Jump to content

Realismus moralis

E Vicipaedia
Ioannes McDowell, philosophus realismi moralis. Lutetiae, 2007.

Realismus moralis, etiam realismus ethicus et Platonismus moralis appellatus, est propositio quae affirmat sententias ethicas propositiones exprimere quae obiectivas mundi proprietates attingunt (quae sunt proprietates ab opinione subiectiva liberae), quarum nonnullae verae esse possunt ut has proprietates accurate referunt.

Quod vicissim significat realismum moralem esse non-nihilisticum genus cognitivismi ethici, ad ontologiam inclinans, contra omnia antirealismi moralis et scepticismi moralis genera, inter quae sunt subiectivismus ethicus (qui negat propositiones morales facta obiectiva attingere), theoria errorum (quae negat ullas propositiones morales veras esse); et non-cognitivismus (qui negat sententias morales propositiones exprimere). Intra realismum moralem, duae partes praecipuae sunt naturalismus ethicus et nonnaturalismus ethicus.

Multi philosophi postulant realismum moralem ex dogmate Platonis superesse.[1] Inter philosophos realismi moralis robusti sunt David Brink,[2] Ioannes McDowell, Petrus Railton,[3] Geoffrey Sayre-McCord,[4] Michael Smith, Terentius Cuneo,[5] Russ Shafer-Landau,[6] G. E. Moore,[7] Ioannes Finnis, Ricardus Boyd, Nicolas Sturgeon,[8] Thomas Nagel, et Derek Parfit. Normannus Geras arguit Carolum Marx realisticum moralem suasisse.[9] Variae adhibitiones philosophicas et utiles realismi moralis investigatae sunt.[10]

Nexus interni

Notae

[recensere | fontem recensere]
  1. ↑ Rist 2012.
  2. ↑ Brink 1989.
  3. ↑ Railton 1986.
  4. ↑ Sayre-McCord 2005.
  5. ↑ Cuneo 2007.
  6. ↑ Shafer-Landau 2003.
  7. ↑ Moore 1903.
  8. ↑ Sturgeon 1985.
  9. ↑ Geras 1985).
  10. ↑ Robinson 2002.

Bibliographia

[recensere | fontem recensere]
  • Brink, David O. 1989. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Novi Eboraci: Cambridge University Press.
  • Cuneo, Terence. 2007. The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism. Oxoniae Oxford University Press.
  • Geras, Norman. 1985. The Controversy about Marx and Justice. New Left Review 150: 47–85.
  • Hume, David. 1739, 1888. Treatise Concerning Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge. Oxoniae: Oxford University Press.
  • Kim, Shin. 2006. Moral Realism. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Fieser & Dowden.
  • Kramer, Matthew H. Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine. New Directions in Ethics.
  • Moore, G. E. 1903. Principia Ethica. Cantabrigiae: Cambridge University Press.
  • Railton, Peter. 1986. Moral Realism. Philosophical Review 95: 163–207.
  • Rist, John M. 2002. Plato's Moral Realism: The Discovery of the Presuppositions of Ethics.
  • Robinson, Daniel N. 2002. Praise and Blame: Moral Realism and Its Applications. New Forum Books.
  • Sayre-McCord, Geoff. 2005. Moral Realism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed hiemalis. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. Nexus.
  • Shafer-Landau, Russ. 2003. Moral realism: a defence. Oxoniae: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0199259755.
  • Sturgeon, Nicholas. 1985. Moral Explanations. Morality, Reason, and Truth, ed. David Copp et David Zimmerman, 49–78. Totowa Novae Caesareae: Rowman and Allanheld.

Nexus externi

[recensere | fontem recensere]
Receptum de "https://la.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Realismus_moralis&oldid=3780714"