# Overt Employment Discrimination by Multinational Firms: Cultural and Economic Influences in a Developing Country

JOHN J. LAWLER and JOHNGSEOK BAE*

An issue that has been explored only to a limited extent is the role that multinational firms might play in promoting or inhibiting employment discrimination based on gender in developing countries. This study focuses on this issue within the context of Thailand, a country that, until quite recently, had one of the world's fastest growing economies, driven to a large extent through investment by foreign multinational firms. The approach we take is to analyze the determinants of the inclusion of explicit gender restrictions in job announcements by both multinationals and Thai-owned firms. Some job announcements restrict jobs to male or to female applicants, and some are silent on the issue of gender. Others specifically invite both male and female applicants. There are no laws in Thailand restricting gender-based discrimination nor requiring "equal opportunity" language on the part of private employers.

The analysis examines the relationship of the cultural characteristics of the firm's home country, along with economic growth in the host country, with the likelihood of various gender-based restrictions being placed in job announcements. We employ widely used measures of national culture developed by Hofstede. Empirical results demonstrate relationships between discrimination and certain of Hofstede's cultural dimensions. Economic growth was not found to have an impact on discrimination. Control variables in the study include dummy variables to control for occupation and the industry of the employee firm.

*The authors' affiliations are, respectively, Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and College of Business Administration at Hanyang University, Seoul, Korea. Partial support for this project was provided by the Campus Research Board, University of Illinois. The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of Harry Triandis, Kevin Hellock, and Wally Hendricks.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Vol. 37, No. 2 (April 1998).  Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK.

INCREASING GLOBAL INVESTMENT by multinational corporations (MNCs) (Aliber and Click, 1993; Jungnickel, 1993) has become a leading factor in promoting economic growth in many developing countries. Extensive investment by MNCs in these countries may have a wide range of effects—some positive and some negative—and the consequences of this process for social change in host countries are especially significant. In the case of employment, for example, the actions of MNCs may run counter to the intentions of national policymakers. Fernandez-Kelly (1983) notes that, in encouraging the establishment of the *maquiladoras* plants in Mexico, government officials had assumed that this would lead to a reduction in male unemployment. However, these companies actually hired primarily female employees, to whom they could pay lower wages, resulting in a very different outcome.

As the Mexican case illustrates, an important debate revolves around the impact of development, when driven by foreign investment, on the status of women. Foreign direct investment has been particularly relevant as a stimulus to growth in the emerging economies of Southeast Asia. Women in this region are increasingly active in the labor force, though employment discrimination remains seemingly widespread, particularly in the case of managerial and professional jobs (Adler and Izraeli, 1994). However, established patterns of discrimination may be changing, and understanding the impact of MNCs on this process would seem to be a critical concern for national policymakers in an era in which the rights of women are increasingly significant.

In this study we examine the impact of MNCs on overt gender discrimination in a rapidly developing country. *Overt gender discrimination* is defined here as a publicly stated gender requirement for candidates for a particular position in an organization (regardless of the gender specified). The data used in this study derive from newspaper advertisements in which employers indicate a gender preference for the position in question. Although generally prohibited in industrialized Western countries, overt discrimination of this type persists throughout much of Asia. Prior to the enactment of laws such as the Civil Rights Act (1964) in the United States, gender-based discrimination in newspaper advertisements was, in fact, quite common in the United States (Goldin, 1990) and other industrialized Western countries. The elimination of such overt forms of employment discrimination has likely contributed extensively to the economic advancement of women. We recognize that overt discrimination is only one form of the phenomenon and perhaps is only the proverbial tip of the iceberg. Subtler and less obvious forms of discrimination may exist even in organizations that profess not to discriminate and that do not manifest

any apparent discriminatory intent. Thus this study deals with only one aspect of the discrimination process.

We examine two principal factors that might be expected to affect the propensity of employers to engage in discriminatory hiring practices. Following the literature in the international management area, we look at the role the national culture of a firm's home country might play in influencing its propensity to engage in overtly discriminatory hiring practices within a host country. We also investigate the impact of economic growth on overt discrimination. The host country in this study is Thailand, where Asian, American, and European MNCs are all playing important roles in the industrialization process.

## I. Literature Review and Hypotheses

*Employment discrimination*. Economic analysis of gender discrimination is often rooted in the notion of tastes or preferences for discrimination on the part of employers, employees, and/or customers (Blau and Ferber, 1992). Such preferences, presumed to be unrelated to productivity, nonetheless may lead to both male-female wage differentials and gender-based occupational and industrial segregation, even in otherwise competitive labor markets. However, individual workers also may make employment decisions, based on personal preferences and needs, leading to disparities in occupational or industrial gender distributions that are not the result of discriminatory practices by employers. Thus research differentiating the intentions of employers from the choices of workers is clearly very significant in understanding employment patterns.

Sociologic analysis is especially relevant in understanding discrimination in the context of developing economies. Jacobs and Lim (1992) note that more mainstream sociologists (e.g., Smelser, 1968; Davis and van den Oever, 1982) argue that development and modernization contribute in the long run to a lessening of discrimination, largely as the consequence of the displacement of ascriptive criteria by criteria related more directly to ability. Yet empirical analysis has not always supported this argument (Charles, 1990), and several authors, including many feminists, maintain that economic development often has led to a deterioration in the status of women, resulting in greater discrimination in the workplace (e.g., Nash and Fernandez-Kelly, 1983; Ward, 1984). MNCs are often singled out as a force serving to undermine the welfare of women.

Much previous research on the impact of discrimination on employment opportunities for women (e.g., Abrahamson and Sigelman, 1987; Bielby and Baron, 1986; Lorence, 1992) has taken place in the United

States or other countries where sex discrimination is prohibited. Although employers may well continue to discriminate in these countries, it is generally not possible to observe and analyze explicit expressions of discriminatory intent. Since Thailand has no laws prohibiting overt discrimination (Siengthai and Leelakukthanit, 1994; Siddiqui, 1988), employers can, and often do, impose explicit gender-related restrictions on jobs. Consequently, in this study we have the advantage of being able to treat the presence or absence of overt discriminatory intent as a dependent variable.

*Home-country culture and employment discrimination*. There is considerable variation among the MNCs operating in Thailand with respect to the cultures of their countries of origin. A culture is defined by the beliefs, attitudes, norms, role expectations, and values widely shared by the members of a particular group. Culture therefore can influence behavior in a variety of ways (Triandis, 1994). An organization's external cultural milieu within which it functions (i.e., national culture) is apt to influence its internal culture, and this, in turn, affects the behaviors and actions of organizational participants. Kashima and Callan (1994), for example, describe ways in which Japanese national cultural traits, such as collectivism, affect internal organizational practices. More generally, Hofstede (1980) hypothesizes a number of ways in which national cultural traits may be linked to intraorganizational action. This is not to say that national culture completely determines organizational culture and action, only that it is one of several possible influences.

If national culture influences organizational actions, then there are various avenues by which a firm's home-country culture could be linked to the likelihood of gender discrimination by the firm's subsidiaries within host countries. First, culturally influenced management practices relating to the role of women in the workplace that have become entrenched in the parent company simply may be transferred to subsidiaries (through, for example, the use of standardized policies and procedures). Second, the cultural predispositions of home-country expatriate managers of subsidiaries may affect their tastes and preferences as related to discrimination. Third, host-country nationals employed in managerial positions are apt to have been socialized to MNC home-country standards and values. For example, many U.S. companies prefer to hire host-country nationals who have attended college in America or worked for other American companies. Japanese companies often send managerial employees to Japan for extensive training and organizational socialization. Consequently, hiring

actions by host-country nationals might well be influenced by MNC home-country culture.

The culture, laws, and economic conditions dominant in a host country might all mitigate, to some extent, the influence of MNC home-country culture. Yet, in highly ethnocentric firms (Heenan and Perlmutter, 1979), management practices in foreign subsidiaries are tightly bound to home-country practices. Even absent rigid home-country controls, ethnocentric forces may still be substantial (Laurent, 1986). However, as MNCs gain experience in the international arena, they may tend to become less ethnocentric (Schuler, Dowling, and De Cieri, 1993). And forces promoting globalization in today's world are said to lessen ethnocentricity in MNCs. The issue as to whether home-country culture has an impact on discriminatory intent in foreign subsidiaries is ultimately an empirical question.

Hofstede (1980) developed a series of scales that measure cultural traits that he argues are related to behavioral tendencies. National norms for these scales have been used in a variety of studies to predict outcomes that can be linked, on theoretical grounds, to cultural traits. Examples include gross national product and economic growth (Franke, Hofstede, and Bond, 1991) and corporate strategic decisions (Shane, 1994; Kogut and Singh, 1988).

Hofstede (1980) originally generated four scales: *power distance* (the extent to which subordinates legitimize power differentials), *masculinity* (the extent to which "masculine" values are stressed in a society as opposed to "feminine" values), *individualism* (the extent to which individuals promote personal goals over group goals), and *uncertainty avoidance* (the extent to which individuals are risk averse). In later work, Hofstede (1991) introduces a fifth scale, termed *Confucian dynamism*, that really assesses the extent to which individuals in a particular culture focus on the future versus the present and past. Of these five scales, two suggest particularly strong theoretical arguments regarding cultural linkages to employer propensities to discriminate: *masculinity* and *individualism*.

*Hypothesis 1*
The likelihood of overt gender discrimination will *increase* with the parent company's home-country average value on Hofstede's masculinity scale.

Masculinity seems, at least on the surface, to be the most obvious cultural factor linked to gender-based discrimination. Countries with relatively high average scores on the masculinity scale are characterized by

highly differentiated sex roles, a "machismo" ethic, and general male dominance in the society (Hofstede, 1980). In such cultures, we might expect that certain jobs will be largely restricted to men and others largely restricted to women.

*Hypothesis 2*
The likelihood of overt gender discrimination will *decrease* with the parent company's home-country average value on Hofstede's individualism scale.

Cultures high on the individualism scale stress personal initiative and autonomy. The converse of individualism is collectivism, in which group affiliation and group consciousness are dominant. We would expect that cultures that score high on individualism tend to emphasize objective competency and skill in evaluating job candidates, while more collectivist cultures would tend to emphasize ascriptive criteria, such as age, social status or class, and gender, and be more apt to perpetuate traditional gender roles. As Hofstede (1980) notes, particularistic criteria (that favor "in groups") are more significant in cultures that score low on individualism, while universalistic (and nonascriptive) criteria are more significant in high-individualism cultures. Since gender often serves as an ascriptive factor (Scoville, 1992), gender-based employment discrimination is presumably less likely in cultures characterized by high individualism. This argument is supported by other theoretical perspectives on individualism and collectivism (Triandis, 1995) and is also consistent with theoretical work that suggests that the emergence of individualism as a dominant value in a society serves to reduce sexism (Charles, 1990).

We should explain why we have chosen not to include the other three Hofstede cultural dimensions in our analysis. Of these three, the power-distance factor has perhaps the most plausible linkage with discrimination. High-power-distance societies are apt to be more traditional in character, and we might assume that this would lead to a greater propensity to be patriarchal and thus exclude women from more significant roles in society. However, Hofstede's scales are not orthogonal, and in fact, individualism and power distance are quite highly correlated.[1] Thus collinearity becomes a significant problem. Following Triandis (1995), we feel that individualism is the more conceptually interesting cultural dimension and have chosen to focus on that dimension rather

[1] In the sample of cases used in the empirical analysis done in this paper, the correlation between power distance and individualism was .84.

than power distance. The Confucian dynamism dimension suggests that it also might be linked to discrimination, except that the name is something of a misnomer. It is not an indicator of the extent to which a culture holds to Confucian values per se but rather an indicator of time orientation. Cultures high on this dimension (primarily East Asian countries) place great emphasis on long-term payoffs to activities, while those low on this dimension (primarily Western countries) are preoccupied with short-term, immediate outcomes. The theoretical linkage to discrimination here seems weak. Similarly, any linkage between uncertainty-avoidance-related behaviors (as identified by Hofstede, 1980) and discrimination would be quite remote in comparison with the masculinity and individualism dimensions.

*Economic growth.* Shifting economic conditions that affect labor supply and demand are expected to influence the willingness and ability of employers to indulge in discriminatory preferences (Reskin, 1993). Oppenheimer (1970, p. 118) notes that "[L]ittle may have changed about a job, but shortages of the traditionally preferred type of worker often lead to the substitution of other types of workers." Some empirical studies have demonstrated that labor shortages reduce occupational sex segregation in American metropolitan areas (Abrahamson and Sigelman, 1987), although there have been contradictory findings (Lorence, 1992).

*Hypothesis 3*
The likelihood of overt discrimination will *decrease* as the rate of real growth in the economy increases.

In the case of economic development in Southeast Asia, Chan and Lee (1994) suggest that rapid economic expansion, coupled with acute labor shortages, has greatly diminished gender discrimination in Singapore. Similar arguments are often reflected in the popular press regarding other East and Southeast Asian countries, particularly where the business communities are largely Chinese (thus excluding Korea and Japan). Chinese-based cultures are seen as more open to female participation in the labor force at all levels, particularly in the face of labor shortages. As with many other countries in this region, Thailand has enjoyed rapid economic growth for some time, although there have been cyclic fluctuations in its growth rate. Moreover, there is a strong Chinese presence in the local business community. While home-country culture may affect the propensity of employers to discriminate, economic vitality represents another possible determinant.

*Control variables*. Hypotheses 1 through 3 deal with only a few of the many factors that may contribute to the creation of "gendering" in the allocation of work opportunities (Reskin and Padavic, 1994). Consequently, we include certain control variables in the analysis. First, we control for the occupational category of the position in question. There is a lengthy literature regarding occupational sex labeling (Oppenheimer, 1968). We also include variables to control for the firm's industrial category. Again, there is research suggesting sex segregation related to discrimination across industrial groups (Reskin, 1993). Industrial categories also control for interindustrial variations in economic conditions that might have an impact on discrimination. Finally, given that the 12-year period of the study, during which Thailand was undergoing fairly rapid modernization, could be associated with cultural change and unmeasured long-term economic changes associated with our economic variables, we include a trend term for control purposes.

## II. Research Methods

*Dependent variable*. This study utilizes newspaper job announcements in which employers were free to express requirements with respect to job candidate gender. Language relating to gender requirements may fall into one of four distinct categories: (1) the position is open *only to male applicants*, (2) the position is open *only to female applicants*, (3) the ad expressly indicates that the position is open *to both male and female applicants* ("equal opportunity" positions), or (4) the ad is silent regarding applicant gender (no gender language positions). In general, the language specifying gender restrictions is quite simple and straightforward (e.g., "Thai male not over 25 years old," "women only," "men only"). In a few instances, ads will describe job duties in terms of male or female third-person pronouns. In the case of "equal opportunity" positions, the ads contain language such as "men and women," "either male or female," etc.

We believe that there is a meaningful distinction between no gender language cases and cases with expressly stated "equal opportunity" language, with the latter case perhaps indicating a more gender-neutral position on the part of the employer.

The dependent variable is a nominal variable consisting of these four categories. In the sample of cases used here, the percentage of cases falling into these four categories was 25.8 percent ("males only"), 13.9 percent ("females only"), 26.9 percent ("equal opportunity"), and 33.4 percent (no gender language).

*Data collection.* The database for this study consists of a sample of job announcements published in the *Bangkok Post*, Thailand's principal English-language newspaper, between 1985 and 1996. Since Hypothesis 3 links discriminatory behavior to variations in economic activity, it was necessary to include both years of high and low growth to test these hypotheses. The period covering 1985 to 1996 represents a considerable range of economic activity in Thailand and seemed appropriate for our purposes. Three issues of the paper were chosen at random from each quarter of each year. Five or six ads were then drawn at random from each issue. The total sample consists of 902 usable cases.

The *Bangkok Post* was used because it is a newspaper of record in Thailand and the most widely read of the English-language dailies. It is also the only one for which we could build a time series over the period in question. We compared the *Post* ads with those in other English-language papers and found it to contain the most extensive set of advertisements. Moreover, ads in other papers are usually replicated in the *Post*. International English-language papers such as the *International Herald Tribune*, *Asian Wall Street Journal*, and *Financial Times* infrequently carry ads relevant to the local labor market, whereas the *Post* carries numerous ads daily.

To what extent are such ads representative of the population of positions being filled? There are different ways in which employers might fill positions. Many positions may be filled internally through promotions or transfers. This study is limited in that it does not address issues of discrimination in this context, although it seems likely that patterns of discrimination in internal hiring are likely to be reflected in external hiring. Another problem concerns the representativeness of newspaper job advertisements for externally filled positions. A number of methods might be used in external recruiting, and a sample drawn only from newspaper ads may be biased. That the ads are in English makes this problem potentially even more serious. Fortunately, previous research found that about 75 percent of a sample of both MNCs and large-scale Thai-owned firms used English-language newspaper ads as a principal means of recruiting for white-collar positions (managers, professionals, and clericals) (Lawler and Atmiyanandana, 1994). One reason for this is that English-language fluency is considered a critical skill in international business and English-language ads serve as a screening tool. This approach, then, seems reasonable, at least for the analysis of white-collar job openings (to which this study is limited, since few lower-level positions are advertised in the English-language press).

Another problem is that employers may discriminate in practice, even though they do not overtly state discriminatory intentions. However, employers who impose discriminatory criteria are also most likely to discriminate in other, perhaps subtler ways. Our approach, consequently, is liable to identify factors related to at least the most egregious forms of discrimination. And a distinct advantage of this approach is that it is unobtrusive. If a survey were done asking employers their gender requirements for specific jobs, responses could well be biased toward no gender restriction.

*Independent variables*. As discussed under Hypotheses 1 and 2, Hofstede's masculinity and individualism scales serve as principal independent variables in this analysis. Questions regarding the reliability and validity of these scales are addressed extensively in Hofstede's book, and as noted earlier, the scales have been validated in other studies. Hofstede (1980) established cultural norms for several countries. Having identified a firm's country of origin, we used that country's means for each of the two scales as the firm-specific scores [sample descriptive statistics are mean = 58.8, SD = 24.7 (masculinity) and mean = 52.2, SD = 27.9 (individualism)]. If there was uncertainty as to the national origin of the firm, reference was made to various Thai business directories to determine ownership and control. In the case of joint ventures, firms were categorized according to majority ownership or control of the firm. The distribution of ads in the sample by firm country of origin is presented in Table 1. Other data included in Table 1 for each country of origin represented in the sample are the average scores on Hofstede's individualism and masculinity scales and the proportion of "males only" and "females only" ads.

Data on Thailand's real rate of economic growth (mean = 7.6 percent, SD = 2.1) was obtained from various issues of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* for the period 1985–1996.[2] This variable corresponds to Hypothesis 3.

Job titles and industries (control variables) for each ad were coded using, respectively, the *Dictionary of Occupational Titles* and the *Standard Industrial Classification Manual*. Although the American coding system was used, this is not seen to be a major problem, since fairly broad occupational and industrial categories were used in the statistical analysis. Occupational groups were coded through a series of dummy

[2] The data in this study predate the significant downturn that occurred in the Thai economy starting in mid-1997.

TABLE 1

AVERAGE HOFSTEDE SCORES AND DISTRIBUTION OF JOB ADVERTISEMENTS BY FIRM'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

| Country | Number of Ads | Percent "Males Only" | Percent "Females Only" | Individualism | Masculinity |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | 4 | 0% | 0% | 90 | 61 |
| Austria | 3 | 0% | 33% | 55 | 79 |
| Bangladesh | 2 | 0% | 100% | 14 | 50 |
| China | 2 | 0% | 50% | 15 | 55 |
| Denmark | 6 | 16.7% | 0% | 74 | 16 |
| Finland | 3 | 33.3% | 33.3% | 63 | 26 |
| France | 28 | 14.3% | 10.7% | 71 | 47 |
| Germany | 65 | 22% | 9.2% | 67 | 66 |
| Hong Kong | 18 | 22% | 11% | 25 | 57 |
| Indonesia | 2 | 0% | 0% | 14 | 46 |
| Italy | 6 | 17% | 0% | 76 | 70 |
| Japan | 210 | 33% | 19% | 46 | 95 |
| Korea | 6 | 33.3% | 33.2% | 18 | 39 |
| Luxembourg | 1 | 0% | 100% | 70 | 60 |
| Netherlands | 25 | 32% | 8% | 80 | 14 |
| Singapore | 8 | 37.5% | 12.5% | 20 | 48 |
| Sweden | 9 | 29.2% | 8.3% | 71 | 5 |
| Switzerland | 21 | 38% | 10% | 69 | 70 |
| Taiwan | 4 | 25% | 75% | 17 | 45 |
| Thailand | 268 | 32.5% | 13.1% | 20 | 34 |
| U.K. | 30 | 13.5% | 11.2% | 89 | 66 |
| U.S.A. | 178 | 13.5% | 11.2% | 91 | 62 |

variables. The excluded (reference) occupational category consisted of clerical positions (17 percent of the cases in the sample), and the included categories (each represented by a separate dummy variable) consisted of engineers (17 percent), scientists and technicians (8 percent), managers and administrators (32 percent), sales representatives and staff (9 percent), and other professional and white-collar positions (17 percent). The excluded (reference) category for the industrial codes was heavy manufacturing (47 percent). The included industrial categories were light manufacturing (8 percent), construction (3 percent), transportation and public utilities (7 percent), wholesale trade (14 percent), retail trade (5 percent), finance and insurance (10 percent), and service (6 percent). The trend variable was simply the difference between the year in which the advertisement was placed (between 1985 and 1996) and the base year (1985).

## III. Results

Given a multivalued nominal dependent variable, we have used multinomial logit to analyze the impact of home-country culture, economic forces, and the control variables on the probability of an advertisement falling into one of the mutually exclusive categories described above.[3] Maximum likelihood estimation was used. The overall statistical significance of the analysis is reflected in the change in the logarithm of the likelihood function [$\chi^2(48) = 356.39$; $p < .01$]. The model correctly predicted 432 of 902 cases in the sample; random assignment to categories based on marginal probabilities would have resulted in the correct classification of only about 243 cases. The pseudo-$R^2$ is .28.

We report the significance levels and marginal effects for each independent variable in Table 2. Significance tests for individual variables are based on the change in the $\chi^2$ resulting from the addition of the variable to the logit model. The method of computing a variable's marginal effect depends on whether it is a continuous or dummy variable. In the former instance, the marginal effect is the partial derivative of the logistic probability function with respect to the variable for a given outcome state (e.g., a "males only" ad) for each case, given values of all the independent variables for the case, averaged across all cases. Asymptotic *t*-statistics for the estimates of the derivatives are also presented.

The results reported in Table 2 involve two groups of dummy variables, one for industrial categories and one for occupational categories. Derivatives are not meaningful estimates of marginal effects in the case of dummy variables, so an alternative computational method was used. Marginal effects for the individual dummy variables within each set were computed in the following manner: (1) All the dummy variables within the set were set equal to zero, and using the parameter estimates of the logit function, within-case probabilities were computed for each outcome (leaving the values of all other independent variable unchanged); (2) the average probability was computed across all cases for each alternative, generating the average probabilities for the excluded, or reference, category (clerical positions for occupations and jobs in heavy manufacturing for industries); (3) for a given included category, the dummy variable was set equal to 1 in all cases (and left a 0 for all other categories); (4) the average probabilities for each alternative across all cases were again computed; and (5) the difference between the numbers obtained in (2) and (4) represents change in probability of an alternative resulting from shifting

[3] Readers unfamiliar with multinomial logit are referred to Greene (1990).

TABLE 2

RESULTS OF MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ANALYSIS: MARGINAL EFFECTS USING HOFSTEDE NATIONAL CULTURE MEASURES ($n$ = 902)

| | | Alternatives | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Independent Variables | $\chi^2$ | "Males Only" | | "Females Only" | | No Gender Language | | "Equal Opportunity" | |
| Masculinity | 36* | .0008 | .965 | .0006 | .723 | –.005 | –5.09* | .003 | 3.93* |
| Individualism | 94* | –.003 | –3.18* | –.0011 | –1.09 | .006 | 7.13* | –.002 | –2.75* |
| Real growth (annual rate) | 7‡ | –.014 | –1.81‡ | .0029 | .61 | –.008 | 0.94 | .019 | 2.24† |
| Occupation (reference: clerical) | | | | | | | | | |
| Engineering | 100* | .26 | (na) | –.32 | (na) | .10 | (na) | –.04 | (na) |
| Science | 30* | .08 | (na) | –.28 | (na) | .08 | (na) | .12 | (na) |
| Management | 98* | .21 | (na) | –.28 | (na) | .03 | (na) | .04 | (na) |
| Sales | 22* | .15 | (na) | –.23 | (na) | .06 | (na) | .02 | (na) |
| Other | 8† | .17 | (na) | –.18 | (na) | –.04 | (na) | .05 | (na) |
| Industry (reference: heavy manufacturing) | | | | | | | | | |
| Construction | 10† | –.20 | (na) | –.01 | (na) | .26 | (na) | –.05 | (na) |
| Light manufacturing | 4 | .01 | (na) | –.01 | (na) | –.10 | (na) | –.10 | (na) |
| Transport/public utilities | 12* | –.01 | (na) | –.02 | (na) | .06 | (na) | –.03 | (na) |
| Wholesale trade | 6 | –.06 | (na) | –.05 | (na) | .06 | (na) | .05 | (na) |
| Retail trade | 10† | –.20 | (na) | .08 | (na) | –.02 | (na) | .14 | (na) |
| Finance/insurance | 20* | –.19 | (na) | –.05 | (na) | .21 | (na) | .03 | (na) |
| Service | 12* | –.19 | (na) | –.05 | (na) | .21 | (na) | .03 | (na) |
| Trend term | 8† | –.013 | –2.80 | .004 | 1.38 | –0.006 | 1.17 | .0031 | .63 |

*Note*: The $\chi^2$ statistic tests the significance of the addition of each independent variable to the equation as a whole (df = 3 in each case). For each of the continuous variables in the analysis (masculinity, individualism, rate of real growth, and trend), the first column of each section reports asymptotic estimates of the first derivative of the logistic probability function with respect to each independent variable for the indicated gender preference, evaluated at the mean for all independent variables. The second column reports asymptotic *t*-statistics for the estimates (see text for method of calculating marginal effects). The procedure for computing the marginal effects of the occupational and industrial dummy variables (for which *t*-statistics could not be computed) is as described in the text.

*Significant at .01 level.

†Significant at .05 level.

‡Significant at .10 level.

from the reference category to the category in question (i.e., the marginal effect). Unlike the marginal effects computed as derivatives, there is no readily available method for calculating the standard errors of those calculated by this second method. Consequently, none are reported for the dummy variables, and inferences regarding their impact are based on a variable's overall significance and the relative magnitudes of its marginal effects.

As indicated in Table 2, the two Hofstede measures—individualism and masculinity—are each statistically significant at the .01 level, the trend term is significant at the .05 level, and the annual rate of real growth is significant only at the .10 level. In addition, the sets of dummy variables indicating occupation and industry are both statistically significant at the .01 level [$\chi^2(15) = 164$ and $\chi^2(21) = 94$, respectively].

*"Males only" ads*. As the level of individualism as a home-country cultural characteristic increases, the probability of a company imposing a "males only" restriction decreases (consistent with Hypothesis 2). This also occurs as the rate of Thai economic growth increases (consistent with Hypothesis 3). The masculinity marginal effect, while consistent in sign with theoretical expectation (Hypothesis 1), is not statistically significant.

Recalling that the excluded category for occupation is the clerical group, it is not surprising, given occupational gendering, that changing to any of the other occupational categories significantly increases the likelihood of encountering a "males only" restriction. However, the counterargument might be that shortages in certain occupations, particularly fields such as engineering and science, might reduce the likelihood of gender discrimination. The marginal effect for scientists is somewhat weaker than for the other fields, yet it is also clear that engineering management is strongly categorized as a male occupation. The marginal effects for the industrial variables are negative in most cases, indicating that the probability of employers outside manufacturing imposing a "males only" restriction is less than within the manufacturing category (note that the marginal effect for light manufacturing is positive). Also, the trend term marginal effect is negative, suggesting a decline over time in the imposition of a "males only" restriction that is unrelated to economic conditions.

*"Females only" ads*. Neither of the marginal effects for the Hofstede scales is significant in the case of "females only" ads, although the signs are both consistent with theoretical expectation. In addition, there would not appear to be any discernible trend with respect to the probability of an ad imposing a "females only" restriction.

The signs associated with the marginal effects of the occupational variables complement those for the "males only" alternative. That is, ads for any white-collar positions besides clerical employees are both more likely to specify "males only" and less likely to specify "females only" than ads for clericals. These findings are quite consistent with the notion of gendering in the allocation of employment opportunities. Indeed, had such relationships not been found, this might have called into question the validity of our assumption that such gender restrictions truly reflect discriminatory intent. That is, if occupational categories generally assumed to be related to gendering had not behaved in the ways observed here, then it would be difficult to rule out the argument that announced gender restrictions for these ads were more or less randomly distributed with regard to true discriminatory intent. As with the "males only" ads, the marginal effects for the industrial variables indicate less occupational gendering outside the manufacturing sector. The marginal effect for the trend term is not significant.

*No gender language ads*. The marginal effects with respect to the two cultural variables (masculinity and individualism) are both statistically significant and of the expected signs (as predicted by Hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively). Increasing masculinity lowers the likelihood of no gender language ads, which are assumed to be nondiscriminatory in nature. Similarly, increasing individualism leads to an increase in the probability of an ad containing no gender-related language.

The marginal effects for the occupational variables are somewhat weaker than in the case of the "males only" and "females only" alternatives. That they are mostly positive indicates less gendering in nonclerical than clerical occupations. The marginal effects of the industrial control variables are more difficult to interpret than those of the occupational categories, which behave, in the case of the "males only" and "females only" ads, in ways fairly consistent with our notions of occupational gender segregation.

*"Equal opportunity" ads*. Since there is no legal requirement in Thailand for firms to run "equal opportunity" job announcements, what might be an employer's motivation? Certainly an employer might utilize "equal opportunity" language in ads out of commitment to the principle of equal treatment for men and women and an interest in achieving diversity within the organization. However, another, more pragmatic possibility is that encountering labor market shortages for certain skills, employers may wish to send strong signals to the labor market that they are indeed seeking any qualified applicant.

By Hypothesis 1, we would anticipate that masculinity would be negatively related to the probability of a firm utilizing "equal opportunity" language. Conversely, by Hypothesis 2, we should anticipate that individualism will be positively related to "equal opportunity" language. However, the marginal effects of the cultural variables, while both statistically significant at the .01 level, are opposite the anticipated signs.

As for the control variables, the trend variable is positive, though not statistically significant, suggesting at best a weak trend over the period of this study toward greater utilization of "equal opportunity" ads. The pattern of the marginal effects for the occupational and industrial dummy variables is mixed and would not seem to be especially meaningful.

## IV. Discussion

Hypotheses 1 and 2 are based on the supposition that although MNCs are said to be increasingly geocentric and global in perspective (Hennan and Perlmutter, 1979; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1991), there is at least some ethnocentricity in their behavior with respect to the management of host-country nationals. These hypotheses derived from an analysis of Hofstede's (1980) well-known cultural dimensions, which suggested that individualism-collectivism and masculinity-femininity might bear the strongest relationship to overt discriminatory behavior. We found support for the general expectation that cultural factors influence discriminatory behavior, given that adding the cultural variables to the logit function significantly improved fit. The marginal effects for individualism were significant for three of the four alternatives and of the expected signs for the "males only," "females only," and no gender language alternatives. Although the marginal effects for masculinity were not significant for either the "males only" or the "females only" alternatives, the signs were still as expected, and the variable, taken as a whole, was found to be statistically significant. However, it would seem that individualism is more strongly related to discriminatory intentions than masculinity. Our findings, then, provide support for the theoretical arguments presented regarding the impact of individualism on overt discrimination but are somewhat more tentative in the case of masculinity.

Hypothesis 3, which deals with the impact of economic growth on discrimination, is somewhat supported by the empirical analysis. The addition of this variable significantly improves the fit of the model, though weakly so and some, although signs of the marginal effects are inconsistent with theory in the cases of the "females only" and no gender language alternatives. However, it is noteworthy that strong economic growth

seems to be reasonably strongly associated with an increase in the likelihood of the "equal opportunity" alternative.

Several control variables demonstrated theoretically reasonable relationships with respect to overt gender discrimination, especially occupational indicators. This, coupled with the overall statistical significance of the model, would tend to support the viability of the framework used here. The theoretically consistent results also suggest that the indicators of discriminatory behavior—the presence or absence of explicit gender restrictions in newspaper ads—validly reflect discriminatory intention.

Despite the generally positive results for the cultural measures, these findings need to be examined more thoroughly, since the study is, to some extent, exploratory in nature. There were some results that ran counter to our hypotheses, and there is at least one alternative explanation for the observed relationships that needs to be considered.

One approach to testing the robustness of the findings is to consider the impact of the principal independent variables within contexts that we might anticipate would be especially prone to "gendering" in job assignments. To this end, we redid the analysis for two subgroups of cases in order to discern if the cultural effects were strongest in settings presumably most conducive to gender-based discrimination. In the first of these analyses, we restricted the sample to only those cases which involved engineering positions, and we analyzed this subsample in terms of the likelihood that the position was a "males only" job versus the "females only" and no gender language categories. The "equal opportunity" cases were excluded because of the countertheoretical impact of cultural measures on this outcome. This subanalysis, which involved binomial rather than multinomial logit, demonstrated a strong and negative relationship between individualism and the likelihood of the position being a "males only" job. The *t*-statistic for the marginal effect of individualism on the probability of the job falling into the "males only" category was –6.03 ($p < .01$).[4] This result is clearly consistent with Hypothesis 2. The marginal effect for masculinity was positive and thus consistent with Hypothesis 1; it also was statistically significant at the .01 level ($t = 3.41$).

A second subanalysis involved restricting the sample to ads for clerical positions and analyzing this in terms of the likelihood that a position was a "females only" job versus "males only" or no gender language job

[4] The full set of results for this analysis is not reported to conserve space. Control variables included the industry dummy variables and the trend term; economic growth also was included in the equation. Of course, none of the occupational dummy variables was included because the sample is restricted to a single occupation. Results for the control variables were consistent with the results reported earlier. The overall analysis was significant at the .01 level.

(again, "equal opportunity" jobs were excluded). However, this analysis was not very successful. Not only was the overall model statistically significant at the .10 level, but neither individualism nor masculinity was statistically significant in the probability function.

The poor results with respect to the analysis of the second subsample is consistent with the weak performance of the cultural variables in the principal analysis with regard to the "females only" alternative (see Table 2). That neither of the cultural effects in the principal analysis were statistically significant in the case of the "females only" alternative may be attributable to the relatively small proportion of the positions restricted to females. Also, most (about 63 percent) of the "females only" ads are for clerical positions (whereas the "males only" ads are distributed more evenly among occupational categories). Thus, after controlling for occupation, there likely is little residual variation in the "females only" category to be explained by other factors.

Countertheoretical findings occurred in the case of the "equal opportunity" alternative with respect to both masculinity and individualism variables. However, in net, the marginal effects consistent with theoretical expectation more than counterbalance those which are inconsistent. For each of the two cultural variables, we can compare the sums of the absolute values of the theoretically consistent marginal effects of the "males only," "females only," and no gender language alternatives with the corresponding absolute value of the marginal effect for the "equal opportunity" alternative. In both cases, the combined absolute magnitudes of the first three effects more than offset the countertheoretical effect of the fourth. Thus, other things constant, an increase in the level of home-country individualism would, at least at the mean, tends to result in a net decrease in overt discrimination (since this would increase the probability of the no gender language alternative and decrease the probabilities of the "males only" and "females only" alternatives to a greater extent than it would decrease the probability of the "equal opportunity" alternative). Applying similar reasoning, an increase in the level of masculinity would result in a net increase in overt discrimination, although the difference would be less than in the case of individualism.

Why do the marginal effects of individualism and masculinity for the "equal opportunity" alternative both run counter to expectation? A plausible explanation here lies in the labor market conditions that may be motivating "equal opportunity" ads in the first place: acute labor shortages attributable to rapid economic expansion. Managers in firms from more collectivist and masculine cultures, with reputations for gender-based discrimination in general, may feel a much greater need to convince potential

applicants that gender is not really an issue in relation to a specific job, even though such companies may continue to utilize gender restriction for other jobs. Thus these countertheoretical relationships are observed.

There is at least one alternative explanation for the findings supporting cultural effects that needs to be explored. MNCs may be indirectly influenced with respect to discrimination by home-country laws and regulations. If the firm is headquarted in a country with strong laws prohibiting gender discrimination, then nondiscriminatory employment practices may be transferred to foreign subsidiaries, either because of deliberate corporate policy or through force of habit. This could occur even though such laws do not apply outside the home country's borders.

Several of the countries represented in the study have antidiscrimination legislation. In addition to the Civil Rights Act in the United States, European Union (E.U.) countries are subject to various directives dating back to the mid-1970s that have required member nations to adopt laws prohibiting gender discrimination in employment (Cook, 1987; Fabricus, 1992). Japanese companies, however, represent the single largest group of foreign investors in Thailand. Antidiscrimination legislation was passed in Japan in 1986, but its provisions and enforcement are seen to be weak (Cook, 1987; Steinhoff and Tanaka, 1994).

Cultural factors and the presence of antidiscrimination legislation are closely related in at least one significant way. The U.S. and E.U. countries, along with Australia, score quite highly on the individualism dimension. Consequently, individualism is strongly and positively correlated with antidiscrimination legislation. If antidiscrimination laws influence recruiting behavior in foreign subsidiaries, then the presence of these laws serves as a confounding factor in our interpretation of the impact of the national cultural factors. An obvious solution would be to use one or more dummy variables indicating the home-country legal environment. Although we did try this, the high correlation between the individualism and legal environment created significant multicollinearity problems. The regression of individualism against dummy variables indicating if the company is based in the United States, Europe, or elsewhere explained 85 percent of the variance in individualism. However, even when we included the country/region dummy variables in the logit analysis, the set of cultural variables, taken as a whole, was still statistically significant [$\chi^2(6) = 16.32$; $p < .05$]. The two dummy variables representing country/region (United States or Europe) also were significant and at about the same magnitude as the cultural variables [$\chi^2(6) = 16.66$; $p < .05$]. The confounding of country/region effects with cultural effects, while not surprising, nonetheless complicates the analysis. We feel, however, that the

theoretical arguments are more compelling in the case of the cultural variables than in the case of the country/region dummy variables, which are rather ad hoc in character. To be sure, some component of the observed effect of national culture may be attributable to home-country legal environment, but these two effects cannot be disentangled here. In any event, it seems likely that a country's legal environment is a reflection of its national culture and that national culture is the primary driver of the observed relationships.

Although the multicollinearity problem precludes estimating the model with both cultural measures and national origin measures included, we do report the results of the logit analysis for the inclusion of only national origin dummy variables. The results reported in Table 3 include four dummy variables for national origin: United States, Europe/Australia, Japan, and Asian countries other than Japan and Thailand. The excluded category consists of Thai-owned firms. The results for the control variables (occupational and industrial categories, trend term) and economic growth are almost identical to the results presented in Table 2 and are thus need no further discussion. Three of the country variables were found to be statistically significant. Since these are dummy variables, it was necessary to compute marginal effects directly rather than use first derivatives (as described earlier for occupational and industry variables). The computed marginal effects are reported in Table 3, although it was not possible to test the statistical significance of each.

The marginal effects for the "males only," "females only," and no gender language ads are as would be anticipated for all geographic areas. Subsidiaries of U.S. and European/Australian firms demonstrated lower probabilities of imposing gender restrictions in job announcements than Thai firms, whereas Japanese subsidiaries actually had a somewhat higher likelihood of doing so than Thai companies (in the case of males but not females). Similarly, U.S. and European/Australian subsidiaries were more likely to be silent on the matter of gender, and Japanese companies less likely, than Thai companies. These results are generally consistent with patterns of masculinity and individualism in these countries (see Table 1), as well as the legal environments with respect to gender-based discrimination in those areas. However, the results for "equal opportunity" jobs were counter to what our principal hypotheses would predict; Japanese companies were much more apt to run ads containing such language than American or European/Australian subsidiaries, with Japanese subsidiaries also more likely than Thai firms to do so. Of course, this result would be consistent with the explanation given earlier for the countertheoretical results in the "equal opportunity" category for the Hofstede

TABLE 3

RESULTS OF MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ANALYSIS: MARGINAL EFFECTS USING COUNTRY OF ORIGIN DUMMY VARIABLES ($n$ = 902)

| | | Alternatives | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Independent Variables | $\chi^2$ | "Males Only" | | "Females Only" | | No Gender Language | | "Equal Opportunity" | |
| Real growth (annual rate) | 6 | –.015 | –1.89‡ | .0003 | .03 | –.005 | –.52 | .019 | 2.17† |
| Country of origin (reference: Thailand) | | | | | | | | | |
| Japan | 22* | .02 | (na) | –.02 | (na) | –.16 | (na) | .16 | (na) |
| U.S.A. | 46* | –.17 | (na) | –.07 | (na) | .32 | (na) | –.08 | (na) |
| Europe/Australia | 18* | –.09 | (na) | –.07 | (na) | .16 | (na) | .00 | (na) |
| Asian countries (except Thailand/Japan) | 2 | –.04 | (na) | .06 | (na) | –.08 | (na) | .06 | (na) |
| Occupation (reference: clerical) | | | | | | | | | |
| Engineering | 136* | .29 | (na) | –.51 | (na) | .20 | (na) | –.01 | (na) |
| Science | 58* | .13 | (na) | –.47 | (na) | .15 | (na) | .19 | (na) |
| Management | 140* | .25 | (na) | –.47 | (na) | .12 | (na) | .10 | (na) |
| Sales | 46* | .18 | (na) | –.42 | (na) | .16 | (na) | .08 | (na) |
| Other | 62* | .10 | (na) | –.40 | (na) | .17 | (na) | .13 | (na) |
| Industry (reference: heavy manufacturing) | | | | | | | | | |
| Construction | 12* | –.18 | (na) | –.04 | (na) | .27 | (na) | –.04 | (na) |
| Light manufacturing | 6 | .02 | (na) | .01 | (na) | –.13 | (na) | .10 | (na) |
| Transport/public utilities | 2 | –.04 | (na) | –.04 | (na) | .04 | (na) | –.03 | (na) |
| Wholesale trade | 6 | –.05 | (na) | –.06 | (na) | .05 | (na) | .06 | (na) |
| Retail trade | 10† | –.17 | (na) | .05 | (na) | –.03 | (na) | .15 | (na) |
| Finance/insurance | 16* | –.16 | (na) | –.06 | (na) | .17 | (na) | .05 | (na) |
| Service | 8† | –.16 | (na) | .00 | (na) | .12 | (na) | .04 | (na) |
| Trend term | 10† | –.013 | –2.79 | .005 | 1.74 | –0.005 | .92 | .003 | .68 |

*Note*: See note for Table 2 for explanation of statistics reported here.
*Significant at .01 level.
†Significant at .05 level.
‡Significant at .10 level.

scales (that Asian firms, with a reputation for discriminatory behavior, may need to be explicit in defining jobs open to both men and women when significant labor market shortages are encountered). And, as in the case of the Hofstede scales, the sum of theoretically consistent marginal effects exceeds inconsistent marginal effects.

Although the likelihood of Western companies placing gender-based job ads is generally lower than for Asian companies, it is not insubstantial. As indicated in Table 1, about 25 percent of all ads by American companies specify gender as a job requirement; this figure is 31 percent for German companies, 25 percent for French companies, and 25 percent for U.K. companies (versus 52 percent for Japanese companies and 46 percent for Thai companies). Of course, these companies are not in violation of laws in doing this. For example, U.S. laws prohibiting gender-based discrimination apply only to foreign subsidiaries in the case of American citizens, and this is only since 1991. However, engaging in such practices would seem to contradict the objective of eliminating discrimination and promoting diversity on a global basis, to which many MNCs profess they are committed. It also would run counter to international efforts, such as those promoted by the United Nations, to enhance the status of women.

Multinational firms that engage in these practices are often not obscure companies; many are prominent corporations. The Appendix contains lists of American, European, and Japanese firms in this sample that placed one or more job ads specifying gender restrictions. The position in question and the date that the advertisement appeared in the *Bangkok Post* are also noted. It should be noted that those companies placing gender-restrictive ads vary considerably with regard to the proportion of ads that fall into this category. For example, some of these companies place numerous “equal opportunity” ads at the same time as they place some gender-restrictive ads, and the preponderance of their ads may not be gender restrictive (this is especially so in the case of the Western companies). However, it is unclear how gender restrictions, except in very limited circumstances where a bona fide occupational qualification may exist, can ever be justified. But why, for example, would it be necessary to be a male in order to be a computer programmer or manager or a female to be a secretary or bookkeeper? Resulting occupational gender segregation can only serve to undercut women’s welfare, not to mention economic efficiency.

## V. Conclusion

There are, of course, limitations to this study. It only deals with white-collar and professional employees, so we do not know the extent to which the processes also have an impact on lower-level employees. Much of the advancement taking place in these firms is likely to involve internal promotions, so the study does not address this component of the labor market. An advantage to the study is that it takes place in an environment where firms are not restricted by law with regard to stating gender requirements in job announcements, nor are they required to use "equal opportunity" language. Consequently, we can assume that such statements are reflective of the intentions of the managers of these companies. However, those ads which are silent with respect to gender are more problematic. We have made the assumption here that discrimination is less likely for those positions than for ones in which explicit gender restrictions are imposed. The reasonableness of this assumption seems to be supported by the empirical findings, particularly in the case of the control variables (which are, in general, related to overt discrimination in expected ways). There is still the likelihood of some systematic measurement error. However, this would seem to be offset by the fact that we are examining what are, in fact, the revealed preferences of decision makers within these firms. We are not relying on answers given by managers in a survey in which they may not be motivated to be truthful.

Future research in this area might include measures of intraorganizational characteristics, such as the size of the firm, its use of internal labor market systems, whether expatriate managers versus host-country nationals authorized the advertisement, and the degree of control the parent company exercises over the subsidiary. Unfortunately, the multiyear focus of this study did not allow for such a survey to be done. We believe that the control variables included in the analysis capture at least some of these organizational variations. Another interesting variation would be to collect job announcement data in several different countries. This would allow one to test the relative impact of host-country culture versus firm home-country culture on propensity to discriminate.

## REFERENCES

Abrahamson, Mark, and Lee Sigelman. 1987. "Occupational Sex Segregation in Metropolitan Areas," *American Sociological Review* 52 (October):588–597.

Adler, Nancy, and Dafna Izraeli (eds.). 1994. *Competitive Frontiers: Women Managers in a Global Economy.* Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Aliber, Robery, and Reid Click (eds.). 1993. *Readings in International Business: A Decision Approach*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Bartlett, Christopher, and Sumantra Ghoshal. 1991. *Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

Bielby, William, and James Baron. 1986. "Men and Women at Work: Sex Segregation and Statistical Discrimination," *American Journal of Sociology* 91 (January):759–799.

Blau, Francine, and Marieanne Ferber. 1992. *The Economics of Women, Men, and Work*, 2d ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Chan, Audrey, and Jean Lee. 1994. "Woman Executives in a Newly Industrialized Economy: The Singapore Scenario." In *Competitive Frontiers: Woman Managers in a Global Economy*, edited by Nancy Adler and Dafna Izraeli, pp. 127–142. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Charles, Maria. 1990. "Occupational Sex Segregation: A Log-Linear Analysis of Patterns in 25 Industrialized Countries." Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University.

Cook, Alice. 1987. "International Comparisons: Problems and Research in the Industrialized World." In *Working Women: Past, Present, Future*, edited by Karen Koziara, Michael Moskow, and Lucretia Tanner, pp. 332–373. Washington, DC: BNA Books.

Davis, K., and P. van den Oever. 1982. "Demographic Foundations of New Sex Roles." *Population and Development Review* 8:495–511.

Fabricius, Fritz. 1992. *Human Rights and European Politics: The Legal-Political Status of Workers in the European Community.* Oxford, UK: Berg Press.

Fernandez-Kelly, Maria. 1983. *For We Are Sold, I and My People: Women and Industry in Mexico's Frontiers*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Franke, Richard, Geert Hofstede, and Michael Bond. 1991. "Cultural Roots of Economic Performance." *Strategic Management Journal* 12 (Summer):165–173.

Greene, William H. 1990. *Econometric Analysis*. New York: Macmillan.

Goldin, Claudia. 1990. *Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History of American Women*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Heenan, David, and Howard Perlmutter. 1979. *Multinational Organizational Development*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Hofstede, Geert. 1980. *Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Hofstede, Geert. 1991. *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Jacobs, Jerry, and Suet Lim. 1992. "Trends in Occupational and Industrial Sex Segregation in 56 Countries, 1960–1980." *Work and Occupations* 19 (November):450–486.

Jungnickel, R. 1993. "Recent Trends in Foreign Direct Investment." In *Multinationals and Employment: The Global Economy of the 1990s*, edited by P. Bailey, A. Parisotto, and G. Renshaw, pp. 5–32. Geneva: International Labour Office.

Kashima, Y. and V. J. Callan. 1994. "The Japanese Work Group." In *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology*, Vol. 4, edited by Harry Triandis, Marvin Dunnette, and Leaetta Hough, pp. 609–646. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.

Kogut, Bruce, and Harbir Singh. 1988. "The Effect of National Culture on the Choice of Entry Mode." *Journal of International Business Studies* 19 (Fall):411–432.

Laurent, Andre. 1986. "The Cross-Cultural Puzzle of Global Human Resource Management." *Human Resource Management* 25 (Spring):133–148.

Lawler, John J., and Vinita Atmiyanandana. 1994. "Human Resource Management in Thailand." In *HRM in the Pacific Rim: Institutions, Practices, and Values*, edited by Larry Moore and P. Devereaux Jennings, pp. 295–318. Berlin: deGruyter.

Lorence, Jon. 1992. "Service Sector Growth and Metropolitan Occupational Sex Segregation." *Work and Occupations* 19 (May):128–156.

Nash, June, and Maria Fernandez-Kelly (eds.). 1983. *Women, Men, and the International Division of Labor.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Oppenheimer, Valerie. 1968. "The Sex-Labeling of Jobs." *Industrial Relations* 7 (May):219–235.

Oppenheimer, Valerie. 1970. *The Female Labor Force in the United States: Demographic and Economic Factors Governing its Growth and Changing Composition*. Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies (University of California).

Reskin, Barbara. 1993. "Sex Segregation in the Workplace." *Annual Review of Sociology* 19:241–270.

Reskin, Barbara, and Irene Padavic. 1994. *Women and Men at Work*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.

Scoville, James (ed.). 1992. *Status Influences in Third World Labor Markets*. Berlin: deGruyter.

Shane, Scott. 1994. "The Effect of National Culture on the Choice Between Licensing and Direct Foreign Investment." *Strategic Management Journal* 15 (October):627–642.

Schuler, Randall, Peter Dowling, and Helen De Cieri. 1993. "An Integrated Framework of Strategic International Human Resource Management." *International Journal of Human Resource Management* 4 (Summer):717–764.

Siddiqui, A. (ed.). 1988. *Labour Administration: Profile on Thailand*. Bangkok: International Labour Organization.

Siengthai, Sununta, and Orose Leelakulthanit. 1994. "Women in Management in Thailand." In *Competitive Frontiers: Woman Managers in a Global Economy*, edited by Nancy Adler and Dafna Izraeli, pp. 160–171. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Smelser, Niel. 1968. "Toward a Theory of Modernization." In *Essays in Sociological Explanation*, edited by Niel Smelser, pp. 125–146. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Steinhoff, Patricia, and Kazuko Tanaka. 1994. "Women Managers in Japan." In *Competitive Frontiers: Woman Managers in a Global Economy*, edited by Nancy Adler and Dafna Izraeli, pp. 79–100. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Triandis, Harry. 1994. "Cross-Cultural Industrial and Organizational Psychology." In *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology*, Vol. 4, edited by Harry Triandis, Marvin Dunnette, and Leaetta Hough, pp. 103–172. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.

Triandis, Harry. 1995. *Individualism and Collectivism*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Ward, Kathryn. 1984. *Women in the World-System: Its Impact on Status and Fertility*. New York: Praeger.

## APPENDIX

EXAMPLES OF "MALES ONLY" AND "FEMALES ONLY" ADVERTISEMENTS PLACED BY THAI SUBSIDIARIES OF WESTERN AND JAPANESE MULTINATIONALS

| Country | Company | Position | Restrictions | Date |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | Lauda Air | Flight attendant | Females only | 3/1/96 |
| Finland | Nokia | Technical support manager | Males only | 11/2/96 |
| France | Estee Lauder | Education manager | Females only | 2/13/96 |
| | Estee Lauder | Training manager | Females only | 2/13/96 |
| Germany | AEG (Daimler-Benz) | General clerk | Females only | 4/1/95 |
| | AEG (Daimler-Benz) | Project engineer | Males only | 4/1/95 |
| | AEG (Daimler-Benz) | Sales engineer | Males only | 4/1/95 |
| | AEG (Daimler-Benz) | Secretary | Females only | 4/1/95 |
| | Behn Meyer | Sales engineer | Males only | 11/2/96 |
| | Hoechst | Computer network manager | Males only | 2/8/96 |
| | Hoechst | Product manager | Males only | 6/6/95 |
| | Hoechst | Technical sales manager | Females only | 6/6/95 |
| | Robert Bosch, Ltd. | Administrative assistant | Females only | 2/6/96 |
| | Robert Bosch, Ltd. | Assistant sales manager | Males only | 2/6/96 |

## APPENDIX (*continued*)

| Country | Company | Position | Restrictions | Date |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Robert Bosch, Ltd. | Product trainer | Females only | 2/6/96 |
| | Rodenstock | Engineer | Males only | 2/2/96 |
| | Rodenstock | Supervisor | Males only | 2/2/96 |
| | Rodenstock | Technician | Males only | 2/2/96 |
| | Siemens | Civil engineer | Males only | 3/11/96 |
| | Siemens | Electrical design engineer | Males only | 3/11/96 |
| | Siemens | Operator | Females only | 11/8/97 |
| | Siemens | Project cost controller | Males only | 3/11/96 |
| | Siemens | Project engineer | Males only | 3/11/96 |
| | Siemens | Purchaser | Males only | 11/8/97 |
| Japan | Canon | Administrative staff | Females only | 12/9/95 |
| | Canon | Personnel manager | Males only | 12/9/95 |
| | Canon | Product manager | Males only | 12/9/95 |
| | Honda | Cashier | Females only | 12/9/94 |
| | Honda | Customer relations officer | Females only | 3/4/95 |
| | Honda | General affairs staff | Males only | 3/4/95 |
| | Honda | Operator and receptionist | Females only | 3/4/95 |
| | Honda | Receptionist | Females only | 12/9/94 |
| | Matsushita | Factory manager | Males only | 3/1/95 |
| | Matsushita | Process engineer | Males only | 3/1/95 |
| | Matsushita | Product control staff | Females only | 3/1/95 |
| | NEC | Computer manager | Males only | 3/8/96 |
| | NEC | Marketing manager | Males only | 3/8/96 |
| | NEC | Receptionist | Females only | 3/8/96 |
| | NEC | Sales executive | Males only | 3/8/96 |
| | NEC | Sales manager | Males only | 3/8/96 |
| | NEC | Secretary | Females only | 3/8/96 |
| | NEC | Service engineer | Males only | 3/8/96 |
| | Sharp Appliances | Assistant manager | Males only | 9/6/95 |
| | Sharp Appliances | Engineering manager | Males only | 9/6/95 |
| | Sharp Appliances | Quality control manager | Males only | 9/6/95 |
| | Sumitomo Corporation | Accounting staff | Females only | 7/1/96 |
| | Sumitomo Corporation | Operator/receptionist | Females only | 7/1/96 |
| | Sumitomo Corporation | Sales representative —machinery | Males only | 7/1/96 |
| | Sumitomo Corporation | Sales representative —metals | Males only | 7/1/96 |
| | Sumitomo Corporation | Secretary | Females only | 7/1/96 |
| | Yaohan | Store operations staff | Males only | 7/2/96 |
| Switzerland | Diethelm and Co. | Parts manager | Males only | 7/13/96 |
| | Diethelm and Co. | Service manager | Males only | 7/13/96 |
| | Golay Buchel | Precious stone buyer | Females only | 11/2/96 |

## APPENDIX (*continued*)

| Country | Company | Position | Restrictions | Date |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | Castrol | Regional sales manager | Males only | 4/9/95 |
| | Castrol | Technical service engineer | Males only | 4/9/95 |
| | Electrolux | Assistant sales managers | Males only | 11/2/96 |
| | Prudential TSLife | Computer operator | Males only | 12/5/95 |
| | Prudential TSLife | Executive secretary | Females only | 12/5/95 |
| | Thomas Cook Group | Refund officer | Males only | 7/15/96 |
| UK/Netherlands | Shell Oil | Laboratory technician | Males only | 9/19/95 |
| United States | Amway | Product trainer | Females only | 12/14/94 |
| | Amway | Sales coordinator | Males only | 12/14/94 |
| | Amway | Warehouse supervisor | Males only | 12/14/94 |
| | Bank of America | Secretary | Females only | 7/8/96 |
| | Cargill | Agronomist | Males only | 12/9/94 |
| | Cargill | Market R&D supervisor | Males only | 12/9/94 |
| | Cargill | Plant engineer | Males only | 12/9/94 |
| | Goodyear | Production management | Males only | 2/13/96 |
| | Johnson and Johnson | Computer/network supervisor | Males only | 3/12/96 |
| | McDonald's | Receptionist | Females only | 9/1/95 |
| | Nike | Apparel production assistant | Females only | 12/1/94 |
| | Nike | Shipping document specialist | Females only | 12/1/94 |
| | Saatchi and Saatchi | Secretaries | Females only | 9/1/94 |
| | Union Carbide | Project manager | Males only | 4/1/95 |