Bitcoin-Standup is a open source project and a suite of tools that helps users to install a Bitcoin-Core full-node on a fresh computer or VPS and to add important privacy tools like onion services and eventually optional Bitcoin-related tools like Electrum Personal Server, C-Lightning, Esplora, BTCPay Server, etc., as well as emerging technologies like Bitcoin-based Decentralized Identifiers.

This tool will also harden and secure your OS to current best practices, as well as adding sufficient system tools to support basic Bitcoin development. After setup, Bitcoin-Standup will present a QR code and/or special URI that can be used to securely link your full-node to other devices, such as your mobile phone (for instance using Fully Noded on iOS) or a remote desktop.

Once installed and fully synced, a Bitcoin-Standup full node can also be used with developer education courses like Learning Bitcoin from the Command Line.

• GitHub Repository: https://github.com/BlockchainCommons/Bitcoin-Standup

• Status
  • Disclaimer
• Background
• Financial Support
• Install
  • macOS Install
  • Linode and Debian Linux Install
• API
  • Quick Connect URL using btcstandup
• Security
  • Tor V3 Authentication using StandUp and FullyNoded
• Maintainers
• Contributing
• License

This project is an early Work-In-Progress, so that we can prototype, discover additional requirements, and get feedback from the broader Bitcoin-Core Developer Community. It has not yet been peer-reviewed or audited. It is not yet ready for production uses. Use at your own risk.

The information and files included in this repository are intended to inform a set of best practices. It may not address risks specific to your situation, and if it does not, you should modify appropriately. While this information may inform best practices, there is no guarantee that following this advice will sufficiently ensure the security of your digital assets. In addition, this information is only a window on best practices at a specific moment in time. Be aware that the Bitcoin and blockchain ecosystems may have evolved, and the risk assessments of specific solutions may have changed since the publication of this document. In other words: be cautious, be careful, and be aware of the current Bitcoin and blockchain landscape before you use this information.

The most important reason to operate a Bitcoin full node is validation. With a full node, Bitcoin users can check whether transactions are valid according to all of Bitcoin's rules. Users can verify that any bitcoins they receive are legitimately mined, correctly signed, and more. This is what makes Bitcoin a trustless solution.

(TODO: Rewrite this paragraph, add other basic reasons why having your own full node rather than relying on others is powerful.)

Bitcoin-Standup is a project of Blockchain Commons, LLC a “not-for-profit” benefit corporation founded with the goal of supporting blockchain infrastructure and the broader security industry through cryptographic research, cryptographic & privacy protocol implementations, architecture & code reviews, industry standards, and documentation.

To financially support further development of Bitcoin-Standup, please consider becoming Patron of Blockchain Commons by contributing Bitcoin at our BTCPay Server or through ongoing fiat patronage by becoming a Github Sponsor or by clicking on the ❤️ above.

If you are a software developer you can join us by offering issues and pull requests in our Bitcoin-Standup GitHub or with other projects located in the Blockchain Commons Community GitHub.

NOTE: At this time Bitcoin-Standup only supports installation on macOS Mojave or Catalina. Future versions will include installation on Debian Linux, Linode, Digital Ocean, etc.

The application Bitcoin Standup.app currently installs, configures, and launches tor stable v0.4.1.6 and bitcoin-qt v0.19.0. The app is under development and as it stands will install and configure a Bitcoin Core full node, Tor as a service, a Tor V3 hidden service controlling each rpcport with native client cookie authentication. The app allows the user to set custom settings including txindex, prune, walletdisabled, testnet, mainnet, datadir which should not interfere with any exisiting bitcoin.conf settings. It offeres a simple go private option which closes off your node to the clearnet only accepting connections over Tor. The user may refresh their hidden service at the push of a button.

The default bitcoin.conf is:

testnet=1
walletdisabled=0
rpcuser=arandomstring
rpcpassword=astrongrandompassword
server=1
prune=0
txindex=1
rpcallowip=127.0.0.1
bindaddress=127.0.0.1
proxy=127.0.0.1:9050
listen=1
debug=tor
[main]
rpcport=8332
[test]
rpcport=18332
[regtest]
rpcport=18443

If there is an exisiting bitcoin.conf in your datadir then Bitcoin Standup.app will simply check for and add rpccredentials if they are missing.

Once the app has completely installed and launched Bitcoin, it will present a Quick Connect QR code which can be used to securely link your full node remotely over Tor to other devices, such as the iOS application Fully Noded.

The app currently relies on initial installation of Strap.sh to install basic development tools before installing tor and bitcoin-qt. This tool also does some basic hardening of your Macintosh including turning on FileVault (the full-disk encryption services offered in macOS), turning on your Mac firewall, and turning off Java. Future versions of Bitcoin Standup will integrate Strap.sh features directly to offer additional macOS hardening configuration options.

• macOS v10.15 Catalina (may work on earlier versions, not tested yet)
• ~300 GB of free space if you want to have a full node with txindex. ~20 GB for a testnet3 full node. Both can be substantially less if the full-node is pruned.
• Install Strap by @MikeMcQuaid

Start by installing Strap, a script hosted on Github for bootstrapping a minimal development environment, intended for a new Mac or a fresh install of macOS. Bitcoin-Standup currently relies on Strap to bootstrap a macOS system before installing Bitcoin and tools.

WARNING: Be careful about using GitHub bash scripts on existing systems as they can compromise your computer. Use these scripts on new systems only. We also suggest you view the script in advance, and only execute it if you trust the source. @MikeMcQuaid is the open source Homebrew Project's lead maintainer and also a senior member of the GitHub staff.

1. Run the Strap script on your Mac. After a fresh macOS install either:
   • Execute the Strap script directly from your Mac's CLI (command line interface)
     1. Execute these commands to install Strap via the Terminal app's command line interface (to start Terminal type command space "terminal"):

     curl -L https://raw.githubusercontent.com/MikeMcQuaid/strap/master/bin/strap.sh > ~/Downloads/strap.sh
     bash ~/Downloads/strap.sh

   • OR Clone the Strap repo to your Mac and then execute the script.
     1. Execute these commands to clone Strap's GitHub repository via the Terminal app's command line interface (to start Terminal type command space "terminal"):

     git clone https://github.com/MikeMcQuaid/strap
     cd strap
     bash bin/strap.sh
     # or `bash bin/strap.sh --debug` for more debugging output

   • OR Use the Strap heroku web app. This web application will request a temporary Github secure access token for your use, allowing you use the strap.sh script to automatically install and download from your own personal GitHub repository .dotfiles and install additional apps from a .Brewfile. This token is solely used to add the GitHub access token to your strap.sh download and is not otherwise used by this web application or stored anywhere.
     1. Open https://macos-strap.herokuapp.com/ in your web browser. Click on the strap.sh button.
     2. Login to your GitHub account.
     3. Download strap.sh to your ~/Downloads/ folder
     4. Execute this command via the Terminal app's command line interface (to start Terminal type command space "terminal"):

     bash ~/Downloads/strap.sh

     5. After strap.sh has finished processing, delete the customized strap.sh (it has a GitHub acces token in it) by executing:

     rm ~/Downloads/strap.sh

2. After running the Strap script, download and run the Bitcoin Standup.app

(COMING SOON - for now use the Build From Source instructions.

Instead of downloading binaries through Strap, you can build Bitcoin-Standup by hand using Apple's Xcode.

• Install Xcode
• You will need a free Apple developer account; create one here
• In XCode, click "XCode" -> "preferences" -> "Accounts" -> add your github account
• On the github repo click "Clone and Download" > "Open in XCode"; when XCode launches, just press the "play" button in the top left

This is currently a work in progress (there is no Quick Connect URI at the end of install yet), but these instructions and scripts from the Learning Bitcoin from the Command Line course will install Bitcoin-Core on a VPS or on Debian Linux.

• Section One: Setting Up a Bitcoin Core VPS by Hand
• Section Two: Setting Up a Bitcoin Core VPS with StackScript

This section defines the spec for a deep link URI and a scannable QR Code. These ideally would have the same format among a number of different software projects and hardware products to ensure universal compatibility.

The iOS application Fully Noded is a proof of concept of such a light client. The server side node manufacturers/providers supporting this protocol are BTCPayServer, Nodl, MyNode and RaspiBlitz.

This example URL follows the current format:

btcstandup://<your rpcuser>:<your rpcpassword>@<your tor hostname>.onion:<your hidden service port>/?label=<optional node label>

Example with label :

btcstandup://rpcuser:[email protected]:8332/?label=Your Nodes Name

Example without label :

btcstandup://rpcuser:[email protected]:8332/?

This allows node hardware manufacturers the option of hard coding a label for the node. Ideally, there would be a two-factor authentication where user inputs a V2 or V3 auth cookie into the client app manually, so that if the URL leaks somehow it would not give an attacker access to the node.

We'd love to have more discussion with other developers about any additional requirements for this initial connection between a full node and a remote device. This could include a possible TOFU two-round auth so that the node can know that the specific remote device is the same one that requested it originally.

Don’t configure a VPS with the Bitcoin wallet feature turned on with any significant real funds; see http://blog.thestateofme.com/2012/03/03/lessons-to-be-learned-from-the-linode-bitcoin-incident/ . A higher level of safety is required for significant funds. A VPS-based install can be a useful as a wallet-less full node connected remotely to a more secure wallet that signs the keys elsewhere.

Think of your StandUp node as a server, and FullyNoded or your iPhone as a client. Tor V3 hidden services have new and improved built in functionality for authenticating client connections to servers, whereby the client stores a private key that is kept secret to everyone only ever existing on the client and the public key is stored in a special directory called authorized_clients on your StandUp server which (in StandUp) lives in your HiddenServiceDir > /usr/local/var/lib/tor/standup/authorized_clients.

The QuickConnect QR code that StandUp produces for you contains very sensitive information. If you had a malicious maid in your house or a hacker was remotely recording your computer screen then they would have access to your node and your bitcoin as soon as they got an image of the QuickConnect QR code. If the authorized_clients directory is empty then anyone with the QR code has full access to your node.

Prevent the existence of any single point of failure or "honey pot" (e.g. the QR code).

Two factor authentication whereby a trusted separate isolated device (e.g. the client) produces the private key and public key, which requires the owner of the server to physically add in the public key to the authorized_clients directory. In this way there is no "honey pot" which contains all the information necessary to obtain access to your node. Of course if someone has access to your node they can produce their own key pair and add the public key into the hidden service but then again they already have access to your node and hidden service so this attack vector is somewhat irrelevant. What we are trying to accomplish is a method to guarantee that your device (e.g. the client) is the only device in the world that is able to remotely access your node. It is highly recommended as an additional layer of security to also encrypt your nodes wallet so that even if someone somehow stole your phone they would still need to brute force your wallet.dat encryption.

For a detailed guide see this link, for a simple video tutorial using StandUp and FullyNoded see this link.

For now the only mobile app which deals with Bitcoin Core RPC communications that we know of is FullyNoded. Assume you have downloaded FullyNoded, have a StandUp node running and want to add native Tor authentication. All you would need to do is open FullyNoded > "Settings" > "Node Manager" > select your node > "Next" > "Next" > "generate key pair" and most importantly tap the blue "Save" or "Update" button at the bottom to save the private key!

If you do not press "Save" or "Update" you will lose the key pair and need to start again. This will produce a x25519 private and public key pair.

In FullyNoded the private key is stored encrypted locally on the device to AES256CBC standards, the user can not access it and the encryption key for the encrypted private key is stored on your keychain. Whenever you connect to your node the key is decrypted and stored in your temporary torrc file which is integrated into FullyNoded's Tor thread. In FullyNoded each time you connect to a node the credentials refresh so there is nothing being stored in clear text on your device persistently.

Tap the green text which would look like descriptor:x25519:JNEF892349FH24HF872H4FU2H387H3R982NFN238HF928, that is your public key which needs to be passed to your StandUp node.

This public key is not sensitive as it only works in conjunction with the private key. FullyNoded will display the public key in QR code format so you can easily scan it with your laptop, you can also send it via airdrop or email just by tapping the text or QR image.

In this way you can also share access to your node with trusted family and friends. Tor V3 hidden services support up to ~330 different public keys stored in the authorized_clients directory (link to source). If you were doing this manually, you would go on your laptop which has StandUp installed and find your HiddenServiceDir which is /usr/local/var/lib/tor/standup/authorized_clients. You would then open the authorized_clients directory and add a file which contains only the public key exactly as FullyNoded exports it. The filename must have a .auth extension.

But of course you are using StandUp so the process is as easy as a click. In StandUp go to "Settings" and paste in the public key just as FullyNoded exported it, then tap "Add".

StandUp then simply creates a random filename with a .auth extension, writes the public key to it, and saves it to /usr/local/var/lib/tor/standup/authorized_clients/.

Once again you can add around 330 of these authorized_clients in this manner. You can also delete them at will, and refresh them. FullyNoded is capable of creating an ~infinite number of the key pairs on demand. If you would like to create your own you can easily do so with a simple python script.

None yet.

To report security issues send an email to [email protected] (not for support).

The following keys may be used to communicate sensitive information to developers:

You can import a key by running the following command with that individual’s fingerprint: gpg --recv-keys "<fingerprint>" Ensure that you put quotes around fingerprints that contain spaces.

• Christopher Allen @ChristopherA <[email protected]> (lead)
• Peter Denton @Fonta1n3

PRs are accepted. See CONTRIBUTING.md

MIT © 2019 Blockchain Commons, LLC

@ChristopherA