

Telling The Time

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The Bug

Server generates a time-based:

- Password reset token

- Session id

- Random password

- REST API Key

...

For example: PHP

`uniqid()`

“Gets a prefixed unique identifier based on the current time in microseconds.”

CAUTION NOT SECURE

WARNING NOT UNIQUE (?!)

blah blah **SECURE** blah **UNIQUE** blah ...

Check Github

```
$token = uniqid(); // 57eb8c5bbf47b; time
```

```
$token = md5(uniqid()); // 41eced92fef729c756... time
```

```
$pwd = substr(md5(uniqid()),0,8); // 41eced92; time
```

```
srand((double) microtime() * 1000000);
```

```
$token = md5(uniqid(rand())); // time,time
```

```
$password = md5(uniqid($session, true)); //time,known,time
```

```
$password = md5(uniqid(time(), true)); // time,time,time
```

Let's Take a Moment

A microsecond is a *really* short period of time

“Lightning fast” - a lightning flash takes $\sim 200,000$ microseconds.

“In the blink of an eye” $\sim 100,000$ microseconds

“In a flash” ~ 1000 microseconds

British Army L115A3 rifle muzzle velocity: 938 m/s

= $\sim 1\text{mm}$ per 1 μs

The Target - Reset

```
<?php // resetPwd.php
```

```
date_default_timezone_set("GMT");
```

```
...
```

```
$pwd = uniqid();
```

```
file_put_contents('/tmp/pwd', $pwd );
```

```
...
```

The Target - Login

```
<?php // login.php

$pwd = $_GET['password'];

$target = file_get_contents('/tmp/pwd');

if( strcmp( $pwd, $target ) == 0 )

{

    print("Access Granted<br>");

    print("target: $target\\n<BR>");

    print(phpinfo());

}
```

Methodology

Could use - ntp, icmp timestamp, snmp, web app...

RFC 2616: Origin servers **MUST** include a Date header field in all responses except: 100,101,500,503 or no clock.

If no clock, **MUST NOT** use expires or last-modified (ie. uncacheable).

But date has a resolution of 1,000,000 μ s... (!)

Known Unknowns

Find a script with similar timing to the password reset script.

Request this many times to find the clock diff.

Date resolution is 1,000,000 μ s, but there's an edge.


Correct for distance from the edge.

Apply this difference.

Brute force (0, 1, -1, 2, -2, 3, -3...)

Req Duration - Metropolitan


■ Frequency



Microsecond Req Duration - Leatherhead to Telecity (SOV), Docklands (~30km) 200 μ sec resolution.

Results - Metropolitan


■ Frequency



Microsecond Error in Brute Force - Leatherhead to Telecity (SOV), Docklands (~30km)
200 μsec resolution.

Results - Antipodes

■ Frequency



Microsecond Error in Brute Force - Leatherhead to Sydney (ec2), ~17000km, 2000 μsec resolution.

But what does it mean?

We can brute force the μs time at which a web script will generate a token in:

LAN: ~ 500 requests

Metropolitan Area: ~ 1000 requests (~ 30 seconds)

Antipodes, tiny server: $\sim 40,000$ requests (~ 1 hour)

...without trying very hard...

Questions?

Improvements:

- Frequency buckets.
- Faster client environment.
- Reliability testing; use a better network.

We haven't talked about:

- Local brute force.
- Millisecond brute force.
- Remote timing attacks in the literature.
- All the many situations in which this is useful...