The private Ethereum wallet with built-in Tor
- Anonymous requests using Tor (the dark net)
- Built for strong zero-cost privacy and security
- Available as an extension and on a website
- Won EthBrno 2022 hackathon ( design award)
- Made by two French cypherpunks
- Almost the same features as MetaMask
- Add our proxy to your networks on your current wallet
Network name: Brume Proxy
New RPC URL: https://proxy.haz.workers.dev
Chain ID: 1
Currency Symbol: ETH
- Go on the logs website https://logs.brume.money/
You can use Brume Wallet as an extension and on a website
- Click here https://wallet.brume.money
- Download and extract the
chrome.zip
file on the release page - Open Chrome, open settings
- Left panel, bottom, click
Extensions
- Top bar, right, enable
Developer mode
- Click
Load unpacked
- Select the folder where
chrome.zip
was extracted
- Download and extract the
firefox.zip
file on the release page - Open Firefox, navigate to
about:debugging
- Left panel, click
This Firefox
Temporary Extensions
, clickLoad Temporary Add-on
- Navigate to the Brume Wallet folder
- Open the folder where
firefox.zip
was extracted - Select the
manifest.json
file
- Get a mac
- Install Xcode
- Enable
Developer mode
in Safari - Build the extension
- Run
npm run xcode
- Enter
y
to everything and/or ignore warnings
Xcode will start
- Top bar, center, left, select
brume-wallet (macOS)
- Top bar, left, click the play button to build the extension
- Open Safari
- Reach macOS toolbar, click
Development
, clickAllow unsigned extensions
at the very bottom - Reach macOS toolbar, click
Safari
, clickSettings
- Top bar, click
Extensions
, findBrume Wallet
, enable it
-
Install node v20.3.1 (npm v9.6.7)
-
Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/brumewallet/wallet && cd wallet
- Build the website and extension
npm install && npm run build && npm run zip
- Website and extension files are in the
dist
folder
GitHub Actions automatically rebuilds each release and checks that the committed files are the same as the built ones
https://github.com/brumewallet/wallet/actions/workflows/release.yml
You can check the comparison yourself by running the following
# Unzip committed zip files into ./unzipped
mkdir ./unzipped
unzip ./dist/chrome.zip -d ./unzipped/chrome
unzip ./dist/firefox.zip -d ./unzipped/firefox
unzip ./dist/safari.zip -d ./unzipped/safari
unzip ./dist/website.zip -d ./unzipped/website
# Build folders into ./dist
npm ci && npm run build
# Compare unzipped committed zip files and built folders
diff -r ./unzipped/chrome ./dist/chrome
diff -r ./unzipped/firefox ./dist/firefox
diff -r ./unzipped/safari ./dist/safari
diff -r ./unzipped/website ./dist/website
# Clean ./unzipped
rm -rf ./unzipped
# Restore built zip files
git restore ./dist/chrome.zip
git restore ./dist/firefox.zip
git restore ./dist/safari.zip
git restore ./dist/website.zip
# Compare other files
[[ -z $(git status --porcelain) ]]
echo $?
Your storage is hashed and encrypted using strong cryptography algorithms and parameters
- Cryptography algorithms are seeded by PBKDF2 with 1M iterations from your password
- All storage keys are hashed using HMAC-SHA256, it is impossible to retrieve the original key
- All storage values are encrypted using AES-256-GCM, each with a different ciphertext/IV
Some critical entities like private keys and seed phrases are stored in WebAuthn and require authentication (FaceID/TouchID)
- They are encrypted before being stored in WebAuthn storage
- Their reference ID and encryption IV are stored in encrypted storage (the one we talked above)
Nobody can access your private keys or seed phrases without your password authentication (FaceID/TouchID)
This mitigates supply-chain attacks and phishing attacks, and prevents phone-left-on-the-table attacks
We try our best to avoid supply-chain attacks from external packages
- We use browser APIs when available
- All WebAssembly packages are reproducible and try to use audited dependencies
- All JavaScript cryptography packages are from Paul Miller and are audited
- We count each individual maintainer in our dependency graph as a risk
- We use runtime protection techniques such as object-capability model
- (Soon) We upload each release on IPFS and publish the hash on Ethereum
We use the Tor and the TLS protocols in a way that's mostly safe, even though they are not fully implemented nor audited
Keep in mind that the zero risk doesn't exist, and a highly motivated attacker could deanonymize you by doing the following steps (very unlikely to happen):
- Owning the entry node, and logging all IP addresses using Brume Wallet, something he could know by:
- Deep packet inspection, since our Tor/TLS packets may not be like those from regular Tor/TLS users
- Behaviour analysis, since our Tor/TLS may not behave the same way as regular Tor/TLS implementations
- Owning the JSON-RPC server, and logging all wallet addresses that used Tor
(Or owning the exit node, since we don't currently check TLS certificates from the JSON-RPC server, the exit node could send your packets to its own JSON-RPC server (Fixed soon))
- Correlating IP addresses logs with wallet addresses logs, and if both sides are small enough, linking a particular IP address to a particular wallet address