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B9-0125/2024 }
B9-0127/2024 }
B9-0128/2024 }
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Amendment 3

Anna Fotyga

on behalf of the ECR Group

Joint motion for a resolution

PPE, S&D, Renew, Verts/ALE, ECR

Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

Joint motion for a resolution

Recital H

Joint motion for a resolution

H. whereas Russia has established contacts with parties, personalities and movements in order to rely on actors within the Union's institutions in order to legitimise Russian positions, support independence movements and proxy governments and to press for the easing of sanctions and mitigate the consequences of international isolation; whereas MEPs from certain political groups, as well as some non-attached MEPs, have been spreading blatant pro-Kremlin propaganda in Parliament;

Amendment

H. whereas Russia has established contacts with parties, personalities and movements in order to rely on actors within the Union's institutions in order to legitimise Russian positions, support independence movements and proxy governments and to press for the easing of sanctions and mitigate the consequences of international isolation; whereas MEPs from certain political groups, as well as some non-attached MEPs, have been spreading blatant pro-Kremlin propaganda in Parliament; ***whereas this is not the first time that an MEP has spied for Russia, as far-right Jobbik member Bela Kovacs was sentenced on similar grounds by the Hungarian authorities;***

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Amendment 4

Anna Fotyga

on behalf of the ECR Group

Joint motion for a resolution

PPE, S&D, Renew, Verts/ALE, ECR

Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

Joint motion for a resolution

Recital H a (new)

Joint motion for a resolution

Amendment

Ha. whereas there are also ‘Russlandverstehers’ (Russia-understanding) politicians within mainstream political parties; whereas several public figures from EU Member States, including former heads of government and cabinet members, most notably Gerhard Schröder, have held well-paid positions in Kremlin-controlled energy companies; whereas, even after the full-scale aggression against Ukraine, some of these people decided not to step down and continued to receive the Kremlin’s blood money, with the silent complicity of their political parties; whereas they continue to use their pro-Russian influence in both their domestic and the European political scenes;

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Amendment 5

Anna Fotyga

on behalf of the ECR Group

Joint motion for a resolution

PPE, S&D, Renew, Verts/ALE, ECR

Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

Joint motion for a resolution

Recital U a (new)

Joint motion for a resolution

Amendment

Ua. whereas other EU institutions are less transparent than the European Parliament, and therefore Russian influence is even harder to expose and counter in those institutions; whereas the most obvious example of Russian special operations within the EU was the construction of the Nord Stream pipelines, which occurred with the silent acquiescence of certain EU officials and which has never been properly investigated;

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Amendment 6

Anna Fotyga

on behalf of the ECR Group

Joint motion for a resolution

PPE, S&D, Renew, Verts/ALE, ECR

Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

Joint motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2

Joint motion for a resolution

2. Unequivocally condemns the ongoing Russian efforts to abuse and falsify the historical recollection of Europe's most tragic periods, ***such as the terror of the Nazi regime***, in order to try to justify its current brutal, illegal and inhumane aggression and its expansionist policy;

Amendment

2. Unequivocally condemns the ongoing Russian efforts to abuse and falsify the historical recollection of Europe's most tragic periods, ***including the consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the terror that followed for the territories conquered by Nazi Germany and communist Russia***, in order to try to justify its current brutal, illegal and inhumane aggression and its expansionist policy;

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Amendment 7

Anna Fotyga

on behalf of the ECR Group

Joint motion for a resolution

PPE, S&D, Renew, Verts/ALE, ECR

Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

Joint motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Joint motion for a resolution

9. Expresses particular concern about recent reports that the Russian authorities are providing specific narratives to far-right political parties and actors in different EU countries, most notably in Germany and France, aimed at subverting public support for Ukraine, following Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022; stresses the seriousness of Russia's connections with parties and politicians in the Union and its extensive interference in secessionist movements in European territories;

Amendment

9. Expresses particular concern about recent reports that the Russian authorities are providing specific narratives to far-right **and radical-left** political parties and actors in different EU countries, most notably in Germany and France, aimed at subverting public support for Ukraine, following Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022; stresses the seriousness of Russia's connections with parties and politicians in the Union and its extensive interference in secessionist movements in European territories;

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Amendment 8

Anna Fotyga

on behalf of the ECR Group

Joint motion for a resolution

PPE, S&D, Renew, Verts/ALE, ECR

Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

Joint motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15

Joint motion for a resolution

15. Reiterates its previous position that the exceptional character of Russian foreign interference requires special efforts by national and EU institutions, including the European Parliament, to identify, address and overcome this specific threat;

Amendment

15. Reiterates its previous position that the exceptional character of Russian foreign interference requires special efforts by national and EU institutions, including the European Parliament, to identify, address and overcome this specific threat; ***calls on the Commission, in this regard, to launch an internal investigation into the handling of and Russian influence during the process of planning and building the Nord Stream pipelines;***

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Amendment 9

Anna Fotyga

on behalf of the ECR Group

Joint motion for a resolution

PPE, S&D, Renew, Verts/ALE, ECR

Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

Joint motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Joint motion for a resolution

17. Recalls that foreign interference is a systemic threat that must be countered vigorously; highlights that hybrid warfare and foreign information manipulation and interference are not just foreign policy issues, but in fact threaten the very basis of our democracies; urges the EU institutions to adopt a permanent cross-cutting approach to combating foreign information manipulation and interference more effectively; considers that electoral interference in one Member State affects the EU as a whole, insofar as it can have an impact on the composition of the EU institutions; believes that national authorities cannot address these threats by working in isolation, nor can private sector self-regulation solve it all; welcomes the work done by the European External Action Service in its second Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats published on 23 January 2024; remains determined to follow through in its efforts to combat foreign interference in the EU in the years to come, among other things, through a dedicated parliamentary body;

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Amendment

17. Recalls that foreign interference is a systemic threat that must be countered vigorously; highlights that hybrid warfare and foreign information manipulation and interference are not just foreign policy **and security** issues, but in fact threaten the very basis of our democracies; urges the EU institutions to adopt a permanent cross-cutting approach to combating foreign information manipulation and interference more effectively; considers that electoral interference in one Member State affects the EU as a whole, insofar as it can have an impact on the composition of the EU institutions; believes that national authorities cannot address these threats by working in isolation, nor can private sector self-regulation solve it all; welcomes the work done by the European External Action Service in its second Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats published on 23 January 2024 **and recommends closer cooperation with NATO in this area**; remains determined to follow through in its efforts to combat foreign interference in the EU in the years to come, among other

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things, through a dedicated parliamentary
body;

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Amendment 10

Anna Fotyga

on behalf of the ECR Group

Joint motion for a resolution

PPE, S&D, Renew, Verts/ALE, ECR

Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

Joint motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21

Joint motion for a resolution

21. Expects the Commission and the Council to deliver on the Defence of Democracy package in order to urgently take action and close the numerous loopholes in EU party financing legislation, find a compulsory regulatory scheme for the big platforms and step up the EU's cyber defence against possible attacks on our electoral system; urges the EU institutions and the Member States to make significant and lasting investments in strengthening our democratic resilience and the rule of law, including through measures directed at enhancing the EU's counter-intelligence capabilities;

Amendment

21. Expects the Commission and the Council to deliver on the Defence of Democracy package in order to urgently take action and close the numerous loopholes in EU party financing legislation, find a compulsory regulatory scheme for the big platforms and step up the EU's cyber defence against possible attacks on our electoral system; urges the EU institutions and the Member States to make significant and lasting investments in strengthening our democratic resilience and the rule of law, including through measures directed at enhancing the EU's counter-intelligence capabilities; ***underlines that criminal investigations into spying charges are the competence of the Member States; highlights that, in almost all Member States, Russian spy networks have been uncovered; invites the Member States to strengthen their efforts and cooperation, including to neutralise attempts to acquire sensitive technology from EU companies to fuel Russia's military capabilities; welcomes the fact that several EU countries have launched special investigative committees devoted to***

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countering Russian influence, but notes that others have recently dissolved theirs; regrets that, in some cases, those who should be rewarded and specially protected by national authorities for dismantling networks of Russian and Belarusian spies and for effectively countering their hybrid warfare, are instead persecuted on political grounds;

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