Paper 2024/864

Collaborative, Segregated NIZK (CoSNIZK) and More Efficient Lattice-Based Direct Anonymous Attestation

Liqun Chen, University of Surrey
Patrick Hough, University of Oxford
Nada El Kassem, University of Surrey
Abstract

Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) allows a (host) device with a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to prove that it has a certified configuration of hardware and software whilst preserving the privacy of the device. All deployed DAA schemes are based on classical security assumptions. Despite a long line of works proposing post-quantum designs, the vast majority give only theoretical schemes and where concrete parameters are computed, their efficiency is far from practical. Our first contribution is to define collaborative, segregated, non-interactive zero knowledge (CoSNIZK). This notion generalizes the property of collaborative zero-knowledge as formalised by Ozdemir and Boneh (USENIX ’22) so that the zero-knowledge property need only apply to a subset of provers during collaborative proof generation. This if of particular interest for proxy-cryptography in which part of an expensive but sensitive computation may be delegated to another party. We give a lattice-based CoSNIZK based on the highly efficient proof framework in (Crypto ’22). Our main contribution is the construction of a DAA based on the hardness of problems over module lattices as well as the ISISf assumption recently introduced by Bootle et al. (Crypto ’23). A key component of our work is the CoSNIZK construction which allows the TPM and host to jointly create attestations whilst protecting TPM key material from a potentially corrupt host. We prove the security of our DAA scheme according to the well-established UC definition of Camenisch et al. (PKC ’16). Our design achieves DAA signatures more than 1.5 orders of magnitude smaller than previous works at only 38KB making it the first truly practical candidate for post-quantum DAA.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Anonymous CredentialsZero-KnowledgeTrusted Hardware
Contact author(s)
liqun chen @ surrey ac uk
patrick hough @ st-hughs ox ac uk
nada elkassem @ surrey ac uk
History
2024-06-05: approved
2024-05-31: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/864
License
No rights reserved
CC0

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/864,
      author = {Liqun Chen and Patrick Hough and Nada El Kassem},
      title = {Collaborative, Segregated {NIZK} ({CoSNIZK}) and More Efficient Lattice-Based Direct Anonymous Attestation},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/864},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/864}
}
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