planning of the attack.

However, to conclude that the decision to attack Spain was mainly the result of Azizi’s desire for vengeance

after the arrests and trials of Abu Dahdah's cell members while the operation used the Western intervention in Iraq as a favorable pretext is a bit farfetched. It underestimates al-Qaeda's strategic thinking at the time that it had to challenge UK, Spain and Italy's roles in supporting the U.S.-led fighting in Iraq, which viewed Spain as the weakest link in the Western military coalition.

Reinares stresses the difficulties and constraints of law enforcement approaches in challenging the threat of the jihadist terrorism in the juridical framework of a democratic state. Proof for this is the survival of part of the Abu Dahdah's network after the arrest of those notoriously involved in the 9/11 plot in the U.S. and their participation in the 3/11 plot in Madrid. The recent terrorist attack at the Jewish Museum in Brussels, Belgium, by the French jihadist Mehdi Nemmouche, an ISIS terrorist who was one of the captors and torturers of Western hostages in Syria and reportedly planned a major terror attack in Paris, is proof of the need to improve the juridical framework and the operational tools to challenge the threat so well analyzed by Professor Reinares.

About the Reviewer: Dr. Ely Karmon is a Senior Research Scholar at The International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Policy and Strategy at The Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) in Herzliya, Israel.

Morten Storm with Paul Cruickshank & Tim Lister, *Agent Storm: My Life Inside Al Qaeda and the CIA*

New York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press 2014, 404 pages, illustrated, US\$ 26.00 [Hardcover]; ISBN-13: 978-0802123145.

Reviewed by Joshua Sinai

In the 1949 book “The God That Failed: A Confession,”[1] prominent ex-communist intellectuals recounted their disillusionment with and abandonment of communism. What also made that book noteworthy was its running concept of “Kronstadt” as the defining moment in which these ex-communists decided not merely to leave the Communist Party, but to actively oppose it as newly fledged anti-communists.

“Agent Storm: My Life Inside Al Qaeda and the CIA” is Morten Storm’s authoritative account of how he was radicalized as a young Danish convert to Islam into ultimately becoming a trusted member of al Qaeda’s inner circles in Yemen and elsewhere and how his subsequent disillusionment with its genocidal ideology and violent tactics led to his own “Kronstadt” moment, in which he decided to become a double agent on behalf of the Danish, British and American intelligence services against al Qaeda, its affiliates, and his brethren in Europe.

Although there are other examples of European Muslim extremists who lost faith with jihadi Islam and al Qaeda and its affiliates and became prominent critics of radical Islam, Mr. Storm’s is the most recent case. Moreover, while the others were at the margins of al Qaeda’s operations, Mr. Storm represents the most high-level Western intelligence penetration of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)—considered al Qaeda’s most dangerous affiliate—as well as other al Qaeda affiliates, such as the Somali al Shabaab. His assistance to American intelligence, according to his account, helped lead to the targeted killing in late September 2011 of Anwar al-Awlaki, one of al Qaeda’s top spiritual and operational leaders in Yemen. Al-Awlaki had inspired many Western jihadi terrorists, such as Major Nidal Hassan (the November 2009 Fort Hood murderer), Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (the unsuccessful 2009 Christmas Day airliner underwear bomber, who had been trained in Yemen), and the Tsarnaev brothers (who conducted the Boston Marathon bombings in mid-April 2013).

The book is filled with dramatic accounts of Mr. Storm’s involvement in numerous Western intelligence penetrations of al Qaeda and its affiliates, whether in Yemen or Somalia, as well as with its extremist adherents in Europe, especially in Denmark, Sweden, and Britain. Written by Mr. Storm and his two collaborators, Paul Cruickshank, a top CNN investigative journalist on al Qaeda, and Tim Lister, who has worked for CNN and the BBC in the Middle East, the book reads like a first-rate spy thriller, but it is in fact a stunning and true inside account of the workings, personalities and mindsets of the leaders and operatives of al Qaeda, its worldwide operations, and extremist Islamist constituencies.

In one of the book’s most dramatic segments, in September 2009 Mr. Storm was asked by al-Awlaki, his long-time “mentor” (whom he had befriended while living in Yemen in 2006)—who had a history of procuring prostitutes while earlier living in America and at the time in Yemen was married to two wives, one older and the second much younger—to find him a wife in the West.” (pp. 195-196) Mr. Storm, who had divorced his first Muslim wife and was living in England with his second, found in a radical Muslim Facebook forum a suitable potential bride for al-Awlaki: a beautiful, blonde 32-year old Muslim convert from Croatia named Aminah, who was willing to travel to Yemen to meet and marry the already married al-Awlaki, whom she had greatly idolized. At this point, no one in Mr. Storm’s family knew about his double-agent status.

What neither Aminah (real name Irena Horak) nor al-Awlaki knew was that this “matchmaking” was being orchestrated and financed by the British and American intelligence services who had planted tracking devices in her suitcase and an electronic Arabic pocket dictionary that they hoped would lead them to al-Awlaki’s whereabouts in Yemen’s lawless tribal areas. The details of how Mr. Storm arranged for Aminah’s travel to meet al-Awlaki, how American intelligence eventually located al-Awlaki’s whereabouts (this time via a different courier in a later meeting arranged by Mr. Storm) to kill him, and her ultimate fate in Yemen (she was unaware of Mr. Storm’s involvement in setting the trap for al-Awlaki) are riveting. These accounts are backed up by extensive evidence in the form of travel and financial documents and videos Mr. Storm provided to his co-authors, including the actual video of al-Awlaki proposing marriage to his prospective Croatian bride.

Aside from bringing readers close to the workings of high-stake intelligence operations, Mr. Storm’s book is important for other reasons. It is a first-rate account of how a troubled young Danish Christian, with a history of petty criminality, incarceration and drug use was drawn to convert to Islam and was radicalized into its most extremist jihadi circles in Denmark and Britain. It illustrates how recruiters in such jihadi circles in Europe identify and send their promising convert adherents to “study” at jihadist religious schools such as the extremist Dammaj Institute in Yemen, where, upon their return to their countries of origin, they are expected to further radicalize others into pro-al Qaeda violent extremism and martyrdom terrorist operations.

In what is the book’s most telling and hopeful segment, Mr. Storm discusses his “Kronstadt” moment in early 2007, when he rejected radical Islam’s “justifications made for the murder and maiming of civilians,” (p. 118) and the steps he took to contact PET, the Danish intelligence service, to offer his services to counter and betray his former comrades in European jihadi circles and al Qaeda around the world because, as he writes, “I knew the murderous worldview of al Qaeda, and I wanted to play a part in stopping them.” (p. 122)

While today Mr. Storm is relieved to have given up jihadism (as well as Islam) and is proud of his previous work in support of Western intelligence in fighting al Qaeda and its sympathizers, these undercover activities took a toll on him and his family. He currently resides in undisclosed whereabouts in England under the protection of British authorities (or others in the private sector operating on their behalf) because of constant death threats against him by his former jihadi comrades.

The drama of “Agent Storm” will no doubt attract Hollywood’s attention (it’s already an hour-long CNN documentary), but bright lights aside, the book is an indispensable guide to how the West can counter the appeal of violent jihadism and its al Qaeda terrorist groupings. Today, when so many young Western Muslims are flocking to Syria and Iraq to join the ranks of genocidal insurgents such as the al Nusra Front and ISIS/ Islamic State, this book’s insights could not be more important.

[This is a revised version of the author’s review that was published in *The Washington Times* on September 16, 2014. Reprinted by permission].

About the Reviewer: Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of ‘*Perspectives on Terrorism*’. He can be reached at: Joshua.sinai@comcast.net.

Note

[1] See Richard Crossman (Ed.), *The God That Failed: A Confession*, New York, NY: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1949.

“Counterterrorism Bookshelf”:**17 Books on Terrorism & Counter-terrorism Related Subjects****by Joshua Sinai**

Continuing the series of columns that focus on books published by major publishers on terrorism and counterterrorism-related subjects, this column focuses on such books published by Springer and its associated imprints. Springer, noted for its extensive scientific and engineering publications, is also a major publisher of books that draw on computational social science and other social science-related approaches to analyzing terrorism and counterterrorism in a systematic manner. Please note that most of these books were recently published, with some of them published over the past several years but deserving renewed interest.

Note: *Future columns will review books by publishers such as Stanford University Press, the University of Chicago Press, as well as other noted publishers.*

Babak Akhgar and Simeon Yates, (Eds.), *Intelligence Management: Knowledge Driven Frameworks for Combating Terrorism and Organized Crime*. New York, NY: Springer, 2011. 232 pp.; US\$ 129.00 [Hardcover], ISBN 978-1-4471-2139-8.

The contributors to this edited volume discuss the incorporation and management of new information and communication technologies (ICT) in countering terrorism and organized crime by law enforcement agencies. The book is divided into three sections. The first section's chapters discuss the Odyssey Project, an effort to develop a prototype Pan-European ballistics and crime information intelligence network for law enforcement agencies. The second section's chapters examine new technologies, such as data management techniques, that have applications in criminal investigations, 3D recognition techniques for forensics and counterterrorism applications, simulation technologies for crisis management, and simulation games for countering violent extremism. The chapters in the final section focus on information sharing in countering human trafficking, applying profiling and trend analysis in countering cybercrime, and training methodologies to train law enforcement agencies on these new technologies.

Shlomo Argamon and Newton Howard, (Eds.) *Computational Methods for Counterterrorism*. New York, NY: Springer, 2009. 306 pp., US\$ 139.00 [Hardcover], ISBN-13: 978-3642011405

The contributors to this edited volume apply computational social science methodologies and technologies, such as data mining and social network analysis visualization tools, to examine new trends in how terrorist groups organize (e.g. hierarchically or non-hierarchically), their motivations, areas of operations, and warfare patterns. They also cover topics such as “anticipating terrorist safe havens from instability induced conflict, and the use of gaming and simulation techniques to demonstrate how ethno-political conflicts play out.

Robert P. Barnidge, Jr., *Non-State Actors and Terrorism: Applying the Law of State Responsibility and the Due Diligence Principle*. The Hague, The Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008. 250 pp., US\$ 69.96 [Hardcover], ISBN-13: 978-9067042598.

An application of the mechanisms of the law of state responsibility and the due diligence principle to enable state counterterrorism agencies to legally fight non-state actors, such as terrorist groups. To achieve this objective, the author begins by discussing how terrorism can be defined under international law, the duty of states to protect their citizens against terrorist-type crimes, and whether the requirements of national security

can override human rights in countering terrorism. The author concludes that “In rendering judgment on these matters, there are grey areas and fine lines, negotiations to be had and horse-trading to be done.” (p. 216).

M. Cherif Bassiouni and Amna Guellali, (Eds.), *Jihad and its Challenges to International and Domestic Law*. The Hague, The Netherlands: Hague Academic Press/ T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010. 300 pp., US\$ 79.95 [Hardcover], ISBN-13: 978-9067043120.

The contributors to this edited volume examine the challenges to international and domestic law presented by the concept of Jihadism, which represents for its adherents a religiously sanctioned war to “propagate or defend” the Muslim faith against their apostate adversaries. Divided into three parts, the book’s chapters discuss the meaning of Jihad in the Islamic tradition, Islamic and Western interpretations of international humanitarian law regarding the protection of civilians, Western European legal responses to Islamic militancy, and whether Western counterterrorism policies are effective at addressing the challenges posed by Jihadist terrorist violence.

Alex Conte, *Human Rights in the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism – Commonwealth Approaches: The United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand*. New York, NY: Springer, 2010. 896 pp., US\$ 329.00 [Hardcover], ISBN-13: 978-3642116070.

A comparative and highly detailed examination of the role of human rights in legislating the counterterrorism campaigns by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. To examine these issues, the book begins with a discussion of the nature of terrorism and how it is defined, particularly from a human rights-based approach, and how international conventions define terrorism. The author then proceeds to discuss the legal components in the counter-terrorism campaigns conducted by these Commonwealth countries and how they relate to international law and human rights compliance, e.g. in terms of criminalizing acts of terrorism, following the rules of criminal procedure in investigating acts of terrorism, arrests and detentions, designating individuals and groups as terrorist entities, measures to control the trans-border movement of terrorists, and regulating the interplay between free speech, media reporting, and alleged incitement to terrorism. All these issues are summed up in the volume’s concluding chapter.

Martin Charles Golumbic, *Fighting Terror Online: The Convergence of Security, Technology, and the Law*. New York, NY: Springer, 2008. 178 pp., US\$ 109.00 [Hardcover], ISBN-13: 978-1441925237.

An examination of the interplay between the requirement for security, the employment of technology, and the need to balance security and civil rights in monitoring and countering the online manifestation of terrorism. Following a general discussion about the need to balance security and civil rights and the legal predicaments faced by Western governments in monitoring extremist activities online, the author discusses how these issues play out in the United States, Britain, Canada and Australia. A separate chapter discusses Israel's legal framework in countering terrorism online. A final chapter discusses technology issues involved in monitoring extremist activities online, including uncovering encryption efforts by terrorist groups. The author concludes that new legal regulations, particularly "in relation to wiretapping and monitoring," are required to counter extremist activities on the Internet because they differ from tracking analog communications. (p. 155)

M.R. Haberfeld and Agostino von Hassel, (Eds.), *A New Understanding of Terrorism: Case Studies, Trajectories and Lessons Learned*. New York, NY: Springer, 2009. 366 pp., US\$ 219.00 [Hardcover], US\$ 59.99 [Paperback], ISBN-13: 978-1441983749.

The contributors to this highly comprehensive volume examine new trends in the spectrum of terrorist warfare, such as urban terrorism, lone wolf terrorism, biological terrorism, environmental terrorism, and terrorists' targeting of the aviation, maritime, and rail transport sectors. Also covered are case studies of major terrorist attacks, such as the 1983 Beirut bombings, the 1995 Tokyo subway attack, the June 1996 attacks against the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, 9/11, the July 2005 London transport bombings, and the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India. The concluding chapter discusses the implications of these new terrorist warfare trends on the need for a new understanding of counter-terrorism responses against such threats.

M.R. Haberfeld, Joseph F. King, and Charles Andrew Lieberman, *Terrorism Within Comparative International Context: The Counter-Terrorism Response and Preparedness*. New York, NY: Springer, 2009. 176 pp., US\$ 169.00 [Hardcover], ISBN-13: 978-0387888606.

This textbook is a comprehensive and systematic overview of the law enforcement components of counterterrorism through the examination of how such campaigns have been conducted by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Germany, and the United States. The concluding chapters discuss best practices drawn from these countries' counterterrorism campaigns, as well as "lessons to be learned" for future campaigns, particularly in terms of "the need to invest more time and resources in proper intelligence gathering" and the creation of what the authors term "the Intelligence File," which is the file that is employed to investigate terrorist suspects and incidents that needs to be effectively shared among all those involved in such investigations while safeguarding a suspect's civil liberties.

Wilhelm Heitmeyer and John Hagan, (Eds.), *International Handbook of Violence Research [Two Volumes]*. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003. 1287 pages, US\$ 719.00 [Hardcover]; US\$ 199.00 [Paperback], ISBN-13: 978-1402039805

This is a highly comprehensive handbook on the spectrum of violence, ranging from youth violence and

guns, organized crime and violence, to political violence such as civil wars, pogroms, and terrorism. Written by prominent experts, the handbook's chapters cover topics such as the different types of groups that engage in violence, the processes of learning and socialization in violent individuals, the evolutionary and social biological approaches to studying the perpetrators of violence, the nature of the different types of victims of violence by individuals and groups, the different types of ideologies and justifications that are used to legitimize the resort to violence, the processes of escalation and de-escalation in the intensification of violence, and the theoretical and methodological issues involved in researching violence.

Rianne Letschert, Ines Staiger, and Antony Pemberton, (Eds.), *Assisting Victims of Terrorism: Towards a European Standard of Justice*. New York, NY: Springer, 2010. 348 pp., US \$ 219.00 [Hardcover], ISBN-13: 978-9048130245.

The contributors to this edited volume examine the issues involved in applying international legal instruments to assist victims of terrorist attacks. Following a discussion of the nature of contemporary terrorism, how terrorism is defined (including the difficulties in formulating a legal definition of terrorism), and defining the primary and secondary victims of terrorism, the discussion shifts to defining "restorative justice," which is intended to provide restitution to its victims. The remaining chapters discuss issues such as the needs of the victims of terrorism, including the provision of psycho-social assistance, providing such victims with access to the justice system, and compensation and reparation for victims of terrorism, which is different from what is provided to victims of "ordinary" crimes.

Cynthia Lum and Leslie W. Kennedy, (Eds.) *Evidence-Based Counterterrorism Policy*. New York, NY: Springer, 2012. 388 pp., US\$ 199.00 [Hardcover], ISBN-13: 978-1493901111

A conceptually innovative approach to the study of terrorism and counterterrorism through the application of evidence-based methodologies, drawn from the discipline of criminology. The volume's sections discuss topics such as data sources for evaluating terrorist warfare (such as developing terrorism event databases, employing trajectory analysis to examine the evolution of terrorism over time, using spatial analysis techniques to analyze terrorists' areas of operation), generating evidence-based information on effectiveness in counterterrorism (such as through the activities of fusion centers, airport screening techniques, and using a complexity method for assessing counterterrorism policies) to evaluating the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies in terms of their ability to curtail terrorist financing and balancing "toughness vs. fairness." The concluding chapter presents a framework for a research infrastructure for evaluating counterterrorism effectiveness.

Roland Otto, *Targeted Killings and International Law*. New York, NY: Springer, 2010. 661 pp., US\$ 149.00 [Hardcover], ISBN-13: 978-3642248573.

Using Israel as its primary case study, this is a very comprehensive and detailed examination of the applicability of international law to a government's perceived need to conduct targeted killings of its terrorist adversaries. The volume's conceptual framework (which takes up most of the book) discusses topics such as how to define "targeted killings", the moral legitimacy and effectiveness of targeted killings, and the relationship between human rights, international humanitarian law, and other relevant international laws to the practice of targeted killings. The conceptual framework is then applied to Israel's engagement in targeted killings of its terrorist adversaries. The author concludes that "if the human rights standards were applied

properly [i.e., to Israel's policy of targeted killings], many killings which would be legal according to the Israeli Supreme Court would be illegal according [to human rights] standards." (p. 540) In this reviewer's opinion, however, perhaps a more nuanced interpretation may be warranted because the terrorists own violation of human rights by their deliberate targeting of innocent civilians and the difficulty of arresting them when they exploit their safe havens by hiding within their protective communities might make targeted assassinations the only viable option for states facing such threats.

Sharon Pickering, Jude McCulloch, and David Wright. *Counter-Terrorism Policing*. New York, NY: Springer, 2008. 142 pp., US\$ 150.00 [Hardcover], ISBN-13: 978-0387768731.

An examination of the dilemmas facing police forces, which are traditionally trained to counter crime, on their added missions to counter terrorism within their often culturally diverse communities. The book's chapters discuss issues such as the nature of the evolving terrorist threat; new approaches to counter-terrorism policing represented by the three models of community intelligence, "belonging," and social cohesion, lessons learned from United Kingdom community policing; the altered policy and legal environments facing democratic policing strategies; the components required in community policing, such as the need to understand the needs of culturally and religiously diverse communities; and the organizational and training components of counter-terrorism community policing. The concluding chapter presents a social cohesion approach to counter-terrorism policing.

Ramon Spaaij, *Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention*. [Springer Briefs in Criminology], New York, NY: Springer, 2012. 100 pp., US\$ 49.95 [Paperback], ISBN-13: 978-9400729803.

A systematic examination of the increasingly pervasive phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism by focusing on six crucial dimensions: definition, incidence and evolution (including a chronology of lone wolf terrorism in 15 countries), motivations and ideologies, influences and radicalization (including personal circumstances, social backgrounds, sociocultural and political influences), modus operandi (in terms of planning, targeting and types of weapons used), and counterterrorism responses (such as those that are legalistic, repressive, and conciliatory). Although one may argue that certain attacks that are generally attributed to lone wolf terrorists (such as Major Nidal Hassan's November 2009 massacre at Fort Hood, Texas) are, in fact, linked, however loosely, to more organized groups, the author's account is highly authoritative and a valuable overview of the academic literature on this subject.

W. Kip Viscusi, (Eds.), *The Risks of Terrorism*. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003. 152 pp., US\$ 159.00 [Hardcover], ISBN-13: 978-1441954282.

Originally published as a special issue of the *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, the contributors to this volume examine the major components of terrorism risk: the relationship between civil liberties and the requirement to reduce terrorism risks, the probability of terrorist incidence, the impact of catastrophic terrorist incidents on the insurance markets that cover such risks, the problems associated with insuring the victims and physical destruction of those affected by the 9/11 attacks, and the governmental policy responses involved in mitigating terrorism risk.

Marianne Wade and Almir Maljevic, (Eds.), *A War on Terror? The European Stance on a New Threat, Changing Laws and Human Rights Implications*. New York, NY: Springer, 2010. 554 pp., US\$ 179.00 [Hardcover], US\$ 79.95 [Paperback], ISBN-13: 978-1461413950.

The contributors to this volume examine the numerous issues involved in the impact of the European states' counterterrorism campaigns on those societies' legal and political institutions, including maintenance of civil liberties. The volume's chapters cover topics such as the German police's perspective on the terrorist threat environment and counterstrategies to mitigate it, terrorists' exploitation of the Internet and the use of international laws to counter it, the roles of the United Nations and the European Union in countering terrorism, how victims of terrorism need to be treated, the utilization of criminal laws to counter terrorism, and the impact of counterterrorism campaigns in limiting civil liberties and human rights.

David Weisburd, Thomas E. Feucht, Idit Hakimi, Lois Felson Mock, and Simon Perry, (Eds.). *To Protect and To Serve: Policing in an Age of Terrorism*. New York, NY: Springer, 2011. 230 pp., US\$ 179.00 [Hardcover], US\$ 89.99 [Paperback], ISBN-13: 978-1441983848.

The contributors to this volume examine the evolving role of policing in countering terrorism and homeland security by focusing on such practices and trends in the cases of Israel and the United States. Beginning with a discussion of trends in international terrorism, including the use of databases to generate incident trends, the volume's chapters cover topics such as the role of the police in counterterrorism and its impact on societies, and future trends and associated requirements in policing terrorism.

About the Reviewer: Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of 'Perspectives on Terrorism'. He can be reached at: Joshua.sinai@comcast.net.

IV. Bibliographies

Bibliography: Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Part 1)

Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

[Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism–BSPT–JT–2014–5]

Abstract

This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To keep up with the rapidly changing political events, more recent publications have been prioritized during the selection process. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to expand the search.

Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, Israel, Palestine, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, terrorism, peace process

NB: All websites were last visited on 5.9.2014.–See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.

Bibliographies and other Resources

AbuZayyad, Ziad; Schenker, Hillel (Eds.) (1994-): *Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture*. URL: <http://www.pij.org>

Adelson, Samuel (2013, May): *Annotated Bibliography for Palestine*. URL: <http://ncusar.org/modelarableague/resources/Annotated-Bibliography-Palestine.pdf>

Balfour Project, The (n.d.): *Bibliography*. URL: <http://www.balfourproject.org/about/the-balfour-project-list-of-resources>

Brown University, New Directions in Palestinian Studies Symposium (2014): *Bibliography*. URL: <http://palestinianstudies.org/2014-2/people/bibliography>

Dowty, Alan (2013, May): The Arab-Israel Conflict. *Oxford Bibliographies Online*. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/OBO/9780199756223-0124>

Institute for Palestine Studies (2006-). URL: <http://palestine-studies.org>

International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) (2008-): *War on Hamas*. URL: <http://www.ict.org.il/Articles.aspx?WordID=109>

Kern, Kathleen (1996, September): *Middle East Bibliography*. URL: <https://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/qbib.htm>

Khalidi, Rashid I. (Ed.) (1971-): *Journal of Palestine Studies*. URL: <http://www.ucpressjournals.com/journal.php?j=jps>

Kiener, Ron (2013, January): *Select Bibliography of the Arab-Israeli Conflict in English*. URL: http://www2.trincoll.edu/~kiener/JWST206_Biblio.htm

- LA Jews for Peace (n.d.): *Books on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict: Annotated Bibliography*. URL: <http://www.lajewsforpeace.org/Bibliography.html>
- Metz, Helen Chapin (1988): Bibliography. In: *Israel: A Country Study*. Washington, DC: GPO for the Library of Congress. URL: <http://countrystudies.us/israel/111.htm>
- Murray, Nancy; Hagopian, Elaine (n.d.): *Select Bibliography on the Palestinian/Israeli Conflict*. URL: http://tari.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25&Itemid=29
- O'Donnell, Patrick S. (2014): *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Select Bibliography*. URL: http://www.academia.edu/4844077/Israeli-Palestinian_Conflict_bibliography
- Palestinian American Research Center (PARC) (2008, October): *Resources: A Bibliography of Books on Palestine and the Palestinians*. URL: <http://parc-us-pal.org/resources/bibliography.htm>
- Pipes, Daniel (n.d.): *Bibliography: The Arab-Israeli Conflict*. URL: http://www.danielpipes.org/biblio_ai.php
- Sarsar, Saliba (1998): *Bibliography on Palestinian Women*. URL: http://library.columbia.edu/locations/global/virtual-libraries/middle_east_studies/women/palestinian.html
- Shihadeh, Magid; Al-Zoughbi, Basheer; Bajes, Dalal (n.d.): *Annotated Bibliography on: Palestinian Refugees & Peace*. URL: <http://home.birzeit.edu/giis/giis/pdf/111210b.pdf>
- United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) (1950-): <http://www.unrwa.org>
- United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) (2013-): *UNRWA Audiovisual Archive for Palestine Refugees*. URL: <http://unrwa.t3platform.com>
- York University, Conference "Israel/Palestine: Mapping Models of Statehood and Paths to Peace" (2009): *Annotated Bibliography*. URL: <http://www.yorku.ca/ipconf/annotatedbibliography.html>

Books and Edited Volumes

- Aaronsohn, Ran (2000): *Rothschild and Early Jewish Colonization in Palestine*. (Geographic Perspectives on the Human Past). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Abrams, Elliott (2013): *Tested by Zion: The Bush Administration and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Abu Hussein, Hussein; McKay, Fiona (2003): *Access Denied: Palestinian Land Rights in Israel*. London: Zed Books.
- Aburish, Saïd K. (1998): *Arafat: From Defender to Dictator*. New York: Bloomsbury.
- Achcar, Gilbert (2010): *The Arabs and the Holocaust: The Arab-Israeli War of Narratives*. [G. M. Goshgarian, Trans.]. New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Adelman, Madelaine; Elman, Miriam Fendius (Eds.) (2014). *Jerusalem: Conflict & Cooperation in a Contested City*. (Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution). Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Allen, Lori (2013): *The Rise and Fall of Human Rights: Cynicism and Politics in Occupied Palestine*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

- Amar-Dahl, Tamar (2012): *Das zionistische Israel: Jüdischer Nationalismus und die Geschichte des Nahostkonflikts*. Paderborn: Schöningh.
- Armstrong, Karen (1997): *Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Aronoff, Yael S. (2014): *The Political Psychology of Israeli Prime Ministers: When Hard-Liners Opt for Peace*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Aruri, Naseer H. (2003): *Dishonest Broker: The U.S. Role in Israel and Palestine*. Cambridge: South End Press.
- Auga, Ulrike; von Braun, Christina (Eds.) (2006): *Gender in Conflicts: Palestine – Israel – Germany*. (Berliner Gender Studies, Vol. 3). Berlin: LIT Verlag.
- Aviad, Guy (2014): *Hamas: The Politics of Terror: An Essential Hamas Lexicon*. Tel Aviv: Contento De Semrik.
- Azoulay, Ariella; Ophir, Adi (2013): *The One-State Condition: Occupation and Democracy in Israel/Palestine*. [Tal Haran, Trans.]. (Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Badran, Amneh Daoud (2010): *Zionist Israel and Apartheid South Africa: Civil Society and Peace Building in Ethnic-National States*. (Routledge Studies on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Vol. 6). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Baracskay, Daniel (2011): *The Palestine Liberation Organization: Terrorism and Prospects for Peace in the Holy Land*. (PSI Guides to Terrorists, Insurgents, and Armed Groups). Santa Barbara: Praeger.
- Bar-On, Dan; Naveh, Eyal J. (2012): *Side by Side: Parallel Histories of Israel-Palestine*. New York: The New Press.
- Baskin, Gershon (2013): *The Negotiator: Freeing Gilad Schalit from Hamas*. New Milford: The Toby Press.
- Bassiouni, M. Cherif; Ben Ami, Shlomo (2009): *A Guide to Documents on the Arab-Palestinian/Israeli Conflict: 1897-2008*. (International and Comparative Criminal Law Series). Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Bauck, Petter; Omer, Mohammed (Eds.) (2013): *The Oslo Accords 1993-2013: A Critical Assessment*. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press.
- Baumgarten, Helga (2006): *Hamas: Der politische Islam in Palästina*. Kreuzlingen: Diederichs.
- Beinart, Peter (2012): *The Crisis of Zionism*. New York: Times Books.
- Beinin, Joel; Stein, Rebecca L. (Eds.) (2006): *The Struggle for Sovereignty: Palestine and Israel, 1993-2005*. (Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies and Cultures). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Bennis, Phyllis (2012): *Understanding the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: A Primer*. Northampton: Olive Branch Press.
- Ben-Porat, Guy (2006): *Global Liberalism, Local Populism: Peace and Conflict in Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland*. (Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution). Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Benvenisti, Eyal; Gans, Chaim; Hanafi, Sari (Eds.) (2007): *Israel and the Palestinian Refugees*. (Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, Vol. 189). Berlin: Springer.
- Berko, Anat (2007): *The Path to Paradise: The Inner World of Suicide Bombers and their Dispatchers*. [Elizabeth Yuval, Trans.]. Westport: Praeger Security International.

- Berman, Eli (2009): *Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Berry, Mike; Philo, Greg (2006): *Israel and Palestine: Competing Histories*. (Expanded ed.). (Middle East Studies). London: Pluto Press.
- Bishara, Amahl A. (2013): *Back Stories: U.S. News Production and Palestinian Politics*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Bishara, Marwan (2003): *Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid? Occupation, Terrorism and the Future*. (New updated ed.). New York: Zed Books.
- Bouillon, Markus E. (2004): *The Peace Business: Money and Power in the Palestine-Israel Conflict*. (Library of Modern Middle East Studies, Vol. 37). London: I.B. Tauris.
- Bouris, Dimitris (2014): *The European Union and Occupied Palestinian Territories: State-Building without a State*. (Routledge Advances in European Politics). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Bregman, Ahron (2014): *Cursed Victory: A History of Israel and the Occupied Territories*. London: Allen Lane.
- Bunton, Martin (2013): *The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: A very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bunzl, John; Beit-Hallahmi, Benjamin (2002): *Psychoanalysis, Identity, and Ideology: Critical Essays on the Israel/Palestine Case*. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Caplan, Neil (2009): *The Israel-Palestine Conflict: Contested Histories*. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Carter, Jimmy (2006): *Palestine: Peace not Apartheid*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Chacham, Ronit (2003): *Breaking Ranks: Refusing to Serve in the West Bank and Gaza Strip*. New York: Other Press.
- Challand, Benoît (2009): *Palestinian Civil Society: Foreign Donors and the Power to Promote and Exclude*. (Routledge Studies on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Vol. 4). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Chomsky, Noam; Pappé, Ilan (2013): *Gaza in Crisis: Reflections on the U.S.-Israeli War on the Palestinians*. (Rev. & updated ed.). Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Christison, Kathleen (1999): *Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cohen, Avner (2010): *The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Cohen, Hillel (2008): *Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917-1948*. [Haim Watzman, Trans.]. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cohen, Hillel (2011): *The Rise and Fall of Arab Jerusalem: Palestinian Politics and the City since 1967*. (Routledge Studies on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Vol. 10). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Cohn-Sherbok, Dan; El-Alami, Dawoud (2008): *The Palestine-Israeli Conflict: A Beginner's Guide*. (New Ed.). Oxford: Oneworld Publications.
- Cordesman, Anthony H. (2006): *Arab-Israeli Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars*. Westport: Praeger

Security International.

Dahan-Kalev, Henriette; Le Febvre, Emilie; El'Sana-Alh'jooj, Amal (2012): *Palestinian Activism in Israel: A Bedouin Woman Leader in a Changing Middle East*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Daigle, Craig (2012): *The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dalsheim, Joyce (2011): *Unsettling Gaza: Secular Liberalism, Radical Religion, and the Israeli Settlement Project*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Daniele, Giulia (2014): *Women, Reconciliation and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Road not yet Taken*. (Routledge Studies on the Arab-Israeli Conflict). Abingdon: Routledge.

Deeb, Dennis J., II (2013): *Israel, Palestine, and the Quest for Middle East Peace*. Lanham: University Press of America.

Dowty, Alan (2012): *Israel / Palestine*. (3rd ed.). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Dumper, Michael (1997): *The Politics of Jerusalem since 1967*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Dumper, Michael (Ed.) (2006): *Palestinian Refugee Repatriation: Global Perspectives*. (Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics). Abingdon: Routledge.

Dunsky, Marda (2008): *Pens and Swords: How the American Mainstream Media Report the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Dzikansky, Mordecai; Kleiman, Gil; Slater, Robert (2012): *Terrorist Suicide Bombings: Attack Interdiction, Mitigation, and Response*. Boca Raton: CRC Press.

El-Hasan, Hasan Afif (2010): *Israel or Palestine? Is the Two-State Solution already Dead?* New York: Algora Publishing.

Elman, Miriam Fendius; Haklai, Oded; Spruyt, Hendrik (Eds.) (2014): *Democracy and Conflict Resolution: The Dilemmas of Israel's Peacemaking*. (Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution). Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Essaid, Aida Asim (2014): *Zionism and Land Tenure in Mandate Palestine*. (Routledge Studies on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Vol. 12). Abingdon: Routledge.

Faris, Hani (Ed.) (2013): *The Failure of the Two-State Solution: The Prospects of One State in the Israel-Palestine Conflict*. (Library of Modern Middle East Studies). London: I.B. Tauris.

Ferris, Jesse (2013): *Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Filc, Dani (2010): *The Political Right in Israel: Different Faces of Jewish Populism*. (Routledge Studies on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Vol. 7). Abingdon: Routledge.

Filiu, Jean-Pierre (2014): *Gaza: A History*. (Comparative Politics and International Studies). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Finkelstein, Norman G. (2008): *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*. (3rd. ed.). London: Verso.

- Finkelstein, Norman G. (2012): *Knowing too Much: Why the American Jewish Romance with Israel is Coming to an End*. New York: OR Books.
- Fischbach, Michael R. (2008): *Jewish Property Claims against Arab Countries*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Flug, Noah; Schäuble, Martin (2007): *Die Geschichte der Israelis und Palästinenser*. München: Carl Hanser.
- Freilich, Charles D. (2012): *Zion's Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Gallagher, Nancy (2007): *Quakers in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Dilemmas of NGO Humanitarian Activism*. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press.
- Ganem, As'ad (2001): *The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 1948-2000: A Political Study*. (SUNY Series in Israeli Studies). Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Ganor, Boaz (2005): *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Gat, Moshe (2012): *In Search of a Peace Settlement: Egypt and Israel between the Wars, 1967-1973*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gawerc, Michelle I. (2012): *Prefiguring Peace: Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding Partnerships*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Gelvin, James L. (2014): *The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War*. (3rd ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ghazi-Bouillon, Asima A. (2009): *Understanding the Middle East Peace Process: Israeli Academia and the Struggle for Identity*. (Routledge Studies on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Vol. 3). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Gidron, Benjamin; Katz, Stanley N., Hasenfeld, Yeheskel (2002): *Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and South Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Golan, Galia (2007): *Israel and Palestine: Peace Plans and Proposals from Oslo to Disengagement*. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers.
- Greenstein, Ran (in press): *Zionism and its Discontents: Radical Currents in Israel/Palestine*. London: Pluto Press.
- Grinberg, Lev Luis (2010): *Politics and Violence in Israel/Palestine: Democracy versus Military Rule*. (Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, Vol. 12). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Günzel, Angelika (2006): *Religionsgemeinschaften in Israel: Rechtliche Grundstrukturen des Verhältnisses von Staat und Religion*. (Jus Ecclesiasticum, Vol. 77). Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- Gur-Ze'ev, Ilan (Ed.) (2000): *Conflicting Philosophies of Education in Israel/Palestine*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Haklai, Oded (2011): *Palestinian Ethnonationalism in Israel*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Halabi, Rabah (Ed.) (2000): *Israeli and Palestinian Identities in Dialogue: The School for Peace Approach*. [Deb Reich, Trans.]. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

- Hanafi, Sari; Hilal, Leila; Takkenberg, Lex (Eds.) (2014): *UNRWA and Palestinian Refugees: From Relief and Works to Human Development*. (Routledge Studies on the Arab-Israeli Conflict). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Handelman, Sapir (2011): *Conflict and Peacemaking in Israel-Palestine: Theory and Application*. (Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, Vol. 34). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Harms, Gregory; Ferry, Todd M. (2008): *The Palestine-Israel Conflict: A Basic Introduction*. (2nd ed.). London: Pluto Press.
- Hass, Amira (1999): *Drinking the Sea at Gaza: Days and Nights in a Land under Siege*. [Elana Wesley; Maxine Kaufman-Lacusta, Trans.]. New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Hermann, Tamar S. (2009): *The Israeli Peace Movement: A Shattered Dream*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Herzog, Chaim; Gazit, Shlomo (2005): *The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East*. (2nd rev. ed.). New York: Vintage Books.
- Hilal, Jamil (Ed.) (2007): *Where now for Palestine? The Demise of the Two-State Solution*. London: Zed Books.
- Honig-Parnass, Tikva (2011): *False Prophets of Peace: Liberal Zionism and the Struggle for Palestine*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Hroub, Khaled (2010): *Hamas: A Beginner's Guide*. (2nd ed.). London: Pluto Press.
- Jones, Clive; Pedahzur, Ami (Eds.) (2005): *Between Terrorism and Civil War: The Al-Aqsa Intifada*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Kanaaneh, Rhoda Ann (2009): *Surrounded: Palestinian Soldiers in the Israeli Military*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Karlinsky, Nahum (2005): *California Dreaming: Ideology, Society, and Technology in the Citrus Industry of Palestine, 1890-1939*. [Naftali Greenwood, Trans.]. (SUNY Series in Israeli Studies). Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Karmi, Ghada (2007): *Married to another Man: Israel's Dilemma in Palestine*. London: Pluto Press.
- Karsh, Efraim (2009): *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: The 1948 War*. (Essential Histories: War and Conflict in Modern Times). New York: The Rosen Publishing Group.
- Karsh, Efraim (2010): *Palestine Betrayed*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Karsh, Efraim; Kumaraswamy, P. R. (Eds.) (2003): *Israel, the Hashemites and the Palestinians: The Fateful Triangle*. (Israeli History, Politics, and Society). London: Frank Cass.
- Khalidi, Rashid (1997): *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Khalidi, Rashid (2013): *Brokers of Deceit: How the U.S. Has Undermined Peace in the Middle East*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Khalili, Laleh (2007): *Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine: The Politics of National Commemoration*. (Cambridge Middle East Studies, Vol. 27). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Klein, Menachem (2007): *A Possible Peace between Israel and Palestine: An Insider's Account of the Geneva Initiative*. [Haim Watzman, Trans.]. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Klein, Menachem (2010): *The Shift: Israel-Palestine from Border Struggle to Ethnic Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Klieman, Aharon S. (2000): *Compromising Palestine: A Guide to Final Status Negotiations*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Knudsen, Are; Hanafi, Sari (2011): *Palestinian Refugees: Identity, Space and Place in the Levant*. (Routledge Studies on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Vol. 9). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Krämer, Gudrun (2008): *A History of Palestine: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Founding of the State of Israel*. [Graham Harman; Gudrun Krämer, Trans.]. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kurtzer, Daniel C. (Ed.) (2012): *Pathways to Peace: America and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kuruvilla, Samuel J. (2013): *Radical Christianity in Palestine and Israel: Liberation and Theology in the Middle East*. (Library of Modern Religion, Vol. 19). London: I.B. Tauris.
- Laqueur, Walter; Rubin, Barry (2008): *The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*. (7th ed.). New York: Penguin Books.
- Lavie, Smadar (2014): *Wrapped in the Flag of Israel: Mizrahi Single Mothers and Bureaucratic Torture*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Law, Stephen (Ed.) (2008): *Israel, Palestine and Terror*. London: Continuum.
- Le More, Anne (2008): *International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo: Political Guilt, Wasted Money*. (Routledge Studies on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Vol. 1). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Levin, Kenneth (2005): *The Oslo Syndrome: Delusions of a People under Siege*. Hanover: Smith and Kraus.
- LeVine, Mark Andrew; Shafir, Gershon (Eds.) (2012): *Struggle and Survival in Palestine/Israel*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Levitt, Matthew (2006): *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lim, Audrea (Ed.) (2012): *The Case for Sanctions against Israel*. London: Verso.
- Loewenstein, Antony; Moor, Ahmed (2012): *After Zionism: One State for Israel and Palestine*. London: Saqi Books.
- Löffler, Roland (2008): *Protestanten in Palästina: Religionspolitik, Sozialer Protestantismus und Mission in den deutschen evangelischen und anglikanischen Institutionen des Heiligen Landes 1917-1939*. (Konfession und Gesellschaft). Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
- Machover, Moshé (2012): *Israelis and Palestinians: Conflict and Resolution*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Masalha, Nur (2000): *Imperial Israel and the Palestinians: The Politics of Expansion*. London: Pluto Press.
- Masalha, Nur (Ed.) (2005): *Catastrophe Remembered: Palestine, Israel and the Internal Refugees: Essays in*

Memory of Edward W. Said. London: Zed Books.

Masalha, Nur (2007): *The Bible and Zionism: Invented Traditions, Archaeology and Post-Colonialism in Israel-Palestine.* London: Zed Books.

Matthews, Elizabeth G.; Newman, David; Daoudi, Mohammed S. Dajani (Eds.) (2011): *The Israel-Palestine Conflict: Parallel Discourses.* (UCLA Center for Middle East Development [CMED] Series, Vol. 3). Abingdon: Routledge.

Merari, Ariel (2010): *Driven to Death: Psychological and Social Aspects of Suicide Terrorism.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Miller, Rory (2011): *Inglorious Disarray: Europe, Israel and the Palestinians since 1967.* London: Hurst.

Milton-Edwards, Beverley; Farrell, Stephen (2010): *Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Mitchell, Thomas G. (2000): *Native vs. Settler: Ethnic Conflict in Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland, and South Africa.* (Contributions in Military Studies, Vol. 200). Westport: Greenwood Press.

Mitchell, Thomas G. (2013): *Israel/Palestine and the Politics of a Two-State Solution.* Jefferson: McFarland & Company.

Morris, Benny (2004): *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited.* (Cambridge Middle East Studies, No. 18). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nakhleh, Khalil (2011): *Globalized Palestine: The National Sell-Out of a Homeland.* Trenton: The Red Sea Press.

Nasasra, Mansour et al. (Eds.) (2014): *The Naqab Bedouin and Colonialism: New Perspectives.* (Routledge Studies on the Arab-Israeli Conflict). Abingdon: Routledge.

Nashif, Esmail (2008): *Palestinian Political Prisoners: Identity and Community.* (Routledge Studies on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Vol. 2). Abingdon: Routledge.

Nasser, Riad M. (2005): *Palestinian Identity in Jordan and Israel: The Necessary "Others" in the Making of a Nation.* (Middle East Studies). New York: Routledge.

Omer, Atalia (2013): *When Peace is not Enough: How the Israeli Peace Camp Thinks about Religion, Nationalism, and Justice.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Oren, Michael B. (2002): *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East.* New York: Ballantine Books.

Pappé, Ilan (Ed.) (1999): *The Israel/Palestine Question.* (Rewriting Histories). London: Routledge.

Pappé, Ilan (2006): *A History of Modern Palestine.* (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pappé, Ilan (2010): *Out of the Frame: The Struggle for Academic Freedom in Israel.* London: Pluto Press.

Pappé, Ilan (2011): *The Forgotten Palestinians: A History of the Palestinians in Israel.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Pappé, Ilan; Hilal, Jamil (Eds.) (2010): *Across the Wall: Narratives of Israeli-Palestinian History.* (Library of

Modern Middle East Studies, Vol. 88). London: I.B. Tauris.

Payes, Shany (2005): *Palestinian NGOs in Israel: The Politics of Civil Society*. (Library of Modern Middle East Studies, Vol. 45). London: Tauris Academic Studies.

Pedahzur, Ami (2009): *The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle against Terrorism*. (Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare). New York: Columbia University Press.

Pedahzur, Ami (2012): *The Triumph of Israel's Radical Right*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pedahzur, Ami; Perliger, Arie (2009): *Jewish Terrorism in Israel*. (Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare). New York: Columbia University Press.

Peled-Elhanan, Nurit (2012): *Palestine in Israeli School Books: Ideology and Propaganda in Education*. (Library of Modern Middle East Studies, Vol. 82). London: I.B. Tauris.

Peleg, Ilan; Waxman, Dov (2011): *Israel's Palestinians: The Conflict within*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Peteet, Julie M. (1991): *Gender in Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Peters, Joel; Newman, David (Eds.) (2013): *The Routledge Handbook on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Pratt, David (2006): *Intifada: The Long Day of Rage*. Havertown: Casemate.

Quigley, John B. (2005): *The Case for Palestine: An International Law Perspective*. (Rev. ed.). Durham: Duke University Press.

Quigley, John B. (2013): *The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense: Questioning the Legal Basis for Preventive War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rabinovich, Abraham (2004): *The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter that Transformed the Middle East*. New York: Schocken Books.

Rabinowitz, Dan; Abu-Baker, Khawla (2005): *Coffins on our Shoulders: The Experience of the Palestinian Citizens of Israel*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Reinhart, Tanya (2005): *Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948*. (2nd ed.). New York: Seven Stories Press.

Reporters Without Borders (Ed.) (2003): *Israel/Palestine: The Black Book*. London: Pluto Press.

Robinson, Shira (2013): *Citizen Strangers: Palestinians and the Birth of Israel's Liberal Settler State*. (Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Rodman, David (2014): *Sword and Shield of Zion: The Israel Air Force in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-2012*. Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press.

Rogan, Eugene L.; Shlaim, Avi (2007): *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948*. (2nd ed.). (Cambridge Middle East Studies, Vol. 15). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ross, Jack (2011): *Rabbi Outcast: Elmer Berger and American Jewish Anti-Zionism*. Washington, DC: Potomac

Books.

- Rotberg, Robert I. (Ed.) (2006): *Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict: History's Double Helix*. (Indiana Series in Middle East Studies). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Ruebner, Josh (2013): *Shattered Hopes: Obama's Failure to Broker Israeli-Palestinian Peace*. London: Verso.
- Sa'idi, Ahmad H.; Abu-Lughod, Lila (Eds.) (2007): *Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of Memory*. (Cultures of History). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Said, Edward W. (1992): *The Question of Palestine*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Salinas, Moises; Abu Rabi, Hazza (Eds.) (2009): *Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Perspectives on the Peace Process*. Amherst: Cambria Press.
- Samman, Maha (2013): *Trans-Colonial Urban Space in Palestine: Politics and Development*. (Routledge Studies on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Vol. 11). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Samy, Shahira (2010): *Reparations to Palestinian Refugees: A Comparative Perspective*. (Routledge Studies on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Vol. 8). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Sand, Shlomo (2012): *The Invention of the Land of Israel: From Holy Land to Homeland*. [Jeremy Forman, Trans.]. London: Verso.
- Sandercock, Josie et al. (Ed.) (2004): *Peace under Fire: Israel/Palestine and the International Solidarity Movement*. London: Verso.
- Scham, Paul; Salem, Walid; Pogrud, Benjamin (2005): *Shared Histories: A Palestinian-Israeli Dialogue*. Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press.
- Schanzer, Jonathan (2008): *Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Schanzer, Jonathan (2013): *State of Failure: Yasser Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas, and the Unmaking of the Palestinian State*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Schanzer, Jonathan; Dubowitz, Mark (2010, October): *P@lestinian Pulse: What Policymakers can Learn from Palestinian Social Media*. [e-Book]. Washington, DC: FDD Press. URL: <http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/palestinian-pulse-what-policymakers-can-learn-from-palestinian-social-media>
- Schäuble, Martin (2011): *Black Box Dschihad: Daniel und Sa'ed auf ihrem Weg ins Paradies*. München: Carl Hanser.
- Schäuble, Martin (2011): *Dschihadisten: Feldforschung in den Milieus: Die Analyse zu "Black Box Dschihad"*. (Schriftenreihe Politik und Kultur, Vol. 12). Berlin: Hans Schiler.
- Schäuble, Martin (2013): *Zwischen den Grenzen: Zu Fuß durch Israel und Palästina*. München: Carl Hanser.
- Schulman, Sarah (2012): *Israel / Palestine and the Queer International*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Selby, Jan (2003): *Water, Power and Politics in the Middle East: The Other Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. (Library of Modern Middle East Studies, Vol. 25). London: I.B. Tauris.
- Shamir, Jacob; Shikaki, Khalil (2010): *Palestinian and Israeli Public Opinion: The Public Imperative in the Second Intifada*. (Indiana Series in Middle East Studies). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

- Shapira, Anita (2012): *Israel: A History*. (The Schusterman Series in Israel Studies). Waltham: Brandeis University Press.
- Sheffer, Gabriel; Barak, Oren (2013): *Israel's Security Networks: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shindler, Colin (2013): *A History of Modern Israel*. (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shlaim, Avi (2009): *Israel and Palestine: Reappraisals, Revisions, Refutations*. London: Verso.
- Shohat, Ella (2010): *Israeli Cinema: East/West and the Politics of Representation*. (Library of Modern Middle East Studies, Vol. 78). London: I.B. Tauris.
- Singh, Rashmi (2011): *Hamas and Suicide Terrorism: Multi-Causal and Multi-Level Approaches*. (LSE International Studies). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Smith, Charles D. (2013): *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents*. (8th ed.). Boston: Bedford/St. Martins.
- Sosland, Jeffrey K. (2007): *Cooperating Rivals: The Riparian Politics of the Jordan River Basin*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Sucharov, Mira M. (2005): *The International Self: Psychoanalysis and the Search for Israeli-Palestinian Peace*. (SUNY Series in Israeli Studies). Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Sufian, Sandy; LeVine, Mark (Eds.) (2007): *Reapproaching Borders: New Perspectives on the Study of Israel-Palestine*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Suleiman, Camelia (2011): *Language and Identity in the Israel-Palestine Conflict: The Politics of Self-Perception in the Middle East*. (Library of Modern Middle East Studies, Vol. 115). London: I.B. Tauris.
- Susser, Asher (2012): *Israel, Jordan, and Palestine: The Two-State Imperative*. Waltham: Brandeis University Press.
- Svirsky, Marcelo (2012): *Arab-Jewish Activism in Israel-Palestine*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Tal, David (Ed.) (2013): *Israeli Identity: Between Orient and Occident*. (Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Society, Vol. 2). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Tessler, Mark A. (2009) : *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. (2nd rev. ed.). (Indiana Series in Arab and Islamic Studies). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Tilley, Virginia (Ed.) (2012): *Beyond Occupation: Apartheid, Colonialism & International Law in the Occupied Palestinian Territories*. London: Pluto Press.
- Weinberg, Leonard; Pedahzur, Ami; Perliger, Arie (2009): *Political Parties and Terrorist Groups*. (2nd ed.). (Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy, Vol. 10). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Yacobi, Haim (2009): *The Jewish-Arab City: Spatio-Politics in a Mixed Community*. (Routledge Studies on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Vol. 5). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Ziolkowski, Britt (2012): *Palästinensische Märtyrerinnen: Selbstdarstellung und innerislamische Wahrnehmung weiblicher Selbstmordattentäter*. (Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, Vol. 309). Berlin: Klaus Schwarz.

Zureik, Elia; Lyon, David; Abu-Laban, Yasmien (Eds.) (2011): *Surveillance and Control in Israel/Palestine: Population, Territory, and Power*. (Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, Vol. 33). Abingdon: Routledge.

Theses

- Abu-Irshaid, Osama (2013): *The Dialectic of Religion and Politics in Hamas' Thought and Practice*. (Doctoral Thesis, Loughborough University, Loughborough, United Kingdom). URL: <https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/12002>
- Al Smadi, Morsee (2012, July): *Le droit international à l'épreuve de la question palestinienne: Quel état palestinien?* (Doctoral Thesis, Université de Grenoble, Saint-Martin-d'Hères, France). URL: <http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00861869>
- Amireh, Makram (2012): *The Legality of Recourse to Defensive Force in Islamic and International Law: (With Reference to the Case in Palestine)*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. U588279)
- Arikat, Hafiza (2011, Fall): *Eye on the Media: The Israel–Palestine Conflict*. (Master's Thesis, California State University, Sacramento, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10211.9/1548>
- Ashfield, Laura (2012): *Diasporic Identity and Political Action: Palestinian Student Activism on Ontario University Campuses*. (Master's Thesis, Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada). URL: <http://digital.library.ryerson.ca/islandora/object/RULA%3A1872>
- Bader, Adeb (2013): *European Union's Foreign Policy toward the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas): Inconsistencies and Paradoxes*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Exeter, Exeter, United Kingdom). URL: <https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/handle/10871/14520>
- Beckerman-Boys, Carly (2013, Spring): *British Foreign Policy Decision-Making towards Palestine during the Mandate (1917-1948): A Poliheuristic Perspective*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom). URL: <http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/4565>
- Bitton, Daniel (2013, December): *Nation, Narration and Conflation: A Mutual Blind Spot in Historical Narratives of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. (Master's Thesis, McGill University, Montreal, Canada). URL: <http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/thesisfile123057.pdf>
- Buda, Dorina Maria (2012): *Danger-Zone Tourism: Emotional Performances in Jordan and Palestine*. (Doctoral Thesis, The University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10289/6085>
- Charles-Pierre, François-Marie (2013, November): *La diplomatie américaine et le Hamas dans le cadre du processus de paix israélo-palestinien: Gestion de crise ou crise de gestion?* (Master's Thesis, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montreal, Canada). URL: <http://www.archipel.uqam.ca/5730>
- Chavis, Mustafa Ahmad (2012): *Zionism: Origins and Challenges*. (Master's Thesis, Central Connecticut State University, New Britain, United States). URL: <http://content.library.ccsu.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ccsutheses/id/1797>
- Davis, Rachel N. (2014, March): *Economic Peace through the Israeli Lens*. (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/41365>

- Dietl, Gulshan (2008): *Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking during the Al-Aqsa Intifada: The Role of the United States (2000-2004)*. (Doctoral Thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India). URL: <http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in:8080/jspui/handle/10603/14510>
- Drache, Dominique (2010): *Israël et les Palestiniens: Regards croisés sur une confrontation de papier dans L'Express et Le Nouvel Observateur (1967-1983)*. (Doctoral Thesis, Université Paul Valéry – Montpellier III, Montpellier, France).
- El Hashash, Mohammed (2010): *Rationalization of Terrorization: Analytical Investigation into the Israeli-Palestinian Political Communication (2008-2009)*. (Master's Thesis, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada). URL: <http://www.ruor.uottawa.ca/handle/10393/28925>
- Geling, Gert Jan (2012, June): *Striving to Become a Player: On the Role of the Peace Process in the Relations between the EU and Israel & the Palestinian Authority*. (Master's Thesis, Universiteit Utrecht, Utrecht, The Netherlands). URL: <http://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/253211>
- Giglioli, Ilaria (2010): *Networks of Power: Water, Infrastructure and Territory in the West Bank Occupied Palestinian Territories*. (Master's Thesis, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/1807/24249>
- Hamid, Sônia Cristina (2007, March): *Entre a Guerra e o Gênero: Memória e Identidade de Mulheres Palestinas em Brasília*. (Master's Thesis, Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, Brasil). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10482/3064>
- Handley, Robert Lyle (2010, May): *Palestine Media Watch and the U.S. News Media: Strategies for Change and Resistance*. (Doctoral Thesis, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2010-05-793>
- Hussein, Cherine (2011, April): *Countering an Illusion of our Epoch: The Re-Emergence of the Single State Solution in Palestine/Israel*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom). URL: <http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/36144>
- Jansen, Pia Therese (2008): *The Consequences of Israel's Counter Terrorism Policy*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, United Kingdom). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10023/439>
- Jochaud du Plessix, Caroline (2013, October): *La norme en Terre sainte: Le système européen face à la solution de deux États (1973-2012)*. (Doctoral Thesis, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, Paris, France). URL: <http://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/cnic3v8rndpflfg9o4o0oad1n>
- Joudah, Nour A. (2012, April): *Palestinian Youth Perspectives on Exile Politics: Between Solidarity and Leadership*. (Master's Thesis, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, United States). URL: <https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/557503>
- Joyce, Anthony Vincent (2011, December): *George Habash: A New Analysis of his Origins and Politics*. (Master's Thesis, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2011-12-4665>
- Kapenga, Jesse Adam (2012): *The Rhetoric of Construction: A Comparative Case Study of the Language of the U.S.-Mexico & Israel-Palestine Border Walls*. (Master's Thesis, The University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, United States). URL: <http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/pqdtopen/doc/1023459978.html?FMT=ABS&pubnum=1512622>

- Knutter, Kristine (2013, January): *Building a State on Shifting Sands: An Evaluation of the Palestinian National Authority's Policy Reforms and Performance in the West Bank, 2009-2011*. (Master's Thesis, University of Kansas, Lawrence, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/1808/11719>
- Kohanteb, Sheila Deborah (2012, May): *Decision Making under Threat: Israeli and Palestinian Public Opinion*. (Doctoral Thesis, Northeastern University, Boston, United States). URL: http://iris.lib.neu.edu/polisci_diss/9
- Kuntzsch, Felix (2014): *The Violent Politics of Nationalism: Identity and Legitimacy in Palestine, Kosovo and Québec*. (Doctoral Thesis, Université Laval, Québec, Canada). URL: www.theses.ulaval.ca/2014/30380/30380.pdf
- Lander, Jonathan Ari (2012): *From Zionism to Diaspora-Zionism: The History of the Zionist Youth Movements in Australia*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia). URL: <http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/52617>
- MacDonald, Robert L. (2012, December): "A Land without a People for a People without a Land": *Civilizing Mission and American Support for Zionism, 1880s-1929*. (Doctoral Thesis, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, United States). URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1352321143
- Manning, Peter Clarence (2013): *The Construction of "the Palestinian" in the Sydney Morning Herald, 1917-2002*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Technology Sydney, Sydney, Australia). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10453/24195>
- Maranhão, Cristina (2013): *Imagens da Guerra: Brasil, Palestina e Portugal*. (Doctoral Thesis, Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, São Paulo, Brasil). URL: http://www.sapientia.pucsp.br//tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=16220
- McCormack, Nathan Eddington (2012): *The Sociopolitical Foundations of Palestinian Resistance, 1948-1970*. (Master's Thesis, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2012-05-5774>
- Merza, Eléonore (2012, November): *Ni Juifs ni Arabes en Israël: Dialectiques d'identification et négociations identitaires d'une minorité dans un espace en guerre: Le cas des Tcherkesses (Adyghéens) de Kfar Kama et de Reyhaniya*. (Doctoral Thesis, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris, France). URL: <http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00769910>
- Morris, Christopher (2012, May): *On the Heroic: Courage, Love, the Greater Good and the Case of Leila Khaled*. (Master's Thesis, Arizona State University, Phoenix, United States). URL: <http://repository.asu.edu/items/14972>
- Nicholson, Elin (2014): *Theatrical Practices of Resistance to Spacio-Cide in Palestine, 2011-12*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom). URL: <https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/uk-ac-man-scw:229687>
- Nisselson, Rachel (2010, August): *Remembering the Future: Francophone Perspectives on the Israel-Palestine Conflict*. (Doctoral Thesis, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, United States). URL: <http://etd.library.vanderbilt.edu/available/etd-07312010-124201>
- Odeh, Rana (2014): *The Impact of Changing Narratives on American Public Opinion toward the U.S.-Israel Relationship*. (Master's Thesis, Wright State University, Dayton, United States). URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1401818860

- O'Regan, Mary (2006, August): *Framing the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Case-Study Analysis of the Irish National "Opinion Leader" Press – July 2000 to July 2004*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Stirling, Stirling, United Kingdom). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/1893/1921>
- Paul, William Andrew (2013, December): *Border Fiction: Fracture and Contestation in Post-Oslo Palestinian Culture*. (Doctoral Thesis, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/2152/23099>
- Persson, Anders (2013, May): *Defining, Securing and Building a Just Peace: The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. (Doctoral Thesis, Lund University, Lund, Sweden). URL: <https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/publication/3736680>
- Possanner, Nikolaus (2012): *Krieg um die Stadt des Friedens: Jerusalem/ al-quds zwischen Politik und Religion*. (Magister Thesis, Universität Wien, Vienna, Austria). URL: <http://othes.univie.ac.at/17882>
- Richmond, John (2011): *The Evolution of British Strategy for Palestine, 1914-20*. (Doctoral Thesis, Royal Holloway, University of London, London, United Kingdom). URL: <http://pure.rhul.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/the-evolution-of-british-strategy-for-palestine-191420%28b602e850-629d-4b84-9383-617b02b44109%29.html>
- Richter-Devroe, Sophie (2010, October): *Gender and Conflict Transformation in Palestine: Women's Political Activism between Local and International Agendas*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Exeter, Exeter, United Kingdom). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10036/3108>
- Ronnen, Edite (2011, October): *Mediation in a Conflict Society: An Ethnographic View on Mediation Processes in Israel*. (Doctoral Thesis, London School of Economics, London, United Kingdom). URL: <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/149>
- Sabarini, Tamara (2012, January): *Palestinian Refugee Identity: Marginalization and Resistance in Refugee Camps in Lebanon*. (Master's Thesis, Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada). URL: <http://digital.library.ryerson.ca/islandora/object/RULA%3A2173>
- Shakkoura, Majdy (2012, July): *Le Hamas, de la résistance armée à l'exercice du pouvoir*. (Doctoral Thesis, Université de Cergy-Pontoise, Cergy-Pontoise, France). URL: <http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00842315>
- Smyser, Katherine A. (2012, June): *To Serve the Interests of the Empire? British Experiences with Zionism, 1917-1925*. (Master's Thesis, College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University, Athens, United States). URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1339426202
- Strindberg, Nils Tage Anders (2001, September): *"From the River to the Sea?" Honour, Identity and Politics in Historical and Contemporary Palestinian Rejectionism*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, United Kingdom). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2646>
- Taha, May Amr (2009): *A Substantive Void: Dependency, Conditionality, and Deformalization of the International Law of Self-Determination in the Case of Palestine*. (Master's Thesis, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/1807/18952>
- Thomson, Amy (2012): *The Ties that Bind: Iran and Hamas' Principal-Agent Relationship*. (Master's Thesis, Massey University, Turitea, New Zealand). URL: <http://mro.massey.ac.nz/handle/10179/3846>
- Toenjes, Ashley Michelle (2011): *The Role and Status of Palestinian Women in the Struggle for National Liberation: Static or Dynamic?* (Master's Thesis, University of Arizona, Tucson, United States). URL: <http://>

hdl.handle.net/10150/201492

Voltolini, Benedetta (2013, July): *Lobbying in EU Foreign Policy-Making towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Exploring the Potential of a Constructivist Perspective*. (Doctoral Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, United Kingdom). URL: <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/751>

Walser, Helmut (2012, January): „Zukunftsvorstellungen für den Nahen Osten“: *Planungsstrategie und Realisierungschancen zentraler Akteure im Nah-Ost-Konflikt*. (Magister Thesis, Universität Wien, Vienna, Austria). URL: <http://othes.univie.ac.at/18093>

Witte, Oliver R. (2014, May): *Inflammatory and Conciliatory Rhetoric in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Content Analysis of How Three Newspapers Covered Two Provocative Events*. (Doctoral Thesis, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Carbondale, United States). URL: <http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/dissertations/866>

Worysz, Michael W. (2011): *Hamas Suicide Terrorism: A Last Resort*. (Master's Thesis, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10822/558118>

Young, Jane (2012): *Otherwise Occupied: An Analysis of the Causes and Consequences of Zionist Carceral Practice*. (Master's Thesis, Massey University, Turitea, New Zealand). URL: <http://mro.massey.ac.nz/handle/10179/4425>

Zarrugh, Amina Riad (2011, May): “Revenge of the Virtuous Women”: *Framing of Gender and Violence by Palestinian Militant Organizations*. (Master's Thesis, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/2152/11904>

Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Aharoni, Sarai B. (2014, August): The Gender–Culture Double Bind in Israeli–Palestinian Peace Negotiations: A Narrative Approach. *Security Dialogue*, 45(4), 373–390. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0967010614537329>

Ahmed, Hisham H. (2005): Palestinian Resistance and “Suicide Bombing”: Causes and Consequences. In: Tore Bjørgo (Ed.): *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward*. Abingdon: Routledge, 87–102.

Alexander, Yonah et al. (2014, June): Israeli–Palestinian Peace Process: Endless or Endgames? *Terrorism: An Electronic Journal and Knowledge Base*, 3(2). URL: <http://www.terrorismelectronicjournal.org/terrorism-journal-1/volume-iii-number-2/israeli-palestinian-peace-process>

Al-Rimmawi, Hussein (2009): Spatial Changes in Palestine: From Colonial Project to an Apartheid System. *African and Asian Studies*, 8(4), 375–412. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156920909X12525685704446>

Amara, Ahmad (2013, Summer): The Negev Land Question: Between Denial and Recognition. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 42(4), 27–47. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2013.42.4.27>

Aouragh, Miriyam (2008, November): Everyday Resistance on the Internet: The Palestinian Context. *Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research*, 1(2), 109–130. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/jammr.1.2.109_1

Arant, Ryan (2013, September): Egypt and Hamas Struggle with the Growing Salafist Threat in the Sinai. *Terrorism Monitor*, 11(17), 3–5. URL: http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_011_Issue17.pdf

Arav, Dan; Gurevitz, David (2014, April): Trauma, Guilt, Forgiveness: The Victimizer as Witness in the Cinematic and Televisual Representations of Conflict in Israel. *Media, War & Conflict*, 7(1), 104–120. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1750635213515098>

- Argo, Nichole (2009): Why Fight? Examining Self-Interested versus Communally-Oriented Motivations in Palestinian Resistance and Rebellion. *Security Studies*, 18(4), 651-680. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636410903368920> URL: <http://d3qi0qp55mx5f5.cloudfront.net/cpost/i/docs/Argo-Why-Fight.pdf>
- Aronoff, Myron J. (2011): The Politics of Collective Identity: Contested Israeli Nationalisms. In: Jean E. Rosenfeld (Ed.): *Terrorism, Identity and Legitimacy: The Four Waves Theory and Political Violence*. (Political Violence). Abingdon: Routledge, 168-189.
- Aronson, Geoffrey (2013, Spring): Policy Options in a Time of Transition: The US and the Israel-Palestine Conflict. *The Middle East Journal*, 67(2), 249-256. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/mej.2013.0045>
- Atran, Scott; Axelrod, Robert (Interviewer) (2010, May): Interview with Ramadan Shallah, Secretary General, Palestinian Islamic Jihad. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 4(2), 3-9. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/95>
- Auerbach, Yehudith; Maoz, Ifat (2012): Terror, Empathy and Reconciliation in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. In: Judith Renner; Alexander Spencer (Eds.): *Reconciliation after Terrorism: Strategy, Possibility or Absurdity?* (Routledge Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution). Abingdon: Routledge, 186-204.
- Aviv, Gali (2014): Crime Victims and Attitudes towards the Police: The Israeli Case. *Police Practice and Research*, 15(2), 115-129. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2013.874170>
- Azoulay, Ariella (2014, Summer): Palestine as Symptom, Palestine as Hope: Revising Human Rights Discourse. *Critical Inquiry*, 40(4), 332-364. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/676411>
- Babst, Gordon A.; Tellier, Nicole M. (2012, Spring): One State or Two in Israel/Palestine: The Stress on Gender and Citizenship. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 34(2), 70-91.
- Baeza, Cecilia (2014, Winter): Palestinians in Latin America: Between Assimilation and Long-Distance Nationalism. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 43(2), 59-72. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2014.43.2.59>
- Barber, Brian K.; Olsen, Joseph A. (2006): Adolescents' Willingness to Engage in Political Conflict: Lessons from the Gaza Strip. In: Jeff Victoroff (Ed.): *Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism*. (NATO Security through Science Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 11). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 203-226.
- Bar-Tal, Daniel (2001, September): Why does Fear Override Hope in Societies Engulfed by Intractable Conflict, as it does in the Israeli Society? *Political Psychology*, 22(3), 601-627. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00255> URL: <http://www.tau.ac.il/~daniel/pdf/8.pdf>
- Ben Hagai, Ella et al. (2013, December): Beliefs Predicting Peace, Beliefs Predicting War: Jewish Americans and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, 13(1), 286-309. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/asap.12023>
- Benziman, Yuval (2014): Dialogues without Narratives: The “London Talks” of the Negotiation for the Geneva Initiative. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 7(1), 76-94. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2014.930162>
- Berg, Carin (2012, October): Tunes of Religious Resistance? Understanding Hamas Music in a Conflict Context. *Contemporary Islam*, 6(3), 297-314. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11562-012-0219-6>

- Berko, Anat; Erez, Edna (2008): Martyrs or Murderers? Victims or Victimizers? The Voices of Would-Be Palestinian Female Suicide Bombers. In: Cindy D. Ness (Ed.): *Female Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, Utility, and Organization*. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 146-166.
- Bernard, Anna (2010, July-September): Another Black September? Palestinian Writing after 9/11. *Journal of Postcolonial Writing*, 46(3-4), 349-358. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449855.2010.482409>
- Berti, Benedetta (2012): Hizbullah, Hamas, and the “Arab Spring”: Weathering the Regional Storm? *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs*, 6(3), 21-29. URL: <http://www.israelcfr.com/documents/6-3/6-3-4-BenedettaBerti.pdf>
- Bisharat, George E. (2013, Spring): Violence’s Law: Israel’s Campaign to Transform International Legal Norms. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 42(3), 68-84. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2013.42.3.68>
- Bitari, Nidal (2013, Autumn): Yarmuk Refugee Camp and the Syrian Uprising: A View from Within. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 43(1), 61-78. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2013.43.1.61>
- Bloom, Mia M. (2012): Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding. In: John Horgan; Kurt Braddock (Eds.): *Terrorism Studies: A Reader*. Abingdon: Routledge, 289-310.
- Bose, Sumantra (2007): Israel and Palestine. In: *Contested Lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 204-289.
- Boudreau, Geneviève Boucher (2014): Radicalization of the Settlers’ Youth: Hebron as a Hub for Jewish Extremism. *Global Media Journal – Canadian Edition*, 7(1), 69-85. URL: http://www.gmj.uottawa.ca/1401/v7i1_boudreau_abstract.html
- Boxer, Paul et al. (2013, January-February): Exposure to Violence across the Social Ecosystem and the Development of Aggression: A Test of Ecological Theory in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict. *Child Development*, 84(1), 163-177. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2012.01848.x>
- Brittain, Victoria (2012, January-March): A Palestine that might have been. *Race & Class*, 53(3), 99-105. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0306396811425989>
- Brown, Nathan J. (2012): The Palestinians: Fighting and Governing. In: Robin Wright (Ed.): *The Islamists are Coming: Who They Really Are*. Washington, DC; Herndon: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; United States Institute of Peace Press, 81-90.
- Brym, Robert J.; Araj, Bader (2008, Fall): Palestinian Suicide Bombing Revisited: A Critique of the Outbidding Thesis. *Political Science Quarterly*, 123(3), 485-500. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165X.2008.tb00632.x> URL: <http://projects.chass.utoronto.ca/soc101y/brym/psq.pdf>
- Byman, Daniel (2013, Summer): Is Hamas Winning? *The Washington Quarterly*, 36(3), 63-76. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2013.825550> URL: http://csis.org/files/publication/TWQ_13Summer_Byman.pdf
- Calis, Irene (2013, Spring): Aid and Occupation: Maintaining the Status Quo in Palestine. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 42(3), 10-28. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2013.42.3.10>
- Caruso, Carmen (2014): Nationality Undetermined: Voices of the Palestinian Diaspora in Italy. *Interventions*, 16(3), 325-345. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2013.798135>

- Catignani, Sergio (2012): Israeli Counterinsurgency: The Never-Ending “Whack-a-Mole”. In: Paul B. Rich; Isabelle Duyvesteyn (Eds.): *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*. (Routledge Handbooks). Abingdon: Routledge, 263-275.
- Cohen-Almagor, Raphael (2013, Winter): Religious, Hateful, and Racist Speech in Israel. *Shofar*, 31(2), 95-117.
- Cohen-Chen, Smadar et al. (2014, January): Hope in the Middle East: Malleability Beliefs, Hope, and the Willingness to Compromise for Peace. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 5(1), 67-75. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1948550613484499>
- Cronin, Audrey Kurth (2009): The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process. In: *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 48-55.
- Cunningham, Karla (2008): The Evolving Participation of Muslim Women in Palestine, Chechnya, and the Global Jihadi Movement. In: Cindy D. Ness (Ed.): *Female Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, Utility, and Organization*. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 84-99.
- Dabed, Emilio (2014, Winter): A Constitution for a Nonstate: The False Hopes of Palestinian Constitutionalism, 1988-2007. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 43(2), 42-58. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2014.43.2.42>
- Daemberg, Judith (2012): Nahostkonflikt 2.0 – Israelis und Palästinenser zwischen virtueller Konfliktaustragung und Online-Frieden. *KAS Auslandsinformationen*, 11/2012, 6-20. URL: <http://www.kas.de/wf/de/33.32763>
- De Vries, Maya; Maoz, Ifat (2013): Tracking for Peace: Assessing the Effectiveness of Track Two Diplomacy in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 6(1-3), 62-74. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2013.861074>
- Di Maio, Michele; Nandi, Tushar K. (2013, January): The Effect of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict on Child Labor and School Attendance in the West Bank. *Journal of Development Economics*, 100(1), 107-116. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2012.08.007>
- Dolnik, Adam (2007): Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command. In: *Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics and Global Trends*. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 81-103.
- Emery, Alan; Will, Donald (2014): Liberation Movements, Universal Citizenship and the Resolution of Ethno-National Conflict: ANC Non-Racialism and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict. *Third World Quarterly*, 35(3), 447-467. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2014.893487>
- Factor, Roni; Castilo, Juan Carlos; Rattner, Arye (2014): Procedural Justice, Minorities, and Religiosity. *Police Practice and Research*, 15(2), 130-142. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2013.874171>
- Fahmy, Shahira; Eakin, Britain (2014, February): High Drama on the High Seas: Peace versus War Journalism Framing of an Israeli/Palestinian-Related Incident. *International Communication Gazette*, 76(1), 86-105. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1748048513504046>
- Falk, Richard (2013, Summer): Rethinking the Palestinian Future. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 42(4), 73-86. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2013.42.4.73>

- Faulkner, Simon (2013, November): Images and Demonstrations in the Occupied West Bank. *JOMEC Journal*, 4. URL: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/jomec/jomecjournal/4-november2013/Faulkner_WestBank.pdf
- Figenschou, Tine Ustad (2014): Challenging the Spin: The Gaza War 2008-2009. In: *Al Jazeera and the Global Media Landscape: The South is Talking Back*. (Routledge Advances in Internationalizing Media Studies, Vol. 11). New York: Routledge, 118-138.
- Freilich, Charles D. (2013, Spring): National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Improving the Process. *The Middle East Journal*, 67(2), 257-266. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/mej.2013.0022>
- Gabrielsen, Iver (2014): The Evolution of Hezbollah's Strategy and Military Performance, 1982-2006. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 25(2), 257-283. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2014.903636>
- Gaisbauer, Felix (2012): Darstellungen von Viktimisierung und Verantwortlichkeit während der Zweiten Intifada und dem Gazakrieg in deutschen Qualitätstageszeitungen. *conflict & communication online*, 11(2). URL: http://www.cco.regener-online.de/2012_2/pdf/gaisbauer_dt.pdf
- Gaiser, Evelyn (2014, August): Das Verhältnis von Militär und Gesellschaft in Israel: Das ganze Volk ist die Armee, das ganze Land ist die Front. *KAS Auslandsinformationen*, 8/2014. URL: <http://www.kas.de/wf/de/33.38621>
- Ganor, Boaz (2007): Israel, Hamas, and Fatah. In: Robert J. Art; Louise Richardson (Eds.): *Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 261-304.
- Gelkopf, Marc et al. (2012, March): Protective Factors and Predictors of Vulnerability to Chronic Stress: A Comparative Study of 4 Communities after 7 Years of Continuous Rocket Fire. *Social Science & Medicine*, 74(5), 757-766. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.10.022> URL: <https://webfiles.uci.edu/rsilver/Gelkopf%20et%20al.%20Social%20Science%20&%20Medicine,%202012.pdf>
- Giacaman, Faris (2013, Autumn): Political Representation and Armed Struggle. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 43(1), 24-40. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2013.43.1.24>
- Ginsberg, Terri (2011): Radical Rationalism as Cinema Aesthetics: The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict in North American Documentary and Experimental Film. *Situations: Project of the Radical Imagination*, 4(1), 91-115. URL: <http://ojs.gc.cuny.edu/index.php/situations/article/download/767/1198>
- Gleis, Joshua L. (2007): Israel's Struggle against Palestinian Terrorist Organizations. In: James J. F. Forest (Ed.): *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives*. (Volume 3: Lessons from the Fight against Terrorism). Westport: Praeger Security International, 408-429.
- Goerzig, Carolin (2010): The PLO's Change of Ends and the Reaction of Hamas. In: *Talking to Terrorists: Concessions and the Renunciation of Violence*. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 45-64.
- Gunning, Jeroen (2008): Terrorism, Charities and Diasporas: Contrasting the Fundraising Practices of Hamas and al Qaeda among Muslims in Europe. In: Thomas J. Biersteker; Sue E. Eckert (Eds.): *Countering the Financing of Terrorism*. Abingdon: Routledge, 93-125.
- Haboub, Wael J. (2012, March): Demystifying the Rise of Hamas. *Journal of Developing Societies*, 28(1), 57-79. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0169796X1102800103>
- Halevi, Jonathan Dahoah (2010): The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Reflected through the Internet. In: Hans-

- Ljudger Dienel et al. (Eds.): *Terrorism and the Internet: Threats – Target Groups – Deradicalisation Strategies*. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 67). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 115-121. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-60750-537-2-115>
- Handley, Robert L. (2008, April): Israeli Image Repair: Recasting the Deviant Actor to Retell the Story. *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, 32(2), 140-154. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0196859907311695>
- Handley, Robert L. (2009): The Conflicting Israeli-Terrorist Image: Managing the Israeli-Palestinian Narrative in the New York Times and Washington Post. *Journalism Practice*, 3(3), 251-267. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17512780902798711>
- Handley, Robert L.; Ismail, Amani (2010, December): Territory under Siege: “Their” News, “our” News and “ours both” News of the 2008 Gaza Crisis. *Media, War & Conflict*, 3(3), 279-297. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1750635210364690> URL: <http://teroauvinen3.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/media-war-conflict-2010-handley-279-97.pdf>
- Hasisi, Badi; Weisburd, David (2014): Policing Terrorism and Police–Community Relations: Views of the Arab Minority in Israel. *Police Practice and Research*, 15(2), 158-172. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2013.874173>
- Hauswedell, Corinna; Johannsen, Margret (2009, September): Konflikte entmilitarisieren: Erfahrungen aus Nordirland, Palästina und Israel. *Hamburger Informationen zur Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik*, 47/2009. URL: <http://ifsh.de/pdf/publikationen/hifs/HI47.pdf>
- Hegghammer, Thomas (2013): ‘Abdallāh ‘Azzām and Palestine. *Die Welt des Islams*, 53(3-4), 353-387. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685152-5334P0003> URL: http://hegghammer.com/files/Hegghammer_%27Abdallah_%27Azzam_and_Palestine.pdf
- Hegghammer, Thomas; Wagemakers, Joas (2013): The Palestine Effect: The Role of Palestinians in the Transnational Jihad Movement. *Die Welt des Islams*, 53(3-4), 281-314. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685152-5334P0001> URL: http://hegghammer.com/files/The_Palestine_Effect_The_Role_of_Palestinians_in_the_Transnational_Jihad_Movement.pdf
- Heller, Mark A. (2010): The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. In: Myriam Dunn Cavelty; Victor Mauer (Eds.): *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*. (Routledge Handbooks). Abingdon: Routledge, 339-348.
- Hoffman, Bruce (2013): The Palestine Police Force and the Challenges of Gathering Counterterrorism Intelligence, 1939-1947. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 24(4), 609-647. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2013.857936>
- Ihle, Rico; Rubin, Ofir D. (2013, October): Consequences of Unintended Food Policies: Food Price Dynamics Subject to the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict. *Food Policy*, 42, 96-105. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2013.07.007>
- Ismail, Amani (2008, Spring): To Counter and to Resist: Cyber Discourses of Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. *Global Media Journal: Mediterranean Edition*, 3(1), 35-49. URL: http://globalmedia.emu.edu.tr/images/stories/ALL_ARTICLES/2008/spring2008/issues/4.%20Cyber%20discourses%20of%20Hezbollah%20and%20Palestinian%20Islamic%20Jihad.pdf
- Ismail, Amani (2008, August): Mission Statehood: Portraits of the Second Palestinian Intifada in US News Media. *Media, War & Conflict*, 1(2), 177-201. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1750635208090956>

- Ismail, Amani (2010, March): When the “Fortress Crumbled”: The Israel-Jenin Story in U.S. News Media. *Communication. Culture & Critique*, 3(1), 66-84. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1753-9137.2009.01058.x>
- Jabareen, Hassan (2013, Autumn): 20 Years of Oslo: The Green Line’s Challenge to the Statehood Project. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 43(1), 41-50. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2013.43.1.41>
- Jäger-Gogoll, Anne Maximiliane (2012): Wider den Krieg der Bilder: Palästinensische Selbstmordattentäter im israelischen und palästinensischen Film. In: Stefan Bronner; Hans-Joachim Schott (Eds.): *Die Gewalt der Zeichen: Terrorismus als symbolisches Phänomen*. (Bamberger Studien zu Literatur, Kultur und Medien, Vol. 3). Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press, 193-218. URL: <http://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-bamberg/frontdoor/index/index/docId/347>
- Jonathan-Zamir, Tal; Aviv, Gali (2014): How has the Israel National Police Perceived its Role in Counterterrorism and the Potential Outcomes? A Qualitative Analysis of Annual Police Reports. *Police Practice and Research*, 15(2), 143-157. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2013.874172>
- Jones, Clive (2010): Israel and the al-Aqsa Intifada: The Concepts of Terror. In: Asaf Siniver (Ed.): *International Terrorism Post-9/11: Comparative Dynamics and Responses*. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 126-143.
- Hafez, Mohammed M. (2006): Moral Agents, Immoral Violence: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in Palestinian Suicide Terrorism. In: Jeff Victoroff (Ed.): *Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism*. (NATO Security through Science Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 11). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 292-307.
- Halabi, Rabah; Zak, Michal (2014): Narratives in Conflict: A Postcolonial Interpretation of Youth Encounters between Jews and Palestinians from Israel. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 7(1), 58-75. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2014.909945>
- Halperin, Eran et al. (2013, January): Can Emotion Regulation Change Political Attitudes in Intractable Conflicts? From the Laboratory to the Field. *Psychological Science*, 24(1), 106-111. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797612452572>
- Harik, Judith Palmer; Johannsen, Margaret (2012): Hezbollah and Hamas: Islamic Insurgents with Nationalist Causes. In: Paul B. Rich; Isabelle Duyvesteyn (Eds.): *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*. (Routledge Handbooks). Abingdon: Routledge, 183-197.
- Hrouh, Khaled (2009): Salafi Formations in Palestine: The Limits of a de-Palestinised Milieu. In: Roel Meijer (Ed.): *Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement*. New York: Columbia University Press, 221-243.
- Kalb, Marvin; Saivetz, Carol (2007, July): The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006: The Media as a Weapon in Asymmetrical Conflict. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 12(3), 43-66. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1081180X07303934> URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2007/0217islamic%20world/2007islamforum_israel%20hezb%20war.pdf
- Kamolnick, Paul (2010, July): Sacred Barriers to Conflict Resolution? A Critique of Atran’s and Axelrod’s Bargaining Model as Applied to the Israeli-Palestinian Confrontation. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 4(3), 39-53. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/106>
- Kampf, Ronit (2014, March): Are Two better than one? Playing Singly, Playing in Dyads in a Computerized Simulation of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict. *Computers in Human Behavior*, 32, 9-14. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2013.11.011>

[org/10.1016/j.chb.2013.11.005](http://www.meforum.org/10.1016/j.chb.2013.11.005)

Karmon, Ely (2005): The Palestinian Terrorist Organizations. In: *Coalitions between Terrorist Organizations: Revolutionaries, Nationalists and Islamists*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 235-278.

Karsh, Efraim (2014, Spring): The Palestinians' Real Enemies. *Middle East Quarterly*, 21(2). URL: <http://www.meforum.org/3766/palestinians-enemies>

Karsh, Efraim (2014, Summer): Palestinian Leaders Don't Want an Independent State. *Middle East Quarterly*, 21(3). URL: <http://www.meforum.org/3831/palestinians-reject-statehood>

Kempf, Wilhelm (2014): Human Rights Orientation and the Assessment of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. *Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz*, 77. URL: http://www.regener-online.de/books/diskuss_pdf/77.pdf

Kempf, Wilhelm (2014): Media Construction of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Case of the German Press and the German Public. *Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz*, 78. URL: http://www.regener-online.de/books/diskuss_pdf/78.pdf

Kempf, Wilhelm; Thiel, Stephanie (2012): On the Interaction between Media Frames and Individual Frames of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. *conflict & communication online*, 11(2). URL: http://www.cco.regener-online.de/2012_2/pdf/kempf-thiel-neu.pdf

Khalidi, Rashid (2013, Summer): The United States and the Palestinians, 1977-2012: Three Key Moments. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 42(4), 61-72. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2013.42.4.61>

Khalidi, Rashid (2014, Summer): 1948 and after in Palestine: Universal Themes? *Critical Inquiry*, 40(4), 314-331. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/676410>

Khoury, Elias (2013, Spring): Remembering Ghassan Kanafani, or How a Nation was Born of Story Telling. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 42(3), 85-91. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2013.42.3.85>

Kimhi, Shaul; Even, Shemuel (2006): The Palestinian Human Bombers. In: Jeff Victoroff (Ed.): *Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism*. (NATO Security through Science Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 11). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 308-323.

Korn, Alina (2004, April): Israeli Press and the War against Terrorism: The Construction of the "Liquidation Policy". *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 41(3), 209-234. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:CRIS.0000024404.11674.23>

Kotia, Emmanuel Wekem; Edu-Afful, Fiifi (2014, June): The Lebanon-Israel War of 2006: Global Effects and its Aftermath. *Small Wars Journal*, 6/2014. URL: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-lebanon-israel-war-of-2006-global-effects-and-its-aftermath>

Lavi, Iris et al. (2014, February): Protected by Ethos in a Protracted Conflict? A Comparative Study among Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 58(1), 68-92. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002712459711>

Liebes, Tamar; Kampf, Zohar (2007, Winter): Routinizing Terror: Media Coverage and Public Practices in Israel, 2000-2005. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 12(1), 108-116. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1081180X06297120>

- Lia, Brynjar (2000): The Establishment of a Palestinian Police Force in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In: Tor Tanke Holm; Espen Barth Eide (Eds.): *Peacebuilding and Police Reform*. (Cass Series on Peacekeeping, Vol. 7). London: Frank Cass. URL: <https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxqaWhhZGZlbXN0dWRpZXNuZXR8Z3g6NjhmOTMxMmIyMGRiZTI5OA>
- Lustick, Ian S. (2013, Spring): What Counts is the Counting: Statistical Manipulation as a Solution to Israel's "Demographic Problem". *The Middle East Journal*, 67(2), 185-205. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/mej.2013.0033>
- Lustick, Ian S. et al. (2013, Winter): Symposium: Two States or One? The Future of Israelis and Palestinians. *Middle East Policy*, 20(4), 1-28. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12042>
- Makdisi, Karim (2014, Winter): Reconsidering the Struggle over UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 43(2), 24-41. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2014.43.2.24>
- Mann, Joseph (2014): Saudi-Palestinian Relations during the Run-Up to and the Aftermath of Black September. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26(4), 713-724. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.773899>
- Manor, Yohanan; Mizrahi, Ido (2010, Spring): Hamas's Web School for Suicide Bombers. *Middle East Quarterly*, 17(2), 31-40. URL: <http://www.meforum.org/2675/hamas-web-school-suicide-bombers>
- Maoz, Ifat (2010): Asymmetric Struggle for the Hearts and Minds of Viewers: Can the Media Actually Trigger Sympathy towards Terrorists? *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 3(2), 99-110. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2010.531036>
- Mason, Michael (2013, December): Climate Change, Securitisation and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict. *The Geographical Journal*, 179(4), 298-308. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geoj.12007>
- Mason, Victoria (2012): "No Permission to Shoot in Gaza is Necessary": Israeli State Terror against Palestinians in Gaza during Operation Cast Lead. In: Scott Poynting; David Whyte (Eds.): *Counter-Terrorism and State Political Violence: The "War on Terror" as Terror*. (Critical Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 116-138.
- McClure, John (2013, Winter): Has Hamas' Progressive Terrorism Tactics Evolved Past Traditional Counterterrorism Measures? An Analysis of a Means to an End for the Terrorist Organization Hamas. *Global Security Studies*, 4(1), 31-37. URL: <http://globalsecuritystudies.com/McClure%20Hammas%20Strategy.pdf>
- Melki, Jad (2014, August): The Interplay of Politics, Economics and Culture in News Framing of Middle East Wars. *Media, War & Conflict*, 7(2), 165-186. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1750635214537405>
- Miaari, Sami; Zussman, Asaf; Zussman, Noam (2014, May): Employment Restrictions and Political Violence in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 101, 24-44. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.02.002>
- Milton-Edwards, Beverley (2013, Fall): Hamas and the Arab Spring: Strategic Shifts? *Middle East Policy*, 20(3), 60-72. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12033>
- Milton-Edwards, Beverley (2014): Islamist versus Islamist: Rising Challenge in Gaza. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26(2), 259-276. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.690791>
- Mor, Ben D. (2014, August): The Structure of Rhetorical Defense in Public Diplomacy: Israel's Social

- Account of the 2010 Turkish Flotilla Incident. *Media, War & Conflict*, 7(2), 250-265. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1750635214538621>
- Naaman, Dorit (2007, Summer): Brides of Palestine/Angels of Death: Media, Gender, and Performance in the Case of the Palestinian Female Suicide Bombers. *Signs*, 32(4), 933-955. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/512624>
- Nesser, Petter (2013): Abū Qatāda and Palestine. *Die Welt des Islams*, 53(3-4), 416-448. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685152-5334P0005>
- Nets-Zehngut, Rafi; Bar-Tal, Daniel (2014, March): Transformation of the Official Memory of Conflict: A Tentative Model and the Israeli Memory of the 1948 Palestinian Exodus. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, 27(1), 67-91. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10767-013-9147-6>
- Noy, Chaim; Kohn, Ayelet (2010): Mediating Touristic Dangerscapes: The Semiotics of State Travel Warnings Issued to Israeli Tourists. *Journal of Tourism and Cultural Change*, 8(3), 206-222. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14766825.2010.517318>
- Orenes, Philippe (2014, May): Operation Pillar of Defence and the 2013 Israeli Elections: Defensive or Provocative Intervention? *Journal of Terrorism Research*, 5(2), 45-58. URL: <http://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/jtr/article/view/882>
- Ozohu-Suleiman, Yakubu (2014, April): War Journalism on Israel/Palestine: Does Contra-Flow Really Make a Difference? *Media, War & Conflict*, 7(1), 85-103. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1750635213516697>
- Pappé, Ilan (2009, August): De-Terrorising the Palestinian National Struggle: The Roadmap to Peace. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 2(2), 127-146. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539150903021399> URL: <http://www.havenscenter.org/files/roadmap.pdf>
- Pappé, Ilan (2014): The Inevitable War on Terror: De-terrorising the Palestinians. In: Alex Houen (Ed.): *States of War since 9/11: Terrorism, Sovereignty and the War on Terror*. (Routledge Critical Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 84-102.
- Paz, Reuven (2011): Jihadists and Nationalist Islamists: Al-Qa'ida and Hamas. In: Assaf Moghadam; Brian Fishman (Eds.): *Fault Lines in Global Jihad: Organizational, Strategic, and Ideological Fissures*. (Political Violence). Abingdon: Routledge, 203-219.
- Pedahzur, Ami; Perliger, Arie (2011): Coping with Terrorism: Lessons Learned from the Israeli Secret Services. In: James J. F. Forest (Ed.): *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives*. (Volume I: Strategic and Tactical Considerations). Westport: Praeger Security International, 465-486.
- Pedahzur, Ami; Perliger, Arie (2011): The Fourth Wave: Comparison of Jewish and other Manifestations of Religious Terrorism. In: Jean E. Rosenfeld (Ed.): *Terrorism, Identity and Legitimacy: The Four Waves Theory and Political Violence*. (Political Violence). Abingdon: Routledge, 103-111.
- Pedahzur, Ami; Ranstorp, Magnus (2012): A Tertiary Model for Countering Terrorism in Liberal Democracies: The Case of Israel. In: John Horgan; Kurt Braddock (Eds.): *Terrorism Studies: A Reader*. Abingdon: Routledge, 313-330.
- Perliger, Arie; Hasasi, Badi; Pedahzur, Ami (2009, December): Policing Terrorism in Israel. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, 36(12), 1279-1304. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0093854809345827>

- Perry, Simon; Jonathan-Zamir, Tal (2014): Lessons from Empirical Research on Policing in Israel: Policing Terrorism and Police–Community Relationships. *Police Practice and Research*, 15(2), 173-187. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2013.874175>
- Philo, Greg (2012): Pictures and Public Relations in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. In: Des Freedman; Daya Kishan Thussu (Eds.): *Media and Terrorism: Global Perspectives*. London: SAGE, 151-164.
- Plasse-Couture, François-Xavier (2013, October-December): Effective Abandonment: The Neoliberal Economy of Violence in Israel and the Occupied Territories. *Security Dialogue*, 44(5-6), 449-466. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0967010613499787>
- Plaut, Steven (2014, Summer): The Myth of Ethnic Inequality in Israel. *Middle East Quarterly*, 21(3). URL: <http://www.meforum.org/3839/israel-inequality>
- Pratto, Felicia et al. (2014, January): Attitudes toward Arab Ascendance: Israeli and Global Perspectives. *Psychological Science*, 25(1), 85-94. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797613497021>
- Prentice, Sheryl et al. (2011, March): Analyzing the Semantic Content and Persuasive Composition of Extremist Media: A Case Study of Texts Produced during the Gaza Conflict. *Information Systems Frontiers*, 13(1), 61-73. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10796-010-9272-y>
- Price, Daniel E. (2012): Islam: Hamas, Hezbollah, and al Qaeda. In: *Sacred Terror: How Faith Becomes Lethal*. Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 183-214.
- Primoratz, Igor (2013): Case Study: Terrorism in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. In: *Terrorism: A Philosophical Investigation*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 148-169.
- Quiquívix, Linda (2014): Art of War, Art of Resistance: Palestinian Counter-Cartography on Google Earth. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 104(3), 444-459. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00045608.2014.892328>
- Reifen Tagar, Michal et al. (2014, March): When Ideology Matters: Moral Conviction and the Association between Ideology and Policy Preferences in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 44(2), 117-125. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.1993> URL: <http://tigger.uic.edu/~lskitka/ReifenEtal2013.pdf>
- Ricolfi, Luca (2005): Palestinians, 1981-2003. In: Diego Gambetta (Ed.): *Making Sense of Suicide Missions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 77-130.
- Riegler, Thomas (2014): Diplomatie und Terror: Die Operationen des PLO-Geheimdienstes 1979 in der BRD und in Österreich. *Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies (JIPSS)*, 8(1), 30-58.
- Roberts, Nicholas E. (2013, Summer): Dividing Jerusalem: British Urban Planning in the Holy City. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 42(4), 7-26. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2013.42.4.7>
- Robinson, Glenn E. (2004): Hamas as Social Movement. In: Quintan Wiktorowicz (Ed.): *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*. (Indiana Series in Middle East Studies). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 112-142.
- Ron, Yiftach; Maoz, Ifat (2013): Peacemaking through Dialogue? Effects of Intergroup Dialogue on Perceptions Regarding the Resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 6(1-3), 75-89. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2013.861918>

- Ron, Yiftach; Maoz, Ifat (2013, August): Dangerous Stories: Encountering Narratives of the Other in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 19(3), 281-294. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0033686>
- Rosenberg, Hananel; Maoz, Ifat (2012): “Meeting the Enemy”: The Reception of a Television Interview with a Female Palestinian Terrorist among Jewish Youth in Israel. *The Communication Review*, 15(1), 45-71. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10714421.2012.647287>
- Roy, Sudeshna (2012, October): Culturally Unconscious: Intercultural Implications of The New York Times Representation of the Israel–Palestine Conflict in 2009 and 2011. *International Communication Gazette*, 74(6), 556-570. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1748048512454823>
- Sanagan, Mark (2013): Teacher, Preacher, Soldier, Martyr: Rethinking ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassām. *Die Welt des Islams*, 53(3-4), 315-352. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685152-5334P0002>
- Sayigh, Rosemary (2013, Autumn): On the Exclusion of the Palestinian Nakba from the “Trauma Genre”. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 43(1), 51-60. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2013.43.1.51>
- Schubert, Manuel; Graf Lambsdorff, Johann (2014, June): Negative Reciprocity in an Environment of Violent Conflict: Experimental Evidence from the Occupied Palestinian Territories. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 58(4), 539-563. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002713478792>
- Schweitzer, Yoram (2008): Palestinian Female Suicide Bombers: Virtuous Heroines or Damaged Goods? In: Cindy D. Ness (Ed.): *Female Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, Utility, and Organization*. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 131-145.
- Seidel, Timothy (2012, December): Development, Religion, and Modernity in Palestine-Israel. *CrossCurrents*, 62(4), 424-441. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cros.12001>
- Sela-Shayovitz, Revital (2007): Suicide Bombers in Israel: Their Motivations, Characteristics, and Prior Activity in Terrorist Organizations. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, 1(2), 160-168. URL: <http://www.ijcv.org/index.php/ijcv/article/viewArticle/13>
- Shafir, Gershon (2013): Barriers to Rights in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. In: Alison Brysk (Ed.): *The Politics of the Globalization of Law: Getting from Rights to Justice*. (Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics, Vol. 104). New York: Routledge, 160-179.
- Shamay-Tsoory, Simone G. et al. (2013, December): Giving Peace a Chance: Oxytocin Increases Empathy to Pain in the Context of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict. *Psychoneuroendocrinology*, 38(12), 3139-3144. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psyneuen.2013.09.015> URL: http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jean_Decety/publication/257529820_Giving_peace_a_chance_Oxytocin_increases_empathy_to_pain_in_the_context_of_the_Israeli-Palestinian_conflict/file/60b7d527674fd1f0cb.pdf
- Shamir, Eitan (2014): A Very Sharp Eye: Moshe Dayan’s Counterinsurgency Legacy in Israel. In: Andrew Mumford; Bruno C. Reis (Eds.): *The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare: Warrior-Scholarship in Counter-Insurgency*. (Studies in Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and National Security). Abingdon: Routledge, 84-104.
- Sharvit, Keren et al. (2013): The Effects of Israeli Use of Coercive and Conciliatory Tactics on Palestinian’s Use of Terrorist Tactics: 2000–2006. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 6(1-3), 22-44. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2013.834067>
- Sheafer, Tamir et al. (2014): Relative Political and Value Proximity in Mediated Public Diplomacy: The

Effect of State-Level Homophily on International Frame Building. *Political Communication*, 31(1), 149-167. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2013.799107> URL: <http://portal.idc.ac.il/he/schools/government/research/documents/sheaffer.pdf>

Sheikh, Hammad; Ginges, Jeremy; Atran, Scott (2013, September): Sacred Values in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict: Resistance to Social Influence, Temporal Discounting, and Exit Strategies. *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 1299, 11-24. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nyas.12275> URL: http://sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/files/nyassheikh_etal_2013_proof.pdf

Shomali, Qustandi (2010): A Semiotic Analysis of 9/11 in the Palestinian Press. *Journal of Media Sociology*, 2(1-4), 241-253. URL: http://www.marquettebooks.com/images/Vol_2_2010_fixed.pdf

SITE Intelligence Group (2008, December): Differing Opinions of Mumbai Attacks amongst Palestinian Forum Members. *inSITE*, 1(8), 19-21. URL: http://sitemultimedia.org/docs/inSITE_December_2008.pdf

Slater, Jerome (2007, Fall): Muting the Alarm over the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The New York Times versus Haaretz, 2000-06. *International Security*, 32(2), 84-120. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec.2007.32.2.84>

Sorek, Tamir (2013, Autumn): Calendars, Martyrs, and Palestinian Particularism under British Rule. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 43(1), 6-23. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2013.43.1.6> URL: <http://plaza.ufl.edu/tsorek/articles/Calendars.pdf>

Spears, Ian S. (2014): Evaluating “Two-State Condominialism’: A New Approach to Resolving the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict? *Global Change, Peace & Security*, 26(2), 195-210. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2014.911158>

Strand, Trude (2014, Winter): Tightening the Noose: The Institutionalized Impoverishment of Gaza, 2005-2010. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 43(2), 6-23. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2014.43.2.6>

Tamari, Salim (2013, Summer): Normalcy and Violence: The Yearning for the Ordinary in Discourse of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 42(4), 48-60. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2013.42.4.48>

Tessler, Mark (2014): The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. In: Ellen Lust (Ed.): *The Middle East*. (13th ed.). Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 287-366.

Thiel, Stephanie; Kempf, Wilhelm (2014): Audience Reactions to Peace Journalism: How Supporters and Critics of the Israeli Policy Process Escalation and De-Escalation Oriented Media Frames. *conflict & communication online*, 13(1). URL: http://www.cco.regener-online.de/2014_1/abstr_engl/thiel-kempf_abstr_engl.html

Tuastad, Dag (2013, Fall): Hamas-PLO Relations before and after the Arab Spring. *Middle East Policy*, 20(3), 86-98. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12035>

Wagemakers, Joas (2013): In Search of “Lions and Hawks”: Abū Muḥammad al-Maḳdisī’s Palestinian Identity. *Die Welt des Islams*, 53(3-4), 388-415. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685152-5334P0004>

Waxman, Dov (2011, December): Living with Terror, not Living in Terror: The Impact of Chronic Terrorism on Israeli Society. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 5(5-6), 4-26. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/living-with-terror>

- Waxman, Dov (2012, Winter): A Dangerous Divide: The Deterioration of Jewish-Palestinian Relations in Israel. *The Middle East Journal*, 66(1), 11-29. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.3751/66.1.11>
- Weimann, Gabriel (1985): Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Labelling Terrorism in the Israeli Press. *Political Communication*, 2(4), 433-445. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10584609.1985.9962776>
- Weisburd, David; Amram, Shai (2014): The Law of Concentrations of Crime at Place: The Case of Tel Aviv-Jaffa. *Police Practice and Research*, 15(2), 101-114. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2013.874169>
- Weisburd, David; Hasisi, Badi; Jonathan-Zamir, Tal (2014): Trends in Israeli Policing: Terrorism, Community, Victimization and Crime Control. *Police Practice and Research*, 15(2), 97-100. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2013.874167>
- Wilson, Timothy (2013): Turbulent Stasis: Comparative Reflections upon Intercommunal Violence and Territoriality in the Israel/Palestine Conflict. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 19(1), 58-79. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2013.761899>
- Yarchi, Moran (2014): The Effect of Female Suicide Attacks on Foreign Media Framing of Conflicts: The Case of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 37(8), 674-688. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.921768>
- Yehoshua, Sagit (2014): The Israeli Experience of Terrorist Leaders in Prison: Issues in Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation. In: Andrew Silke (Ed.) (2014): *Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform*. (Political Violence). Abingdon: Routledge, 144-156.
- Yiftachel, Oren (2006): *Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Yiftachel, Oren (2013, Spring): Liberal Colonialism? Israel's 2013 Elections and the "Ethnocratic Bubble". *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 42(3), 48-67. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2013.42.3.48>
- Zeitsoff, Thomas (2011, December): Using Social Media to Measure Conflict Dynamics: An Application to the 2008-2009 Gaza Conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 55(6), 938-969. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002711408014>
- Zeitsoff, Thomas (2014, June): Anger, Exposure to Violence, and Intragroup Conflict: A "Lab in the Field" Experiment in Southern Israel. *Political Psychology*, 35(3), 309-335. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/pops.12065> URL: http://www.zeitsoff.com/uploads/2/2/4/1/22413724/zeitsoff_rockets_polpsych.pdf
- Ziolkowski, Britt (2012, September): Weibliche Selbstmordattentäter in den Palästinensergebieten: Gesellschaftliche Resonanz und sicherheitspolitische Bedeutung. *Die Kriminalpolizei*, 09/2012. URL: <http://www.kriminalpolizei.de/ausgaben/2012/september/detailansicht-september/artikel/weibliche-selbstmordattentaeter-in-den-palaestiniensergebieten.html>

Grey Literature

- Abraham, Karin (2014, April): «Price Tag» and Radical Settler Terrorism. (SISA Report No. 22 – 2014). URL: http://strategiskanalyse.no/Publikasjoner%202014/2014-04-22_SISA22_Price-Tag_KA.pdf
- Abu Ras, Thabit (2013, July): *The Praver Plan and the Confiscation of the Land of the Negev Arabs*. (ACRPS Case Analysis). URL: <http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/d3263477-f307-4522-87d3-19b2f277b423>

Alon, Hanan (1980, August): *Countering Palestinian Terrorism in Israel: Toward a Policy Analysis of Countermeasures*. (RAND Notes, N-1567-FF). URL: <http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N1567.html>

Alpher, Yossi (2005, September): *The Future of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Critical Trends Affecting Israel*. (USIP Special Report, 149). URL: <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr149.pdf>

Alpher, Yossi (2013, June): *Israel: Alternative Regional Options in a Changing Middle East*. (NOREF Report). URL: <http://www.peacebuilding.no/Regions/Middle-East-and-North-Africa/Israel-Palestine/Publications/Israel-alternative-regional-options-in-a-changing-Middle-East>

Amrov, Sabrien (2014, January): *Intractable Peace 2.0.1.3: Israel – Palestine*. (SETA Analysis, No. 3). URL: <http://setav.org/en/intractable-peace-2013-israel-palestine/analysis/14407>

Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) (2014, April): *Palestinian Public Opinion: Attitudes towards Peace Negotiations and National Reconciliation*. (Arab Public Opinion Project – Arab Index 2014). URL: <http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/0b6f8087-fdf2-4b86-8b02-8af3670d95d2>

Barahmeh, Salem (2014, June): *The Palestinians, the PLO, and Political Representation: The Search for Palestinian Self-Determination*. (ICSR, The Atkin Paper Series). URL: <http://icsr.info/2014/07/palestinians-plo-political-representation-search-palestinian-self-determination>

Bauck, Petter; Omer, Mohammed (2013, October): *The Oslo Accords, 1993 and 20 Years on: Israeli and Palestinian Dilemmas*. (NOREF Expert Analysis). URL: <http://www.peacebuilding.no/Regions/Middle-East-and-North-Africa/Israel-Palestine/Publications/The-Oslo-Accords-1993-and-20-years-on-Israeli-and-Palestinian-dilemmas>

Benotman, Noman; Swan, Ed. (2013, December): *Israel-Palestine: The Peace Process and Global Extremist Discourse*. (Quilliam Report). URL: <http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/israel-palestine-the-peace-process-and-global-extremist-discourse.pdf>

Berman, Eli; Laitin, David D. (2008, January): *Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing the Club Model*. (NBER Working Paper Series, No. 13725). URL: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w13725>

Cordesman, Anthony H. (2014, July): *Gaza: The Human Dimension*. (CSIS Report). URL: <http://csis.org/publication/gaza-human-dimension>

Djerejian, Edward P.; Al-Abid, Samih; Hirschfeld, Yair (2014, July): *Changing Minds, Making Peace: U.S. Public Diplomacy Strategy in Support of an Israeli-Palestinian Two-State Solution*. (Baker Institute Policy Report). URL: <http://bakerinstitute.org/research/changing-minds-making-peace-us-public-diplomacy-strategy-support-israeli-palestinian-two-state-solut>

Dror, Tal (2014, June): *“Always the Bridesmaid?” The EU Role in the Middle East Peace Process*. (ICSR, The Atkin Paper Series). URL: <http://icsr.info/2014/07/9108>

Finkelstein, Justin Scott (2014, February): *An Opening for Peace: Israelis, Palestinians and the Two-State Solution*. (FPRI E-Notes). URL: <http://www.fpri.org/articles/2014/02/opening-peace-israelis-palestinians-and-two-state-solution>

Garcia-Arcos, Sergio (2013, June): *Hizb Al-Tahrir in Palestine: A New Political Actor?* (NOREF Expert Analysis). URL: <http://www.peacebuilding.no/Regions/Middle-East-and-North-Africa/Israel-Palestine/Publications/Hizb-Al-Tahrir-in-Palestine-a-new-political-actor>

- Gold, Zack (2013, October): *Sinai Security: Opportunities for Unlikely Cooperation among Egypt, Israel, and Hamas*. (Saban Center for Middle East Policy Analysis Papers, No. 30). URL: <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/10/22-sinai-hamas-egypt-israel-gold>
- Gresh, Alain (2011, September): *The Strategic Crisis of the Palestinians' National Movement and the UN Bid*. (ACRPS Dossiers). URL: <http://english.dohainstitute.org/file/Get/2571bc0d-5187-4f75-a5c9-7dc6186c91a1>
- Høigilt, Jacob; Atallah, Akram; el-Dada, Hani (2013, June): *Palestinian Youth Activism: New Actors, New Possibilities?* (NOREF Report). URL: <http://www.peacebuilding.no/Regions/Middle-East-and-North-Africa/Israel-Palestine/Publications/Palestinian-youth-activism-new-actors-new-possibilities>
- IntelCenter (2009, January): *Gaza Response: Analysis of Jihadist Statements & Threatened Targets. v1.0*. (IntelCenter Analytical Report). URL: <http://www.intelcenter.com/GazaResponse-v1-0-30Jan2009.pdf>
- International Crisis Group (2013, November): *Leap of Faith: Israel's National Religious and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. (Middle East Report N°147). URL: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/israel-palestine/147-leap-of-faith-israel-s-national-religious-and-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict.aspx>
- International Crisis Group (2014, March): *The Next Round in Gaza*. (Middle East Report N°149). URL: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/israel-palestine/149-the-next-round-in-gaza.aspx>
- International Crisis Group (2014, July): *Gaza and Israel: New Obstacles, New Solutions*. (Middle East Briefing N°39). URL: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/israel-palestine/b039-gaza-and-israel-new-obstacles-new-solutions.aspx>
- Isotalo, Riina (2013, January): *The Civil Defence-Civilian Protection Nexus in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*. (NOREF Report). URL: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/97b2e67d36e03e28d722b9195ee29b66.pdf
- Khairallah, Daoud (2011, September): *UN Membership for a Palestinian State: Legal and Political Ramifications*. (ACRPS Dossiers). URL: <http://english.dohainstitute.org/file/Get/d12c8122-2f4c-4cb8-ab0e-77493c4d3a03>
- Laub, Zachary (2014, August): *Hamas*. (CFR Backgrounders). URL: <http://www.cfr.org/israel/hamas/p8968>
- Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, The (2014, August): *Reports from Foreign Correspondents in the Gaza Strip vis-à-vis the Limitations Hamas Placed on Media Coverage of the Military Aspects of the Fighting*. (Article). URL: <http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20699>
- Muhareb, Mahmoud (2011, September): *Israel and the Palestinian Bid at the United Nations*. (ACRPS Dossiers). URL: <http://english.dohainstitute.org/file/Get/f89ddf60-b205-41e0-af28-8b26f6c2ac5c>
- Naami, Saleh (2014, July): *Predictions of the Third War on Gaza*. (Aljazeera Center for Studies Report). URL: <http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2014/07/2014724111720760887.htm>
- Or, Shahar (2009, September): *Psychological Victory: The Palestinian Terror Organization's Media Strategy*. (RIEAS Research Paper No. 135). URL: <http://www.rieas.gr/images/rieas135.pdf>
- Reene, Jared; Sanford, Scott (2010, May): *The Fortunes of Political Salafism in Gaza and Algeria*. (IMES Capstone Paper Series). URL: <https://www.gwu.edu/~imes/research/2010Capstones/Reene,%20Sanford.pdf>

Samaan, Jean-Loup (2014, May): *From War to Deterrence? Israel-Hezbollah Conflict since 2006*. (SSI Monograph). URL: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1198>

Schanzer, Jonathan (2014, May): *The Palestinian Authority, Israel and the Peace Process: What's Next? Testimony presented before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, Washington, DC, May 8, 2014*. URL: <http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/schanzer-jonathan-the-palestinian-authority-israel-and-the-peace-process-whats-next>

Schweitzer, Yoram; Brom, Shlomo (2014, July): *The Murder of the Teenagers and the Escalation in the Palestinian Arena*. (INSS Insight No. 570). URL: <http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=7176>

Shikaki, Khalil (2014, February): *The Likelihood, Consequences and Policy Implications of PA Collapse or Dissolution: The "Day After" Final Report*. (PSR/USMEP/NOREF Report). URL: <http://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/finalreport.pdf>

Siboni, Gabi; Ben-Barak, Ram (2014, January): *The Sinai Peninsula Threat Development and Response Concept*. (Saban Center for Middle East Policy Analysis Papers, No. 31). URL: <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/28-sinai-israel-siboni>

Note

Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories or on author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of pre-prints); it might therefore not have passed through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only be cited after getting consent by the author(s).

About the compiler: Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., studied Information Science and New German Literature and Linguistics at the Saarland University (Germany). Her **doctoral thesis** dealt with Internet usage of Islamist terrorists and insurgents. Currently she works in the research & development department of the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (**ZPID**). She also serves as Editorial Assistant for 'Perspectives on Terrorism'.

Bibliography: Domestic State (or Regime) Terrorism and Repression

Compiled and selected by Eric Price

[BSPT - EP -2014-5]

NB: some of the items listed below are clickable and allow access to the full text; those with an asterix [*] only have a clickable table of contents/only more information.

Keywords: *State Terrorism, Repression*

Books (Monographs and Edited Volumes)

- Adler, N. (1993) *Victims of Soviet terror: the story of the Memorial movement*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger [*<http://lccn.loc.gov/92046164>]
- Akamatsu, P. & Kochan, M. (2010) *Meiji 1868: Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Japan* Hoboken: Taylor & Francis [*<http://lccn.loc.gov/73152462>]
- Allen, R. (1999) *Threshold of terror: the last hours of the Monarchy in the French Revolution* Stroud: Sutton [*<http://library.st-andrews.ac.uk/record=b1323353~S5>]
- Anderson, P. (2010) *The Francoist military trials: terror and complicity, 1939-1945* New York: Routledge [*<http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1011/2009016459-b.html>]
- Andress, D. (2006) *The Terror: the merciless war for freedom in revolutionary France* New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux [*<http://library.st-andrews.ac.uk/record=b1935465~S5>]
- Balint, B. & Pal, S. (Eds.) (2006) *50 év 1956-2006* [in Hungarian] Basel; Budapest: Europai Protestans Magyar SDzabadegetem [*http://libritomcat.big.hu/konyv/balla_balint.50-ev-1956-2006.html]
- Barkawi, T. & Stanski, K. (Eds.) (2012) *Orientalism and war* New York: Columbia University Press [*<http://lccn.loc.gov/2012551632>]
- Brysk, A. & Shafir, G. (Eds.) (2007) *National insecurity and human rights: democracies debate counterterrorism* Berkeley: University of California Press [*<http://lccn.loc.gov/2007018438>]
- Burbach, R. (2003) *The Pinochet affair: state terrorism and global justice* London; New York: Zed Books [*<http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0708/2003049701.html>]
- Bushnell, P.T. (et al.) (1991) *State organized terror: the case of violent internal repression* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press [*<http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0832/91020259-b.html>]
- Carlton, D. & Schaerf, C. (Eds.) (1981) *Contemporary terror: studies in sub-state violence* London: Macmillan [*<http://lccn.loc.gov/86672304>]
- Condon, C. (1994) *The modern world: conflict and change* South Melbourne: Macmillan Education [*http://www.worldcat.org/title/modern-world-conflict-and-change/oclc/38355653&referer=brief_results]
- Conquest, R. (1986) *The harvest of sorrow: Soviet collectivization and the terror-famine* London: Hutchinson [*<http://lccn.loc.gov/86673555>]
- Corsi, J.R. (2005) *Atomic Iran: how the terrorist regime bought the bomb and American politicians* Nashville,

Tenn.: WND Books [[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip056/2005001596.html](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip056/2005001596.html)]

Corradi, J.E. & Fagen, P.E. & Merino, M.A.G. (1992) *Fear at the edge: state terror and resistance in Latin America* Berkeley: University of California Press [[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/description/ucal041/91030628.html](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/description/ucal041/91030628.html)]

Crankshaw, E. (1960) *Gestapo* London: Hamilton & Co [[*http://primocat.bl.uk/F/?func=direct&local_base=PRIMO&doc_number=010934269&format=001&con_lng=prm](http://primocat.bl.uk/F/?func=direct&local_base=PRIMO&doc_number=010934269&format=001&con_lng=prm)]

Crotty, W.J. (2005) *Democratic development & political terrorism: the global perspective* Boston: Northeastern University Press [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/2004009740](http://lccn.loc.gov/2004009740)]

Davenport, C. (2010) *State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [[*http://assets.cambridge.org/97805218/64909/toc/9780521864909_toc.pdf](http://assets.cambridge.org/97805218/64909/toc/9780521864909_toc.pdf)]

Deletant, D. (1999) *Communist terror in Romania: Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State, 1948-1965* London: Hurst & Company [[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0667/99013905-t.html](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0667/99013905-t.html)]

Dent, B. (2006) *Budapest 1956; locations of dramas* Budapest: Europa Konyvkiado [[*http://www.europakiado.hu/konyv/149640/budapest-1956/](http://www.europakiado.hu/konyv/149640/budapest-1956/)]

Duncan G. (et al.) (Eds.) (2013) *State Terrorism and Human Rights* Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge [[*http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415629072/](http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415629072/)]

Dwyer, P.G. & McPhee, P. (2002) *The French Revolution and Napoleon: a sourcebook* London; New York: Routledge [[*http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/52751123/editions?editionsView=true&referer=di](http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/52751123/editions?editionsView=true&referer=di)]

Ebner, M.R. (2011) *Ordinary violence in Mussolini's Italy* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [[*http://www.worldcat.org/search?q=isbn%3A9780521762137](http://www.worldcat.org/search?q=isbn%3A9780521762137)]

Esparza, M. & Huttenbach, H.R. & Feierstein, D. (Eds.) (2010) *State violence and genocide in Latin America: the Cold War years* London: Routledge [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/2009015183](http://lccn.loc.gov/2009015183)]

Evans, R.J. (2005) *The Third Reich in power, 1933-1939* New York: Penguin Press [[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0721/2005052128-d.html](http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0721/2005052128-d.html)]

Fitzpatrick, D. (ed.) (2012) *Terror in Ireland, 1916-1923* Dublin: Lilliput Press [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/2012427286](http://lccn.loc.gov/2012427286)]

Francis, S. T. (1985) *The Soviet strategy of terror* Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/85080674](http://lccn.loc.gov/85080674)]

Ganesan, N. & Kim, S.C. (Eds.) (2013) *State violence in East Asia* Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky [[*http://library.st-andrews.ac.uk/record=b2092604~S5](http://library.st-andrews.ac.uk/record=b2092604~S5)]

Gareau, F.H. (2004) *State terrorism and the United States: from counterinsurgency to the war on terrorism* Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press; London: Zed Books [[*https://www.socialjusticejournal.org/pdf_free/103Gutierrez.pdf](https://www.socialjusticejournal.org/pdf_free/103Gutierrez.pdf)]

Goldstein, R.J. (2001) *Political Repression in Modern America from 1870 to 1976* Urbana: University of Illinois Press [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/00064881](http://lccn.loc.gov/00064881)]

Graziano, F. (1992) *Divine violence: spectacle, psychosexuality & radical Christianity in the Argentine* «dirty

- war» Boulder: Westview Press [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/91042871](http://lccn.loc.gov/91042871)]
- George, A. (1991) *Western state terrorism* New York: Routledge [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/91002715](http://lccn.loc.gov/91002715)]
- Halfin, I. (2009) *Stalinist confessions: messianism and terror at the Leningrad Communist University* Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press [[*http://library.st-andrews.ac.uk/record=b1844439~S5](http://library.st-andrews.ac.uk/record=b1844439~S5)]
- Hantos, E. (1969) *Ungarn 1848 und 1956. Zwei Revolutionen, zwei Konterrevolutionen, ein Ausgleich* [in German] Bern, Verlag SOI (Schweizerisches Ostinstitut) [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/70418856](http://lccn.loc.gov/70418856)]
- Harris, J. (Ed.) (2013) *The anatomy of terror: political violence under Stalin* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/2012277869](http://lccn.loc.gov/2012277869)]
- Hay, J. (Ed.) (2014) *Argentina* Detroit: Greenhaven Press [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/2014000935](http://lccn.loc.gov/2014000935)]
- Ilić, M. (2006) *Stalin's terror revisited* Basingstoke (UK); New York: Palgrave Macmillan [[*http://library.st-andrews.ac.uk/record=b1802024~S5](http://library.st-andrews.ac.uk/record=b1802024~S5)]
- Jackson, R. & Murphy, E. & Poynting, S. (2010) *Contemporary state terrorism: theory and practice* London; New York: Routledge [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/2009014983](http://lccn.loc.gov/2009014983)]
- Koehler, J.O. (1999) *Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police* New York: Basic Books [[*http://gh.oxfordjournals.org/content/18/4/546.extract](http://gh.oxfordjournals.org/content/18/4/546.extract)]
- Koonings, K. & Kruijt, D. (Eds.) (1999) *Societies of fear: the legacy of civil war, violence and terror in Latin America* London: Zed Books [[*http://library.st-andrews.ac.uk/record=b1936326~S5](http://library.st-andrews.ac.uk/record=b1936326~S5)]
- Kornbluh, P. (2003) *The Pinochet file: a declassified dossier on atrocity and accountability* New York: New Press [[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy041/2003050956.html](http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy041/2003050956.html)]
- Koslow, J. (1958) *The Kremlin; eight centuries of tyranny and terror* New York: T. Nelson [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/58008019](http://lccn.loc.gov/58008019)]
- Land, I. (Ed.) *Enemies of humanity: the nineteenth-century war on terrorism* New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/2007047247](http://lccn.loc.gov/2007047247)]
- Lewytzkij, B. (Comp.) (1974) *The Stalinist terror in the thirties; documentation from the Soviet press* Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/72137404](http://lccn.loc.gov/72137404)]
- Martin, A. E. (2012) *Alter-nations: nationalisms, terror, and the state in nineteenth-century Britain and Ireland* Columbus: Ohio State University Press [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/2012015270](http://lccn.loc.gov/2012015270)]
- Marti'nez, L. (2007) *The Libyan paradox* New York: Columbia University Press [[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0718/2007020785.html](http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0718/2007020785.html)]
- McCoy, A.W. (2009) *Policing America's empire: the United States, the Philippines, and the rise of the surveillance state* Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/2009010253](http://lccn.loc.gov/2009010253)]
- Menji'var, C. & Rodriguez, N. (2005) *When states kill: Latin America, the U.S., and technologies of terror* Austin: University of Texas Press [[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0422/2004019668.html](http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0422/2004019668.html)]
- Miah, M.M. (2001) *State of human rights in Bangladesh and related issues* Dhaka: Gatidhara [[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy032/2001435800.html](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy032/2001435800.html)]

- Miller, S.J. (2008) *State and society in eighteenth-century France: a study of political power and social revolution in Languedoc* Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press [[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0804/2007030354.html](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0804/2007030354.html)]
- Munthe, T. (2002) *The Saddam Hussein reader* New York: Thunder's Mouth Press [[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0830/2002075273-d.html](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0830/2002075273-d.html)]
- O'Kane, R. H.T. (1996) *Terror, force, and states: the path from modernity* Cheltenham, UK: Brookfield, US Edward Elgar [[*http://lcn.loc.gov/95034568](http://lcn.loc.gov/95034568)]
- O'Kane, R. H.T. (2007) *Terrorism* Harlow: Pearson Longman [[*http://www.worldcat.org/title/terrorism/oclc/77012539&referer=brief_results](http://www.worldcat.org/title/terrorism/oclc/77012539&referer=brief_results)]
- Oliverio, A. (1998) *The state of terror* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press [[*http://lcn.loc.gov/97017274](http://lcn.loc.gov/97017274)]
- Pál, J. & Popovici, V. (Eds.) (2014) *Elites and politics in Central and Eastern Europe (1848-1918)* Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Edition [[*http://lcn.loc.gov/2013047149](http://lcn.loc.gov/2013047149)]
- Parrish, M. (1996) *The lesser terror: Soviet state security, 1939-1953* Westport, Conn.: Praeger [[*http://lcn.loc.gov/94038565](http://lcn.loc.gov/94038565)]
- Pavlov, A.P. & Perrie, M. (2003) *Ivan the Terrible* London: Pearson/Longman [[*http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/52143420/editions?editionsView=true&referer=di](http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/52143420/editions?editionsView=true&referer=di)]
- Pelkaus, E. & Skriņvele, I. & Veisbergs, A. & Valsts arhīvs, L.(Eds.) (1999) *Policy of occupation powers in Latvia, 1939-1991: a collection of documents* Riga: Nordik [[*http://lcn.loc.gov/2003420045](http://lcn.loc.gov/2003420045)]
- Perry, M. & Berg, M. & Krukones, J. (Comp.) (2009) *Sources of European history since 1900* Boston, MA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning [[*http://www.worldcat.org/search?q=isbn%3A9781424069675](http://www.worldcat.org/search?q=isbn%3A9781424069675)]
- Pohl, J. O. (1997) *The Stalinist penal system: a statistical history of Soviet repression and terror, 1930-1953* Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland [[*http://lcn.loc.gov/97026939](http://lcn.loc.gov/97026939)]
- Poynting, S. & Whyte, D. (Eds.) (2012) *Counter-terrorism and state political violence: the «war on terror» as terror* Abingdon: Routledge [[*http://library.st-andrews.ac.uk/record=b1894108~S5](http://library.st-andrews.ac.uk/record=b1894108~S5)]
- Price, R. (Ed.) (1975) *Revolution and reaction: 1848 and the Second French Republic* London : C. Helm; New York: Barnes & Noble Books [[*http://lcn.loc.gov/76379110](http://lcn.loc.gov/76379110)]
- Ridgeon, L. (Ed.) (2005) *Religion and politics in modern Iran: a reader* London; New York: I.B. Tauris [[*http://library.st-andrews.ac.uk/record=b1615876~S5](http://library.st-andrews.ac.uk/record=b1615876~S5)]
- Sachikonye, L. (2011) *When a State Turns on its Citizens: 60 years of Institutionalised Violence in Zimbabwe* Sunnyside, Auckland Park, South Africa: Jacana Media [[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy13pdf02/2011343572.pdf](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy13pdf02/2011343572.pdf)]
- Sadat, L.N. (Ed.) *Forging a convention for crimes against humanity* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [[*http://www.worldcat.org/search?q=isbn%3A9780521116480](http://www.worldcat.org/search?q=isbn%3A9780521116480)]
- Sandal, N.A. (Ed.) (2014) *Religious actors in world politics* New York: International Debate Education

Association [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/2013042585](http://lccn.loc.gov/2013042585)]

Simons, G.L. (2003) *Libya and the West: from independence to Lockerbie* Oxford: Centre for Libyan Studies; New York: Distributed by Palgrave Macmillan [[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/hol052/2004557601.html](http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/hol052/2004557601.html)]

Sluka, J.A. (Ed.) (2000) *Death squad: the anthropology of state terror* Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press [[*http://library.st-andrews.ac.uk/record=b1324029~S5](http://library.st-andrews.ac.uk/record=b1324029~S5)]

Smith, L. (2011) *The strong horse: power, politics, and the clash of Arab civilizations* New York, NY: Anchor Books [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/2011378358](http://lccn.loc.gov/2011378358)]

Soares, B.F. & Otayek, R. (Eds.) (2007) *Islam and Muslim politics in Africa* New York: Palgrave Macmillan [[*http://library.st-andrews.ac.uk/record=b1661148~S5](http://library.st-andrews.ac.uk/record=b1661148~S5)]

Solzhenit̄syn, A. I. (1991) *The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956* New York: Westview Press [[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0832/97141179-b.html](http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0832/97141179-b.html)]

Sperber, J. (2013) *Revolutionary Europe, 1780-1850* London; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/00024831](http://lccn.loc.gov/00024831)]

Spooner, M.H. (1994) *Soldiers in a narrow land: the Pinochet regime in Chile* Berkeley: University of California Press [[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/description/ucal041/93009910.html](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/description/ucal041/93009910.html)]

Stohl, M & Lopez, G.A. (1988) *Terrible beyond endurance? the foreign policy of state terrorism* New York: Greenwood Press [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/87000251](http://lccn.loc.gov/87000251)]

Taylor, B. D. (2011) *State Building in Putin's Russia* Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/2010037099](http://lccn.loc.gov/2010037099)]

Tusell, J. (2007) *Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy* Blackwell Pub. [[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip074/2006036157.html](http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip074/2006036157.html)]

Volpi, F. (2003) *Islam and democracy: the failure of dialogue in Algeria* London; Sterling, VA : Pluto Press [[*http://www.worldcat.org/title/islam-and-democracy-the-failure-of-dialogue-in-algeria/oclc/49518928/editions?referer=di&editionsView=true](http://www.worldcat.org/title/islam-and-democracy-the-failure-of-dialogue-in-algeria/oclc/49518928/editions?referer=di&editionsView=true)]

Westra, L. (2012) *Faces of State Terrorism* Leiden: Brill [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/2012006489](http://lccn.loc.gov/2012006489)]

Wheeler, T. (2007) *A tourist on the axis of evil* Hawthorn, Victoria, AUS: Lonely Planet Publications [[*http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/851995509/editions?editionsView=true&referer=di](http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/851995509/editions?editionsView=true&referer=di)]

Woloch, I. (1994) *The new regime: transformations of the French civic order, 1789-1820s* New York: W.W. Norton [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/93001917](http://lccn.loc.gov/93001917)]

Zepezaner, J. (1999) *Udvarhelyszék az 1848-1849-es forradalom és szabadságharc idején: tanulmány és okmánytár az udvarhelyszéki eseményekhez* Székelyudvarhely: Haáz Rezső Kulturális Egyesület [in Hungarian] [[*http://lccn.loc.gov/00271020](http://lccn.loc.gov/00271020)]

Non-conventional Literature

Al-Dawoody, A. M. (2009) *War in Islamic law: justifications and regulations* [thesis] University of Birmingham [<http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/382>]

- Alimahomed, S. (2011) *The Global War on Terror: race, gender, and empire after 9/11* [thesis] University of California Riverside [<http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/53f0m3r1>]
- Amador, B. S. (2003) *The Federal Republic of Germany and left-wing terrorism* [thesis] Naval Postgraduate School [<http://hdl.handle.net/10945/6236>]
- Avdan, N. (2010) *States' pursuit of sovereignty in a globalized security context: controlling international human mobility* [thesis] Duke University [<http://hdl.handle.net/10161/3049>]
- Bean, J. (2008) *Institutional response to terrorism: the domestic role of the military in consolidated democracies* [thesis] University of Texas at Austin [<http://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/23443>]
- Beyer, A. C. (2009) *Counter-terrorism and international power relations: the EU, ASEAN and hegemonic global governance* [thesis] University of Hull
[*<http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?did=2&uin=uk.bl.ethos.518591>]
- Boukhars, A. (2011) *Political violence in North Africa: the perils of incomplete liberalization* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution [<http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/01/north-africa-boukhars>]
- Case, E. S. (2009) *State-level causes of terrorism: Limits on political expression* [thesis] University of North Texas [<http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc12092/>]
- Cooper Drury, A. (et al.) (2011) *Sanctions and state-sponsored terrorism* University of Missouri [*http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1900554]
- Dufka, C. (2011) "We have lived in darkness": a human rights agenda for Guinea's new government New York, NY, USA: Human Rights Watch [http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/guinea0511webwcover_1.pdf]
- Darling-Brekhus, K. (2008) *Internal colonialism and social control in the Age of Terror: the FBI's war on Islamic charities following the September 11th Attacks of 2001* [thesis] University of Missouri – Columbia [<http://hdl.handle.net/10355/5726>]
- Dhillon, S. (1992) *Government responses to the threat of terrorism in the liberal democratic state: a comparative examination of public policy efforts in the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany* [thesis] [<http://digitalcommons.mcmaster.ca/opendissertations/6417>]
- Espriú Guerra, A. (2005) *Human security in Latin America: contesting and revising the current hemispheric security system in the Americas* [thesis] Universidad de las Américas Puebla [http://catarina.udlap.mx/u_dl_a/tales/documentos/lri/espriu_g_a/]
- Fahey, S. (2010) *State instability and terrorism* [thesis] University of Maryland [<http://hdl.handle.net/1903/10789>]
- Favero, G. T. (1999) *Flexibility of the incident command system to respond to domestic terrorism* [thesis] Naval Postgraduate School [<http://hdl.handle.net/10945/13428>]
- Fayyaz, S. (2012) *Pakistan response towards terrorism: a case study of Musharraf regime* [thesis] University of Birmingham (UK) [<http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/3451/>]
- Fiaz, N. (2010) *A constructivist account of Pakistan's political practice in the aftermath of 9/11 : the normalisation of Pakistan's participation in the 'war on terror'* [thesis] University of Bradford [<http://hdl>]

[handle.net/10454/4477](http://hdl.handle.net/10454/4477)]

Franklin, D. (2013) *State level intelligence doctrine: bridging the gap* [thesis] Naval Postgraduate School [<http://hdl.handle.net/10945/38931>]

Gallagher, A. (2011) *Responding to terrorism: United States counterterrorism from 1968* [thesis] University of Ulster [*<http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?did=7&uin=uk.bl.ethos.552740>]

Goldstein, E. (2011) *Tunisia's repressive laws: the reform agenda* New York, NY: Human Rights Watch [<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/tunisia1111webwcover.pdf>]

Guilmartin, E. K. (2002) *An empirical analysis of right wing domestic terrorism in the United States (1995—2001)* [thesis] Stanford University [*<http://phdtree.org/pdf/25782791-an-empirical-analysis-of-right-wing-domestic-terrorism-in-the-united-states-1995-2001/>]

Heller, D. E. (2010) *Designating domestic terrorist individuals or groups* [thesis] Naval Postgraduate School [http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/5213/10Sep_Heller.pdf?sequence=1]

Kahssay, T. A. (2009) *Keeping the peace: Intervention and security challenges in Africa* [thesis] Erasmus University [<http://thesis.eur.nl/pub/6628/>]

Kavanagh, J. E. (2011) *The dynamics of protracted terror campaigns: domestic politics, terrorist violence, and counterterror responses* [thesis] University of Michigan [<http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/84524>]

Kaye, D.D. (et al.) (2008) *More freedom, less terror? liberalization and political violence in the Arab world* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG772.pdf]

Keiber, J. A. (2014) *The surveillance of individuals in international politics* [thesis] Ohio State University [http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1397573412]

Kilic, Azer (2013) *Identity, interest, and politics: the rise of Kurdish associational activism and the contestation of the state in Turkey* [thesis] Universität zu Köln [<http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/5393/>]

Kim, J. (2008) *The sources of North Korean terrorism: Analyses at three levels* [thesis] University of Hawai'i at Manoa [*<http://phdtree.org/pdf/25285636-the-sources-of-north-korean-terrorism-analyses-at-three-levels/>]

Miles, A. (2010) *The rise of the rogue states doctrine: the Clinton and Bush approach to national security in the post-Cold War era* [thesis] University of Salford [<http://usir.salford.ac.uk/26819/>]

Oermann, R. L. (2010) *Russia's Federal Security Service in the twenty-first century: terrorism, the political manipulation of domestic intelligence, and the dramatic expansion of the FSB* [thesis] University of Texas – Austin [<http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2010-05-917>]

Rosenzweig, P. & McNulty, T.J. & Shearer, E. (2012) *National security law in the news: a guide for journalists, scholars, and policymakers* [thesis] Chicago: American Bar Association [<http://www.lskslaw.com/documents/national-security.pdf>]

Shirley, W. D. (2012) *When activism is terrorism: Special interest politics and state repression of the animal rights movement* [thesis] University of Oregon [<http://hdl.handle.net/1794/12448>]

- Shor, E. (2012) *Terrorism and counterterrorism: a comparative cross-national analysis* [thesis] Stony Brook University [<http://hdl.handle.net/1951/55624>]
- Sproat, P. A. (1997) *An investigation of the concept of state terrorism* [thesis] Newcastle University [<https://theses.ncl.ac.uk/dspace/handle/10443/435>]
- Starr-Deelen, D. G. (2012) *United States use of force against terrorism and the threat of terrorism: an analysis of the past four U.S. Presidents' use of force to combat international terrorism* [thesis] University of Bradford [<http://hdl.handle.net/10454/6309>]
- Tedesco, L. (1994) *The crisis of the Argentinian State: democratisation and economic restructuring, 1976-1989* [thesis] University of Warwick [<http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/2352/>] [<http://hdl.handle.net/10822/558610>]
- Troyer, L. A. (2003) *The location of terrorism: counterterrorism, American politics, and the docile citizen* [thesis] University of California, Berkeley [[*http://phdtree.org/pdf/25709228-the-location-of-terrorism-counterterrorism-american-politics-and-the-docile-citizen/](http://phdtree.org/pdf/25709228-the-location-of-terrorism-counterterrorism-american-politics-and-the-docile-citizen/)]
- Webber, C. W. A. (2012) *The decline of dualism: the relationship between international human rights treaties and the United Kingdom's domestic counter-terror laws* [thesis] University of South Africa [<http://hdl.handle.net/10500/10348>]
- Wicaksana, I. G. W. (2012) *Islam and Indonesia's foreign policy, with special focus on Jakarta-Islamabad relations* [thesis] University of Western Australia [http://repository.uwa.edu.au:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=34221&local_base=GEN01-INS01]
- Yamauchi, P. E. (2000) *Patterns of death: The socio-economic origins of domestic state terrorism in Guatemala, 1979—1985* [thesis] Cornell University [[*http://phdtree.org/pdf/25271848-patterns-of-death-the-socio-economic-origins-of-domestic-state-terrorism-in-guatemala-1979-1985/](http://phdtree.org/pdf/25271848-patterns-of-death-the-socio-economic-origins-of-domestic-state-terrorism-in-guatemala-1979-1985/)]

Prime Journal Articles

- Brennan, J.: The Conundrum of Iran: Strengthening Moderates without Acquiescing to Belligerence *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 618 (2008) pp.168-179 [<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/743.pdf>]
- Brooks, R.A.: Liberalization and Militancy in the Arab World *Orbis* 46 (4, Autumn) 2002 pp.611-621 [[*http://sergkolom.com.ua/wp-content/uploads/Article-analysis.pdf](http://sergkolom.com.ua/wp-content/uploads/Article-analysis.pdf)]
- Bufacci, V. & Maria Arrigo, J.: Torture, Terrorism and the State: a Refutation of the Ticking-Bomb Argument *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 23 (3) 2006 pp.355-373 [[*http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2006.00355.x/abstract](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2006.00355.x/abstract)]
- Carey, S. C.: The Use of Repression as a Response to Domestic Dissent *Political Studies* 58 (1) 2010 pp.167-186 [[*http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2008.00771.x/abstract](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2008.00771.x/abstract)]
- Cavallaro, J. & Brewer, S.E.: Never Again? The Legacy of the Argentine and Chilean Dictatorships for the Global Human Rights Regime *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* Volume 39 (2, August) 2008 pp.233-244. [<http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jih/summary/v039/39.2.cavallaro.html>]
- Chenoweth, E.: Terrorism and Democracy *Annual Review of Political Science* 16 (May) 2013 pp.355-378 [[*http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-221825](http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-221825)]

- Dalacoura, K.: Islamist terrorism and the Middle East democratic deficit: Political exclusion, repression and the causes of extremism *Democratization* 13 (3, June) 2006 pp.508-525 [[*http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3254/](http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3254/)]
- Eadie, P.E.: Legislating for Terrorism: The Philippines' Human Security Act 2007 *Journal of Terrorism Research* 2 (3) 2011 [<http://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/jtr/article/view/226/243>]
- Hall, R. E.: A Note on September Eleventh: The Arabization of Terrorism *The Social Science Journal* 40 (3) 2003 pp.459-464 [http://scholars.opb.msu.edu/pubDetail.asp?t=pm&id=42843507&n=Ronald+E+Hall&id=1025&oe_id=1&o_id=]
- Jackson N. M.: War on the Enemy: Self-Defence and State-Sponsored Terrorism *Melbourne Journal of International Law* 4 (2) 2003 pp.406-438 [<http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/files/dmfile/download01db1.pdf>]
- Kattelman, K.T.: Operation Enduring Freedom: Institutional Constraints, Alliance Commitments, and the Power Capabilities of Counterterrorism *Journal of Terrorism Research* 5 (2, May) 2014 pp.12-29 [<http://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/jtr/article/view/880/728>]
- Kis-Katos, K. & Liebert, H. & Schulze, G.G.: On the Origin of Domestic and International Terrorism *European Journal of Political Economy* 27 (December) 2011, Supplement 1 pp.S17-S36 [<http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/poleco/v27y2011is1ps17-s36.html>]
- Riegler, T.: The State as a Terrorist: France and the Red Hand *Perspectives on Terrorism* 6 (6, December) 2012 pp.22-33. [<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/229/html>]
- Roy, D.: China and the War on Terrorism *Orbis* 46 (3, Summer) 2002 pp.511-521. [<http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/8600245/china-war-terrorism>]
- Sánchez-Cuenca, Luis de la Calle, I.: Domestic Terrorism: The Hidden Side of Political Violence *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (June) 2009 pp.31-49 [<http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.031607.094133%40violence.2013.1.issue-1?journalCode=violence>]
- Scahill, T.: The Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003: A Glimpse into a Post-PATRIOT Act Approach to Combating Domestic Terrorism *The John Marshall Law Review* 38 (1) 2004 pp.327-356 [<http://repository.jmls.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1349&context=lawreview>]
- Schmid, A.P. & Jongman, A.J.: Violent Conflicts and Human Rights Violations in the mid-1990s *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9 (4, Winter) 1997 pp.166-192 [<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546559708427436#.VCF8c6EcQy8>]
- Stohl, M.: The Global War on Terror and State Terrorism *Perspectives on Terrorism* 2 (9, June (2008) pp.4-10 [<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/48/html>]
- Wirtz, J.J.: Counter-terrorism via Counter-proliferation *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14 (3) 2002 pp.120-140 [<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/714005621?journalCode=ftpv20#.VBa2qsKSx8E>]
- Zoubir, Yah, H.: Libya in US Foreign Policy: From Rogue State to Good Fellow? *Third World Quarterly* 23 (1) 2002 pp.31-53 [<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993575>]

Resources on the Internet

1848 Revolutions in Europe –Nature and Impacts / R.G. Collingwood [<http://idea-of-history.blogspot>]

co.at/2012/12/revolutions-of-1848.html]

The Failed Revolutions of 1848 [http://www2.needham.k12.ma.us/nhs/cur/Baker_00/2001_p2/baker_mcsh_p2/1848_webpage_2.htm]

Frontlines of Revolutionary Struggle / Blog [<http://revolutionaryfrontlines.wordpress.com/tag/domestic-repression/>]

State-sponsored terrorism / Wikipedia [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State-sponsored_terrorism]

Stop the killings in the Philippines [<http://stopthekillings.org/>]

Terrorist Designations and State Sponsors of Terrorism/ US Department of State [<http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/index.htm>]

***About the Compiler:** Eric Price is a Professional Information Specialist who worked for many years as a librarian with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. Upon retirement, he joined the Editorial Team of Perspectives on Terrorism.*

V. Op-Ed

The IS-Caliphate: What Should Be Done to Prevent it from Spinning out of Control?

by Philipp Holtmann

Last year in an Op-Ed in *Perspectives on Terrorism* (Vol. 7, No. 3, 2013) I suggested three possible future scenarios for the Syrian civil war. The worst scenario depicted the emergence of a “*Jihadi Super-region from the Euphrates to the Nile and all along the North African Coast and an Extremely Hot Cold War in the Middle East.*” The announcement of a Caliphate by the Islamic State connecting large parts of Syria and Iraq and the enthusiasm with which it was received by many fellow jihadists in the Muslim world has opened the doors for this worst case. IS envisions a Jihadi empire whose ambitions are ultimately global: not only Middle Eastern borders, but all other states and ideologies, are to be crushed in its vision. The West and the rest of the world cannot stand idly by and watch events unfold in the hope that the Islamic State will implode under the weight of its own contradictions.

At the moment the IS-caliphate is like a large honey-pot for global Jihadists: thousands of them from all five continents have, according to IS, been heeding the call of the new caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In the case of the Islamic State, a policy of containment rather than one of arming often dubious allies and providing them with air support might turn out to be the best option. If IS is allowed to spread beyond parts of Syria and Iraq, the task of degrading and defeating it will become very costly indeed.

What we have seen so far is that IS has mastered “Blitzkrieg” tactics. Proof for this is the extremely quick rise of IS since 2013. Portraying itself as the saviour of Sunnis from the Syrian and Iraqi regimes and capitalising on the civil war in Syria, IS has catapulted itself to the position of the leading insurgent organisation in the region, despite numbering not more than 20,000 to 30,000 fighters according to one recent US intelligence estimate. Online IS has shown itself to be at least as savvy as on the ground; it has mastered the art of psychological warfare through social media, e.g. under the Twitter-hashtag “AllEyesOnISIS” and the “One Billion Muslim Campaign to Support IS”.

IS has sidelined al-Qaeda by being more extreme and more global. It is, as one TV commentator put it: “the son of al-Qaeda on testosterone.” The promise to bring back the glory of the Islamic empire has ignited an ideological wildfire that may continue burning, even if a lucky strike by the “Coalition of the Willing” knocks out IS caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Such a hit – as proven by previous killings of top jihadist leaders—might create a black hole that could be filled by an even more extreme person. Other jihadist factions, among them the Syrian “Islamic Front” and the al-Qaeda allied “al-Nusra Front,” might be joining or might be waiting in order to portray themselves as “moderates” in IS’ place. Moreover, as a martyr, al-Baghdadi might enjoy a second life among followers who venerate him and his ideas after his death, turning him into a post-mortem leader with a greater than life charisma. Al-Baghdadi apparently sees himself as a messianic preparer. Some Muslim traditions (*ahadith*) have it that the establishment of a caliphate in the Levant will be ushering in the return of the Mahdi—according to Islamic prophesy the rightly guided redeemer of Islam, who will return together with Jesus near the end of times. The Mahdi’s task is to rid the world of evil, establish Islam on earth (the last caliphate) and prepare for Judgment Day.

Today, the reach of the Islamic State already goes beyond the Euphrates valley. IS exerts a considerable level of ideological-strategic guidance (“virtual leadership”) over its followers via the Internet. For example, Algerian terrorists calling themselves “Soldiers of the Caliphate”—former members of al-Qaeda in the Islamic

Maghreb—pledged allegiance to IS and claimed to act on orders of “our leader Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi” when they gruesomely murdered their French hostage Hervé Gourdel. Shortly before, on 21 September 2014, IS-spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, had called upon IS cells worldwide to attack Westerners. IS has extended its strategy from fighting the near enemy (the Shiite dominated Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian regimes) to fighting both the near and the far enemies: the “West” and all member states of the “Coalition of the Willing”. IS volunteers, inspired by ultra-takfiri [calling enemies apostates] and violent apocalyptic fantasies, are likely to bring their struggle to Europe, possibly trying to recruit susceptible members of Muslim diasporas for their cause.

IS commits unspeakable war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes against women; it engages in genocidal policies against religious and ethnic minorities. Yet we have to remember that IS is not the only actor in the Syrian-Iraqi civil war landscape, committing gross human rights violations and mass atrocities using similar tactics (collective punishment, mass executions, beheadings, torture). The world’s reaction to these crimes has been lukewarm and divided so far. Until recently, the U.S. and some other NATO states have been involved in arms and money transfers by Gulf States to Syrian opposition forces, which contain hardcore jihadist factions, some of them connected to IS. Turkey and some other states in the neighbourhood have even covertly supported IS forerunner “Islamic State in Iraq and the Greater Syria” (ISIS) by buying cheap oil from it and from other jihadist factions which took control of oil fields. Some European oil companies, with the knowledge of European governments and with an eye on Russian energy supply bottlenecks in the coming winter, have also been buying oil through stooges at dumping prices.

A comprehensive strategy for combating IS requires several elements. The oil fields, IS main source of revenue, must be recaptured, and, until then, international companies should be prohibited to buy their crude oil through middlemen. The Assad regime’s indifferent slaughter of its own citizens and the Iraqi regime’s discrimination of Sunnis have facilitated the large-scale mobilisation and integration of Jihadi fighters into IS-ranks, and both regimes (Assad’s and al-Baghdadi’s) must be held accountable. A coalition that exerts effective political pressure should include not only pro-Western states, but also allies of both Syria and Iraq. A decisive defense plan to safeguard religious and ethnic minorities against IS attacks is urgently needed. Regional actors, such as the Kurdish Peshmerga, should be strengthened without infuriating Turkey, who is afraid of Kurdish separatist aspirations. And finally, a critical task of the West is to communicate with Muslim opinion leaders. 120 Muslim scholars have recently signed an open letter to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of IS, refuting his theological claims point-by-point. We must remember that hundreds of millions of Muslims do not share IS’s ideology. They should be encouraged and enabled to stand up against Jihadi extremists and challenge the so-called “Islamic State”. Only through a multi-dimensional counterterrorism strategy – beyond bombing and supplying weapons – will the international community prevent the IS nightmare from spinning out of control.

About the author: Dr. Philipp Holtmann is a Research Associate of the Terrorism Research Initiative and regular contributor to Perspectives on Terrorism.

VI. Announcement

TRI Award for Best PhD Thesis 2014: Call for Submissions

The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) seeks to enhance the quality of research in the field of Terrorism Studies. For this purpose it has established an *Annual Award for the Best Doctoral Dissertation on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism*. Last year's call for PhD theses submitted or defended in 2013 before an academic institution resulted in 29 entries. The jury, consisting of the directors of the Terrorism Research Initiative, identified three finalists and among them the winner—Dr. Tricia Bacon (American University, Washington, D.C.).

With this announcement, a *new call is made for PhD theses submitted or defended at an academic institution in the year 2014*. The winner will be announced in August 2015 and can expect an Award of US \$ 1,000.- and a document signed by the jury, acknowledging the granting of the award. Altogether three finalists will be identified. They will all receive a document signed by the jury. *The deadline for entries (in English, or with translation into English) is 31 March, 2015*. Theses should be submitted in electronic form to the chairman of the jury, Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid, at < apschmid@terrorismanalysts.com >, together with a cover letter (1-3 pp.) explaining its merits as the author sees them. Theses can also be submitted by academic supervisors.

VII. Notes from the Editor

About Perspectives on Terrorism

Perspectives on Terrorism (PT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS), headquartered at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts, United States of America.

PT is published six times per year as a free peer-reviewed online journal available at www.terrorismanalysts.com. It seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. The editors invite readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

Perspectives on Terrorism has sometimes been characterised as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our free on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles – but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal’s articles are peer-reviewed by members of the Editorial Board as well as outside experts. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and conflict-waging. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to.

Editorial Team of Perspectives on Terrorism

Alex P. Schmid, Editor-in-Chief

James J.F. Forest, Co- Editor

Joseph J. Easson, Associate Editor

Joshua Sinai, Books Reviews Editor

Eric Price, Editorial Assistant

Judith Tinnes, Editorial Assistant

Members of the Editorial Board

The Editorial Board of *Perspectives on Terrorism* currently consists of 20 experienced researchers. They are (in no particular order):

Shazad Ali (Karachi, Pakistan)

Joost Augusteijn (Leiden, The Netherlands)

Jeffrey M. Bale (Monterey, USA)

Michael Boyle (Philadelphia, USA)

Jarret Brachman (North Dakota, USA)

Richard Chasdi (Walsh College, USA)

James 'Chip' O. Ellis (Vancouver, Canada)

Leah Farrall (Massey University, New Zealand)

Paul Gill (University College London)

Jennifer Giroux (ETH, Zürich, Switzerland)

M.J. Gohel (Asia-Pacific Foundation, London)

Beatrice de Graaf (Utrecht University, The Netherlands)

Thomas Hegghammer (Stanford University, USA)

Bradley McAllister (Washington, DC, USA)

John Morrison (University of East London)

Assaf Moghadam (ICT, Herzliya, Israel)

Sam Mullins (Wollongong, Australia)

Thomas Riegler (Vienna, Austria)

Simon Shen (Chinese University, Hong Kong)

Anne Speckhard (Georgetown University Medical School, USA)

Currently there are several vacancies on the Editorial Board. Readers of *Perspective on Terrorism* are invited to submit names of possible candidates. Selection will take place on the basis of the publication record of those nominated, taking also into account their contribution to a better gender and geographical balance of the Editorial Board.

Members of the Editorial Board act as peer-reviewers for articles submitted to *Perspectives on Terrorism*. In addition, the Editorial Board relies on the special expertise of other experienced researchers. In particular we would like to acknowledge the contributions of

Dr. Dean Alexander

Dr. O. Shawn Cupp

Dr. Alessandro Orsini

Dr. Brian Philips

Dr. P. Daniel Silk

Dr. James Wirtz

People Behind the Terrorism Research Initiative

The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) has three Directors: Robert Wesley (President), Alex P. Schmid and James J.F. Forest. TRI has an **International Advisory Board** (currently 11 members), a **Consortium of Participating Institutions** (currently 17 institutions and centers) as well as **Group of Individual Researchers** (currently 120) guiding and supporting its efforts. They are listed below.

International Advisory Board of the Terrorism Research Initiative

Adam Dolnik, University of Wollongong, Australia.

Javier Jordán is a Professor at the Universidad de Granada, Spain, and Director of Athena Intelligence.

Gary LaFree is a Professor of Criminology at the University of Maryland and the Director of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).

David Rapoport is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at UCLA, a Mellon Foundation Emeritus Fellow, Founding and Co-Editor of the journal *Terrorism and Political Violence*.

Marc Sageman is a Consultant on transnational terrorism with various governmental agencies and foreign governments and the author of *Understanding Terror Networks and Leaderless Jihad*.

Michael Scheuer is currently a Senior Fellow with The Jamestown Foundation, prior to which he served in the CIA for 22 years where he was the Chief of the bin Laden Unit at the Counterterrorist Center from 1996 to 1999.

Yoram Schweitzer is a Researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and Lecturer at Tel Aviv University.

Michael S. Stohl is Professor of Communication at the University of California at Santa Barbara (UCSB).

Jeff Victoroff is an Associate Professor of Clinical Neurology and Psychiatry at the Keck School of Medicine, University of Southern California.

Peter Waldmann is Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Augsburg, Germany, and a long time member of the Advisory Board of the German Ministry of Development.

Leonard Weinberg is Foundation Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada.

Consortium of Participating Institutions

[Athena Intelligence, Spain.](#)

Center on Terrorism, John Jay College, USA.

Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism (CTC) at Campus The Hague of Leiden University, Netherlands.

(Handa) Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), University of St. Andrews, Scotland.

Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP), University of Wollongong, Australia.

Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University, USA.

Defense & Strategic Studies Department, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan.

Department of International Relations, University of Minas (PUC) , Brazil.

Global Terrorism Research Centre (GTReC), Monash University, Australia.

International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), Singapore.

Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, Syracuse University, USA.

The Institute of International and European Affairs, (IIEA), Dublin, Ireland, with a branch in Brussels.

Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, Pakistan.

Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS), Athens, Greece.

Research Unit, Political Violence, Terrorism and Radicalization, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Denmark.

University of the Pacific, School of International Studies, USA.

University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh Institute for the Study of Religion, Violence and Memory, USA.

TRI's Individual Participants

Mahan Abedin is a former editor of the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor and currently the Director of Research at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism , London. He is editor of Islamism Digest - a monthly academic journal specialising on the in-depth study of Islamic movements.

Gary Ackerman is Research Director at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)

Shaheen Afroze is Research Director and Head of the Peace and Conflict Studies Division at the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BISS).

Abdullah Alaskar is Professor of History at King Saud University, columnist, Riyadh daily newspaper.

Mustafa Alani is a Senior Advisor and Program Director in Security and Terrorism Studies at the Gulf Research Center, UAE.

Rogelio Alonso is Professor in Politics and Terrorism at Rey Juan Carlos University, Madrid, where he holds the position of Ramón y Cajal Fellow in Political Sciences.

Ramiro Anzit Guerrero is a Senior Advisor in the Argentine National Congress and Professor at the University del Salvador and University del Museo Social Argentino.

Victor Asal joined the faculty of the Political Science Department of the University at Albany in Fall 2003 and is also the Director of the Public Security Certificate at Rockefeller College, SUNY, Albany.

Omar Ashour is Director, Middle East Studies, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies University of Exeter

Scott Atran is Presidential Scholar at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City, Visiting Professor of Psychology and Public Policy at the University of Michigan, and Research.

Edwin Bakker is Professor of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies at the Campus The Hague of Leiden University and Director of its Center for Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. He is also a Research Fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism in The Hague

Daniel Baracskey is a full-time faculty member in the Department of Political Science at Valdosta State University, where he also teaches public administration courses.

Michael Barkun is professor of Political Science in the Maxwell School at Syracuse University.

Shazadi Beg is a Barrister in the United Kingdom and an acknowledged expert on Pakistan.

Gabriel Ben-Dor is Director of the School of Political Sciences and Head of the National Security Graduate Studies Program at the University of Haifa, where he teaches and conducts research in the fields of political violence, civil-military relations and national security.

Eddine Benhayoun is a Professor of Cultural Studies and Director of the Research Group on Culture and Globalisation, Abdelmalek Essaadi University, Tetuan, Morocco.

Andrew Black is the Managing Director of Black Watch Global, an intelligence and risk management consultancy headquartered in Washington, DC.

Mia Bloom is Professor of Security Studies at the University of Massachusetts (Lowell Campus).

Randy Borum is a Professor at the University of South Florida and a behavioral science researcher/consultant on National Security issues.

Anneli Botha is a senior researcher on terrorism at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria, South Africa.

Amel Boubekeur is a Research Fellow and the leader of the Islam and Europe programme at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels, focusing on Political Islam in Europe and North Africa.

Jarret Brachman is a member of the faculty of North Dakota State University and an independent Al-Qaeda analyst. He runs a [jihadist monitoring blog](#)

Jean-Charles Brisard is an international consultant and expert on terrorism and terrorism financing.

Francesco Cavatorta is a lecturer in International Relations and Middle East politics at the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland.

David Charters is a military historian and senior fellow at the Gregg Center, University of New Brunswick, Canada.

Erica Chenoweth is Assistant Professor of Government at Wesleyan University and a visiting scholar at Stanford University, California.

David Cook is an Associate Professor of religious studies at Rice University, specializing in apocalyptic literature and movements, radical Islamic thought and West African Islam.

Victor D. Comras is an attorney and consultant on terrorism, terrorism-financing, sanctions and international law. He served as one of five International Monitors appointed by the Security Council to oversee the implementation of measures imposed against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated terrorist groups.

Maura Conway is the MA Programme Director at the School of Law & Government, Dublin City University.

Steven R. Corman is the Director of the Consortium for Strategic Communication at Arizona State University.

Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen is the Head of Research Unit, Political Violence, Terrorism and Radicalization at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS).

Luis de la Corte is a Professor of social psychology at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, and an investigator at Athena Intelligence.

James Dingley is a sociologist and former lecturer on terrorism and political violence at the University of Ulster. He is now running his own consultancy on terrorism (Cybernos Associates) and chairs the Northern Ireland think tank Northern Light Review.

Vera Eccarius-Kelly is an Assistant Professor of Comparative Politics at Siena College in Albany, NY, specialized in Latin American and Middle East politics, and, in particular, on revolutionary and social movements in Central America and Muslim Minority activism in Europe.

Rodney Faraon is Director of Intelligence and Threat Analysis for the Walt Disney Company's Global Security Division.

Shabana Fayyaz is an Assistant Professor with the Defense and Strategic Studies Department at the Quaid-Izam University, Islamabad and is also a Doctoral Candidate at the Political Science Department, University of Birmingham, UK.

James Forest is one of the three directors of the Terrorism Research Initiative and co-editor of Perspectives on Terrorism. He is Director of the Security Studies at the University of Massachusetts at its Lowell Campus and was the first director of the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University in Tampa, Florida.

Jennifer Giroux is a CRN Researcher in Terrorism and Political Violence at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, Switzerland.

Sebestyén L. v. Gorka is the Founding Director of the Institute for Transitional Democracy and International Security (ITDIS) Hungary, and the Director for Policy Studies at the Educational Initiative for Central and Eastern Europe (EICEE), USA.

Beatrice de Graaf is Professor for the history of International Relations and Global Governance at Utrecht University, The Netherlands.

Bob de Graaff is Socrates Foundation Professor for political and cultural reconstruction from a humanist perspective at Utrecht University and former Director of the Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism at Campus The Hague/Leiden University.

Stuart Groombridge holds a Masters of Justice (Strategic Intelligence) from Queensland University of Technology, specialising in Organised Crime and recruitment methodologies utilised by Islamist Terrorist Groups. He is currently a PhD candidate at the University of Wollongong's Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention.

Rohan Gunaratna is the Head of the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

Dipak K. Gupta was, until his retirement, Fred J. Hansen Professor of Peace Studies and Distinguished Professor in Political Science, San Diego State University.

Abdulhadi Hairan is a Kabul-based researcher and security, governance and terrorism analyst.

Irm Haleem is an Assistant Professor in the Political Science Department at Seton Hall University, currently researching and publishing on Islamist extremism in the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe.

Muhammad Haniff Hassan is an Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

John Horgan is Director of the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies at the University of Massachusetts, Lowell Campus.

Brian K. Houghton is an Associate Professor of Public Policy & Management at BYU-Hawaii, and the former Director of Research at the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism.

Russell Howard, a former US Army General, is currently at the Monterey Institute of Non-Proliferation Studies.

Richard Jackson is founding editor of the journal *Critical Studies on Terrorism*.

Jolene Jerard is a Research Analyst at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a center of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore.

George Joffé teaches Middle Eastern and North African Affairs at the Centre of International Studies at the University of Cambridge.

Ranga Kalansooriya is a journalist from Sri Lanka with wide experience in terrorism and political violence and a PhD Candidate in journalism and political violence.

Jeffrey Kaplan is Associate Professor of Religion and Director of the University of Wisconsin Oshkosh Institute for the Study of Religion, Violence and Memory.

Emmanuel Karagiannis is an investigator at the START center, University of Maryland, and a lecturer at the University of Macedonia, Greece.

George Kassimeris is a Senior Research Fellow in Conflict and Terrorism at the University of Wolverhampton and co-editor of the journal *Critical Studies in Terrorism*.

Robert E. Kelly is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the School of International Studies at the University of the Pacific.

Jesmeen Khan is a Research Analyst at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism

Research (ICPVTR), a centre of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore.

Brian Kingshott is Professor of Criminal Justice at Grand Valley State University, USA.

Jorge Lasmar, is head of the Department of International Relations at the University of Minas, Brazil.

Faryal Leghari a researcher at the Gulf Research Center, UAE.

Ambassador Melvyn Levitsky is a retired Career Minister in the U.S. Foreign Service. He teaches international relations at the University of Michigan's Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy and is Senior Fellow of the School's International Policy Center.

Pete Lentini is Co-founder and Director of the Global Terrorism Research Centre (GTReC), Monash University, Australia. He is currently researching neo-jihadism; extremism and terrorism in Australia and Russia.

Brynjar Lia is Associate Research Professor at the University of Oslo and also Adjunct Research Professor at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI). He is a historian by training.

Douglas Macdonald has taught at Colgate University for twenty years and Director of its International Relations Program.

Lieutenant General Talat Masood served in the Pakistan Army for nearly 40 years with his last assignment being Secretary for Defence Production in Ministry of Defence. Since retirement he is closely associated with think- tanks and universities regionally and globally, working to promote peace and stability in the region.

William McCants is the founder of Jihadica and also co-founder of Insight Collaborative, a Washington, D.C. -based company that provides education and expertise on Islamism.

Andrew McGregor is the Director of Aberfoyle International Security in Toronto, Canada.

George Michael is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and Administration of Justice at the University of Virginia's College of Wise.

Mansoor Moaddel is a Professor of Sociology at Eastern Michigan University, where he teaches sociology of religion, ideology, revolution, Islam and the Middle East.

Fathali M. Moghaddam is Professor of Psychology at Georgetown University and author of Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Psychological Implications for Democracy in Global Context.

Gregory Miller is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma and is one of the Director's of the Summer Workshop on Teaching about Terrorism (SWOTT).

Will H. Moore is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Florida State University with research interests in violent political conflict within and between countries.

Sam Mullins gained an MSc in Investigative Psychology from the University of Liverpool, and is currently teaching at the Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP) at the University of Wollongong, Australia.

Kevin R. Murphy is Department Head and Professor of Psychology at Pennsylvania State University.

Brigitte L. Nacos is a journalist and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, specialized in mass media, public opinion and decision-making; terrorism and counterterrorism. [Blog](#)

Peter Neumann is Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. Prior to this appointment, he was Director of the Centre for Defence Studies (2005–2007) at King's College London.

John M. Nomikos is Director of the Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS).

Mariya Y. Omelicheva is an Assistant Professor at the University of Kansas.

Raffaello Pantucci is a researcher at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, UK.

Alison Pargeter is a Senior Research Associate at the Centre of International Studies at the University of Cambridge and a visiting scholar at Pembroke College.

Reuven Paz is a long-time researcher of radical Islam, and the founder and director of the Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM) in Herzliya, Israel.

Gregory Pemberton is a graduate of the Royal Military College Duntroon and the University of Sydney and is currently Manager of Postgraduate Programs of the Centre of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism at Macquarie University.

Keli Perrin is the Assistant Director of the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism at Syracuse University.

James A. Piazza is Professor at the International Center for the Study of Terrorism, at Pennsylvania State University.

Nico Prucha is Affiliated Researcher at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP) and a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Vienna.

Gilbert Ramsay is a researcher at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews, Scotland where he is also a Teaching Assistant.

Muhammad Amir Rana is the Director of the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, Pakistan.

Magnus Ranstorp is the Research Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College in Stockholm.

Xavier Raufer is a Professor at the EDHEC Business School in Paris, a Member of the Council on Global Terrorism, and a Member of the Terrorism Studies Board of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence.

Fernando Reinares is a Professor of Political Science and Security Studies, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, and Director of the Program on Global Terrorism, Elcano Royal Institute, Madrid.

Louise Richardson is Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of St. Andrews, Scotland.

Karl Roberts is a Forensic Psychologist, Principal Lecturer in Psychology at Sunderland University and a consultant to UK police forces on risk assessment in terrorism and investigative skills for law enforcement.

Hanna Rogan is a Research Fellow and Ph.D. Candidate at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment.

Johnny Ryan is a Senior Researcher at the Institute of International and European Affairs.

Alex P. Schmid is one of the three Directors of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) and Editor-in-Chief of its online journal 'Perspectives on Terrorism'. He is a Fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism in The Hague.

Richard J. Schmidt is an Associate Professor at the University of Nebraska with interests in intelligence analysis, counterterrorism, terrorism and political violence.

Mark Sedgwick is an Associate Professor and Coordinator of the Unit for Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Aarhus, Denmark.

Abdel Aziz Shady is Director of the Terrorism Studies and Research Program at the Faculty of Economics and Political Sciences at Cairo University, Egypt.

Stephen M. Shellman is a Research Scientist within the Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations at the College of William & Mary and is Director of the Violent Intranational Political Conflict and Terrorism (VIPCAT) Research Laboratory.

Dmitry Shlapentokh is an Associate Professor-Indiana University, South Bend and author of several books and many articles.

Joshua Sinai is a Washington DC based educator and consultant; he is Book Reviews Editor of 'Perspectives on Terrorism'.

Stephen Sloan is Emeritus Professor and Fellow of the Global Perspectives Office of the University of Central Florida.

Jeffrey Sluka is an Associate Professor in the Social Anthropology Programme at Massey University, New Zealand.

John Solomon is global head of terrorism research for World-Check.

Guido Steinberg is a former advisor on international terrorism in the German Federal Chancellery. Currently he is serving as Senior Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) in Berlin, specializing in Middle East and Gulf Affairs.

Michael Stohl is Professor of Communication Studies at the University of California-Santa Barbara.

Nicole Stracke is a Researcher in the Department of Security and Terrorism Studies at the Gulf Research Center, UAE.

Praveen Swami is Associate Editor for The Hindu and Frontline magazine in India.

Andrew T. H. Tan is an Associate Professor in Social Science and International Studies at the University of New South Wales, Australia.

Manuel R. Torres Soriano is a professor of political science at the Universidad Pablo de Olavide de Sevilla, Spain.

Peter Waldmann is Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Augsburg, Germany, and a long time member of the Advisory Board of the German Ministry of Development.

Carl Anthony Wege is professor of Political Science at the College of Coastal Georgia.

Leonard Weinberg is a Foundation Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada.

Clive Williams is an Adjunct Professor at PICT, a Visiting Professor at ADFA, and a Visiting Fellow at the ANU; his specialised field is politically motivated violence.

Phil Williams is a Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh. Currently he is a Visiting Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle PA. His research interests include the relationship between organized crime and terrorism, and terrorist finances.

Mark Woodward is an anthropologist and Islam specialist who teaches in the Department of Religious Studies at Arizona State University.

David Wright-Neville is a former senior intelligence analyst with the Australian government and is now Deputy Director of the Global Terrorism Research Centre and an Associate Professor at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia, where his research and teaching focuses on the political psychology of terrorism and counter-terrorism, especially in Southeast Asia.

Sherifa Zuhur is Director of the Institute of Middle Eastern, Islamic and Strategic Studies.

Legal Note: *Perspectives on Terrorism* (PT) hosts articles that reflect a diversity of opinions. The views expressed therein, and the empirical evidence cited in their support, remain the sole responsibility of the contributing authors; they do not necessarily reflect positions and views of the journal's Editorial Team and Editorial Board or PT's parent organizations, the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS).