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Working Class Defence Organization, Anti-Fascist Resistance and the *Arditi del Popolo* in Turin, 1919–22

[In Turin] there is from morning to night a queue of young men who go enthusiastically to give their names and to unite with those that form the ranks of the *Arditi del Popolo*.¹

Introduction

The *Arditi del Popolo* (ADP, the people's *arditi*) was a popular anti-fascist paramilitary movement which emerged in the summer of 1921 to combat fascist violence. The ADP took its name from the Italian army's First World War *arditi* shock troops. It was intended to be autonomous from political parties and trade unions and to remain above party politics. Its aim was to defend the persons and institutions of the working class from fascist squadristism by openly confronting fascism on the same terrain of violence chosen by Mussolini's movement.² Thousands, from various political currents — communist, anarchist, socialist, republican, revolutionary syndicalists, Catholics and war veterans and the wider working-class population — adhered to the movement. The ADP successfully linked a First World War ex-combatant tradition tied to the proletarian parties, through the Proletarian War Veterans' League (*Lega Proletaria*), to popular expressions of anti-fascist sentiment. In summer to autumn of 1921 it was the popular and non-sectarian ADP, rather than the proletarian parties, which organized and led the anti-fascist resistance.

The older accounts of the ADP, best exemplified by Guglielmo Palazzolo and Paolo Spriano,³ tended to examine the

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movement through its relationship to political institutions. As a result the ADP was overly considered as another branch of the workers' movement. Consequently, the anti-fascist resistance of 1921–22 is too closely viewed as a revolution betrayed by the socialist and communist leaders.⁴

Eros Francescangeli's recent study shows how an organic relationship between organized forms of proletarian defence and the wider working-class community existed. Francescangeli states that resistance to the fascist *squadristi* was primarily driven by the survival instincts of the working class rather than by politics.⁵ Tobias Abse, in his work on Livorno, states that the ADP did not substitute for the popular masses of working-class quarters but entered into a reciprocal relationship in which it organized and led them. In this way the ADP formalized a pre-existent tradition of illegality that had given rise to popular agitation and resistance in earlier times.⁶

In Livorno, La Spezia and Rome, the ADP were territorially-based in working-class neighbourhoods.⁷ In this way, the ADP was able to draw upon long-held and deeply-rooted forms of non-sectarian association, solidarity and resistance which underscored social relations in working-class neighbourhoods.

The ADP appear to have been strongest and most successful in areas where traditional working-class political culture was less exclusively socialist and had strong anarchist or syndicalist traditions, for example, Bari, Livorno, Parma and Rome. Here, schisms between the various left-wing currents were less pronounced and more successfully overcome at times of crisis, while alliances with a left ex-combatant middle class were formed more easily.⁸

Turin's place in the history of the ADP movement has been almost completely ignored. This article aims to redress this shortfall in the historiography. It will argue that the Turin experience of the ADP should be placed in a similar context to the cases of Bari, Livorno, Parma and Rome. The question of the ADP in light of the communist dominance of the local workers' movement, and its abandonment by the Italian Communist Party (*Partito Comunista d'Italia* — PCd'I), has led to suggestions that the ADP had little impact in Turin or that the city's ADP was simply a communist movement.⁹ However, while it was the communists, including ex-army officers, who organized and led the rank-and-file of Turin's ADP squads, the ADP encouraged a

response in which participation was informed by a specifically non-sectarian tradition of libertarian working-class culture, found in the city's working-class neighbourhoods. Local left leaders were often more attuned to these traditions than the national leaderships. These dynamics encouraged workers from different strands of the left (socialists, communists and anarchists) and also the non-political to unite around anti-fascist agitation.

In this way, the article intends to recast the relationship between the workers' movement and the wider working class. It also aims to show that the relatively brief experience of the ADP in Turin had important consequences for later communist-led forms of anti-fascist, military-style organization. In order to do so, I will examine four major themes:

- (1) the importance of traditional working-class social relations to the evolution of working-class defence organization;
- (2) the development of community and factory forms of working-class defence organization;
- (3) the attitude of the political, trade union and intellectual leaders of the workers' movement towards the ADP; and
- (4) the reality of the ADP experience in Turin.

The Importance of Traditional Working-class Social Relations to the Evolution of Working-class Defence Organization

Carl Levy has identified a 'second socialist subculture', preceding and acting outside of the official reformist socialism that appeared in the last decade of the nineteenth century. The alternative subculture or *tradizione sovversiva* (subversive tradition) constituted 'a network of institutions bound together by sentiments of localism, anti-statism and *operaismo* (workerism)'. The important libertarian sentiment of autonomy from, and resistance to, authority also coloured social relations in these neighbourhoods. This development enabled the libertarian-infused subculture that emerged out of the radicalism of nineteenth-century anarchist and republican artisan groups to survive a transitional period witnessing the emergence of rapid urbanization and industrialization.¹⁰

The existence and importance of an independent proletarian culture in Turin is confirmed in a number of works that show

how the *barriera* (workers' residential neighbourhood) became a crucial protagonist in the struggles of the first decades of the twentieth century.¹¹ The *barriera* acted as a cultural space in which collective identity and action were fostered and networks of sociability and solidarity were created. It was the solidaristic network, ready to become operative at moments of crisis, that explains the capacity of the Turin working class to resist on those occasions in which they found themselves completely abandoned by the national workers' organizations, such as the car strikes of 1912–13, the revolt during the First World War in August 1917 and the Piedmont general strike to defend the factory councils in April 1920.¹²

The *tradizione sovversiva* helped to shape the forms of social relations found in working-class neighbourhoods. Informal networks of social relations were grounded in the everyday life of the *barriera* and were centred around neighbourhood workers' circles. An autonomous solidarity, independent of organizational structures and ideological elaboration, was fostered in the cultural space of the *barriera*. The *barriera* offered spontaneous forms of sociability, based on the physical separation of the *barriere* from other parts of the city, and consolidated by the balcony walkways situated within the closed space of the houses' courtyards. A communal balcony walkway and communal hygiene services offered continuous forms of communication to workers and their families, which in turn helped to foster a spirit of familiarity, comradeship and solidarity.¹³

In working-class neighbourhoods, social relations were largely separated by gender. Many among Turin's working-class population arrived in the city from rural areas of the province, or were the children of men and women who had emigrated to Turin, bringing more traditional gender relations with them. Female involvement was centred around the home and the immediate neighbourhood while male networks were more likely to be based in the workplace, bars and workers' circles. In areas characterized by lack of money and piecemeal, insufficient politically-organized forms of material assistance — particularly acute at times of large-scale unemployment and strikes — women provided reciprocal services of childcare, domestic help, nursing in times of sickness and old age. They were also at the forefront of campaigns in support of political prisoners and against poor housing conditions. In this way, women became central to these

forms of sociability and solidarity and attained a level of control over the home environment. Men exchanged favours and work skills, sometimes acting as labour exchanges by informing neighbours or drinking partners of jobs at their workplaces. At times of strikes, workers relied on neighbouring families who were less affected by the disputes to help feed their children.¹⁴

Workers' circles offered more than simple political association and organization. The circles provided a local venue for drinking, music and dancing, sports opportunities, such as cycling excursions and *bocce* (a form of bowls), card playing and lectures, political meetings and education classes. Although it was a male-dominated arena, women did participate both socially and politically in the life of the circle. Some neighbourhoods contained one or few such circles and attracted members from all political currents as well as the independent and non-politicized workers and their families living in the neighbourhoods in which these circles were located.¹⁵

While social relations could strengthen the ties of sociability and solidarity made between working-class members through home and workers' circle associations, they could also lead to tensions: between skilled and unskilled workers, or those belonging to different political currents, or between the politicized and non-politicized. The natural irritations and grievances felt between neighbours, common to all periods and living circumstances, could also be aggravated by close, daily and even intrusive forms of contact. Thus income differentials, political rivalry, petty dislikes and jealousies and disparities in the levels of material assistance given to neighbours at times of difficulty, particularly if not reciprocated, could also undermine solidarity. These tensions act as a brake on over-romanticizing the solidarity found in working-class neighbourhoods. Nonetheless, the crucial point lies in the ability to overcome such tensions and to offer solidarity and collective resistance at times of crisis.

Maurizio Gribaudo and Giuseppe Berta challenge the notion of a culture of collectivity and solidarity in Turin's working-class neighbourhoods in the 1920s. Berta goes so far as to argue that traditional neighbourhood forms of socialization were radically altered from the immediate postwar years, as younger males in particular were provided with higher wages and increased opportunities for leisure. They argue that more disposable income, increased leisure time and wider recreational opportunities

destroyed class- and neighbourhood-based forms of sociability with detrimental effects on collectivity and solidarity. Berta, in particular, cites the bicycle as a more modern instrument of autonomy, offering greater freedom of movement and emancipating young workers from the confines of the *barriera*. The argument runs that these developments decisively weakened collective resistance to fascism.¹⁶

To this observer, however, these analyses are premature. The higher wages of the 1919–20 *biennio rosso* period (a two-year cycle of political, economic and social agitation) were quickly diluted by rising costs of living, significant periods of mass unemployment and wage cuts. While younger, unmarried male workers did eventually enjoy wider recreational opportunities than their fathers, this does not necessarily equate with a break from traditional forms and locales of socialization. The neighbourhood remained central to working-class socialization, indeed increasingly so as the young unemployed living in the workers' suburbs, largely on the north and western periphery of the city, were cut off economically and spatially from the wealthier city centre and from the new consumer culture.

Bicycles could not erode the increasing anti-working class hostility among the middle classes. Indeed, bicycles would more likely exacerbate what Berta acknowledges as an 'emotive anti-worker wave' of bourgeois resentment at workers' political, economic and social improvements.¹⁷ Moreover, as we shall see, bicycles were used for political purposes by young workers both before and after the First World War.

Carl Levy has developed the earlier work of Paolo Spriano in identifying the emergence of a new generation of young socialists and anarchists from 1910 onwards, who were raised and/or living in the same workers' suburbs, employed in the same factories or sharing common political and social aspirations, who associated and debated together in the same local clubs and societies. The most influential of these institutions was the Francisco Ferrer Modern School, located in the *Barriera di Milano* working class district of Turin, named in honour of the Spanish libertarian educationist executed in 1909.¹⁸

For many workers, who migrated to Turin from the Vercellese, Novarese and Biellese countryside, these points of contact and new forms of alliances were cemented by pre-industrial libertarian traditions which helped to ease political and social differ-

ences. Out of this new generation of intellectuals and workers would emerge a number of the leaders of the postwar workers' movement. To name just the most prominent: communists such as Antonio Gramsci, Palmiro Togliatti, Angelo Tasca and Umberto Terracini founded the influential *Ordine Nuovo* group, while socialists such as Bruno Buozzi, Mario Guarnieri and Gino Castagni would become leaders of the Federation of Italian Metallurgical Workers, FIOM. Importantly, young anarchists such as Maurizio Garino and Pietro Ferrero would also emerge from the 'generation of 1910' to become leading figures within Turin's political and trade union arenas.

Tensions and divisions within both the territorial and institutional forms of association and organization in working-class communities were constant in the postwar period. However, it was the formal and informal networks of sociability and solidarity, ready to become operative and able to overcome internecine disputes at times of crisis, which helped to shape working-class resistance to the government, police, nationalists and, later, fascists. Working-class attempts at defence organization benefited qualitatively and quantitatively from the forms of non-sectarian alliances fostered by the *tradizione sovversiva*. First socialists, and then communists, grafted their political, economic and social structures onto pre-existing institutional forms such as wine circles, social clubs and mutual aid societies. These traditions had important consequences for the development of working-class defence organization. The *Guardia Rossa* (Red Guard) of 1919–20 and ADP and communist squads of 1921–22 were the inheritors of these antecedents which owed their existence and vitality to community as well as political and workplace factors.

The Development of Community and Factory Forms of Working-class Defence Organization

Working-class self-defence was a necessary requirement both before and immediately after the First World War, as the working class came under attack from nationalist and militaristic elements. The need for self-defence produced a response in the best traditions of non-sectarian working-class association. Carl Levy states that the new alliances fostered through clubs and circles became operative in order to counter the appearance of

middle-class nationalism on the streets following the Libyan War of 1911–12. Anarchists and socialists were forced to ‘establish self-defence units at demonstrations to protect themselves from attacks by nationalist youths’.¹⁹

During the Turin revolt of August 1917 against food shortages and the war, Garino recalled that the whole *Barriera di Milano* working-class community, men and women, politicized and non politicized alike, helped to construct the barricades and defend their neighbourhood. If Garino and other militants were at the vanguard, he states that the rest of the community were in position behind the barricades. Garino remembers that, at its most tense point, he found himself joined in battle by many who had shown no previous interest in politics:

[T]he population which lived in the *Barriera di Milano*, impregnated by all our activity, at the decisive moment, instead of going to play *bocce* were there, ready at the barricades.²⁰

The development of working-class defence organization became increasingly urgent in the postwar years. Before 1921, the most coherent and successful attempt at military-style organization was found in the formation of the *Guardia Rossa* during the factory occupations of September 1920. The Red Guard of September 1920 was the culmination of earlier piecemeal attempts to provide a militarized form of working-class defence. It successfully coalesced community solidarity and factory and political organization in order to meet the demands of the new crisis.

The initial moves towards the establishment of a Red Guard centred on the establishment of *squadre di vigilanza* (surveillance squads), to be organized and co-ordinated by the workers’ circles in the various working-class districts of Turin. Six workers, from each workers’ circle, chosen from among those with military experience, were to form a Red Guard squad, to make themselves available to marshal demonstrations and to guard important workers’ institutions, in particular the Chamber of Labour (*Camera del Lavoro*), the Turin Cooperative Association (*Alleanza Cooperativa Torinese* — ACT) premises, the workers’ circles and the *Ordine Nuovo* building.²¹

Moves towards the formation of the Red Guard as part of a more general united front policy were far from smooth. In May 1919 many anarchists, frustrated by what they saw as socialist prevarication over the establishment of a common plan of action,

threatened to proceed with the Red Guard plans irrespective of socialist cooperation. Nonetheless, anarchist-socialist alliances continued at grass roots level.²²

The rate of development and the increase in numerical strength of the Red Guard followed a pattern which responded to immediate need and times of crisis. In July 1919, the International General Strike in support of the Russian and Hungarian republics led to intensified moves to organize a Red Guard to marshal the demonstrations and to defend the protesters.²³

In mid-August 1919 the Prefect of Turin, Paolino Taddei, reported that his office had revealed how in the past three months (and particularly since the beginning of the preparations for the International Strike) the *sovversivi* of the workers' circles had directed a propaganda campaign that each day had become more 'assiduous, intense and insistent'.²⁴

Taddei also noted a private meeting, held at a workers' circle in the Campidoglio district on 30 July 1919, to organize the recruitment of a *Ciclisti Rossi* (Red Cyclist) group. These were to serve as carriers of subversive propaganda into the villages of the province and as the disseminators of orders and communications. Workers with familial ties in these villages often smoothed the way for these actions. The Red Cyclists were also expected to participate at demonstrations and festivals. The Red Cyclist initiative resurrected prewar forms of political organization and participation.²⁵

The development of working-class defence organization remained a piecemeal process. Between 1919 and the summer of 1920 the development of working-class defence organization was characterized by ebb and flow. On 13 August 1920, two-and-a-half weeks before the beginning of the factory occupations, Taddei stated that:

In reality the Red Guard now in existence is formed by youth elements and the most driven from the various socialist circles and is numerically small, without any organic formation or command and by themselves of little possible danger to public order. . .²⁶

Though surveillance squads continued to marshal important working-class institutions and festivals, the Red Guard movement would have to wait until the Occupation of the Factories period before it emerged as a significant military-style force.

The Red Guard During the Occupation of the Factories

During the factory occupations the Red Guard became a distinctly factory-based organization for the first time, merging with and absorbing pre-existent factory groups. During this period, the squads were identified as the Red Guard and placed under the control of the factory councils at each Turin factory. In Milan and Sesto San Giovanni, the Red Guard was coordinated on a city- and town-wide basis by the local *Camera del Lavoro*.²⁷

In this period of crisis, the factory–community nexus continued to foster collective responses and solidarity to working-class organization and resistance. The populations in working-class districts held meetings, distributed propaganda, provided food, clothing, blankets and arms for occupying workers, and towards the end of the occupations they assisted the Red Guards and other workers in transporting and concealing arms smuggled out of the factories. Women played an important role in all these activities.²⁸ Women also played their part as Red Guards and members of the factory councils, most visibly in textile factories where a significant number of the workforce were female.²⁹

At the largest and most important factory in Turin, FIAT Centro, the secretary of the Internal Commission, Giovanni Parodi, led the occupation on the first morning. The Red Guard were soon assigned to their surveillance posts at the entrances and exits and on the roofs of the factory. Red Cyclists patrolled the outer perimeter of the occupied factories.³⁰

Contrary to the view of Gwyn A. Williams, significant levels of coordination and cooperation between factories occurred in Turin. The members of the Factory Council and organizers of the Red Guard at the Savigliano factory were in close contact with their counterparts at the nearby Elli and Zerboni firm. Similarly, the Red Guard at the BIAK factory formed part of a coordinated group with the Fotostampa, Maserà and Garrone factories during the factory occupations.³¹

The coordination and solidarity of occupying workers from different factories was also in evidence during episodes of violence between the Red Guards and other workers on the one hand, and the security forces on the other, during the last week of the occupations. The occupying workers engaged in numerous and increasingly violent battles with the security forces, many of which were offensive rather than simply defensive.³²

September 1920 continued to cast a large shadow over Italian politics in the period before the fascist March on Rome in October 1922. Importantly, during 1921 and 1922 the government, industrialists, police authorities, fascists, nationalists, sections of the bourgeois press and middle classes attempted to lay the blame for postwar violence and illegality in Italy at the feet of the radical workers' organizations. This development was not confined to the above interests. The socialist political and trade union leaderships' support for the government-brokered Pact of Pacification (3 August 1921) with the fascists sanctioned the criminalization of the ADP. However, it was not only the Italian Socialist Party (*Partito Socialista d'Italia* — PSI) and General Confederation of Labour (*Confederazione Generale del Lavoro* — CGL) whose tactics and attitude towards the ADP had a detrimental effect on its development and strength. The PCd'I leadership, unlike many anarchist leaders, also failed to understand the necessity of offering its full support to the nascent form of popular anti-fascist resistance.

The Attitude of the Working-class Movement in Relation to the *Arditi del Popolo*

The experience of the ADP offers us an opportunity to revise our understanding of the relationship between the workers' movement and wider working-class community. The libertarian custom of autonomy from, and resistance to, authority was also operated against the leaders of the workers' movement, particularly when they were held to have misunderstood the situation at grass roots level. The experience of the non-sectarian anti-fascist paramilitary ADP — where rank-and-file communists and socialists defied their leaders' denunciation of the movement to form non-sectarian alliances, and to organize and lead Turin's ADP — clearly showed this dynamic at work.

Between 22 June and the first days of July 1921 the *Arditi del Popolo* association was formed out of a schism, largely involving left ex-combatants and pro-fascists, within the Roman *arditi* organization.³³ ADP groups quickly emerged in almost all regions of Italy as political and social differences were overcome and common ground was found in the defence of the *barriere* from fascist violence. On 6 July 3000 armed and militarily-

organized ADP paraded at a large anti-fascist rally at the Botanical Gardens in Rome.³⁴ By the end of July, the ADP had organized and led popular resistance to defeat fascist squads on military terrain in Viterbo and Sarzana.³⁵ However, at this point the ADP's future growth and strength were undermined by the attitudes and policies of the leaders of the working-class political parties and trade unions. By the end of the first week of August 1921 the PSI, CGL and the PCd'I had officially denounced the ADP. Only the anarchist leaders, if not always sympathetic to the programme of the ADP, did not abandon the movement.

In July 1921, following discussions with members of the local ADP the Turin Executive Committee of the anarco-sindicalist-controlled Union of Italian Syndicalists (*Unione Sindacale Italiana* — USI) declared that it was not 'incompatible' for its members to adhere to the ADP. The Piedmontese Anarchist Union (*Unione Anarchica Piemontese* — UAP) had expressed similar sentiments a week earlier.³⁶

Despite misgivings over its non-revolutionary tactics and aims, the influential anarchist newspaper, *Umanità Nova* strongly supported the ADP; stressing the need to support it on the grounds that it represented a popular expression of anti-fascist resistance and in defence of a freedom to organize.³⁷

The legalistic and pacifistic aims of the PSI and CGL, in supporting the government-sponsored Pact of Pacification with fascism, threatened a crisis for the ADP movement. The fascist movement was able to build on the legitimacy afforded by the right of the political spectrum in the May 1921 political elections, when it won 35 seats in parliament, to gain a significant measure of legitimacy from the PSI and CGL via the Pact of Pacification.

The Pact of Pacification represented a major political victory for fascism. The pact offered the ADP up as the scapegoat for violence in the country. The PSI and CGL leaderships which signed the pact, officially abandoned and denounced the ADP in clause five of the Pact of Pacification.³⁸

A telegram from the interior minister to all prefects in the kingdom, dated 12 August 1921, criminalized the ADP as an extra-legal organization intending to subvert order and legality. The Pact of Pacification, by definition, had offered legitimacy to the fascists who were fighting the ADP.³⁹

Despite the universal communist condemnation of the PSI and CGL's collaborationist and legalistic approach to the ending of

the civil war in the country many of its political and intellectual leaders also denounced — or at best were contradictory in their support of — the ADP. On the same day as the Pact was signed, *Ordine Nuovo* published a PCd'I communication warning communists against involvement in the ADP.⁴⁰ On 7 August 1921, four days after the Pact, the PCd'I leadership, admitted that many communists were actively involved in the ADP and officially abandoned the movement. Severe disciplinary measures were threatened against those communists who continued to participate in, or liaise with, the ADP.⁴¹

However, the reality of the battles against fascism in the streets and neighbourhoods led many communists and socialists to ignore the dikats of their political leaders and to insert themselves into burgeoning ADP groups.

The PCd'I Central Executive is commonly held to be culpable for the communist hostility towards the ADP. Amadeo Bordiga and Ruggero Grieco were particularly suspicious of the ADP's non-exclusively proletarian composition, its leadership and its non-revolutionary aims. They considered the movement a bourgeois plan to sap the energy from the proletarian's fight against fascism. Nonetheless, other, less sectarian communists on the Executive, including Umberto Terracini, held similar reservations about the ADP.⁴²

Argo Secondari, the *ex-ardito* and inspiration behind the ADP movement, was held by these and other communists to be an agent-provocateur and pawn in the campaign of the liberal ex-Prime Minister, Francesco Saverio Nitti, to undermine his rival Giovanni Giolitti's possible return to power.⁴³

The Comintern executive, particularly Lenin and Bukharin, supported the ADP initiative as one capable of winning over the majority of the Italian working class to the PCd'I. The Italian Communist Party was urged to postpone its objections to the ADP. Instead, communists should insert themselves into the ADP movement in order to assume the leadership of this expression of the popular will.⁴⁴

In line with the Comintern and in opposition to the Bordighian leadership of the PCd'I, some communist leaders, such as Antonio Gramsci of the Turin *Ordine Nuovo* group and Nicola Bombacci and Egidio Gennari of the PCd'I Central Executive, remained sympathetic to the ADP movement.⁴⁵

Also in tune with the Comintern, and in opposition to both the

PCd'I and the Serratian leadership of the PSI, some third internationalist maximalist socialists, including the ex-combatant PSI deputies and ADP leaders Filippo Amedeo (Turin), Guido Picelli (Parma), Giuseppe Mingrino (Pisa) and Giuseppe di Vittorio (Bari), and other maximalist socialist deputies such as Costantino Lazzari, Fabrizio Maffi and Ezio Riboldi, also supported the ADP.⁴⁶

On 12 July 1921, *Ordine Nuovo* published a largely sympathetic interview with Secondari on its front page.⁴⁷ Three days later, following the enrolment in the ADP, of the ex-combatant PSI deputy in Pisa, Giuseppe Mingrino, Gramsci stated in an article in *Ordine Nuovo*:

To launch or join a movement of popular resistance while setting in advance a limit to its expansion, is the most serious error of tactics that can be committed at this moment . . . It is essential to make them [the popular masses] understand, it is essential to compel them to understand that today the proletariat is confronted not just by a private association, but by the whole State apparatus, with its police, its courts, its newspapers which manipulate public opinion as the government and the capitalists please . . . Are the communists opposed to the *Arditi del Popolo* movement? On the contrary: they want the arming of the proletariat, the creation of an armed proletarian force which is capable of defeating the bourgeoisie and taking charge of the organization and development of the new productive forces generated by capitalism.⁴⁸

In this way Gramsci encapsulated how even those communist leaders sympathetic to the ADP couched their support. They accepted and supported the popular, anti-fascist inspiration behind the movement, but criticized the limits imposed on the ADP which aimed only at defeating fascism and restoring order and legality to Italy, rather than extending its aim to destroying the whole state apparatus and economic élites, allied with fascism against the working class. In common with all communist leaders, Gramsci awaited the formation of the PCd'I-led military squads. Nonetheless, he recognized that in this period the ADP best expressed grass roots working-class demands for an armed anti-fascist proletarian organization.

On 19 July in *Ordine Nuovo*, another PCd'I order for communists to join only party-based military squads appeared in the same edition: Gramsci prefigured a generalized anti-fascist organization and battle, based on a reciprocal alliance between the community and the ADP:

In each home in which working class families live groups of proletarian defence should be formed in which able workers of all parties should participate. Each group linking with the groups of neighbouring homes, should become an element of the neighbourhood unit. The defence of the neighbourhood should be entrusted to this unit . . . The *Arditi del Popolo* could effectively co-ordinate the workers' squads, organising them in groups at pre-established points in every neighbourhood to intervene, in case of need . . .⁴⁹

From the outset, moves towards forming united front anti-fascist defence organizations were positively encouraged by communist leaders in Turin. On 15 July 1921, *Ordine Nuovo* published an appeal signed by the Provisional Commission of the Proletarian Defence Organization, stating the necessity of constituting a single group of this type in Turin. A meeting was convened for the evening of the following day at the local *Camera del Lavoro*. The non-sectarian nature of the embryonic organization was evinced by the wide-ranging list of cross-current political, economic, social and cultural workers' organizations expected to send representatives.⁵⁰

In Turin, as in many other Italian towns and cities, the appeals and meetings to form an anti-fascist workers' defence organization led to the formation of ADP groups. In the summer of 1921 Taddei, and the local police superintendent, Mariano Norcia, both claimed that the earlier experience of the Red Guard meant that the constitution of the ADP represented a more immediate danger in Turin than elsewhere. Norcia stated:

As predicted, since the first announcement of the formation of the *Arditi del Popolo* conceived by Argo Secondari of the Rome group, the local extremist elements receiving the proposal with fervour, opened enrolment on a vast scale and have taken as its base the squads of the Red Guard, of the communist circles and the *Gruppi Rivoluzionari d'Azione* [factory-based Revolutionary Action Groups], quickly turning them into military-type organic formations . . .⁵¹

At that time, the PCd'I's preparations for strictly party-based military organization had not yet been made concrete. The emergence of the ADP offered communists a long-awaited opportunity for military organization. It was one which, in the best traditions of the Turin working class, transcended narrower political divisions. The communist leadership of Turin's ADP was strongest at the grass roots level and involved lower categories of communist leaders. These militants were involved in official capacities within the communist-controlled Turin

workers' institutions rather than the PCd'I itself. While it was mainly, though not exclusively, communists who organized and led Turin's ADP it was less as communists and more as part of a wider, working-class self-identification that this occurred. This dynamic was re-enforced by an important socialist and anarchist presence in the Turin ADP.

The ADP encouraged a response that was shaped by the subversive traditions of collective identity, solidarity and self-defence. In this way even military squads, based in communist workers' circles and made up largely of communists, appropriated the name, formation and inspiration of the popular expression of anti-fascism in the summer of 1921, the ADP. This provided these squads with that vital organic link with working-class communities, which sectarian, party-based communist squads would have lacked at that time.

Turin's ADP should be seen more in line with the examples of collective, non-sectarian defence organizations found in Bari, Livorno, Parma and Rome. It was hegemonized more by the independent libertarian subculture and less by political ideologies or parties. In Turin, as elsewhere, the PCd'I and PSI denunciation of the ADP inevitably had a weakening effect, depriving it of potential members, funds and experience. However, some communist leaders remained sympathetic and supportive of the movement. Moreover, many communist militants and sympathizers reacted to the realities of the time and responded in line with the culture of their neighbourhoods and the need to survive, rather than blindly acquiesce with official diktats. This was also true of many local socialists. As the ADP lay outside of political party control and within community forms of association and action it had some room for manoeuvre, despite official socialist and communist proclamations and bans. In Turin it would be the immediate and widespread repression of the ADP by the authorities, rather than the abandonment of the movement by the communist central leadership, that would be a more determinant factor in its break-up.

The Turin Experience of the *Arditi del Popolo*

Both the anarchist *Umanità Nova* and communist *Ordine Nuovo* newspapers printed the manifesto of the ADP Turin section in

July 1921. The manifesto appealed more to the communists', and also the anarchists', wider programme of defeating not only fascism but also its allies in the state apparatus and economic élites:

The *Arditi del Popolo*, frank expression of sane Italian people . . . genuine expression of the forces that knew the horror of the war, in the trenches of Carso and Piave, to defend and enrich a handful of thieves and suck-ups in tail coats; today they rise up against those that deny them bread and personal safety and devastate and condemn their homes, built on a thousand sacrifices, to flames. The *Arditi del Popolo*, since it no longer believes in the effectiveness of the punitive laws of the Royal Government, will from now on oppose itself with arms in hand against the devastators and slaughterers of Italy. Workers, *impiegati* [white collar workers] and peasants, old soldiers of the trenches, sincere revolutionaries, rush to swell the ranks of the new army of proletarian defence. The cry *A Noi!* (To Us!) will become finally the cry of the abolition of the reign of exploitation, of slavery and of murder madness! Long live the freedom of the Italian people! Long live the *Arditi del Popolo!* Adherents to the *Corpo di Difesa Proletaria* will be temporarily received at the *Lega Proletaria* in Corso Galileo Ferraris 12, Torino.⁵²

The manifesto of the Turin ADP clearly signalled the pivotal organizing and recruitment role to be played by the city's *Lega Proletaria* war veterans' league. From the outset, the ADP initiative received the full support of the Turin leadership of the *Lega Proletaria*.⁵³

Francescangeli states that, outside of Rome, the majority of local impulses for the formation of the ADP came from the sections of the *Lega Proletaria*. This development was unsurprising given that the war veterans' association linked with the proletarian parties already provided a *trait d'union* between the factory and the trenches, between ex-combatants and the workers' movement.⁵⁴

The ADP in Turin was centrally organized around the *Lega Proletaria*, which was based in the General Workers Organization (AGO) building and around the network of workers' circles in the neighbourhoods. Affiliation to these institutions did not necessarily equate with leadership or membership of political parties. Some men, such as the PSI deputy Amedeo, were involved at a leadership level in political parties and in both the Turin *Lega Proletaria* and ADP. Others were not members of any political party. As we have seen, workers' circles offered more than simply political forms of organization. This suggests

that association could take place as much on the community as on the political level.

A good example of this dynamic can be found at the communist workers' circle in the Campidoglio district of Turin. Some of its younger elements were involved in the murder of the young fascist activist, Dario Pini, on 11 July 1921. The Pini episode provides important evidence on the composition and organization of the ADP, and of its organic links to the workers' movement and wider working-class community in Turin.

The *Spartachiane* (Spartacist) squad at the Campidoglio communist workers' circle was centred around its youth section and formed part of a wider network of ADP groups in Turin. This demonstrates a direct institutional link between local communists and the ADP in defiance of the PCd'I leadership's growing abandonment of the movement. While closely associated with PCd'I institutions, the squad's composition was as much a product of the working-class neighbourhood in which it emerged. It was also an example of the emergence of a new generation of younger workers adhering to the traditions of collectivity, solidarity and neighbourhood-based forms of association that continued to colour working-class communities.

Members of the Campidoglio communist circle stated that the Spartacist squad was an ADP rather than an exclusively communist formation.⁵⁵ Moreover, Pini's killer, Giuseppe Bovio, and some of the other members of the Campidoglio communist circle's youth section, were enrolled as members of the communist circle but not in the PCd'I.⁵⁶

One of the members of the Campidoglio workers' circle under arrest for his part in the murder of Pini, Giovanni Nata, confessed to having joined the ADP in July 1921 and to having officially enrolled at the city centre offices of the *Lega Proletaria*.⁵⁷ Nata was himself rounded up and arrested in late July on his way to the *Camera del Lavoro* to participate in an ADP meeting.

That the ADP in Turin adhered to traditional non-sectarian forms of association, rather than conforming to party political orders was clearly in evidence during the first public appearance of its battalions in mid-July 1921. On 14 July 1921 the Central Executive of the PCd'I published a communication ordering that communists could only belong to party-based military squads and warned against their involvement in non-sectarian organizations such as the ADP.⁵⁸ On 15 July the funerals of two com-

munists, Isidoro Provera and the ex-Red Guard Giuseppe Miglioretti, killed in the July 1921 fascist reprisals for the deaths of two young fascists, Pini and Aldo Campiglio, engendered a show of solidarity from both the workers' movement and working-class communities.

According to *Ordine Nuovo* thousands of working class people, politicized and non-politicized alike, joined the funeral procession on its journey through the city centre. The mourners marched behind the banners of organizations and institutions drawn from the whole of the workers' movement including the PCd'I and PSI, anarchist groups, *Camera del Lavoro*, metallurgical workers' unions, railway workers, tram workers and the textile and building unions, tens of workers' circles, tenants' associations and women's groups. The rally held at the cemetery included communist, socialist and anarchist speakers. Among the speakers were two First World War veterans, representatives of the city's *Lega Proletaria* and leaders of the Turin ADP; the socialist Amedeo and the communist Dante Mandelli.⁵⁹

Of crucial importance was the appearance of militarily organized squads during the funeral procession and rally. That the military squads at the funerals were not simply organized by, and composed of, communists but run on non-sectarian lines was confirmed by both newspaper and local police reports of the event. The Turin liberal daily newspaper *La Stampa*, the anarchist *Umanità Nova* and the police superintendent Vittorio Labbro all stated that the squads represented the first public showing of the ADP in the city.⁶⁰

Labbro reported that the ADP squads were under the command of the socialist, Amedeo. Labbro also stated that after the funeral he was forced to breakup a march on the city centre by 200 ADP which had been organized militarily. The march had ignored an earlier agreement between Labbro and the funeral organizers that the military squads would return to their headquarters in separate groups, according to the workers' circles in which they were enrolled.⁶¹

Communists, and the use of communist-controlled institutions, continued to feature heavily in the local ADP movement. Even the official denunciation of the ADP by the communist national leadership on 7 August 1921 did not result in an end to communist propaganda in support of, or presence in, the movement in Turin.

It is too simplistic to suggest that a communist leadership of many of Turin's workers' organizations meant the wholesale absorption of the ADP into communist squads from the outset. It is also simplistic to suggest, as both Spriano (and more recently) Ivan Fuschini have, that the Red Guard simply became the ADP in Turin.⁶² Palazzolo, Rossi and Francescangeli have all stated that in Turin the ADP was developed out of the pre-existent communist organizations of the Red Guard, workers' circles and the factory-based action groups.⁶³

While the organized forms of the ADP appeared to have emerged out of these antecedent forms of working class military, community and factory defence, its experience in Turin should not be reduced to its relationship to communist organizations. Nor was Turin's Red Guard seamlessly transformed, ten months later in the summer of 1921, into the ADP. My research shows that while members of the 1919–20 Red Guard were also present in the Turin ADP, this interpretation requires modification. Hundreds of Red Guards and other militants of the Occupation of the Factories period were arrested, and sentenced or remained in custody awaiting trial between October 1920 and late 1922. In summer 1922 the PSI deputy, Giuseppe Romita, claimed that 350 workers were being detained for offences relating to September 1920, while a further 150 had already passed through the courts and most had received prison sentences.⁶⁴ Others were on the run from warrants for their arrest, while many more emigrated, particularly to France, in this period. Others had been killed or beaten into submission by fascist violence. The pre-existent factory groups had also been severely fragmented and weakened by the mass-dismissals of militants from Turin's factories in spring 1921.

It would be more accurate to argue that earlier forms of working class defence organization were resurrected and grafted onto existing structures by the nascent ADP groups in Turin. In Turin the ADP formalized popular forms of illegality, which took on organized forms developed on the base of pre-existent factory and community organizations, largely, though not exclusively, in the hands of communists. However, antecedent organizational forms required some rebuilding in summer 1921. The PCd'I's orders to set up party-based military squads during July and August suggested that these moves were far from complete at this time. It was the ADP which provided those anxious to

counter fascist violence with the organizational form that they required.

The Activities of the Turin *Arditi del Popolo* and the Authorities’ Crackdown

The earliest official sighting of working-class military squads in Turin in summer 1921 occurred three days before the funerals of the communists Provera and Miglioretti. The police superintendent Alberto Mosso reported that at 9.30 p.m. on 12 July 1921 a group of around 50 men were discovered participating in military exercises. Further inquiries by Mosso led him to declare that those involved belonged to the Borgo San Donato section of the ADP.⁶⁵

The authorities almost immediately prohibited suspected ADP meetings in Turin. Fascist–ADP clashes on the streets of Turin in the last week of July 1921 only heightened the authorities’ fear of escalating public disorder.⁶⁶

The previously noted government circular, dated 12 August 1921, issued to all prefects in Italy, had ordered the ‘disarming of the population’.⁶⁷ The implementation of these orders was overwhelmingly applied to the ADP and communist squads, while the fascists were left relatively untroubled.⁶⁸

If the Turin ADP was among the first to receive swingeing government repression it should also be seen as part of a nationwide offensive against the ADP, led by Ivanoe Bonomi’s government in favour of fascism. A telegram signed on 23 August 1921, by the Vice-Prefect of Turin, Edoardo Boggio to the Interior Minister, showed that the attitude of the authorities in Turin, as elsewhere, was specifically set on destroying the ADP while granting fascism an unofficial amnesty. Boggio reported that:

Arditi del Popolo meetings were prohibited here [Turin] after the judicial authorities denounced the leaders of the movement and issued warrants for their arrest, advising that the ADP characterizes the criminal association offence not existing in the *Fasci di Combattimento*, which aims at strengthening the nation . . . fascist meetings have not taken place here for some time and the last local demonstration of the *fascio* related to the pacification of minds . . . I can rule out that other associations carry out illicit activities, or even threaten action against political adversaries.⁶⁹

The distinction between the 'criminal' ADP and the 'nation-strengthening' fascists made by the local authorities had a hollow ring. It was a distinction made political by the pacification process and the emergence of popular and fascist forms of military organization.⁷⁰ In Turin, Boggio's statement concealed numerous episodes of fascist violence during summer 1921. These included the two-day revenge assaults on workers and their institutions in July 1921 following the murders of Pini and Campiglio, during which the communists Provera and Miglioretti were killed. Moreover, Boggio ignored or concealed the intensification of fascist military organization in Turin, between spring and summer 1921.⁷¹

The immediately repressive stance of the authorities in relation to working-class defence organization did much to suffocate the development of the ADP in Turin. Nonetheless, while ADP meetings were prohibited, its leaders at times succeeded in holding them. These continued to be announced in the communist press and held within communist-controlled institutions within the city. Heavy police surveillance and wide scale stop-and-search methods were employed on persons approaching the intended venues. Suspected leaders of the Turin ADP were also arrested and detained in custody in the days and weeks following the Pact of Pacification. On one level, the concentration of the institutions and venues of the workers' movement in Turin in the city centre AGO building, made the movement vulnerable to attack and easier to police. However, the networks of collectivity and solidarity found in working-class neighbourhoods were able to provide some protection to the ADP.

On the night of 11 August, would-be participants of an ADP meeting were prevented from holding an assembly by the strong police presence in and around the AGO. On this occasion many fell back on the potential for clandestine association within the *barriera*. *La Stampa* reported that the postponed meeting was held that night at an unknown location in the *Barriera di Nizza* working-class district.⁷² *Ordine Nuovo* and the prefect of Turin both reported that late into the night of 11 August, around a hundred militarily organized ADP had begun a march from the *Barriera di Nizza* towards Valentino Park in the city centre. The march drew great enthusiasm and applause from onlookers and shouts of 'Hurrah for the *Arditi del Popolo!* Hurrah for the Proletariat! and Hurrah for the Communist Party!' as they

passed. At the park the squad dispersed. At this point the security forces arrived and rounded up a number of young workers found in the vicinity of the park.⁷³

Perhaps the most important evidence which exists on the organization, composition and activities of the Turin ADP can be found in the trial records of eight *sovversivi*, charged with being its organizers and leaders. Among the eight were seven communists and one anarchist. The communists were Arturo Bendini, Luigi Visconti, Lorenzo Franchino, Dante Mandelli, Giulio Guerrini, Antonio Rovei and Francesco Ricci. The anarchist defendant was Raffaele Schiavina.

Interestingly, in late October 1922, the eight *sovversivi* were all acquitted of charges relating to the formation of armed military organization. If the accusations against the eight men could not be upheld juridically, this does not mean that the men involved did not play a leading role in organizing and leading the ADP in Turin. Abundant proof of ADP organization and activity in Turin was provided despite contradictory claims of its non-existence by both *Umanità Nova* and also *Ordine Nuovo* in Turin in October 1922.

Ordine Nuovo stated that the ADP

had never had any importance in our city, nor on the one hand could it, since the communists do not and have never adhered to it, and on the other hand its Executive Committee [. . .] has no relationship with our organizations, either central or local.⁷⁴

As we have seen, both newspapers consistently published notices and articles relating to the ADP in Turin. The timing of the claims suggested an attempt to undermine the prosecution's case. By October 1922 *Ordine Nuovo* was also engaged in upholding the party line and party mythology, stating that only the communists were able to organize a military-style popular defence organization.

One probable reason for the apparently anomalous acquittal of suspected *sovversivi*, particularly when viewed in relation to the general tendency for working-class defendants to be detained for longer, more likely to be sent for trial and sentenced, and to receive longer terms of imprisonment than fascists, lay in the escalation of fascist militarization and violence by end of October 1922. Turin had a long tradition of middle-class support for Giolittian liberalism and for more radical varieties of liberalism

which interacted with the city's reformist and more radical brands of socialism respectively. This tradition had acted as another barrier to the ready acceptance of fascism among certain elements of Turin's middle classes. Fascism's betrayal of the pacification process may have had an effect on the judiciary and middle-class jury, many of whose sympathy for fascism was restricted to its potential defeat of the workers' movement and to restore order rather than simply replace radical forms of organization.

It should be remembered that, despite the many illiberal and biased implementations of law and order, Italy was still a liberal state at this time. The decision of the bourgeois jury could in part be explained by fascism (rather than the workers' movement) appearing as the greatest danger to peace, legality and the liberal state by the end of October 1922. Two days before the beginning of the trial against the ADP, the Turin Crown Court had acquitted the two low-ranking, scapegoat fascists, Gazzera and Milanese, who had been sent to trial for the burning of the Turin *Camera de Lavoro* on the night of 25–26 April 1921. Moreover, the irony of holding a trial of suspected *sovversivi* military organizers in the same days that the fascists directed a military concentration of 30,000 armed blackshirts, with special units and cavalry, undisturbed by the authorities in Naples, was probably not lost on the prosecutor general, Crosta-Curti, and the members of the jury. Another likely reason was that the 14 months of custody prior to trial was considered a sufficient penalty.⁷⁵

The identification of the suspected leaders of Turin's ADP resulted from their military experience and *sovversiva* activities. A closer look at the communists who were arrested showed that their involvement was determined more by the key positions they held within the institutions of the wider workers' movement, particularly the *Lega Proletaria*, rather than by membership of the PCd'I itself.

An important misconception about the rise to power of fascism in Italy is that Mussolini's movement provided the natural home for the First World War *arditi* shock troops and the veterans of the D'Annunzian-led occupation of Fiume from September 1919 to December 1920.⁷⁶ Del Carria, Rossi and Francescangeli have struck at the heart of this debate by confirming the presence of many left-leaning *ex-arditi*, fiuman legionnaires and other ex-combatants in ADP groups all over Italy.⁷⁷

Some of the leaders of Turin's ADP were not only ex-combatants in the First World War, some could also be described as lower-middle class in terms of their occupations. This provided the city's ADP with an important element of working-class–middle-class alliance that Del Carria himself has denied for Turin.⁷⁸ Furthermore, at the end of July 1921 a small group of Turin *fiuman* legionnaires had sent a letter in support of the proletariat to *Ordine Nuovo*.⁷⁹ The *Ardito del Popolo* Giovanni Nata was found in possession of a letter addressed to *Ordine Nuovo*, in which he offered 'libertarian greetings' and claimed that the ADP was the true heir to the First World War *arditi*.⁸⁰

On 10 July a group of Catholic war veterans, calling themselves the *Arditi Bianchi* (White *Arditi*), marched through Turin's city centre.⁸¹ During 1921 there were a series of clashes between young Catholics and fascists in Turin. It is likely that many of these young *popolari* found their way into the local ADP.

The four leading communists arrested provide evidence of an ex-combatant leadership of the local ADP rooted in the wider proletarian institutions rather than the PCd'I. Importantly, Arturo Bendini, Dante Mandelli, Francesco Ricci and Giulio Guerrini provided the local ADP with links to political institutions and experience of military organization, training and tactics.

Bendini, 30 years-old, a former lieutenant in the infantry regiment during the First World War, and in this period Mayor of Collegno in Turin Province, had long been known to the authorities as a dangerous subversive. During the Occupation of the Factories he was regarded as one of the most violent organizers of the Red Guard, at the Frejus factory in Turin. Along with Luigi Visconti, Bendini was charged with the transportation and concealment of war materials from FIAT Centro, in relation to the discovery of an arms cache in Collegno cemetery. He was also a member of the executive of the Turin–Cuneo *Lega Proletaria* association. Bendini was arrested along with Visconti and Lorenzo Franchino for being the leaders of the Collegno ADP group and for having organized military exercises in the Pozzo Strada and Borgata Leumann districts of Turin.⁸²

Mandelli, 23 years-old, was from the middle classes and was described by the Turin police as educated and cultured. Mandelli practised as a qualified accountant and was employed by both the ACT and the *Lega Proletaria*. He had been a lieutenant in the Fourth Alpine Regiment during the First World War, and was

also one of the regional councillors and most active propagandists of the *Lega Proletaria*. He held no official position within the PCd'I itself. He was accused of commanding an ADP battalion at the funerals of Provera and Miglioretti on 15 July 1921.⁸³

The 23-year-old Ricci's position as administrative secretary of the *Lega Proletaria* in the city marked him out as one of the authorities' prime suspects. Ricci had a long past as a *sovversivo*, stretching back to the Red Week anti-militarist revolt of June 1914. A soldier in the Engineers during the First World War, he was wounded at the battle of Carso in June 1917. In 1919, Ricci had been sentenced to one year in prison for refusing to obey orders, although he was later granted an amnesty.⁸⁴

A police search of Ricci's living quarters uncovered incriminating evidence. The most important finds were two registers which the police decoded as detailing the names and military experience of members of the ADP in Turin.⁸⁵ The police report stated that the registers related to a single battalion of the ADP, containing the names of 272 members of the local section, including Ricci himself and Mandelli. Ricci denied these charges, stating the registers referred to *Lega Proletaria* business only. He also denied being a member of the PCd'I, but admitted being interested in and sympathizing with parts of communist theory.⁸⁶

Guerrini, 28 years-old and a resident of Turin, was the secretary of the communist workers' education circle of Pilonetto in Turin Province. Guerrini was enrolled in the armed forces from 1914 until September 1915, when he was demobilized. He had reached the rank of corporal but had been demoted following a breach of discipline. Guerrini admitted being a communist although he denied holding any official position within the PCd'I. On 10 August 1921 Guerrini was arrested and accused of organizing an ADP squad in Moncalieri.⁸⁷

If it was communists who dominated working-class military organization in Turin, their participation adhered to non-sectarian traditions. A grass roots understanding of the situation in Turin and its surrounding areas militated against these men simply accepting official PCd'I diktats against involvement in non-communist military squads. The traditions of non-sectarian association and organization in Turin continued to transcend political differences at times of crisis. This helps to explain an anarchist presence and influence in the Turin ADP.

Another of the suspected leaders of the Turin ADP sent to trial was the anarchist Raffaele Schiavina. Schiavina, a 27-year-old qualified accountant, had left Italy for America in 1913. He remained in the United States until July 1919 when he was deported for anarchist activities. He was arrested on his return to Italy for not having presented himself for military service. Released soon after, he went to Turin where he occupied himself as editor of the anarchist newspaper *Cronaca Sovversiva*.⁸⁸ Schiavina lived with Ilario Margherita; an important figure in the 1919–1920 moves towards establishing a Red Guard. In common with Mandelli, Schiavina was charged with having commanded an ADP squad at the funerals of Provera and Miglioretti on 15 July 1921. The *Cronaca Sovversiva* newspaper and Schiavina, with another renowned old Turin anarchist, Luigi Galleani, appeared on a list of ADP correspondents discovered by the Italian authorities in a raid on the ADP headquarters in Rome in October 1922.⁸⁹

Giuseppe Tirone was also named as a subversive in central government files, and was identified as a member of the Turin ADP during 1921. Turin police reports chronicled Tirone's involvement in both communist and anarchist political and social groups in the city.⁹⁰ Giuseppe Tirone, who held official positions within the PCd'I's youth federation between 1921 and 1924, may have been confused with one or both of his brothers, Riccardo and Angelo, one of whom was a noted anarchist and the other a communist militant.⁹¹ It is probable that all three men were involved in the ADP in this period. The important point is that communist and anarchist militants remained in close contact, through the ADP, in summer to autumn 1921. Margherita, Giuseppe Odello and Domenico Rubatto have been noted also as anarchist members of the Turin ADP.⁹²

Despite the arrests of the organizers and leaders of the movement, the repressive stance taken against the ADP in Turin did not lead to its complete disappearance. This was due in part to the strong roots and traditions of non-sectarian working-class relations in Turin.

On 23 August 1921, Taddei gave an indication of the difficulties in eradicating working-class defence organization. Taddei noted the workers' movement's tendency to adapt itself to counter-repressive measures taken by the authorities. The foundation for this resilience was the networks of collectivity and

solidarity found in working-class neighbourhoods. In spite of the crackdown on military organization, Taddei was forced to concede;

[T]he leaders have not believed in putting off their criminal work and even though militarily organized squads have no longer appeared in public, they have sought all means with which to hold clandestine meetings with the aim of preparation and propaganda.⁹³

On 16 September 1921 *La Stampa* reported that 450 ADP, divided into two squads, had gathered at the main piazza in the *Barriera di Lanzo* before marching in military formation towards the *Madonna di Campagna* district. The squads finally arrived at the *Borgo Vittoria casa del popolo* where a rally was held, attended by 1000 young communists. The crowd was addressed by the communist leaders Giovanni Boero and Umberto Terracini.⁹⁴

If the September military squads were more closely connected to the PCd'I itself, the ADP retained at least a symbolic importance in Turin. A report by Taddei on 16 November 1921 stated that the local section of the PCd'I had formed, in each neighbourhood communist circle, a squad of ten individuals nominated as ADP. The function of these squads recalled the tasks of earlier forms of working-class defence organization. As with the surveillance squads and the first Red Guards these ADP groups' activities would be largely limited to guarding working-class institutions such as the AGO and *Ordine Nuovo*. Taddei listed the communist workers' circles where the ADP squads had been formed and their respective strengths.⁹⁵

The ADP's brief existence in Turin had shown some communist leaders the error of attempting to organize on strictly party and sectarian lines. The history of working-class resistance to external threat in Turin had shown how the *barriere* fostered the transcendence of internecine tensions in favour of community-based defence at times of crisis. The *barriera* represented the best opportunity of mobilizing and sustaining resistance in the latter months of 1922.

The defence of Turin, of symbolic importance as the centre of the most organized, politicized and resistant proletariat in Italy, was imbued with added significance in the light of the fall of Milan, Genoa and Livorno to fascism in August 1922. The communists were particularly concerned with re-inforcing and

defending the Piedmontese capital after August 1922. Communist propaganda aimed at a mobilization of defence centred on two broad fronts. While direct efforts to re-establish or develop specific forms of militarization were not lacking, much propaganda was aimed at mobilizing working-class communities to a defence of their neighbourhoods from fascist invasion.

At an assembly of the Turin PCd'I section on 29 August 1922, its leaders concentrated on organizing the defence of Turin which was, along with Rome and Trieste, the last bastion against fascist invasion in northern and central Italy. Terracini informed the assembly of the PCd'I Central Executive's decision to direct large funds to be used to defend Turin and *Ordine Nuovo*. Terracini invited communists in Turin to renew armed military organization both inside and outside of the Piedmontese capital.⁹⁶

These measures were an organizational part, and at times a subordinate one, of the more urgent need to mobilize working-class populations in defence of their neighbourhoods. Such propaganda transcended the communist leadership's narrower, politically sectarian appeals for military organization which had marred earlier initiatives. The traditional experience of organized defence, from surveillance squads and the Red Guard to the ADP, showed that military-style squads worked best when they entered into a reciprocal relationship with working-class communities.

The *barriera* thereby remained central to anti-fascist resistance. Important examples of working-class resistance to fascism between winter 1921 and autumn 1922 were characterized by military squad-community cooperation in working-class districts. For example, in both the Borgo Vittoria and Pozzo Strada districts in September 1922, fascist attacks were repelled by military squads working together with these communities. Armed look-outs were posted on the roofs of workers' institutions and homes, while other squad members lay in wait in the surrounding fields. Residents offered shelter to those fighting and/or pursued by fascists. Some were armed and fired at the fascists, while others threw all kinds of objects: stones, bottles, roof tiles and boiling water out of their houses onto the fascists below.⁹⁷ These actions showed the organic link between working-class defence organization and *barriera*. Not until the fascists seized power at the national level in late October 1922 would Turin fall to fascism.

Conclusion

The tradition of working-class forms of organized defence in Turin owed its existence and vitality to community as well as political and workplace factors. In Turin the working-class response to the ADP was based on the tenets of collectivity and solidarity. Non-sectarian alliance and an instinct for survival at times of crisis, rather than political affiliation or ideology, characterized the proletarian attitude to the ADP.

The experience of the ADP in Turin enables us to understand more clearly the relationship between the workers' movement and the working class as a whole. The recourse to libertarian sentiments and customs shows how resistance could be turned against workers' leaders, particularly when they were held to have misunderstood the situation at grass roots level. The rank-and-file's defiance of its political and trade union leaderships' abandonment of the ADP clearly shows this dynamic at work.

One of the most important factors in deciding the fate of the ADP in Turin was the immediate crackdown by the authorities, given added powers by government legislation. The government's attitude was related to the already existing shift to the right in the balance of political power.

The brief existence of the ADP in Turin should not equate with a lack of impact or importance. During summer and autumn 1921, the Turin ADP represented a serious obstacle to fascist advances in the city. By the end of autumn 1921 the ADP in Turin had been broken up. Nonetheless, the traditions of working-class defence organization allowed the experience of the ADP to be absorbed by the communists whose development of party-led military organization was increasingly effective. The ADP remained closely linked to communist military organization, at least symbolically and linguistically, in a direct attempt to appeal to the popular, non-sectarian customs of the wider working-class community. Militants of all Left political currents retreated into the stronger communist organizational networks. From autumn 1921 communist military organization showed that important lessons had been learned from the brief experience of the ADP. Communist military organizers proved more responsive to the realities of the fascist threat to the workers' movement and working-class communities. Though the PCd'I

demanded control of, and discipline to, party-led military organization, vital space was provided for non-sectarian participation.

Notes

1. *Umanità Nova*, 24 July 1921, 3.
2. *Umanità Nova*, 26 July 1921, 4; *Ordine Nuovo*, 12 July 1921, 1; Tom Behan, *The Resistible Rise of Benito Mussolini* (London 2002).
3. Guglielmo Palazzolo, 'L'Apparato Illegale del PCd'I nel 1921–1922 e la Lotta Contro il Fascismo', *Rivista Storica del Socialismo*, Vol. 29 (September–December 1966), 95–142; Paolo Spriano, *Storia del Partito Comunista Italiano: Da Bordiga a Gramsci*, Vol. 1 (Turin 1967), Ch. 9.
4. Eros Francescangeli, *Arditi del Popolo: Argo Secondari e la Prima Organizzazione Antifascista, 1917–1922* (Rome 2000), 157–64.
5. *Ibid.*, 161.
6. Tobias Abse, *Sovversivi e Fascisti a Livorno: Lotta Politica e Sociale, 1918–1922* (Milan 1991), 170–1.
7. For La Spezia, see Antonio Bianchi, *Lotte Sociali e Dittatura in Lunigiana Storica e Versilia, 1919–1930* (Rome 1981), 175–200; for Rome, see Francescangeli, *op. cit.*, 166; Marco Grispigni, 'Gli Arditi del Popolo a Roma. Due Aspetti Particolari della Loro Storia', *Storia Contemporanea*, Vol. XXVII (October 1986), 871; Marco Rossi, *Arditi, Non Gendarmi! Dall'Arditismo di Guerra agli Arditi del Popolo, 1917–1921* (Pisa 1997), 113 and 113–14, n. 190.
8. Renzo Del Carria, *Proletari Senza Rivoluzione: Storia delle Classe Subalterne in Italia, 1914–1922*, Vol. 3 (Rome 1977), 220–4; Abse, *op. cit.*, 169–70.
9. Del Carria, *op. cit.*, 220, n. 120; Grispigni, *op. cit.*, 872.
10. Carl Levy, 'Italian Anarchism, 1870–1926', in David Goodway, ed., *For Anarchism: History, Theory and Practice* (London 1989), 44–5.
11. See Carl Levy, *Gramsci and the Anarchists* (London 2000); Marco Revelli, 'Maurizio Garino: Storia di un Anarchico', in *Mezzosecolo*, Vol. 4 (1980/1982), 51–80, esp. 69–75; Giorgina Levi, *Il Lingotto: Storia di un Quartiere Operaio, Torino 1922–1973* (Turin 1975), and *Cultura e Associazione Operaie in Piemonte, 1890–1975* (Milan 1985); Celestino Cantieri, *Lotte Operaie Nella Barriera di Nizza: Storia del Circolo Carlo Marx* (Turin 1977); Daniele Jalla and Stefano Musso, eds, *Territorio Fabbrica e Cultura Operaia a Torino, 1900–1940* (Cuneo 1981).
12. Revelli, *op. cit.*, 73–5.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Maurizio Gribaudo, *Mondo Operaio e Mito Operaio: Spazi Percorsi Sociali a Torino nel Primo Novecento* (Turin 1987), 106; Revelli, *op. cit.*, 75.
15. For the active political and social participation of women in Turin workers' circles see the testimonies of Maria Francesca Accossato (Circolo Carl Marx), 27; Clementina Succio (Pozzo Strada), 113; Anna Fenoglio (Barriera di Milano), 132, in Bianca Guidetti Serra, *Compagne: Testimonianze di Partecipazione Politica Femminile*, Vol. 1 (Turin 1977).
16. Gribaudo, *op. cit.*, 106–12; Giuseppe Berta, 'The Interregnum: Turin, FIAT and Industrial Conflict Between War and Fascism', in Chris Wrigley, ed., *Challenges of Labour, Central and Western Europe, 1917–1920* (London 1993),

105–24 and also *Conflitto Industriale e Struttura d'Impresa alla FIAT, 1919–1979* (Bologna 1998), 58–60.

17. Berta, *Conflitto Industriale*, 48–55.

18. Levy, *Gramsci and the Anarchists* (London 2000), 34–45; Revelli, op. cit., 62–8.

19. Prefect of Turin telegram to Interior Minister, 15 December 1918, in Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Ministero dell'Interno, Direzione Generale di Pubblica Sicurezza (henceforth ACS, MI, DGPS), 1919, b. 85, Movimento Sovversiva-Torino; Giancarlo Carcano, *Torino AntiFascista: Vent'Anni di Opposizione, 1922–1943* (Turin 1993), 9; Levy, *Gramsci*, 36.

20. Revelli, op. cit., 73; for the involvement of women in the construction of barricades and in the defence of the *barriera*, see the testimonies of Angiolina Fenoglio, 8 and Anna Fenoglio, 128, in Guidetti Serra, op. cit.; Mario Montagnana, *Ricordi di un Operaio Torinese: Sotto la Guida di Gramsci*, Vol. 1 (Rome 1949), 75–6.

21. Levy, *Gramsci*, 138–140.

22. Prefect of Turin report to Interior Minister, 23 May 1919, n. 509, in ACS, MI, DGPS, 1920, b. 85, Guardie Rosse; Levy, *Gramsci*, 139.

23. See ACS, MI, DGPS, 1921, b. 77, Movimento Sovversiva-Guardie Rosse; and also Prefect of Turin report to Interior Minister, 22 June 1919, n. 645/8, in ACS, MI, DGPS, 1920, b. 85, Guardie Rosse.

24. Prefect of Turin telegram to Interior Minister, 14 August 1919, n. 1545, in ACS, MI, DGPS, 1920, b. 85, Guardie Rosse; Abse, op. cit., 35, n. 1: 'The term *sovversivo* was a generic title used by the police and rightwing press to indicate socialists, communists, anarchists and republicans. This definition was accepted in this period with a certain pride by these four parties . . . The title of *sovversivo* was more appropriate than that of "revolutionary" or even "of the left" because the republicans could not have been included in the latter two [categories], and because the Socialist Party included a well-defined reformist current.' See also Franco Andreucci, 'Subversiveness and Anti-Fascism in Italy', in Raphael Samuel, ed., *People's History and Socialist Theory* (London 1981), 199–204.

25. Prefect of Turin telegram to Interior Minister, 18 September 1919, n. 306, in ACS, MI, DGPS, 1920, b. 85, Guardie Rosse.

26. See Prefect of Turin reports to Interior Minister, 13 August 1920, n. 1561 and 14 August 1920, n. 1545, in ACS, MI, DGPS, 1920, b. 85, Guardie Rosse.

27. Donald H. Bell, *Sesto San Giovanni: Workers, Culture and Politics in an Italian Town, 1918–1922* (New Brunswick, NJ 1986), 120.

28. See the testimonies of Anna Fenoglio, 9; Clementina Succio, 113; Anna Fenoglio, 130; Maria Barbero, 214, in Guidetti Serra, op. cit.

29. See Archivio di Stato di Torino, Fondo Corte d'Assise, Cartello 20 and 67 (henceforth AST, FCd'A, Cart.); see the testimonies of Maria Grisini, 87–90; Anna Fenoglio, 127–30; Anna Anselmo, 69; Anna Bonivardi, 206, Maria Barbero, 214, in Guidetti Serra, op. cit.

30. See the report of the Prosecution Section at the Turin Court of Appeal, 30 March 1922, in AST, FCd'A, Cart. 20; Paolo Spriano, *L'Occupazione delle Fabbriche: Settembre 1920* (Turin 1964), 67–8; Gwyn A. Williams, *Proletarian Order: Antonio Gramsci, Factory Councils and the Origins of Communism in Italy, 1911–1921* (London 1975), 145–6; Montagnana, op. cit., 143.

31. For the Savigliano and Elli and Zerboni factories see AST, FCd'A, Cart.

66; for BIAK, Fotostampa, Masera and Garrone see AST, FCd'A, Cart. 45.

32. Prefect of Turin report to Interior Minister, 29 September 1920, n. 5373, in ACS, MI, DGPS, 1923, b. 67, Agitazione Metallurgiche-Torino, 1920. See also the report from the Turin Criminal Investigation Department to the Prosecutor General of Turin, 15 November 1921, n. 31355, in AST, FCd'A, Cart. 45.

33. Francescangeli, op. cit., 46–58; Rossi, op. cit., 79–80 and 88.

34. *Ordine Nuovo*, 7 July 1921, 1; Francescangeli, op. cit., 54–62; Rossi, op. cit. 90; Ivan Fuschini, *Gli Arditi del Popolo* (Ravenna 1994), 46–8.

35. For Viterbo and Sarzana, see Francescangeli, op. cit., 73–9; Rossi, op. cit., 112–13; Grispigni, op. cit., 867–8; for Sarzana, see Bianchi, op. cit., 175–200; Fuschini, op. cit., 57–64.

36. *Ordine Nuovo*, 14 July 1921, 5; *Umanità Nova*, 23 July 1921, 3.

37. *Umanità Nova*, 20 August 1921, 1.

38. For the Pact of Pacification see ACS, MI, Gabinetto Bonomi (1921–22), Ordine Pubblico, b.1, Fascisti e Socialisti-Pacificazione; Fuschini, op. cit., 80–4.

39. Interior Minister telegram to all the Prefects of the Kingdom, 12 August 1921, in ACS, MI, DGPS, 1922, b. 97, Arditi del Popolo-Affari-Generali.

40. *Ordine Nuovo*, 3 August 1921, 1.

41. For the official PCd'I communication denouncing the ADP see *II Comunista*, 7 August 1921; see also Rossi, op. cit., 140; Francescangeli, op. cit., 101–2.

42. See Spriano, *Storia del Partito*, Vol. 1, 149, n. 1; Francescangeli, op. cit., 104–5, n. 62; Rossi, op. cit., 81, n. 125.

43. See Rossi, op. cit., 79–88; Grispigni, op. cit., 854–61; Francescangeli, op. cit., 47–58. In July 1919, Secondari was held to have acted as a police agent in an easily foiled raid on the Fort at Pietralata aimed at provoking the insubordination of soldiers (including a battalion of *arditi*) into supplying Secondari and his group with arms.

44. For the Comintern's support for the popular-*arditismo* experience of the ADP and criticism of the sectarian attitude of the PCd'I executive see Francescangeli, op. cit., 102–9; Claudio Natoli, *La Terza Internazionale e il Fascismo, 1919–1923: Proletariato di Fabbrica e Reazione Industriale nel Primo Dopoguerra* (Rome 1982), 155–9; Spriano, *Storia del Partito*, 149–51; Fuschini, op. cit., 16.

45. *Ordine Nuovo*, 19 July 1921, 6; Francescangeli, op. cit. 92 and 104; Rossi, op. cit., 81, n. 125.

46. Francescangeli, op. cit., 84–5.

47. *Ordine Nuovo*, 12 July 1921, 1.

48. *Ordine Nuovo*, 15 July 1921, 1, now in Quintin Hoare, ed., *Antonio Gramsci: Selections from Political Writings, 1921–1926* (London 1978), 56–8.

49. *Ordine Nuovo*, 19 July 1921, 1 and 19 August 1921, 1; Hoare, op. cit., 61–2; Natoli, op. cit., 151–4.

50. *Ordine Nuovo*, 15 July 1921, 3.

51. Norcia report to Turin's Public Prosecutor, Crosta-Curti, 4 August 1921, n. 3008, in AST, FCd'A, Cart. 67; Taddei letter to Interior Minister, 19 July 1921, n. 3008, in ACS, MI, DGPS, 1922, b.98, Arditi del Popolo-Torino.

52. *Umanità Nova*, 22 July 1921, 2; *Ordine Nuovo*, 19 July 1921, 5; AST, FCd'A, Cart. 67. Leaflets containing this appeal manifesto by the Turin section of the ADP were found affixed on walls all over the city.

53. *Ordine Nuovo*, 28 June 1921, 3.

54. Francescangeli, op. cit., 158–9; see also Gianni Isola, ‘Socialismo e Combattentismo: La Lega Proletaria, 1918–1922’, in *Italia Contemporanea*, Vol. 41 (1980), 5–29.
55. See the testimonies of Giuseppe Cantone and Mario Ighina, in AST, FCd’A, Cart. 43.
56. See the testimonies of Giuseppe Bovio, Giovanni Carelli and Guido Versaldi, in AST, FCd’A, Cart. 43.
57. AST, FCd’A, Cart. 43.
58. *Ordine Nuovo*, 14 July 1921, 2.
59. *Ordine Nuovo*, 16 July 1921, 3.
60. *La Stampa*, 16 July 1921, 4; *Umanità Nova*, 22 July 1921, 2; Labbro’s report, 15 July 1921, in AST, FCd’A Cart. 67.
61. See Labbro’s report, 15 July 1921, op. cit.
62. Spriano, op. cit., 144; Fuschini, op. cit., 38.
63. Palazzolo, op. cit., 108–9; Rossi, op. cit., 144; Francescangeli, op. cit., 97 and 204–6.
64. See the Minister of Justice telegram to the Prosecutor General of Turin, 6 June 1922, n. 3303, in AST, Procura Generale di Torino Corte d’Appello, b. 2599.
65. See appendix 5 of Norcia report to Public Prosecutor, 4 August 1921 and Mosso’s testimony of 24 August 1921, in AST, FCd’A Cart. 67.
66. *Umanità Nova*, 24 July 1921, 3; Prefect of Turin telegram to Interior Minister, 1 August 1921, n. 2229, in ACS, MI, DGPS, 1922, b. 98, Arditi del Popolo-Torino.
67. Similar circulars were also issued in September, October and December 1921.
68. Francescangeli, op. cit., 110–39; Philip Morgan, *Italian Fascism, 1919–1945* (London 1995), 52.
69. Vice-Prefect of Turin telegram to Interior Minister, 23 August 1921, n. 3008, in ACS, MI, DGPS, 1922, b. 98, Arditi del Popolo-Torino.
70. For the national picture see Francescangeli, op. cit., 110–39.
71. D.M. Tuninetti, *Squadrisimo e Squadristi Piemontesi* (Rome 1942), 167; Emma Mana, ‘Gli Origini del Fascismo a Torino, 1919–1926’, in Umberto Levra and N. Tranfaglia, eds, *Torino fra Liberalismo e Fascismo* (Milan 1987), 263; see also *Ordine Nuovo*, 5 October 1921, 3.
72. *La Stampa*, 12 August 1921, 3.
73. *Ordine Nuovo*, 12 August 1921, 3; *La Stampa*, 12 August 1921, 3; Prefect of Turin telegram to Interior Minister, 12 August 1921, n. 2029 and n. 3008, in ACS, MI, DGPS, 1922, b. 98, Arditi del Popolo-Torino.
74. *Ordine Nuovo*, 17 October 1922, 5; see also *Umanità Nova*, 28 October 1922, 3.
75. See FCd’A, Cart. 67.
76. Giorgio Rochat, *Gli Arditi della Grande Guerra: Origini, Battaglie e Miti* (Milan 1981), 140–1.
77. Del Carria, op. cit., 213–60; Rossi, op. cit., 25–78; Francescangeli, op. cit., 11–45.
78. Del Carria, op. cit., 220, n. 120.
79. *Ordine Nuovo*, 27 September 1921, 3; *Umanità Nova*, 1 October 1921, 4.
80. AST, FCd’A, Cart. 43.
81. *Ordine Nuovo*, 11 July 1921, 3.

82. For Bendini, see ACS, MI, DGPS, Casellario Politico Centrale (henceforth CPC), b. 487, n. 30811; AST, FCd'A, Cart. 20 and Cart. 67; Franco Andreucci and T. Detti, eds, *II Movimento Operaio Italiano: Dizionario Biografico*, Vol. 1 (Rome 1975), 233–4.

83. For Mandelli, see ACS, MI, DGPS, CPC, b. 2976, n. 15721; AST, FCd'A, Cart. 67.

84. For Ricci, see ACS, MI, DGPS, CPC, b. 4302, n. 45830; AST, FCd'A, Cart. 67.

85. The names in the registers were written next to letters which the police were convinced related to an individual's experience of arms: F for *Fucile* (rifle); P for *Pugnale* (dagger); R for *Rivoltella* (pistol or gun).

86. See Ricci's testimonies of 22 and 28 August 1921, in AST, FCd'A, Cart. 67.

87. *Ordine Nuovo*, 16 August 1921, 3; AST, FCd'A, Cart. 67.

88. See AST, FCd'A, Cart. 67; see also the Prefect of Turin's report of 17 January 1922, n. 5219 and the Prefect of Ferrara's report of 12 April 1925, in ACS, MI, DGPS, CPC, b. 4690, n. 26609.

89. Rome chief of police letter to Interior Minister, 31 August 1922, n. 5607; see also the letter from a special agent in Boston to Ministero della Giustizia e degli Affari di Culto, 10 September 1922, in ACS, MI, DGPS, 1922, b. 97, Arditi del Popolo-Affari Generali.

90. See ACS, MI, DGPS, CPC, b. 5106, n. 002912; see also Interior Minister telegram to Prefect of Turin, 10 October 1921, n. 27287, and Prefect of Turin telegram to Interior Minister, 20 October 1921, n. 2850 in ACS, MI, DGPS, 1921, b. 115, Movimento Anarchico e Comunista-Torino.

91. See the files on Angelo and Riccardo Tirone, in ACS, MI, DGPS, CPC, b. 5106.

92. Francescangeli, *op. cit.*, 273–4.

93. Prefect of Turin telegram to Bonomi, 23 August 1921, n. 2452–3, in ACS, MI, Gabinetto Bonomi (1921–1922), Ordine Pubblico, b. 1, Arditi del Popolo.

94. *La Stampa*, 6 September 1921, 4; Rossi, *op. cit.*, 146, states that other police reports noted recurrent paramilitary exercises taking place on the extreme periphery of the city, with the participation of 100–150 Red Guards and auxiliary army officers.

95. Prefect of Turin report to Interior Minister, 16 November 1921, n. 2998, in ACS, MI, DGPS, b. 98, Arditi del Popolo-Torino: Circolo Comunista Barriera di Milano, in Corso Vercelli n. 58, 100 members; Circolo Comunista Regio Parco, in Via Delle Maddalene, n. 1, 40 members; Circolo Comunista Carlo Liebknecht, in Via Mantova, n. 59, 25 members; Circolo Comunista Fratellanza Internazionale, in Via Mongrando, n. 30, 40 members; Circolo Comunista di Borgo San Paolo and Pozzo Strada, in Via Virle, n. 9, 25 members; Casa del Popolo Villa Quenda (at Condove di Susa), 40 members.

96. Prefect of Turin telegram to Interior Minister, 1 September 1922, n. 2173, in ACS, MI, DGPS, 1922, b. 65, Partito Comunista e Movimento Anarchico-Torino; see also Palazzolo *op. cit.*, 140; Rossi, *op. cit.*, 147.

97. For Borgo Vittoria and Pozzo Strada, see *Ordine Nuovo*, 10 September 1922, 5 and 11 September 1922, 1; Prefect of Turin telegram to Interior Minister, 9 September 1922, n. 801, in ACS, MI, DGPS, 1922 b. 157, Fasci di Combattimento-Torino; *La Stampa*, 11 September 1922, 3.

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