



# UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE.

## The Determinants of Immigrant Integration Policies in 28 EU-Member States

### Does the Political Party Spectrum Matter?

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## **Abstract**

This paper explores the link between the ideological positioning of different political party constellations in national parliaments amongst EU-Member States and the openness of immigrant integration policies in the respective countries. Although it is largely assumed that a higher proportion of extreme left, center left, and center parties in parliament would implement more open immigrant integration policies (thus scoring higher on the MIPEX Index) than far- and center right parties, this link is more complex in practice. This is partly because parties may be influenced by other socio-economic factors than their ideological party positioning or cleavage location that determine national policy outcomes on integration issues. Drawing on the MIPEX Index database that evaluates migrant integration policies cross-nationally, the effect of the composition of national parliaments on the integration policies in the 28 EU-Member States in 2014 is assessed in this thesis. Results indicate that there is no clear association between the political party spectrum and the openness of immigrant integration policies. Only the share of far right parties in parliament seems to be an appropriate determinant for the degree to which national integration policies are less favorable towards their target group. Instead, it is found that macroeconomic and socio-demographic factors such as a high economic performance and immense refugee levels and migratory movements account for more open integration policies and alter the traditional ideological and social cleavage positioning of political parties from either end of the party spectrum.

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## List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

<b>ALDE</b>	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
<b>DV</b>	Dependent Variable
<b>ECR</b>	European Conservatives and Reformists
<b>EFDD</b>	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy
<b>ENF</b>	Europe of Nations and Freedom
<b>EP</b>	European Parliament
<b>EPFs / EPGs</b>	European party federations / European party groups
<b>EPP</b>	European People's Party
<b>ERPs</b>	European right parties
<b>EU MSs</b>	Member States of the European Union
<b>EUL / NGL</b>	European United Left-Nordic Green Left
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>G - EFA</b>	The Greens - European Free Alliance
<b>IV</b>	Independent Variable
<b>MEP</b>	Member of the European Parliament
<b>MIPEX Index</b>	Migrant Integration Policy Index
<b>MPG</b>	Migration Policy Group
<b>PPS</b>	Purchasing Power Standards
<b>S&amp;D</b>	Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
<b>VIF</b>	Variance Inflation Factor

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# Chapter 1: Introduction and Research Question

Since the beginning of 2014, international migration and integration issues have become highly salient and contentious topics in the political agendas of EU-Member States which is due to an increase in violent conflicts and wars around the globe resulting in massive migratory movements.<sup>1</sup> The question of whether and if so, how states should support the integration of immigrants is highly debated in the public discussion. Although parties across the whole political spectrum appear to have moved towards a more restrictive stance on migration issues as a reaction to voter hostility on immigration and/or the rise of far right populist parties (Van Spanje, 2010), they continue to differ in their positioning on immigrant integration. A review of the political science literature on immigrant integration policies across the EU provides evidence that a range of actors influences policy outcomes, including "interest groups, courts, labour unions, bureaucracies [...] and private actors" (Lahav et al., 2006). However, political parties, being the major decision-makers in national parliaments, have thus far received relatively little attention among researchers of immigration politics: "They enter the story as minor characters with undefined roles" (Triadafilopoulos et al., 2006). Only a limited number of studies employing systematic, empirical hypothesis-testing in this area is available and "those who study migration do not focus much on parties, while those who study parties tend to focus on migration only insofar as it affects electoral competition" (Bale, 2008). Even if incurring political parties, scholars of party politics often analyse immigrant integration policies in a very limited context; namely by dealing with the party impact of far-right or "extremist" parties, rather than incurring the more "mainstream" or leftist parties (Bale, 2008). Previous research has dealt with the various consequences of immigration for national politics, but the impact of ideology and partisanship of political parties from the whole left-right political party spectrum on the favorability of integration policies has been largely underestimated in the past.

In order to account for this lack of research, this study's focus is placed upon the ways in which ideology and party positioning reflected in different political constellations in national parliaments amongst EU-Member States affect the openness of immigrant integration policies in the respective country, which will be measured by the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX Index)<sup>2</sup>. The research question that will be addressed in this paper is therefore:

*"To what extent does the **ideological spectrum of political parties** represented in national parliaments of the 28 EU-Member States have an impact on the **openness of national immigrant integration policies** in year 2014?"*

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<sup>1</sup> Amongst current conflicts that trigger severe humanitarian consequences and lead to the massive refugee surge are i.a. the civil war in Syria, the situation in Iraq, South Sudan, and Afghanistan, as well as the economic situation in the Balkan States.

<sup>2</sup> The MIPEX Index is a database that measures policies to integrate migrants in all EU-Member States. It comprises 167 indicators in 8 distinct policy domains including labour market mobility, education, family reunion, permanent residence, access to nationality, political participation, health, and anti-discrimination



"Although government policy is only one of a number of factors that affects integration, it is vital because it sets the legal and political framework within which other aspects of integration occur" (MIPEX, 2015). Despite the fact that policy-making in liberal democracies is always a compromise between different actors, it seems reasonable to expect that the positioning and preferences of ruling and dominating political parties in parliament determine actual national policy outcomes. Constituting an issue of scientific as well as societal relevance, this thesis will not only contribute to the scientific debate on party politics and immigration policies, but also reveal the underlying practical and societal impact of ideologies, attitudes and social cleavages (see chapter 2.3.) dominating party behaviour on the issue of immigrant integration.

**1.1. Immigration and Integration Policies in Europe**

Although Europe has been exposed to constant immigration flows since the 1950s, it has only been lately that immigration has become a highly salient issue amongst EU-Member States: In a recent Eurobarometer study, it was ranked as one of the top two major challenges defying the future of the EU and even the most multicultural countries in Europe are struggling with the current scale of the migrant and refugee influx, in addition to the challenge of integrating newcomers into the receiving society (EP Eurobarometer, 2015; Hollifield, 2016). In 2013, Europe hosted the largest amount of international immigrants: 72 million, including EU citizens, and 34.5 million excluding EU citizens (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013). In comparison to a total EU population of approx. 505 million in 2013, this number appears to be enormous (Eurostat, n.d.). Figure 1 shows the number of international immigrants per region indicating an overall worldwide increase over time. Almost all EU-Member States have to deal with this massive influx of international migrants and are exposed to new tasks in order to account for their (successful) integration.




Figure 1: Number of International Immigrants by major area, 1990-2013 in mil. (UN Dep. of Economic; Social Affairs, 2013)

Immigrant integration is a policy area that was initially developed in response to the needs of newly arrived migrant populations in Europe over the past few decades (Collett et al., 2014). Policies have not only become broader in scope but also more sophisticated as priorities have shifted and policy-makers identified new needs for improvement (ibid). There are many ways in which receiving countries have responded to these challenges: Traditional receiving states have often times reacted in a more open way towards newcomers, while newer hosting countries have more difficulties in coping with the increase in ethnic diversity (Castles et a., 2014). "Migration can change demographic, economic and social structures and create new cultural diversity, which often brings in to question national identity" (ibid). Different integration policy frameworks have been outlined including assimilationist and multicultural models (Taras, 2012). Although there are contradictory findings about the effects of multicultural policies in the literature, policy-makers have increasingly called multiculturalism into question as the perception of migration has been progressively linked to national security issues (Castles et al., 2014): German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and British Prime-Minister David Cameron both proclaimed that a multicultural approach towards immigrants had "utterly failed" in their respective country (Bloemraad, 2011). This shift away from multiculturalism has frequently been connected to an emphasis of civic integration norms that stress the necessity of immigrants to integrate into the hosting society. Not only is the current refugee influx and immigrant integration policy issue one of great **societal relevance and practical concern** that dominates current newspaper headlines and public attention across the European landscape, it also has political effects, leading to new political cleavages and a shift in political party behavior that ultimately determines national integration policies.

## **1.2. Political Parties and Immigrant Integration**

Even if integration policies can be traced to external stakeholders, macroeconomic and/or socio-demographic factors in a country, it is the control of government by "institutions that respond, [...] not just to public opinion, but to the physical flows and cultural clashes that underline it" (Bale, 2008) that shape the openness of national integration policies. Whereas political parties are the driving forces of national policies including immigrant integration policies, Bale's suggestion, will be taken as an underlying assumption in this study. As in this regard much emphasis has been placed upon the rise of populist political parties that increasingly dominate the European political landscape (Robins-Early, 2015; Agady, 2016), as well as on the relationship between right-wing parties and immigration policies (Freeman et al., 2008; Van Spanje, 2010), other parties have nowhere nearly enjoyed the same attention. The present study will account for this lack in research and focuses on political parties from the whole ideological party spectrum as determinants of state policy on immigrant integration. Thereby, a realistic composition of national parliaments in EU-MSs, as opposed to only a small share of political parties that are often-times not even involved in national governments, will be taken into account.

Contributing to the **scientific debate**, this paper determines the role of ideology and party positioning on national immigrant integration policies amongst EU-Member States. Considering Lo et al.'s (2013) presumption that the positioning of political parties represented in national parliaments can be attributed to their respective cleavage location, it attempts to answer the question if political parties are more important to integration policies than they are traditionally given credit for. It creates nuances in existing scientific theory by means of clarifying relevant determinants for the openness of immigrant integration policies and controls for other factors, such as the macroeconomic performance and number of asylum seekers that might influence party behavior and thus account for a shift in the extent to which integration policies are favorable towards their target group. Addressing the current immigration debate, this thesis contributes to the literature by empirically testing the relevance of parties from the whole political party spectrum considering their traditional ideological programmatic commitments in order to examine whether or not they matter for immigrant integration policies.

### **1.3. Research Question**

This paper develops a series of explanations on the relationship between political parties and immigrant integration that are derived from the literature on both factors. Arguing that political parties have been the driving forces in the development of immigrant integration policies in the EU-Member States, the research question addresses the role of ideology and traditional political party positioning in making and shifting state policy on immigrant integration. It aims at empirical hypothesis testing as it assesses the effect of the independent variable, distribution of seats in parliament via political party family, on the dependent variable, national openness of immigrant integration policies, measured by the MIPEX Index. Since the question includes both cause and effect, it is of explanatory nature and can be formulated as follows: *"To what extent does the **ideological spectrum of political parties** represented in national parliaments of the 28 EU-Member States have an impact on the **openness of national immigrant integration policies** in year 2014?"*

In order to clarify the objective of the study and to provide an in-depth understanding of the question's dimension, a set of sub-questions are included into the study. These are the following:

- ❖ How can political constellations be classified into "dominance groups"?
  - How does the traditional ideological spectrum (social cleavage location of party families) apply to the party positioning on immigrant integration policies?
- ❖ To what extent are national immigrant integration policies in EU-MSs favorable / restrictive towards their target group?
- ❖ Is there a relationship between the political party spectrum and the openness of immigrant integration policies in EU-MSs?
  - What other factors influence the degree of openness of integration policies in a country?

The next part of the thesis reviews the existing literature on the topic and formulates expectations that can be made for the study at hand. The third part describes which methods are used in the study, while the fourth chapter discusses the main findings from the analysis. As a last step, conclusions and implications for further research and policy making will be discussed.

## **Chapter 2: Theory and Hypotheses**

This chapter introduces the theoretical framework concerning political party and immigrant integration policy research. The question is whether ideology and political party positioning influences the degree to which countries install open integration policies, granting equal rights and support towards their target group. The expectations and hypotheses that can be derived from the theoretical framework will be provided within this chapter.

### **2.1. Framing Immigrant Integration Policy**

Although scholars approved the fact that integration policies should be seen "as distinct from immigration policies per se" (Favell, 2001), controversies demonstrate that there is persistent disagreement about "what immigrant integration is, why it is important, who is involved, [...] and what is to be done about it" (Scholten, 2011). The fact that there is no consensus on any formal definition of immigrant integration, neither in international refugee law nor in the scientific literature, reflects the subjective character of integration as a process by which individuals can be integrated in a hosting society (UNHCR, 2013). The question that arises is consequently how to grasp immigrant integration theoretically and conceptually as "it is not only something that happens to a passive individual over time, but is a process in which an individual may actively and selectively control certain aspects" (Scholten, 2011). Put simply, "the goal of integration is equality (through) social and economic inclusion" (UNHCR, 2013) of newcomers; i.e. refugees<sup>3</sup> or migrants<sup>4</sup> and their children into the receiving society in hosting states. In this context, the distinction between migrant and refugee is essential as countries deal with migrants under their own immigration laws, whereas countries deal with refugees through norms of refugee protection and asylum that are defined in both national legislation and international law (UNHCR, 2015b). Both groups will be included into the study, whereas its terms are used according to the outlined definitions. It is notable that refugees can be seen as 'migrants' too, although this inference does not apply the other way around.

The Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) has developed a definition of immigrant integration using the term "everyday integration", supposing that in today's world "one can be simultaneously

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<sup>3</sup> A refugee is a person fleeing armed conflict or persecution across an international border. (S)he is in need of sanctuary in a hosting state as it is very dangerous for her/him to return to their country of origin. The status of a refugee is protected in international law (see 1951 Refugee Convention; 1967 Protocol; 1969 OAU Refugee Convention) (UNHCR, 2015b).

<sup>4</sup> A migrant is any person who changes her/his country of usual residence and chooses to move primarily to improve her/his life by finding work, for education, family reunion, or other reasons (UNHCR, 2015b).

integrated into multiple locations, to a range of degrees, and for a variety of personally identified outcomes" (ibid). This definition reflects the parallel existence of many areas in which a migrant may be integrated, such as into the receiving country's society by mutually maintaining his/her affiliation to the country of origin. Germany's Federal Office for Migration and Refugees refers to integration as "a long-term process with the aim of including everyone into society who lives in Germany on a permanent and legal basis" (BAMF, 2016). Immigrants should further have the opportunity to participate in all aspects of social, political and economic life on an equal basis with the host countries' society. As the migrants' responsibility is to learn the language and to respect and abide by the Constitution and its laws, the aim of integration goes beyond facilitating communities to co-exist (ibid). However, immigrants are not required to assimilate and abandon their own cultural values, religion, and language, in order to be regarded as fully integrated into the hosting society.

Entzinger et al. (2003) suggest that immigrant integration comprises four dimensions including **socio-economic integration**, defined as "the participation of immigrants in the labour market and factors that stimulate or hamper it, such as education and language skills" (ibid); **cultural integration**, i.e. the acculturation process of refugees or migrants to the host society or local communities, **legal and political integration** defined as the granting of equal rights to all citizens residing in EU territory, certain entitlements to the benefits of the welfare state, and the participation in decision-making of the hosting state; and ultimately **attitudes of recipient countries**, i.e. "the atmosphere that makes [migrants] feel welcome in the new country" and encompassing factors such as reported cases of discrimination, perceptions of migrants by the host society, and incidence and effects of diversity policies. Entzinger et al. (2003) stress that integration is the product of a multifaceted two-way process, requiring efforts by all parties concerned, where not only the migrant, but also the recipient society equally bear a responsibility. On the one hand, it includes will of the refugee or immigrant to "adapt" to the host society without abandoning his/her own cultural identity and, on the other hand, requires a corresponding "preparedness" of host communities and public institutions to welcome refugees and immigrants (Strang et al., 2010). In that sense, integration is described as an interactive, mutual two-way process involving both refugees or migrants and receiving-state nationals as well as (political) institutions: "The result is ideally a society that is both diverse and open, where people can form a community, regardless of differences" (UNHCR, 2013). The extent to which such a result can be achieved highly depends on the extent to which integration policies in the receiving state are favorable towards their target group and targeted at migrants' opportunities to participate in society.

## **2.2. Political Parties and Immigration: Why Political Parties Matter**

A well-known definition of political parties provided by Downs (1957) suggests that "a political party is a team of men, seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in duly constituted election." According to Hofmeister et al. (2011) "parties can be understood as permanent associations

of citizens that are based [...] on a program and are anxious to occupy the politically decisive positions of the country [...] in order to materialize suggestions for resolving outstanding problems." Both definitions imply that competition among political parties serves as an instrument to gain decision-making as well as policy-making power in a country and to obtain posts of political representation. In the context of democratically managed conflicts of interests, political parties all represent particular world-views within the political system. Hofmeister et al. (2011) agree that parliaments and governments, that normally rely on political parties, are the most important institutions of politics in a democratic state.

Hence, although there are diverging political systems in the EU-Member States, they are all based on the notion of co-existing competing political parties and a pluralistic society. The composition of national parliaments therefore mainly results from two factors: the structure of social conflicts and interests, as well as party and electoral laws (ibid). In this thesis, the focus will be placed upon the former factor as throughout European history, party systems have developed along social and/or ideological lines of conflict, i.e. social cleavages. Assessing the impact of political parties on policy outputs, advocates of the "politics matter" school of thought argue that, despite other socio-economic values, there is a correlation between partisan variables, ideology, and policy outputs (Imbeau et al., 2001). Leading migration scholars have agreed on the need to analyze how the influx of migrants and refugees impacts attitudes of political parties and in turn their policy-making, as only very few treat parties as a vital source of state policy. According to Schain (2006), the omission of political parties is peculiar considering that in every European country political parties are responsible for the way issues of immigration are framed and shaped, and how and where they are placed on the political agenda. "Given that the direction and content of state policy demonstrably depends on who governs" (Imbeau et al, 2001), political parties are highly likely to count for policies on integration issues (Bale, 2008). Additionally, Lahav (2004) argues political parties matter to migration policy because "the nation-state is where the majority of the migration action lies". Thus, even if the competence in this policy area moves even further towards the EU, political parties will still be relevant: "As long as representative politics remains a feature of the nation-state [...] there is no escape from parties" (ibid). Therefore, the most reasonable way to acknowledge the potential influence of political parties on immigrant integration policies is to look at the (party) composition of national parliaments in EU-Member States.

### **2.3. Classification of Political Party Spectrum: The standard left-right scale**

According to Marks et al. (2002), the response of a political party to a salient issue arising on the agenda is conditioned by the "bounded rationalities" of party leaders as well as by reputational constraints imposed by prior policy positions. Therefore, political parties are considered to be bound by their long-standing agendas and existing ideologies that influence them in responding to newly arising issues and challenges (ibid). In European party systems, these ideologies can be attributed to historical socio-political cleavage locations.

Albeit the influence of social cleavages might have diminished in shaping voting choices of individuals (Marks et al., 2000), it can be assumed that such cleavages may still be powerful in structuring the way political parties are positioned on salient issues and how they engage in the policy debate. The underlying presumption is therefore that organizations "assimilate and exploit new issues within existing schemes" (ibid). As the agenda of a party is considered to be "the product of ideologies of party leaders and endogenous constraints of party organization" (Marks et al., 2000); those rationales shape the way they respond to new challenges. Hofmeister et al. (2011) define ideologies as "social developments, which contain explanations, values and goals for the past, present and future developments [that] inspire and justify political and social action [and] are essential for political orientation." Hence, political parties have to be seen as historically rooted organizations that arose of different traditions and are "not [only] empty vessels into which issue positions are poured in response to electoral or constituency pressures" (Marks et al., 2002). Ideologies and worldviews that arose from social cleavage locations are thus assumed to be of particular relevance for political parties.

According to Hofmeister et al. (2011), political parties can be classified according to a number of different criteria; including their level of organization, the social classes they want to represent, their positioning towards the political system, or socio-political targets and cleavages. However, identifying their ideological stance and the policy space parties inhabit is both practically and conceptually challenging (McElroy et al., 2011) as party positioning in European party systems is no longer considered to be rigidly bound along social cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), who identified four main cleavages that arose of large-scale social conflicts as well as national and industrial revolutions. In their famous article, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) encapsulated the idea that societies and party systems in Europe underwent similar developments, identifying four fundamental cleavages: the *class* cleavage (or *worker-owner* cleavage), the *church-state* cleavage, the *center-periphery*, and *urban - rural* cleavage. However, over time a new dynamic, i.e. *new politics* cleavage, arose that lead to the creation of new parties that establish their profile in new conflicts rather than through traditional cleavages and include Green and populist parties (see table 1).

These historical developments allow us to group parties across Europe into party families that in turn can be classified into the common left-right scale as they share cross-national ideologies developed in social cleavages (Marks et al., 2000; 2002). It is assumed that the cleavages constitute frameworks or "prisms" through which parties respond to newly arising issues such as immigrant integration. Some migrant scholars deny a correlation between the political party spectrum - the traditional left-right dimension - and integration policies, as immigration is "located at the crossroads between two very different semantics: those based on economic or functional issues and those based on culture, identity and tradition [thus rendering] the distinction between conservative and progressive" problematic (Bale, 2008).

However, according to Givens et al. (2005), studies emphasizing the importance of electoral competition underestimate the degree to which party behaviour occurs within ideological contexts, as "parties evaluate societal change, [...] through the filter of guiding ideological principles" (ibid). The fundamental point is that ideology functions as a frame with which parties choose their concrete policies, although it may not be the only aspect parties consider: "they analyse and evaluate how ideological goals can be reached given strategic considerations regarding voter opinion, members' views and possible coalition partners" (Hinnfors et al., 2012). Therefore, established political parties are expected to assimilate the issue of immigrant integration into their existing ideologies and socio-cultural and socio-economic objectives that have historically structured European party systems and will constitute the institutional framework for locating political parties along the left-right dimension.

For the purpose of this study, political parties are therefore categorized into different party families ranging from the extreme left (communists/socialists); to the centre left (green; social democratic parties); the center (liberals); centre right (Christian democratic; conservative parties); and the far or extreme right (see table 1) (Lo et al., 2013). Lahav (2004) proves that immigrant integration does not cross-cut the common left-right party spectrum, suggesting that there is a clear ideological distinction between the conventional left and right on this issue. Given the powerful role of social cleavages in structuring party systems and conditioning parties' stances on fundamental issues, it will be assumed that immigrant integration assimilates into pre-existing ideologies of party leaders and constituencies that are shaped by their traditional cleavages. Hence, social cleavage theory will be used in order to categorize national political parties according to their party families by means assessing their respective affiliation to a European party group. European party groups (EPGs) are taken as a framework that each consist of multiple national parties from the EU-Member States as political parties "are increasingly coherent at the transnational level" (Bale, 2008) and membership of political parties to a party family is associated with their positioning on immigrant integration.

According to a study by Duncan et al. (2008), party groups in the European Parliament (EP) adopt distinct stances on migration issues that are determined more by ideology than by national interest. Therefore, this thesis assumes that also in national parliaments, parties from the same dominance group, i.e. party family, that have affiliated to the respective fraction at European level adopt a similar partisan approach as their ideology based on the respective party family and social cleavage is supposed to be congruent (Lahav, 2004). Scientific work, amplifying how national parties choose their EPG affiliation, suggests that the process is mainly driven by a concern to minimize policy incongruence between the national and transnational level (McElroy, 2011). One could therefore expect strong similarities in the policy-positioning among national parties within each European party group. Duncan et al. (2008) prove that political parties "brought together by transnational links adopt surprisingly similar stances on [...] integration which also corresponds to the manifestos of their



respective transnational party federation." One explanation for that would be to view the programmatic congruence as an indication of Europeanization of party politics whereby policy orientations of national parties are shaped by their contact within EPGs and ideology, and not just national interests provide a guide for parties' programmatic responses (Duncan et al., 2008).

McElroy et al. (2011) suggest the European party groups (EPGs) to be located at the center of the distribution of their member parties on each dimension of contestation. According to McElroy et al. (2011) the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (EUL/NGL) is located at the extreme left of the political spectrum, followed by the Greens (G/EFA), the Social Democrats (S&D) and the Liberals (ALDE). "The three largest party groups, the S&D, the ALDE and the EPP occupied positions at the left of centre, centre, and right of centre" (ibid). On the far right of the policy scale appeared the European Conservatives and Reformists group (ECR) and Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group (EFDD). Figure 2 thus serves as a determinant to position the EPGs on the left-right scale.




Figure 2: European party groups on the general left-right scale, 2010. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals (McElroy et al., 2011)

## 2.5. Ideology and Cleavage Location of Political Parties on Immigrant Integration

In order to classify political parties and assess their respective attitudes concerning the degree to which immigrant integration policies should be favorable and supportive, it is useful to consider existing ideological divisions, partisanship and socio-political cleavages as relevant determinants (Marks et al., 2000). McElroy et al. (2011) provide evidence that "on the issue of immigration policy, the Socialists became more permissive, whereas the Christian Democratic Group shifted slightly in the opposite direction." However, "amongst liberals [...], a majority backed greater rights, but [...] in considerably lower proportion supporting the extension of rights compared to the groups of the left (Bale, 2008c). A survey about MEPs' preferences by party group on general immigrant levels gives evidence that members of extreme left fractions, followed by their counterparts in the socialist and liberal groups, were most likely to express a preference for more openness towards immigration while support for greater restrictions on immigration was strongest in the European right and far right group (Lahav,

2004). Duncan et al. (2008) point out that on average, the center and far right, i.e. Christian democratic and conservative as well as nationalist and Eurosceptic parties support a less multicultural stance than the center left, i.e. socialist and green parties as well as parties on the extreme left political spectrum. Bale (2003) stresses that political responses to immigration, particularly in its connection with law and order, appear to have more credibility in the manifestos of the right, which allows mainstream right parties to put immigration, nationalism and xenophobia on their political agendas as a way to compete with the center left. This leads to the assumption that right parties tend to implement more restrictive immigration policies than parties from the left end of the party spectrum.

Evidence from European party programs will help gain clarity about how EPGs position themselves on the issue of immigrant integration, given their long-standing ideological commitments: Whereas the position paper of the European People's Party (EPP) (Christian democratic party family) reveals that this group of parties is in support of "stringent return practices for dismissed (asylum) applicants to achieve fair and swift procedures that either lead to effective integration or immediate return" (EPP, 2013), a report of the European Conservative and Reformists Group (ECR) (Conservative party family) states that the cohesion of the EU-Member States should be the overall guiding principle when dealing with the flow of refugees and economic migrants into Europe (ECR, 2016). It is pointed out that the ECR focuses on peace-building missions in Africa and the Middle East in order to discourage migrants and refugees from coming to Europe, preventing "the terrorist threat" and taking "illegal migrants" back to their country of origin (ibid). Therefore, both groups are considered to take a moderately to strongly restrictive stance on immigration and integration. Although ECR takes a more restrictive approach, both parties are considered to belong to the center right of the political spectrum. Overall, the Eurosceptic and nationalist European Party Groups (ENF; EFDD) take an anti-immigration position stressing that "peoples and nations of Europe have the right to protect their borders and strengthen their own historical, traditional, religious and cultural values" (EFDD, 2016) as well as "the right to control and regulate immigration" (ENF, 2016). Therefore, European Parliamentary Groups from the far right of the political spectrum are considered to take a restrictive stance on the topic of immigration and integration alike.

On the contrary, the EUL/NGL's (Agrarian party family, left wing ideology) priorities are to ensure an equal treatment in terms of economic, cultural and social rights, recognizing all civic and political rights, working for solidarity with refugees, and condemning the use of any terminology that implies migrants are criminals (GUE/NGL, 2013). This EPG is therefore considered to take a very respectful and humanitarian stance on the issue of immigrant integration. Furthermore, the position paper of the S&D (Social democratic party family) points to a positive and progressive policy approach on the issue of legal migration and integration, highlighting that "it is in the interest of the EU and its citizens to ensure that migrants have the chance to integrate and play a full role in society" stressing that migrants are first and foremost human beings with equal human and social rights (S&D, 2014). In

their policy paper, the Greens/EFA (Green, Regionalist party family) propose several ways to improve integration prospects of asylum seekers, condemning incidences of inhumane treatment of migrants and refugees across the EU and favoring European solidarity, respect for human dignity and the rights of refugees and migrants (The Greens, 2015). Therefore, both EPGs from the center left party spectrum, and consequently all national political parties that are affiliated to these parliamentary groups, are considered to take a favorable and generous approach towards the integration of immigrants.

However, regarding liberal parties that are located at the center of the party spectrum, evidence is much more manifold and no explicit indication of their positioning on immigration issues is made. Due to the fact that the liberal group in the EP, i.e. the Alliance of Democrats and Liberals for Europe (ALDE), is in favor of protecting minorities "involving citizens from all ethnic backgrounds ensuring safe and legal entry possibilities" (ALDE, 2015), this EPG is generally seen as moderately in favor of more open immigration policies. However, as liberal parties are considered to form the most ideologically diverse and heterogenic of the major party families and European liberalism, unlike the rest of the party families, is rooted in a variety of cleavages that according to Marks et al. (2000) arose out of the *urban-rural* cleavage (GB; GER in the 19th century), the *state-church* cleavage taking an anti-clericalism and pro-capitalism stance (FR; IT; ESP), and the *center-periphery* cleavage (Nordic countries in 20th century) favoring progressive politics, that are often anti-authoritarian and relatively liberal-radical. Whereas for instance the Dutch VVD takes a *liberal-conservative* position concerning immigrant integration, emphasizing economic freedoms and thus tends to be located right-of-center, the Danish Venstre Party and Dutch D66 support *liberal-radicalism* favoring social justice and opposing nationalism, which is why they are considered to take an open position towards immigrant integration.<sup>5</sup> A study by McElroy et al. (2011) proves that in terms of the overall diversity of positions within party groupings, ALDE has the widest range of positions among its member parties as it has actively recruited members from outside the ranks of the traditional liberal parties of Europe: "In fact, the ALDE is a purely parliamentary construction, consisting of two separate European transnational groups, the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR) and the European Democratic Party (EDP). Furthermore, Agardy (2016) states that although most of the "classic liberal parties in Europe used to be pro-immigration [and] minded favoring the policy of open borders [...] advocating the humanitarian perspective on immigration" (ibid), stances of some national liberal parties have changed recently in adaptation to a steady increase of eurosceptical and anti-immigration parties.

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<sup>5</sup> By means of a sensitivity analysis of the positioning of all center parties in national parliaments of EU-MSs concerning immigrant integration, it became evident that the Dutch VVD, the Danish Venstre Party, the Latvian ZZS Party, and the Lithuanian LRLS Party embrace *liberal-conservative* ideologies, taking a rather conservative stance on the respective issues. They are therefore not clustered in the center but in the center right of the political party spectrum.

By means of evidence from existing theory and a party manifesto analysis of EPGs, extreme left, center left and center parties are expected to be more open and favorable towards immigrant integration policies than center right and far right parties. Table 1 provides a summarizing overview over the positioning of European party families that are categorized according to the left-right spectrum by means of their respective cleavage location. The party positioning on the issue of immigrant integration is derived from the secondary literature and policy program analysis. This table will be used to classify all national parties that hold mandates in national parliaments according to their affiliation to their European Party Group (EPG) and thus determine their stance on the issue of immigrant integration. Appendix 2 provides an overview over the classification of political parties in national parliaments amongst the EU-Member States that is based on their respective affiliation to EPGs.

Political Spectrum	Party Family	Cleavage Location	Party Positioning on Immigrant Integration	Affiliation to EPGs
<b>Extreme Left</b>	Communist / Socialist	<i>Class cleavage:</i> extreme left position on state regulation of markets, welfare, social justice, democratic decision-making <i>Goal:</i> achieving social equality	strongly in favor	EUL / NGL
<b>Centre left</b>	Green	<i>New politics cleavage:</i> environmental protection, minority rights, material welfare	strongly in favor	The Greens - EFA
<b>Centre left</b>	Social Democratic	<i>Class cleavage:</i> moderate left positions on state regulations of markets, welfare, economic equality	moderately in favor	S&D
<b>Center</b>	Liberal	<i>Urban - rural cleavage;</i> <i>Church - state cleavage:</i> opposition to clericalism and aristocracy, support for economic and political freedoms, emphasis on democratic character of constitution <i>Center - periphery cleavage</i>	<i>liberal-radical</i> parties moderately in favor; <i>liberal-conservative</i> parties moderately opposed	ALDE
<b>Center right</b>	Christian Democratic	<i>Church - state cleavage:</i> religious cleavage, support for social market economy, self-responsibility of the citizens, discrete role for the state, supranational Catholic church, authoritarianism, conservative values	moderately opposed	EPP
<b>Center right</b>	Conservative	<i>Class cleavage:</i> neo-liberalism: support for free markets, minimal state intervention, national appeal: defense of national community, traditionalist values <i>Goal:</i> retain, restore the "approved" order, traditional ideas, values, skeptical to change	moderately - strongly opposed	ECR
<b>Extreme Right</b>	Populist	<i>New politics cleavage:</i> defense of the nation, national culture and national sovereignty; Eurosceptic, nationalist	strongly opposed	ENF EFDD

Table 1: Cleavage Location and party positioning on immigrant integration according to party family (Marks; et al., 2000; Hofmeister et al., 2011; authors own assumptions based on policy program analysis)

## 2.6 Hypotheses

What expectations can be drawn from the theoretical framework for the study at hand? In the analysis, political parties from the whole party spectrum will be considered; socio-demographic and economic factors will serve as other explanatory factors that are considered to have an impact not only on national immigrant integration policies but on political party behavior as well.

### a) Right Parties and Immigration

Empirical research has found that right parties are often seen as being "stricter" on immigration than their leftist opponents (Thränhardt, 1995). Part of their reason to exist is "to defend the socio-economic and cultural status quo to which the entry of large numbers of migrants appears to present a challenge" (Alonso, 2011). According to Alonso (2011), center right parties are likely to have a more restrictive attitude, expressing the desire to protect "us" from "them". According to issue-ownership theory, which assumes that parties can develop a reputation of attention and competence in a particular political domain (Petrocik, 1996), right parties supposedly own immigration issues in electoral competition, because its critical stance on these matters is in line with the views of the median voter<sup>6</sup>: "They are in favour of keeping tax low, ensuring law and order is maintained and national security is protected - all aims that apparently are threatened by ethnic minorities that have been overrepresented in welfare polls, crime statistics and are now, especially in the era of [several bomb attacks across Europe], thought to present an even more dramatic threat" (Alonso, 2011). Furthermore, parties of the center right have an ambivalent relationship with far right parties as on the one hand, "they might eat into their vote share, [and on the other hand], it may help them into office by joining or supporting governments that center right parties lead" (Bale, 2003). According to Bale (2003), center right parties are in fact better off than their center left opponents as the far right is likely "to support Conservatives and Christian Democrats in government formation, but certainly not Socialists and Social Democrats". Hence, the center right finds itself in a situation between its own office-seeking interests and the anti-immigration appeal of the extreme right: "Calling for the tightening of borders and sounding off against the evils of multiculturalism might serve to counter the electoral threat from radical right-wing populists or, by boosting the salience of the issues [...], it might increase their vote share and help the more respectable right to win back or maintain office." (Bale, 2003). Based on the aforementioned findings from relevant literature, the following can be expected:

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<sup>6</sup> The median voter theorem by Anthony Downs (1957) states that "a majority rule voting system will select the outcome most preferred by the median voter". The theorem assumes single-peaked preferences of voters over a single-dimensional policy space and suggests an enormous force driving candidates towards the median voter's preferences in order to be elected.

Hypothesis 1: *The higher the percentage share of seats of far right and center right parties in national parliament, the less open the immigrant integration policies of the respective country.*



Figure 3: Causal Diagram between X1 and Y

### **b) Left Parties and Immigration**

Extensive literature studies have proven the traditional positioning and ideological foundation of social-democratic parties in Europe is laid solidly upon public sector support, solidarity, inclusiveness, internationalism, and redistribution (Sphehar et al, n.d; Hinnfors et al., 2012). One can assume that this EPG is solidly in favor of more inclusive integration policies and more generous support treating weak or vulnerable groups such as migrants and refugees with open and solidaristic means (Hinnfors et al, 2012). As Lipset and Rokkan (1967) noted this party family is exceptionally homogenous (as it arose to a deep uniform *class* cleavage, namely the worker-owner struggle), scholars agree on certain ideological core aspects of social democracy as an element of reduced status and class differences between societal groups with a comprehensive welfare state being the key means, and the expressed goal of lifting poorer groups (ibid). Thus, social democratic parties are thought to position themselves "between equality and fairness, between collective and individual rights, between redistribution and individual enhancement - including entitlements" (Hinnfors, 2006). Also radical-liberal parties in Europe can be seen as favoring open immigration policies, multiculturalism and social attitudes, rather taking a political position that is comparable to center left parties on the immigration issue.

Hypothesis 2, the counter hypothesis to hypothesis 1, is therefore:

*The higher the percentage share of extreme left, center left, and center parties in national parliament, the more open the immigrant integration policies of the respective country.*




Figure 4: Causal Diagram between X2 and Y

### c) The Influence of the Far Right

In the past few years, European far right extremist parties (ERP) have increasingly gained popularity in many of the EU-Member States. Scholars agree, the ideology of ERPs is based upon authoritarianism, populism, and nationalism, as a means of defending "European values" (Beauchamp, 2016). Kurnosov (n.d.) and Alonso (2011) find that key elements of today's far right discourse are socio-economic and socio-cultural issues - emphasizing competition with immigrants for employment and state assistance on the one hand, and cultural incompatibility of native and immigrant populations on the other. According to Alonso (2011), the far right parties' "winning formula" consists of a coalition between advocates of neo-liberalism and working-class antipathy towards migrants that has led to an increased emphasis on "welfare chauvinism", i.e. "the defeat of welfare expansion to national citizens and its limitation to foreign residents" (ibid). Schain (2006) suggests that "while the radical right in Europe has been generally isolated from making policy, [...], it has been a major force in constraining and shaping the way immigration policy was developed in many countries in the 1990s" (ibid). Analyzing the impact of the French National Front on immigration policy, Schain (2006) finds the party increased influence over the policy agenda, "as parties of both the right and the left attempted to co-opt and gain control of the issues of immigration and *sécurité*" (ibid). Furthermore, a study on citizenship liberalization underlines, the most important factor to mobilize an anti-immigrant public opinion that prevents citizenship liberalization is the relative strength of far right parties (Howard, 2010). Other scholars point out, "when challenged by European right parties (ERPs), the mainstream parties have incentives to give more relevance to immigration in their political agendas and to adjust their positions towards the extreme right" (Agardy, 2016). The emergence of far right parties is assumed to threaten all mainstream parties, although Alonso (2011) identifies the challenge is considered to be particularly strong for parties of the left political spectrum. Social democratic and socialist parties are particularly vulnerable as in working-class voters with anti-immigrant sentiments, right parties have seen an electoral vacuum they can exploit. The question then can be raised whether there is an impact of radical right parties on immigrant integration policy that can be generalized and if it is evident amongst all Member States of the EU. In order to account for the influence of far right parties in national parliaments on the openness of integration policies, Hypothesis 3 is the following:

*The higher the share of seats of far right parties in parliament, the less open the immigrant integration policies of the respective country.*




Figure 5: Causal Diagram between X3 and Y

## **Alternative Explanations: Immigrant Influx and Economic Wellbeing**

In formulating immigrant integration policies, one must consider the large disparities between EU-MSs on a wide range of critical background factors, and the question must be raised what other influences -aside from ideology and socio-political cleavages of political parties- may impact political parties in their policy-making, and determine the degree of openness for national immigrant integration policies (Givens et al. 2005). Thus, factors such as the extent of the current migrant influx or a country's economic performance might trigger a shift in traditional political party positioning and influence the openness of integration policies. Hatton (2013) supposes that historically a period of economic recession especially following a period of high immigration causes a backlash in immigration policies, although one could assume the scope of the current refugee and migrant influx into Europe to account for a great need to integrate newcomers successfully.

### **d) Immigrant Influx and Changes in Left-Right Political Space**

As "Europe's refugee crisis [...] has incited forceful and sometimes contradictory rhetoric from politicians across the political spectrum [...]" (Banulescu-Bogdan et al., 2015), recent migratory flows in the EU-Member States is seen as a useful determinant; assumed to not only influence the openness of national immigrant integration policies, but also alter political party behavior. Not all states within the EU are equally attractive to refugees or migrants, and variations in existing foreign population sizes in addition to the numbers of migrants and refugees entering the hosting state are considerable across the EU: the number of non-EU asylum applications in 2014 ranged from 155 in Estonia to 202,645 in Germany (Eurostat, 2015). Hence, the refugee crisis leads to unprecedented numbers of asylum seekers and some EU-Member States are only now experiencing the transition from sending to hosting state that might trigger a shift in their political landscape. Lahav (2004) identifies a pattern of negative attitudes towards immigrants that rises according to the size of the immigrant population. Further evidence from the literature ascertains, the numerical presence of immigrants in society raises support for anti-immigrant political movements, which could then be expected to force policy in a more restrictive direction (Givens; Luedtke, 2005).

Moreover, research shows, the immigration issue can also reshape political party behavior (Pardos-Prado et al., 2013). "Mainstream parties have adapted a wide array of strategies, ranging from cooperative to highly confrontational" (ibid). As opposed to their traditional positioning, right parties may feel obligated to successfully integrate arriving immigrants into their hosting society when the number of asylum applications is considerably high. This leftward shift on the ideological spectrum in the wake of the refugee influx has become apparent in countries such as Germany (Heine, 2013). "In shaping her refugee policies, Merkel followed the tenets of humanism and internationalism, both of which are rooted in Christianity but whose political home had thus far been on the left side of the ideological spectrum" (Kurbjuweit, 2016).



On the contrary, socialist and social democratic parties on the one hand tend to cater to voters with liberal socio-cultural values, specifically social egalitarianism and solidarity, while on the other hand simultaneously tailoring to working-class voters who are not the beneficiaries of re-distribution and might be threatened by economic globalization. The high influx of migrants and refugees, which may lead to an increase in perceived ethnic threats, could be expected to cause socialist and social democratic parties to become more restrictive, resulting in a rightward shift on the party spectrum, in order to prevent the rise of far right (anti-immigration) parties that already gained votes in the wake of the current refugee influx (Kurbjuweit, 2016). The importance of the latter issue cannot be underestimated and may constrain the extent to which left parties are open and favorable with regard to integration policies. A considerably high amount of asylum seekers in a country could result in an increased public pressure, especially on left parties, as they fear losing (working-class and anti-immigrant) voters to the far-right (Givens et al., 2005). Thus, when immigrant integration becomes a salient issue on the political agenda, the strategic choices of the center left depend on which constituencies they decide to give priority to: "Do they want to prevent the defection of voters with liberal socio-cultural preferences to extreme left parties or rather of working-class voters to the center or far right?" (Alonso, 2011). Research has shown, the mainstream left indeed sometimes encouraged the anti-immigrant rhetoric of far right parties, in an attempt to prevent the defection of its voters to these parties (Pardos-Prado et al., 2013). However, the mainstream left may also act according to their traditional positioning, defending social justice and pro-immigrant positions, avoiding the defection of the left parts of its electorate to smaller parties.

Applying the above outlined theoretical framework, and given the current circumstances and heated debate in the EU, it can be assumed that some political parties may feel obliged to install more or less favorable immigrant integration policies than they normally would. Firstly, the direct relationship between the number of asylum seekers and the openness of immigrant integration policies will be tested. In countries with a high amount of asylum applications, political parties are considered to install less open immigrant integration policies as a reaction to anti-immigrant sentiments of the receiving population. However secondly, the variable is considered to impose a conditional effect on the relationship between the traditional political party positioning and ideology concerning the national openness of immigrant integration policies (see figures 7, and 8).

Hypothesis 4 is therefore: *The higher the number of (non-EU) asylum applications, the less open a country's national immigrant integration policies.*



Figure 6: Causal Diagram between X4 and Y

Interaction Hypothesis 5: *The extent to which a high share of right parties in parliament leads to less open immigrant integration policies is dependent on the number of asylum applications in a country. Due to the urgent need to integrate the high number of immigrants, center and far right parties are assumed to move towards the middle of the party spectrum and install more favorable integration policies.*




Figure 7: Causal Diagram of the Interaction Effect of Z on the relationship between X1 and Y

Interaction Hypothesis 6: *The extent to which a high share of left parties in parliament leads to more open immigrant integration policies is dependent on the number of asylum applications in a country. Left parties are assumed to install less favorable immigrant integration policies as they fear to lose their voters to the far right.*




Figure 8: Causal Diagram of the Interaction Effect of Z on the relationship between X2 and Y

### e) Economic Performance

Political economy scholars tend to see a positive straightforward relationship between macroeconomic factors, such as the national economic wealth (GDP) and immigrant integration policies. The GDP level of a country shows its economic condition and is further an indication of the domestic labor market. Artiles and Meardi (2014) found that variables connected to competition on welfare and employment resources led to more negative attitudes towards immigrants and in times of an economic downturn, welfare regimes would be less supportive. Similarly, Hatton (2013) indicates that historically economic recessions have caused policy backlashes in immigration policy, especially when following a period of high immigration of migrants who are culturally different from the receiving state's population. However, he finds that this was not the case with the financial crisis that broke out in Europe in 2008 causing a deep recession in many countries. Instead, Hatton (2013) argues far right parties have used the recession to renew political pressure for tougher immigration policies. For the purpose of this study, a high GDP per capita score (in PPS) is assumed to lead to greater national openness of immigrant integration policies in the respective country. This effect is to be seen as independent of the governing political party spectrum in a country and will (only) serve as a control factor in this study.

Hypothesis 7 is thus: *The higher the level of GDP per capita (in PPS), the more supportive is the country's immigrant integration policy.*



Figure 9: Causal Diagram between X5 and Y

## Chapter 3: Methodology - Data and Documents

This chapter illustrates the methods that will be used in order to answer the research question and test the abovementioned hypotheses. This section includes the data collection method, the case selection and sampling method, the research design of the study, as well as the construction and operationalization of the dependent variable and explanatory variables. The dependent variable is the *openness of national integration policies* (measured by the MIPEX Index), whereas the independent variables are the proportion of seats by political party family in national parliaments as well as the number of (non-EU) asylum applications and the economic wellbeing of a country (GDP per capita in PPS).

### 3.1. Data Collection Method

The dependent variable *openness of immigrant integration policies* will be measured via aggregate quantitative data from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). Developed by the British Council and the Migration Policy Group, the MIPEX allows one to pursue a comparative assessment of the degree of legal equality of immigrants across the 28 EU-Member States, North America, and the Pacific. The MIPEX Index covers 167 indicators in eight policy areas which contain the migrant's journey to full citizenship. The eight policy areas include labor market mobility, family reunion, education, health, political participation, permanent residence, access to nationality, and anti-discrimination. Its first edition was published in 2004, included 15 EU-Member States and was the first time migration policies had been presented in a comparable format. MIPEX is an ongoing monitoring and assessment tool that produces a "score" for each country (UNHCR, 2013). It reveals policy changes and allows for an assessment of the impact of newly introduced policies (ibid). "The index is comprehensive, reliable and a frequently used tool to compare what governments are doing to promote the integration of migrants across Europe" (Mipex, 2015a). Countries score high on the index when immigrants can easily and with minimal preconditions obtain equal rights.

Each policy field is made up of four dimensions which categorize the 167 indicators; it assesses a country's performance on a scale from 1-3, with 3 points representing the highest standards for equal treatment. Based on the mean indicators' scores, the four dimensions are averaged to find the overall score in a particular policy area for a given country. In order to make comparisons, the scale is converted to a 1-100 scale (MIPEX, 2015b). The key indicators allow for measurement and comparability of openness towards immigrant integration, touch upon relevant issues of concern, and will be weighted equally throughout the thesis. For an overview over the policy areas and their four dimensions see figure 10. MIPEX Methodology (2015) provides a comprehensive list of all policy fields, dimensions and indicators. The index includes social and civic terms of integration and is based on the concept of equal opportunities for all (MIPEX, 2015a). It aims to make assessment of an ever widening range of policy areas that are critical to migrant's opportunities to integrate and further

identifies the highest European and international standards aimed at achieving equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for all residents (ibid). The sources for these standards include EU Directives, Council of Europe Conventions, and documents from the United Nations and International Labour Organization (see Appendix 1). The data were gathered via questionnaires that were answered by national experts based on their expertise in national laws and policies, and the answers were anonymously checked by peer reviewers and the Migration Policy Group (MPG). The MPG further checked both the experts' and the reviewers' responses to guarantee international consistence (MIPEX, 2015b). All the above mentioned measures ensure the reliability of the Index and rule out subjectivity.




Figure 10: MIPEX Policy Fields and Dimensions (MIPEX, 2014). (Author's own creation)

The data for the main independent variables, covering political party families from the whole range of the left-right party spectrum, are collected by means of various online databases. The sources for the share of political parties in national parliament are manifold and include different online sources to assess the results of the most recent national parliamentary elections in the 28 EU-Member States prior to 2014 in order to make sure that the composition of parliament proceeds their policy-making and installation of integration policies (causality assumption: time order). Whereas official government websites were used if available (Czech Statistical Office, 2013; House of Representatives Cyprus, 2016; Republik Österreich Parlament, 2016), the Election Resources Website served as the main database to assess national election statistics in the 28 EU-Member States (Alvarez-Rivera, 2014a-i; 2015 a-m; 2016). Annex 2 provides tables and figures for each respective country's national parliamentary composition based on the percentage distribution of mandates each political party obtained in the last national election proceeding 2014. Categorizations of each political party in an

EU-Member State into the left-right party spectrum was conducted according to their affiliation towards their European Parliamentary Group (EPG) as the programmatic positions on integration are supposed to be congruent. Exemptions were made in the case of certain center parties that arose from distinct cleavage locations and whose policy programs indicated evidence of a liberal-conservative stance on immigration and integration issues. These liberal parties are not categorized to the center but the center-right of the party spectrum (see Appendix 2).

Sources for the other independent variables include Eurostat (2015a) for the number of (non-EU) asylum applications in the EU-Member States, and Eurostat (2015b) for the GDP per capita in PPS. Ascertaining that the time order assumption is fulfilled in order to be able to establish causality, data for the GDP per capita variable are collected for year 2013. However, as in 2013 the number of asylum seekers in EU-Member States was still extremely low and the MIPEX Index not yet available for 2015, data for the number of (non-EU) asylum seekers variable is collected for 2014 to control for the influence of the recent refugee surge into the EU. It is assumed that political parties react to short-term fluctuations and install integration policies rapidly once the number of asylum applications extensively increases.

### **3.2. Case Selection and Sampling**

In quantitative studies, one aims to measure variables and generalize findings obtained from a representative population. The units in this study are the national parliaments of the 28-EU-Member States. Within the population to be examined, specific focus will be placed upon the mandates of political parties held in national parliament. These are categorized into existing political party families and the left-right party spectrum according to their underlying ideological position which is based on the party's affiliation to the respective European party federations (EPFs). A national approach, as opposed to a European approach, is considered to constitute an optimal setting for this research as the current refugee and migrant influx has led to reluctance by the Member States to transfer power and policy competence on immigration, asylum, and integration to supranational bodies of the EU. Abraham (2016) supposes that human migration is considered to be handled best by sovereign states making decisions under conditions of liberal values embodied in the Refugee treaties<sup>7</sup>, combined with the democratic legitimacy of national immigration laws and social integration policies. National political contexts are thus still seen as the main determinants in integration policy-making and Member States' national parliaments considered to be a reasonable population to be examined; they are the ones to hold the main legislative power in a country and apply different integration models depending on local circumstances (Mulcahy, 2011; Agardy, 2016). National parliaments are hence seen to be responsible for the degree to which national integration policies in a respective country are favorable towards immigrants.

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<sup>7</sup> Legal Framework is laid out in 1951 Geneva Convention, 1967 Protocol; Art. 67(2); 78 TFEU, Art. 18 EU CFR.

The selection of political parties in national parliaments is based on a non-probability sampling technique that refers to the subjective judgment of the researcher when selecting units from the population to be included (Laerd, 2012): "Especially for quantitative research designs, non-probability sampling can provide the researcher with strong theoretical reasons for the choice of units to be included in their sample and may sometimes even be regarded as inferior to probability sampling" (ibid). This is done via purposive sampling, more specifically by means of total population sampling, i.e. a type of purposive sampling where the researcher chooses to examine the entire population. This method implies that, for the purpose of this study, every political party with mandates in a national parliament of an EU-Member State is classified into a European party family and in turn into a specific existing political spectrum that ranges from the extreme left to the far right. Total population sampling is an appropriate method as the size of the entire population is relatively small and equals the sample size ( $n = 28$ ). If not all units were included into the study, a significant piece of the investigation would be missing (Laerd, 2012).

### **3.3. The Research Design**

As the aim of the thesis is to assess the impact of partisanship and ideology represented in the party spectrum amongst EU-Member States on the openness of national immigrant integration policies, a cross-sectional cross-national research design will account to be beneficial.

Hantrais (1999) offers a basic definition of this research design as an observation of "social phenomena across nations, to develop robust explanations of similarities or differences, and to attempt to assess their consequences [...]." This definition fits the intended research that focuses on cross-country differences in parliamentary compositions, as well as socio-demographic and economic factors, that may offset or amplify the cross-national variation in the MIPEX Index. According to Dooley (2009), we may speak of cross-sectional research when all variables of a set of units are measured at the same time and none of the variables is manipulated differently for a subset of units. Comparing cross-sectional research design to a longitudinal study that would be focusing on one or a few EU-Member States over time, cross-sectional research bears the following advantages: As cross-sectional research allows for a larger sample than other designs and thus possesses a greater external validity, it can be used to address the current issue of migration forces not only into a few, but nearly all EU-Member States (Carlson et al., 2009). As a practical argument, the MIPEX Index that is used to assess the openness of immigrant integration policies is only available for a time period from 2004<sup>8</sup> to 2014, a comparatively short time span that does not allow to account for much variation on the dependent variable. Besides, it can be questioned if political constellations in national parliaments of Member States changed as much over time as would be sufficient to account for any variation in the political party spectrum. Among the general benefits of cross-sectional research is its feasibility. Even

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<sup>8</sup> In 2004, the MIPEX Index comprised policy evaluations of the then EU-15. If incurred into the study, the sample size would decrease considerably.

within a limited amount of time resources available it is possible to assess and measure the variables included in the study since no repetition of the study is needed that is usually associated with time and financial investment (Sedgwick, 2014).

Three basic assumptions need to be fulfilled in order to establish causality: association (X and Y are correlated), time order (X precedes Y), and non-spuriousness (no other variable produces the correlation) (ibid). On the one hand, cross-sectional research bears the threat of reverse causation as both dependent and independent variables are measured at the same time, and on the other hand, involves the risk of containing third variables that may account for the relationship (Mann, 2003). Assessing the relationship between the variables in this study, one can say that the composition of national parliaments as well as the political party positioning that is based on a party's respective affiliation to a European party group precedes the actual policy-making and installation of integration policies, wherefore the threat of reverse causation can be ruled out. The risk of spuriousness will be countered by installing several control variables that check for possible factors that may influence party positioning on immigrant integration policies. However, considering all possible third variables goes beyond the scope of this study and has to be left to future research.

The impact of the political party spectrum and other control variables on the MIPLEX Index will be based on a single and afterwards multiple regression analysis. Two statistical methods should be considered: A correlation analysis by means of a Pearson's R correlation as well as a linear regression analysis. Pearson's R correlation is a method to assure that a statistically significant correlation between the variables exists. The regression analysis will be divided into different single regression analyses that test the abovementioned hypotheses. In a last step, a multiple linear regression including all independent variables will be conducted. Statistically insignificant variables will be excluded by means of a sensitivity analysis in order to create a model with variables that best explain the variation in the MIPLEX Index. However, caution regarding external validity must prevail given the limited number of cases incurred in the study. Regression analysis has several important assumptions that need to be fulfilled. These assumptions will be tested by means of scatterplots and error scores that are provided in Appendix 4.

### **3.4. Construction and Operationalization of the Variables**

In order to explain variation in the openness of immigrant integration policies cross-nationally, different predictor variables are installed. The underlying assumption is, countries with more favorable immigrant integration policies are likely to have a national parliament that is composed of a welcoming culture, i.e. with high shares of extreme, center left, and center parties in parliament, whereas parliaments with a high share of far and center right parties are assumed to install more restrictive integration policies. Thus, the percentage share of political party families in national



parliaments will be the overarching explanatory variable (X1, X2, X3), whereas the number of (non-EU) asylum applications (X4, Z) accounts to be another explanatory variable as well as an interaction variable, and GDP per capita in PPS (X5) serves as control variable.

❖ **Dependent Variable (Y)**

The dependent variable *openness of immigrant integration policies*, i.e. policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants integrate into the receiving society of EU-Member States, is ought to be affected by the composition of national parliaments according to political party seats/mandates and their respective ideologies. The variable will be assessed via aggregate quantitative data from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) and the values that will be used in this paper cover the beginning of the refugee and immigrant wave to Europe that started in 2014. The MIPEX Index is measured on a continuous 0-100 scale with summary scores on each indicator, dimension and policy field. A score of 100 means that the respective country fulfills the highest standards on which the MIPEX is built (Appendix 1). Evaluating the index, it is remarkable that it only covers the legal and institutional conditions of integration, and leaves out cultural circumstances or stakeholder influences in the respective countries that play a role in integration. However, it gives an idea of the direction that countries take in their integration policies and shows the commitment of equality standards for migrants in all central policy fields. The MIPEX Index thus serves as an applicable measure for a cross-country comparison that is able to expose possible relationships between the dependent and independent variable (MIPEX, 2014).

❖ **Main Independent Variable (X1, X2, X3)**

Even amongst those states in the EU that are familiar with mass immigration and integration, there have been wide differences in attitudes among political party ideologies. What makes the different countries comparable is that European party federations (EPFs) set out policy commitments that are shared by all member parties (Duncan, 2008). One can therefore assume that national parties orient their political programs to the ones of their political fractions in the European parliament and adopt a similar ideology or partisan approach. The independent variable ideology and political party positioning will be measured via the percentage share of mandates held by the fractions from distinct ideological spectra, i.e. the percentage share of seats held by extreme left, center left, center, center right and far right parties in national parliaments across the 28 EU-Member States. This categorization is based on national parties' affiliation towards their respective fraction in the European Parliament, as political parties in the same European parliamentary group are thought to adopt a similar ideological or policy approach. Assessing to which European party group a national party belongs enables one to make accurate predictions about its attitude towards immigration and integration policies (see Appendix 2). National extreme left parties including socialist and communist parties that are affiliated to the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (EUL/NGL) are clustered to

the extreme left party spectrum. Center left parties, comprising social democratic and green parties that affiliate with the Socialists & Democrats fraction or Greens/EFA in the EP are grouped as center left parties. Liberal political parties that are affiliated to the Alliance of Liberals and Democrat for Europe (ALDE) Party are generally classified as center parties, however, some exceptions are made for several liberal parties in Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Netherlands. These are grouped to the center right spectrum as their party programs indicate a rather *liberal-conservative* (and thus moderately restrictive) stance on the topics of immigration and integration. Center right parties, i.e. conservative and Christian democrats, are assessed via their affiliation to the European People's Party (EPP) or European Conservative and Reformists Group (ECR) in the European Parliament. Ultimately, far right parties are grouped as being affiliated to the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group (EFDD) or the Europe of Nations and Freedom Party (ENF). The mandates of political parties are based on election results of the respective Member State's most recent national election prior to 2014. Mandates of parties from the same ideological spectrum are added, and percentage shares computed, in order to arrive at a continuous 0-100% scale that controls for the respective effects of the shares of extreme left, center left, and center parties in parliament, as opposed to the shares of center right, and far right parties. The higher the number, the higher the share of mandates of parties from the same respective ideological spectrum.

#### ❖ Other Explanatory Variables

**X4/Z:** The *number of (non-EU) asylum applications* is seen as a useful determinant that not only affects the degree to which immigrant integration policies are favorable, but is also considered to influence the relationship between political party behavior and national immigrant integration policies. "Asylum is a form of international protection given by a state on its territory [and] is granted to a person who is unable to seek protection in his/her country of citizenship or residence, in particular for fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion" (Eurostat, 2016). Given the current surge of arriving refugees in the EU, the number of (non-EU) asylum seekers (measured in persons applying for asylum in a respective country) appears to be a useful control variable that is assumed to affect the relationship between the political party spectrum and installation of more or less favorable integration policies. Eurostat provides statistics on the number of non-EU asylum applications in 2014.

**X5:** *GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS)* is a measure for the economic activity of a country. It is defined as "the value of all goods and services produced less the value of any goods or services used in their creation" (Eurostat, 2015c). The unit GDP per capita in PPS is expressed in relation to the EU-28 average set to equal 100, so that any value higher than 100 is higher than the average GDP per capita in the EU-28 and vice versa. Just like any other economic related variables, the analysis of diverging GDP per capita is especially practicable for cross-country comparisons, as different economic performances are easily assessed. Expressed in PPS, a common currency is defined

that eliminates the differences in price levels between the countries allowing meaningful comparisons between the countries. Eurostat provides statistics on the economic wellbeing of each country in form of its GDP per capita in PPS (Eurostat, 2015b).

Table 2 provides an overview over the operationalization of different variables, the units and the setting that is used in the thesis.

	Operationalization
<b>Main Independent Variable (X1-X3)</b>	Distribution of Seats via Political Party Spectrum: → share of center right and far right parties (X1) → share of extreme left center left; center parties (X2) → share far right parties only (X3)
<b>Control Variables (X4-X5)</b>	Number of (non-EU) Asylum Applications (X4) GDP per capita (in PPS) (X5)
<b>Dependent Variables (Y)</b>	Overall MIPEX Index in 2014
<b>Units</b>	National Parliaments in the European Union
<b>Setting</b>	EU-Member States, 2014

Table 2: Variables, Units, Setting

### 3.4. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Min	Max.	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
<b>Y: Openness of Immigrant Integration Policies (MIPEX Index)</b>	34	80	52.39	12.57	28
<b>X1: share far- and center right parties</b>	18	85	48.14	14.87	28
<b>X2: share extreme left, center left, and center parties</b>	15	77	50.71	14.15	28
<b>X3: share far right parties</b>	0	34	7.68	10.2	28
<b>X4/Z: number of (non-EU) asylum applications</b>	155	202645	22722.5	41690.53	28
<b>X5: GDP per capita in PPS</b>	46	264	97.57	41.71	28

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics

Table 3 lists the descriptive statistics for each of the variables included into this study. The results for each country's score on the overall MIPEX Index in 2014 vary from 34 to 80, whereas the country with the minimum estimate (least favorable towards immigrant integration) included in the dataset is Latvia and the ones with the maximum estimate (most favorable) are Sweden and Portugal. The mean of the immigrant integration variable is 52.39 and the standard deviation is 12.57. Thus, many countries are clustered at around 12.57 points from the mean (scoring from approximately 40 to 65 on the MIPEX Index). Figure 11 indicates how the countries included into the study score on the overall ranking.




Figure 11: MIPEX overall scores 2014 (created by author based on MIPEX, 2015)

The share of far and center right parties in the dataset (X1) ranges from 18% to 85% with a mean of 48.14 and a standard deviation of 14.69. The country with the highest share of right parties in national parliament is Poland, whereas the country with the lowest proportion is Romania. The share of extreme left, center left, and center parties in parliament (X2) ranges from 15% to 77% with an average estimate of 50.71 and a standard deviation of 14.15. The share of far right parties in national parliaments of EU-Member States (X3) ranges from 0% to 34% (mean: 7.68, Std. deviation: 10.2). The countries with the highest share of far right parties in parliament are Poland and Cyprus. The numbers concerning (non-EU) asylum applications (X4) are more widespread and range from a minimum of 155 applications in Estonia to 202645 applications in Germany. The average asylum application rate is approx. 22723 and the standard deviation  $\sim$  41691. The GDP per capita in PPS rate (X5) of the countries in the dataset range from 46 (Bulgaria) to 264 (Luxembourg), indicating that in relation to the EU-28 average, Bulgaria has the poorest economic wellbeing, and Luxembourg has the greatest. The mean GDP per capita rate is 97.57 with a standard deviation of 41.71.

The following chapter applies the abovementioned methods and tests the hypotheses in order to answer the research question as well as the multiple sub-questions.

# Chapter 4: Quantitative Analyses and Results

In this section it will be tested whether the expected relationship can be found in the data set. To recall the expected relationships of the dependent and independent variables see figure 12. Beginning with a correlation analysis, and controlling for linear regression assumptions, a simple linear regression of each of the independent variables with the dependent variable will be conducted in order to check whether the hypotheses are to be verified or falsified. Furthermore, the conditional effects will be tested in order to closely examine the interaction hypotheses. Examining the statistical significance of each of the variables, p-values are taken into account that indicate whether the relationship between X and Y (keeping the other Xs constant) cannot be attributed to chance.<sup>9</sup> While examining each hypothesis one by one, influential cases are excluded from the dataset by means of Cook's Distance, which will possibly lead to changes in the coefficients and p-values. Afterwards, a multiple linear regression model is conducted to visualize how much of the variance in the immigrant integration variable can be explained by the included predictor variables. A closer view on the interpretation of the coefficients of the multiple linear regression will give evidence about arising problems of multicollinearity. A sensitivity analysis will possibly lead to a transformation of the model and only statistically significant variables will be included in the "Best Model Fit", in which the revised model and coefficients will be interpreted in order to determine what factors influence the degree of openness of immigrant integration policies in a country.

**Research Question at a glance:**

*"To what extent does the ideological spectrum of political parties represented in the national parliaments of the 28 EU-Member States have an impact on the openness of national immigrant integration policies in year 2014?"*

- ❖ What other factors influence the openness of immigrant integration policies in a country?




Figure 12: The expected relationships between the variables summarized in a comprehensive causal model (author's own creation)

<sup>9</sup> P-values of 0,05 indicate statistical significance. A low p-value suggests that the sample included in the study provides evidence that the null hypothesis can be rejected.

#### 4.1. Correlation Analysis

The Correlation Coefficient Pearson's R is an estimate of the strength and direction of a linear relationship between two variables. The coefficient ranges from +1 to -1, whereas the closer the estimate to +/-1, the stronger the positive or negative relationship. A score of 0 indicates that there is no correlation between the two variables. The correlation between the MIPEX Index and the independent variables is found to be fully statistically significant at the p-value of 0.05 (\*\*)<sup>10</sup> or at the critical p-value of < 0.1 (\*)<sup>11</sup>. The variable that is found to be fully statistically significant and with the highest correlation coefficient is the GDP per capita in PPS (r = 0.449). The percentage share of far right parties in parliament (r = -0.363) and the number of asylum applications (r = 0.355) both show moderately high presumption against the null hypothesis (p < 0.7\*), which is partially due to the small sample size. The share of far and center right parties in parliament (r = -0.178), as opposed to the share of extreme left, center left, and center parties (r = 0.207), both indicate p-values greater than 0.1. In a sensitivity analysis, outliers will be excluded from the study, which will possibly lead to a decrease in p-values. A correlation of -.0988, -0.631, and 0.618 (*numbers in cursive in table 4*) between the share of left, right, and far right parties in parliament indicates that there is a very strong relationship between the three predictor variables. This relationship is obviously present as the variables are all derived from the same data, namely the proportions of political parties in national parliaments. A multicollinearity analysis possibly leads to an exclusion of either variable from the multiple linear regression model.

Correlations Pearson's R	Immigrant Integration (MIPEX)	Right Party Share	Left, Center Party Share	Far Right Party Share	Asylum Applications	GDP per capita in PPS
<b>Immigrant Integration (MIPEX)</b>	1.0	-.178 (p = .366)	.207 (p = .291)	-.363* (p = .058)	.355* (p = .064)	.449** (p = .016)
<b>Right Party Share</b>		1.0	-.988** <sup>12</sup> (p = .000)	.631** (p = .004)	-.002 (p = .991)	-.123 (p = .534)
<b>Left, Center Party Share</b>			1.0	-.618** (p = .000)	.040 (p = .839)	.138 (p = .483)
<b>Far Right Party Share</b>				1.0	-.072 (p = .717)	-.164 (p = .405)
<b>Asylum Applications</b>					1.0	.187 (p = .341)
<b>GDP per capita in PPS</b>						1.0

Table 4: Pearson's R correlation coefficient table

<sup>10</sup> \*\* indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level.

<sup>11</sup> indicates statistical significance at 0.07 level.

<sup>12</sup> Cursive: In a sensitivity analysis in Multiple Linear Regression, variables that indicate multicollinearity will be excluded from the model in order to create a best model fit.

## 4.2. Linear Regression Assumptions

In order to apply the method of linear regression to test the hypotheses included in the study, it is necessary to fulfill five underlying linear regression assumptions, comprising a) that the dependent variable is measured on a continuous/interval scale, b) independence of errors, c) linearity, d) constant error variance/homoscedasticity and e) normally distributed errors (Laerd Statistics, 2013). These assumptions need to be fulfilled before conducting a linear regression analysis in order to prevent biased results. Appendix 4 offers a detailed overview over the linear regression assumptions, i.a. indicating that the dependent variable, the MIPEX Index, is measured on a continuous 0 to 100 scale.

For the purpose of fulfilling the assumptions of constant error variance (homoscedasticity), independence of errors and normal distribution of errors, scatterplots of the predicted scores against the residual scores of every predictor variable as well as P.-P. Plots and Histograms are created. It becomes apparent that there is evidence of heteroscedasticity in the far right party success and the number of asylum applications variables. The inconstant error variance of the far right party success variable can be attributed to a high concentration in the actual percentage shares of far right parties in national parliaments amongst EU-Member States. Far right parties often-times do not hold any mandates, which is why its data scores contain a frequent number of 0. Evidence of heteroscedasticity in the number of asylum applications variable seems to be due to largely varying distances between the actual number of asylum applicants in the respective countries included in the study. Thus, it is a result of the applied scale that only influences the standard error, i.e. a measure of the average distance of the actual values from the predicted values and can thus be neglected in the analysis.

Examining the assumption of linearity, scatterplots of the dependent variable, the MIPEX Index and the independent variables are created (see figure 13). Each scatterplot indicates if the relationship is given in the expected direction, and which variable shows a stronger correlation with the dependent variable than the others. Although nearly all variables indicate a tendency towards the expected relationship, the results are diverse. The scatterplot of the share of far and center right parties and the dependent variable shows the expected negative linear relationship with medium scatter along the line. Contrarily, the scatterplot of the dependent variable and the percentage share of extreme left, center left, and center parties in parliament likewise shows a relatively linear line and although there is some scatter along the line, the relationship is slightly positive as has been hypothesized. The scatterplot of the far right party success in parliament and the MIPEX Index is sufficiently linear and flows into the expected negative direction that corresponds to hypothesis 3. Unlike assumed, the scatterplot of the variable measuring the number of (non-EU) asylum applications in a country in relation to the MIPEX Index does not show a negative, but indicates a positive relationship. The plot is relatively linear, but shows somewhat more scatter along the line. Ultimately, the scatterplot of the economic variable, the GDP per capita in PPS, and the dependent variable shows the strongest relationship that is positive, as has been expected. The line is clearly linear, although there is evidence of some outliers.








Figure 13: Scatterplots of the dependent variable with each independent variable with regression lines. Created by the author based on MIPEX data of 2014 (MIPEX, 2015), data of Eurostat (2015a-b), and the Election Resources Website (Alvarez, 2014a-i; 2015a-m; 2016).



### 4.3. Simple Linear Regression Models

#### Answer Hypothesis 1: The Effect of the Proportion of Far- and Center Right Parties in Parliament

The first hypothesis describes the expected negative relationship between the share of far and center right parties and the openness of policies directed towards the integration of immigrants. Supposedly, a high proportion of right parties in parliament is associated with a low MIPEX Index. The model was run twice, before and after excluding influential cases on the basis of Cook's Distance. In linear regression, an outlier is a case whose dependent variable value is unusual given its value on the predictor variable. A case is said to be influential if removing it from the dataset substantially changes the estimate of the coefficients. Cook's Distance is a measure of influence that indicates how much influence a predictor variable has on the predicted value of the outcome variable. Specifically, it refers to how far on average predicted Y values will change if the particular record is dropped from the data set. There are several ways to identify potential influential cases within the data. Cook's Distance indicates how much the regression coefficients will change if a particular case is removed and combines high leverage and discrepancy points. Cook's Distance as such is an indication of any extreme values, whereas influential cases appear when Cook's Distance is  $> 4/n$ . In this model, n equals 28. Thus, any case with a greater value than  $4/n = 0,142$  can be detected as influential. The scatterplots with an identification of influential cases as well as the original output of the model are provided in Appendix 5. As can be seen by the residual statistics table, influential cases in the model have a value between 0,142 and 0,144. Hence, a potential influential case in the dataset is Portugal. The case of Portugal has an unusual record on the outcome variable, MIPEX Index (80), conditional on its value of the predictor variable (far-, centre right party share (57%)) that is unlike expected. Contextually speaking, there has been a shift in government from left-wing majority between 2007-2010 to right-wing majority since 2012 in Portugal with no extreme-right party in national elections, but highly positive attitudes towards immigrants before and during the economic crisis.

Removing the case from the dataset, the  $\beta$  coefficient as well as the explanatory power of the model changes: The unstandardized  $\beta$  coefficient for the independent variable now equals -0.198, indicating that for each percentage increase in the party share of far- and center right parties in parliament, there is a 0.198 point decrease in the MIPEX Index (stand.  $\beta$  coefficient = -0.255)<sup>13</sup>. Furthermore, although there is an improvement in significance of the relationship from a 0.372 to 0.199 level, the p-value still exceeds the threshold of  $p > 0.1$  after having removed the influential case, indicating that there is weak evidence against the null hypothesis ( $H_0$ ) ( $p > 0.1$ ). Accordingly, the model fails to reject the null hypothesis to which far and center right parties in parliament do not account for the variance in the

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<sup>13</sup> The standardized  $\beta$  coefficient shows the effect of one standard deviation in the scale of the proportion of far; centre right parties in parliament on the MIPEX Index of a country. This estimate allows for a comparable analysis of the effects of the different predictor variables on the outcome variable (MIPEX Index).

MIPEX Index and the relationship has to be considered as statistically insignificant. However, this is also largely due to the sample size ( $n = 28$ ) and albeit there seems to be a relationship between the variables, there are just not enough cases to prove it.

The scatterplot with the regression line indicates that the assumed relationship tends to flow into the assumed direction, but the relationship between the variables is relatively weak (see figure 13). The  $R^2$  coefficient of determination shows how much variance in the dependent variable can be explained by the independent variable: An  $R^2$  of 0,065 indicates that 6.5% of the variance in the MIPEX Index can be attributed to the proportion of far- and center right parties in parliament. Although the relationship between the variables might indicate the assumed negative direction, there is no evidence against the null hypothesis and the percentage share of far and center right parties in the national parliament of a respective country has to be considered as a variable with limited explanatory power in order to explain the variance in the overall MIPEX Index in 2014. Thus, **hypothesis 1 cannot be confirmed** as no statistically significant relationship is found between the variables.

**Model Summary**

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	0.255	0.065	0.028	11.395

Table 5: Model Summary of share of far and center right parties (X1) on MIPEX Index (Y) after removal of influential cases

**Coefficients**

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	Sig.	N
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	60.856	7.517		0.00	
	share right parties	-0.198	0.150	-0.255	0.199	27

Table 6: Coefficients table of share of far and center right parties (X1) on MIPEX Index (Y) after removal of influential cases.

## Answer Hypothesis 2: Proportion of Extreme Left, Center Left and Center Parties in Parliament

Hypothesis 2 supposes that a high share of extreme left, center left, and center parties in national parliament is likely to be associated with an open policy towards immigrant integration in the respective EU-Member State. As a consequence, it is assumed to be associated with a high MIPEX score, indicating favorability towards immigrant integration. Regarding the linear regression assumptions, the scatterplot of predicted and residual scores indicates that those can be verified and the regression line flows into the expected positive direction. An examination of influential cases by means of Cook's Distance indicates that the maximum Cook's Distance in the relationship is 0.138 (see Appendix 6). As previously outlined, any case with a Cook's Distance that exceeds the value of 0,142 is to be identified as an influential case in the study. Therefore, no influential cases are found in the relationship and the coefficients as well as the explanatory power of the model remains untouched when running the model multiple times. The unstandardized  $\beta$  coefficient for the proportion of left and center parties in parliament equals 0.183, indicating that for each percentage increase in the left- and center party share, there is a 0.183 point increase in MIPEX Index (stand.  $\beta = 0.204$ ). The p-value of the variable equals 0.291 ( $p > 0,1$ ), signifying that no presumption against the null hypothesis can be made and the relationship has to be considered as statistically insignificant. As indicated by an  $R^2$  of 0.043, only 4.3% of the variance in the MIPEX Index can be explained by the share of extreme and center left as well as center parties in national parliaments of the EU-Member States. The share of left and center parties in parliament appears to be a variable with limited power. Although it verifies the assumed direction of the variables made in hypothesis 2, the significance of the relationship with the MIPEX Index is not given. Thus, **hypothesis 2 has to be falsified** and the percentage share of extreme left, center left, and center parties in national parliaments of EU-Member States does not represent a statistical significant variable in order to explain the variance in the national openness of integration policies, measured by the overall MIPEX Index in 2014.

### Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	0.207	0.043	0.006	12.528

Table 7: Model Summary of share of extreme left, center left, and center parties (X2) on MIPEX Index (Y)

### Coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	Sig.	N
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	43.088	8.958		0,00	
	share left; center parties	0.183	0.170	0.204	0.291	28

Table 8: Coefficients table of share of extreme left, center left, and center parties (X2) on MIPEX Index (Y)

### Answer Hypothesis 3: Far Right Party Success in Parliament

Hypothesis 3 assumes a negative linear relationship between the far right party success in parliament and the openness of immigrant integration policies in a country. The scatterplot with the regression line reveals that the assumed negative relationship tends to be verified (see figure 13). Regarding the linear regression assumptions, the violence of homoscedasticity is normally considered to go along with an influence of the standard error. The coefficient table indicates that the standard error seems to be very low (0.225), indicating that the violence of the assumption can be neglected. Identifying potential influential cases in the relationship between the far right party success in parliament and the MIPEX Index, it can be said that the maximum Cook's Distance equals 0.131, revealing that the relationship does not contain any influential case. The unstandardized  $\beta$  coefficient demonstrates that a one percentage increase in far right party share in parliament contributes to a 0.447 decrease in the MIPEX Index (stand.  $\beta$  coefficient = -0.363). The p-value close to the threshold of  $< 0.05$  (0.058) contains relatively strong evidence against the null hypothesis and the relationship is to be seen as statistically significant. As indicated by table 9 and an  $R^2$  of 0.132, 13.2% of the variance in the MIPEX Index in 2014 can be explained by incurring the far right party success in national parliaments across the EU. Thus, **hypothesis 3 can be verified**: A high share of far right parties in a national parliament of a respective EU-Member State seems to be a statistically significant determinant for the variance in the openness of immigrant integration policies and is thus associated with a low overall MIPEX Index score of EU-Member States in 2014. The regression equation is as follows:

$$\text{MIPEX} = 43.088 \times (-0.447) \text{ percentage share of far right party seats in parliament}$$

#### Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	0.363	0.132	0.098	11.931

Table 9: Model Summary of share of far right parties (X3) on MIPEX Index (Y)

#### Coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	Sig.	N
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	55.784	2.839		0.00	
	far right parties	-0.447	0.225	-0.363	0.058	28

Table 10: Coefficients table of share of far right parties (X3) on MIPEX Index (Y)

#### **Answer Hypothesis 4: Refugee Influx - The Number of (non-EU) Asylum Applications**

Hypothesis 4 assumes that there is a negative relationship between the number of asylum applications and the openness of national immigrant integration policies in a respective country, i.e. a higher number of (non-EU) asylum applications in a respective EU-Member State contributes to a lower overall MIPEX Index in 2014, as anti-immigrant sentiments in the receiving country's population force political parties to adopt more restrictive integration policies.

Examining the linear regression assumptions, it appeared that there is evidence of heteroscedasticity, which is due to scaling issues and great intervals between countries accepting largely varying numbers of refugees. Identifying outliers and influential cases will dissolve the problem of heteroscedasticity. Running the model multiple times and conducting two sensitivity analyses, four influential cases in the relationship between the number of (non-EU) asylum applications (X4) and the MIPEX Index (Y) are identified. As the maximum Cook's Distance (d) in this case equals 2.511 and all cases with a Cook's Distance bigger than 0,142 are to be considered as influential, the cases of Germany (d: 2.511), Sweden (d: 0.217), Portugal (d: 0.159), and Finland (d: 1.641) have unusual data estimates that change the relationship between X and Y. Removing all influential cases from the dataset substantially changes the estimate of the coefficients. Appendix 8 provides an overview over the process of identifying influential cases, reasons for them being influential, as well as overall model outcomes.

The unstandardized  $\beta$  coefficient equals 0.00, which indicates that a one unit increase in the number of asylum applications leads to a 0.00 increase in the MIPEX Index - an outcome that appears relatively meaningless and is due to the measurement scale of the variable number asylum applications. Thus, the standardized  $\beta$  coefficient is a more accurate measure to reveal the impact of the variable: One standard deviation increase in the asylum applications variable is likely to be associated with a 0.429 increase in the dependent variable, the MIPEX Index. The positive coefficient reveals that the relationship exists in the opposite direction from the one expected. Furthermore, the  $R^2$  coefficient of determination is 0.184, signifying that after having removed all influential cases from the dataset, 18.4% of the variance in the openness of immigrant integration policies can be explained by incurring the number of asylum applications in the country. The p-value is 0.037 ( $p < 0.05$ ), revealing strong evidence against the null hypothesis and indicating that the relationship is fully significant.

As a result, **hypothesis 4 has to be falsified** demonstrating that although the scope of the migrant influx in 2014, measured by the number of (non-EU) asylum applications in a country, serves as significant explanatory variable for the national supportiveness of immigrant integration policies, the relationship is positive. A higher the number of asylum applications accounts for a higher MIPEX score of a respective country. The regression equation of the model is therefore:

MIPEX = 45.89 x (+0.429) Std. deviations of number of (non-EU) asylum applications

### Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	0.429	0.184	0.147	8.577

Table 11: Model Summary of share of asylum applications (X4) on MIPEX Index (Y)

### Coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	Sig.	N
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	45.898	2.203		0.00	
	asylum applications	0.00	0.00	0.429	0.037	24

Table 12: Coefficients table of share of asylum applications (X4) on MIPEX Index (Y)

**Answer (Interaction) Hypothesis 5: Conditional Effect of Number of Asylum Applications (Z) on Relationship between Share of Right Parties (X1) and the MIPEX Index in 2014 (Y)**

$$\hat{Y} = a + b_1X + b_2Z + b_3XZ$$

Y = MIPEX Index

X = proportion of far and center right parties in parliament

Z = number of (non-EU) asylum applications

The Interaction Hypothesis assumes that the scope of the migrant influx, measured by the number of (non-EU) asylum applications in a country, changes the relationship between the proportion of far and center right parties and the openness towards immigrant integration policies in a country. It is assumed that the previously negative relationship between the proportion of right parties in parliament and the MIPEX Index becomes reversed once the number of asylum applications is taken into consideration. A high number of asylum seekers in a country supposedly increases public pressure on politicians to adopt more open and (non-)restrictive policies in order to successfully integrate those refugees that have been granted the right to asylum.

Conditional effects consist of three impacts: the main effect of X on Y (the share of right parties and MIPEX Index), the effect of Z on Y (number of (non-EU) asylum applications and MIPEX Index), and the interaction effect, in which the number of asylum applications as a continuous intervening variable is assumed to change the relationship between the percentage share of right parties in parliament and the openness of immigrant integration policies in the EU-MSs in 2014. As becomes evident by table 13-14, the number of (non-EU) asylum applications variable exerts explanatory power on the MIPEX Index (stand.  $\beta$  coefficient: 0.346). Also, the relationship between the proportion of far and center right parties in parliaments and openness of immigrant integration policies is still present when controlling for number of asylum applications (stand.  $\beta$  coefficient: -0.278). Although the p-values (slightly) exceed the threshold of  $p < 0.05$  and normally appear to be too high in order to speak of full statistical significance, the interaction effect will be still be tested by means of a marginal effect plot.

**Model Summary**

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	0.434	0.188	0.114	9.515

Table 13: Model Fit of right party share and number of asylum applications (X1; Z2) on MIPEX Index (Y) after having removed influential cases

### Coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta	
1	(Constant)	55.936	6.440		0.00
	share right parties	-0.182	0.126	-0.278	0.162
	number of asylum applications	0.000	0.000	0.346	0.086

Table 14: Coefficients Table of right party share and number of asylum applications (X1; Z2) on MIPEX Index (Y) after having removed influential cases (see Appendix 6)

A marginal effect plot is necessary to visualize the marginal effect of X on Y with Z included (see figure 14). Taking into account the position of the solid line, one can say that the graph falls below zero, indicating that Z changes the relationship between X and Y in the supposed (positive) direction, thus verifying the assumption made in hypothesis 5. The downward direction of the solid line indicates that the relationship between the proportion of far and center right parties in parliament and the openness of immigrant integration policies becomes stronger once the number of asylum applications in a country increases. Thus, when there is a high number of asylum applications in a country, the now positive relationship between the share of center and far right parties in parliament and the MIPEX Index increases. However, the position of the dashed lines, and the Confidence Interval including 0, suggest that the relationship has to be considered as statistically insignificant. This is partially due to largely varying amounts in the number of asylum applications in a country and the small sample size included into the study. Therefore, although the supposed relationship can be found in the data, **hypothesis 5 cannot be verified** as the relationship is lacking statistical significance.




Figure 14: Marginal effect plot of Interaction Effect of number of non-EU asylum applications (Z), share of far and center right parties (X) and MIPEX Index (Y) with position line and Confidence Intervals at 0.05-level (source: created by author)



**Answer Interaction Hypothesis 6: Conditional Effect of Number of Asylum Applications (Z) on Relationship between Share of Left and Center Parties (X2) and the MIPEX Index in 2014 (Y)**

$$\hat{Y} = a + b_1X + b_2Z + b_3XZ$$

Y = MIPEX Index

X = proportion of extreme left, center left, and center parties in parliament

Z = number of asylum applications

As a counterhypothesis, also the relationship between the percentage share of left, and center parties in parliament and the openness of national immigrant integration policies is assumed to be affected by the number of asylum applications in a respective country. However, left parties are considered to install less open (or more restrictive) immigrant integration policies as they are expected to fear losing their voters to far right parties that have already increasingly gained votes in the wake of the recent refugee influx into the EU.

An overview of the model outputs is provided in Appendix 10. As indicated by table 15 and 16, the number of asylum applications as a continuous intervening variable exerts explanatory power on the MIPEX Index (stand.  $\beta$  coefficient: 0.333). Furthermore, the relationship between the proportion of left, and center parties in parliament and the openness of integration policies is still present once the number of asylum applications variable is adopted into the model (stand.  $\beta$  coefficient: 0.278).

**Model Summary**

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	0.589	0.347	0.290	9.727

Table 15: Model Fit of left and center party share and number of asylum applications (X2; Z) on MIPEX Index (Y) after having removed influential cases (see Appendix 6)

**Coefficients**

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta	
1	(Constant)	36.169	7.125		0.00
	share left; center parties	0.204	0.133	0.199	0.138
	number of asylum applications	0.000	0.000	0.355	0.006

Table 16: Coefficients Table of left and center party share and number of asylum applications (X2; Z) on MIPEX Index (Y)

The marginal effect plot in figure 15 visualizes the marginal effect of X on Y, once Z is included. The position and direction of the solid line (up and above zero) indicates that there is a positive marginal effect between the extreme left, center left, and center party share in parliament and the MIPEX Index that becomes stronger with increasing numbers of asylum applications (unlike assumed in Hypothesis 6). This indication contradicts the assumption that the number of non-EU asylum applicants reverses the relationship between the proportion of left and center parties and the MIPEX Index. Instead, it becomes evident that left parties tend to install even more favorable immigrant integration policies when the number of asylum applications in a country increases. As a result, it can be said that left and center parties rather stick to their traditional ideological party positioning and social cleavage location when confronted with a large number of asylum seekers in a country, and are not affected by an increasing electoral threat of (working-class or anti-immigrant) voters that could be lost to the far right. However, the position of the dashed lines indicates that the Confidence Interval slightly includes 0, which is why the statistical significance of the relationship has to be neglected and **interaction hypothesis 6 is to be falsified.**

One can therefore say that when encountered with an increasing influx of asylum seekers in a country, the effect of the composition of political parties in parliament on the MIPEX Index, regardless of where parties stand on the political left-right party spectrum, is positive and becomes stronger with increasing numbers of immigrants. Not only parliaments that are composed of a large far- and center right party share tend to install more open immigrant integration policies, but also those that have a large share of left and center parties as parties of both ends are assumed to feel the urgent need to integrate the newcomers.




Figure 15: Marginal effect plot of interaction effect of number of non-EU asylum applications (Z), share of extreme left, center left, and center parties (X) and MIPEX Index (Y) with position line and Confidence Intervals at 0.05-level (source: created by author)

### Answer Hypothesis 7: Economic Wellbeing - GDP per capita in PPS

Hypothesis 7 assumes that there is a positive linear relationship between the GDP per capita (in PPS) and the openness of immigrant integration policies in a country. The scatterplot with the regression line in figure 13 reveals that the supposedly positive relationship can be verified. Appendix 4 illustrates that the linear regression assumptions for the variable are fulfilled. Controlling for influential cases in the relationship between the variables not only changes the  $\beta$  coefficients but also alters the explanatory power of the model. Running the model multiple times revealed that possible outliers are the cases of Luxembourg (having a GDP per capita highly above EU-28 average (266), and a relatively low MIPEX Index score (60)) and Portugal (whose GDP per capita is below EU-28 average (78), but the MIPEX Index score very high (80)). An overview of the exclusion of influential cases, model summaries, and coefficients table is provided in Appendix 11. After having removed these cases from the dataset, the unstandardized  $\beta$  coefficient equals 0.303, which indicates that a one-unit Purchasing Power Standard increase in GDP per capita of a country contributes to a 0.303 increase in the MIPEX Index (stand.  $\beta$  coefficient: 0.698). As indicated in the Model Summary, also explanatory power of the model increases: An  $R^2$  of 0.473 suggests that 48.7% in the variance of the MIPEX Index can be explained by looking at the economic well-being of a country. Furthermore, the statistical significance is given and even decreases to a p-value of 0.00, containing no evidence against the null hypothesis and revealing full statistical significance of the relationship between the variables. Thus, **hypothesis 8 can be verified**, as countries with a high economic wellbeing tend to score high on the MIPEX Index as well.

#### Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	0.698	0.487	0.466	8.516

Table 17: Model Summary of GDP per capita in PPS (X5) on MIPEX Index (Y) after excluding influential cases

#### Coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta	
1	(Constant)	23.17	6.067		0.00
	GDP per capita in PPS	0.303	0.063	0.698	0.000

Table 18: Coefficients table of GDP per capita in PPS (X5) on MIPEX Index (Y) after excluding influential cases

#### 4.4. Multiple Linear Regression

A multiple linear regression model will give evidence about which selected group of predictor variables best explains the values in the outcome variable. By means of (a) multicollinearity analysis; and (b) identifying influential cases and checking for statistical significance of the variables in the first regression model; different cases and variables will be excluded from the model in order to construct a best model fit (c) consisting of only statistically significant determinants that best explain the variance in the dependent variable, the openness of immigrant integration policies in a country, measured by the overall MIPEX Index in 2014.

##### a. Multicollinearity

Multicollinearity occurs when there are two or more independent variables ( $X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n$ ) that are highly correlated with each other. This leads to problems in understanding which explanatory variable contributes to the variance explained in the dependent variable. An inspection of multicollinearity diagnostics, such as the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) will give evidence about arising multicollinearity between the independent variables. The VIF is calculated by  $VIF = 1 / 1-R^2$ . The estimated number reveals how much larger the error variance for the unique effect of a predictor variable is, relative to a situation where multicollinearity is absent. Thus, the VIF measures the impact of a predictor variable when we add an extra variable. If the VIF is much greater than 10, depending on the model size, then multicollinearity is present. As already indicated in the Correlation Analysis section, a VIF higher than 40 indicates the risk of multicollinearity between the share of left, and center parties on the one hand and far and center right parties on the other hand (cf. table 19). This is due to the fact that the share of parties of each ideological spectrum is dependent upon the share of other parties in parliament and are thus likely to correlate. Omitting either of the two variables from the multiple regression model, will dissolve the problem of multicollinearity.

Model	Variance Inflation Factor
share far- and center right parties	45.397
share extreme left, center left, and center parties	44.067
share far right parties	1.703
number of asylum applications	1.102
GDP per capita (in PPS)	1.069

dependent variable: MIPEX Index

Model	Variance Inflation Factor
share extreme left, center left, and center parties	1.620
share far right parties	1.636
number of asylum applications	1.038
GDP per capita (in PPS)	1.064

dependent variable: MIPEX Index

Table 19: Collinearity Statistics before and after omitting X1 (share of right parties) from the model (Source: created by author)

**b. First Multiple Regression Model**

The first multiple regression model includes all independent variables in order to account for as much variance in the dependent variable as possible. The R<sup>2</sup> coefficient of determination equals 0.374 (adj. R<sup>2</sup>: 0.231), suggesting that 37.4% of the variance in the MIPEX Index can be explained by all five explanatory variables. However, as already suggested by the correlation coefficient (Pearson's R), the VIF, and the p-values of the share of far- and center right (p: 0.479) as well as the left, and center party share (p: 0.513), the variables indicate great evidence of multicollinearity. Both variables will thus be excluded from the model.

**Model Summary**

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	0.611	0.374	0,231	11.016

Table 20: Model Summary of all IV on DV, MIPEX Index

**Coefficients**

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta	
1	(Constant)	-23.365	96.050		0.810
	share right parties	0.701	0.973	0.819	0.479 <sup>14*</sup>
	share left, and center parties	0.661	0.994	0.744	0.513*
	share far right parties	-0.427	0.271	-0.347	0.130
	asylum applications	7.156E-5	0.000	0.237	0.194
	GDP per capita	-0.104	0.053	0.346	0.060

Table 21: Coefficients table of all IV on DV, MIPEX Index

<sup>14</sup> \* signals indications of multicollinearity

**c. Best Model Fit (X3, X4, X5 -> Y)**

Excluding the variables that indicated multicollinearity and running the model multiple times to identify potential outliers by means of Cook's Distances further alters the coefficients, and explanatory power of the model. As stated in the simple linear regression section, any case with a greater Cook's Distance (d) value than 0.142 can be identified as being influential. As indicated by Appendix 12, the influential cases in the model take the value  $0.142 < 2.092$ . Potential influential cases are thus Luxembourg (d: 1,872), Germany (d: 2.06) and Portugal (d: 0.173).

The transformation of the model indicates that removing influential cases from the dataset augments the explanatory power of the model to an  $R^2$  of 0.64, signifying 64% of the variance in the dependent variable, the MIPEX Index, can be explained by taking all three predictor variables into account. The unstandardized  $\beta$  coefficients verify the assumed relationship between the respective independent variable and the dependent variable, keeping all other factors constant. As can be seen by table 23, a one percentage increase in the share of far right parties accounts for a 0.321 unit decrease in the MIPEX Index, keeping the number of asylum applications and GDP per capita in PPS in a country constant. Thus, a higher share of far right parties tends to go along with a lower MIPEX Index and a greater restrictiveness of immigrant integration policies, while the influx of migrants and economic wellbeing remain constant. As the unstandardized  $\beta$  coefficient for the number of (non-EU) asylum applications does not prove to be meaningful (which is due to the scale of the variable), it is more reasonable to incur the standardized  $\beta$  coefficient. The coefficient suggests, for a one standard deviation increase in asylum applications, there is a 0.366 unit increase in the MIPEX Index, keeping all other variables constant. This outcome falsifies the assumption that a higher number of asylum applications leads to less open immigrant integration policies, but rather indicates that the relationship is existent the other way around. Furthermore, for every PPS increase in the GDP per capita in a country, there is a 0.224 unit increase in the MIPEX Index, keeping both other IVs constant. This reveals that a better economic performance leads to more open immigrant integration policies, keeping the share of far right parties in parliament and the number of asylum applications in a country constant. In order to investigate which of the variables has the best explanatory power, the standardized  $\beta$  coefficients can be taken into account. As all three variables prove to be statistically significant (\*\*; p value < 0.05), it can be concluded that the economic wellbeing of a country (stand.  $\beta$  coefficient: 0.511) exerts the strongest explanatory power of the variables included in the model and best accounts for the variation in the MIPEX Index.

Omitting X1 and X2 from the model and excluding influential cases, the general form of the equation to predict the MIPEX Index (Y) by means of the share of far right parties, the number of (non-EU) asylum applications, and the GDP per capita (in PPS) equals:

$$\text{MIPEX} = 29.855 \times (-0.321) \% \text{ share of far right parties} + 0.366 \text{ std. deviation in (non-EU) asylum applications} + 0.224 \text{ GDP per capita in PPS}$$

Thus, the best fit regression model is composed of the following parameters:

$$Y = a + \beta \text{ share far right parties} + \beta \text{ number of asylum applications} + \beta \text{ GDP per capita (in PPS)} + e$$

Y = dependent variable

a = constant

$\beta$  = regression coefficients

E = error term

#### Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	0.800	0.640	0.589	7.455

Table 22: Model Summary of X3, X4, X5 on MIPEX Index (Y) with influential cases removed

#### Coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta	
1	(Constant)	29.835	6.017		0.000
	share far right parties	-0.321	0.147	-0.287	0.041**
	asylum applications	0.000	0.000	0.378	0.020**
	GDP per capita	0.224	0.063	0.511	0.002**

Table 23: Coefficients table on MIPEX Index (Y) after removing influential cases

## Chapter 5: Conclusion and Discussion

This paper explored the link between the composition and party constellations of national parliaments amongst the 28 EU-Member States and the openness or restrictiveness of their respective national immigrant integration policies, by means of the MIPEX Index, in 2014. The analysis was conducted in two parts. Whereas the first part covered the correlation analysis by means of Pearson's R correlation as well as the fulfillment of linear regression assumptions, the second part dealt with the actual simple and multiple regression analysis. Table 24 shows the research results at a glance. Incurring theoretical and practical implications as well as strengths and weaknesses of the research design, this chapter discusses which general conclusions and results can be drawn from the study at hand. In a last step, recommendations for future research will be provided.

Hypothesis	Expectation	Result <sup>15</sup>	Explanation
1	The higher the proportion of far right, and center right parties in national parliament, the less open the immigrant integration policies of the respective country.	-	relationship statistically insignificant
2	The higher the proportion of extreme left, center left and center parties in national parliament, the more open the immigrant integration policies of the respective country.	-	relationship statistically insignificant
3	The higher the share of seats of right-wing parties in parliament, the less open the immigrant integration policies of the respective country.	+	relationship fully verified
4	The higher the number of asylum applications, the less open the country's national immigrant integration policy.	-	relationship significant; but in opposite direction
5	The extent to which a high share of far and centre right parties in parliament leads to less open immigrant integration policies is dependent on the amount of migrants entering the country, i.e. the number of asylum applications in a country. Due to the urgent need to integrate the high number of migrants, right parties are assumed to move towards the middle and install more favorable integration policies.	-	relationship statistically insignificant. direction as assumed
6	The extent to which a high share of seats of extreme left, centre left, and center parties in parliament leads to more open immigrant integration policies is dependent on the amount of migrants entering the country, i.e. the number of asylum applications in a country. Left parties are assumed to install less favorable immigrant integration policies as they fear to lose their voters to the far right.	-	relationship statistically insignificant. direction unlike assumed
7	The higher the levels of GDP per capita (in PPS), the more supportive is the country's immigrant integration policy.	+	relationship fully verified

Table 24: The results at a glance

<sup>15</sup> Whereas a minus (-) indicates that the relationship has to be rejected, a plus (+) means that the hypothesis can be verified.



## 5.1. General Conclusions

The analyses in this paper suggest that the composition of national parliaments plays a relatively marginal role in determining immigrant integration policies. Only when it comes to the share of far right parties in parliament do the MIPEX Index data provide evidence for the widespread assumption that far right parties are in favor of more restrictive immigrant integration policies than political parties from the remaining ends of the political party spectrum. Besides this expectation, the results are robust in *not* indicating any statistically significant evidence of the left-right gradient in which extreme left, center left, and center party dominated national parliaments of EU-Member States are assumed to install more open immigrant integration policies, whereas far and center right party dominated parliaments would take a more restrictive approach.

Therefore, the overall research question of the study has to be partially *falsified*: The ideological spectrum of political parties represented in national parliaments of the 28-EU Member States only has a *marginal impact* on the openness of national immigrant integration policies in year 2014. Thus, it can be concluded that the ideological positioning of political parties and social cleavage location is of limited importance when explaining the openness of immigrant integration policies in a country. However, although the political party spectrum and the degree to which national parliaments are composed of a high share of extreme, center left and center parties as opposed to far and center right parties itself pointed into the hypothesized directions, the variables failed to provide strong explanations for the variance in the openness of integration policies, rendering very low explanatory power and no statistical significance. Only for the far right party success variable does the MIPEX Index provide evidence for the widespread assumption that these account for the implementation of less open immigrant integration policies than political parties from the remaining political party spectrum. Thus, far right parties' success in a country seems to exert influence on the other (governing) parties in a way to adopt more restrictive immigrant integration policies. This is particularly due to an overall anti-immigrant sentiment of far right parties that in recent decades "has become a defining characteristic of its new populist version [...] eager to redefine itself as more voter-friendly" (Kurnosov, n.d.).

What this paper shows, is that although issues of immigration and integration are subject to fierce debates in the public sphere and extensive political bargaining in the political sphere, the actual policies enacted seem to be mainly driven by factors other than party ideologies or political orientation. There are other elements than the left-right ideological party spectrum that affect policy-making of political parties and thus influence the degree of permissiveness of immigrant integration policies in a country. As the results from the simple and multiple regression analyses confirm hypotheses 3 and 7, and indicate that the supposed relationship of hypothesis 4 exists in the opposite direction, significant national predictors of immigrant integration policies, besides the share of far

right parties in parliament, include the scope of the current refugee and migrant influx, and the macroeconomic performance of a country. It was found that the higher the number of (non-EU) asylum applications in a country, the more open the country's immigrant integration policies, irrespective of the party constellation in parliament. Hence, left and right party dominated parliaments are considered to react to short-term fluctuations rapidly and will feel the need for successfully integrating immigrants and refugees alike by setting equality standards with regards to the local population. Furthermore, it became clear that the openness of immigrant integration policies in EU-Member States is strongly determined by economic factors such as the GDP per capita. The regression analysis suggests that with a high GDP per capita in a country, governments will install more open and favorable integration policies, irrespective of their majoritarian party spectrum. This liberalizing effect of economic wellbeing is mainly explained through its effect on entry policies targeted at socio-economic integration of refugees and migrants into the labour market, as well as providing access to education and health services. By means of the findings, it can thus be assumed that political parties tend to react to other social and economic factors rather than only incurring their ideological stance when installing integration policies: Albeit lacking statistical significance hypotheses 5 and 6 suggest a tendency that with increasing asylum application rates in a country, integration policies become more generous, and parliaments that are composed of a high share of parties from either end of the ideological spectrum (i.e. with a hegemony of left or right parties) tend to adopt more liberal policies. This being said, especially left parties tend to follow their ideological stance and are not influenced by electoral threats that have possibly been imposed from the far right. However, it is remarkable that also parliaments that are dominated by a high share of right parties supposedly tend to adopt a more liberal approach installing more supportive and generous integration policies when they are confronted with a high share of asylum seekers in a country. These analyses point to the complexities of mechanisms through which economic- and migratory trends feed (back) into immigrant integration policies.

## **5.2. Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research**

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, immigration is a central phenomenon of our time which is likely to continue in the coming years. It changes the way we think about national identity which makes it necessary to find ways to incorporate people from vast backgrounds in the hosting society. Only little research has been conducted on integration policy and its relationship with the political constellations and compositions of national parliaments amongst EU-Member States that incur the whole political party spectrum and focus on party ideology.

Studies like these and the study at hand indicate that the relationship may be subject to more detailed circumstances in different countries that should be analyzed in future research. The findings of this paper are based on the pooling of a large variety of countries. Given that processes underlying

migration and integration policy-making cross-nationally are incredibly complex, only detailed case studies of certain policy changes in a specific national and political environment will be able to bring this complexity to light. It may also be worth discussing if such quantitative studies, including a bigger amount of cases is meaningful in the field of integration policy as it seems to be difficult to quantify integration policy and to measure the many different aspects influencing policy-making in different circumstances. This conflict is discussed by Freeman and Kessler (2008) who point out that “the determinants of policy are complex, difficult to pin down, and certainly not reducible to preferences of individual actors or group-level demands”. As the data included in the analysis are based on allocations of political parties according to their European party groups (EPGs), there is much room for national variation as national parties can still take a more "independent" detached approach and, although they are affiliated to the same EPG, they might take a different stance on immigration or integration issues. However, as models are always a simplification of reality by which full reality can never be revealed, the classification of political parties that is adopted in this paper is considered to point into a similar direction as if there had been a more elaborate categorization by means of policy papers and party manifestos of each political party in national parliaments amongst EU-Member States. This was only feasible and strongly reasonable in the case of center (or liberal) parties. Given the limited amount of time resources, such a close elaboration would have extended the scope of this study and has to be left to future research.

Furthermore, one could claim that decision-making in parliament is not only dependent on a hegemony of left or right parties, but much more complex and often-times dependent on coalition-building. However, as coalitions that are dependent on a qualified majority in parliament, are often-times formatted by cabinets that are composed of parties adjacent to an ideological spectrum or cleavage dimension, i.e. "minimal connected winning coalitions" (Dodd, 1976), it is reasonable to distinguish between political parties that take similar stances on salient issues. This fact renders a classification of extreme left, center left, and center parties that are considered to take a favorable integration policy approach as opposed to a more restrictive approach by far right and center right parties as appropriate. In terms of predictions which policy approach parties adopt and which will ultimately be implemented, there are many theorems, including the median voter, and equilibrium concepts such as the Nash bargaining model, that all render different policy outcomes and would have extended the scope of the study.

Another aspect to consider in future research is Biffl and Faustmann's (2013) critique on the MIPEX Index, who argue that the MIPEX Index does not necessarily include all aspects of integration policy. As the MIPEX is a mere input indicator, meaning that it only assesses the legal and institutional basic conditions of integration and leaves out other cultural and non-governmental circumstances playing a role in integration, it is not a determining indicator of the actual situation of migrants in the hosting society, but only gives an idea of a country's respective integration policies, showing its commitment

to equal chances for migrants in central policy fields. Thus, this analysis is based on "policies on paper" and does not take into account variations in implemented policy measures that would constitute a valuable future contribution to the literature as implementation leaves wide leverage to decision-making power of bureaucracies and private actors.

An additional important limitation that is recommended to be overcome in future research is the influence of other determinants to which political parties may alter their traditional ideological positioning on integration. These include the public opinion, to which political parties respond and correspond (Bale, 2008), the share of the non-national population, or other economic or fiscal determinants such as the unemployment rate or debts in a country. However, one cannot discard the strong correlation and significant results found for the relationship of a country's overall economic performance and its integration policies on the one hand, for the current refugee surge or migrant influx and non-restrictiveness of integration policies on the other hand, and ultimately for the percentage share of far right parties in parliament and the openness of national integration policies.

Studies like these and the study at hand indicate relationships that may be subject to more detailed circumstances in different countries such as distinct features of national political systems (for instance the electoral system or the level of federalism) which should be analyzed in more detail in future research. Combined with the analysis of political system factors, these studies should take a more elaborate view on needs to form coalition governments, incur multi-dimensional issues, and/or the influence of interest groups, unions and lobbies that may result in policies that are slightly changed from initial policy positions of political parties. These should include a larger variety of countries, such as Anglo-Saxon ones, and more detailed data measured over time as immigrant integration will most likely be a salient issue in the upcoming years as much as it is a central phenomenon now. Research on immigrant integration policy and its relationship with political party positioning and party ideology should play a central role in this.

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## Statutory Declaration

I hereby declare that I have authored this thesis independently, that I have not used other than the declared sources, and that I have explicitly marked all material which has been quoted either literally or by content from the used sources.

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## Appendix

### Appendix 1: Sources of MIPEX equality standards<sup>16</sup>

Sources of MIPEX equality standards: Europe
Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions, 15 and 16 October 1999
Immigration Law Practitioners' Association and the Migration Policy Group, The Amsterdam Proposals: Proposed Directive on Admission of migrants, 2000
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Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, 2000/43 of 29 June 2000
Directive establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, 2000/78 of 27 November 2000
Sources of MIPEX equality standards: International
UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
UN International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
UN International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and the Members of Their Families
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)
UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education
ILO Convention No. 97 of 1949 on Migration for Employment
ILO Convention No. 143 of 1979 on Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions)
ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration: Non-binding principles and guidelines for a rights-based approach to labour migration

<sup>16</sup> MIPEX Methodology (2015). Retrieved on 2 June, 2016 from: <http://www.mipex.eu/methodology>

## Appendix 2: Classification of Political Parties

The classification of political parties in national parliaments is based on their respective affiliation to European parliament groups (EPGs). The following tables and figures show the composition of national parliaments by political parties from the left-right party spectrum after the respective Member State's most recent national election prior to 2014. The percentage shares are estimated by the number of mandates they hold in parliament.

### National Assembly Austria




Figure 1: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Austrian Parliament as of parliamentary elections in 2013.

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates	European affiliation
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ)	52	S&D
	<i>Greens</i>	The Greens	24	The Greens
<b>Center</b>	<i>Liberalism</i>	NEOS – The New Austria and Liberal Forum	9	ALDE
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	Austrian People's Party (ÖVP)	47	EPP
<b>Far right</b>	<i>Right-wing populism / anti-immigration</i>	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	40	ENF
		Team Stronach for Austria	11	
			183	

Table 1: Composition National Assembly Austria (as of parliamentary elections in 20

**Chamber of Representatives Belgium**




Figure 2: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Belgian Parliament as of parliamentary elections in 2014.

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Socialist Party (PS)	23	S&D
		Socialist Party. Different (sp.a)	13	S&D
	<i>Green</i>	Green / Ecolo	12	The Greens
<b>Center</b>	<i>Liberalism</i>	Reform Movement (MR)	20	ALDE
		Open VLD (Flemish Liberals and Democrats)	14	ALDE
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	New Flemish Alliance (N-VA)	33	AECR
		Christian Democratic & Flemish (CD&V)	18	EPP
		Humanist Democratic Center (cdH)	9	EPP
<b>Far right</b>	<i>Right-wing populism / anti-immigration</i>	Flemish Interest (VB)	3	ENF
		Popular Party (PP)	1	ADDE
<b>others</b>		Worker’s Party of Belgium (PVDA/PTB)	2	none
		Francophone Democratic Federalists (FDF)	2	none
			150	

Table 2: Composition Chamber of Representatives Belgium (as of parliamentary elections in 2014)

**National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria**




Figure 3: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Bulgarian Parliament as of parliamentary elections in 2013



Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates	European affiliation
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Coalition for Bulgaria	84	S&D
<b>Center</b>	<i>Liberalism</i>	Movement for Rights and Freedoms	36	ALDE
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	GERB	97	EPP
<b>Far right</b>	<i>Right-wing populism / anti-immigration</i>	Attack	23	none
			240	

Table 3: Composition National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria (as of parliamentary elections in 2013)

### Croatian Parliament




Figure 4: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Croatian Parliament as of parliamentary elections in 2011

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Extreme left</b>	<i>Socialism</i>	Croatian Labour Party	6	none
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Social Democrat Party (SDP)	61	S&D
		Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS)	3	S&D
<b>Center</b>	<i>Liberalism</i>	Croatian People's Party (HNS)	14	ALDE
		Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS)	3	ALDE
		Independent candidate Ivan Grubisic	2	none
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)	47	EPP
		Croatian Peasant Party (HSS)	1	EPP
<b>Far right</b>	<i>Populism</i>	Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja (HDSSB)	6	none
		Croatian Party of Rights Ante Starčević	1	ECR
<b>Others</b>		Croatian Party of Pensioners (HSU)	2	none
		minority representatives	5	none
			151	

Table 4: Composition Chamber of Croatian Government (as of parliamentary elections in 2011)

## House of Representatives Cyprus




Figure 5: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Cypriot Parliament as of parliamentary elections in 2011

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Democratic Party (DIKO)	9	S&D
		Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK)	5	S&D
		Ecological and Environmental Movement (Green Party)	1	The Greens
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	Democratic Rally (DISY)	20	EPP
		European Party (Evroko)	2	none
<b>Far right</b>		Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL)	19	ENF
			56	

Table 5: Composition House of Representatives Cyprus (as of parliamentary elections in 2011)

## Chamber of Deputies - Parliament of the Czech Republic




Figure 6: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Czech Parliament (as of parliamentary elections in 2013)

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Extreme left</b>	<i>Communism</i>	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM)	33	GUE/NGL
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	*Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD)	50	S&D
<b>Center</b>	<i>Liberalism</i>	ANO 2011	47	ALDE
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	TOP 09	26	EPP
		Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	16	ECR
		Christian and Democratic Union (KDU-CSL)	14	EPP
<b>Far right</b>	<i>right-wing populism</i>	Dawn of Direct Democracy (USVIT)	14	none
			<b>200</b>	

Table 6: Composition Chamber of Deputies Czech Republic (as of parliamentary elections in 2013)

### Folketing - Danish Parliament




Figure 7: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Danish Parliament (as of parliamentary elections in 2011)

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Extreme left</b>	<i>Communist / Left-wing</i>	Unity List - Red-Green Alliance	12	EL
		Socialist People's Party	16	Greens/EFA
		Community of the People	1	none
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Social Democratic Party	44	S&D
		Faroe Islands	2	none
<b>Center</b>	<i>Liberalism</i>	Danish Social Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre)	17	ALDE
		Liberal Party of Denmark (Venstre) <sup>17</sup>	47	ALDE
		Liberal Alliance	9	none
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	Conservative People's Party	8	EPP
		Union Party	1	none
<b>Far right</b>	<i>right-wing populism</i>	Danish People's Party	22	AECR
			179	

Table 7: Composition Folketing Danish Parliament (as of parliamentary elections in 2013)

<sup>17</sup> Although the Venstre Party is traditionally rooted in the liberal tradition emphasizing individual freedom, free markets and liberalization of business, it embraces both conservative and liberal ideologies, and thus merely takes a liberal-conservative stance (Agardy, 2016). The party is thus classified to the center right spectrum.

**Estonian Riigikogu - Parliament of Estonia**




Figure 8: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Estonian Parliament (as of parliamentary elections in 2011)

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Social Democratic Party Estonia (SDE)	19	S&D
<b>Center</b>	<i>Liberalism</i>	Estonian Centre Party (KE)	26	ALDE
		Estonian Reform Party <sup>18</sup>	33	ALDE
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (IRL)	23	EPP
			101	

Table 8: Composition Estonian Riigikogu (as of parliamentary elections in 2011)

**Finnish Eduskunta - Parliament of Finland**




Figure 9: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Finnish Parliament (as of parliamentary elections in 2011)

<sup>18</sup> The Estonian Reform Party is an economically liberal party. Although it has a center right world view and emphasizes market freedoms and the adoption of Estonian, the party program reveals that they favor deeper and open integration of individuals as well as equal opportunities for everyone (Eesti Reformierakond, 2013). Thus, they are considered as favorable towards integration and categorized to the center of the spectrum.

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Extreme left</b>	<i>Communist / Left-wing</i>	Left Alliance	14	GUE / NGL
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Social Democratic Party of Finland	42	S&D
		The Green League	10	Green / EFA
<b>Center</b>	<i>Liberalism</i>	Centre Party of Finland	35	ALDE
		Swedish People's Party of Finland (SFP)	9	ALDE
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	Finns Party	39	AECR
		National Coalition Party	44	EPP
		Christian Democrats	6	EPP
<b>Others</b>			1	
			200	

Table 9: Composition Finnish Eduskunta (as of parliamentary elections in 2011)

### French National Assembly




Figure 10: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in French Parliament (as of parliamentary elections in 2012)

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Extreme left</b>	<i>Communist / Left-wing</i>	Left Front	10	EL
		Miscellaneous Left	22	/
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Socialist Party (PS)	280	S&D
		Radical Party of the Left (PRG)	12	S&D
		Europe Ecology - The Greens	17	Green / EFA
<b>Center</b>	<i>Liberalism</i>	Radical Party (Rad.)	6	ALDE
		Centrist Alliance (AC)	2	ALDE
		Center for France	2	ALDE
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	Union for a Popular Movement - The Republicans (LR)	194	EPP
		European Social Liberal Party (New Centre)	12	EPP
<b>Far right</b>	<i>National Conservatism / Anti-immigration</i>	National Front (FN)	2	ENF
		Miscellaneous Right	15	/
<b>Others</b>			3	
			577	

Table 10: Composition French National Assembly (as of parliamentary elections in 2012)

**German Bundestag (18th Parliament)**




Figure 11: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in German Bundestag (as of parliamentary elections in 2013)

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Extreme left</b>	<i>Communist / Left-wing</i>	Left Party	64	GUE/NGL
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Social Democratic Party (SPD)	193	S&D
		Alliance 90/The Greens	63	The Greens - EFA
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	Christian Democratic Union Christian Social Union (CDU / CSU)	311	EPP
			631	

Table 11: Composition German Bundestag (as of parliamentary elections in 2013)

**Hellenic Parliament (Greece)**




Figure 12: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Hellenic Parliament (as of parliamentary elections in 2012)

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Left wing</b>	<i>Communist / Left-wing</i>	Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza)	71	EL
		Communist Party of Greece (KKE)	12	Initiative
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)	33	S&D
		Democratic Left (DIMAR)	17	none
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	New Democracy (ND)	129	EPP
<b>Far right</b>	<i>Nationalism / Populism</i>	Popular Association - Golden Dawn (XA)	18	APF
		Independent Greeks (ANEL)	20	none
			300	

Table 12: Composition Hellenic Parliament (as of parliamentary elections in 2012)

### National Assembly Hungary




Figure 13: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Hungarian National Assembly (as of parliamentary elections in 2014)

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Unity Alliance - Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) - Together Party (Együtt) - Democratic Coalition (DK) - Dialogue for Hungary (PM) - Hungarian Liberal Party (MLP)	38	S&D S&D S&D The Greens ALDE
		Politics Can Be Different (LMP)	5	The Greens
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Union (KDNP)	133	EPP
<b>Far right</b>	<i>Nationalism / Populism</i>	Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary-	23	AENM
			199	

Table 13: Composition Hungarian Parliament (as of parliamentary elections in 2014)

## Dáil Éirann - Assembly of Ireland




Figure 14: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Assembly of Ireland as of parliamentary elections in 2011

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Left wing</b>	<i>Communist / Left-wing</i>	Sinn Féin	14	GUE / NGL
		People Before Profit Alliance (PBPA)	2	GUE / NGL
		Anti-Austerity Alliance - People Before Profit	2	none
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Labour Party	37	S&D
<b>Center</b>	<i>Liberalism</i>	Fianna Fáil	20	ALDE
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	Fine Gael	76	EPP
<b>Others</b>		Independent Alliance	15	none
			166	

Table 14: Composition Irish Parliament (as of parliamentary elections in 2011)

## Chamber of Deputies (Italy)




Figure 15: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Italy's Chamber of Deputies (as of parliamentary elections in 2013)



Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Italy. Common Good Coalition (Pier Luigi Bersani) - Democratic Party (PD) - Left Ecology Freedom (SEL) - Democratic Centre (DC) - South Tylorean People's Party (SVP)	340	S&D / The Greens / GUE / NGL
<b>Center</b>	<i>Liberalism</i>	With Monti for Italy (Mario Monti) - Civic Choice (SC) - Union of the Centre (UdC) - Future and Freedom (FLI)	45	ALDE / EPP
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	Centre-right coalition (Silvio Berlusconi) - The People of Freedom (PdL) - Lega Nord (LN) - Brothers of Italy (Fdl)	124	EPP / ENF
<b>Far right</b>	<i>Populism / Eurosceptic</i>	Five Star Movement (M5S)	108	EFDD
			617	

Table 15: Composition Italian Parliament (as of parliamentary elections in 2013)

### Latvian Saeima - Parliament




Figure 16: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Latvian Saeima (as of parliamentary elections in 2011)

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Left wing / Centre left</b>	<i>Social democracy / Russian Minority Politics</i>	Harmony Centre	31	GUE / NGL S&D
<b>Center</b>	<i>Liberalism</i>	Union of Greens and Farmers (ZZS) <sup>19</sup>	13	ALDE
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	Zatlers' Reform Party	22	none
		Unity - Vienotiba	20	EPP
<b>Far right</b>	<i>Populism / Eurosceptic</i>	National Alliance	14	AECR
			100	

Table 16: Composition Latvian Parliament (as of parliamentary elections in 2011)

<sup>19</sup> The ZZS is a centrist party with populist instincts. Although it includes a Green Party, the Latvian Greens are actually rather conservative in comparison to Western European counterparts (The Democratic Society, 2016). Thus, the party is categorized in the center right party spectrum.

## Seimas (Parliament) of the Republic of Lithuania




Figure 17: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (as of parliamentary elections in 2012)

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Social Democratic Party of Lithuania (LSDP)	38	S&D
		Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union (LVZS)	1	The Greens
<b>Center</b>	<i>Liberalism</i>	Labour Party (DP)	29	ALDE
		Liberals' Movement of the Republic of Lithuania (LRLS) <sup>20</sup>	10	ALDE
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (LLRA)	8	AECR
		Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS - LKD)	33	EPP
<b>Far right</b>	<i>Populism / Euroscepticism</i>	Order and Justice (PTT)	11	ADDE
		The Way of Courage (DK)	7	/
<b>Others</b>		Independents	3	none
			140	

Table 17: Composition Lithuanian Parliament (as of parliamentary elections in 2012)

## Chamber of Deputies Luxembourg




Figure 18: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies (as of parliamentary elections in 2013)

<sup>20</sup> The Liberal Movement is a conservative-liberal party in Lithuania that will be thus classified to the center right party spectrum (cf. liberalai, n.d.).

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Left wing</b>	<i>Communist / Left wing</i>	The Left	2	none
<b>Centre left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party (LSAP)	13	S&D
		The Greens	6	Greens / EFA
<b>Centre</b>	<i>Liberalism</i>	Democratic Party (DP)	13	ALDE
<b>Centre right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	Christian Social People's Party (CSV)	23	EPP
		Alternative Democratic Reform Party (ADR)	3	AECR
			60	

Table 18: Composition Luxembourg Parliament (as of parliamentary elections in 2013)

### House of Representatives Malta




Figure 19: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in House of Representatives Malta (as of parliamentary elections in 2013)

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Malta Labour Party (MLP)	39	S&D
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	Nationalist Party (PN)	30	EPP
			69	

Table 19: Composition Maltese Parliament (as of parliamentary elections in 2013)

### Dutch Tweede Kamer - House of Representatives The Netherlands




Figure 20: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in House of Representatives of the Netherlands (as of parliamentary elections in 2012)

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Left wing</b>	<i>Communist / Left wing</i>	Socialist Party (SP)	15	GUE/NGL
		Party for the Animals (PvdD)	2	GUE/NGL
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Labour Party (PvdA)	38	S&D
		GroenLinks	4	Greens / EFA
<b>Center</b>	<i>Liberalism</i>	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) <sup>21</sup>	41	ALDE
		Democrats 66 (D66)	12	ALDE
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)	13	EPP
		Christian Union (CU)	5	ECR
		Reformed Political Party (SGP)	3	ECR
<b>Far right</b>	<i>Right-wing populism</i>	Party for Freedom (PVV)	15	AECR
<b>Others</b>		50PLUS	2	none
			150	

Table 20: Composition Parliament of the Netherlands (as of parliamentary elections in 2012)

### Parliament of Poland (Polish Sejm)




Figure 21: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Polish Sejm (as of parliamentary elections in 2011)

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)	27	S&D
		Palikot's Movement (RP)	40	none
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	Civic Platform (PO)	207	EPP
		Polish People's Party (PSL)	28	EPP
<b>Far right</b>	<i>Right-wing populism</i>	Law and Justice (PiS)	157	AECR
<b>Others</b>		German Minority	1	none
			460	

Table 21: Composition Parliament of Poland (as of parliamentary elections in 2011)

<sup>21</sup> The VVD Party positions itself on the center right party spectrum and is economically liberal (Agady, 2016). Combining both conservative and liberal political ideas, the party is often referred to as 'conservative-liberal'. The party takes a conservative stance on immigration and integration issues and its ideology is increasingly conservative in recent years. "According to VVD, the EU migration system cannot be sustained as it brings security risks and in the current system it is difficult to differentiate between real refugees, economic migrants and terrorists" (ibid). Therefore, this party will be considered as a center right party.

## Assembly of the Republic Portugal




Figure 22: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Assembly of the Republic of Portugal (as of parliamentary elections in 2011)

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Left wing</b>	<i>Communist / Eco-Socialism</i>	Unitary Democratic Coalition (PCP - PEV)	16	none
		Left Bloc (B.E.)	8	GUE/NGL
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Socialist Party (PS)	73	S&D
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	Social Democratic Party (PPD/PSD)	105	EPP
		CDS - People's Party (CDS - PP)	24	EPP
			226	

Table 22: Composition Parliament of Portugal (as of parliamentary elections in 2011)

## Chamber of Deputies Romania




Figure 23: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Chamber of Deputies Romania (as of parliamentary elections in 2012)

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Extreme left</b>	<i>Socialism</i>	People's Party - Dan Diaconescu (PPDD)	47	EUD (GUE/NGL ALDE)
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Social-Liberal Union (USL) - Social Democratic Party (PSD) - National Liberal Party (PNL) - Conservative Party (PC)	273	S&D ALDE S&D
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism / Christian democracy</i>	Right Romania Alliance (ARD) - Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) - Christian Democratic National Peasant's Party (PNTCD) - Civic Force (FC)	56	EPP
		Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR)	18	EPP
<b>Others</b>		National Minorities	18	none
			412	

Table 23: Composition Romanian Parliament (as of parliamentary elections in 2012)

### National Council Slovakia




Figure 24: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Chamber of Deputies Romania (as of parliamentary elections in 2012)

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Direction - Social Democracy (SMER SD)	83	S&D
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OL'aNO)	16	ECR
		Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)	16	EPP
		Most - Híd (MOST)	13	EPP
		Slovak Democratic and Christian Union - Democratic Party (SDKÚ-DS)	11	EPP
		Freedom and Solidarity (SaS)	11	ECR
			150	

Table 24: Composition Romanian Parliament (as of parliamentary elections in 2012)

## National Assembly Slovenia




Figure 25: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Slovenian National Assembly (as of parliamentary elections in 2011)

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Positive Slovenia (LZJ-PS)	28	S&D
		Social Democrats (SD)	10	S&D
<b>Center</b>	<i>Liberalism</i>	Civic List (LGV)	8	ALDE
		Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS)	6	ALDE
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS)	26	EPP
		Slovenian People's Party (SLS)	6	EPP
		New Slovenia - Christian People's Party (NSi)	4	EPP
<b>Others</b>		Hungarian and Italian national communities	2	none
			90	

Table 25: Composition Slovenian National Assembly (as of parliamentary elections in 2011)

## Congress of Deputies - Spain




Figure 26: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Spanish Congress of Deputies (as of parliamentary elections in 2011)

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Left wing</b>	<i>Communist / Left wing</i>	United Left - The Greens: The Plural Left	11	/
		Amaiur	7	none
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	110	S&D
		Republican Left of Catalonia	3	Greens / EFA
		Galician Nationalist Bloc	2	Greens / EFA
		Commitment Coalition - Equo	1	Greens / EFA
		Yes to the Future - Geroa Bai	1	none
<b>Center</b>	<i>Liberalism</i>	Union, Progress and Democracy (UPyD)	5	ALDE
		Convergence and Union (CiU)	16	ALDE
		Basque Nationalist Party	5	EDP
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	People's Party (PP)	186	EPP
		Canarian Coalition - New Canarias	2	none
		Asturias Forum	1	none
			345	

Table 26: Composition Spanish Congress of Deputies (as of parliamentary elections in 2011)

## Riksdag of Sweden




Figure 27: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in Swedish Riksdag (as of parliamentary elections in 2010)

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Left wing</b>	<i>Communist / Left wing</i>	Left Party	19	GUE/NGL
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Swedish Social Democratic Party	112	S&D
		Green Party	25	Greens / EFA
<b>Center</b>	<i>Liberalism</i>	Liberal People's Party	24	ALDE
		Centre Party	23	ALDE
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	Moderate Party	107	EPP
		Christian Democrats	19	EPP
<b>Far right</b>	<i>Right-wing / nationalism</i>	Sweden Democrats	20	ADDE
			349	

Table 27: Composition Swedish Riksdag (as of parliamentary elections in 2010)



## United Kingdom - House of Commons




Figure 28: Percentage distribution of party mandates according to their ideological fraction in United Kingdom House of Commons (as of parliamentary elections in 2010)

Political Spectrum	Ideology	Political Party	Mandates / Seats	European affiliation
<b>Left wing</b>	<i>Left wing / Socialism</i>	Sinn Féin	5	GUE/NGL
<b>Center left</b>	<i>Social democracy</i>	Labour Party	258	S&D
		Scottish National Party	6	Greens / EFA
		Green Party of England and Wales	1	Greens / EFA
		Plaid Cymru - the Party of Wales	3	Greens / EFA
		Social Democratic and Labour Party	3	S&D
<b>Center</b>	<i>Liberalism</i>	Liberal Democrats	57	ALDE
		Alliance Party of Northern Ireland	1	none
<b>Center right</b>	<i>Conservatism</i>	Conservative Party	306	ECR
<b>Far right</b>	<i>Right-wing populism</i>	Democratic Unionist Party	8	non-inscrits
<b>Others</b>		Independents	2	
			650	

Table 28: Composition United Kingdom House of Commons (as of parliamentary elections in 2010)

### Appendix 3: Overview of data used in Regression Analysis

Country	MIPEX INDEX	% share far right, center right parties	% share extreme left, center left, center parties	Far right (% share)	Number of Asylum Applications	GDP per capita in PPS
Austria	48	54	46	28	28035	131
Belgium	70	42	55	2	22710	120
Bulgaria	44	50	50	10	11080	46
Croatia	44	37	58	6	450	59
Cyprus	36	73	27	34	1745	84
Czech Republic	45	35	65	7	11450	83
Denmark	59	43	57	12	14680	126
Estonia	49	23	77	0	155	75
Finland	71	44	55	0	3620	113
France	54	39	61	0	64310	108
Germany	63	49	51	0	202645	124
Greece	46	56	44	13	9430	74
Hungary	46	78	22	11	42775	66
Ireland	51	46	45	0	1450	131
Italy	58	38	62	18	64625	98
Latvia	34	69	31	14	375	62
Lithuania	38	45	49	9	440	73
Luxembourg	60	43	57	0	1150	264
Malta	39	43	57	0	1350	86
The Netherlands	61	51	48	10	24495	132
Poland	43	85	15	34	8020	67
Portugal	80	57	43	0	440	77
Romania	45	18	77	0	1545	54
Slovakia	38	45	55	0	330	76
Slovenia	48	40	58	0	385	80
Spain	61	55	45	0	5615	91
Sweden	80	42	58	6	81180	124
United Kingdom	56	48	52	1	31745	108

**Appendix 4: Linear Regression Assumptions**

1. Assumption: The dependent variable should be measured on a continuous scale (interval/ratio scale)

An interval variable is a measurement where the difference between the values is meaningful (Graph Pad, 2015). The dependent variable, the MIPEX Index is measured on a scale from 0-100, whereas a value of 100 indicates conformity to the highest standards that are included in the index, and a value of 0 indicates no conformity to the standards, thus indicating great restrictiveness of immigrant integration policies and laws. This scale proves that the difference between the scores is meaningful in its sense. Thus, the first linear regression assumption is fulfilled.

2. Assumption: Linearity

When considering a simple regression model, it is necessary to check the linearity assumption, i.e. the outcome variable can be explained via a linear function of the predictor variable. Therefore, the scatterplots of each independent variable and the dependent variable, the MIPEX Index, indicate if the expected relationships are given in the expected direction, and which variables show a stronger correlation with the dependent variable.




Figure 1: Scatterplot of proportion of far; centre right parties in parliament (X1) and MIPEX Index (Y) with regression line.




Figure 2: Scatterplot of share of extreme left; center left; center parties (X2) and MIPEX Index (Y) with regression line.




Figure 3: Scatterplot of far right party success (X3) and MIPEX Index (Y) with regression line.




Figure 4: Scatterplot of number of asylum applications (X4) and MIPEX Index (Y) with regression line.




Figure 5: Scatterplot of GDP per capita (X5) and MIPEX Index (Y) with regression line.

**Assumption 3-5:** In order to fulfill the assumptions of independence of errors, constant error variance and normality, the scatterplots of predicted scores and residual scores will be used (ZRESID against ZPRED).

### 3. Assumption: Independence of residuals/errors

First of all, the assumption of independence of errors has to be met in order to conduct a linear regression. The plotted residuals should not follow any pattern, but must be randomly distributed.

### 4. Assumption: Constant error variance /Homoscedasticity

The assumption of homoscedasticity requires that the error variance remains constant as you move along the line whereas an inconsistent line signals heteroscedasticity. By plotting the predicted scores against the residual scores, the scatterplot shows whether the relationship is consistent or non-consistent. A flat, consistent line indicates homoscedasticity whereas an inconsistent line signals heteroscedasticity. Thus, an error variance that is constant with varying values in the predicted variable reveals homoscedasticity.

*H3/H5:* In the case of the variables X3 and X5, the scatterplot suggests a fairly non-random pattern of standardized residuals. Thus, there is evidence of heteroscedasticity. The inconstant error variance (heteroscedasticity) of the far right party success variable can be attributed to high concentration in the actual percentage shares of far right parties in national parliaments amongst the EU-Member States. Far right parties often-times do not hold any mandates, which is why its data scores reveal a frequent number of 0. Evidence of heteroscedasticity in the number of asylum applications variable seems to be due to largely varying distances between the number of asylum applicants in the respective countries included in the study. Thus, it is a result of its scale that only influences the standard error, i.e. a measure of the average distance of the actual values from the predicted values.




Figure 6: Scatterplot of predicted scores and residual scores of share of far- center right parties (X1) and MIPEX Index (Y)\*\*<sup>22</sup>




Figure 7: Scatterplot of predicted scores and residual scores of share of left, and center parties (X2) and MIPEX Index (Y)\*\*




Figure 8: Scatterplot of predicted scores and residual scores of share of far right parties (X3) and MIPEX Index (Y)




Figure 9: Scatterplot of predicted scores and residual scores of asylum applications (X4) and MIPEX Index (Y)






Figure 10: Scatterplot of predicted scores and residual scores of GDP per capita (in PPS) (X5) and MIPEX Index (Y)\*\*



<sup>22</sup> \*\* assumes a fairly random pattern of residuals and the fulfillment of linear regression assumption 3-5.

## 5. Assumption: Normally distributed errors / residuals



It is necessary to check that the residuals (errors) are approximately normally distributed. In order to check this assumption a visualization by means of Normal P-P. Plots and histograms will be applied. If all residuals are clustered around the line in the Normal P-P. Plot and fit under the normal distribution curve, the assumption of normality of distributed errors is met. Figures 11-12, 13-14, 15-16, and 19-20 show that all errors fit the straight line assuming that these are normally distributed. In case of variable 4, the histograms and P.-P. Plots indicate a slightly abnormal distribution (cf. figures 17-18).





Figures 11-12: Histogram and Normal P.-P. Plot of far right, center right party share (X1) on MIPEX Index (Y)





Figures 13-14: Histogram and Normal P.-P. Plot of extreme left, centre left, and center party share (X2) on MIPEX Index (Y)



Figures 15-16: Histogram and Normal P.-P. Plot of far right party share (X3) on MIPEX Index (Y)



Figures 17-18: Histogram and Normal P.-P. Plot of number of asylum applications (X4) on MIPEX Index (Y)



Figures 19-20: Histogram and Normal P.-P. Plot of number of GDP per capita (in PPS) (X5) on MIPEX Index (Y)

## Model Outputs

### Appendix 5: Output Model 1

**The MIPEX score 2014 (Y) and the percentage share of far and center right parties in parliament (X1)**

#### *Model Summary<sup>b</sup>*

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,178 <sup>a</sup>	,032	-,006	12,60038

a. Predictors: (Constant), share\_right\_parties

b. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

#### *Coefficients<sup>a</sup>*

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	59,714	8,298		7,196	,000
	share_right_parties	-,152	,165	-,178	-,921	,366

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

### Identification of Influential Cases in the Model

#### *Residuals Statistics<sup>a</sup>*

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	46,7880	56,9767	52,3929	2,23333	28
Std. Predicted Value	-2,510	2,052	,000	1,000	28
Standard Error of Predicted Value	2,381	6,535	3,170	1,156	28
Adjusted Predicted Value	48,1818	59,8178	52,6680	2,38357	28
Residual	-15,22110	28,95405	,00000	12,36484	28
Std. Residual	-1,208	2,298	,000	,981	28
Stud. Residual	-1,281	2,357	-,010	1,012	28
Deleted Residual	-17,11036	30,45184	-,27512	13,16783	28
Stud. Deleted Residual	-1,297	2,606	,006	1,052	28
Mahal. Distance	,000	6,298	,964	1,624	28
Cook's Distance	,000	,144	,033	,042	28
Centered Leverage Value	,000	,233	,036	,060	28

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX






Figure 1: Scatterplot of influential cases from first model run with threshold line at 0,142 level (X1 -> Y)

### Influential Cases

- Portugal (reason: high MIPEX (80); relatively high far and center right share in parliament (57))

### Output Model 1 - The MIPEX score 2014 (Y) and the percentage share of far and center right parties in parliament (X1) after removal of influential cases

#### Model Summary<sup>b</sup>

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,255 <sup>a</sup>	,065	,028	11,39527

a. Predictors: (Constant), share\_right\_parties

b. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

#### Coefficients<sup>a</sup>

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	60,856	7,517		8,095	,000
	share_right_parties	-,198	,150	-,255	-1,319	,199

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

## Appendix 6: Output Model 2

The MIPEX score 2014 (Y) and the percentage share of extreme left; center left; and center parties in parliament (X2)

### Model Summary<sup>b</sup>

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,207 <sup>a</sup>	,043	,006	12,52790

a. Predictors: (Constant), share\_left\_parties

b. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

### Coefficients<sup>a</sup>

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	43,088	8,958		4,810	,000
	share_left_parties	,183	,170	,207	1,077	,291

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

## Identification of Influential Cases in the Model

### Residuals Statistics<sup>a</sup>

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	45,8404	57,2154	52,3929	2,59648	28
Std. Predicted Value	-2,524	1,857	,000	1,000	28
Standard Error of Predicted Value	2,368	6,529	3,157	1,136	28
Adjusted Predicted Value	46,8995	59,6028	52,6419	2,72842	28
Residual	-15,17915	29,02247	,00000	12,29371	28
Std. Residual	-1,212	2,317	,000	,981	28
Stud. Residual	-1,249	2,373	-,009	1,011	28
Deleted Residual	-16,55721	30,44482	-,24902	13,06974	28
Stud. Deleted Residual	-1,263	2,629	,007	1,052	28
Mahal. Distance	,000	6,368	,964	1,601	28
Cook's Distance	,000	,138	,032	,039	28
Centered Leverage Value	,000	,236	,036	,059	28

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

## Appendix 7: Output Model 3

The MIPEX score 2014 (Y) and the percentage share of far right parties in parliament (X3)

### Model Summary<sup>b</sup>

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,363 <sup>a</sup>	,132	,098	11,93086

a. Predictors: (Constant), far\_right\_success

b. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

### Coefficients<sup>a</sup>

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	55,828	2,842		19,647	,000
	far_right_success	-,447	,225	-,363	-1,986	,058

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

## Identification of Influential Cases in the Model

### Residuals Statistics<sup>a</sup>

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	40,6165	55,8283	52,3929	4,56111	28
Std. Predicted Value	-2,582	,753	,000	1,000	28
Standard Error of Predicted Value	2,260	6,343	3,008	1,078	28
Adjusted Predicted Value	39,6776	56,9004	52,3847	4,62566	28
Residual	-17,82828	26,85614	,00000	11,70783	28
Std. Residual	-1,494	2,251	,000	,981	28
Stud. Residual	-1,539	2,293	,000	1,008	28
Deleted Residual	-18,90042	27,87985	,00821	12,36177	28
Stud. Deleted Residual	-1,582	2,518	,012	1,045	28
Mahal. Distance	,004	6,666	,964	1,765	28
Cook's Distance	,000	,131	,028	,032	28
Centered Leverage Value	,000	,247	,036	,065	28

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

## Appendix 8: Output Model 4

### The MIPEX score 2014 (Y) and the number of (non-EU) asylum applications (X4)

#### Model Summary<sup>b</sup>

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,355 <sup>a</sup>	,126	,092	11,97022

a. Predictors: (Constant), asylum\_applications

b. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

#### Coefficients<sup>a</sup>

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	49,962	2,587		19,311	,000
	asylum_applications	,000	,000	,355	1,936	,064

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

### Identification of Influential Cases in the Model

#### Residuals Statistics<sup>a</sup>

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	49,9782	71,6437	52,3929	4,46070	28
Std. Predicted Value	-,541	4,316	,000	1,000	28
Standard Error of Predicted Value	2,262	10,196	2,849	1,482	28
Adjusted Predicted Value	48,5529	94,4923	53,1475	8,39167	28
Residual	-16,00178	29,99127	,00000	11,74645	28
Std. Residual	-1,337	2,505	,000	,981	28
Stud. Residual	-1,378	2,566	-,021	1,032	28
Deleted Residual	-31,49233	31,44709	-,75467	13,66762	28
Stud. Deleted Residual	-1,404	2,911	-,002	1,081	28
Mahal. Distance	,000	18,625	,964	3,484	28
Cook's Distance	,000	2,511	,117	,472	28
Centered Leverage Value	,000	,690	,036	,129	28

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX




Figure 1: Scatterplot of influential cases from first model run with threshold line at 0,142 level (X4 -> Y)

### Influential Cases

- Portugal (reason: high MIPEX (80); low number of asylum applications (440))
- Sweden (reason: high MIPEX Index (80); moderately high number of asylum applications (81180))
- Germany (reason: high MIPEX (63); very high number of asylum applications (202645))

### Residuals Statistics<sup>a</sup>

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	47,3084	58,6600	49,7600	3,36679	25
Std. Predicted Value	-,728	2,643	,000	1,000	25
Standard Error of Predicted Value	1,948	5,603	2,590	,956	25
Adjusted Predicted Value	46,6405	60,8474	49,9012	3,72411	25
Residual	-13,34712	23,08151	,00000	9,53177	25
Std. Residual	-1,371	2,371	,000	,979	25
Stud. Residual	-1,415	2,435	-,007	1,010	25
Deleted Residual	-14,22025	24,35954	-,14120	10,15233	25
Stud. Deleted Residual	-1,448	2,765	,014	1,060	25
Mahal. Distance	,001	6,988	,960	1,852	25
Cook's Distance	,000	,164	,032	,040	25
Centered Leverage Value	,000	,291	,040	,077	25

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX




Figure 2: Scatterplot of influential cases from first model run with threshold line at 0,142 level (X4 -> Y)

### Influential Cases

- Finland (reason: high MIPEX (71); relatively low number of asylum applications (3620))

### Output Model 4 - The MIPEX score 2014 (Y) and the number of (non-EU) asylum applications (X4) after removal of influential cases

#### Model Summary<sup>b</sup>

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,429 <sup>a</sup>	,184	,147	8,57655

a. Predictors: (Constant), asylum\_applications

b. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

#### Coefficients<sup>a</sup>

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	45,898	2,203		20,832	,000
	asylum_applications	,000	,000	,429	2,226	,037

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

## Appendix 9: Output Model 5

**Interaction Effect - The MIPEX score 2014 (Y), the share of far and center right parties (X1), and the number of (non-EU asylum applications (Z2)**

### *Model Summary<sup>b</sup>*

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,397 <sup>a</sup>	,157	,090	11,98651

a. Predictors: (Constant), asylum\_applications, share\_right\_parties

b. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

### *Coefficients<sup>a</sup>*

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	57,254	7,996		7,160	,000
	share_right_parties	-,151	,157	-,177	-,964	,344
	asylum_applications	,000	,000	,355	1,932	,065

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

## Identification of Influential Cases in the Model

### *Residuals Statistics<sup>a</sup>*

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	45,2404	71,4935	52,3929	4,98429	28
Std. Predicted Value	-1,435	3,832	,000	1,000	28
Standard Error of Predicted Value	2,311	10,211	3,554	1,692	28
Adjusted Predicted Value	46,0836	93,9639	53,3709	8,54676	28
Residual	-12,84607	31,32991	,00000	11,53403	28
Std. Residual	-1,072	2,614	,000	,962	28
Stud. Residual	-1,353	2,695	-,030	1,023	28
Deleted Residual	-30,96393	33,31958	-,97805	13,66212	28
Stud. Deleted Residual	-1,377	3,136	-,007	1,080	28
Mahal. Distance	,040	18,630	1,929	3,655	28
Cook's Distance	,000	1,614	,083	,303	28
Centered Leverage Value	,001	,690	,071	,135	28

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX




Figure 1: Scatterplot of influential cases with threshold line at 0,142 level (X2 -> Y)




Figure 2: Scatterplot of influential cases with threshold line at 0,142 level (X4 -> Y)

**Influential Cases**

- Sweden (Cook's Distance = 0,143)
- Portugal (Cook's Distance = 0,154)
- Germany (Cook's Distance = 1,614)

**Output Model 5 Interaction Effect - The MIPEX score 2014 (Y), the share of far and center right parties (X1), and the number of (non-EU asylum applications (Z2) after removal of influential cases**

*Model Summary<sup>b</sup>*

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,434 <sup>a</sup>	,188	,114	9,51361

a. Predictors: (Constant), asylum\_applications, share\_right\_parties

b. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

*Coefficients<sup>a</sup>*

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	55,936	6,440		8,686	,000
	share_right_parties	-,182	,126	-,278	-1,446	,162
	asylum_applications	,000	,000	,346	1,800	,086

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX






Figure 3: Marginal effect plot of interaction effect of number of non-EU asylum applications (Z), share of far and center right parties (X) and MIPEX Index (Y) with position line and Confidence Intervals at 0.05-level (source: created by author)

## Appendix 10: Output Model 6

**Interaction Effect - The MIPEX score 2014 (Y), the share of extreme left; center left; and center parties (X2), and the number of (non-EU asylum applications (Z2)**

### *Model Summary<sup>b</sup>*

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,404 <sup>a</sup>	,163	,096	11,94555

a. Predictors: (Constant), asylum\_applications, share\_left\_parties

b. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

### *Coefficients<sup>a</sup>*

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	41,338	8,592		4,811	,000
	share_left_parties	,171	,163	,193	1,052	,303
	asylum_applications	,000	,000	,347	1,897	,070

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

## Identification of Influential Cases in the Model

### *Residuals Statistics<sup>a</sup>*

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	44,7438	71,2730	52,3929	5,07453	28
Std. Predicted Value	-1,507	3,721	,000	1,000	28
Standard Error of Predicted Value	2,303	10,181	3,543	1,685	28
Adjusted Predicted Value	45,4017	93,2374	53,3413	8,49252	28
Residual	-12,78241	31,25912	,00000	11,49461	28
Std. Residual	-1,070	2,617	,000	,962	28
Stud. Residual	-1,324	2,694	-,029	1,021	28
Deleted Residual	-30,23744	33,12982	-,94844	13,54593	28
Stud. Deleted Residual	-1,345	3,133	-,006	1,078	28
Mahal. Distance	,039	18,648	1,929	3,653	28
Cook's Distance	,000	1,551	,080	,291	28
Centered Leverage Value	,001	,691	,071	,135	28

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX




Figure 1: Scatterplot of influential cases with threshold line at 0,142 level (X2 -> Y)




Figure 2: Scatterplot of influential cases with threshold line at 0,142 level (X4 -> Y)

**Influential Cases**

- Sweden (Cook's Distance = 0,142)
- Portugal (Cook's Distance = 0,144)
- Germany (Cook's Distance = 1,551)

**Output Model 6 (Interaction Effect) - The MIPEX score 2014 (Y), the share of extreme left; center left; and center parties (X2), and the number of (non-EU asylum applications (Z2) after having removed influential cases**

*Model Summary<sup>b</sup>*

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,434 <sup>a</sup>	,188	,115	9,51221

a. Predictors: (Constant), asylum\_applications, share\_left\_parties

b. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

*Coefficients<sup>a</sup>*

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	37,673	7,046		5,347	,000
	share_left_parties	,189	,131	,278	1,449	,162
	asylum_applications	,000	,000	,333	1,736	,097

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX




Figure 3: Marginal effect plot of interaction effect of number of non-EU asylum applications (Z), share of extreme left, center left and center parties (X) and MIPEX Index (Y) with position line and Confidence Intervals at 0.05-level (source: created by author)

## Appendix 11: Output Model 7

### The MIPEX score 2014 (Y) and the GDP per capita (in PPS) (X5)

#### Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,449 <sup>a</sup>	,202	,171	11,43930

a. Predictors: (Constant), GDP\_per\_capita

#### Coefficients<sup>a</sup>

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	39,187	5,586		7,016	,000
	GDP_per_capita	,135	,053	,449	2,564	,016

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

### Identification of Influential Cases in the Model

#### Residuals Statistics<sup>a</sup>

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	45,4126	74,9190	52,3929	5,64500	28
Std. Predicted Value	-1,237	3,990	,000	1,000	28
Standard Error of Predicted Value	2,162	9,047	2,794	1,264	28
Adjusted Predicted Value	45,5564	99,8356	53,2792	9,72280	28
Residual	-14,91904	30,39149	,00000	11,22546	28
Std. Residual	-1,304	2,657	,000	,981	28
Stud. Residual	-2,131	2,718	-,029	1,054	28
Deleted Residual	-39,83556	31,81439	-,88630	13,69621	28
Stud. Deleted Residual	-2,300	3,150	-,012	1,127	28
Mahal. Distance	,000	15,924	,964	2,953	28
Cook's Distance	,000	3,793	,158	,713	28
Centered Leverage Value	,000	,590	,036	,109	28

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX




Figure 1: Scatterplot of influential cases with threshold line at 0,142 level (X5 -> Y)

**Influential Cases:**

- Luxembourg (reason: GDP per capita in PPS highly above EU-28 average (266), moderate MIPEX Index score (60))
- Portugal (reason: GDP per capita in PPS (78) below EU-28 average, very high MIPEX Index score (80))

*Model Summary<sup>b</sup>*

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,698 <sup>a</sup>	,487	,466	8,51574

a. Predictors: (Constant), GDP\_per\_capita

b. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

*Coefficients<sup>a</sup>*

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	23,177	6,067		3,820	,001
	GDP_per_capita	,303	,063	,698	4,777	,000

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

## Appendix 12

### 1. Output First Multiple Linear Regression Model

#### *Model Summary<sup>b</sup>*

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,611 <sup>a</sup>	,374	,231	11,01616

a. Predictors: (Constant), GDP\_per\_capita, share\_right\_parties, asylum\_applications, far\_right\_success, share\_left\_parties

b. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

#### *Coefficients<sup>a</sup>*

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-23,365	96,050		-,243	,810
	share_right_parties	,701	,973	,819	,721	,479
	share_left_parties	,661	,994	,744	,664	,513
	far_right_success	-,427	,271	-,347	-1,575	,130
	asylum_applications	7,156E-5	,000	,237	1,340	,194
	GDP_per_capita	,104	,053	,346	1,982	,060

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

### 2. Transformation of the Model (Exclusion of X1 and X2)

#### *Model Summary<sup>b</sup>*

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,598 <sup>a</sup>	,357	,277	10,68263

a. Predictors: (Constant), GDP\_per\_capita, far\_right\_success, asylum\_applications

b. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

#### *Coefficients<sup>a</sup>*

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	42,905	5,738		7,477	,000
	far_right_success	-,353	,205	-,286	-1,723	,098
	asylum_applications	8,098E-5	,000	,269	1,612	,120
	GDP_per_capita	,106	,051	,352	2,090	,047

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

### 3. Identification of Influential Cases

#### *Residuals Statistics<sup>a</sup>*

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	38,6786	72,4754	52,3929	7,51254	28
Std. Predicted Value	-1,826	2,673	,000	1,000	28
Standard Error of Predicted Value	2,203	9,159	3,653	1,752	28
Adjusted Predicted Value	36,9412	98,7693	54,1171	13,10560	28
Residual	-13,14098	28,88783	,00000	10,07168	28
Std. Residual	-1,230	2,704	,000	,943	28
Stud. Residual	-1,845	2,819	-,055	1,063	28
Deleted Residual	-35,76929	31,39868	-1,72421	14,22278	28
Stud. Deleted Residual	-1,949	3,375	-,035	1,144	28
Mahal. Distance	,184	18,883	2,893	4,662	28
Cook's Distance	,000	2,060	,161	,512	28
Centered Leverage Value	,007	,699	,107	,173	28

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

#### **Influential Cases:**

- Luxembourg (Cook's Distance = 1,872)
- Germany (Cook's Distance = 2,060)
- Portugal (Cook's Distance = 0,172)

### 4. Best Model Fit

#### *Model Summary<sup>b</sup>*

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,800 <sup>a</sup>	,640	,589	7,45553

a. Predictors: (Constant), GDP\_per\_capita, far\_right\_success, asylum\_applications b. Dependent Variable: MIPEX

#### *Coefficients<sup>a</sup>*

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	29,855	5,774		5,170	,000
	far_right_success	-,321	,147	-,287	-2,182	,041
	asylum_applications	,000	,000	,366	2,528	,020
	GDP_per_capita	,224	,063	,511	3,529	,002

a. Dependent Variable: MIPEX