PARALLEL HISTORY PROJECT ON NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT (PHP)

Stasi Intelligence on NATO

Bernd Schaefer and Christian Nuenlist (eds.)

[Stasi Archives]

[Stasi Documents]

PHP Publications Series

Washington, D.C. / Zurich

November 2003

This publication is part of a publications series by the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP). The PHP provides new scholarly perspectives on contemporary international history by collecting, analyzing, and interpreting formerly secret governmental documents. Since its establishment in 1999, the project has collected thousands of pages of material on security-related issues of the Cold War, published a large number of online documentaries on central issues such as mutual threat perceptions and alliance management, and organized several major international conferences on war planning, intelligence, and intra-bloc tensions. Further information is provided at the PHP Website: **www.isn.ethz.ch/php**.

CSS An ETH Center

National Security Archive
The George Washington University

Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies

Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies

Institute for Strategy and Security Policy

Table of Contents

Please note: This issue of the PHP Publication Series offers highlights from a much larger online document collection. Please consult the PHP website for all the documents in their original language and other features: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/collections/coll_17.htm.
The PHP has published a number of document collections on various aspects of the security-related history of the cold war: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php.

1) Introduction, by Bernd Schaefer

The Warsaw Pact's Intelligence on NATO: East German Military Espionage Against the West

Preserving the Memory of Success

First East German penetrations of NATO had occurred as early as the beginning of the 1960s. [1] But it was between the late 1970s and the demise of the Soviet Bloc that Stasi human intelligence operations targeting the Western alliance evolved into one of the most successful enterprises by any communist intelligence service. All this work was done on behalf of the Soviet Union, and the material obtained went straight to Moscow.

By 1980, the Stasi's foreign intelligence branch (HVA) ranked the highest among the ten clusters of intelligence to be gathered "military policy, military planning and intentions, military potential of NATO, the USA, FRG [Federal Republic of Germany], other main imperialist powers, and the PRC [People's Republic of China]". The second rank included "armament research and production in the USA and other NATO countries, particularly the development and production of new strategic weapons and weapons systems". [2] From the Stasi's perfectionist perspective, this ranking reflected not only priorities but also existing deficiencies.

However, in assessing the mere fraction that is left of the original Stasi paper trail on penetrating NATO, it is the success of the Eastern intelligence that is striking. The extant record has been preserved as the monument to the Stasi leadership's quest for living on in the memory of posterity. [3] During its self-dissolution in early 1990, the HVA destroyed the bulk of its files with the consent of East German political authorities. Stasi officers involved in this operation have testified that exceptions were made with regard to "certain material selected to end up in the archives, which might be useful for future historical assessment of HVA's record to demonstrate the effects of our work to objective observers." [4] Among the files selected to showcase the fame of Stasi capabilities, information on NATO and West German defense policies and armaments featured prominently. The collection published for the first time on this website draws upon those documents. It is but a fraction of the fragmentary files that have survived. It is all but impossible to extrapolate from them the actual quantity and quality of all the classified material obtained by the Stasi from the West during the Cold War. This may, of course, have been the intention of the Stasi officers in setting up their showcase for posterity in 1990.

Institutional Structures

Following the Soviet model of KGB and GRU - the political and military intelligence agencies, respectively - in the early 1950s the GDR established two separate services to gather intelligence abroad: the HVA within the Stasi for gathering political intelligence, incorporating directorates concerned with military matters, and the "Aufklärung" [5] as a specialized military intelligence service within the Ministry of National Defense. [6]

HVA as the civilian branch was commissioned by the Warsaw Pact to target West Berlin, the FRG, United States. and NATO. The intelligence it gathered was presented to the GDR's top political and military leadership. In 1988, for instance, Department IV of the HVA (Military Espionage) directed 74 FRG citizens as its agents [7], whereas Department XII, in charge of infiltrating NATO and the European Community, had 72 agents at its disposal to penetrate their institutions. [8] Of the eighteen HVA departments, four were primarily assigned to monitor and infiltrate specific countries and their institutions: Department I (Federal Republic of Germany/FRG government), II (FRG parties and institutions), XI (USA) and XII (NATO and the European Community).

The “Aufklärung” was much less independent. After West German intelligence had in 1958 succeeded in recruiting officers from the highest levels of the “Aufklärung”, the East German military intelligence service came under the control of the Stasi’s HVA. Since then, the latter gradually penetrated its partner service to a high degree, treated it as a dependency, and ‘stole’ much of its intelligence for its own purposes. The “Aufklärung” was explicitly assigned by its Warsaw Pact partners to monitor West Berlin, the FRG, the Benelux countries and Denmark. By 1975 it also ran GDR military attachés in embassies worldwide. It reported exclusively to the GDR military leadership. In 1989 “Aufklärung” employed 1146 military and civilian personnel in all its GDR facilities. At that time it directed 293 agents worldwide, among them 138 based in the FRG.

Agents

Most of the important East German agents were actually native West Germans, who spied for the GDR for political reasons and personal motives. Overall they were highly committed to their cause despite initial hesitation and feelings of guilt. They conducted espionage in a professional manner of secrecy, ran high risks of detection, and more or less successfully suppressed emotions when betraying superiors and friends. Usually they did not hold high-ranking or decision-making positions. They served inconspicuously in low and mid-level functions with excellent access to classified information. Theirs are biographies imaginable only in the FRG, where they were motivated to work for the weaker German state, identifying it as a peaceful alternative society more just and on a higher moral ground than West Germany. [9]

There is no room here to tell the stories of all the agents within NATO, the West German Ministry of Defense, the German Federal Army, and the U.S. Armed Forces in the FRG and West Berlin. In all these institutions, agents benefited from opportunities to obtain NATO's secret documents. [10] Although the HVA and "Aufklärung" never managed to penetrate agencies that made decisions on nuclear planning and targeting, or else the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium, they nonetheless gathered from 1967 to 1989 an ever increasing flow of documents. In Brussels alone, these came from four main sources:

- Between 1967 and 1979 Ursula Lorenzen, alias "Michelle" worked as an Assistant to the British Director for Operations in NATO's General Secretariat. She had been recruited in 1962 in West Germany by an East German agent, codenamed "Bordeaux", whom she later married. The couple had worked closely together in Brussels until the GDR called them back abruptly in 1979, following the defection of a Stasi officer from East Berlin to West Germany. In the GDR Ursula Lorenzen gave scripted press conferences as a key witness for alleged NATO aggressiveness. While working on her memoirs, which were never published, she inspired a GDR television documentary on her secret life devoted to exposing NATO's supposed "real intentions". [11]

- Rainer Rupp [12], a student from West Germany, had been recruited by the HVA as an informant in 1968 and was codenamed "Mosel." In 1972 he married a British citizen, Ann-Christine Bowen. whom he recruited for the HVA as "Kriemhild." At that time, Bowen had worked as a secretary in NATO's Integrated Communications System Management Agency. In early 1975 she moved on to Plans and Policy in the International Staff of NATO and in 1977 to the Office of Security in NATO Headquarters where she began to phase out her intelligence activities. That year Rupp himself finally made it into NATO bureaucracy, where he became a country rapporteur in the Directorate of Economics within the General Secretariat. When "Michelle" had to be withdrawn in March 1979, the HVA alerted Rupp to fill the gap (he even inherited "Michelle's" now vacant internal Stasi identification number, a highly unusual procedure). Renamed "Topas," he delivered in the next ten years nearly 2500 documents and "information material" to East Berlin, [13] believing he was turning the wheels of history. Every six to eight weeks he was on duty in the Situation Center of NATO HQ and reported from there. Rupp may have been a key source that warned Moscow about NATO's potential nuclear first strike.

- Between 1973 and 1980 a Belgian secretary, codenamed "Weiler," was recruited by an "Aufklärung" agent, whom she later married. She worked in the French Language Staff of the General Secretariat and delivered documents matching HVA's "Michelle" during the same period. In 1980 the GDR called the couple back to prevent detection.

- In 1987, a former West German signal officer and diplomat, "Cherry," having worked for the "Aufklärung" for many years in the FRG embassy in Vienna, which possessed extensive material on the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, was transferred to Brussels and became a member of the West German Mission to NATO. Working there as a signal officer, he delivered about 800 pages of documents monthly. He and "Topas" duplicated the intelligence the GDR received from Brussels between 1987 and 1989, sometimes providing copies of the same documents without knowing of each other's activities.

The Website Collection

Of the roughly 10.000 pages of surviving HVA records concerned with NATO and the military affairs of its member states, about ten percent have been selected for this collection and grouped into three categories of "information material." They encompass the entire period from 1969 through 1989, with a major emphasis on the last decade of the Cold War. Mostly based on original Western documents, they contain classified information snatched by East German agents from such places as the NATO Headquarters, FRG Ministry of Defense, U.S. Forces in West Germany and West Berlin, West German Federal Army, and the U.S. Embassy in Bonn.
The first cluster consists of assessments of military capabilities and reports on armament planning of selected NATO member states and other Western countries. The bulk of the documents pertain to the United States (16 documents) and France (5). Samples are provided for those pertaining to the United Kingdom (2), Greece (1), Italy (1), Spain (1) and NATO's two Nordic members, Denmark and Norway (2). The selection reflects the arbitrary nature of the destruction of which the records on hand are the result. The destroyers did not try to conceal the fact that the Stasi had obtained a much greater variety of documents on each of NATO's members on a regular basis.

The twelve documents on Western intelligence assessments of the Warsaw Pact make for especially fascinating reading. Like a mirror within a mirror, they provide the Warsaw Pact's view of its own capabilities from the perspective of the adversary, thus reflecting the Western state of knowledge of those capabilities. This allowed the East to assess how successful it had been in hiding its military secrets and possibly identify leaks and other lapses of secrecy that had taken place. Accordingly, the Eastern side could verify or dispute Western assumptions on its military strength through an "assessment of the adversary's intelligence" (see the GDR Defense Ministry documents in this collection) and apply countermeasures. At the same time, the Stasi espionage could document NATO's high respect for the Warsaw Pact's capabilities, regardless of the Western awareness of the substantial problems of individual Warsaw Pact armies and the deficiencies of their equipment. As a side effect, the intelligence the GDR obtained from NATO informed it about Soviet military capabilities that Moscow would have otherwise hardly shared with its East German ally, for example, the number and location of Soviet nuclear weapons on GDR territory.

The third cluster of material includes ten representative Western documents from 1980 to 1988 illustrating the deployment and eventual dismantling of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Western Europe in response to the installation and later removal of the Soviet SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe.

The document dated 4 October 1989 is unique in presenting Stasi knowledge of the nuclear, chemical and ballistic missile potential of several countries on the threshold of development of such weapons.

Conclusions

Almost all of the remarkable wealth of intelligence on the Western alliance obtained by the East German secret services went straight to Moscow. For Soviet state holidays, the Stasi sometimes prepared leatherbound volumes with exquisite morsels from NATO files and proudly presented them to the KGB as special gifts. KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov was reportedly so excited at being able to read the same documents as the “NATO generals” that he wanted to see not only the Russian translations but also the original English originals. [14]

Only the Soviet Union had the capacity to verify the substance of this unrelenting stream of classified Western material in trying to apply it to develop and refine its own military strategy and technology. The HVA and "Aufklärung" departments of analysis in East Berlin were rather small and, in case of the Stasi, understaffed, perhaps deliberately. [15] The GDR's political leadership also did not fully grasp the sophistication of NATO strategies and armaments. Only the East German Ministers of Defense and Chiefs of the Staff approximated their Soviet military counterparts' sensitivity in these matters.

The quantity and quality of documents obtained from NATO since the late 1960s may well have undermined some of the more extreme Warsaw Pact scenarios for nuclear war inherited from the 1950-60s by confronting them with the reality of Western capabilities. [16] Or, on the contrary, the knowledge may have encouraged the Soviet Union to follow in the 1970s a more aggressive strategy of seeking military superiority by counting on division and weakness within the Western alliance. As the superpower confrontation mounted by the end of that decade, the amount of intelligence from NATO sources expanded substantially.

The intelligence increased Moscow's fear of a Western "surprise attack" by a nuclear first strike - the fear rooted in the "trauma of 1941" that was still the formative experience of much of the Soviet military and political leadership. Ever since Hitler's attack in World War II, the adversary's

capabilities were equated with the intention to use them for aggressive purposes once the conditions were right. NATO's option of the "first-use" of nuclear weapons in case of an Eastern conventional attack was interpreted as a "first-strike" intended to decapitate the Soviet Union. [17] The Soviet "war scare" peaked in November 1983, after Moscow's worries about "VRYaN" (Likelihood of a Nuclear Missile Attack) in 1979 and then "RYaN" (Nuclear Missile Attack) in 1981. [18]

Such perceptions of military threats did not subside in the Soviet Union before the mid-1980s, leading to a fundamental change of Warsaw Pact military doctrine in 1987. Because of the inaccessibility of Soviet military records, it is impossible to estimate to what extent the change may have been influenced by the intelligence on NATO received from the GDR agents during those years. Thanks to them, the Soviet Union was thoroughly aware of Western strategies and plans. The intelligence provided support for two contradictory options, both of which the Soviet leadership pursued during the 1980s: Either exploiting NATO's weaknesses by striving for military superiority, particularly by thwarting the deployment of the Euromissiles, or else acknowledging the West's growing military strength and technological advance, leading to negotiation and accommodation.

Stasi intelligence could be used to substantiate either strategy. Through the East German agents NATO may have inadvertently fertilized the ground for the military changes implemented in the Gorbachev era. In another paradox, the intelligence on NATO may have also accelerated the Soviet disarmament proposals and domestic reforms in the USSR, thereby unintentionally undermining the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact. The secret files from Brussels amply demonstrated NATO's anxiety about the impact of Soviet disarmament efforts on the morale of its members, particularly their willingness for continued military spending, which in turn may have spurred further Soviet disarmament efforts. In the late 1980s, however, neither the West nor the Gorbachev leadership grasped the depth of the reverse impact of Moscow's new defensive military strategy and disarmament drive on the morale of Warsaw Pact military and political leaders. In the end, the reforms and disarmament initiatives turned out to remove yet another stone from the shaky edifice of the Soviet empire.

The East Germans ultimately cut pathetic figures in these historic happenings. They were of course ignorant of how the products of their efforts might be interpreted and used by Moscow or East Berlin. They were certainly no “messengers of peace,” as they were heralded by the GDR’s official propaganda and as they still often think of themselves. They may be more properly described as reckless gamblers—not only because of their unsavory personal double-lives but, more importantly, also because of the unpredictable results that the information they supplied could have had in the hands of both paranoid and reasonable Soviet leaders.

BERND SCHAEFER is a Research Fellow at the German Historical Institute in Washington D.C. where he is currently working on U.S. foreign policy since 1969. He graduated from the University of Tuebingen (M.A.) and the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University (Master of Public Administration). From the University of Halle he got his Ph.D. on postwar East German history. Within PHP he coordinates the research in the East German Stasi archives.

Notes

[1] Hans-Joachim Bamler, "Die erste NATO-Residentur", in *Kundschafter im Westen. Spitzenquellen der DDR-Aufklärung erinnern sich,* ed. Klaus Eichner and Gotthold Schramm (Berlin: edition ost, 2003), 33-38; Markus Wolf (with Anne McElvoy), *Man Without a Face. The Autobiography of Communism's Greatest Spymaster* (New York: Public Affairs, 1997), 149-151.
[2] Helmut Mü&ller-Enbergs, ed., *Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit.Teil 2: Anleitungen für die Arbeit mit Agenten, Kundschaftern und Spionen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 1998), 542-543.
[3] Jochen Hecht, "Die Unterlagen der Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung des MfS (HVA): Vernichtung, ́erlieferung, Rekonstruktion", in, *Deutsche Fragen: Von der Teilung zur Einheit*, ed. Heiner Timmermann (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 199-218. For English-language publications on the Stasi: Jens Gieseke and Doris Hubert,*The GDR State Security. Shield and Sword of the Party* (Berlin: The Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service, 2002); John O. Koehler,*Stasi. The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police* (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1999); David Childs and Richard Popplewell, *The Stasi. The East German Intelligence and Security Service* (New York: NYU Press, 1996).
[4] Klaus Eichner and Andreas Dobbert, *Headquarters Germany. Die USA-Geheimdienste in Deutschland* (Berlin: edition ost, 1997), 276-277.
[5] Official East German terms changed with time from "Allgemeine Verwaltung", to "Verwaltung 19", "12. Verwaltung", "Verwaltung Aufklärung" and "Bereich Aufklärung". In West Germany "Militärischer Nachrichtendienst" (MilND) was most common.
[6] Walter Richter, *Der Militärische Nachrichtendienst der DDR und seine Kontrolle durch das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit* (Frankfurt/New York: Peter Lang, 2002); Heinz Busch, *Die Militärspionage der DDR* (Berlin: Manuscript, 2001); Peter Siebenmorgen,*"Staatssicherheit" der DDR. Der Westen im Fadenkreuz der Stasi* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1993), 127-134; Helmut Göpel: Aufklärung, in*NVA, Anspruch und Wirklichkeit*, ed. Klaus Naumann (Berlin 1993), 221-239; Andreas Kabus, *Auftrag Windrose: Der militärische Geheimdienst der DDR* (Berlin 1993).
[7] Müller-Enbergs, *Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter*, 211-214.
[8] Jens Gieseke, *Mielke-Konzern, Die Geschichte der Stasi 1945-1990* (Stuttgart: DVA, 2001), 214.
[9] Klaus Eichner and Gotthold Schramm, ed., *Kundschafter im Westen. Spitzenquellen der DDR-Aufklärung erinnern sich* (Berlin: edition ost, 2003); Gabiele Gast*, Kundschafterin des Friedens. 17 Jahre Topspionin der DDR beim BND* (Berlin: Aufbau, 2000).
[10] In particular two secretaries working in Bonn at the U.S. Embassy (Gabriele Albin: "Gerhard") and the FRG Defense Ministry (Erika Schmitt: "Erich") provided quite some NATO documents for the HVA.
[11] Günter Bohnsack and Herbert Brehmer, *Auftrag: Irreführung. Wie die Stasi Politik im Westen machte* (Hamburg: Carlsen, 1992); Günter Bohnsack, *Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung: Die Legende stirbt. Das Ende von Wolfs Geheimdienst* (Berlin: edition ost, 1997).
[12] Rainer Rupp, "NATO: mittendrin", in *Kundschafter im Westen. Spitzenquellen der DDR-Aufklärung erinnern sich,* eds. Klaus Eichner and Gotthold Schramm, (Berlin: edition ost, 2003), 38-51.
[13] The PHP obtained copies of titles for 1043 of Rupp's "informations" of which about two-thirds consisted of NATO documents rated as "valuable" by the HVA: BStU, SIRA TDB 21, XV 333/69, ZV 8243845.

[14] Markus Wolf, *Man Without a Face*, 334.
[15]According to Busch, *Militärspionage*.
[16] See on the website of the Parallel History Project on NATO and Warsaw Pact (PHP) in particular the collections on the 1964 Warsaw Pact war plan (www.isn.ethz.ch/php/collections/coll_1.htm) and the 1965 Warsaw Pact war game (www.isn.ethz.ch/php/collections/coll_4.htm).
[17] For a representative sample of Warsaw Pact propaganda at the time: Albrecht Charisius, Tibor Dobias and Wolfgang Roschlau, *Presidential Directive No. 59. Kernwaffenkriegsstrategie der USA gegen die Staaten des Warschauer Vertrages* (Berlin: Militärverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1981).
[18] Ben B. Fischer, *A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare* (Washington D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1997). See Vojtech Mastny's introduction to this website collection.

2) Did East German Spies Prevent A Nuclear War?
By Vojtech Mastny

The documentation of the amazing extent of NATO's penetration by Warsaw Pact agents during the Cold War appears on the PHP website on the twentieth anniversary of the November 1983 "Able Archer" incident - the time sometimes believed to have been the closest the world ever came to a nuclear war. The name was that of a NATO exercise generating Soviet suspicions that it was a cover-up for an imminent nuclear strike by the West. The information on NATO's most closely guarded secrets that East German spies were able to procure for the benefit of their Soviet masters raises the tantalizing question of whether the information may have reassured its Moscow recipients, thus preventing the Soviet Union from starting a nuclear war by launching a pre-emptive strike. There is also the question, however, whether the spies' reporting may not have actually precipitated the brush with a disaster by leaving doubt in the Kremlin about the West's intentions.

The 1983 Soviet "war scare" was the culmination of Moscow's growing concern about Western quest for military superiority - a concern prompted by the decline in the late 1970s of East-West détente, believed by Soviet leaders to have changed the global balance of power irreversibly in their favor. Surprised by the reversal, the Kremlin attributed it to US effort to compensate for the West's political, economic, and other nonmilitary setbacks by building up military power that could be used to blackmail the Soviet Union - ironically the mirror image of the way in which conservative US analysts interpreted the motives behind the uninterrupted growth of Soviet military power regardless of détente. Although the Kremlin was particularly worried about the technological and organizational advances of NATO's conventional forces, to the extent that the advances threatened to undermine the numerical advantage the Warsaw Pact had always enjoyed, the prospective shift in the military balance in Europe also seemed to enhance the value of nuclear weapons not only as a deterrent but also as an instrument of political pressure and perhaps even fighting war.

As speculation about the feasibility of fighting and winning a nuclear war led to an increasingly rarefied public and behind-the-scenes discussion in both the United States and the Soviet Union - to the dismay of Europeans whose homelands were those facing obliteration in the event of such a war - at issue was finding out what each of the potential belligerents really wanted to do. American strategists, beholden to their mechanistic theory of deterrence, were customarily dismissive of the importance of intentions on the dreary assumption that what counted was capabilities regardless of intentions. Their Soviet counterparts, viewing the world through the prism of their Marxist-Leninist doctrine, were despite its flaws better equipped by its nature to appreciate the primary importance of intentions. It was the job of their spies to provide information about enemy intentions that could be used, among other input, in making strategic decisions. As early as March 1979, East Germany's chief of military intelligence Gen. Gregori reported that NATO, having achieved "a qualitatively new level of development," was capable of increasing the number of its combat ready divisions and tactical aircraft so quickly that it could start offensive operations shortly after the opening of hostilities to make matters worse for Moscow, minister of defense Marshal Dmitrii Ustinov told an assembly of the highest Soviet military a few months later, NATO could now allegedly count of Chinese support, thus making the Western alliance more dangerous than ever. Later that year, NATO's annual "Autumn Forge" maneuvers - which showed increased coordination with France as well - were viewed by Warsaw Pact intelligence as bearing evidence of the enemy's capacity to attain almost compete readiness to fight by the time the war would start. In February 1980, East German agents reported that NATO was exercising

for the first time on the assumption of as little as 48 hours warning time before the start of hostilities. [1]

On the basis of intelligence received, the Warsaw Pact perceived NATO's December 1979 "dual-track" decision - which raised the prospect of future deployment of its intermediate-range strategic missiles as an inducement to negotiate away the same kind of missiles already deployed by the Soviet Union to cover all of Western Europe - as being aimed at attaining Western military superiority on the Continent by 1985-86. Although the perception was wrong, Iurii Andropov, who as the chief of the KGB intelligence agency was by definition the Soviet Union's best informed person, became particularly alarmed at what he regarded as deliberate US striving for nuclear superiority. On the occasion of a Moscow celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the East German ministry for state security in February 1980, he "outlined a gloomy scenario in which a nuclear war was a real threat." Spymaster Markus Wolf, who was present, had "never seen him so somber and depressed." [2]

Andropov's meeting with general secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev in early 1981 resulted in the decision that "the acquisition of information on military strategy from the United States and [the countries of] the Western alliance [with the goal of obtaining] a well-founded advance warning of an imminent military attack by the adversary be given absolute priority before all other assignments." Accordingly, the KGB and with its foreign collaborators were assigned to conduct a worldwide operation, under the Russian acronym RYaN, to detect the probability of a nuclear missile attack. Although the results of the operation remained inconclusive, the war plan of the US 5th Army Corps in Germany from January 1981 - which the proficient East German spies were soon able to get hold of - was bound to be disconcerting to Soviet strategists because of its embodying the new concept of AirLand Battle that provided for responding to a Warsaw Pact attack by deep strikes into enemy territory. The plan anticipated that attacking Warsaw Pact forces could already be stopped in the border area without reinforcements, though with the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons, and that retaliatory strikes behind enemy lines would be delivered at the same time. [3]

With the collapse of superpower détente, the advances in Western strategy and their implementation threatened to vitiate the offensive strategy that had been the staple of Soviet planning for war in Europe ever since the 1961 peak of the Berlin crisis. Soviet chief of staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov took the lead in trying to draw consequences from what he perceived as the West's new confidence in its ability to fight and win a war in Europe, with or without resort to nuclear weapons. His writings since 1979, arguing that the Soviet Union could win such a war by striking first, by using tactical nuclear weapons against Western Europe, contrasted with Brezhnev's persisting conviction, as late as 1981, that starting such a war would be insane and winning it impossible. In June 1982, the Soviet military conducted an unprecedented exercise simulating a "seven-hour nuclear war" that featured an all-out strike against the United States and Western Europe. Indicating that Ogarkov's views did not enjoy unqualified endorsement by the Soviet leadership, however, soon after the exercise Ustinov obliquely took issue with those "who would invent a 'sure method' of fighting a victorious nuclear war." [4]

At a meeting with Warsaw Pact chiefs of staff at Minsk in September 1982, Ogarkov fomented a war scare by claiming that that the United States had "in effect already declared war on us." He compared the existing situation with that which had preceded immediately the outbreak of World War II, insisting that "the material preparations for war, as shown also by the current maneuvers of the NATO states, are no game, but are dead serious." The marshal concluded somberly that "the danger of war has never been so great," adding pointedly that "the leading imperialist circles are unpredictable." In a telling reversal of what NATO used to be afraid of in the 1950s, the

Warsaw Pact's supreme commander Marshal Viktor Kulikov subsequently told the participants in the alliance's "Soiuz-83" exercise that the enemy was capable of launching a surprise attack in all parts of Europe simultaneously. [5]

Once Andropov succeeded Brezhnev as the supreme Soviet leader at the end of 1982, he became the greatest Cassandra ever to rule in the Kremlin. In a keynote speech to the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee in January 1983, he posed the question of how to explain the sudden change in Western policy. He answered it by attributing the change not only to the attainment of military parity between the superpowers, the West's losses in the Third World, and the capitalist system's alleged internal crisis, but also to opportunities provided by the Soviet bloc's systemic weaknesses - indebtedness to Western creditors, inability to feed its own people without imports from abroad, growing technological backwardness. He suggested that the West's new armament programs made it difficult to differentiate between the intention to "blackmail" and the readiness to take "a fatal step." Contrary to the belief of Americans alarmed at Soviet military buildup, Andropov expressed his conviction that the arms race was a growing burden for the Soviet Union but no problem for the United States. Calling President Ronald Reagan a "political thug," he blamed squarely the United States for an increased danger of war. [6]
Andropov's adviser Viacheslav I. Dashichev disagreed. A few days after the Warsaw Pact meeting, he completed a memorandum in which he used the Western concept of security dilemma to explain the danger of "reflective reaction" by both adversaries. He faulted the Soviet Union for allowing the West to see Soviet policies as expansionistic and the Soviet military build-up as unrelenting, and emphasized the importance of reassuring the adversary about one's own intentions. It is unlikely that Andropov ever read the memorandum, which foreshadowed the "new thinking" about security that would later dawn under Gorbachev. Attesting to the monumental lack of trust between the superpowers, in February 1983 RYaN's level of alert was increased and KGB officers abroad were assigned to keep "continual watch" for any indications of a surprise attack. [7]

On March 23, Reagan lived up to Ogarkov's image of unpredictable capitalist leaders by announcing a radical change in US strategy in his "Star Wars" speech. Relying for survival on defense rather than on the threat of "mutually assured destruction," the change actually made the strategy more congenial to the Soviet way of thinking than it had been before. The unexpected suddenness with which the change was proclaimed, however, was bound to enervate Moscow. Andropov publicly railed against Washington's supposed intent to devise plans that would allow it to unleash a nuclear war in the optimal way to ensure victory. Secretly he confided in Warsaw Pact leaders his view that the United States was moving from statements to practical measures in order to gain military superiority. He was closer to the truth, however, in suspecting that the administration wanted to "radically change the international situation to its advantage in order to dictate us how to live and how to handle our own affairs." [8]

The catalyst that precipitated a war scare in Soviet Union in 1983 was the September 1 destruction of the KAL 007 South Korean airliner with all its passengers by a missile fired by a Soviet fighter plane after malfunctioning in the chain of command that proved the command system's unreliability in an emergency. In an attempt to shift the blame on the exploitation of the incident by the Reagan administration, the war scare was instigated and orchestrated by the Soviet propaganda machine. In another few weeks later, however, the precariousness of the warning systems was demonstrated again, albeit out of public sight, when images of what appeared to be five incoming Minuteman missiles on the Soviet monitoring screens briefly created a panic. After five tense minutes, it was the colonel in charge who averted potentially

catastrophic countermeasures by figuring out that more missiles would have had to be launched if the attack had been real, and acted accordingly. [9]

Former Soviet ambassador to Washington, Anatolii F. Dobrynin, testifies that the Soviet politburo had by then become convinced than coming to terms with the United States was impossible, leading Andropov to declare publicly that a military conflict might come. Andropov blamed what he called an "outrageous military psychosis that had taken hold of the United States" and "completely dispelled" any illusions about the policy of the Reagan administration changing for the better. Amid all this real and artificial scare-mongering, it was NATO's command post exercise "Able Archer," started on 8 November 1983 with the goal of testing procedures for the release of nuclear weapons in case of an all-out war, was what gave the scare a taste of reality. [10]

East German agents installed in the NATO headquarters evidently did not get hold of inside information about this singularly ill-timed exercise. If they had succeeded in getting it, evidence of such a feat would have certainly been preserved for posterity by the Stasi destroyers of documents seeking to build an image of their agency as both competent and dedicated to the cause of peace. It was rather the KGB that acted on reports on the exercise, presumably coming from their own sources, such as Soviet signal intelligence monitoring the enemy's activities. Soviet forces in East Germany and the Baltic area were put on alert as a result. The disturbing part of the war game was its encoded electronic signature that made it impossible to distinguish feigned firing of nuclear missiles from the real thing. The KGB felt compelled to pass on its station chiefs around the world the urgent though incorrect information that US forces had been put on special alert. [11]

What the KGB did not do was to pass its findings about the "Able Archer" to the Soviet politburo or even the upper levels of the defense ministry. Evidently the KGB processors of intelligence did not regard the information important and urgent enough; indeed, what NATO was doing was not any more alarming than the Soviet Union's own June 1982 "seven-hour nuclear war" exercise that had simulating an all-out attack on the West in June 1982. If anybody could claim credit for preventing in November 1983 a tragedy that could have ensued from the "Able Archer" being discussed in the Moscow politburo, it is those unknown Soviet intelligence analysts who, whether out of common sense or because of incompetence, failed to provide policymakers with the potentially explosive information. Their achievement, however, was more apparent than real. Since the putative US missiles, once launched, would have taken only a few minutes to reach their targets the politburo members would have most likely been dead before being able to do anything. Such was the absurdity of the strategic relationship on which the security of the superpowers was supposed to be resting. [12]

What inadvertently helped to keep the relationship stable was not what East German spies had been able to find out about NATO but rather the information they were unable to find because it did not exist. NATO's defensive doctrine and strategy was an open book for them, but for evidence of an imminent enemy attack they would look in vain. Heinz Busch, who was responsible for analyzing and processing their reports at the Stasi headquarters, pertinently testifies in his unpublished memoirs that "at no time were the highest organs of the Warsaw Pact provided with unequivocal evidence that would have explicitly proved that [NATO's] military doctrine and strategy had changed." [13]

The war scare cultivated by Soviet propaganda, as well as the RYaN operation, remained unaffected by the "Able Archer." The scare continued to be cultivated because of its putative utility in Moscow's campaign against the deployment of NATO's "Euromissiles," which was about to reach its peak at that time with the approaching crucial vote on the subject in the German

Bundestag. Once West Germany's parliament, on November 23, had approved the deployment on November 23 and the installation of the missiles started, however, the campaign became not only pointless but also counterproductive by generating panic among Soviet populace. It was soon called off, but RYaN continued until as late 1990. [14]

The Reagan administration, ever mistrustful of what the leaders of the "evil empire" might be up to, had become more scared than they after having realized how they could have reacted to the "Able Archer." Shuddering at the thought of what could have been the consequences of a catastrophic misunderstanding, the president not only turned down his anti-Soviet rhetoric but also sent a reassuring message to Andropov. By then, the even more mistrustful Andropov lay dying, about to make room for successors who would eventually reassess the costs and benefits of Soviet security policy. In fostering the reassessment, the effects of Moscow's miscalculation about the Euromissiles, which were for everyone to see, proved to be more consequential than the potential miscalculation that, hidden from the public eye, could have followed, but did not, from the "Able Archer" incident. Hence also the value of the NATO's secrets snatched by East German spies must be rated proportionately lower.

Other things being equal, unwitting transparency in relations between adversaries can sometimes be more stabilizing than ignorance conducive to suspicions or illusions; the managed ignorance that produced the intelligence fiasco of the 2003 Iraq war is a telling case in point. Since things are never equal, however, governments are unlikely ever to stop trying to hide their secrets from their enemies nor are enemies ever likely to stop trying to snatch the secrets. Historians are the beneficiaries. The East German documents published on this website provide the most extensive glimpse thus far of Western military planning, its rationale and implications, during a period of the Cold War on which the vast majority of original archival documents are still classified. Most importantly, the documents show how much advances in the West's conventional military power, rather than the sterile accumulation of nuclear weaponry, helped to eventually impress upon the enemy that it cannot win the war.

VOJTECH MASTNY, the PHP coordinator, is Senior Research Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Senior Fellow at the National Security Archive, both in Washington, D.C. He has been Professor of History and International Relations at Columbia University, University of Illinois, Boston University, and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, as well as Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and the first Manfred Wörner Fellow of NATO. His most recent book, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, *is the winner of the American Historical Association's 1997 George L. Beer Prize*.

Notes

[1] Report of 9 March 1979, VA-01/39517, pp. 53-73, German Federal Archives, Military Branch [later cited as BA-MA]. See also report of January 1979, AZN 30525, pp. 8-24, at p. 18, BA-MA, and Otto Wenzel, *Kriegsbereit: Der Nationale Verteidigungsrat der DDR, 1960 bis 1989* (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1995), p. 203. Information on Ustinov's speech by Gen. Shadrov, VA-01/40406, pp. 294-303, BA-MA. Report by Gregori about "Autumn Forge" for National Defense Council, 23 November 1979 , DVW1/39520, BA-MA. "Information über Vorbereitung der strategischen NATO-Kommandostabsübung WINTEX 81," 22 February 1980, HVA, 23, pp. 63-70, Stasi archives, intelligence division (lated cited BStU).
[2] "Auskunft über den Stand der Erfüllung des NATO-Langzeitprogramms (LTDP)," 7 April 1981, HVA, 6, pp. 252-78, BStU. Markus Wolf, *Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg: Erinnerungen* (Munich: Econ, 1998), p. 326.
[3] Heinz Busch, *Die Militärspionage der DDR*, unpublished manuscript, 2001, p. 130. "General Defense Plan (GDP) of US 5th Army Corps," 1 January 1981, in "Information über militärische Planungen der USA ... ," 16 December 1982, HVA, 19, BStU).
[4] Ben B. Fischer, "Intelligence and Disaster Avoidance: The Soviet War Scare and US-Soviet Relations," in *Mysteries of the Cold War*, ed. Stephen J. Cimbala (Burlington: Ashgate, 1999), pp. 89-104, at p. 96.
[5] Hoffmann to Honecker and note on statements by Ogarkov, 14 September 1982, AZN 32643, pp. 117-26, BA-MA. Statement by Kulikov, 9 June 1983, VS, OS, 1987, čj. 75174/4, Central Military Archives, Prague (VÚA).
[6] Speech by Andropov, 4 January 1983, VA-01/40473, pp. 60-85, BA-MA.
[7] Wjatscheslaw I. Daschitschew, " 'Nicht durchhaltbare Mission der sowjetischen Aussenpolitik' - ein Gutachten für Andropow," in *Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung 1997* (Berlin: Akademie, 1997), pp. 216-32. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Operations 1975-1985* (London: Stoddard & Houghton, 1991), pp. 74-75.
[8] Speech by Andropov at Moscow meeting of party chiefs, 28 June 1983, DC/20/I/3/1950, pp. 67-77, at p. 68, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO), Berlin.
[9] Elizabeth Teague, "War Scare in the USSR," in *Soviet/East European Survey, 1983-1984: Selected Research and Analysis from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, ed. Vojtech Mastny (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985), pp. 71-76.Stephen J. Cimbala, "Nuclear Weapons and Soviet Military Strategy in the Cold War," in his *Russia and Armed Persuasion* (Lanham: Rowland & Littlefield, 2001), pp. 39-56, at pp. 63-64.
[10] Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents* (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 540.
[11] Ben B. Fischer, *A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1997), pp. 24-26.
[12] Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 139.
[13] Busch, *Die Militärspionage der DDR*, p. 130.
[14] Benjamin B. Fischer, "The 1980s Soviet War Scare: New Evidence from East German documents," *Intelligence and National Security* 14, no. 3 (1999): 186-97.

3) Stasi Files and GDR Espionage Against the West,
by Bernd Schaefer

IFS Info 2/02

Bernd Schäfer

Stasi Files and GDR Espionage Against the West

Table of contents

On the author

Dr. Bernd Schäfer was born in Kaiserslautern in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1962. During the 1980s, he studied History, Catholic Theology and Political Science at the Universities of Tübingen, Germany and Vienna, Austria. From 1989 to 1991 he was John M. McCloy Fellow at Harvard University, were he obtained a Masters of Public Administration degree in 1991. Following to years as dissertation fellow at the German National Merit Foundation, he became in 1993 a fellow at the Commision of East German Catholic Episcopate, working on GDR and the Catholic Church. In 1997 he defended his Ph. D. thesis "State and Catholic Church in the GDR 1945-1989" at the Martin-Luther-Universität, Halle. From 1998 to 2001 he was a fellow at the Hannah Arendt Institute for Research on Totalitarianism. Since then, he has worked on "American Triangular Diplomay, 1969-1976" at the German Historical Institute, Washington DC.

This paper is based on a lecture Dr. Schäfer gave at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies in February 2002.

Stasi Files and GDR Espionage Against the West

The Seizure of Stasi Buildings in 1989/90 and the Stasi Records Law of 1991

The East German experience of 1989 was in many ways different from the downfall pattern of other Warsaw Pact countries' regimes. Concerning the legacy of a repressive regime's intelligence files, the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) was even unique. Attempts by its intelligence agency "Ministry for State Security" (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit" - Stasi) to burn their files without having the capacity to conceal smoking chimneys, were met by civic resistance groups all over the GDR entering and seizing Stasi buildings. Such targeted and persistent attacks on a central nerve center of communist regimes were without analogies in the countries of the Soviet bloc.

Between 4th and 7th December 1989 the Stasi buildings in all district cities and most of the county towns all over the GDR were stormed and seized by spontaneously arranged citizens' committees. All remaining files and documents were secured and sealed. Those were the days when the Central Committee of the "Socialist Unity Party" (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands/ - SED), the GDR's communist party, had disbanded itself and the GDR's financial wizard for acquiring capitalist hard 'valuta' currency, Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, feared for his life in the GDR and defected to the West, where he got debriefed by West Germany's intelligence service. After December 7 only the Stasi headquarters in Berlin were still in business, since people living in the GDR's former center of power did not dare to enter the huge compound. Finally on 15 January 1990 there were efforts made to negotiate a takeover combined with simultaneous pressure from outside demonstrators. They resulted in the seizure of still remaining, quite comprehensive central files as well.

In the following months leading toward German unification in October 1990, citizens' committees in East Germany oversaw the dismantling of the Stasi. They regarded its files as property of the public and fenced off all attempts by the West German government to close them forever or at least move them to the West German Federal Archive with its strict archival guidelines and then across-the-board 30-Years-Rule. The first freely elected East German parliament passed a law on handling and accessing the files in August 1990. The German Unification Treaty created a special body to administer the files headed by Joachim Gauck until new regulations would have been passed by all-German parliament after unification. The final "Law on the Files of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic" was then codified on 20 December 1991 and came into effect a few days later on 1 January 1992.[1] When the new "Authority of the Federal Envoy for the Materials of the Ministry for State Security of the former GDR",[2] which soon became popularly known as 'Gauck

Authority', officially began its work at the same day, it had at its disposal files at a length of altogether 180 kilometers designed for public use.

Since 1992 all individual German or foreign citizens, on which the Stasi had created files, are entitled to apply for checking and reading them in the newly established federal authority. According to the Stasi records law, academic and other researchers, as well as the press, were granted the right to see all non-personal files, personal files of Stasi informers and the surveillance files of so-called "people of contemporary history". The latter clause for prominents was very generously interpreted and affected various intellectuals and politicians of all kinds, down to many lower-ranking officials in East and West Germany. Recently this clause was overturned by the Federal Administrative Court after former Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl had issued a lawsuit to deny public access to his Stasi files. In the wake of the court's decision, the Federal Authority on the Stasi files, meanwhile headed by Marianne Birthler, was temporarily required to block further access to some of its papers on prominents and to blacken many names from copies handed out until then without such deletions. In all likelihood the German Parliament will take up this issue and amend the current Stasi Records Law in the near future, though without fully returning to *status quo ante*.

The Foreign Intelligence Files

The so-called "foreign intelligence lines" within the Stasi consisted of the Berlin center of the "Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung" (HVA) and the Departments XV in the fifteen district Stasi headquarters all over the GDR. In October 1989 approximately 5.000 full-time employees worked for these "foreign intelligence" units, among them 4.000 in Berlin. Compared to the 1950s the number of officers was ten times as high at the end of the GDR and had tripled since the heydays of detente in 1972. If one also includes the signal intelligence people and the military and administrative staff of the intelligence service of the Ministry of Defense, roughly 10.000 people within the GDR worked in "foreign intelligence". In relation to the overall population this was by any proportions a world record. Only the KGB and the CIA were numerically somewhat stronger, but they operated from countries with more than two hundred million people compared to the 16.5 million population of the GDR. In 1988 these foreign intelligence officers directed about 3.000 agents of various status and intensity in the FRG alone. Agents from other foreign countries are significantly lower than this number.[3] So far the latter are not fully accounted for unless the CIA will let us know the full scope of the files it acquired in 1992 ('Rosenholz').[4]

Besides this human intelligence, the Stasi had an ever-increasing capacity and capability of signal intelligence. At least since the mid-1970s it could listen not just into every phone conversation between West and East Germany. It also targeted certain objects and individuals in West Berlin and West Germany and tapped their lines whenever they became busy. Those conversations were recorded, transcribed, summarized and sometimes even analyzed. As a matter of fact the Stasi was able to target basically every phone conversation originating from West Berlin or within West Germany, including government lines in the far away Western federal capital of Bonn in the Rhineland.

The "Rosenholz" File Cards

In 1985 Stasi Minister Erich Mielke, still preparing for emergency measures against a nuclear attack from the West, ordered to microfilm all 317.000 personal file cards with the real names of all HVA agents and 77.000 file cards with codewords of HVA operations. In addition, on his order also computerized forms had to be prepared on each individual agent holding some basic information on the nature of the contact. Whereas the paper file cards were destroyed in early 1990, one microfilm copy had apparently made it to the KGB. From there supposedly the CIA obtained the films in 1992 and brought them to its center in Langley for scrutiny. According to another rumor a former Stasi Major General sold it to the CIA for 1.5 million U.S. dollars.[5]

It took a while for German authorities to find out about this coup. Finally there was an arrangement set up for West German intelligence officers to travel to the United States and transcribe during many weeks in 1993 the information in these films concerning West German agents only. The West German service called this operation on the more or less friendly territory of Northern Virginia "Rosenholz". As a result of this operation, back in Germany many agents were identified, but the trials they were put on produced comparatively minor sentences. Besides formal facts like in which period a particular agent worked for the Stasi, what his code-name was, whether he used technical devices to communicate with his handlers in East Berlin and the number of pages in his destroyed working file, there was not much substance to sentence somebody on this basis to a significant term in prison.

Sharing this assessment, the United States FBI felt the need to produce additional evidence. In the cases of the rather minor American Stasi agent couple Kurt Stand and Teresa Squillacote, identified by the microfilms, they launched a so-called "sting operation" to prove the couple's ongoing willingness to spy for communist causes, in this case for South Africa. Since Mrs. Squillacote, who worked at that time in the Pentagon, fell into this trap, the U.S. Government built a case mostly on that recent incident and sentenced the couple to very harsh 21 respectively 17 years in prison in accordance with U.S. law on delivering classified government material to a foreign power.[6] Their sentences alone almost exceed the ones for all convicted West German HVA spies combined.

The SIRA Tapes

Some of these sentences in West Germany might have been higher, had the decoding of the so-called SIRA tapes not occurred in 1998 but somewhat earlier. This "System Information Recherche Aufklärung" (SIRA) consisted of computerized databases, in which the HVA put the headlines of almost every single "information" obtained by its different agents together with other statistical data including evaluating grades on an information's value. These electronic tapes were destroyed in the early 1990s, but copies turned up later with the former East German army where the 'Gauck-Authority' discovered and decoded them in many years work.

For the period between 1969 and 1989 there have been 4.500 different „sources" with codenames identified, although this number is not identical with the actual number of individual agents.[7] Some codenames were used to conceal electronic sources. In other cases the number of "informations" attributed to certain agents might not match their actual output. Anyway, a fraction of the printed "information" left over in 1990 might now be traced to individual agents since the SIRA tapes contain the call numbers of these "informations".

The whole SIRA tapes complex could be appropriately described as an excellent archi-

val finding aide or a decent library catalogue – but without any files or books to order. A very important aspect of the SIRA tapes was their discovery and decoding as such. It finally made the CIA in 1999 to accept a trade with the German government to deliver CD-ROMs with 'Rosenholz' file cards and forms to Germany and obtain in turn copies of the SIRA tapes. Together these two sources contribute to an assessment of the intensity and value of various HVA agents.

GDR Espionage Against the West

As a reflection of a period of increasing cold war tensions, in 1980 the HVA listed among ten complexes of intelligence gathering at the first position: "Military policy, military planning and intentions, military potential of NATO, USA, FRG, other main imperialistic powers and the PRC"[8]. The second position was reserved for "armament research and armament production in the USA and other NATO countries, particularly development and production of new strategic weapons and weapon systems". Only on third position there was the actual "policy of USA, NATO and FRG vis-à-vis the member states of the socialist community".[9]

Of the eighteen HVA departments only four were assigned to monitor and infiltrate specific countries respectively their institutions: Department I (Federal Republic of Germany/ FRG government), II (FRG parties and institutions), XI (USA) and XII (NATO and European Community). Besides the latter two all other departments were more or less focused on the FRG anyway, for instance Department IV (Military Espionage). Actual Stasi intelligence on policy and strategy developed in the USA itself was almost negligible. Knowledge about the U.S. was almost exclusively limited to the military theater of West Germany and consisted of mostly short-living human and technical sources in the U.S. Military in West Berlin respectively West Germany or of a staff member from the U.S. Embassy in Bonn.

Penetration of West German Government and Intelligence Services

The HVA, on the other hand, was very successful in placing agents in the Federal Chancellery as well as in various ministries of the Federal Government.[10] Since those agents were mostly serving in administrative staff functions, they were excellent in delivering secret documents and internal information. However, with very few exceptions, they were not themselves involved with decision making. In 1988, for instance, the Stasi had two agents connected to the center of FRG executive power - a female technical assistant in the Federal Chancellery and a political scientist working for government affiliated think tanks. Of course there had been the famous case of Günter Guillaume, a "sleeper agent" of the HVA emigrating to West Germany in the 1950s and rising through the ranks of the Social Democratic Party right into the staff of Chancellor Willy Brandt after 1969. Identified in 1974, he was arrested and later traded for Western agents to the GDR. Guillaume, who contributed to the down-fall of Brandt by also spying on him during his vacations in Norway, provided the GDR with a wealth of information on Brandt's policies and personality, but in the end politic-ally burned the very politician the HVA so desperately wanted to keep in office during the debate over the no-confidence vote in the German parliament of May 1972. Brandt had survived this motion by just one

vote. After the political opposition had bought some members of Brandt's coalition to defect him, the Stasi was very likely instrumental in buying two CDU parliamentarians to secretly vote for Brandt, maybe the only case when the Stasi really influenced German politics. Nevertheless six months later in November 1972 Brandt won an overwhelming election victory without any help by the Stasi.

With regard to other federal ministries, the Stasi had recruited between one and two lower-ranking division heads as well as female technical assistants and people working in affiliate institutions of almost every department. Particularly affected were the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, where the Stasi had obtained the cooperation of a few minor diplomats, and the Ministries of the Interior, Economic Affairs and Intra-German Relations. Agents within these institutions provided a wealth of documents and information for the GDR. It might be fairly concluded, however, that their actual influence on shaping or changing political strategies and events in the West was very much limited. Such active involvement also was not part of their assignments given from East Berlin. They were just expected to collect as much information as possible without arousing any suspicion of being affiliated with or sympathetic to East German causes.

Thus it was up to the East German political decision makers to use the massive insights into the FRG provided by the HVA for furthering the interests of the GDR. But if it comes to an analysis of the actual East German advantages stemming from the espionage on the West German government, there is not this much left to say. Obviously it hasn't contributed to a enlightening of the mindset or at least a refining of political strategies of the East German communists. This was mostly due to the rigid ideological framework and the Byzantine power structures in the GDR politburo, but also to the problem of making use of all this clandestine information without compromising or identifying the valuable Stasi sources in the West.

But there should be no downplaying of the successes and achievements of East German intelligence at all. Those are becoming easily evident if one shifts the focus from surveillance or influencing the FRG Government to the operational influence on the three West German intelligence services. Since the late 1960s the HVA effectively could monitor and thwart all relevant West German intelligence efforts on GDR territory.[11] These Eastern intelligence coups were never matched by any similar Western penetration of Eastern services.

Already in the 1950s the KGB was able to recruit as an agent the leader of the counter-espionage division against the USSR in the FRG's foreign intelligence service BND.[12] Detected and arrested in 1961, Heinz Felfe was later traded to the GDR in exchange for Western agents. Never detected were two Stasi top agents in the BND working there from the early 1970s up to 1989. Alfred Spuhler worked in the division of sources from communist countries; Gabriele Gast worked in the analysis department and later became deputy of the Soviet Union division.

With Hans-Joachim Tiedge's defection to the GDR in 1985, the domestic intelligence service BfV[13] unexpectedly lost a high-ranking division head. Only in 1989 did it become aware of the espionage activity of Tiedge's subordinate Klaus Kuron from the so-called ‚countermen operations division', who had offered the Stasi his services in 1982. Even worse hit was the West German military intelligence service MAD[14], whose deputy chief, Colonel Joachim Krase, worked for the Stasi from 1973 until his death in 1988.

Espionage against NATO

The East German intelligence success story continues when we proceed to military espionage against the German Ministry of Defense, the German Federal Army and NATO Headquarters. Following the Soviet model of KGB and GRU, the GDR had founded and created two separate foreign intelligence services, both working on military matters: The "Military Intelligence Service" (Militärischer Nachrichtendienst/ MilND) integrated in the East German Ministry of Defense and the political intelligence of the HVA within the Ministry for State Security. Omitting institutional history details of these two services since the 1950s, we might base the following analysis of GDR military espionage on the combined forces of the two services.[15]

By its partners in the Warsaw Pact, MilND was assigned West Berlin, FRG, Benelux and Denmark as explicit areas of operation. It also organized the service of military attaches in GDR embassies worldwide, recruiting them and sometimes additional embassy personnel as their informers. Relying not just on human intelligence, information was also gathered to a great extent by signal and electronic sources. Presenting intelligence findings right to the military leadership, the MilND's analyses were blunt, filled with ideological phrases and had the tendency to overstate the strength of the enemy in order to justify and increase the defense budget (sounds like a familiar pattern to Western defense analysts). In 1989 it employed 1146 soldiers and civilians in all its GDR facilities. At that time it directed 293 agents worldwide, among them 138 in the FRG.

But MilND never was really independent. When the West German intelligence service had been successful to hire MilND officers at highest levels up to 1958, the Defense Ministry's intelligence service soon came under the control of the Stasi, which secretly penetrated its fraternal partner service to a high degree, treated it like a subordinate and dependent body and 'stole' a lot of its intelligence. There was a lot of double work, but combined the results of military intelligence were even more impressive than the respective record of each service seen in isolation.

The HVA as the political intelligence branch was assigned within the Warsaw Pact the targeting of West Berlin, the FRG, USA and other NATO countries. It presented its intelligence information to the political leadership in less ideological language than the military counterparts. In 1988 Department IV of the HVA (Military Espionage) directed 74 FRG citizens as agents[16], whereas Department XII, in charge of infiltrating NATO and EU, had 72 agents on these institutions on file.[17]

It would consume some considerable time and space to tell the stories of all the highly valuable agents within the German Ministry of Defense, the German Federal Army and the U.S. Armed Forces in West Germany and Berlin, all of them having obtained from time to time also NATO documents for East Berlin and Moscow. A focus on the sources known to have operated for the GDR services in Brussels is quite revealing in a sense. Although MilND and HVA could never place sources with nuclear target planning decision makers or within the operational process of the Supreme European Command of NATO in Belgium, from 1967 to 1989 it gathered an ever increasing flow of documents from Brussels primarily from these sources:

* Between 1967 and 1979 Ursula Lorenzen alias "Michelle" worked as an Assistant to the British Director for Operations in NATO's General Secretariat. She had been recruited in 1962 in West Germany by an East German "romeo" agent with the codename of "Bordeaux", whom she later married. They worked closely together in Brussels before the GDR called them back abruptly in 1979, af-

ter a Stasi officer had defected from East Berlin to West Germany.

* Rainer Rupp, a student from West Germany, had been recruited by the HVA as an informant in 1968 and given the codename ‚Mosel'. In 1972 he married the British citizen Ann-Christine Bowen, whom he recruited for the HVA himself as "Kriemhild". She worked as a secretary in the NATO Integrated Communications System Management Agency at that time. In early 1975 she switched to Plans and Policy in the International Staff of NATO and in 1977 to Office of Security in NATO Headquarters. In that year Rupp himself finally made it into NATO bureaucracy by becoming a country rapporteur in the Directorate for Economics of NATO General Secretariat. When "Michelle" had to be withdrawn in March 1979, the HVA activitated Rupp to fill the gap and he delivered. He even inherited "Michelle's" now vacant internal Stasi identification number, a highly unusual procedure. Now named "Topas", he delivered in the next ten years nearly 2500 "informations" to East Berlin, for instance documents on every NATO summit and each meeting of the Defense Planning Council and much, much more. Every six to eight weeks he was on duty in the Situation Center of NATO HQ and reported from there. As a result NATO defense planning in Brussels was absolutely transparent for Moscow in those years. Rupp was even considered to early warn the Warsaw Pact of a supposed NATO first strike for which HVA provided him with ‚technology'.

If one wants to know more on some GDR double work on NATO, here are the sources of MilND:

* Between 1973 and 1980 a Belgian secretary, codename "Weiler", recruited by GDR-Romeo "Valentin" whom she later married, worked in the French Language Staff in NATO General Secretariat and delivered documents matching HVA-„Michelle" of the same period. In 1980 the GDR called the couple back to prevent detection.

* In 1987 the former West German signal officer and diplomat „Cherry", having worked for MilND for many years, e.g. in the German embassy in Vienna with its extensive materials on the 'Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR)' negotia-tions , was finally transferred to Brussels as member of the German Delegation to NATO. From his work as a signal officer, he could deliver about 800 pages of documents monthly.

Almost all this wealth of intelligence on NATO obtained by the East German services went right to Moscow. Only the Soviet Union was capable of evaluating, assessing and applying information from those documents for the purpose of developing their own military strategy and, moreover, of using it to advance military technology at home and within the Warsaw Pact. For Soviet State Holidays the Stasi prepared leather-bound booklets for the KGB with cover letters by Minister Mielke and some exquisite original documents from NATO. In certain cases affected socialist partners in Eastern Europe got selected documents (except Romania). The analysis departments in HVA and MilND were deliberately small and understaffed, and despite the overwhelming amount of intelligence raw material the GDR leadership proved unable to develop a sense for the inner sophistication of NATO strategies and armaments.

Paradoxically (or logically?) the superb quantity and quality of documents obtained from NATO since the late 1960s not only scrapped adventurous war scenarios of the Warsaw Pact from the 50s and 60s.[18] It also encouraged the Soviet Union to follow a more aggressive strategy of seeking superiority in some fields. Furthermore, in the political context of superpower confrontation, it substantially increased Moscow's fear of a Wes-

tern nuclear first strike in the early 1980s. This Soviet 'War Scare' phenomenon "Wrjan" (Veroiatnost Raketno-Iadernogo Napadeniia i.e. "Likeliness of Nuclear Missile Attack")[19] and the assessments of threats and threat perceptions subsided in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and led to a change of doctrine. It would be fascinating to assess the role intelligence from GDR agents within NATO may have played during those years. Due to their activities, the Soviet Union knew all too well the real strategies and planning of NATO and had two basic options at hand. Both of them it pursued for some time – either to exploit the weaknesses of NATO by going for superiority or to acknowledge its military strength and go for negotiation and accommodation.

For both opposing strategies the material from GDR intelligence proved to be vital. Through the channels of these agents, who absolutely were no 'mediators' at all, NATO finally and inadvertently provided to the Soviet Union the background for changes in military strategy implemented in the late Gorbachev era, which were based on a modified assessment of a potential threat posed by NATO to the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. In the pre-Gorbachev period, however, the East German agents would have delivered significant and substantial advantages to the USSR in a military crisis situation. Indeed they were everything else but 'messengers of peace', as the GDR's official propaganda heralded its Stasi agents on foreign soil.

Notes

[1] Cf. A. James McAdams, *Judging the German Past*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

[2] "Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Materialien des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik".

[3] Jens Gieseke, Mielke-Konzern, *Die Geschichte der Stasi 1945-1990*, DVA: Stuttgart 2001, p. 201-2.

[4] See chapter 2b below.

[5] John O. Koehler, *Stasi. The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police*, Westview Press: Boulder 2001, p. 245.

[6] United States vs. Squillacote, Nos. 99-4088, 99-4099.

[7] Gieseke, Mielke-Konzern, p. 204-5.

[8] FRG = Federal Republic of Germany, PRC = People's Republic of China.

[9] Helmut Müller-Enbergs (Hg.), *Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit*. Teil 2: Anleitungen für die Arbeit mit Agenten, Kundschaftern und Spionen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ch. Links: Berlin 1998, p. 542-3.

[10] See Müller-Enbergs, *Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter*, pp. 199-203.

[11] See Gieseke, Mielke-Konzern, p. 209-10; Müller-Enbergs, *Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter*, pp. 217-225.

[12] BND = Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service).

[13] BfV = Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution).

[14] MAD = Militärischer Abschirmdienst (Military Shielding Service).

[15] See for details of this chapter extensively: Walter Richter, *Der Militärische Nachrichtendienst der DDR und seine Kontrolle durch das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit*, Peter Lang Publishing: Frankfurt/New York, 2002; Heinz Busch, *Die Militärspionage der DDR*, Manuskript, 2001.

[16] Müller-Enbergs, pp. 211-214.

[17] Gieseke, Mielke-Konzern, p. 214; Müller-Enbergs, pp. 231-233.

[18] See the website of the Parallel History Project on NATO and Warsaw Pact: www.isn.ethz.ch/php.

[19] Cf. Ben B. Fischer, *A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare*, Center for the Study of Intelligence: Washington D.C., 1997.

Tidligere utgitte publikasjoner

1991:

1.	Div. forfattere:	Perspektiver på Norges sikkerhet.
2.	C. Archer	Security Options for Denmark.
3.	Div. forfattere:	Perspektiver på Sveriges sikkerhet.
4.	O. Riste	De Gaulle, Alliances, and Minor Powers.
5.	T. Huitfeldt, T. Ries, J.K. Skogan	Sovjet i nord etter CFE.
6.	R. Kristiansen	Norsk forsvarsindustri ved en skillevei?
7.	T. Ries	Consequences of START for the Nordic Region.
8.	N.A. Røhne	Norwegian Attitudes Towards the Briand Plan.

1992:

1.	O. Riste	Postwar security: Universal or regional?
2.	R. Tamnes	Norges hemmelige tjenester under den kalde krigen. Et sammenlignende internasjonalt perspektiv.
3.	L. Shevtsova	August 1991. The attempted coup and its consequences.
4.	T. Kristiansen	Det fjerne og farlige Baltikum. Norge og det baltiske spørsmål 1918-1922.
5.	O. Riste	Eit 'minimumsforsvar' for Norge? FK90 og spørsmålet om alliert assistanse.
6.	O. Wicken	Kald krig i norsk forskning.
7.	K. Hirsch	Den norske klagesaken mot Tyrkia i 1982.

1993:

1.	F. Liland	Culture and Foreign Policy. An introduction to Approaches and Theory.
2.	R. Tamnes	Penetrasjon og polarisering. Nordområdene i et historisk perspektiv.
3.	H. Sjursen	Gamle problemer i ny klesdrakt? EFs utvidelsesproblemer i 1990-årene.
4.	W. Wladyka	Fortidens skygger i polsk politikk. Reformprosessens utfordringer etter valget.
5.	K.E. Eriksen, H. Pharo	Norway and the Early Cold War: Conditional Atlantic Cooperation.
6.	E. Løchen	Norges møte med Europa,1950-1964.
7.	M. Berdal	United Nations Peacekeeping at a Crossroads. The Challenges of Management and Institutional Reform.

1994:

1.	S.R. Rader	Strengthening the Management of UN Peacekeeping Operations. An Agenda for Reform.
2.	J.M. van Splunter	Love at first sight. Co-operation between the Netherlands and Norway on the peaceful use of atomic energy, 1950-60.
3.	N.A. Røhne	Norway Between Great Britain and Germany.
4.	F. Molvig	Norsk forsvarspolitikk i 1970- og 80-årene.
5.	K.E. Haug	Den tysk-norske spenningen under Første verdenskrig.
6.	S.G. Holtsmark	Om Den røde hær rykker inn i Norge ... Spørsmålet om sovjetisk deltagelse i frigjøringen av Norge 1941-1944.
7.	S.G. Holtsmark	The limits to Soviet influence: Soviet strategic interests in Norway and Denmark 1944-47.
8.	O. Njølstad	Fissionable consensus: Scandinavia and the US quest for international atomic energy control, 1946-1950.

1995:

1.	F.O. Nilsen	Sovjetisk ubåtvirksomhet i nord - behov og tradisjoner.
2.	J. Hammerstad, K. Jahr	Telemark bataljon. NATOs nye styrkestruktur og Norges deltakelse i IRF.
3.	M.R. Berdal	The United Nations at Fifty: Its role in Global Security.
4.	O. Njølstad, O.K.Grimnes, J.Rønneberg, B. Goldschmidt	The Race for Norwegian Heavy Water, 1940-1945.
5.	T. Ito	UN Authorized Use of Force: Recent Changes in UN Practice.
6.	R.Hobson, T. Kristiansen	Militærmakt, krig og historie. En innføring i militære studier fra Clausewitz til våre dager.

1996:

1.	Holtsmark, S.G.	Great Power Guarantees or Small State Cooperation? Atlanticism and European regionalism in Norwegian Foreign Policy, 1940-45.
2.	O. Riste, R. Berg	Isolasjonisme, atlantisk samarbeid og nordpolitikk.
3.	F. Liland	Moral og realpolitikk. Norges forhold til Kina etter 1966.
4.	K.O. Sundnes	A Balkan Sideshow. The Medical Support System and United Nations Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia.
5.	Chr. Coker	The future is history.
6.	H. Macdonald	National separatisms and the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

1997:

1.	P.V. Wiker	Amerikansk våpenhjelp til Norge 1949-1953.
2.	H. Krombach	The Meaning of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
3.	T. Huitfeldt	De norske partisanene i Finnmark 1941-44 - i skyggen av den kalde krigen.
4.	R. Berg	Nordisk samarbeid 1914-1918.
5.	H.O. Sandnes	"Olav Tryggvason-affæren".
6.	R.G. Patman	Securing Somalia : A Comparison of US and Australian Peace-keeping during the UNITAF Operation.

1998:

1.	L.M. Ramberg	Luftforsvaret en læringsorganisasjon? Logistiske utfordringer ved NORAIRs deployering til Bosnia 1993.
2.	K. Skogrand	Cash and Cannons. Norway, Denmark, and the US Aid Programmes 1947-1952.
3.	T. Huitfeldt	Striden om landminer.Ottawa-konvensjonens muligheter og begrensninger.
4.	R. Berg	Nasjon - union - profesjon. Forsvaret på 1800-tallet.
5.	K. Skogrand O. Njølstad R. Tamnes	Brennpunkt. Kald krig, nordområder og storstrategi.
6.	J. Sherr	Ukraine's new time of troubles.

1999:

1.	I. Johnstone	The UN's Role in Transitions from War to Peace: Sovereignty, Consent and the Evolving Normative Climate.
2.	S.G. Holtsmark	Gullet fra Moskva. Sovjetisk pengestøtte til norske kommunister, 1917-1990.
3.	T. Farer	Shaping Agendas in Civil Wars. Can international criminal law help?
4.	V. Helgesen	Kosovo og folkeretten.
5.	W.P.S. Sidhu	New Challanges for the Non-Proliferation Regime.
6.	R. Berg	Den svenske "generalguvernörtiden" i Norge, 1814-1829.

2000:

1.	P.Fr.I. Pharo	Necessary, not perfect: NATO's war in Kosovo.
2.	A. Brookes	Hard European Lessons from the Kosovo Air Campaign.
3.	P.Fr.I. Pharo	Norge på Balkan 1990-1999. "Lessons learned".
4.	J. Kidd, P. Mitchell	European defence challenges.
5.	M. Petersson	Vapenbröder. Svensk-norska säkerhetspolitiska relationer under det kalla kriget.
6.	A. Brookes	The prospects for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

2001:

1.	Chr. Coker	Asymmetrical War.
2.	O. Bosch	The Year 2000 Issue and Information Infrastructure Security.
3.	K. Kleve (red.)	Kilder til norsk luftmilitær historie
4.	R. Tamnes (red.)	Kommandospørsmålet på nordflanken. Utviklingen i to formative perioder.

2002:

1.	E. Männik	Estonian Defence. Ten Years of Development.
2.	B. Schäfer	Stasi Files and GDR Espionage Against the West.

Publikasjoner fra IFS

· Forsvarsstudier: Større arbeider og bredere fremstillinger
· IFS Info: Mindre artikler, foredrag etc.

Begge publikasjoner utgis 6-10 ganger årlig. Alle abonnenter av Forsvarsstudier vil automatisk få tilsendt IFS Info.

Abonnementspris:
Institusjoner: kr 350,-
Privatpersoner: kr 250,-

Abonnementet anses løpende til oppsigelse skjer, hvis ikke opphørsdato er uttrykkelig fastsatt i bestillingen. Ved adresseforandring, vennligst husk å oppgi gammel adresse.

Salg av enkelthefter:
Disse kan bare anskaffes i den utstrekning de er på lager. Priser, som kan endres uten forutgående varsel, oppgis på forlangende. Løssalg dette hefte: kr 40,-

I tillegg til de ordinære publikasjonene utgir IFS også enkelte store forskningsarbeider i bokform.

Abonnement og enkeltstudier bestilles fra:
Institutt for forsvarsstudier
Tollbugt. 10
0152 Oslo
Tlf: 23 09 31 05, Fax: 23 09 33 79

Postgiro: 0824 0172977
Send ingen penger ved ny bestilling.
Regning blir sendt.

Publications from IFS

· *Forsvarsstudier* - Defence studies: major research papers and broader studies.
· *IFS Info*: Shorter studies aimed more towards the general public.

Both series are published six to ten times annually.
Subscribers to Forsvarsstudier will automatically receive IFS Info also.

Subscription:
Institutions: NOK 350 (GBP 30, USD 50)
Individuals: NOK 250 (GBP 25, USD 40)

Single issues:
Can only be obtained according to stock in hand. Prices which are subject to change without any notice, are available upon request. Price, this issue: NOK 40,-

In addition to its ordinary publications, IFS publishes occasional studies as books.

To subscribe or order single issues, write to:
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies
Tollbugt. 10, N-0152 Oslo, Norway.
Phone +47 23 09 31 05, Fax + 47 23 09 33 79

Subscriptions may be ordered through postal giro (or equivalents in Your country) to our Account No. 0824 0172977, or by bank draft to our
Institute. Send no money when ordering - we will bill you.

IFS Info 2/2000

Bernd Schäfer

Institutt for forsvarsstudier
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies

Tollbugt. 10
N-0152 OSLO
Norway

Tlf: +47 23 09 31 05
Fax: +47 23 09 33 79

Institutt for forsvarsstudier
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies

4) List of Documents

Documents

All documents selected for the purpose of this collection are copies of originals from the Ministry of State Security (MfS) of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). They have been declassified and released upon request according to the German Stasi Records Law by the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Files in Berlin. These documents are not original records from NATO, U.S., or Western European government or military files. They are based on intelligence delivered by East German agents with access to the original Western documents. Written on official stationery with MfS letterhead, they are German-language "Information" on certain subjects intended to brief the GDR military and political leadership.

Countries

Denmark & Norway

Defense Policy and Military Forces of Denmark [242 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 126, pp. 242-247
4 October 1976
Language: German

NATO Activities in North European Command [232 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 23, pp. 128-131
18 February 1980
Language: German

France

Assessment of French Defense Policy by West German Military Leadership
[283 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 148, pp. 77-84
28 June 1969
Language: German

French Defense Policy and Military Forces 2 [entire document, 1188 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 94, pp. 107-151
8 May 1973
Language: German

Armament Program of French Military Forces [339 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 107, pp. 40-53
29 May 1974
Language: German

French Defense Policy and Military Forces [137 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 125, pp. 115-118
19 August 1976
Language: German

Mission of French Forces in NATO Framework [155 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 761, pp. 28-31
27 March 1989
Language: German

Greece

Assessment of Greece's Contribution to NATO in Context of Armed Forces Planning [179 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 53, pp. 245-252
30 June 1988
Language: German

Italy

Italian Defense Policy and Military Forces 2 [entire document, 1151 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 88, pp. 51-89
9 February 1972
Language: German

Spain

Military Potential of Spain [385 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 813; pp. 32-44
1989
Language: German

United Kingdom

UK Defense Planning in Fullfillment of NATO Requirements 2
[entire document, 1065 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 1, pp. 58-105
19 May 1980
Language: German

UK Defense Planning for NATO [751 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 36, pp. 190-208
24 May 1985
Language: German

USA

Combat Readiness of Active U.S. Army Divisions [121 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 114, pp. 39-42
3 March 1975
Language: German

Overall Assessment of U.S. Military Forces (1980) by NATO [742 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 6, pp. 308-333
30 March 1981
Language: German

U.S. Military Contribution to NATO Until 1985/1986 2
[entire document, 1072 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 7, pp. 154-191
12 June 1981
Language: German

U.S. Report to NATO on Assessment of U.S. Forces Mission in NATO Framework [776 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 14, pp. 8-33
23 March 1982
Language: German

16 December 1982

U.S. and NATO Military Planning on Mission of V Corps/U.S. Army During Crises and in Wartime, Part I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
[entire document, 4424 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 19, pp. 126-359
Language: German, English Excerpt

Planning of V Corps/U.S. Army on Support of Non-American Units in NATO Ground Forces with Nuclear Mines [319 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 25, pp. 118-129
22 June 1983
Language: German

Internal Military Assessment of FRG Forces by United States [418 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 26, pp. 228-238
8 August 1983
Language: German

State of Development and Planning of U.S. Army for NATO 2
[entire document, 1134 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 29, pp. 1-31
28 February 1984
Language: German

State of Development and Planning Concerning Forces and Armaments of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps for NATO 2 3 [entire document, 1356 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 30, pp. 138-177
16 April 1984
Language: German

State of Development and Planning Concerning Forces and Armaments of U.S. Air Force for NATO 2 [entire document, 768 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 31, pp. 186-218
29 June 1984
Language: German

U.S. Army Europe Forces in Crises and in Wartime [375 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 32, pp. 9-26
1984 [undated]
Language: German

Signal Network of U.S. Nuclear Forces Deployed in Western Europe (Flaming Arrow) [98 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 36, pp. 270-272
May 1985
Language: German

State of Development and Planning of U.S. Army Europe Forces in NATO
[440 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 49, pp. 155-166
27 August 1987
Language: German

Assessment of State of American Debate on Ratification of INF Treaty and Related Questions on Continuation of Disarmament Dialogue USA-USSR
[469 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 52, pp. 272-283
26 April 1988
Language: German

Inventory, Storage and Planned Destruction of Unitary Chemical Weapons in the U.S. [150 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 812, pp. 47-53
21 April 1989
Language: German

Assessment On Some Current Aspects of the Bush Administration's Policy Concerning the USSR [491 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 812, pp. 111-122
16 May 1989
Language: German

Special Document

Nuclear, Chemical, and Ballistic Missile Potential of Selected Threshold Countries [300 kb]
Featuring: Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Argentina, Brazil
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 813, pp. 238-245
4 October 1989
Language: German, English Excerpt

NATO Intelligence on Warsaw Pact

Adversary's Intelligence on Planning and Intelligence of Warsaw Pact Forces
[123 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, AGM 1599, pp. 24-28
3 February 1982
Language: German

NATO Assessment of Political Situation in the Soviet Union and the Other Socialist European States [203 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 16, pp. 104-109
11 June 1982
Language: German

FRG Assessment on Development of Soviet Ground Forces until 1995 [324 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 26, pp. 179-189
14 September 1983
Language: German

U.S. Assessment of Soviet Strategic Forces [122 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 27, 165-168
5 December 1983
Language: German

Adversary's Assessment of Reliability of Warsaw Pact Forces [171 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 30, pp. 182-186
April 1984
Language: German

NATO Assessment of Long-term Economic Development in Warsaw Pact States [178 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 36, pp. 386-390
16 April 1985
Language: German

FRG Assessment of Civilian Defense in Warsaw Pact Countries [243 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 36, pp. 100-106
6 June 1985
Language: German

Assessment of Adversary's Intelligence on Development of Warsaw Pact Forces 1983-1985 2 3 4 5 6
[entire document, 3011 kb],
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 39, pp. 62-147
16 December 1985
Language: German, English Excerpt

FRG Assessment of Military Importance of the GDR in Warsaw Pact (and Comment of GDR Defense Ministry, 27 May 1986) [448 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, ZAIG, Information 7466, pp. 1-13
28 April 1986
Language: German

Comment of GDR Defense Ministry on Document "Assessment of Adversary's Intelligence on Development of Warsaw Pact Forces and Armaments" [275 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, Sekretariat Neiber 185, pp. 185-193
12 November 1987
Language: German

Assessment of Adversary's Intelligence on Development of Warsaw Pact Forces and Armaments [753 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 812, pp. 248-267
12 June 1989
Language: German

NATO Assessment of Military Forces and Strength of USSR and Warsaw Pact
[583 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 813, pp. 268-282
16 October 1989
Language: German

INF Deployment

FRG Activities to Develop a Defense System Against Medium Range Missiles
[91 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 1, pp. 253-255
16 April 1980
Language: German

U.S. and FRG Plans to Upgrade their Pershing Missile Forces
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 5, pp. 127-167
26 February 1981
Language: German

Development of a Conventional Version of Pershing II Against Airbases
[227 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 9, pp. 8-17
16 November 1981
Language: German

Geneva Negotiations Between USSR and USA on Medium Range Nuclear Weapons in Europe [263 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 16, pp. 193-199
23 May 1982
Language: German

Situation and Perspectives of Soviet-American Negotiations in Geneva on Nuclear Arms Limitation in Europe [372 kb]
Archives: West German Documents
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 24, pp. 155-164
11 March 1983
Language: German

Assessment of FRG Experts on Soviet Capabilities of Locating and Fighting Pershing II on FRG Territory [179 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 26, pp. 161-165
14 September 1983
Language: German

Situation of Soviet-American Negotiations in Geneva on Limitation and Reduction of Strategic Forces [[133 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 27, pp. 215-218
11 November 1983
Language: German

Adversary's Intelligence on Soviet Potential of Long-Range INF [539 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 48, pp. 1-24
12 August 1986
Language: German

Planned Sequence of Withdrawal of U.S. INF From Europe [112 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 51, pp. 114-117
17 February 1988
Language: German

Precisions on Planned Sequence of Withdrawal of U.S. INF From Europe [152 kb]
Archives: BStU Archives, Berlin
Call-Nr.: ZA, HVA, 52, pp. 108-113
July 1988
Language: German

5) Sample Documents

16 December 1982
U.S. and NATO Military Planning on Mission of
V Corps/U.S. Army During Crises and in Wartime

Preface

Through reliable intelligence we received knowledge of U.S. and NATO planning during crises and in wartime for the V Corps/U.S. Army stationed in the FRG. It considers the secret operations plan (OPLAN) 33001 (GDP: General Defense Plan) for the V Corps/U.S. Army. Worked out by the Staff of the U.S. Army Europe, and approved by the U.S. Department of the Army, it has been incorporated into NATO planning after consultations. This OPLAN is the basis of action for the V Corps to lead the defense within NATO'S Central Army Group (CENTAG). It consists of two parts, the so-called basic plan (OPLAN) and the attachments. Besides general information on intentions, goals and operational structure to defend CENTAG, the OPLAN has detailed instructions for the V Corps and its related combat and support troops, as well as general orders for cooperation and joint actions. 18 attachments with altogether 33 appendixes refer to the operational structure of the corps, boundaries of corps and divisions areas for defense operations, guiding principles to conduct the operation and ensure implementation of orders. Also they include the guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons and chemical agents. In addition, there are appendixes on plans for outside reinforcements to the V Corps/U.S. Army.

OPLAN 33001 (GDP) came into force on January 1, 1981. For U.S. forces it has the security classification SECRET, and within NATO it is NATO SECRET.

This OPLAN is an important document of real NATO war planning. It allows drawing extensive conclusions on the perspective of NATO leaders regarding the character of an initial phase in a potential war, on the strategy of "Flexible Response", and on the principles of "Forward Defense" and defense operations in the European theater of war.

The plan is based on the assumption of a war starting unfavorably to NATO. According to this plan, Joint Forces of the Warsaw Pact begin a war after short preparation with conventional attacks. NATO has only 48 hours of advance alert to occupy defense lines, dig in and fortify them. None, or just parts, of the planned outside reinforcements are available.

CENTAG consists of V Corps/U.S. Army, VII Corps/U.S. Army, II and III Army Corps/FRG, and the II. French Army Corps, provided there is a respective decision by the French government. CENTAG conducts its defense with the intention to destroy attacking forces of the Warsaw Pact already near the border areas, to maintain the integrity of NATO territory resp. restore it, to maintain a cohesive defense in conjunction with Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), and to prevent a breakthrough towards the Rhine.

Remarkable is NATO's intention to include the 12th Tank Division/FRG in the first line of defense within VII Corps/U.S. Army. This confirms existing information and conclusions drawn from

exercises that in times of crises the 12th Tank Division will be released from the III Army Corps/FRG and integrated into VII Corps/U.S. Army.

Concerning the assessment of Warsaw Pact Forces there exists NATO's constantly updated "enemy assessment". It will be added separately to the OPLAN, supposedly on orders by NATO. Assessments about intentions and potential of Warsaw Pact Joint Forces, however, are evident in the appendixes. According to them, NATO expects in the defense area of V Corps/U.S. Army about six to eight Warsaw Pact divisions in the first wave and additional three to four divisions during the second wave. Main attacks are expected in directions Eisenach-Bad Hersfeld-Alsfeld and Eisenach-Huenfeld-Schlitz.

[Translated from German by Bernd Schaefer]

4 October 1989
Nuclear, Chemical, and Ballistic Missile Potential of Selected Threshold Countries

excerpt from page 5

Iraq does not possess nuclear weapons. Its industrial base does not permit a production of such kind of weapons in a foreseeable future. There also is no research going on. In contrast, the country has substantially amplified its capacities to produce chemical weapons. Applying respective imports from all the major Western European countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, it is producing psycho-toxic (Tabun, Sarin), skin-infecting (Yperit) and paralyzing agents, altogether more than 1.000 tons per year. Iraqi forces possess hundreds of 100 and 250 kilogram airfighter bombs, airfighter containers, containers with detonators, as well as between 3.000 and 5.000 pieces of artillery, including those of 155 millimeter caliber. Production of single chemical warheads for tactical missiles are in preparation. Units specialized in chemical warheads to be delivered by 155 millimeter howitzers have been integrated in the Army's artillery brigades. Army and Air Force exercise the use of chemical weapons in combat and protection from them. Special forces do exist for protection during chemical warfare according to the Soviet model.
Iraq is running an extensive program to modernize missiles acquired from the USSR and China. As a result of modernizing the Soviet missile 8K14, and with the support from specialists from Egypt, Brazil, and West Germany, they produced the missiles "Al Hussein" (range: 650 kilometers, warhead: 200 kilograms max.) and "Al Abbas" (range: 900 kilometers). Both missiles are capable of carrying conventional as well as chemical warheads. Potentially Iraq might be able to modernize about 180 missiles per year. Other efforts are concerned with the domestic production of a tactical missile ranging 1.500 kilometers, and with joining the Argentine project "Condor-2".

[Translated from German by Bernd Schaefer]

16 December 1985
Assessment of Adversary's Intelligence on Development of Warsaw Pact Forces, 1983-1985

Preface

Intelligence services and military intelligence of NATO countries relentlessly continue their activities for a comprehensive exploration and assessment of military policy and doctrine, armed forces and armaments of the Warsaw Pact. […]
For these purposes, they constantly use all sources of information (human intelligence, technical intelligence, official channels). Intelligence collection is realized through a comprehensive and intensive evaluation which is increasingly based on the use of electronic data. NATO countries conduct this business on a national level and synchronize the results by an intensive informational exchange within NATO structures. These data are being constantly updated in NATO's operational headquarters. […] These assessments also serve as justification for NATO forces' requirements and as guidelines for developing weapons technology.

Main actors of intelligence activities, in qualitative as well as in quantitative terms, are continuously the United States, Great Britain and the FRG. France is also very active in this respect and integrated in joint NATO actions by informational exchange.

Other NATO countries make their contributions according to agreed divisions of labor (e.g. the Netherlands against Poland) and to their specific potential. Intelligence information also comes from other capitalist countries. Cooperation between the U.S. and the FRG concerning intelligence services and military intelligence has been increased. Besides mutual support to complete the actual state of knowledge on a worldwide scale, they [NATO] primarily undertake efforts to clarify unresolved questions. […] It is evident that not all intelligence obtained flows into NATO channels.

All in all, the adversary believes to possess an appropriate, and in details mostly accurate and reliable, state of knowledge about the Warsaw Pact. Two major conclusions have been drawn from this gathered intelligence:

1. The Warsaw Pact constantly increases its military potential especially in quantitative terms. Concerning the technological state of armaments, the Warsaw Pact does not lag behind NATO in most areas (with the exception of electronics). This tendency will continue.

2. The Warsaw Pact's war preparations have reached an high level and and will be pushed further.

The adversary goes public with its knowledge in a targeted and planned manner. That activity is cleared within NATO as well. There are limits, however. In particular in the U.S. they are restrictive with certain parts of intelligence. For instance, this results in the publication of drawings instead of obtained picture documentations as the 1985 issue of "Soviet Military Power" demonstrated. Demands by NATO's Supreme Commander , U.S. General Rogers, "not to protect the secrets of the enemy", were not accepted. Especially the U.S. goes at length to avoid that the

Warsaw Pact is obtaining clues about the real internal state of NATO knowledge. In general the other NATO countries follow the same principle. Thus there exists a contradiction between increasing requirements for classifying information, and the intention to influence its own people and the public worldwide with the “Warsaw Pact Threat” by means of externally correct facts.

[Translated from German by Bernd Schaefer]

27 May 1986
Comment of GDR Defense Ministry on “FRG Assessment of Military Importance of the GDR in Warsaw Pact”

In general it has to be said that the adversary apparently conducts very targeted intelligence activities and an intensive evaluation of obtained information. The facts in this assessment are partly confirmed by reality, or come at least close. Major deviations concern troops’ strength and numbers of military technology.

From this information we have to draw mainly these conclusions:
- The adversary has obtained an approximately realistic assessment of the GDR’s military relevance.

- We have to devote even more attention to questions of vigilance and secrecy, in particular with regard to publications by the GDR itself.

[There follows a detailed assessment and, if necessary, correction of certain information and numbers obtained by Western intelligence]

[Translated from German by Bernd Schaefer]

6) NATO's «ABLE ARCHER 83» Exercise and the 1983 Soviet War Scare

6.1) ABLE ARCHER 83, by Ben F. Fischer

The Soviets were familiar with the annual NATO command post exercise codenamed ABLE ARCHER 83 from previous years, but the 1983 version included two important changes:

- In the original scenario (which was later modified), the 1983 exercise was to involve high-level officials, including the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in major roles, with cameo appearances by the President and the Vice President. Such high-level participation would have meant greater publicity and visibility than was the case during past runnings of this exercise.

- ABLE ARCHER 83 included a practice drill that took NATO forces through a full-scale simulated release of nuclear weapons.

According to high-level Soviet KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky, on the night of November 8 or 9-he was not sure which-the KGB Center sent a flash cable to West European residencies advising them, incorrectly, that US forces in Europe had gone on alert and that troops at some bases were being mobilized. The cable speculated that the (nonexistent) alert might have been ordered in response to the then-recent bomb attack on the US Marine barracks in Lebanon, or was related to impending US Army maneuvers, or was the beginning of a countdown to a surprise nuclear attack. Recipients were asked to confirm the US alert and evaluate these hypotheses.

Gordievsky described the reaction in stark terms:

> In the tense atmosphere generated by the crises and rhetoric of the past few months, the KGB concluded that American forces had been placed on alert--and might even have begun the countdown to war [...]. The world did not quite reach the edge of the nuclear abyss [...], but during ABLE ARCHER 83 it had, without realizing it, come frighteningly close--certainly closer than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

The ABLE ARCHER story has been told and retold by journalists with inside contacts in the White House and Whitehall. Three themes run though the various versions: The US and USSR came close to war as a result of Soviet overreaction; only Gordievsky's timely warning to the West kept things from getting out of hand; and Gordievsky's information was an epiphany for President Reagan, convincing him that the Kremlin indeed was fearful of a US surprise nuclear attack:

> Within a few weeks after [...] ABLE ARCHER 83, the London CIA station reported, presumably on the basis of information obtained by the British from Gordievsky, that the Soviets had been alarmed about the real possibility that the United States was preparing a nuclear attack against them. [National Security Adviser Robert] McFarlane, who received the reports at the White House, initially

> discounted them as Soviet scare tactics rather than evidence of real concern about American intentions, and told Reagan of his view in presenting them to the President. But a more extensive survey of Soviet attitudes sent to the White House early in 1984 by CIA director William Casey, based in part on reports from the double agent Gordievsky, had a more sobering effect. Reagan seemed uncharacteristically grave after reading the report and asked McFarlane, "Do you suppose they really believe that? [...] I don't see how they could believe that--but it's something to think about." [...] In a meeting the same day, Reagan spoke about the biblical prophecy of Armageddon, a final world-ending battle between good and evil, a topic that fascinated the President. McFarlane thought it was not accidental that Armageddon was on Reagan's mind.

Is Gordievsky's stark description credible? According to US foreign affairs correspondent Don Oberdorfer, the "volume and urgency" of Warsaw Pact communications increased during the exercise. In addition, US sources reported that Soviet fighter aircraft with nuclear weapons at bases in East Germany and Poland were placed on alert. But a US expert who queried a number of senior Soviet political and military officials, Raymond Garthoff, reports that none had heard of ABLE ARCHER, and all denied that it had come to the attention of the Politburo or even the upper levels of the Defense Ministry. Moreover, the knowledgeable Soviet ambassador to Washington Anatoly F. Dobrynin, who argues that the top leadership took the war threat seriously, makes no mention of ABLE ARCHER.

ABLE ARCHER 83, it seems, made more of an impression in the White House than in the Kremlin. In any event, it was not comparable to the Cuban crisis, when the superpowers were on a collision course, US nuclear forces were on full alert, and the USSR had deployed nuclear weapons in Cuba.

[Excerpt from Ben B. Fischer, *A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1997), pp. 24-26.]

6.2) Observations on the „War Scare“ of 1983 From an Intelligence Perch, by Fritz W. Ermarth

We are “celebrating” the 20th anniversary of the “war scare” of 1983, one of the most fascinating and enigmatic episodes of the Cold War. This has occasioned a number of commentaries, publication of newly available documents especially from the Eastern side, and recollection of previous histories on Johnsons Russia List, the Parallel History Project, and others. Numerous writers have characterized the “war scare” as the most dangerous period in the Cold War after the Cuban missile crisis.

My view of this episode is somewhat different as I shall explain below. I apologize to historians who already know this material; but I think it may be new to many interested readers, and, I hope, contains some fresh points of use to historians.

On 2 January 1984 I rejoined CIA after some years at the NSC staff and in private industry to become the NIO/USSR. Almost immediately, I was directed by Robert Gates, then holding the positions of Deputy Director for Intelligence of CIA and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, to undertake a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on all aspects of the palpably tense situation in US-Soviet relations, focusing primarily on a variety of unusual or potentially threatening military activities by the Soviet side.

Doing this SNIE provided most of my perspective on the “war scare”, then and now. Entitled “Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities” (SNIE 11-10-84/JX, dated 18 May 1984), this document has since been almost entirely declassified. From the main text, numerous short passages have been excised because of sensitivity with respect to intelligence sources and methods. Still, it displays the broad range of issues we addressed: military moves, but also propaganda trends, diplomatic developments, Soviet leadership perceptions; and amply discloses the evidence and reasoning that led to our conclusions. The Key Judgments presenting those conclusions have been declassified entirely. They represent the burden of my case, and deserve citation in full:

KEY JUDGMENTS

During the past several months, a number of coincident Soviet activities have created concern that they reflect abnormal Soviet fear of conflict with the United States, belligerent intent that might risk conflict, or some other underlying Soviet purpose. These activities have included large-scale military exercises (among them a major naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea, unprecedented SS-20 launch activity, and large-scale SSBN dispersal); preparations for air operations against Afghanistan; attempts to change the air corridor regime in Berlin; and shrill propaganda attributing a heightened danger of war to US behavior.
Examining these developments in terms of several hypotheses, we reach the following conclusions:

> *We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States. This judgment is based on the absence of forcewide combat readiness or other war preparation moves in the USSR, and the absence of a tone of fear or belligerence in Soviet diplomatic communications, although the latter remain uncompromising on many issues. There have been instances*

where the Soviets appear to have avoided belligerent propaganda or actions. Recent Soviet "war scare" propaganda, of declining intensity over the period examined, is aimed primarily at discrediting US policies and mobilizing "peace" pressures among various audiences abroad. This war scare propaganda has reverberated in Soviet security bureaucracies and emanated through other channels such as human sources. We do not believe it reflects authentic leadership fears of imminent conflict.

We do not believe that Soviet war talk and other actions "mask" Soviet preparations for an imminent move toward confrontation on the part of the USSR, although they have an incentive to take initiatives that discredit US policies even at some risk. Were the Soviets preparing an initiative they believed carried a real risk of military confrontation with the United States, we would see preparatory signs which the Soviets could not mask.

Soviet actions examined are influenced to some extent by Soviet perceptions of a mounting challenge from US foreign and defense policy. However, these activities do not all fit into an integrated pattern of current Soviet foreign policy tactics.

Each Soviet action has its own military or political purpose sufficient to explain it. Soviet military exercises are designed to meet long-term requirements for force development and training which become ever more complex with the growth of Soviet military capabilities.

In specific cases, Soviet military exercises are probably intended to have the ancillary effect of signaling Soviet power and resolve to some audience. For instance, maneuvers in the Tonkin Gulf were aimed at backing Vietnam against China; Soviet airpower use in Afghanistan could have been partly aimed at intimidating Pakistan; and Soviet action on Berlin has the effect of reminding the West of its vulnerable access, but very low-key Soviet handling has muted this effect.

Taken in their totality, Soviet talk about the increased likelihood of nuclear war and Soviet military actions do suggest a political intention of speaking with a louder voice and showing firmness through a controlled display of military muscle. The apprehensive outlook we believe the Soviet leadership has toward the longer term US arms buildup could in the future increase its willingness to consider actions – even at some heightened risk – that recapture the initiative and neutralize the challenge posed by the United States.

These judgments are tempered by some uncertainty as to current Soviet leadership perceptions of the United States, by continued uncertainty about Politburo decision making processes, and by our inability at this point to conduct a detailed examination of how the Soviets might have assessed recent US/NATO military exercises and reconnaissance operations. Notwithstanding these uncertainties, however, we are confident that, as of now, the Soviets see not an

imminent military clash but a costly and – to some extent – more perilous strategic and political struggle over the rest of the decade.

Some further comments and observations are in order:
When I started to preside over this estimate (the real work and expertise came from analysts all over the intelligence community, including in this case overseas commands), I had been detached from the details of our intelligence on Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces since the mid-1970s. I was astonished and enormously gratified to learn how much it had improved in the intervening years. Some recent commentaries (notably in PHP) on the "war scare" have revealed how much the East knew about NATO war plans and posture. In January 1984, I learned that we knew a lot about Soviet and Warsaw Pact war plans. In effect, we had many of their military cook books. This permitted us to judge confidently the difference between when they might be brewing up for a real military confrontation or, as one wag put it, just rattling their pots and pans. It allowed us to distinguish between isolated if purposeful military moves, mere anomalies, and real military preparations for large scale warfare. As the Key Judgments make clear, we saw the former, not the latter.

For intelligence history buffs, it is worth noting that this was an episode where classical human intelligence operations (espionage) contributed crucially to the vital cause of keeping the Cold War cold. Much of our knowledge was based on documentary materials collected by spies.
Another point of possible interest to historians: Note that the date on this SNIE is 18 May 1984 (11-10-84/JX is a serial number, not a date). By this time, the judgments in this estimate had long since been reported to and ingested by the leadership of the intelligence community and by top policymakers. And the "war scare" had largely passed. In a sense, the document itself, as are many nation intelligence estimates, was somewhat for the record. In cases like this, the process of producing such estimates is what is important. That process double checks data, triple checks judgments, and surfaces disputes which need to be scrubbed down. Had the analysts around the community on whose judgments and expertise this estimate rested been more alarmed, we would have produced it much faster.

In later years, I got personal confirmation that our conclusions were on the mark, namely that what animated Soviet behavior and discontent was not fear of an imminent military confrontation but worry that Soviet economic and technological weaknesses and Reagan policies were turning the "correlation of forces" against them on an historic scale. This was the essence of a long conversation I had, after he'd come in from the cold, with Oleg Gordievskiy, who had been a very worried observer in 1983. He noted, interestingly, that intelligence professionals on the Soviet side did not take seriously the much ballyhooed warning system called VRYAN or RYAN; it seemed more like a political instrument to energize the geriatric Politburo.
At the close of the decade, while researching his book on the end of the Cold War, Don Oberdorfer interviewed the late Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev. The Marshal reported that he'd never heard of "Able Archer", the NATO nuclear CPX that supposedly triggered the alerting of a nuclear-capable strike fighter regiment in the GDR and is widely cited as the peak of the "war scare." At the time Akhromeyev was chief of the main operations directorate of the Soviet General Staff. If it had been cause for serious alarm, he above all people would have known about it and been in the chain of command that ordered a response. I understand that Ray Garthoff drew similar blanks from interviews with senior Soviet political figures in his researches. Evidently, the "war scare" did not involve real fear of war on the Soviet side, as we indeed concluded.

One of the more worrisome features of this whole affair is alluded to in the last paragraph of the Key Judgments cited above: "…our inability…to conduct a detailed assessment of how the Soviets might have assessed recent US/NATO military exercises and reconnaissance operations." We had an abundance of intelligence on the Red side, but our ability to assess it was hampered by lack of knowledge about potentially threatening Blue activities we knew or suspected were going on. This is a classic difficulty and danger for intelligence, particularly at the national level. Our leaders in intelligence and defense must strive to overcome it, particularly in confrontational situations.

In the late 1980s, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) directed a thorough, highly classified review of the case. It was conducted by a very able young lady named Nina Stewart. It was lengthy and concluded by indicting us, the authors of the SNIE, for being dangerously relaxed. I retorted that we were being indicted for being right, alas, not the first or last time this has happened in intelligence work. If it hasn't already been, her report should be declassified as much as possible. I'll stick by the conclusions of the SNIE. But the historical work done since then suggests Nina had a point, and it is worth pursuing further.

Although the "war scare" was not, in my view, as scary as it seemed at the time or as depicted in belatedly-revealed contemporaneous materials (themselves artifacts of the misplaced "scare"), it was still a seminal and very interesting period of the Cold War.

On the US side, it definitely helped persuade Ronald Reagan that the time had come for a new opening with the Soviets and new probes for what he called real détente. He made his first move in a major speech in early January 1984. This was reciprocated by Chernyenko in March. Later that year, Gromyko came to Washington and a whole new ball game commenced.

Some have written that this change of tack by Reagan was the product of pressuring by the First Lady and Michael Deaver with an eye to the up-coming elections. My own sense of the President from later interactions was that it was more the product of his own actor's sense of timing. By early 1984, he'd turned the rhetorical and ideological tables on Moscow, had got America "standing tall" again in terms of military image (e.g., budgets, SDI, etc), and concluded the time had come to start looking for deals that would make the relationship with the Soviets saner and safer. His ear for domestic politics surely played a role. But his eye was on the strategic competition.

I suspect that the "war scare" played an even more important role on the Soviet side by intensifying the leadership's introspection and debates about the need for and possibility of internal reforms that would restore the competitiveness of the Soviet system, and also the need for foreign policy moves that would mute or keep at bay the American challenge. Marshal Ogarkov was sounding the tocsin about the military dangers of Soviet internal weaknesses throughout this period. Before long this process produced Gorbachev, uskoryeniye, perestroika, glasnost, and the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Bloc, and the USSR.

So I contend, we got it right: The US did not intend to attack the USSR, and Moscow perceived no such intention. Moscow did not intend to attack nor start a confrontation that could lead to war. Our getting it right was important and had important consequences. Had we got it wrong by letting all the sound and fury of the time distract us from the hard facts, we might have had a real war scare and possibly worse.

Fritz W. Ermarth is currently Director of National Security Programs at the Nixon Center and a Senior Analyst in the Strategies Group of Science Applications International Corporation. He retired from CIA in 1998.

7) Sample Document: Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities, 18 May 1984

Director of Central Intelligence

~~Top Secret~~

Special National Intelligence Estimate

Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities

SNIE 11-10-84

IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT SOVIET MILITARY-POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

KEY JUDGMENTS

During the past several months, a number of coincident Soviet activities have created concern that they reflect abnormal Soviet fear of conflict with the United States, belligerent intent that might risk conflict, or some other underlying Soviet purpose. These activities have included large-scale military exercises (among them a major naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea, unprecedented SS-20 launch activity, and large-scale SSBN dispersal); preparations for air operations against Afghanistan; attempts to change the air corridor regime in Berlin; new military measures termed responsive to NATO INF deployments; and shrill propaganda attributing a heightened danger of war to US behavior.

Examining these developments in terms of several hypotheses, we reach the following conclusions:

— We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States. This judgment is based on the absence of forcewide combat readiness or other war preparation moves in the USSR, and the absence of a tone of fear or belligerence in Soviet diplomatic communications, although the latter remain uncompromising on many issues. There have also been instances where the Soviets appear to have avoided belligerent propaganda or actions. Recent Soviet "war scare" propaganda, of declining intensity over the period examined, is aimed primarily at discrediting US policies and mobilizing "peace" pressures among various audiences abroad. This war scare propaganda has reverberated in Soviet security bureaucracies and emanated through other channels such as human sources. We do not believe it reflects authentic leadership fears of imminent conflict.

— We do not believe that Soviet war talk and other actions "mask" Soviet preparations for an imminent move toward confrontation on the part of the USSR, although they have an incentive to take initiatives that discredit US policies even at some risk. Were the Soviets preparing an initiative they believed carried a real risk of military confrontation with the United States, we would see preparatory signs which the Soviets could not mask.

— The Soviet actions examined are influenced to some extent by Soviet perceptions of a mounting challenge from US foreign and defense policy. However, these activities do not all fit into an integrated pattern of current Soviet foreign policy tactics.

— Each Soviet action has its own military or political purpose sufficient to explain it. Soviet military exercises are designed to meet long-term requirements for force development and training which have become ever more complex with the growth of Soviet military capabilities.

— In specific cases, Soviet military exercises are probably intended to have the ancillary effect of signaling Soviet power and resolve to some audience. For instance, maneuvers in the Tonkin Gulf were aimed at backing Vietnam against China; Soviet airpower use in Afghanistan could have been partly aimed at intimidating Pakistan; and Soviet action on Berlin has the effect of reminding the West of its vulnerable access, but very low-key Soviet handling has muted this effect.

Taken in their totality, Soviet talk about the increased likelihood of nuclear war and Soviet military actions do suggest a political intention of speaking with a louder voice and showing firmness through a controlled display of military muscle. The apprehensive outlook we believe the Soviet leadership has toward the longer term US arms buildup could in the future increase its willingness to consider actions—even at some heightened risk—that recapture the initiative and neutralize the challenge posed by the United States.

These judgments are tempered by some uncertainty as to current Soviet leadership perceptions of the United States, by continued uncertainty about Politburo decisionmaking processes, and by our inability at this point to conduct a detailed examination of how the Soviets might have assessed recent US/NATO military exercises and reconnaissance operations. Notwithstanding these uncertainties, however, we are confident that, as of now, the Soviets see not an imminent military clash but a costly and—to some extent—more perilous strategic and political struggle over the rest of the decade.

DISCUSSION

Introduction

1. There has been much Soviet talk about the increased danger of nuclear war. This theme has appeared in public pronouncements by Soviet political and military leaders, in statements by high officials targeted at both domestic and foreign audiences, in internal communications, and in other channels. Soviet authorities have declared that Washington is preparing for war, and have issued dire warnings that the USSR will not give in to nuclear blackmail or other military pressure. The articulation of this theme has paralleled the Soviet campaign to derail US INF deployment. It continues to this day, although at a somewhat lower intensity in recent months than in late 1983.

2. Since November 1983 there has been a high level of Soviet military activity, with new deployments of weapons and strike forces, large-scale military exercises, and several other noteworthy events:

— *INF response:* Start of construction of additional SS-20 bases following Andropov's announcement on 24 November 1983 of termination of the 20-month moratorium on SS-20 deployments opposite NATO; initiation [redacted] of patrols by E-II nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines off the US coast; [redacted] forward deployment [redacted] of long-range missile-carrying D-class SSBNs; and the start of deployment [redacted] of 925-km range SS-12/22 missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and continued propaganda and active measures against INF deployment.

— *Response to NATO exercise:* Assumption by Soviet air units in Germany and Poland [redacted] of high alert status with readying of nuclear strike forces as NATO conducted "Able Archer-83," a nuclear release command post exercise.

— *Soviet exercises:* Large-scale exercise activity during spring 1984 [redacted] featuring the multiple launches of SS-20s and SLBMs; survivability training including the dispersal of [redacted] operational Northern Fleet SSBNs supported by a large number of ships; [redacted]

— *Berlin air corridors:* Periodic Soviet imposition beginning 20 February 1984 of minimum flight altitudes for the entire length of one or more of the Berlin air corridors—a unilateral change in the rules governing air access to Berlin.

— *Afghanistan:* Deployment in mid-April of several airborne units to Afghanistan, launching of a major spring offensive into the Panjsher Valley, and initiation on 21 April for the first time of high-intensity bombing of Afghanistan by over 105 TU-16 and SU-24 bombers based in the USSR.

— *East Asia:* Deployment in mid-November 1983 of naval TU-16 strike aircraft to Vietnam for the first time; positioning of both Soviet operational aircraft carriers for the first time simultaneously in Asian waters in March 1984; and the first joint Soviet/Vietnamese amphibious assault exercises on the coast of Vietnam in April.

— *Caribbean:* A small combined Soviet/Cuban naval exercise in the Gulf of Mexico, with the first-ever visit of a Soviet helicopter carrier in April/May, and Soviet/Cuban antisubmarine drills.

— *Troop rotation:* Initiation of the airlift portion of Soviet troop rotation in Eastern Europe 10 days later in April than this has occurred for the past five years.

This Estimate explores whether the Soviet talk about the increasing likelihood of nuclear war and the Soviet military activities listed above constitute a pattern of behavior intended either to alarm or intimidate the United States and its allies or to achieve other goals.

Possible Explanations

3. Specifically, in examining the facts we address five explanatory hypotheses:

a. Both the Soviet talk about war and the military activities have been consciously orchestrated

across the board to achieve political effects through posturing and propaganda. The object has been to discredit US defense and foreign policies; to put Washington on notice that the USSR will pursue a hard—perhaps even dangerous—line, unless US concessions are forthcoming; to maintain an atmosphere of tension conducive to pressure by "peace" groups on Western governments; and, if possible, to undercut President Reagan's reelection prospects.

b. Soviet behavior is a response to Washington's rhetoric, US military procurement and R&D goals, and US military exercises and reconnaissance activities near Soviet territory—which have excited Soviet concerns and caused Moscow to flex its own military responsiveness, signaling to Washington that it is prepared for any eventuality.

c. Moscow itself is preparing for threatening military action in the future requiring a degree of surprise. The real aim behind its recent actions is not to alarm, but to desensitize the United States to higher levels of Soviet military activity—thus masking intended future moves and reducing US warning time.

d. A weak General Secretary and political jockeying in the Soviet leadership have lessened policy control at the top and permitted a hardline faction, under abnormally high military influence, to pursue its own agenda, which—intentionally or not—looks more confrontational to the observer.

e. The Soviet military actions at issue are not linked with the talk about war and are basically unrelated events, each with its own rationale.

Soviet Talk About Nuclear War

4. Our assessment of the meaning of alarmist statements and propaganda about the danger of nuclear war provides a starting point for evaluating recent Soviet military activities.

5. Soviet talk about the war danger is unquestionably highly orchestrated. It has obvious external aims:

— To create a tense international climate that fosters "peace" activism in the West and public pressure on Western governments to backtrack on INF deployment, reduce commitments to NATO, and distance themselves from US foreign policy objectives.

— To elicit concessions in arms control negotiations by manipulating the anxieties of Western political leaders about Soviet thinking.

— To strengthen cohesion within the Warsaw Pact and reinforce Soviet pressure for higher military outlays by non-Soviet member states.

The overall propaganda campaign against the United States has recently been supplemented with the boycott of the Olympic Games.

6. The talk about the danger of nuclear war also has a clear domestic propaganda function: to rationalize demands on the Soviet labor force, continued consumer deprivation, and ideological vigilance in the society. This message is also being disseminated [redacted] within the Soviet and East European [redacted] bureaucracies, [redacted]

7. The central question remains: what are the real perceptions at top decisionmaking levels of the regime? Our information about such leadership perceptions is largely inferential. Nevertheless, we have confidence in several broad conclusions.

8. First, we believe that there *is* a serious concern with US defense and foreign policy trends. There is a large measure of agreement among both political and military leaders that the United States has undertaken a global offensive against Soviet interests. Central to this perception is the overall scope and momentum of the US military buildup. Fundamentally, the Soviets are concerned that US programs will undercut overall Soviet military strategy and force posture. Seen in this context, Moscow condemns INF deployment as a telling—but subordinate—element in a more far-reaching and comprehensive US effort aimed at "regaining military superiority." *The threat here is not immediate, but longer term.* However, the ability of the United States to carry out its longer term plans is questioned by Soviet leaders not only to reassure domestic audiences but also because they genuinely see some uncertainty in the ability of the United States to sustain its military effort.

9. Secondly, in our judgment *the nature of the concern is as much political as it is military.* There is a healthy respect for US technological prowess and anxiety that this could in due course be used against the USSR. The Soviets are thus concerned that the United States might pursue an arms competition that could over time strain the Soviet economy and disrupt the regime's ability to manage competing military and

civilian requirements. More immediately, the Soviets are concerned that the United States could achieve a shift in the overall balance of military power which, through more interventionist foreign policies, could effectively thwart the extension of Soviet influence in world affairs and even roll back past Soviet gains. From this perspective, the United States' actions in Central America, Lebanon, Grenada, and southern Africa are seen as a token of what could be expected on a broader scale in the future.

10. Third, and most important for this assessment, we do not believe the Soviet leadership sees an imminent threat of war with the United States. It is conceivable that the stridency of Soviet "war scare" propaganda reflects a genuine Soviet worry about a near-future attack on them. This concern could be inspired by Soviet views about the depth of anti-Soviet intentions in Washington combined with elements of their own military doctrine projected onto the United States, such as the virtues of surprise, striking first, and masking hostile initiatives in exercises. Some political and military leaders have stressed the danger of war more forcefully than others, suggesting that there may have been differences on this score—or at least how to talk about the issue—over the past half year.

11. However, on the basis of what we believe to be very strong evidence, we judge that the Soviet leadership does not perceive an imminent danger of war. Our reasons are the following:

- The Soviets have not initiated the military readiness moves they would have made if they believed a US attack were imminent.
- In private US diplomatic exchanges with Moscow over the past six months the Soviets have neither made any direct threats connected with regional or other issues nor betrayed any fear of a US attack.
- Obligatory public assertions of the viability of the Soviet nuclear deterrent have been paralleled by private assertions within regime circles by Soviet experts that there is currently a stable nuclear balance in which the United States does not have sufficient strength for a first strike.
- In recent months top leaders, including the Minister of Defense and Politburo member Dmitriy Ustinov, have somewhat downplayed the nuclear war danger, noting that it should not be "overdramatized" (although Ustinov's recent Victory Day speech returned to a somewhat shriller tone). At the same time, high foreign affairs officials have challenged the thesis that the United States can unleash nuclear war and have emphasized constraints on such a course of action.

Moreover, the Soviets know that the United States is at present far from having accomplished all of its force buildup objectives.

Recent Soviet Military Activities

12. ***Intimidation?*** It is possible that some of the Soviet military activities listed above were intended, as ancillary to their military objectives, to intimidate selected audiences:

- The East Asian naval maneuvers, deployment of strike aircraft to Vietnam, and amphibious exercises have displayed military muscle to China.
- The bombing campaign in Afghanistan could be seen not only as an operation against the insurgency but also as an implicit threat to neighboring countries—Pakistan and perhaps Iran.
- In mounting large-scale and visible exercises (such as the March-April Northern and Baltic Fleet exercise in the Norwegian Sea) Moscow would understand that they could be perceived as threatening by NATO audiences.

13. Soviet INF-related military activities have also been designed to convey an impression to the West that the world is a more dangerous place following US INF deployment and that the USSR is making good on its predeployment threats to counter with deployments of its own.

14. There is uncertainty within the Intelligence Community on the origins of Soviet behavior with respect to the Berlin air corridors. It is possible that Soviet action was a deliberate reminder of Western vulnerability. Alternatively, airspace requirements for exercises may have motivated this move. The low-key manner in which the Soviets have handled the issue does not suggest that they have been interested in squeezing access to Berlin for intimidation purposes. Nevertheless, the Soviets have been in the process of unilaterally changing the corridor flight rules and thereby reminding the West of their ultimate power to control access to Berlin. After a short hiatus in late April and early May, the Soviets declared new air corridor restrictions, indicating that this effort contin-

ues. In a possibly related, very recent development, the Soviets declared tight new restrictions on travel in East Germany by allied missions located in Potsdam.

15. In a number of instances we have observed the Soviets avoiding threatening behavior or propaganda when they might have acted otherwise, perhaps in some cases to avoid embarrassment or overcommitment. For example, they:

— Never publicly acknowledged the incident in November 1983 in which a Soviet attack submarine was disabled off the US coast as it attempted to evade a US ASW ship, and moved the sub quickly out of Cuba where it had come for emergency repairs.

—[redacted]

— Took no tangible action in March when one of their merchant tankers hit a mine off Nicaragua.

— Notified Washington of multiple missile launches in early April as a gesture of "good will."

16. ***Reaction to US actions?*** The new Soviet deployments of nuclear-armed submarines off US coasts and the forward deployment of SS-12/22 missiles in Eastern Europe are a Soviet reaction to NATO INF deployment, which the Soviets claim is very threatening to them—although the threat perceived here by Moscow is certainly not one of imminent nuclear attack.

17. Soviet military exercises themselves sometimes embody a "reactive" element.[redacted]

[redacted] A key issue is whether this counterexercising takes on the character of actual preparation for response to a perceived threat of possible US attack.

18. A case in point is the Soviet reaction to "Able Archer-83." This was a NATO command post exercise held in November 1983 that was larger than previous "Able Archer" exercises[redacted]

[redacted] The elaborate Soviet reaction to this recent exercise included[redacted]

[redacted] the placing of Soviet air units in East Germany and Poland in heightened readiness[redacted]

[redacted] Alert measures included increasing the number of fighter-interceptors on strip alert,[redacted]

[redacted] Although the Soviet reaction was somewhat greater than usual, by confining heightened readiness to selected air units Moscow clearly revealed that it did not in fact think there was a possibility at this time of a NATO attack.

19. How the Soviets choose to respond to ongoing US military activities, such as exercises and reconnaissance operations, depends on how they assess their scope, the trends they may display, and above all the hostile intent that might be read into them. We are at present uncertain as to what novelty or possible military objectives the Soviets may have read into recent US and NATO exercises and reconnaissance operations because a detailed comparison of simultaneous "Red" and "Blue" actions has not been accomplished. The Soviets have, as in the past, ascribed the same threatening character to these activities as to US military buildup plans, that is, calling them preparations for war. But they have not charged a US intent to prepare for imminent war

20. ***Preparation for surprise military action?*** There is one case in our set of military activities that might conceivably be ascribed to the "masking" of threatening Soviet initiatives. For the first time in five years, the airlift portion of the troop rotation in Eastern Europe began on 25 April rather than 15 April. This may have reflected a change in training and manning practices or the introduction of new airlift procedures. The change of timing of the airlift portion of the annual troop rotation could also be a step toward blurring a warning indicator—a comprehensive delay of annual Soviet troop rotations which would prevent degradation of the forces by withdrawing trained men. But the rail portion of the rotation began ahead of schedule and, in any event, the pattern of rotation was within broad historical norms.

21. In early April, when the Soviets began to assemble a bomber strike force in the Turkestan Military

District, there was some concern that it might represent masking of preparations for operations against Pakistan, or even Iran, rather than against the most obvious target, Afghanistan. At this point the force is clearly occupied against Afghanistan. It was never suitably deployed for use against Iran. We believe that, although the force could be used against Pakistan, a major air offensive against Pakistan without forewarning or precursor political pressure would serve no Soviet purpose and is extremely unlikely.

22. [redacted]

[redacted]

23. *Policy impact of leadership weakness or factionalism?* The Soviet Union has had three General Secretaries in as many years and, given the age and frail health of Chernenko, yet another change can be expected in a few years. This uncertain political environment could be conducive to increased maneuvering within the leadership and magnification of policy disagreements. Some have argued that either the Soviet military or a hardline foreign policy faction led by Gromyko and Ustinov exerts more influence than it could were Chernenko a stronger figure. Although individual Soviet military leaders enjoy great authority in the regime and military priorities remain high for the whole leadership, we do not believe that the Soviet military, as an institution, is exerting unusually heavy influence on Soviet policy. Nor do we believe that any faction is exerting influence other than through Politburo consensus. Consequently we reject the hypothesis that weak central leadership accounts for the Soviet actions examined here.

24. *A comprehensive pattern?* In our view, the military activities under examination here do tend to have their own military rationales and the exercises are integrated by long-term Soviet force development plans. However, these activities do not all fit into an integrated pattern of current Soviet foreign policy tactics. The different leadtimes involved in initiating various activities argue against orchestration for a political purpose. A number of the activities represent routine training or simply refine previous exercises. In other cases, the activities respond to circumstances that could not have been predicted ahead of time.

Conclusions

25. Taken in their totality, Soviet talk about the increased likelihood of nuclear war and Soviet military actions do suggest a political intention of speaking with a louder voice and showing firmness through a controlled display of military muscle. At the same time, Moscow has given little sign of desiring to escalate tensions sharply or to provoke possible armed confrontation with the United States.

26. Soviet talk of nuclear war has been deliberately manipulated to rationalize military efforts with domestic audiences and to influence Western electorates and political elites. Some Soviet military activities have also been designed to have an alarming or intimidating effect on various audiences (notably INF "counterdeployments," the naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea, and naval and air activities in Asia).

27. Our assessment of both Soviet talk about nuclear war and Soviet military activities indicates a very low probability that the top Soviet leadership is seriously worried about the imminent outbreak of nuclear war, although it is quite possible that official propaganda and vigilance campaigning have generated an atmosphere of anxiety throughout the military and security apparatus. The available evidence suggests that none of the military activities discussed in this Estimate have been generated by a real fear of imminent US attack.

28. Although recent Soviet military exercises combine with other ongoing Soviet programs to heighten overall military capabilities, we believe it unlikely that they are intended to mask current or near-future preparations by the USSR for some directly hostile military initiative. Moreover, we are confident that the activities we have examined in this Estimate would

not successfully mask all the extensive logistic and other military preparations the Soviets would have to commence well before a realistic offensive initiative against any major regional security target.

29. Both the talk of nuclear war and the military activities address the concerns of a longer time horizon. Moscow's inability to elicit major concessions in the arms talks, successful US INF deployment, and—most important by far—the long-term prospect of a buildup of US strategic and conventional military forces, have created serious concern in the Kremlin. We judge that the Soviet leadership does indeed believe that the United States is attempting to restore a military posture that severely undercuts the Soviet power position in the world.

30. The apprehensive outlook we believe the Soviet leadership has toward the longer term Western arms buildup could in the future increase its willingness to consider actions—even at some heightened risk—that recapture the initiative and neutralize the military challenge posed by the United States. Warning of such actions could be ambiguous.

31. Our judgments in this Estimate are subject to three main sources of uncertainty. We have inadequate information about:

a. The current mind-set of the Soviet political leadership, which has seen some of its optimistic international expectations from the Brezhnev era disappointed.

b. The ways in which military operations and foreign policy tactics may be influenced by political differences and the policy process in the Kremlin.

c. The Soviet reading of our own military operations, that is, current reconnaissance and exercises.

Notwithstanding these uncertainties, however, we are confident that, as of now, the Soviets see not an imminent military clash but a costly and—to some extent—more perilous strategic and political struggle over the rest of the decade.