JJWT aims to be the easiest to use and understand library for creating and verifying JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) and JSON Web Keys (JWKs) on the JVM and Android.
JJWT is a pure Java implementation based exclusively on the JOSE Working Group RFC specifications:
It was created by Les Hazlewood and is supported and maintained by a community of contributors.
JJWT is open source under the terms of the Apache 2.0 License.
- Features
- Community
- What is a JSON Web Token?
- Installation
- Quickstart
- Creating a JWT
- Reading a JWT
- Signed JWTs
- Encrypted JWTs
- JSON Web Keys (JWKs)
- JWK Sets
- Compression
- JSON Support
- Base64 Support
- Examples
- JWT Signed with HMAC
- JWT Signed with RSA
- JWT Signed with ECDSA
- JWT Signed with EdDSA
- JWT Encrypted Directly with a SecretKey
- JWT Encrypted with RSA
- JWT Encrypted with AES Key Wrap
- JWT Encrypted with ECDH-ES
- JWT Encrypted with a Password
- SecretKey JWK
- RSA Public JWK
- RSA Private JWK
- Elliptic Curve Public JWK
- Elliptic Curve Private JWK
- Edwards Elliptic Curve Public JWK
- Edwards Elliptic Curve Private JWK
- Learn More
- Author
- License
-
Fully functional on all Java 7 JDKs and Android
-
Automatic security best practices and assertions
-
Easy to learn and read API
-
Convenient and readable fluent interfaces, great for IDE auto-completion to write code quickly
-
Fully RFC specification compliant on all implemented functionality, tested against RFC-specified test vectors
-
Stable implementation with almost 1,700 tests and enforced 100% test code coverage. Every single method, statement and conditional branch variant in the entire codebase is tested and required to pass on every build.
-
Creating, parsing and verifying digitally signed compact JWTs (aka JWSs) with all standard JWS algorithms:
Identifier Signature Algorithm HS256
HMAC using SHA-256
HS384
HMAC using SHA-384
HS512
HMAC using SHA-512
ES256
ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256
ES384
ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384
ES512
ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512
RS256
RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA-256
RS384
RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA-384
RS512
RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA-512
PS256
RSASSA-PSS using SHA-256 and MGF1 with SHA-2561
PS384
RSASSA-PSS using SHA-384 and MGF1 with SHA-3841
PS512
RSASSA-PSS using SHA-512 and MGF1 with SHA-5121
EdDSA
Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm2
1. Requires Java 11 or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath.
2. Requires Java 15 or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath.
-
Creating, parsing and decrypting encrypted compact JWTs (aka JWEs) with all standard JWE encryption algorithms:
Identifier Encryption Algorithm A128CBC‑HS256
AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 authenticated encryption algorithm
A192CBC-HS384
AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 authenticated encryption algorithm
A256CBC-HS512
AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 authenticated encryption algorithm
A128GCM
AES GCM using 128-bit key1
A192GCM
AES GCM using 192-bit key1
A256GCM
AES GCM using 256-bit key1
1. Requires Java 8 or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath.
-
All Key Management Algorithms for obtaining JWE encryption and decryption keys:
Identifier Key Management Algorithm RSA1_5
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5
RSA-OAEP
RSAES OAEP using default parameters
RSA-OAEP-256
RSAES OAEP using SHA-256 and MGF1 with SHA-256
A128KW
AES Key Wrap with default initial value using 128-bit key
A192KW
AES Key Wrap with default initial value using 192-bit key
A256KW
AES Key Wrap with default initial value using 256-bit key
dir
Direct use of a shared symmetric key as the CEK
ECDH-ES
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static key agreement using Concat KDF
ECDH-ES A128KW
ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with "A128KW"
ECDH-ES A192KW
ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with "A192KW"
ECDH-ES A256KW
ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with "A256KW"
A128GCMKW
Key wrapping with AES GCM using 128-bit key1
A192GCMKW
Key wrapping with AES GCM using 192-bit key1
A256GCMKW
Key wrapping with AES GCM using 256-bit key1
PBES2-HS256 A128KW
PBES2 with HMAC SHA-256 and "A128KW" wrapping1
PBES2-HS384 A192KW
PBES2 with HMAC SHA-384 and "A192KW" wrapping1
PBES2‑HS512 A256KW
PBES2 with HMAC SHA-512 and "A256KW" wrapping1
1. Requires Java 8 or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath.
-
Creating, parsing and verifying JSON Web Keys (JWKs) in all standard JWA key formats using native Java
Key
types:JWK Key Format Java Key
TypeJJWT Jwk
TypeSymmetric Key
SecretKey
SecretJwk
Elliptic Curve Public Key
ECPublicKey
EcPublicJwk
Elliptic Curve Private Key
ECPrivateKey
EcPrivateJwk
RSA Public Key
RSAPublicKey
RsaPublicJwk
RSA Private Key
RSAPrivateKey
RsaPrivateJwk
XDH Private Key
XECPublicKey
1OctetPublicJwk
XDH Private Key
XECPrivateKey
1OctetPrivateJwk
EdDSA Public Key
EdECPublicKey
2OctetPublicJwk
EdDSA Private Key
EdECPublicKey
2OctetPrivateJwk
1. Requires Java 15 or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath.
2. Requires Java 15 or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath.
-
Convenience enhancements beyond the specification such as
-
Payload compression for any large JWT, not just JWEs
-
Claims assertions (requiring specific values)
-
Claim POJO marshaling and unmarshalling when using a compatible JSON parser (e.g. Jackson)
-
Secure Key generation based on desired JWA algorithms
-
and more…
-
-
Non-compact serialization and parsing.
This feature may be implemented in a future release. Community contributions are welcome!
If you have trouble using JJWT, please first read the documentation on this page before asking questions. We try very hard to ensure JJWT’s documentation is robust, categorized with a table of contents, and up to date for each release.
If the documentation or the API JavaDoc isn’t sufficient, and you either have usability questions or are confused about something, please ask your question here. However:
Please do not create a GitHub issue to ask a question.
We use GitHub Issues to track actionable work that requires changes to JJWT’s design and/or codebase. If you have a usability question, instead please ask your question here, and we can convert that to an issue if necessary.
If a GitHub Issue is created that does not represent actionable work for JJWT’s codebase, it will be promptly closed.
If you do not have a usability question and believe you have a legitimate bug or feature request, please discuss it here FIRST. Please do a quick search first to see if an existing discussion related to yours exist already and join that existing discussion if necesary.
If you feel like you’d like to help fix a bug or implement the new feature yourself, please read the Contributing section next before starting any work.
Simple Pull Requests that fix anything other than JJWT core code (documentation, JavaDoc, typos, test cases, etc) are always appreciated and have a high likelihood of being merged quickly. Please send them!
However, if you want or feel the need to change JJWT’s functionality or core code, please do not issue a pull request without starting a new JJWT discussion and discussing your desired changes first, before you start working on it.
It would be a shame to reject your earnest and genuinely-appreciated pull request if it might not align with the project’s goals, design expectations or planned functionality. We’ve sadly had to reject large PRs in the past because they were out of sync with project or design expectations - all because the PR author didn’t first check in with the team first before working on a solution.
So, please create a new JJWT discussion first to discuss, and then we can see easily convert the discussion to an issue and then see if (or how) a PR is warranted. Thank you!
If you would like to help, but don’t know where to start, please visit the Help Wanted Issues page and pick any of the ones there, and we’ll be happy to discuss and answer questions in the issue comments.
If any of those don’t appeal to you, no worries! Any help you would like to offer would be appreciated based on the above caveats concerning contributing pull requests. Feel free to discuss or ask questions first if you’re not sure. :)
JSON Web Token (JWT) is a general-purpose text-based messaging format for transmitting information in a compact and secure way. Contrary to popular belief, JWT is not just useful for sending and receiving identity tokens on the web - even if that is the most common use case. JWTs can be used as messages for any type of data.
A JWT in its simplest form contains two parts:
-
The primary data within the JWT, called the
payload
, and -
A JSON
Object
with name/value pairs that represent metadata about thepayload
and the message itself, called theheader
.
A JWT payload
can be absolutely anything at all - anything that can be represented as a byte array, such as Strings,
images, documents, etc.
But because a JWT header
is a JSON Object
, it would make sense that a JWT payload
could also be a JSON
Object
as well. In many cases, developers like the payload
to be JSON that
represents data about a user or computer or similar identity concept. When used this way, the payload
is called a
JSON Claims
object, and each name/value pair within that object is called a claim
- each piece of information
within 'claims' something about an identity.
And while it is useful to 'claim' something about an identity, really anyone can do that. What’s important is that you trust the claims by verifying they come from a person or computer you trust.
A nice feature of JWTs is that they can be secured in various ways. A JWT can be cryptographically signed (making it what we call a JWS) or encrypted (making it a JWE). This adds a powerful layer of verifiability to the JWT - a JWS or JWE recipient can have a high degree of confidence it comes from someone they trust by verifying a signature or decrypting it. It is this feature of verifiability that makes JWT a good choice for sending and receiving secure information, like identity claims.
Finally, JSON with whitespace for human readability is nice, but it doesn’t make for a very efficient message format. Therefore, JWTs can be compacted (and even compressed) to a minimal representation - basically Base64URL-encoded strings - so they can be transmitted around the web more efficiently, such as in HTTP headers or URLs.
Once you have a payload
and header
, how are they compacted for web transmission, and what does the final JWT
actually look like? Let’s walk through a simplified version of the process with some pseudocode:
-
Assume we have a JWT with a JSON
header
and a simple text message payload:header
{ "alg": "none" }
payload
The true sign of intelligence is not knowledge but imagination.
-
Remove all unnecessary whitespace in the JSON:
String header = '{"alg":"none"}' String payload = 'The true sign of intelligence is not knowledge but imagination.'
-
Get the UTF-8 bytes and Base64URL-encode each:
String encodedHeader = base64URLEncode( header.getBytes("UTF-8") ) String encodedPayload = base64URLEncode( payload.getBytes("UTF-8") )
-
Join the encoded header and claims with period ('.') characters:
String compact = encodedHeader '.' encodedPayload '.'
The final concatenated compact
JWT String looks like this:
eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.VGhlIHRydWUgc2lnbiBvZiBpbnRlbGxpZ2VuY2UgaXMgbm90IGtub3dsZWRnZSBidXQgaW1hZ2luYXRpb24u.
This is called an 'unprotected' JWT because no security was involved - no digital signatures or encryption to 'protect' the JWT to ensure it cannot be changed by 3rd parties.
If we wanted to digitally sign the compact form so that we could at least guarantee that no-one changes the data without us detecting it, we’d have to perform a few more steps, shown next.
Instead of a plain text payload, the next example will use probably the most common type of payload - a JSON claims
Object
containing information about a particular identity. We’ll also digitally sign the JWT to ensure it
cannot be changed by a 3rd party without us knowing.
-
Assume we have a JSON
header
and a claimspayload
:header
{ "alg": "HS256" }
payload
{ "sub": "Joe" }
In this case, the
header
indicates that theHS256
(HMAC using SHA-256) algorithm will be used to cryptographically sign the JWT. Also, thepayload
JSON object has a single claim,sub
with valueJoe
.There are a number of standard claims, called Registered Claims, in the specification and
sub
(for 'Subject') is one of them. -
Remove all unnecessary whitespace in both JSON objects:
String header = '{"alg":"HS256"}' String claims = '{"sub":"Joe"}'
-
Get their UTF-8 bytes and Base64URL-encode each:
String encodedHeader = base64URLEncode( header.getBytes("UTF-8") ) String encodedClaims = base64URLEncode( claims.getBytes("UTF-8") )
-
Concatenate the encoded header and claims with a period character '.' delimiter:
String concatenated = encodedHeader '.' encodedClaims
-
Use a sufficiently-strong cryptographic secret or private key, along with a signing algorithm of your choice (we’ll use HMAC-SHA-256 here), and sign the concatenated string:
SecretKey key = getMySecretKey() byte[] signature = hmacSha256( concatenated, key )
-
Because signatures are always byte arrays, Base64URL-encode the signature and join it to the
concatenated
string with a period character '.' delimiter:String compact = concatenated '.' base64URLEncode( signature )
And there you have it, the final compact
String looks like this:
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJKb2UifQ.1KP0SsvENi7Uz1oQc07aXTL7kpQG5jBNIybqr60AlD4
This is called a 'JWS' - short for signed JWT.
Of course, no one would want to do this manually in code, and worse, if you get anything wrong, you could introduce serious security problems and weaknesses. As a result, JJWT was created to handle all of this for you: JJWT completely automates both the creation of JWSs and the parsing and verification of JWSs for you.
So far we have seen an unprotected JWT and a cryptographically signed JWT (called a 'JWS'). One of the things that is inherent to both of these two is that all the information within them can be seen by anyone - all the data in both the header and the payload is publicly visible. JWS just ensures the data hasn’t been changed by anyone - it doesn’t prevent anyone from seeing it. Many times, this is just fine because the data within them is not sensitive information.
But what if you needed to represent information in a JWT that is considered sensitive information - maybe someone’s postal address or social security number or bank account number?
In these cases, we’d want a fully-encrypted JWT, called a 'JWE' for short. A JWE uses cryptography to ensure that the payload remains fully encrypted and authenticated so unauthorized parties cannot see data within, nor change the data without being detected. Specifically, the JWE specification requires that Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data algorithms are used to fully encrypt and protect data.
A full overview of AEAD algorithms are out of scope for this documentation, but here’s an example of a final compact JWE that utilizes these algorithms (line breaks are for readability only):
eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0. 6KB707dM9YTIgHtLvtgWQ8mKwboJW3of9locizkDTHzBC2IlrT1oOQ. AxY8DCtDaGlsbGljb3RoZQ. KDlTtXchhZTGufMYmOYGS4HffxPSUrfmqCHXaI9wOGY. U0m_YmjN04DJvceFICbCVQ
Next we’ll cover how to install JJWT in your project, and then we’ll see how to use JJWT’s nice fluent API instead of risky string manipulation to quickly and safely build JWTs, JWSs, and JWEs.
Use your favorite Maven-compatible build tool to pull the dependencies from Maven Central.
The dependencies could differ slightly if you are working with a JDK project or an Android project.
If you’re building a (non-Android) JDK project, you will want to define the following dependencies:
<dependency>
<groupId>io.jsonwebtoken</groupId>
<artifactId>jjwt-api</artifactId>
<version>0.12.5</version>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>io.jsonwebtoken</groupId>
<artifactId>jjwt-impl</artifactId>
<version>0.12.5</version>
<scope>runtime</scope>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>io.jsonwebtoken</groupId>
<artifactId>jjwt-jackson</artifactId> <!-- or jjwt-gson if Gson is preferred -->
<version>0.12.5</version>
<scope>runtime</scope>
</dependency>
<!-- Uncomment this next dependency if you are using:
- JDK 10 or earlier, and you want to use RSASSA-PSS (PS256, PS384, PS512) signature algorithms.
- JDK 10 or earlier, and you want to use EdECDH (X25519 or X448) Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman encryption.
- JDK 14 or earlier, and you want to use EdDSA (Ed25519 or Ed448) Elliptic Curve signature algorithms.
It is unnecessary for these algorithms on JDK 15 or later.
<dependency>
<groupId>org.bouncycastle</groupId>
<artifactId>bcprov-jdk18on</artifactId> or bcprov-jdk15to18 on JDK 7
<version>1.76</version>
<scope>runtime</scope>
</dependency>
-->
dependencies {
implementation 'io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-api:0.12.5'
runtimeOnly 'io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-impl:0.12.5'
runtimeOnly 'io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-jackson:0.12.5' // or 'io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-gson:0.12.5' for gson
/*
Uncomment this next dependency if you are using:
- JDK 10 or earlier, and you want to use RSASSA-PSS (PS256, PS384, PS512) signature algorithms.
- JDK 10 or earlier, and you want to use EdECDH (X25519 or X448) Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman encryption.
- JDK 14 or earlier, and you want to use EdDSA (Ed25519 or Ed448) Elliptic Curve signature algorithms.
It is unnecessary for these algorithms on JDK 15 or later.
*/
// runtimeOnly 'org.bouncycastle:bcprov-jdk18on:1.76' // or bcprov-jdk15to18 on JDK 7
}
Android projects will want to define the following dependencies and Proguard exclusions, and optional
BouncyCastle Provider
:
Add the dependencies to your project:
dependencies {
api('io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-api:0.12.5')
runtimeOnly('io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-impl:0.12.5')
runtimeOnly('io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-orgjson:0.12.5') {
exclude(group: 'org.json', module: 'json') //provided by Android natively
}
/*
Uncomment this next dependency if you want to use:
- RSASSA-PSS (PS256, PS384, PS512) signature algorithms.
- EdECDH (X25519 or X448) Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman encryption.
- EdDSA (Ed25519 or Ed448) Elliptic Curve signature algorithms.
** AND ALSO ensure you enable the BouncyCastle provider as shown below **
*/
//implementation('org.bouncycastle:bcprov-jdk18on:1.76') // or bcprov-jdk15to18 for JDK 7
}
You can use the following Android Proguard exclusion rules:
-keepattributes InnerClasses -keep class io.jsonwebtoken.** { *; } -keepnames class io.jsonwebtoken.* { *; } -keepnames interface io.jsonwebtoken.* { *; } -keep class org.bouncycastle.** { *; } -keepnames class org.bouncycastle.** { *; } -dontwarn org.bouncycastle.**
If you want to use JWT RSASSA-PSS algorithms (i.e. PS256
, PS384
, and PS512
), EdECDH (X25512
or X448
)
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman encryption, EdDSA (Ed25519
or Ed448
) signature algorithms, or you just want to
ensure your Android application is running an updated version of BouncyCastle, you will need to:
-
Uncomment the BouncyCastle dependency as commented above in the dependencies section.
-
Replace the legacy Android custom
BC
provider with the updated one.
Provider registration needs to be done early in the application’s lifecycle, preferably in your application’s
main Activity
class as a static initialization block. For example:
class MainActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
companion object {
init {
Security.removeProvider("BC") //remove old/legacy Android-provided BC provider
Security.addProvider(BouncyCastleProvider()) // add 'real'/correct BC provider
}
}
// ... etc ...
}
Notice the above JJWT dependency declarations all have only one compile-time dependency and the rest are declared as runtime dependencies.
This is because JJWT is designed so you only depend on the APIs that are explicitly designed for you to use in your applications and all other internal implementation details - that can change without warning - are relegated to runtime-only dependencies. This is an extremely important point if you want to ensure stable JJWT usage and upgrades over time:
|
JJWT guarantees semantic versioning compatibility for all of its artifacts except the |
This is done to benefit you: great care goes into curating the jjwt-api
.jar and ensuring it contains what you need
and remains backwards compatible as much as is possible so you can depend on that safely with compile scope. The
runtime jjwt-impl
.jar strategy affords the JJWT developers the flexibility to change the internal packages and
implementations whenever and however necessary. This helps us implement features, fix bugs, and ship new releases to
you more quickly and efficiently.
Most complexity is hidden behind a convenient and readable builder-based fluent interface, great for relying on IDE auto-completion to write code quickly. Here’s an example:
import io.jsonwebtoken.Jwts;
import io.jsonwebtoken.security.Keys;
import java.security.Key;
// We need a signing key, so we'll create one just for this example. Usually
// the key would be read from your application configuration instead.
SecretKey key = Jwts.SIG.HS256.key().build();
String jws = Jwts.builder().subject("Joe").signWith(key).compact();
How easy was that!?
In this case, we are:
-
building a JWT that will have the registered claim
sub
(Subject) set toJoe
. We are then -
signing the JWT using a key suitable for the HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm. Finally, we are
-
compacting it into its final
String
form. A signed JWT is called a 'JWS'.
The resultant jws
String looks like this:
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJKb2UifQ.1KP0SsvENi7Uz1oQc07aXTL7kpQG5jBNIybqr60AlD4
Now let’s verify the JWT (you should always discard JWTs that don’t match an expected signature):
assert Jwts.parser().verifyWith(key).build().parseSignedClaims(jws).getPayload().getSubject().equals("Joe");
There are two things going on here. The key
from before is being used to verify the signature of the JWT. If it
fails to verify the JWT, a SignatureException
(which extends JwtException
) is thrown. Assuming the JWT is
verified, we parse the claims and assert that that subject is set to Joe
. You have to love code one-liners
that pack a punch!
ℹ️ NOTE
|
Type-safe JWTs: To get a type-safe |
But what if parsing or signature validation failed? You can catch JwtException
and react accordingly:
try {
Jwts.parser().verifyWith(key).build().parseSignedClaims(compactJws);
//OK, we can trust this JWT
} catch (JwtException e) {
//don't trust the JWT!
}
Now that we’ve had a quickstart 'taste' of how to create and parse JWTs, let’s cover JJWT’s API in-depth.
You create a JWT as follows:
-
Use the
Jwts.builder()
method to create aJwtBuilder
instance. -
Optionally set any
header
parameters as desired. -
Optionally call
signWith
orencryptWith
methods if you want to digitally sign or encrypt the JWT. -
Call the
compact()
method to produce the resulting compact JWT string.
For example:
String jwt = Jwts.builder() // (1)
.header() // (2) optional
.keyId("aKeyId")
.and()
.subject("Bob") // (3) JSON Claims, or
//.content(aByteArray, "text/plain") // any byte[] content, with media type
.signWith(signingKey) // (4) if signing, or
//.encryptWith(key, keyAlg, encryptionAlg) // if encrypting
.compact(); // (5)
-
The JWT
payload
may be eitherbyte[]
content (viacontent
) or JSON Claims (such assubject
,claims
, etc), but not both. -
Either digital signatures (
signWith
) or encryption (encryptWith
) may be used, but not both.
|
Unprotected JWTs: If you do not use the |
A JWT header is a JSON Object
that provides metadata about the contents, format, and any cryptographic operations
relevant to the JWT payload
. JJWT provides a number of ways of setting the entire header and/or multiple individual
header parameters (name/value pairs).
The easiest and recommended way to set one or more JWT header parameters (name/value pairs) is to use the
JwtBuilder
's header()
builder as desired, and then call its and()
method to return back
to the JwtBuilder
for further configuration. For example:
String jwt = Jwts.builder()
.header() // <----
.keyId("aKeyId")
.x509Url(aUri)
.add("someName", anyValue)
.add(mapValues)
// ... etc ...
.and() // go back to the JwtBuilder
.subject("Joe") // resume JwtBuilder calls...
// ... etc ...
.compact();
The JwtBuilder
header()
builder also supports automatically calculating X.509 thumbprints and other builder-style benefits that
a simple property getter/setter object would not do.
ℹ️ NOTE
|
Automatic Headers: You do not need to set the |
In addition to type-safe builder methods for standard header parameters, JwtBuilder.header()
can also support
arbitrary name/value pairs via the add
method:
Jwts.builder()
.header()
.add("aHeaderName", aValue)
// ... etc ...
.and() // return to the JwtBuilder
// ... etc ...
Using Jwts.builder().header()
shown above is the preferred way to modify a header when using the JwtBuilder
.
However, if you would like to create a 'standalone' Header
outside of the context of using the JwtBuilder
, you
can use Jwts.header()
instead to return an independent Header
builder. For example:
Header header = Jwts.header()
.keyId("aKeyId")
.x509Url(aUri)
.add("someName", anyValue)
.add(mapValues)
// ... etc ...
.build() // <---- not 'and()'
There are only two differences between Jwts.header()
and Jwts.builder().header()
:
-
Jwts.header()
builds a 'detached'Header
that is not associated with any particular JWT, whereasJwts.builder().header()
always modifies the header of the immediate JWT being constructed by its parentJwtBuilder
. -
Jwts.header()
has abuild()
method to produce an explicitHeader
instance andJwts.builder().header()
does not (it has anand()
method instead) because its parentJwtBuilder
will implicitly create the header instance when necessary.
A standalone header might be useful if you want to aggregate common header parameters in a single 'template'
instance so you don’t have to repeat them for each JwtBuilder
usage. Then this 'template' Header
can be used to
populate JwtBuilder
usages by just appending it to the JwtBuilder
header, for example:
// perhaps somewhere in application configuration:
Header commonHeaders = Jwts.header()
.issuer("My Company")
// ... etc ...
.build();
// --------------------------------
// somewhere else during actual Jwt construction:
String jwt = Jwts.builder()
.header()
.add(commonHeaders) // <----
.add("specificHeader", specificValue) // jwt-specific headers...
.and()
.subject("whatever")
// ... etc ...
.compact();
A JWT payload
can be anything at all - anything that can be represented as a byte array, such as text, images,
documents, and more. But since a JWT header
is always JSON, it makes sense that the payload
could also be JSON,
especially for representing identity claims.
As a result, the JwtBuilder
supports two distinct payload options:
-
content
if you would like the payload to be arbitrary byte array content, or -
claims
(and supporting helper methods) if you would like the payload to be a JSON ClaimsObject
.
Either option may be used, but not both. Using both will cause compact()
to throw an exception.
You can set the JWT payload to be any arbitrary byte array content by using the JwtBuilder
content
method.
For example:
byte[] content = "Hello World".getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
String jwt = Jwts.builder()
.content(content, "text/plain") // <---
// ... etc ...
.build();
Notice this particular example of content
uses the two-argument convenience variant:
-
The first argument is the actual byte content to set as the JWT payload
-
The second argument is a String identifier of an IANA Media Type.
The second argument will cause the JwtBuilder
to automatically set the cty
(Content Type) header according to the
JWT specification’s recommended compact format.
This two-argument variant is typically recommended over the single-argument content(byte[])
method because it
guarantees the JWT recipient can inspect the cty
header to determine how to convert the payload
byte array into
a final form that the application can use.
Without setting the cty
header, the JWT recipient must know via out-of-band (external) information how to process
the byte array, which is usually less convenient and always requires code changes if the content format ever changes.
For these reasons, it is strongly recommended to use the two-argument content
method variant.
Instead of a content byte array, a JWT payload may contain assertions or claims for a JWT recipient. In
this case, the payload is a Claims
JSON Object
, and JJWT supports claims creation with type-safe
builder methods.
The JwtBuilder
provides convenient builder methods for standard registered Claim names defined in the JWT
specification. They are:
-
issuer
: sets theiss
(Issuer) Claim -
subject
: sets thesub
(Subject) Claim -
audience
: sets theaud
(Audience) Claim -
expiration
: sets theexp
(Expiration Time) Claim -
notBefore
: sets thenbf
(Not Before) Claim -
issuedAt
: sets theiat
(Issued At) Claim -
id
: sets thejti
(JWT ID) Claim
For example:
String jws = Jwts.builder()
.issuer("me")
.subject("Bob")
.audience().add("you").and()
.expiration(expiration) //a java.util.Date
.notBefore(notBefore) //a java.util.Date
.issuedAt(new Date()) // for example, now
.id(UUID.randomUUID().toString()) //just an example id
/// ... etc ...
If you need to set one or more custom claims that don’t match the standard setter method claims shown above, you
can simply call the JwtBuilder
claim
method one or more times as needed:
String jws = Jwts.builder()
.claim("hello", "world")
// ... etc ...
Each time claim
is called, it simply appends the key-value pair to an internal Claims
builder, potentially
overwriting any existing identically-named key/value pair.
Obviously, you do not need to call claim
for any standard claim name, and it is
recommended instead to call the standard respective type-safe named builder method as this enhances readability.
If your JWT payload is large (contains a lot of data), you might want to compress the JWT to reduce its size. Note that this is not a standard feature for all JWTs - only JWEs - and is not likely to be supported by other JWT libraries for non-JWE tokens. JJWT supports compression for both JWSs and JWEs, however.
Please see the main Compression section to see how to compress and decompress JWTs.
You read (parse) a JWT as follows:
-
Use the
Jwts.parser()
method to create aJwtParserBuilder
instance. -
Optionally call
keyLocator
,verifyWith
ordecryptWith
methods if you expect to parse signed or encrypted JWTs. -
Call the
build()
method on theJwtParserBuilder
to create and return a thread-safeJwtParser
. -
Call one of the various
parse*
methods with your compact JWT string, depending on the type of JWT you expect. -
Wrap the
parse*
call in a try/catch block in case parsing, signature verification, or decryption fails.
For example:
Jwt<?,?> jwt;
try {
jwt = Jwts.parser() // (1)
.keyLocator(keyLocator) // (2) dynamically locate signing or encryption keys
//.verifyWith(key) // or a constant key used to verify all signed JWTs
//.decryptWith(key) // or a constant key used to decrypt all encrypted JWTs
.build() // (3)
.parse(compact); // (4) or parseSignedClaims, parseEncryptedClaims, parseSignedContent, etc
// we can safely trust the JWT
catch (JwtException ex) { // (5)
// we *cannot* use the JWT as intended by its creator
}
ℹ️ NOTE
|
Type-safe JWTs: If you are certain your parser will only ever encounter a specific kind of JWT (for example, you only
ever use signed JWTs with These |
If the JWT parsed is a JWS or JWE, a key will be necessary to verify the signature or decrypt it. If a JWS and signature verification fails, or if a JWE and decryption fails, the JWT cannot be safely trusted and should be discarded.
So which key do we use?
-
If parsing a JWS and the JWS was signed with a
SecretKey
, the sameSecretKey
should be specified on theJwtParserBuilder
. For example:Jwts.parser() .verifyWith(secretKey) // <---- .build() .parseSignedClaims(jwsString);
-
If parsing a JWS and the JWS was signed with a
PrivateKey
, that key’s correspondingPublicKey
(not thePrivateKey
) should be specified on theJwtParserBuilder
. For example:Jwts.parser() .verifyWith(publicKey) // <---- publicKey, not privateKey .build() .parseSignedClaims(jwsString);
-
If parsing a JWE and the JWE was encrypted with direct encryption using a
SecretKey
, the sameSecretKey
should be specified on theJwtParserBuilder
. For example:Jwts.parser() .decryptWith(secretKey) // <---- or a Password from Keys.password(charArray) .build() .parseEncryptedClaims(jweString);
-
If parsing a JWE and the JWE was encrypted with a key algorithm using with a
PublicKey
, that key’s correspondingPrivateKey
(not thePublicKey
) should be specified on theJwtParserBuilder
. For example:Jwts.parser() .decryptWith(privateKey) // <---- privateKey, not publicKey .build() .parseEncryptedClaims(jweString);
But you might have noticed something - what if your application doesn’t use just a single SecretKey
or KeyPair
? What
if JWSs and JWEs can be created with different SecretKey
s or public/private keys, or a combination of both? How do
you know which key to specify if you don’t inspect the JWT first?
In these cases, you can’t call the JwtParserBuilder
's verifyWith
or decryptWith
methods with a single key -
instead, you’ll need to configure a parsing Key Locator, discussed next.
It is common in many applications to receive JWTs that can be encrypted or signed by different cryptographic keys. For example, maybe a JWT created to assert a specific user identity uses a Key specific to that exact user. Or perhaps JWTs specific to a particular customer all use that customer’s Key. Or maybe your application creates JWTs that are encrypted with a key specific to your application for your own use (e.g. a user session token).
In all of these and similar scenarios, you won’t know which key was used to sign or encrypt a JWT until the JWT is
received, at parse time, so you can’t 'hard code' any verification or decryption key using the JwtParserBuilder
's
verifyWith
or decryptWith
methods. Those are only to be used when the same key is used to verify or decrypt
all JWSs or JWEs, which won’t work for dynamically signed or encrypted JWTs.
If you need to support dynamic key lookup when encountering JWTs, you’ll need to implement
the Locator<Key>
interface and specify an instance on the JwtParserBuilder
via the keyLocator
method. For
example:
Locator<Key> keyLocator = getMyKeyLocator();
Jwts.parser()
.keyLocator(keyLocator) // <----
.build()
// ... etc ...
A Locator<Key>
is used to lookup both JWS signature verification keys and JWE decryption keys. You need to
determine which key to return based on information in the JWT header
, for example:
public class MyKeyLocator extends LocatorAdapter<Key> {
@Override
public Key locate(ProtectedHeader<?> header) { // a JwsHeader or JweHeader
// implement me
}
}
The JwtParser
will invoke the locate
method after parsing the JWT header
, but before parsing the payload
,
or verifying any JWS signature or decrypting any JWE ciphertext. This allows you to inspect the header
argument
for any information that can help you look up the Key
to use for verifying that specific jwt. This is very
powerful for applications with more complex security models that might use different keys at different times or for
different users or customers.
What data might you inspect to determine how to lookup a signature verification or decryption key?
The JWT specifications' preferred approach is to set a kid
(Key ID) header value when the JWT is being created,
for example:
Key key = getSigningKey(); // or getEncryptionKey() for JWE
String keyId = getKeyId(key); //any mechanism you have to associate a key with an ID is fine
String jws = Jwts.builder()
.header().keyId(keyId).and() // <--- add `kid` header
.signWith(key) // for JWS
//.encryptWith(key, keyAlg, encryptionAlg) // for JWE
.compact();
Then during parsing, your Locator<Key>
implementation can inspect the header
to get the kid
value and then use it
to look up the verification or decryption key from somewhere, like a database, keystore or Hardware Security Module
(HSM). For example:
public class MyKeyLocator extends LocatorAdapter<Key> {
@Override
public Key locate(ProtectedHeader<?> header) { // both JwsHeader and JweHeader extend ProtectedHeader
//inspect the header, lookup and return the verification key
String keyId = header.getKeyId(); //or any other parameter that you need to inspect
Key key = lookupKey(keyId); //implement me
return key;
}
}
Note that inspecting the header.getKeyId()
is just the most common approach to look up a key - you could inspect any
number of header parameters to determine how to lookup the verification or decryption key. It is all based on how
the JWT was created.
If you extend LocatorAdapter<Key>
as shown above, but for some reason have different lookup strategies for
signature verification keys versus decryption keys, you can forego overriding the locate(ProtectedHeader<?>)
method
in favor of two respective locate(JwsHeader)
and locate(JweHeader)
methods:
public class MyKeyLocator extends LocatorAdapter<Key> {
@Override
public Key locate(JwsHeader header) {
String keyId = header.getKeyId(); //or any other parameter that you need to inspect
return lookupSignatureVerificationKey(keyId); //implement me
}
@Override
public Key locate(JweHeader header) {
String keyId = header.getKeyId(); //or any other parameter// that you need to inspect
return lookupDecryptionKey(keyId); //implement me
}
}
ℹ️ NOTE
|
Simpler Lookup: If possible, try to keep the key lookup strategy the same between JWSs and JWEs (i.e. using
only |
Regardless of which implementation strategy you choose, remember to return the appropriate type of key depending on the type of JWS or JWE algorithm used. That is:
-
For JWS:
-
For HMAC-based signature algorithms, the returned verification key should be a
SecretKey
, and, -
For asymmetric signature algorithms, the returned verification key should be a
PublicKey
(not aPrivateKey
).
-
-
For JWE:
-
For JWE direct encryption, the returned decryption key should be a
SecretKey
. -
For password-based key derivation algorithms, the returned decryption key should be a
io.jsonwebtoken.security.Password
. You can create aPassword
instance by callingKeys.password(char[] passwordCharacters)
. -
For asymmetric key management algorithms, the returned decryption key should be a
PrivateKey
(not aPublicKey
).
-
If any verification or decryption key returned from a Key Locator
must be used with a specific security Provider
(such as for PKCS11 or Hardware Security Module (HSM) keys), you must make that Provider
available for JWT parsing
in one of 3 ways, listed in order of recommendation and simplicity:
-
Configure the Provider in the JVM, either by modifying the
java.security
file or by registering theProvider
dynamically via Security.addProvider(Provider). This is the recommended approach so you do not need to modify code anywhere that may need to parse JWTs. -
Set the
Provider
as the parser default by callingJwtParserBuilder#provider(Provider)
. This will ensure the provider is used by default with all located keys unless overridden by a key-specific Provider. This is only recommended when you are confident that all JWTs encountered by the parser instance will use keys attributed to the sameProvider
, unless overridden by a specific key. -
Associate the
Provider
with a specific key usingKeys.builder
so it is used for that key only. This option is useful if some located keys require a specific provider, while other located keys can assume a default provider. For example:public Key locate(Header<?> header) { PrivateKey /* or SecretKey */ key = findKey(header); // implement me Provider keySpecificProvider = findKeyProvider(key); // implement me if (keySpecificProvider != null) { // Ensure the key-specific provider (e.g. for PKCS11 or HSM) will be used // during decryption with the KeyAlgorithm in the JWE 'alg' header return Keys.builder(key).provider(keySpecificProvider).build(); } // otherwise default provider is fine: return key; }
You can enforce that the JWT you are parsing conforms to expectations that you require and are important for your application.
For example, let’s say that you require that the JWT you are parsing has a specific sub
(subject) value,
otherwise you may not trust the token. You can do that by using one of the various require
* methods on the
JwtParserBuilder
:
try {
Jwts.parser().requireSubject("jsmith")/* etc... */.build().parse(s);
} catch (InvalidClaimException ice) {
// the sub claim was missing or did not have a 'jsmith' value
}
If it is important to react to a missing vs an incorrect value, instead of catching InvalidClaimException
,
you can catch either MissingClaimException
or IncorrectClaimException
:
try {
Jwts.parser().requireSubject("jsmith")/* etc... */.build().parse(s);
} catch(MissingClaimException mce) {
// the parsed JWT did not have the sub claim
} catch(IncorrectClaimException ice) {
// the parsed JWT had a sub claim, but its value was not equal to 'jsmith'
}
You can also require custom claims by using the require(claimName, requiredValue)
method - for example:
try {
Jwts.parser().require("myClaim", "myRequiredValue")/* etc... */.build().parse(s);
} catch(InvalidClaimException ice) {
// the 'myClaim' claim was missing or did not have a 'myRequiredValue' value
}
(or, again, you could catch either MissingClaimException
or IncorrectClaimException
instead).
Please see the JwtParserBuilder
class and/or JavaDoc for a full list of the various require
* methods you may use
for claims assertions.
When parsing a JWT, you might find that exp
or nbf
claim assertions fail (throw exceptions) because the clock on
the parsing machine is not perfectly in sync with the clock on the machine that created the JWT. This can cause
obvious problems since exp
and nbf
are time-based assertions, and clock times need to be reliably in sync for shared
assertions.
You can account for these differences (usually no more than a few minutes) when parsing using the JwtParserBuilder
's
clockSkewSeconds
. For example:
long seconds = 3 * 60; //3 minutes
Jwts.parser()
.clockSkewSeconds(seconds) // <----
// ... etc ...
.build()
.parse(jwt);
This ensures that minor clock differences between the machines can be ignored. Two or three minutes should be more than enough; it would be fairly strange if a production machine’s clock was more than 5 minutes difference from most atomic clocks around the world.
If the above clockSkewSeconds
isn’t sufficient for your needs, the timestamps created
during parsing for timestamp comparisons can be obtained via a custom time source. Call the JwtParserBuilder
's
clock
method with an implementation of the io.jsonwebtoken.Clock
interface. For example:
Clock clock = new MyClock();
Jwts.parser().clock(myClock) //... etc ...
The JwtParser
's default Clock
implementation simply returns new Date()
to reflect the time when parsing occurs,
as most would expect. However, supplying your own clock could be useful, especially when writing test cases to
guarantee deterministic behavior.
If you used JJWT to compress a JWT and you used a custom compression algorithm, you will need to tell the
JwtParserBuilder
how to resolve your CompressionAlgorithm
to decompress the JWT.
Please see the Compression section below to see how to decompress JWTs during parsing.
The JWT specification provides for the ability to cryptographically sign a JWT. Signing a JWT:
-
guarantees the JWT was created by someone we know (it is authentic) as well as
-
guarantees that no-one has manipulated or changed the JWT after it was created (its integrity is maintained).
These two properties - authenticity and integrity - assure us that a JWT contains information we can trust. If a JWT fails authenticity or integrity checks, we should always reject that JWT because we can’t trust it.
But before we dig in to showing you how to create a JWS using JJWT, let’s briefly discuss Signature Algorithms and Keys, specifically as they relate to the JWT specifications. Understanding them is critical to being able to create a JWS properly.
The JWT specifications identify 13 standard signature algorithms - 3 secret key algorithms and 10 asymmetric key algorithms:
Identifier | Signature Algorithm |
---|---|
|
HMAC using SHA-256 |
|
HMAC using SHA-384 |
|
HMAC using SHA-512 |
|
ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256 |
|
ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384 |
|
ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512 |
|
RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA-256 |
|
RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA-384 |
|
RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA-512 |
|
RSASSA-PSS using SHA-256 and MGF1 with SHA-2561 |
|
RSASSA-PSS using SHA-384 and MGF1 with SHA-3841 |
|
RSASSA-PSS using SHA-512 and MGF1 with SHA-5121 |
|
Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)2 |
1. Requires Java 15 or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath.
2. Requires Java 15 or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath.
These are all represented as constants in the io.jsonwebtoken.Jwts.SIG
registry class.
What’s really important about the above standard signature algorithms - other than their security properties - is that the JWT specification RFC 7518, Sections 3.2 through 3.5 requires (mandates) that you MUST use keys that are sufficiently strong for a chosen algorithm.
This means that JJWT - a specification-compliant library - will also enforce that you use sufficiently strong keys for the algorithms you choose. If you provide a weak key for a given algorithm, JJWT will reject it and throw an exception.
This is not because we want to make your life difficult, we promise! The reason why the JWT specification, and consequently JJWT, mandates key lengths is that the security model of a particular algorithm can completely break down if you don’t adhere to the mandatory key properties of the algorithm, effectively having no security at all. No one wants completely insecure JWTs, right? Right!
So what are the key strength requirements?
JWT HMAC-SHA signature algorithms HS256
, HS384
, and HS512
require a secret key that is at least as many bits as
the algorithm’s signature (digest) length per RFC 7512 Section 3.2.
This means:
-
HS256
is HMAC-SHA-256, and that produces digests that are 256 bits (32 bytes) long, soHS256
requires that you use a secret key that is at least 32 bytes long. -
HS384
is HMAC-SHA-384, and that produces digests that are 384 bits (48 bytes) long, soHS384
requires that you use a secret key that is at least 48 bytes long. -
HS512
is HMAC-SHA-512, and that produces digests that are 512 bits (64 bytes) long, soHS512
requires that you use a secret key that is at least 64 bytes long.
JWT RSA signature algorithms RS256
, RS384
, RS512
, PS256
, PS384
and PS512
all require a minimum key length
(aka an RSA modulus bit length) of 2048
bits per RFC 7512 Sections
3.3 and 3.5.
Anything smaller than this (such as 1024 bits) will be rejected with an WeakKeyException
.
That said, in keeping with best practices and increasing key lengths for security longevity, JJWT recommends that you use:
-
at least 2048 bit keys with
RS256
andPS256
-
at least 3072 bit keys with
RS384
andPS384
-
at least 4096 bit keys with
RS512
andPS512
These are only JJWT suggestions and not requirements. JJWT only enforces JWT specification requirements and for any RSA key, the requirement is the RSA key (modulus) length in bits MUST be >= 2048 bits.
JWT Elliptic Curve signature algorithms ES256
, ES384
, and ES512
all require a key length
(aka an Elliptic Curve order bit length) equal to the algorithm signature’s individual
R
and S
components per RFC 7512 Section 3.4. This means:
-
ES256
requires that you use a private key that is exactly 256 bits (32 bytes) long. -
ES384
requires that you use a private key that is exactly 384 bits (48 bytes) long. -
ES512
requires that you use a private key that is exactly 521 bits (65 or 66 bytes) long (depending on format).
The JWT Edwards Curve signature algorithm EdDSA
supports two sizes of private and public EdECKey
s (these types
were introduced in Java 15):
-
Ed25519
algorithm keys must be 256 bits (32 bytes) long and produce signatures 512 bits (64 bytes) long. -
Ed448
algorithm keys must be 456 bits (57 bytes) long and produce signatures 912 bits (114 bytes) long.
If you don’t want to think about bit length requirements or just want to make your life easier, JJWT has provided convenient builder classes that can generate sufficiently secure keys for any given JWT signature algorithm you might want to use.
If you want to generate a sufficiently strong SecretKey
for use with the JWT HMAC-SHA algorithms, use the respective
algorithm’s key()
builder method:
SecretKey key = Jwts.SIG.HS256.key().build(); //or HS384.key() or HS512.key()
Under the hood, JJWT uses the JCA default provider’s KeyGenerator
to create a secure-random key with the correct
minimum length for the given algorithm.
If you want to specify a specific JCA Provider
or SecureRandom
to use during key generation, you may specify those
as builder arguments. For example:
SecretKey key = Jwts.SIG.HS256.key().provider(aProvider).random(aSecureRandom).build();
If you need to save this new SecretKey
, you can Base64 (or Base64URL) encode it:
String secretString = Encoders.BASE64.encode(key.getEncoded());
Ensure you save the resulting secretString
somewhere safe -
Base64-encoding is not encryption, so it’s still considered sensitive information. You can
further encrypt it, etc, before saving to disk (for example).
If you want to generate sufficiently strong Elliptic Curve or RSA asymmetric key pairs for use with JWT ECDSA or RSA
algorithms, use an algorithm’s respective keyPair()
builder method:
KeyPair keyPair = Jwts.SIG.RS256.keyPair().build(); //or RS384, RS512, PS256, etc...
Once you’ve generated a KeyPair
, you can use the private key (keyPair.getPrivate()
) to create a JWS and the
public key (keyPair.getPublic()
) to parse/verify a JWS.
ℹ️ NOTE
|
If you want to use either set of algorithms, and you are on an earlier JDK that does not support them, see the Installation section to see how to enable BouncyCastle. All other algorithms are natively supported by the JDK. |
You create a JWS as follows:
-
Use the
Jwts.builder()
method to create aJwtBuilder
instance. -
Call
JwtBuilder
methods to set thepayload
content or claims and any header parameters as desired. -
Specify the
SecretKey
or asymmetricPrivateKey
you want to use to sign the JWT. -
Finally, call the
compact()
method to compact and sign, producing the final jws.
For example:
String jws = Jwts.builder() // (1)
.subject("Bob") // (2)
.signWith(key) // (3) <---
.compact(); // (4)
It is usually recommended to specify the signing key by calling the JwtBuilder
's signWith
method and let JJWT
determine the most secure algorithm allowed for the specified key.:
String jws = Jwts.builder()
// ... etc ...
.signWith(key) // <---
.compact();
For example, if you call signWith
with a SecretKey
that is 256 bits (32 bytes) long, it is not strong enough for
HS384
or HS512
, so JJWT will automatically sign the JWT using HS256
.
When using signWith
JJWT will also automatically set the required alg
header with the associated algorithm
identifier.
Similarly, if you called signWith
with an RSA PrivateKey
that was 4096 bits long, JJWT will use the RS512
algorithm and automatically set the alg
header to RS512
.
The same selection logic applies for Elliptic Curve PrivateKey
s.
ℹ️ NOTE
|
You cannot sign JWTs with |
If you want to sign a JWS using HMAC-SHA algorithms, and you have a secret key String
or
encoded byte array, you will need
to convert it into a SecretKey
instance to use as the signWith
method argument.
If your secret key is:
-
SecretKey key = Keys.hmacShaKeyFor(encodedKeyBytes);
-
A Base64-encoded string:
SecretKey key = Keys.hmacShaKeyFor(Decoders.BASE64.decode(secretString));
-
A Base64URL-encoded string:
SecretKey key = Keys.hmacShaKeyFor(Decoders.BASE64URL.decode(secretString));
-
A raw (non-encoded) string (e.g. a password String):
Password key = Keys.password(secretString.toCharArray());
|
It is almost always incorrect to call any variant of |
In some specific cases, you might want to override JJWT’s default selected signature algorithm for a given key.
For example, if you have an RSA PrivateKey
that is 2048 bits, JJWT would automatically choose the RS256
algorithm.
If you wanted to use RS384
or RS512
instead, you could manually specify it with the overloaded signWith
method
that accepts the SignatureAlgorithm
as an additional argument:
.signWith(privateKey, Jwts.SIG.RS512) // <---
.compact();
This is allowed because the JWT specification allows any RSA algorithm strength for any RSA key >= 2048 bits. JJWT just
prefers RS512
for keys >= 4096 bits, followed by RS384
for keys >= 3072 bits and finally RS256
for keys >= 2048
bits.
In all cases however, regardless of your chosen algorithms, JJWT will assert that the specified key is allowed to be used for that algorithm when possible according to the JWT specification requirements.
If your JWT payload is large (contains a lot of data), and you are certain that JJWT will also be the same library that reads/parses your JWS, you might want to compress the JWS to reduce its size.
|
Not Standard for JWS: JJWT supports compression for JWS, but it is not a standard feature for JWS. The JWT RFC specifications standardize this only for JWEs, and it is not likely to be supported by other JWT libraries for JWS. Use JWS compression only if you are certain that JJWT (or another library that supports JWS compression) will be parsing the JWS. |
Please see the main Compression section to see how to compress and decompress JWTs.
You read (parse) a JWS as follows:
-
Use the
Jwts.parser()
method to create aJwtParserBuilder
instance. -
Call either keyLocator or
verifyWith
methods to determine the key used to verify the JWS signature. -
Call the
build()
method on theJwtParserBuilder
to return a thread-safeJwtParser
. -
Finally, call the
parseSignedClaims(String)
method with your jwsString
, producing the original JWS. -
The entire call is wrapped in a try/catch block in case parsing or signature validation fails. We’ll cover exceptions and causes for failure later.
For example:
Jws<Claims> jws;
try {
jws = Jwts.parser() // (1)
.keyLocator(keyLocator) // (2) dynamically lookup verification keys based on each JWS
//.verifyWith(key) // or a static key used to verify all encountered JWSs
.build() // (3)
.parseSignedClaims(jwsString); // (4) or parseSignedContent(jwsString)
// we can safely trust the JWT
catch (JwtException ex) { // (5)
// we *cannot* use the JWT as intended by its creator
}
ℹ️ NOTE
|
Type-safe JWSs
|
The most important thing to do when reading a JWS is to specify the key used to verify the JWS’s cryptographic signature. If signature verification fails, the JWT cannot be safely trusted and should be discarded.
So which key do we use for verification?
-
If the jws was signed with a
SecretKey
, the sameSecretKey
should be specified on theJwtParserBuilder
.
For example:Jwts.parser() .verifyWith(secretKey) // <---- .build() .parseSignedClaims(jwsString);
-
If the jws was signed with a
PrivateKey
, that key’s correspondingPublicKey
(not thePrivateKey
) should be specified on theJwtParserBuilder
. For example:Jwts.parser() .verifyWith(publicKey) // <---- publicKey, not privateKey .build() .parseSignedClaims(jwsString);
But you might have noticed something - what if your application doesn’t use just a single SecretKey
or KeyPair
? What
if JWSs can be created with different SecretKey
s or public/private keys, or a combination of both? How do you
know which key to specify if you can’t inspect the JWT first?
In these cases, you can’t call the JwtParserBuilder
's verifyWith
method with a single key - instead, you’ll need a
Key Locator. Please see the Key Lookup section to see how to dynamically obtain different keys when
parsing JWSs or JWEs.
If you used JJWT to compress a JWS and you used a custom compression algorithm, you will need to tell the
JwtParserBuilder
how to resolve your CompressionAlgorithm
to decompress the JWT.
Please see the Compression section below to see how to decompress JWTs during parsing.
In some cases, especially if a JWS payload is large, it could be desirable to not Base64URL-encode the JWS payload, or even exclude the payload from the compact JWS string entirely. The JWT RFC specifications provide support for these use cases via the JSON Web Signature (JWS) Unencoded Payload Option specification, which JJWT supports.
This option comes with both benefits and disadvantages:
A JWS producer can still create a JWS string to use for payload integrity verification without having to either:
-
Base64URL-encode the (potentially very large) payload, saving the time that could take.
-
Include the payload in the compact JWS string at all. Omitting the payload from the JWS compact string entirely produces smaller JWSs that can be more efficient to transfer.
-
Your application, and not JJWT, incurs the responsibility to ensure the payload is not modified during transmission so the recipient can verify the JWS signature. For example, by using a sufficiently strong TLS (https) cipher suite as well as any additional care before and after transmission, since TLS does not guarantee end-to-end security.
-
If you choose to include the unencoded payload in the JWS compact string, your application MUST ensure that the payload does not contain a period (
.
) character anywhere in the payload. The JWS recipient will experience parsing errors otherwise.
Before attempting to use this option, one should be aware of the RFC’s security considerations first.
ℹ️ NOTE
|
Protected JWS Only
The RFC specification defines the Unencoded Payload option for use only with JWSs. It may not be used with with unprotected JWTs or encrypted JWEs. |
This example shows creating and parsing a compact JWS using an unencoded payload that is detached, i.e. where the payload is not embedded in the compact JWS string at all.
We need to do three things during creation:
-
Specify the JWS signing key; it’s a JWS and still needs to be signed.
-
Specify the raw payload bytes via the
JwtBuilder
'scontent
method. -
Indicate that the payload should not be Base64Url-encoded using the
JwtBuilder
'sencodePayload(false)
method.
// create a test key for this example:
SecretKey testKey = Jwts.SIG.HS512.key().build();
String message = "Hello World. It's a Beautiful Day!";
byte[] content = message.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
String jws = Jwts.builder().signWith(testKey) // #1
.content(content) // #2
.encodePayload(false) // #3
.compact();
To parse the resulting jws
string, we need to do two things when creating the JwtParser
:
-
Specify the signature verification key.
-
Specify the externally-transmitted unencoded payload bytes, required for signature verification.
Jws<byte[]> parsed = Jwts.parser().verifyWith(testKey) // 1
.build()
.parseSignedContent(jws, content); // 2
assertArrayEquals(content, parsed.getPayload());
This example shows creating and parsing a compact JWS with what the RFC calls a 'non-detached' unencoded payload, i.e. a raw string directly embedded as the payload in the compact JWS string.
We need to do three things during creation:
-
Specify the JWS signing key; it’s a JWS and still needs to be signed.
-
Specify the raw payload string via the
JwtBuilder
'scontent
method. Per the RFC, the payload string MUST NOT contain any period (.
) characters. -
Indicate that the payload should not be Base64Url-encoded using the
JwtBuilder
'sencodePayload(false)
method.
// create a test key for this example:
SecretKey testKey = Jwts.SIG.HS512.key().build();
String claimsString = "{\"sub\":\"joe\",\"iss\":\"me\"}";
String jws = Jwts.builder().signWith(testKey) // #1
.content(claimsString) // #2
.encodePayload(false) // #3
.compact();
If you were to print the jws
string, you’d see something like this:
eyJhbGciOiJIUzUxMiIsImI2NCI6ZmFsc2UsImNyaXQiOlsiYjY0Il19.{"sub":"joe","iss":"me"}.wkoxYEd//...etc...
See how the claimsString
is embedded directly as the center payload
token instead of a standard Base64URL value?
This is why no period (.
) characters can exist in the payload. If they did, any standard JWT parser would see more
than two periods total, which is required for parsing standard JWSs.
To parse the resulting jws
string, we need to do two things when creating the JwtParser
:
-
Specify the signature verification key.
-
Indicate that we want to support Unencoded Payload Option JWSs by enabling the
b64
crit
header parameter.
Jws<Claims> parsed = Jwts.parser().verifyWith(testKey) // 1
.critical().add("b64").and() // 2
.build()
.parseSignedClaims(jws);
assert "joe".equals(parsed.getPayload().getSubject());
assert "me".equals(parsed.getPayload().getIssuer());
Did you notice we used the .parseSignedClaims(String)
method instead of .parseSignedClaims(String, byte[])
? This is
because the non-detached payload is already present and JJWT has what it needs for signature verification.
Additionally, we needed to specify the b64
critical value: because we’re not using the two-argument
parseSignedClaims(jws, content)
method, the parser has no way of knowing if you wish to allow or support unencoded
payloads. Unencoded payloads have additional security considerations as described above, so they are disabled by
the parser by default unless you indicate you want to support them by using critical().add("b64")
.
Finally, even if the payload contains a non-detached String, you could still use the two-argument method using the payload String’s UTF-8 bytes instead:
parsed = Jwts.parser().verifyWith(testKey)
.build()
.parseSignedClaims(jws, claimsString.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8)); // <---
The JWT specification also provides for the ability to encrypt and decrypt a JWT. Encrypting a JWT:
-
guarantees that no-one other than the intended JWT recipient can see the JWT
payload
(it is confidential), and -
guarantees that no-one has manipulated or changed the JWT after it was created (its integrity is maintained).
These two properties - confidentiality and integrity - assure us that an encrypted JWT contains a payload
that
no-one else can see, nor has anyone changed or altered the data in transit.
Encryption and confidentiality seem somewhat obvious: if you encrypt a message, it is confidential by the notion that random 3rd parties cannot make sense of the encrypted message. But some might be surprised to know that general encryption does _not guarantee that someone hasn’t tampered/altered an encrypted message in transit_. Most of us assume that if a message can be decrypted, then the message would be authentic and unchanged - after all, if you can decrypt it, it must not have been tampered with, right? Because if it was changed, decryption would surely fail, right?
Unfortunately, this is not actually guaranteed in all cryptographic ciphers. There are certain attack vectors where it is possible to change an encrypted payload (called 'ciphertext'), and the message recipient is still able to successfully decrypt the (modified) payload. In these cases, the ciphertext integrity was not maintained - a malicious 3rd party could intercept a message and change the payload content, even if they don’t understand what is inside the payload, and the message recipient could never know.
To combat this, there is a category of encryption algorithms that ensures both confidentiality and integrity of the ciphertext data. These types of algorithms are called Authenticated Encryption algorithms.
As a result, to ensure JWTs do not suffer from this problem, the JWE RFC specifications require that any encryption algorithm used to encrypt a JWT MUST be an Authenticated Encryption algorithm. JWT users can be sufficiently confident their encrypted JWTs maintain the properties of both confidentiality and integrity.
The JWT specification defines 6 standard Authenticated Encryption algorithms used to encrypt a JWT payload
:
Identifier | Required Key Bit Length | Encryption Algorithm |
---|---|---|
|
256 |
AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 authenticated encryption algorithm |
|
384 |
AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 authenticated encryption algorithm |
|
512 |
AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 authenticated encryption algorithm |
|
128 |
AES GCM using 128-bit key1 |
|
192 |
AES GCM using 192-bit key1 |
|
256 |
AES GCM using 256-bit key1 |
1. Requires Java 8 or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath.
These are all represented as constants in the io.jsonwebtoken.Jwts.ENC
registry singleton as
implementations of the io.jsonwebtoken.security.AeadAlgorithm
interface.
As shown in the table above, each algorithm requires a key of sufficient length. The JWT specification RFC 7518, Sections 5.2.3 through 5.3 requires (mandates) that you MUST use keys that are sufficiently strong for a chosen algorithm. This means that JJWT - a specification-compliant library - will also enforce that you use sufficiently strong keys for the algorithms you choose. If you provide a weak key for a given algorithm, JJWT will reject it and throw an exception.
The reason why the JWT specification, and consequently JJWT, mandates key lengths is that the security model of a particular algorithm can completely break down if you don’t adhere to the mandatory key properties of the algorithm, effectively having no security at all.
You might have noticed something about the above Authenticated Encryption algorithms: they’re all variants of the AES algorithm, and AES always uses a symmetric (secret) key to perform encryption and decryption. That’s kind of strange, isn’t it?
What about RSA and Elliptic Curve asymmetric key cryptography? And Diffie-Hellman key exchange? What about password-based key derivation algorithms? Surely any of those could be desirable depending on the use case, no?
Yes, they definitely can, and the JWT specifications do support them, albeit indirectly: those other
algorithms are indeed supported and used, but they aren’t used to encrypt the JWT payload
directly. They are
used to produce the actual key used to encrypt the JWT
payload.
This is all done via the JWT specification’s concept of a Key Management Algorithm, covered next. After we cover that,
we’ll show you how to encrypt and parse your own JWTs with the JwtBuilder
and JwtParserBuilder
.
As stated above, all standard JWA Encryption Algorithms are AES-based authenticated encryption algorithms. So what about RSA and Elliptic Curve cryptography? And password-based key derivation, or Diffie-Hellman exchange?
All of those are supported as well, but they are not used directly for encryption. They are used to produce the
key that will be used to directly encrypt the JWT payload
.
That is, JWT encryption can be thought of as a two-step process, shown in the following pseudocode:
Key algorithmKey = getKeyManagementAlgorithmKey(); // PublicKey, SecretKey, or Password
SecretKey contentEncryptionKey = keyManagementAlgorithm.produceEncryptionKey(algorithmKey); // 1
byte[] ciphertext = encryptionAlgorithm.encrypt(payload, contentEncryptionKey); // 2
Steps:
-
Use the
algorithmKey
to produce the actual key that will be used to encrypt the payload. The JWT specifications call this result the 'Content Encryption Key'. -
Take the resulting Content Encryption Key and use it directly with the Authenticated Encryption algorithm to actually encrypt the JWT
payload
.
So why the indirection? Why not just use any PublicKey
, SecretKey
or Password
to encrypt the payload
directly ?
There are quite a few reasons for this.
-
Asymmetric key encryption (like RSA and Elliptic Curve) tends to be slow. Like really slow. Symmetric key cipher algorithms in contrast are really fast. This matters a lot in production applications that could be handling a JWT on every HTTP request, which could be thousands per second.
-
RSA encryption (for example) can only encrypt a relatively small amount of data. A 2048-bit RSA key can only encrypt up to a maximum of 245 bytes. A 4096-bit RSA key can only encrypt up to a maximum of 501 bytes. There are plenty of JWTs that can exceed 245 bytes, and that would make RSA unusable.
-
Passwords usually make for very poor encryption keys - they often have poor entropy, or they themselves are often too short to be used directly with algorithms that mandate minimum key lengths to help ensure safety.
For these reasons and more, using one secure algorithm to generate or encrypt a key used for another (very fast) secure algorithm has been proven to be a great way to increase security through many more secure algorithms while also still resulting in very fast and secure output. This is after all how TLS (for https encryption) works - two parties can use more complex cryptography (like RSA or Elliptic Curve) to negotiate a small, fast encryption key. This fast encryption key is produced during the 'TLS handshake' and is called the TLS 'session key'.
So the JWT specifications work much in the same way: one key from any number of various algorithm types can be used
to produce a final symmetric key, and that symmetric key is used to encrypt the JWT payload
.
The JWT specification defines 17 standard Key Management Algorithms used to produce the JWE Content Encryption Key (CEK):
Identifier | Key Management Algorithm |
---|---|
|
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 |
|
RSAES OAEP using default parameters |
|
RSAES OAEP using SHA-256 and MGF1 with SHA-256 |
|
AES Key Wrap with default initial value using 128-bit key |
|
AES Key Wrap with default initial value using 192-bit key |
|
AES Key Wrap with default initial value using 256-bit key |
|
Direct use of a shared symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key |
|
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static key agreement using Concat KDF |
|
ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with "A128KW" |
|
ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with "A192KW" |
|
ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with "A256KW" |
|
Key wrapping with AES GCM using 128-bit key1 |
|
Key wrapping with AES GCM using 192-bit key1 |
|
Key wrapping with AES GCM using 256-bit key1 |
|
PBES2 with HMAC SHA-256 and "A128KW" wrapping1 |
|
PBES2 with HMAC SHA-384 and "A192KW" wrapping1 |
|
PBES2 with HMAC SHA-512 and "A256KW" wrapping1 |
1. Requires Java 8 or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath.
These are all represented as constants in the io.jsonwebtoken.Jwts.KEY
registry singleton as
implementations of the io.jsonwebtoken.security.KeyAlgorithm
interface.
But 17 algorithms are a lot to choose from. When would you use them? The sections below describe when you might choose each category of algorithms and how they behave.
The JWT RSA key management algorithms RSA1_5
, RSA-OAEP
, and RSA-OAEP-256
are used when you want to use the
JWE recipient’s RSA public key during encryption. This ensures that only the JWE recipient can decrypt
and read the JWE (using their RSA private
key).
During JWE creation, these algorithms:
-
Generate a new secure-random Content Encryption Key (CEK) suitable for the desired encryption algorithm.
-
Encrypt the JWE payload with the desired encryption algorithm using the new CEK, producing the JWE payload ciphertext.
-
Encrypt the CEK itself with the specified RSA key wrap algorithm using the JWE recipient’s RSA public key.
-
Embed the payload ciphertext and encrypted CEK in the resulting JWE.
During JWE decryption, these algorithms:
-
Retrieve the encrypted Content Encryption Key (CEK) embedded in the JWE.
-
Decrypt the encrypted CEK with the discovered RSA key unwrap algorithm using the JWE recipient’s RSA private key, producing the decrypted Content Encryption Key (CEK).
-
Decrypt the JWE ciphertext payload with the JWE’s identified encryption algorithm using the decrypted CEK.
|
The JWT AES key management algorithms A128KW
, A192KW
, A256KW
, A128GCMKW
, A192GCMKW
, and A256GCMKW
are
used when you have a symmetric secret key, but you don’t want to use that secret key to directly
encrypt/decrypt the JWT.
Instead, a new secure-random key is generated each time a JWE is created, and that new/random key is used to directly encrypt/decrypt the JWT payload. The secure-random key is itself encrypted with your symmetric secret key using the AES Wrap algorithm, and the encrypted key is embedded in the resulting JWE.
This allows the JWE to be encrypted with a random short-lived key, reducing material exposure of the potentially longer-lived symmetric secret key.
Because these particular algorithms use a symmetric secret key, they are best suited when the JWE creator and receiver are the same, ensuring the secret key does not need to be shared with multiple parties.
During JWE creation, these algorithms:
-
Generate a new secure-random Content Encryption Key (CEK) suitable for the desired encryption algorithm.
-
Encrypt the JWE payload with the desired encryption algorithm using the new CEK, producing the JWE payload ciphertext.
-
Encrypt the CEK itself with the specified AES key algorithm (either AES Key Wrap or AES with GCM encryption), producing the encrypted CEK.
-
Embed the payload ciphertext and encrypted CEK in the resulting JWE.
During JWE decryption, these algorithms:
-
Retrieve the encrypted Content Encryption Key (CEK) embedded in the JWE.
-
Decrypt the encrypted CEK with the discovered AES key algorithm using the symmetric secret key.
-
Decrypt the JWE ciphertext payload with the JWE’s identified encryption algorithm using the decrypted CEK.
|
The symmetric key used for the AES key algorithms MUST be 128, 192 or 256 bits as required by the specific AES key algorithm. JJWT will throw an exception if it detects weaker keys than what is required. |
The JWT dir
(direct) key management algorithm is used when you have a symmetric secret key, and you want to use it
to directly encrypt the JWT payload.
Because this algorithm uses a symmetric secret key, it is best suited when the JWE creator and receiver are the same, ensuring the secret key does not need to be shared with multiple parties.
This is the simplest key algorithm for direct encryption that does not perform any key encryption. It is essentially a 'no op' key algorithm, allowing the shared key to be used to directly encrypt the JWT payload.
During JWE creation, this algorithm:
-
Encrypts the JWE payload with the desired encryption algorithm directly using the symmetric secret key, producing the JWE payload ciphertext.
-
Embeds the payload ciphertext in the resulting JWE.
Note that because this algorithm does not produce an encrypted key value, an encrypted CEK is not embedded in the resulting JWE.
During JWE decryption, this algorithm decrypts the JWE ciphertext payload with the JWE’s identified encryption algorithm directly using the symmetric secret key. No encrypted CEK is used.
|
The symmetric secret key MUST be 128, 192 or 256 bits as required by the associated AEAD encryption algorithm used to encrypt the payload. JJWT will throw an exception if it detects weaker keys than what is required. |
The JWT password-based key encryption algorithms PBES2-HS256 A128KW
, PBES2-HS384 A192KW
, and PBES2-HS512 A256KW
are used when you want to use a password (character array) to encrypt and decrypt a JWT.
However, because passwords are usually too weak or problematic to use directly in cryptographic contexts, these algorithms utilize key derivation techniques with work factors (e.g. computation iterations) and secure-random salts to produce stronger cryptographic keys suitable for cryptographic operations.
This allows the payload to be encrypted with a random short-lived cryptographically-stronger key, reducing the need to expose the longer-lived (and potentially weaker) password.
Because these algorithms use a secret password, they are best suited when the JWE creator and receiver are the same, ensuring the secret password does not need to be shared with multiple parties.
During JWE creation, these algorithms:
-
Generate a new secure-random Content Encryption Key (CEK) suitable for the desired encryption algorithm.
-
Encrypt the JWE payload with the desired encryption algorithm using the new CEK, producing the JWE payload ciphertext.
-
Derive a 'key encryption key' (KEK) with the desired "PBES2 with HMAC SHA" algorithm using the password, a suitable number of computational iterations, and a secure-random salt value.
-
Encrypt the generated CEK with the corresponding AES Key Wrap algorithm using the password-derived KEK.
-
Embed the payload ciphertext and encrypted CEK in the resulting JWE.
ℹ️ NOTE
|
Secure defaults
When using these algorithms, if you do not specify a work factor (i.e. number of computational
iterations), JJWT will automatically use an
OWASP PBKDF2 recommended
default appropriate for the specified |
During JWE decryption, these algorithms:
-
Retrieve the encrypted Content Encryption Key (CEK) embedded in the JWE.
-
Derive the 'key encryption key' (KEK) with the discovered "PBES2 with HMAC SHA" algorithm using the password and the number of computational iterations and secure-random salt value discovered in the JWE header.
-
Decrypt the encrypted CEK with the corresponding AES Key Unwrap algorithm using the password-derived KEK.
-
Decrypt the JWE ciphertext payload with the JWE’s identified encryption algorithm using the decrypted CEK.
The JWT Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static key agreement algorithms ECDH-ES
, ECDH-ES A128KW
,
ECDH-ES A192KW
, and ECDH-ES A256KW
are used when you want to use the JWE recipient’s Elliptic Curve public key
during encryption. This ensures that only the JWE recipient can decrypt and read the JWE (using their Elliptic Curve
private key).
During JWE creation, these algorithms:
-
Obtain the Content Encryption Key (CEK) used to encrypt the JWE payload as follows:
-
Inspect the JWE recipient’s Elliptic Curve public key and determine its Curve.
-
Generate a new secure-random ephemeral Elliptic Curve public/private key pair on this same Curve.
-
Add the ephemeral EC public key to the JWE epk header for inclusion in the final JWE.
-
Produce an ECDH shared secret with the ECDH Key Agreement algorithm using the JWE recipient’s EC public key and the ephemeral EC private key.
-
Derive a symmetric secret key with the Concat Key Derivation Function (NIST.800-56A, Section 5.8.1) using this ECDH shared secret and any provided PartyUInfo and/or PartyVInfo.
-
If the key algorithm is
ECDH-ES
:-
Use the Concat KDF-derived symmetric secret key directly as the Content Encryption Key (CEK). No encrypted key is created, nor embedded in the resulting JWE.
-
-
Otherwise, if the key algorithm is
ECDH-ES A128KW
,ECDH-ES A192KW
, orECDH-ES A256KW
:-
Generate a new secure-random Content Encryption Key (CEK) suitable for the desired encryption algorithm.
-
Encrypt this new CEK with the corresponding AES Key Wrap algorithm using the Concat KDF-derived secret key, producing the encrypted CEK.
-
Embed the encrypted CEK in the resulting JWE.
-
-
-
Encrypt the JWE payload with the desired encryption algorithm using the obtained CEK, producing the JWE payload ciphertext.
-
Embed the payload ciphertext in the resulting JWE.
During JWE decryption, these algorithms:
-
Obtain the Content Encryption Key (CEK) used to decrypt the JWE payload as follows:
-
Retrieve the required ephemeral Elliptic Curve public key from the JWE’s epk header.
-
Ensure the ephemeral EC public key exists on the same curve as the JWE recipient’s EC private key.
-
Produce the ECDH shared secret with the ECDH Key Agreement algorithm using the JWE recipient’s EC private key and the ephemeral EC public key.
-
Derive a symmetric secret key with the Concat Key Derivation Function (NIST.800-56A, Section 5.8.1) using this ECDH shared secret and any PartyUInfo and/or PartyVInfo found in the JWE header.
-
If the key algorithm is
ECDH-ES
:-
Use the Concat KDF-derived secret key directly as the Content Encryption Key (CEK). No encrypted key is used.
-
-
Otherwise, if the key algorithm is
ECDH-ES A128KW
,ECDH-ES A192KW
, orECDH-ES A256KW
:-
Obtain the encrypted key ciphertext embedded in the JWE.
-
Decrypt the encrypted key ciphertext with the associated AES Key Unwrap algorithm using the Concat KDF-derived secret key, producing the unencrypted Content Encryption Key (CEK).
-
-
-
Decrypt the JWE payload ciphertext with the JWE’s discovered encryption algorithm using the obtained CEK.
Now that we know the difference between a JWE Encryption Algorithm and a JWE Key Management Algorithm, how do we use them to encrypt a JWT?
You create an encrypted JWT (called a 'JWE') as follows:
-
Use the
Jwts.builder()
method to create aJwtBuilder
instance. -
Call
JwtBuilder
methods to set thepayload
content or claims and any header parameters as desired. -
Call the
encryptWith
method, specifying the Key, Key Algorithm, and Encryption Algorithm you want to use. -
Finally, call the
compact()
method to compact and encrypt, producing the final jwe.
For example:
String jwe = Jwts.builder() // (1)
.subject("Bob") // (2)
.encryptWith(key, keyAlgorithm, encryptionAlgorithm) // (3)
.compact(); // (4)
Before calling compact()
, you may set any header parameters and claims
exactly the same way as described for JWS.
If your JWT payload or Claims set is large (contains a lot of data), you might want to compress the JWE to reduce its size. Please see the main Compression section to see how to compress and decompress JWTs.
You read (parse) a JWE as follows:
-
Use the
Jwts.parser()
method to create aJwtParserBuilder
instance. -
Call either keyLocator or
decryptWith
methods to determine the key used to decrypt the JWE. -
Call the
JwtParserBuilder
'sbuild()
method to create a thread-safeJwtParser
. -
Parse the jwe string with the
JwtParser
'sparseEncryptedClaims
orparseEncryptedContent
method. -
Wrap the entire call is in a try/catch block in case decryption or integrity verification fails.
For example:
Jwe<Claims> jwe;
try {
jwe = Jwts.parser() // (1)
.keyLocator(keyLocator) // (2) dynamically lookup decryption keys based on each JWE
//.decryptWith(key) // or a static key used to decrypt all encountered JWEs
.build() // (3)
.parseEncryptedClaims(jweString); // (4) or parseEncryptedContent(jweString);
// we can safely trust the JWT
catch (JwtException ex) { // (5)
// we *cannot* use the JWT as intended by its creator
}
ℹ️ NOTE
|
Type-safe JWEs
|
The most important thing to do when reading a JWE is to specify the key used during decryption. If decryption or integrity protection checks fail, the JWT cannot be safely trusted and should be discarded.
So which key do we use for decryption?
-
If the jwe was encrypted directly with a
SecretKey
, the sameSecretKey
must be specified on theJwtParserBuilder
. For example:Jwts.parser() .decryptWith(secretKey) // <---- .build() .parseEncryptedClaims(jweString);
-
If the jwe was encrypted using a key produced by a Password-based key derivation
KeyAlgorithm
, the samePassword
must be specified on theJwtParserBuilder
. For example:Password password = Keys.password(passwordChars); Jwts.parser() .decryptWith(password) // <---- an `io.jsonwebtoken.security.Password` instance .build() .parseEncryptedClaims(jweString);
-
If the jwe was encrypted with a key produced by an asymmetric
KeyAlgorithm
, the correspondingPrivateKey
(not thePublicKey
) must be specified on theJwtParserBuilder
. For example:Jwts.parser() .decryptWith(privateKey) // <---- a `PrivateKey`, not a `PublicKey` .build() .parseSignedClaims(jweString);
What if your application doesn’t use just a single SecretKey
or KeyPair
? What
if JWEs can be created with different SecretKey
s, Password
s or public/private keys, or a combination of all of
them? How do you know which key to specify if you can’t inspect the JWT first?
In these cases, you can’t call the JwtParserBuilder
's decryptWith
method with a single key - instead, you’ll need
to use a Key Locator
. Please see the Key Lookup section to see how to dynamically obtain different
keys when parsing JWSs or JWEs.
The JWT ECDH-ES
, ECDH-ES A128KW
, ECDH-ES A192KW
, and ECDH-ES A256KW
key algorithms validate JWE input using
public key information, even when using PrivateKey
s to decrypt. Ordinarily this is automatically performed
by JJWT when your PrivateKey
instances implement the
ECKey or
EdECKey
(or BouncyCastle equivalent) interfaces, which is the case for most JCA Provider
implementations.
However, if your decryption PrivateKey
s are stored in a Hardware Security Module (HSM) and/or you use the
SunPKCS11 Provider,
it is likely that your PrivateKey
instances do not implement ECKey
.
In these cases, you need to provide both the PKCS11 PrivateKey
and it’s companion PublicKey
during decryption
by using the Keys.builder
method. For example:
KeyPair pair = getMyPkcs11KeyPair();
PrivateKey jwtParserDecryptionKey = Keys.builder(pair.getPrivate())
.publicKey(pair.getPublic()) // PublicKey must implement ECKey or EdECKey or BouncyCastle equivalent
.build();
You then use the resulting jwtParserDecryptionKey
(not pair.getPrivate()
) with the JwtParserBuilder
or as
the return value from a custom Key Locator implementation. For example:
PrivateKey decryptionKey = Keys.builder(pkcs11PrivateKey).publicKey(pkcs11PublicKey).build();
Jwts.parser()
.decryptWith(decryptionKey) // <----
.build()
.parseEncryptedClaims(jweString);
Or as the return value from your key locator:
Jwts.parser()
.keyLocator(keyLocator) // your keyLocator.locate(header) would return Keys.builder...
.build()
.parseEncryptedClaims(jweString);
Please see the Provider-constrained Keys section for more information, as well as
code examples of how to implement a Key Locator
using the Keys.builder
technique.
If a JWE is compressed using the DEF
(DEFLATE) or GZIP
(GZIP) compression algorithms, it will automatically be decompressed
after decryption, and there is nothing you need to configure.
If, however, a custom compression algorithm was used to compress the JWE, you will need to tell the
JwtParserBuilder
how to resolve your CompressionAlgorithm
to decompress the JWT.
Please see the Compression section below to see how to decompress JWTs during parsing.
JSON Web Keys (JWKs) are JSON serializations of cryptographic keys, allowing key material to be embedded in JWTs or transmitted between parties in a standard JSON-based text format. They are essentially a JSON-based alternative to other text-based key formats, such as the DER, PEM and PKCS12 text strings or files commonly used when configuring TLS on web servers, for example.
For example, an identity web service may expose its RSA or Elliptic Curve Public Keys to 3rd parties in the JWK format. A client may then parse the public key JWKs to verify the service’s JWS tokens, as well as send encrypted information to the service using JWEs.
JWKs can be converted to and from standard Java Key
types as expected using the same builder/parser patterns we’ve
seen for JWTs.
You create a JWK as follows:
-
Use the
Jwks.builder()
method to create aJwkBuilder
instance. -
Call the
key
method with the Java key you wish to represent as a JWK. -
Call builder methods to set any additional key parameters or metadata, such as a
kid
(Key ID), X509 Certificates, etc as desired. -
Call the
build()
method to produce the resulting JWK.
For example:
SecretKey key = getSecretKey(); // or RSA or EC PublicKey or PrivateKey
SecretJwk = Jwks.builder().key(key) // (1) and (2)
.id("mySecretKeyId") // (3)
// ... etc ...
.build(); // (4)
You can read/parse a JWK by building a JwkParser
and parsing the JWK JSON string with its parse
method:
String json = getJwkJsonString();
Jwk<?> jwk = Jwks.parser()
//.provider(aJcaProvider) // optional
//.deserializer(deserializer) // optional
.build() // create the parser
.parse(json); // actually parse the JSON
Key key = jwk.toKey(); // convert to a Java Key instance
As shown above you can specify a custom JCA Provider or JSON deserializer in the same way as the JwtBuilder
.
Unlike Java, the JWA specification requires a private JWKs to contain both public key and private key material (see RFC 7518, Section 6.1.1 and RFC 7518, Section 6.3.2).
In this sense, a private JWK (represented as a PrivateJwk
or a subtype, such as RsaPrivateJwk
, EcPrivateJwk
, etc)
can be thought of more like a Java KeyPair
instance. Consequently, when creating a PrivateJwk
instance,
the PrivateKey
's corresponding PublicKey
is required.
If you do not provide a PublicKey
when creating a PrivateJwk
, JJWT will automatically derive the PublicKey
from
the PrivateKey
instance if possible. However, because this can add
some computing time, it is typically recommended to provide the PublicKey
when possible to avoid this extra work.
For example:
RSAPrivateKey rsaPrivateKey = getRSAPrivateKey(); // or ECPrivateKey
RsaPrivateJwk jwk = Jwks.builder().key(rsaPrivateKey)
//.publicKey(rsaPublicKey) // optional, but recommended to avoid extra computation work
.build();
If you have a Java KeyPair
instance, then you have both the public and private key material necessary to create a
PrivateJwk
. For example:
KeyPair rsaKeyPair = getRSAKeyPair();
RsaPrivateJwk rsaPrivJwk = Jwks.builder().rsaKeyPair(rsaKeyPair).build();
KeyPair ecKeyPair = getECKeyPair();
EcPrivateJwk ecPrivJwk = Jwks.builder().ecKeyPair(ecKeyPair).build();
KeyPair edEcKeyPair = getEdECKeyPair();
OctetPrivateJwk edEcPrivJwk = Jwks.builder().octetKeyPair(edEcKeyPair).build();
Note that:
-
An exception will be thrown when calling
rsaKeyPair
if the specifiedKeyPair
instance does not containRSAPublicKey
andRSAPrivateKey
instances. -
Similarly, an exception will be thrown when calling
ecKeyPair
if theKeyPair
instance does not containECPublicKey
andECPrivateKey
instances. -
Finally, an exception will be thrown when calling
octetKeyPair
if theKeyPair
instance does not contain X25519, X448, Ed25519, or Ed448 keys (introduced in JDK 11 and 15 or when using BouncyCastle).
Because private JWKs contain public key material, you can always obtain the private JWK’s corresponding public JWK and
Java PublicKey
or KeyPair
. For example:
RsaPrivateJwk privateJwk = Jwks.builder().key(rsaPrivateKey).build(); // or ecPrivateKey or edEcPrivateKey
// Get the matching public JWK and/or PublicKey:
RsaPublicJwk pubJwk = privateJwk.toPublicJwk(); // JWK instance
RSAPublicKey pubKey = pubJwk.toKey(); // Java PublicKey instance
KeyPair pair = privateJwk.toKeyPair(); // io.jsonwebtoken.security.KeyPair retains key types
java.security.KeyPair jdkPair = pair.toJavaKeyPair(); // does not retain pub/private key types
A JWK Thumbprint is a digest (aka hash) of a canonical JSON representation of a JWK’s public properties. 'Canonical' in this case means that only RFC-specified values in any JWK are used in an exact order thumbprint calculation. This ensures that anyone can calculate a JWK’s same exact thumbprint, regardless of custom parameters or JSON key/value ordering differences in a JWK.
All Jwk
instances support JWK Thumbprints via the
thumbprint()
and thumbprint(HashAlgorithm)
methods:
HashAlgorithm hashAlg = Jwks.HASH.SHA256; // or SHA384, SHA512, etc.
Jwk<?> jwk = Jwks.builder(). /* ... */ .build();
JwkThumbprint sha256Thumbprint = jwk.thumbprint(); // SHA-256 thumbprint by default
JwkThumbprint anotherThumbprint = jwk.thumbprint(Jwks.HASH.SHA512); // or a specified hash algorithm
The resulting JwkThumbprint
instance provides some useful methods:
-
jwkThumbprint.toByteArray()
: the thumbprint’s actual digest bytes - i.e. the raw output from the hash algorithm -
jwkThumbprint.toString()
: the digest bytes as a Base64URL-encoded string -
jwkThumbprint.getHashAlgorithm()
: the specificHashAlgorithm
used to compute the thumbprint. Many standard IANA hash algorithms are available as constants in theJwks.HASH
utility class. -
jwkThumbprint.toURI()
: the thumbprint’s canonical URI as defined by the JWK Thumbprint URI specification
Because a thumbprint is an order-guaranteed unique digest of a JWK, JWK thumbprints are often used as convenient
unique identifiers for a JWK (e.g. the JWK’s kid
(Key ID) value). These identifiers can be useful when
locating keys for JWS signature verification or JWE decryption, for example.
For example:
String kid = jwk.thumbprint().toString(); // Thumbprint bytes as a Base64URL-encoded string
Key key = findKey(kid);
assert jwk.toKey().equals(key);
However, because Jwk
instances are immutable, you can’t set the key id after the JWK is created. For example, the
following is not possible:
String kid = jwk.thumbprint().toString();
jwk.setId(kid) // Jwks are immutable - there is no `setId` method
Instead, you may use the idFromThumbprint
methods on the JwkBuilder
when creating a Jwk
:
Jwk<?> jwk = Jwks.builder().key(aKey)
.idFromThumbprint() // or idFromThumbprint(HashAlgorithm)
.build();
Calling either idFromThumbprint
method will ensure that calling jwk.getId()
equals thumbprint.toString()
(which is Encoders.BASE64URL.encode(thumbprint.toByteArray())
).
A JWK’s thumbprint’s canonical URI as defined by the JWK Thumbprint URI
specification may be obtained by calling the thumbprint’s toURI()
method:
URI canonicalThumbprintURI = jwk.thumbprint().toURI();
Per the RFC specification, if you call canonicalThumbprintURI.toString()
, you would see a string that looks like this:
urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:HASH_ALG_ID:BASE64URL_DIGEST
where:
-
urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:
is the URI scheme prefix -
HASH_ALG_ID
is the standard identifier used to compute the thumbprint as defined in the IANA Named Information Hash Algorithm Registry. This is the same asthumbprint.getHashAlgorithm().getId()
. -
BASE64URL_DIGEST
is the Base64URL-encoded thumbprint bytes, equal tojwkThumbprint.toString()
.
Because they contain secret or private key material, SecretJwk
and PrivateJwk
(e.g. RsaPrivateJwk
,
EcPrivateJwk
, etc) instances should be used with great care and never accidentally transmitted to 3rd parties.
Even so, JJWT’s Jwk
implementations will suppress certain values in toString()
output for safety as described
next.
Because it would be incredibly easy to accidentally print key material to System.out.println()
or application
logs, all Jwk
implementations will print redacted values instead of actual secret or private key material.
For example, consider the following Secret JWK JSON example from RFC 7515, Appendix A.1.1:
{
"kty": "oct",
"k": "AyM1SysPpbyDfgZld3umj1qzKObwVMkoqQ-EstJQLr_T-1qS0gZH75aKtMN3Yj0iPS4hcgUuTwjAzZr1Z9CAow",
"kid": "HMAC key used in https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515#appendix-A.1.1 example."
}
The k
value (AyAyM1SysPpby...
) reflects secure key material and should never be accidentally
exposed.
If you were to parse this JSON as a Jwk
, calling toString()
will NOT print this value. It will
instead print the string literal <redacted>
for any secret or private key data value. For example:
String json = getExampleSecretKeyJson();
Jwk<?> jwk = Jwks.parser().build().parse(json);
System.out.printn(jwk);
This code would print the following string literal to the System console:
{kty=oct, k=<redacted>, kid=HMAC key used in https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515#appendix-A.1.1 example.}
This is true for all secret or private key members in SecretJwk
and PrivateJwk
(e.g. RsaPrivateJwk
,
EcPrivateJwk
, etc) instances.
The JWK specification specification also defines the concept of a JWK Set:
A JWK Set is a JSON object that represents a set of JWKs. The JSON object MUST have a "keys" member, with its value being an array of JWKs.
For example:
{
"keys": [jwk1, jwk2, ...]
}
Where jwk1
, jwk2
, etc., are each a single JWK JSON Object.
A JWK Set may have other members that are peers to the keys
member, but the JWK specification does not define any
others - any such additional members would be custom or unique based on an application’s needs or preferences.
A JWK Set can be useful for conveying multiple keys simultaneously. For example, an identity web service could expose all of its RSA or Elliptic Curve public keys that might be used for various purposes or different algorithms to 3rd parties or API clients as a single JWK Set JSON Object or document. An API client can then parse the JWK Set to obtain the keys that might be used to verify or decrypt JWTs sent by the web service.
JWK Sets are (mostly) simple collections of JWKs, and they are easily supported by JJWT with parallel builder/parser concepts we’ve seen above.
You create a JWK Set as follows:
-
Use the
Jwks.set()
method to create aJwkSetBuilder
instance. -
Call the
add(Jwk)
method any number of times to add one or more JWKs to the set. -
Call builder methods to set any additional JSON members if desired, or the
operationPolicy(KeyOperationPolicy)
builder method to control what key operations may be assigned to any given JWK added to the set. -
Call the
build()
method to produce the resulting JWK Set.
For example:
Jwk<?> jwk = Jwks.builder()/* ... */.build();
SecretJwk = Jwks.set() // 1
.add(jwk) // 2, appends a key
//.add(aCollection) // append multiple keys
//.keys(allJwks) // sets/replaces all keys
//.add("aName", "aValue") // 3, optional
//.operationPolicy(Jwks.OP // 3, optional
// .policy()
// /* etc... */
// .build())
//.provider(aJcaProvider) // optional
.build(); // (4)
As shown, you can optionally configure the .operationPolicy(KeyOperationPolicy)
method using a
Jwts.OP.policy()
builder. A KeyOperationPolicy
allows you control what operations are allowed for any JWK
before being added to the JWK Set; any JWK that does not match the policy will be rejected and not added to the set.
JJWT internally defaults to a standard RFC-compliant policy, but you can create a
policy to override the default if desired using the Jwks.OP.policy()
builder method.
You can read/parse a JWK Set by building a JWK Set Parser
and parsing the JWK Set JSON with one of its various
parse
methods:
JwkSet jwkSet = Jwks.setParser()
//.provider(aJcaProvider) // optional
//.deserializer(deserializer) // optional
//.policy(aKeyOperationPolicy) // optional
.build() // create the parser
.parse(json); // actually parse JSON String, InputStream, Reader, etc.
jwkSet.forEach(jwk -> System.out.println(jwk));
As shown above, you can specify a custom JCA Provider, JSON deserializer or KeyOperationPolicy
in the
same way as the JwkSetBuilder
. Any JWK that does not match the default (or configured) policy will be
rejected. You can create a policy to override the default if desired using the Jwks.OP.policy()
builder method.
|
The JWT specification standardizes compression for JWEs (Encrypted JWTs) ONLY, however JJWT supports it for JWS (Signed JWTs) as well. If you are positive that a JWS you create with JJWT will also be parsed with JJWT, you can use this feature with both JWEs and JWSs, otherwise it is best to only use it for JWEs. |
If a JWT’s payload
is sufficiently large - that is, it is a large content byte array or JSON with a lot of
name/value pairs (or individual values are very large or verbose) - you can reduce the size of the compact JWT by
compressing the payload.
This might be important to you if the resulting JWT is used in a URL for example, since URLs are best kept under 4096 characters due to browser, user mail agent, or HTTP gateway compatibility issues. Smaller JWTs also help reduce bandwidth utilization, which may or may not be important depending on your application’s volume or needs.
If you want to compress your JWT, you can use the JwtBuilder
's compressWith(CompressionAlgorithm)
method. For
example:
Jwts.builder()
.compressWith(Jwts.ZIP.DEF) // DEFLATE compression algorithm
// .. etc ...
If you use any of the algorithm constants in the Jwts.ZIP
class, that’s it, you’re done. You don’t have to
do anything during parsing or configure the JwtParserBuilder
for compression - JJWT will automatically decompress
the payload as expected.
If the default Jwts.ZIP
compression algorithms are not suitable for your needs, you can create your own
CompressionAlgorithm
implementation(s).
Just as you would with the default algorithms, you may specify that you want a JWT compressed by calling the
JwtBuilder
's compressWith
method, supplying your custom implementation instance. For example:
CompressionAlgorithm myAlg = new MyCompressionAlgorithm();
Jwts.builder()
.compressWith(myAlg) // <----
// .. etc ...
When you call compressWith
, the JWT payload
will be compressed with your algorithm, and the
zip
(Compression Algorithm)
header will automatically be set to the value returned by your algorithm’s algorithm.getId()
method as
required by the JWT specification.
However, the JwtParser
needs to be aware of this custom algorithm as well, so it can use it while parsing. You do this
by modifying the JwtParserBuilder
's zip()
collection. For example:
CompressionAlgorithm myAlg = new MyCompressionAlgorithm();
Jwts.parser()
.zip().add(myAlg).and() // <----
// .. etc ...
This adds additional CompressionAlgorithm
implementations to the parser’s overall total set of supported compression
algorithms (which already includes all of the Jwts.ZIP
algorithms by default).
The parser will then automatically check to see if the JWT zip
header has been set to see if a compression
algorithm has been used to compress the JWT. If set, the parser will automatically look up your
CompressionAlgorithm
by its getId()
value, and use it to decompress the JWT.
A JwtBuilder
will serialize the Header
and Claims
maps (and potentially any Java objects they
contain) to JSON with a Serializer<Map<String, ?>>
instance. Similarly, a JwtParser
will
deserialize JSON into the Header
and Claims
using a Deserializer<Map<String, ?>>
instance.
If you don’t explicitly configure a JwtBuilder
's Serializer
or a JwtParserBuilder
's Deserializer
, JJWT will
automatically attempt to discover and use the following JSON implementations if found in the runtime classpath.
They are checked in order, and the first one found is used:
-
Jackson: This will automatically be used if you specify
io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-jackson
as a project runtime dependency. Jackson supports POJOs as claims with full marshaling/unmarshaling as necessary. -
Gson: This will automatically be used if you specify
io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-gson
as a project runtime dependency. Gson also supports POJOs as claims with full marshaling/unmarshaling as necessary. -
JSON-Java (
org.json
): This will be used automatically if you specifyio.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-orgjson
as a project runtime dependency.ℹ️ NOTEorg.json
APIs are natively enabled in Android environments so this is the recommended JSON processor for Android applications unless you want to use POJOs as claims. Theorg.json
library supports simple Object-to-JSON marshaling, but it does not support JSON-to-Object unmarshalling.
If you want to use POJOs as claim values, use either the io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-jackson
or
io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-gson
dependency (or implement your own Serializer and Deserializer if desired). But beware,
Jackson will force a sizable (> 1 MB) dependency to an Android application thus increasing the app download size for
mobile users.
If you don’t want to use JJWT’s runtime dependency approach, or just want to customize how JSON serialization and
deserialization works, you can implement the Serializer
and Deserializer
interfaces and specify instances of
them on the JwtBuilder
and JwtParserBuilder
respectively. For example:
When creating a JWT:
Serializer<Map<String,?>> serializer = getMySerializer(); //implement me
Jwts.builder()
.json(serializer)
// ... etc ...
When reading a JWT:
Deserializer<Map<String,?>> deserializer = getMyDeserializer(); //implement me
Jwts.parser()
.json(deserializer)
// ... etc ...
If you want to use Jackson for JSON processing, just including the io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-jackson
dependency as a
runtime dependency is all that is necessary in most projects, since Gradle and Maven will automatically pull in
the necessary Jackson dependencies as well.
After including this dependency, JJWT will automatically find the Jackson implementation on the runtime classpath and use it internally for JSON parsing. There is nothing else you need to do - JJWT will automatically create a new Jackson ObjectMapper for its needs as required.
However, if you have an application-wide Jackson ObjectMapper
(as is typically recommended for most applications),
you can configure JJWT to use your own ObjectMapper
instead.
You do this by declaring the io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-jackson
dependency with compile scope (not runtime
scope which is the typical JJWT default). That is:
Maven
<dependency>
<groupId>io.jsonwebtoken</groupId>
<artifactId>jjwt-jackson</artifactId>
<version>0.12.5</version>
<scope>compile</scope> <!-- Not runtime -->
</dependency>
Gradle or Android
dependencies {
implementation 'io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-jackson:0.12.5'
}
And then you can specify the JacksonSerializer
using your own ObjectMapper
on the JwtBuilder
:
ObjectMapper objectMapper = getMyObjectMapper(); //implement me
String jws = Jwts.builder()
.json(new JacksonSerializer(objectMapper))
// ... etc ...
and the JacksonDeserializer
using your ObjectMapper
on the JwtParserBuilder
:
ObjectMapper objectMapper = getMyObjectMapper(); //implement me
Jwts.parser()
.json(new JacksonDeserializer(objectMapper))
// ... etc ...
By default, JJWT will only convert simple claim types: String, Date, Long, Integer, Short and Byte. If you need to
deserialize other types you can configure the JacksonDeserializer
by passing a Map
of claim names to types in
through a constructor. For example:
new JacksonDeserializer(Maps.of("user", User.class).build())
This would trigger the value in the user
claim to be deserialized into the custom type of User
. Given the claims
payload of:
{
"issuer": "https://example.com/issuer",
"user": {
"firstName": "Jill",
"lastName": "Coder"
}
}
The User
object could be retrieved from the user
claim with the following code:
Jwts.parser()
.json(new JacksonDeserializer(Maps.of("user", User.class).build())) // <-----
.build()
.parseUnprotectedClaims(aJwtString)
.getPayload()
.get("user", User.class); // <-----
ℹ️ NOTE
|
Using this constructor is mutually exclusive with the |
If you want to use Gson for JSON processing, just including the io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-gson
dependency as a
runtime dependency is all that is necessary in most projects, since Gradle and Maven will automatically pull in
the necessary Gson dependencies as well.
After including this dependency, JJWT will automatically find the Gson implementation on the runtime classpath and use it internally for JSON parsing. There is nothing else you need to do - just declaring the dependency is all that is required, no code or config is necessary.
If you’re curious, JJWT will automatically create an internal default Gson instance for its own needs as follows:
new GsonBuilder()
.registerTypeHierarchyAdapter(io.jsonwebtoken.lang.Supplier.class, GsonSupplierSerializer.INSTANCE)
.disableHtmlEscaping().create();
The registerTypeHierarchyAdapter
builder call is required to serialize JWKs with secret or private values.
However, if you prefer to use a different Gson instance instead of JJWT’s default, you can configure JJWT to use your own - just don’t forget to register the necessary JJWT type hierarchy adapter.
You do this by declaring the io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-gson
dependency with compile scope (not runtime
scope which is the typical JJWT default). That is:
Maven
<dependency>
<groupId>io.jsonwebtoken</groupId>
<artifactId>jjwt-gson</artifactId>
<version>0.12.5</version>
<scope>compile</scope> <!-- Not runtime -->
</dependency>
Gradle or Android
dependencies {
implementation 'io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-gson:0.12.5'
}
And then you can specify the GsonSerializer
using your own Gson
instance on the JwtBuilder
:
Gson gson = new GsonBuilder()
// don't forget this line!:
.registerTypeHierarchyAdapter(io.jsonwebtoken.lang.Supplier.class, GsonSupplierSerializer.INSTANCE)
.disableHtmlEscaping().create();
String jws = Jwts.builder()
.json(new GsonSerializer(gson))
// ... etc ...
and the GsonDeserializer
using your Gson
instance on the JwtParser
:
Gson gson = getGson(); //implement me
Jwts.parser()
.json(new GsonDeserializer(gson))
// ... etc ...
Again, as shown above, it is critical to create your Gson
instance using the GsonBuilder
and include the line:
.registerTypeHierarchyAdapter(io.jsonwebtoken.lang.Supplier.class, GsonSupplierSerializer.INSTANCE)
to ensure JWK serialization works as expected.
JJWT uses a very fast pure-Java Base64 codec for Base64 and Base64Url encoding and decoding that is guaranteed to work deterministically in all JDK and Android environments.
You can access JJWT’s encoders and decoders using the io.jsonwebtoken.io.Encoders
and io.jsonwebtoken.io.Decoders
utility classes.
io.jsonwebtoken.io.Encoders
:
io.jsonwebtoken.io.Decoders
:
All cryptographic operations, like encryption and message digest calculations, result in binary data - raw byte arrays.
Because raw byte arrays cannot be represented natively in JSON, the JWT specifications employ the Base64URL encoding scheme to represent these raw byte values in JSON documents or compound structures like a JWT.
This means that the Base64 and Base64URL algorithms take a raw byte array and converts the bytes into a string suitable to use in text documents and protocols like HTTP. These algorithms can also convert these strings back into the original raw byte arrays for decryption or signature verification as necessary.
That’s nice and convenient, but there are two very important properties of Base64 (and Base64URL) text strings that are critical to remember when they are used in security scenarios like with JWTs:
-
Changing Base64 characters does not automatically invalidate data.
Base64-encoded text is not encrypted.
While a byte array representation can be converted to text with the Base64 algorithms, anyone in the world can take Base64-encoded text, decode it with any standard Base64 decoder, and obtain the underlying raw byte array data. No key or secret is required to decode Base64 text - anyone can do it.
Based on this, when encoding sensitive byte data with Base64 - like a shared or private key - the resulting string is NOT safe to expose publicly.
A base64-encoded key is still sensitive information and must be kept as secret and as safe as the original source
of the bytes (e.g. a Java PrivateKey
or SecretKey
instance).
After Base64-encoding data into a string, it is possible to then encrypt the string to keep it safe from prying eyes if desired, but this is different. Encryption is not encoding. They are separate concepts.
In an effort to see if signatures or encryption is truly validated correctly, some try to edit a JWT string - particularly the Base64-encoded signature part - to see if the edited string fails security validations.
This conceptually makes sense: change the signature string, you would assume that signature validation would fail.
But this doesn’t always work. Changing base64 characters is an invalid test.
Why?
Because of the way the Base64 algorithm works, there are multiple Base64 strings that can represent the same raw byte array.
Going into the details of the Base64 algorithm is out of scope for this documentation, but there are many good Stackoverflow answers and JJWT issue comments that explain this in detail. Here’s one good answer:
|
Remember that Base64 encodes each 8 bit entity into 6 bit chars. The resulting string then needs exactly 11 * 8 / 6 bytes, or 14 2/3 chars. But you can’t write partial characters. Only the first 4 bits (or 2/3 of the last char) are significant. The last two bits are not decoded. Thus all of:
All decode to the same 11 bytes (116, 101, 115, 116, 32, 115, 116, 114, 105, 110, 106). |
As you can see by the above 4 examples, they all decode to the same exact 11 bytes. So just changing one or two characters at the end of a Base64 string may not work and can often result in an invalid test.
JJWT’s default Base64/Base64URL decoders automatically ignore illegal Base64 characters located in the beginning and
end of an encoded string. Therefore, prepending or appending invalid characters like {
or ]
or similar will also
not fail JJWT’s signature checks either. Why?
Because such edits - whether changing a trailing character or two, or appending invalid characters - do not actually change the real signature, which in cryptographic contexts, is always a byte array. Instead, tests like these change a text encoding of the byte array, and as we covered above, they are different things.
So JJWT 'cares' more about the real byte array and less about its text encoding because that is what actually matters in cryptographic operations. In this sense, JJWT follows the Robustness Principle in being slightly lenient on what is accepted per the rules of Base64, but if anything in the real underlying byte array is changed, then yes, JJWT’s cryptographic assertions will definitely fail.
To help understand JJWT’s approach, we have to remember why signatures exist. From our documentation above on signing JWTs:
guarantees it was created by someone we know (it is authentic), as well as
guarantees that no-one has manipulated or changed it after it was created (its integrity is maintained).
Just prepending or appending invalid text to try to 'trick' the algorithm doesn’t change the integrity of the underlying claims or signature byte arrays, nor the authenticity of the claims byte array, because those byte arrays are still obtained intact.
Please see JJWT Issue #518 and its referenced issues and links for more information.
If for some reason you want to specify your own Base64Url encoder and decoder, you can use the JwtBuilder
encoder
method to set the encoder:
Encoder<byte[], String> encoder = getMyBase64UrlEncoder(); //implement me
String jws = Jwts.builder()
.b64Url(encoder)
// ... etc ...
and the JwtParserBuilder
's decoder
method to set the decoder:
Decoder<String, byte[]> decoder = getMyBase64UrlDecoder(); //implement me
Jwts.parser()
.b64Url(decoder)
// ... etc ...
This is an example showing how to digitally sign a JWT using an HMAC (hash-based message authentication code). The JWT specifications define 3 standard HMAC signing algorithms:
-
HS256
: HMAC with SHA-256. This requires a 256-bit (32 byte)SecretKey
or larger. -
HS384
: HMAC with SHA-384. This requires a 384-bit (48 byte)SecretKey
or larger. -
HS512
: HMAC with SHA-512. This requires a 512-bit (64 byte)SecretKey
or larger.
Example:
// Create a test key suitable for the desired HMAC-SHA algorithm:
MacAlgorithm alg = Jwts.SIG.HS512; //or HS384 or HS256
SecretKey key = alg.key().build();
String message = "Hello World!";
byte[] content = message.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
// Create the compact JWS:
String jws = Jwts.builder().content(content, "text/plain").signWith(key, alg).compact();
// Parse the compact JWS:
content = Jwts.parser().verifyWith(key).build().parseSignedContent(jws).getPayload();
assert message.equals(new String(content, StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
This is an example showing how to digitally sign and verify a JWT using RSA cryptography. The JWT specifications define 6 standard RSA signing algorithms. All 6 require that RSA keys 2048-bits or larger must be used.
In this example, Bob will sign a JWT using his RSA private key, and Alice can verify it came from Bob using Bob’s RSA public key:
// Create a test key suitable for the desired RSA signature algorithm:
SignatureAlgorithm alg = Jwts.SIG.RS512; //or PS512, RS256, etc...
KeyPair pair = alg.keyPair().build();
// Bob creates the compact JWS with his RSA private key:
String jws = Jwts.builder().subject("Alice")
.signWith(pair.getPrivate(), alg) // <-- Bob's RSA private key
.compact();
// Alice receives and verifies the compact JWS came from Bob:
String subject = Jwts.parser()
.verifyWith(pair.getPublic()) // <-- Bob's RSA public key
.build().parseSignedClaims(jws).getPayload().getSubject();
assert "Alice".equals(subject);
This is an example showing how to digitally sign and verify a JWT using the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm. The JWT specifications define 3 standard ECDSA signing algorithms:
-
ES256
: ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256. This requires an EC Key exactly 256 bits (32 bytes) long. -
ES384
: ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384. This requires an EC Key exactly 384 bits (48 bytes) long. -
ES512
: ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512. This requires an EC Key exactly 521 bits (65 or 66 bytes depending on format) long.
In this example, Bob will sign a JWT using his EC private key, and Alice can verify it came from Bob using Bob’s EC public key:
// Create a test key suitable for the desired ECDSA signature algorithm:
SignatureAlgorithm alg = Jwts.SIG.ES512; //or ES256 or ES384
KeyPair pair = alg.keyPair().build();
// Bob creates the compact JWS with his EC private key:
String jws = Jwts.builder().subject("Alice")
.signWith(pair.getPrivate(), alg) // <-- Bob's EC private key
.compact();
// Alice receives and verifies the compact JWS came from Bob:
String subject = Jwts.parser()
.verifyWith(pair.getPublic()) // <-- Bob's EC public key
.build().parseSignedClaims(jws).getPayload().getSubject();
assert "Alice".equals(subject);
This is an example showing how to digitally sign and verify a JWT using the
Edwards Curve Digital Signature Algorithm using
Ed25519
or Ed448
keys.
ℹ️ NOTE
|
The If you are using JDK 14 or earlier and you want to use them, see the Installation section to see how to enable BouncyCastle. |
The EdDSA
signature algorithm is defined for JWS in RFC 8037, Section 3.1
using keys for two Edwards curves:
-
Ed25519
:EdDSA
using curveEd25519
.Ed25519
algorithm keys must be 255 bits long and produce signatures 512 bits (64 bytes) long. -
Ed448
:EdDSA
using curveEd448
.Ed448
algorithm keys must be 448 bits long and produce signatures 912 bits (114 bytes) long.
In this example, Bob will sign a JWT using his Edwards Curve private key, and Alice can verify it came from Bob using Bob’s Edwards Curve public key:
// Create a test key suitable for the EdDSA signature algorithm using Ed25519 or Ed448 keys:
Curve curve = Jwks.CRV.Ed25519; //or Ed448
KeyPair pair = curve.keyPair().build();
// Bob creates the compact JWS with his Edwards Curve private key:
String jws = Jwts.builder().subject("Alice")
.signWith(pair.getPrivate(), Jwts.SIG.EdDSA) // <-- Bob's Edwards Curve private key w/ EdDSA
.compact();
// Alice receives and verifies the compact JWS came from Bob:
String subject = Jwts.parser()
.verifyWith(pair.getPublic()) // <-- Bob's Edwards Curve public key
.build().parseSignedClaims(jws).getPayload().getSubject();
assert "Alice".equals(subject);
This is an example showing how to encrypt a JWT directly using a symmetric secret key. The JWT specifications define 6 standard AEAD Encryption algorithms:
-
A128GCM
: AES GCM using a 128-bit (16 byte)SecretKey
or larger. -
A192GCM
: AES GCM using a 192-bit (24 byte)SecretKey
or larger. -
A256GCM
: AES GCM using a 256-bit (32 byte)SecretKey
or larger. -
A128CBC-HS256
: AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 using a 256-bit (32 byte)SecretKey
. -
A192CBC-HS384
: AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 using a 384-bit (48 byte)SecretKey
. -
A256CBC-HS512
: AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 using a 512-bit (64 byte)SecretKey
.
The AES GCM (A128GCM
, A192GCM
and A256GCM
) algorithms are strongly recommended - they are faster and more
efficient than the A*CBC-HS*
variants, but they do require JDK 8 or later (or JDK 7 BouncyCastle).
Example:
// Create a test key suitable for the desired payload encryption algorithm:
// (A*GCM algorithms are recommended, but require JDK >= 8 or BouncyCastle)
AeadAlgorithm enc = Jwts.ENC.A256GCM; //or A128GCM, A192GCM, A256CBC-HS512, etc...
SecretKey key = enc.key().build();
String message = "Live long and prosper.";
byte[] content = message.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
// Create the compact JWE:
String jwe = Jwts.builder().content(content, "text/plain").encryptWith(key, enc).compact();
// Parse the compact JWE:
content = Jwts.parser().decryptWith(key).build().parseEncryptedContent(jwe).getPayload();
assert message.equals(new String(content, StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
This is an example showing how to encrypt and decrypt a JWT using RSA cryptography.
Because RSA cannot encrypt much data, RSA is used to encrypt and decrypt a secure-random key, and that generated key in turn is used to actually encrypt the payload as described in the RSA Key Encryption section above. As such, RSA Key Algorithms must be paired with an AEAD Encryption Algorithm, as shown below.
In this example, Bob will encrypt a JWT using Alice’s RSA public key to ensure only she may read it. Alice can then decrypt the JWT using her RSA private key:
// Create a test KeyPair suitable for the desired RSA key algorithm:
KeyPair pair = Jwts.SIG.RS512.keyPair().build();
// Choose the key algorithm used encrypt the payload key:
KeyAlgorithm<PublicKey, PrivateKey> alg = Jwts.KEY.RSA_OAEP_256; //or RSA_OAEP or RSA1_5
// Choose the Encryption Algorithm to encrypt the payload:
AeadAlgorithm enc = Jwts.ENC.A256GCM; //or A192GCM, A128GCM, A256CBC-HS512, etc...
// Bob creates the compact JWE with Alice's RSA public key so only she may read it:
String jwe = Jwts.builder().audience().add("Alice").and()
.encryptWith(pair.getPublic(), alg, enc) // <-- Alice's RSA public key
.compact();
// Alice receives and decrypts the compact JWE:
Set<String> audience = Jwts.parser()
.decryptWith(pair.getPrivate()) // <-- Alice's RSA private key
.build().parseEncryptedClaims(jwe).getPayload().getAudience();
assert audience.contains("Alice");
This is an example showing how to encrypt and decrypt a JWT using AES Key Wrap algorithms.
These algorithms use AES to encrypt and decrypt a secure-random key, and that generated key in turn is used to actually encrypt the payload as described in the AES Key Encryption section above. This allows the payload to be encrypted with a random short-lived key, reducing material exposure of the potentially longer-lived symmetric secret key. This approach requires the AES Key Wrap algorithms to be paired with an AEAD content encryption algorithm, as shown below.
The AES GCM Key Wrap algorithms (A128GCMKW
, A192GCMKW
and A256GCMKW
) are preferred - they are faster and more
efficient than the A*KW
variants, but they do require JDK 8 or later (or JDK 7 BouncyCastle).
// Create a test SecretKey suitable for the desired AES Key Wrap algorithm:
SecretKeyAlgorithm alg = Jwts.KEY.A256GCMKW; //or A192GCMKW, A128GCMKW, A256KW, etc...
SecretKey key = alg.key().build();
// Chooose the Encryption Algorithm used to encrypt the payload:
AeadAlgorithm enc = Jwts.ENC.A256GCM; //or A192GCM, A128GCM, A256CBC-HS512, etc...
// Create the compact JWE:
String jwe = Jwts.builder().issuer("me").encryptWith(key, alg, enc).compact();
// Parse the compact JWE:
String issuer = Jwts.parser().decryptWith(key).build()
.parseEncryptedClaims(jwe).getPayload().getIssuer();
assert "me".equals(issuer);
This is an example showing how to encrypt and decrypt a JWT using Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static Key Agreement (ECDH-ES) algorithms.
These algorithms use ECDH-ES to encrypt and decrypt a secure-random key, and that generated key in turn is used to actually encrypt the payload as described in the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static Key Agreement section above. Because of this, ECDH-ES Key Algorithms must be paired with an AEAD Encryption Algorithm, as shown below.
In this example, Bob will encrypt a JWT using Alice’s Elliptic Curve public key to ensure only she may read it.
Alice can then decrypt the JWT using her Elliptic Curve private key:
// Create a test KeyPair suitable for the desired EC key algorithm:
KeyPair pair = Jwts.SIG.ES512.keyPair().build();
// Choose the key algorithm used encrypt the payload key:
KeyAlgorithm<PublicKey, PrivateKey> alg = Jwts.KEY.ECDH_ES_A256KW; //ECDH_ES_A192KW, etc...
// Choose the Encryption Algorithm to encrypt the payload:
AeadAlgorithm enc = Jwts.ENC.A256GCM; //or A192GCM, A128GCM, A256CBC-HS512, etc...
// Bob creates the compact JWE with Alice's EC public key so only she may read it:
String jwe = Jwts.builder().audience().add("Alice").and()
.encryptWith(pair.getPublic(), alg, enc) // <-- Alice's EC public key
.compact();
// Alice receives and decrypts the compact JWE:
Set<String> audience = Jwts.parser()
.decryptWith(pair.getPrivate()) // <-- Alice's EC private key
.build().parseEncryptedClaims(jwe).getPayload().getAudience();
assert audience.contains("Alice");
This is an example showing how to encrypt and decrypt a JWT using Password-based key-derivation algorithms.
These algorithms use a password to securely derive a random key, and that derived random key in turn is used to actually encrypt the payload as described in the Password-based Key Encryption section above. This allows the payload to be encrypted with a random short-lived cryptographically-stronger key, reducing the need to expose the longer-lived (and potentially weaker) password.
This approach requires the Password-based Key Wrap algorithms to be paired with an AEAD content encryption algorithm, as shown below.
//DO NOT use this example password in a real app, it is well-known to password crackers:
String pw = "correct horse battery staple";
Password password = Keys.password(pw.toCharArray());
// Choose the desired PBES2 key derivation algorithm:
KeyAlgorithm<Password, Password> alg = Jwts.KEY.PBES2_HS512_A256KW; //or PBES2_HS384_A192KW or PBES2_HS256_A128KW
// Optionally choose the number of PBES2 computational iterations to use to derive the key.
// This is optional - if you do not specify a value, JJWT will automatically choose a value
// based on your chosen PBES2 algorithm and OWASP PBKDF2 recommendations here:
// https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html#pbkdf2
//
// If you do specify a value, ensure the iterations are large enough for your desired alg
//int pbkdf2Iterations = 120000; //for HS512. Needs to be much higher for smaller hash algs.
// Choose the Encryption Algorithm used to encrypt the payload:
AeadAlgorithm enc = Jwts.ENC.A256GCM; //or A192GCM, A128GCM, A256CBC-HS512, etc...
// Create the compact JWE:
String jwe = Jwts.builder().issuer("me")
// Optional work factor is specified in the header:
//.header().pbes2Count(pbkdf2Iterations)).and()
.encryptWith(password, alg, enc)
.compact();
// Parse the compact JWE:
String issuer = Jwts.parser().decryptWith(password)
.build().parseEncryptedClaims(jwe).getPayload().getIssuer();
assert "me".equals(issuer);
Example creating and parsing a secret JWK:
SecretKey key = Jwts.SIG.HS512.key().build(); // or HS384 or HS256
SecretJwk jwk = Jwks.builder().key(key).idFromThumbprint().build();
assert jwk.getId().equals(jwk.thumbprint().toString());
assert key.equals(jwk.toKey());
byte[] utf8Bytes = new JacksonSerializer().serialize(jwk); // or GsonSerializer(), etc
String jwkJson = new String(utf8Bytes, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
Jwk<?> parsed = Jwks.parser().build().parse(jwkJson);
assert parsed instanceof SecretJwk;
assert jwk.equals(parsed);
Example creating and parsing an RSA Public JWK:
RSAPublicKey key = (RSAPublicKey)Jwts.SIG.RS512.keyPair().build().getPublic();
RsaPublicJwk jwk = Jwks.builder().key(key).idFromThumbprint().build();
assert jwk.getId().equals(jwk.thumbprint().toString());
assert key.equals(jwk.toKey());
byte[] utf8Bytes = new JacksonSerializer().serialize(jwk); // or GsonSerializer(), etc
String jwkJson = new String(utf8Bytes, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
Jwk<?> parsed = Jwks.parser().build().parse(jwkJson);
assert parsed instanceof RsaPublicJwk;
assert jwk.equals(parsed);
Example creating and parsing an RSA Private JWK:
KeyPair pair = Jwts.SIG.RS512.keyPair().build();
RSAPublicKey pubKey = (RSAPublicKey) pair.getPublic();
RSAPrivateKey privKey = (RSAPrivateKey) pair.getPrivate();
RsaPrivateJwk privJwk = Jwks.builder().key(privKey).idFromThumbprint().build();
RsaPublicJwk pubJwk = privJwk.toPublicJwk();
assert privJwk.getId().equals(privJwk.thumbprint().toString());
assert pubJwk.getId().equals(pubJwk.thumbprint().toString());
assert privKey.equals(privJwk.toKey());
assert pubKey.equals(pubJwk.toKey());
byte[] utf8Bytes = new JacksonSerializer().serialize(privJwk); // or GsonSerializer(), etc
String jwkJson = new String(utf8Bytes, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
Jwk<?> parsed = Jwks.parser().build().parse(jwkJson);
assert parsed instanceof RsaPrivateJwk;
assert privJwk.equals(parsed);
Example creating and parsing an Elliptic Curve Public JWK:
ECPublicKey key = (ECPublicKey) Jwts.SIG.ES512.keyPair().build().getPublic();
EcPublicJwk jwk = Jwks.builder().key(key).idFromThumbprint().build();
assert jwk.getId().equals(jwk.thumbprint().toString());
assert key.equals(jwk.toKey());
byte[] utf8Bytes = new JacksonSerializer().serialize(jwk); // or GsonSerializer(), etc
String jwkJson = new String(utf8Bytes, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
Jwk<?> parsed = Jwks.parser().build().parse(jwkJson);
assert parsed instanceof EcPublicJwk;
assert jwk.equals(parsed);
Example creating and parsing an Elliptic Curve Private JWK:
KeyPair pair = Jwts.SIG.ES512.keyPair().build();
ECPublicKey pubKey = (ECPublicKey) pair.getPublic();
ECPrivateKey privKey = (ECPrivateKey) pair.getPrivate();
EcPrivateJwk privJwk = Jwks.builder().key(privKey).idFromThumbprint().build();
EcPublicJwk pubJwk = privJwk.toPublicJwk();
assert privJwk.getId().equals(privJwk.thumbprint().toString());
assert pubJwk.getId().equals(pubJwk.thumbprint().toString());
assert privKey.equals(privJwk.toKey());
assert pubKey.equals(pubJwk.toKey());
byte[] utf8Bytes = new JacksonSerializer().serialize(privJwk); // or GsonSerializer(), etc
String jwkJson = new String(utf8Bytes, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
Jwk<?> parsed = Jwks.parser().build().parse(jwkJson);
assert parsed instanceof EcPrivateJwk;
assert privJwk.equals(parsed);
Example creating and parsing an Edwards Elliptic Curve (Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, X448) Public JWK
(the JWT RFC 8037 specification calls these Octet
keys, hence the
OctetPublicJwk
interface names):
PublicKey key = Jwks.CRV.Ed25519.keyPair().build().getPublic(); // or Ed448, X25519, X448
OctetPublicJwk<PublicKey> jwk = builder().octetKey(key).idFromThumbprint().build();
assert jwk.getId().equals(jwk.thumbprint().toString());
assert key.equals(jwk.toKey());
byte[] utf8Bytes = new JacksonSerializer().serialize(jwk); // or GsonSerializer(), etc
String jwkJson = new String(utf8Bytes, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
Jwk<?> parsed = Jwks.parser().build().parse(jwkJson);
assert parsed instanceof OctetPublicJwk;
assert jwk.equals(parsed);
Example creating and parsing an Edwards Elliptic Curve (Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, X448) Private JWK
(the JWT RFC 8037 specification calls these Octet
keys, hence the
OctetPrivateJwk
and OctetPublicJwk
interface names):
KeyPair pair = Jwks.CRV.Ed448.keyPair().build(); // or Ed25519, X25519, X448
PublicKey pubKey = pair.getPublic();
PrivateKey privKey = pair.getPrivate();
OctetPrivateJwk<PrivateKey, PublicKey> privJwk = builder().octetKey(privKey).idFromThumbprint().build();
OctetPublicJwk<PublicKey> pubJwk = privJwk.toPublicJwk();
assert privJwk.getId().equals(privJwk.thumbprint().toString());
assert pubJwk.getId().equals(pubJwk.thumbprint().toString());
assert privKey.equals(privJwk.toKey());
assert pubKey.equals(pubJwk.toKey());
byte[] utf8Bytes = new JacksonSerializer().serialize(privJwk); // or GsonSerializer(), etc
String jwkJson = new String(utf8Bytes, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
Jwk<?> parsed = Jwks.parser().build().parse(jwkJson);
assert parsed instanceof OctetPrivateJwk;
assert privJwk.equals(parsed);
This project is open-source via the Apache 2.0 License.