Partially Non-Interactive Two-Round Lattice-Based Threshold Signatures

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Abstract. This paper gives the first lattice-based two-round threshold signature based on lattice assumptions for which the first message is independent of the message being signed without relying on fully-homomorphic encryption, and our construction supports arbitrary thresholds.
Our construction provides a careful instantiation of a generic threshold signature construction by Tessaro and Zhu (EUROCRYPT '23) based on specific linear hash functions, which in turns can be seen as a generalization of the FROST scheme by Komlo and Goldberg (SAC '20). Our reduction techniques are new in the context of lattice-based cryptography. Also, our scheme does not use any heavy tools, such as NIZKs or homomorphic trapdoor commitments.

1 Introduction

Multiple novel applications, primarily motivated by blockchains (e.g., digital wallets [GGN16]), are re-energizing a multi-decade agenda aimed at developing practical threshold signatures [Des88, DF90] with the goal of reducing trust assumptions in systems using digital signatures. To this end, recall that in a *t-out-of-n threshold signature scheme*, a set of n signers each hold shares of a secret signing key associated with a public verification key. Any subset of at least t of these signers should be able to come together and run a signing protocol to produce a signature on any message. However, an adversary that controls an arbitrary subset of fewer than t signers should not be able, on its own, to come up with a valid signature, even when they maliciously deviate from the protocol.

Threshold signatures are currently the focus of standardization efforts by NIST [Natnt] and IETF [CKGW22], and threshold signing protocols for a number of existing signature schemes have been given from a variety of cryptographic assumptions. These include threshold versions of BLS [Bol03, BL22], Schnorr [SS01, GJKR03, KG20, Lin22, BCK+22, CGRS23, CKM23a] and (EC-)DSA [GJKR96, GJKR07, GGN16, BGG19, GG18, LNR18, CGG+20], along with several schemes for ad-hoc signatures in pairing-free groups with specific properties [CKM+23b, TZ23, BLT+23]. Several RSA-based constructions [DDFY94, GRJK00, Sho00, DK01, TZ23] have also been proposed.

Lattice-based threshold signatures. With the threat of quantum computers looming on the horizon (and, in particular, their ability to break all assumptions behind all aforementioned threshold signatures), a widely recognized goal is to develop threshold signatures that are based on quantum-safe assumptions. The most natural candidate for such schemes are lattice-based assumptions, considering in particular the fact that NIST has selected DILITHIUM [LDK+22] and FALCON [PFH+22], two lattice-based signature schemes, for standardization. Regardless of quantum safety, it is also important to obtain constructions from a set of assumptions as diverse as possible.

While lattice-based cryptography has been enormously successful in enabling extremely sophisticated functionalities, building efficient lattice-based threshold signatures has turned out to be

very challenging. In principle, the problem can be solved generically and round optimally with constructions [BGGK17, BGG+18, ASY22] based on *Fully-Homomorphic Encryption* (FHE), but these require the homomorphic evaluation of the signing algorithm *within* the FHE, thus imposing a substantial computational and communication overhead on the signing process.

There have been attempts [DOTT21, Che23] at giving more direct constructions of two-round signing protocols based on the Fiat-Shamir-with-abort paradigm [Lyu09], obtained by adapting constructions for the related notion of multi-signatures. These constructions only realize n-out-of-n threshold signatures, i.e., do not tolerate arbitrary thresholds $t < n$. Gur, Katz, and Silde [GKS23] recently proposed a new two-round construction based on linearly homomorphic encryption (LHE) which supports arbitrary thresholds. Both rounds are message-dependent, and they rely on homomorphic trapdoor commitments and NIZKs to ensure security against malicious signers. For $n = 5$ and $t = 3$, their signatures and public keys have sizes 46.6 and 13.6 KB, respectively, whereas the communication costs for signing are roughly 3 MB per signer. Recent work by del Pino *et al.* [dPKM+24] proposes a more efficient lattice-based threshold signature scheme that does not rely on FHE or the aforementioned heavy primitives, but the drawback is that the protocol has three message-dependent rounds.

Better two-round threshold signatures. In this paper, we pursue the question of designing better and more efficient two-round threshold signatures. Clearly, we would like to minimize communication along with signature and key sizes, but other properties are desirable. For example, a fundamental property of FROST [KG20, BCK+22] is that it is *partially* non-interactive, in that while the signing protocol consists of two rounds, the first round messages are simply nonces *independent* of the message being signed. This allows us to recover some of the positive features of non-interactive schemes by preprocessing the initial round. Currently, with the exception of FHE-based schemes, we do not know of any partially non-interactive lattice-based threshold signatures. Note that in fact partially non-interactive lattice-based multi-signatures exist [BTT22], inspired by the discrete-log based counterparts [NRS21], but it is not clear how to turn these into threshold signatures, especially for the case $t < n$.

Our contributions. In this paper, we develop the first partially non-interactive lattice-based threshold signatures where signing proceeds in two rounds, and the first round only consists of message-independent nonces. Our scheme does not rely on FHE or other heavy primitives like NIZKs and trapdoor commitments. The security of our scheme is based on standard lattice assumptions, in particular, we rely on the Module-SIS assumption.

To achieve 128-bit of security and allow for up to 2^{64} signatures to be generated with the same key, for the case $n = 5$, which is the same setting considered by [GKS23], the signatures in our scheme have sizes roughly of 219.2 KB with the size of public keys 33.7 KB, and the communication complexity per signer is 1.1 MB. While the signature and public key sizes are larger than [GKS23], we achieve better communication complexity.

Like other recent works [BCK+22, BLT+23, CKM23a, dPKM+24], we do not propose an explicit distributed key generation (DKG) protocol. (We can envision that keys are either set up manually, or that they are the output of a suitable generic MPC protocol.) We leave the design of suitable DKG protocols as an interesting open question.

Our approach. A common way to construct an efficient lattice-based primitive is to take an efficient construction based on pairing-free groups and translate it into a lattice-based scheme. However, one key barrier in translating ideas from FROST, the state-of-art group-based partially non-interactive threshold signature scheme, to the lattice setting is that the security analysis of

FROST relies on the one-more discrete logarithm assumption, of which no analog is known in the lattice world. A recent work by Tessaro and Zhu [TZ23] proposes a variant of FROST based on linear hash functions (LHF) and gives a security reduction to the plain DL assumption. Inspired by the work of Hauck et al. [HKLN20], which turns a LHF-based blind signature scheme into a lattice-based one, our starting point is to translate the LHF-based threshold signatures into lattice-based threshold signatures. The main difficulty in this idea is that the lattice-based linear hash functions do not have the desirable algebraic properties as required in the original analysis from [TZ23]. We refer to the technical overview below for the detailed issues and our solutions.

However, we want to particularly point out that our solution requires stronger properties from the underlying secret sharing scheme, which are satisfied by the secret sharing scheme by Benaloh and Leichter [BL90]. We also discuss in Section 3.3 the issues which make other secret sharing schemes, such as the one by Applebaum et al. [ANP23], not applicable to our use case.

Significance of the work. We emphasize that we see the primary value of our paper in showing the feasibility of constructing partially non-interactive threshold signatures without using FHE and new techniques involved in transforming a DL-based schemes into a lattice-based one. Nonetheless, we note that the efficiency of our schemes is still within the practical realm and deserves further investigation.

Other related works. We discuss some additional related works we have not discussed above. An alternative approach to obtain threshold signatures is to leverage standard MPC techniques to evaluate (part of the) signing. For example, Bendlin *et al.* [BKP13] use this approach to obtain a threshold version of GPV signatures [GPV08]. More recently, Cozzo and Smart [CS19] considered more broadly MPC-based instantiations of NIST post-quantum signature candidates and concluded that they are unlikely to lead to practical solutions.

1.1 Technical Overview

Our starting point is a variant of FROST [KG20] proposed by [TZ23] which gives a threshold signature scheme based solely on the DL assumption, instead of the stronger one-more DL assumption. The key idea is to replace the map $x \mapsto g^x$ (for a generator g) in FROST with a *compressing* and *collision resistant linear* map $F : \mathfrak{D} \to \mathfrak{R}$, referred to as a linear hash function (LHF), where $\mathfrak{D}$ and $\mathfrak{R}$ are two vector spaces over a scalar field $\mathfrak{S}$. The secret key of the scheme is a random element $\mathsf{sk} \in \mathfrak{D}$ and the corresponding public key is $\mathsf{pk} \leftarrow F(\mathsf{sk})$. The secret key shares $\{\mathsf{sk}_i\}_{i\in[n]}$ are generated using Shamir's secret sharing. The signing protocol consists of one offline round and one online round.

- In the offline round, each signer i samples $r_{i,0}, r_{i,1} \in \mathfrak{D}$ and publishes a token $(R_{i,0}, R_{i,1}) \leftarrow (F(r_{i,0}), F(r_{i,1}))$.
- In the online round, to sign a message μ, the user selects a set of signers SS of size at least t and sends a request $lr \leftarrow (\mu, SS, \{R_{i,0}, R_{i,1}\}_{i\in SS})$ to each signer in SS. Each signer i sends $R \leftarrow \sum_{i'\in SS}(R_{i',0} + bR_{i',1})$ with $b \leftarrow \mathrm{H}_1(\mathsf{pk}, lr)$, and $z_i \leftarrow r_{i,0} + br_{i,1} + c\lambda_i^{SS}\mathsf{sk}_i$ with $c \leftarrow \mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, \mu, R)$ to the user, where H_1 and H_2 are two hash functions.
- Finally, the signature is computed as $(R, z = \sum_{i\in SS} z_i)$. To verify it, one checks whether $F(z) = R + c \cdot \mathsf{pk}$ for $c = \mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, \mu, R)$.

Here $\mathrm{H}_1, \mathrm{H}_2 : \{0,1\}^* \to \mathfrak{S}$ are hash functions. We note that the underlying signature scheme can be viewed as a LHF-based analog of Schnorr signatures. The required properties of F is that: 1.

it is linear, i.e. $F(a) + F(b) = F(a + b)$ holds for any $a, b \in \mathfrak{D}$; 2. it is collision resistance, i.e. it is hard to find $x \neq y \in \mathfrak{D}$ such that $F(x) = F(y)$ for a randomly sampled F; 3. it is compressing, i.e. the pre-image of any element in $\mathfrak{R}$ under F contains multiple elements. As observed by Hauck et al. [HKLN20], a natural candidate to instantiate LHF from lattices is $F(\boldsymbol{x}) = A\boldsymbol{x}$, where A is a randomly sampled matrix $A \in R_q^{k\times m}$ for a prime q and the ring $R_q := \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^N + 1)$, with $\mathfrak{D} = \{\boldsymbol{x} \in R_q^m | \, \|\boldsymbol{x}\|_\infty \leqslant \sigma_x\}$, $\mathfrak{R} = R_q^k$, and $\mathfrak{S} = R_q$, where $\sigma_x < q$ is a constant. It is clear that F is linear and compressing if $|\mathfrak{D}| = (2\sigma_x)^{mN} \gg q^{kN} = |\mathfrak{R}|$. Also, F is collision resistance under the Module-SIS (MSIS) assumption, which guarantees that given a uniform matrix $A \in R_q^{k\times \ell}$, it must be infeasible to find a small-norm solution $\boldsymbol{x} \neq \boldsymbol{0}$ such that $A\boldsymbol{x} = \boldsymbol{0}$. If one can find $\boldsymbol{x}_1 \neq \boldsymbol{x}_2 \in \mathfrak{D}$ such that $F(\boldsymbol{x}_1) = F(\boldsymbol{x}_2)$, we have $A(\boldsymbol{x}_1 - \boldsymbol{x}_2) = 0$, which gives us a MSIS solution $(\boldsymbol{x}_1 - \boldsymbol{x}_2)$ for A with infinite norm bounded by $2\sigma_x$.

Unfortunately, we cannot simply apply the analysis from [TZ23] to the above lattice-based instantiation. A simple reason is that $\mathfrak{D}$ as defined above is not a linear space,[1] which are required by the prior analysis. There are also more technical reasons why this does not work, and to see what they are, we now try to apply the prior analysis here.

Reduction idea from prior work. The reduction idea is simple. Denote an adversary that breaks unforgeability of the threshold signature scheme as $\mathcal{A}$, which corrupts up to $t-1$ signers, engages in an arbitrary number of signing sessions with honest signers, and forges a valid signature for a message that was not signed in any of the signing sessions. We construct a MSIS adversary $\mathcal{B}$ as follows: (In the analysis, H_1 and H_2 are modeled as random oracles.) Initially, $\mathcal{B}$ receives a MSIS challenge A. Then, $\mathcal{B}$ runs $\mathcal{A}$ by simulating the key generation, the signing sessions and the random oracles following the protocol by itself. If $\mathcal{A}$ returns a valid message-signature pair $(\mu^*, sig^* = (\boldsymbol{R}^*, \boldsymbol{z}^*))$, $\mathcal{B}$ rewinds $\mathcal{A}$ to the step that the query $\mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, \mu^*, \boldsymbol{R}^*)$ is made and runs $\mathcal{A}$ again while answering its random oracle queries with refreshed randomness. If $\mathcal{A}$ returns $(\bar{\mu}^*, \overline{sig}^* = (\bar{\boldsymbol{R}}^*, \bar{\boldsymbol{z}}^*))$ with $(\mu^*, \boldsymbol{R}^*) = (\bar{\mu}^*, \bar{\boldsymbol{R}}^*)$, then we find a collision $F(\boldsymbol{z}^* - c \cdot \mathsf{sk}) = \boldsymbol{R}^* = \bar{\boldsymbol{R}}^* = F(\bar{\boldsymbol{z}}^* - \bar{c} \cdot \mathsf{sk})$, where c and $\bar{c}$ are the outputs of $\mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, \mu^*, \boldsymbol{R}^*)$ in the first and second execution respectively. Therefore, $\mathcal{B}$ returns $(\boldsymbol{z}^* - \bar{\boldsymbol{z}}^* - (c - \bar{c}) \cdot \mathsf{sk})$. Otherwise, $\mathcal{B}$ aborts.

By the Forking Lemma, we can show that with high probability $\mathcal{B}$ does not abort and $c \neq \bar{c}$ if $\mathcal{A}$ breaks unforgeability with high probability. The difficulty here is to show we indeed find a collision, i.e. $(\boldsymbol{z}^* - \bar{\boldsymbol{z}}^* - (c - \bar{c})\mathsf{sk}) \neq 0$. The prior analysis from [TZ23] shows that for any two different secret keys $\mathsf{sk}, \mathsf{sk}'$ mapping to the same public key, there exists a bijection Φ that maps the randomness ρ of $\mathcal{B}$ to another randomness ρ' such that the view of $\mathcal{A}$ given (sk, ρ) is identical to that given (sk', ρ'). Therefore, $\mathcal{A}$ outputs the same $(\mu^*, \boldsymbol{R}^*, \boldsymbol{z}^*, \bar{\mu}^*, \bar{\boldsymbol{R}}^*, \bar{\boldsymbol{z}}^*)$ independent of whether $\mathcal{B}$ is run with (sk, ρ) or (sk', ρ'). Since $\mathsf{sk} \neq \mathsf{sk}'$ and $c \neq \bar{c}$, we have $\boldsymbol{z}^* - \bar{\boldsymbol{z}}^* - (c - \bar{c}) \cdot \mathsf{sk} \neq \boldsymbol{z}^* - \bar{\boldsymbol{z}}^* - (c - \bar{c}) \cdot \mathsf{sk}'$, so $\mathcal{B}$ wins in at least one of the cases. Hence, $\mathcal{B}$ wins with at least half of the probability that $\mathcal{B}$ does not abort.

Challenges in lattice instantiations. The main challenges lie in how to construct Φ. Note that given the secret key sk, the execution of $\mathcal{B}$ is determined by the randomness $\boldsymbol{h}$ for answering RO queries, the secret key shares $\{\mathsf{sk}_i\}_{i\in[n]}$, and the randomness $(\boldsymbol{r}_{i,0}, \boldsymbol{r}_{i,1})$ for generating the tokens of each signing session. Therefore, we only consider Φ defined over those variables. First of all, Φ maps $\boldsymbol{h}$ to itself since $\mathcal{A}$ can learn $\boldsymbol{h}$ from RO queries. For the other two parts, Φ satisfies the following:

[1] This is because given $\boldsymbol{x}_1, \boldsymbol{x}_2$ with infinite norm bounded by σ_x, $\|\boldsymbol{x}_1 + \boldsymbol{x}_2\|_\infty$ can exceed σ_x.

(1) Φ maps $\{\mathsf{sk}_i\}_{i\in[n]}$ to $\{\mathsf{sk}'_i\}_{i\in[n]}$ such that $\{\mathsf{sk}'_i\}_{i\in[n]}$ is the shares of sk' and $\mathsf{sk}_i = \mathsf{sk}'_i$ for any corrupted signer i.

(2) For the interaction with signer i during signing, Φ maps $(\boldsymbol{r}_{i,0}, \boldsymbol{r}_{i,1})$ to $(\boldsymbol{r}'_{i,0}, \boldsymbol{r}'_{i,1})$ such that $F(\boldsymbol{r}_{i,0}) = F(\boldsymbol{r}'_{i,0})$, $F(\boldsymbol{r}_{i,1}) = F(\boldsymbol{r}'_{i,1})$, and

$$\begin{pmatrix}1 & b\\ 1 & \bar{b}\end{pmatrix}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{r}_{i,0}\\ \boldsymbol{r}_{i,1}\end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix}c\lambda_i^{SS}\mathsf{sk}_i\\ \bar{c}\lambda_i^{SS}\mathsf{sk}_i\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{z}_i\\ \bar{\boldsymbol{z}}_i\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}1 & b\\ 1 & \bar{b}\end{pmatrix}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{r}'_{i,0}\\ \boldsymbol{r}'_{i,1}\end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix}c\lambda_i^{SS}\mathsf{sk}'_i\\ \bar{c}\lambda_i^{SS}\mathsf{sk}'_i\end{pmatrix},$$

where we use $\bar{(\cdot)}$ to denote the variables after rewinding. (It is possible that the adversary makes only one query or the same queries for the token during the two executions, but these cases are easier to deal with. Thus, we only discuss the above hardest case here.)

It is not hard to satisfy the first condition due to the property of secret sharing. For the second condition, by the idea of prior work, if $b - \bar{b}$ is invertible, we can set $(\boldsymbol{r}'_{i,0}, \boldsymbol{r}'_{i,1}) = (\boldsymbol{r}_{i,0} + (c - b(b - \bar{b})^{-1}\Delta_c)\Delta_{\mathsf{sk}}, \boldsymbol{r}'_{i,1} + (b - \bar{b})^{-1}\Delta_c\Delta_{\mathsf{sk}})$, where $\Delta_c = c - \bar{c}$ and $\Delta_{\mathsf{sk}} = \lambda_i^{SS}(\mathsf{sk}_i - \mathsf{sk}'_i)$. It is not hard to check that it satisfies the above equation. However, the problem is that the map is not a bijection since $\mathfrak{D}$ is not a vector space. There is no guarantee that $(\boldsymbol{r}'_{i,0}, \boldsymbol{r}'_{i,1}) \in \mathfrak{D}$ for $\boldsymbol{r}_{i,0}, \boldsymbol{r}_{i,1} \in \mathfrak{D}$. A common solution, which was also used by Hauck et al. [HKLN20], is to enlarge $\mathfrak{D}$ (by increasing σ_x) such that $(\boldsymbol{r}'_{i,0}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{r}'_{i,\ell}) \in \mathfrak{D}$ except for a negligible fraction of $(\boldsymbol{r}_{i,0}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{r}_{i,\ell})$. Still, there are two issues we need to address: 1. We need to show that the shift $(b-\bar{b})^{-1}\Delta_c\Delta_{\mathsf{sk}}$ is small. is small; 2. To make the fraction of bad randomness negligible, we have to set $\sigma_x = \Omega(2^\kappa \left\|(b - \bar{b})^{-1}\Delta_c\Delta_{\mathsf{sk}}\right\|)$, where κ denotes the security parameter. This would lead to a very large modulus.

OUR SOLUTION. For the first issue, we need to show all of the three parts, i.e., $(b_j - \bar{b}_j)^{-1}$, Δ_c, and Δ_{sk}, are small. To make sure the inverse of $(b_j - \bar{b}_j)^{-1}$ is small, the idea is to restrict the range of H_1 to be $\{0, 1\}$. As a result, with $1/2$ probability, $b - \bar{b} \in \{1, -1\}$ and thus its inverse is small (either 1 or -1). Then, we boost the probability to $1 - 2^{-2\kappa}$ by increasing the number of nonces. More precisely, in the offline round, each signer i samples $\boldsymbol{r}_{i,0}, \boldsymbol{r}_{i,1}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{r}_{i,\ell}$ for $\ell = 2\kappa$. In the online round, signer i returns $\boldsymbol{z}_i \leftarrow \boldsymbol{r}_{i,0} + \sum_{j\in[\ell]} b_j\boldsymbol{r}_{i,j}$, where $(b_1, \ldots, b_\ell) \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ are computed from H_1. Also, Φ maps $(\boldsymbol{r}_{i,0}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{r}_{i,\ell})$ to $(\boldsymbol{r}'_{i,0}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{r}'_{i,\ell}) = (\boldsymbol{r}_{i,0} + (c - b_j(b_j - \bar{b}_j)^{-1}\Delta_c)\Delta_{\mathsf{sk}}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{r}_{i,j-1}, \boldsymbol{r}_{i,j} + (b_j - \bar{b}_j)^{-1}\Delta_c\Delta_{\mathsf{sk}}, \boldsymbol{r}_{i,j+1}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{r}_{i,\ell})$, where j denotes the first index with $b_j \neq \bar{b}_j$.

For Δ_c, it is a common practice to sample c with small ℓ_1-norm, which implies the norm of Δ_c is small. Lastly, we have to ensure that the norm of Δ_{sk} is small. This imposes an additional requirement on the secret sharing scheme. Namely, it requires that there exists a map Φ satisfying the aforementioned condition (1) and in addition, satisfying that $\left\|\mathsf{sk}_i - \mathsf{sk}'_i\right\|_\infty$ is small. We show that a special class of secret sharing schemes, referred to as linear secret sharing schemes with small coefficients, satisfies the requirement. We refer to Section 3 for the detailed definition and instantiation.

To address the second issue, we sample each $\boldsymbol{r}_{i,j}$ from an m-dimensional discrete Gaussian distribution centered at the origin with variance σ_x. Intuitively, $\mathfrak{D}$ becomes a probability distribution instead of a set, and we can show that $\mathcal{B}$ wins with high probability as long as the ratio $\alpha = \frac{\mathsf{Pr}[(\boldsymbol{r}_{i,0},\ldots,\boldsymbol{r}_{i,\ell})]}{\mathsf{Pr}[\Phi(\boldsymbol{r}_{i,0},\ldots,\boldsymbol{r}_{i,\ell})]}$ is close to 1 except for a negligible fraction of $(\boldsymbol{r}_{i,0}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{r}_{i,\ell})$. More precisely, we need to show $\alpha^{\mathsf{q}_s} \in (1 - \varepsilon, 1 + \varepsilon)$ for some constant ε, where q_s denotes the number of signing sessions. Since the map only shifts $\boldsymbol{r}_{i,0}$ and $\boldsymbol{r}_{i,j}$ by roughly $\Delta = \Delta_c\Delta_{\mathsf{sk}}$, the ratio is roughly $\exp\left(\frac{\|\Delta\|^2 + 2\|\Delta\|\cdot\left\|(\boldsymbol{r}_{i,0},\ldots,\boldsymbol{r}_{i,\ell})\right\|}{\sigma_x^2}\right)$, and we can achieve the desired bound by setting $\sigma_x = \Omega(\mathsf{q}_s \left\|\Delta\right\|)$.

We now discuss two important optimizations we made to improve the efficiency of our protocol in the following paragraphs.

Decreasing the number of nonces. In the above protocol, the number of nonces generated is equal to the security parameter, resulting in significant overhead in communication complexity. To decrease the number of nonces ℓ, the key observation is that we can extend the domain of b to $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{b}} := \{\pm e_0, \ldots, \pm e_{N-1}\}$, where $e_i = X^i \in R_q$. Although for any $b \neq \bar{b} \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{b}}$, $(b - \bar{b})$ is not invertible, we show that there exists $v_{b-\bar{b}} \in R$ such that $v_{b-\bar{b}}(b - \bar{b}) = 2$ and $\left\|v_{b-\bar{b}}\right\|_1 \leqslant 1$. Therefore, we let each signer compute $\boldsymbol{z}_i \leftarrow \boldsymbol{r}_{i,0} + \sum_{j\in[\ell]} b_j \boldsymbol{r}_{i,j} + 2c \cdot \lambda_i^{SS} \mathsf{sk}_i$, and, then we can structure the map Φ following the same way as above except that we replace $(b - \bar{b})^{-1}$ with $v_{b-\bar{b}}$. As a result, we just need to set $\ell = 2\kappa/\log(2N)$, which is 10 times smaller for $N = 512$ used in our concrete efficiency analysis.

Improving modulus size using the Rényi Divergence. Another main efficiency problem is that the modulus size depends linearly on q_s, which is implied by how we set σ_x. To address this, we observe that the ratio $\frac{\mathsf{Pr}[(\boldsymbol{r}_{i,0},\ldots,\boldsymbol{r}_{i,\ell})]}{\mathsf{Pr}[(\boldsymbol{r}'_{i,0},\ldots,\boldsymbol{r}'_{i,\ell})]}$ is not evenly distributed. It gets larger as the norm of $\boldsymbol{r}_{i,j}$ becomes larger. However, as the norm of $\boldsymbol{r}_{i,j}$ becomes larger, its probability of being sampled becomes exponentially small. As a result, there are only a small fraction of points with ratios close to the ratio bound, while a large proportion of points have much smaller ratios. Therefore, we try to use the Rényi divergence, which computes the *average* of the probability ratio of two distributions. More precisely, instead of considering the probability that a particular random value $(\boldsymbol{r}_{i,0}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{r}_{i,\ell})$ is sampled, we consider the distribution of the view of $\mathcal{A}$ conditioning on sk (denoted by T_{sk}) directly. We show that $\mathcal{B}$ wins with high probability as long as the Rényi divergence $R_\alpha\left(T_{\mathsf{sk}} \| T_{\mathsf{sk}'}\right)$ is close to 1. Then, we observe that the Rényi divergence of the view of $\mathcal{A}$ in a *single* signing session given sk from that given sk' is roughly the Rényi divergence of two discrete Gaussian distributions both with variance $O(\sigma_x)$ and with distance $\|\Delta\|$ between their centers. Thus, considering all signing sessions (both before and after the rewinding), $R_\alpha\left(T_{\mathsf{sk}} \| T_{\mathsf{sk}'}\right)$ is roughly $\exp\left(\mathsf{q}_s \|\Delta\|^2 / \sigma_x^2\right)$, where the constants and unimportant factors are omitted. Therefore, we can set $\sigma_x = \Omega(\sqrt{\mathsf{q}_s}\,\|\Delta\|)$, improving the modulus size by a factor of $\sqrt{\mathsf{q}_s}$. We also note that similar techniques have been used by Agrawal et al. [ASY22] to improve the modulus size of the FHE-based scheme.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Notations

For any positive integers $k < n$, $[n]$ denotes $\{1, \ldots, n\}$, and $[k..n]$ denotes $\{k, \ldots, n\}$. We use κ to denote the security parameter. For a finite set S, $|S|$ denotes the size of S, and $x \leftarrow\!\!\$\, S$ denotes sampling an element uniformly from S and assigning it to x. For a distribution $\mathcal{D}$, $x \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathcal{D}$ denotes sampling x according to $\mathcal{D}$. For a sequence of variables $x_1, \ldots, x_\ell$, we use $x_{[i..j]}$ to denote $(x_i, \ldots, x_j)$. For any vector space V over a field F and a set $S \in V$, we denote $\mathsf{Span}_F(S)$ as the F-span of S, which is the smallest F-subspace of V that contains S. In particular, we omit F from the subscript if $F = \mathbb{R}$. For a finite set $S = \{v_1, \ldots, v_n\} \subseteq V$, we say S is F-linearly independent if and only if for any non-zero $(a_1, \ldots, a_n) \in F^n$, $\sum_{i\in[n]} a_i v_i \neq 0$. We say S is a F-basis of V if and only if S is F-linearly independent and $\mathsf{Span}_F(S) = V$. The dimension of V is equal to the size of S.

2.2 Polynomial Rings

Let q be an odd prime and N be a power of 2. We denote the ring $R := \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^N + 1)$, which is contained in the field $K_{\mathbb{R}} = \mathbb{R}[X]/(X^N + 1)$, and let $R_q := R/qR \cong \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^N + 1)$. For an element $v \in K_{\mathbb{R}}$, where $v = \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} v_i X^i$, we denote its conjugate as $v^* = \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} -v_i X^{N-i}$. We say $v \in \mathbb{R}$ if and only if $v_i = 0$ for all $i \in [N-1]$. We use ϕ to denote the coefficient embedding that embeds $K_{\mathbb{R}}$ in $\mathbb{R}^N$, and ϕ maps v to vector $(v_0, \ldots, v_{N-1}) \in \mathbb{R}^N$. When applying ϕ to a vector $\boldsymbol{v} \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$, ϕ maps $\boldsymbol{v}$ to a vector in $\mathbb{R}^{mN}$ by applying ϕ to each entry of $\boldsymbol{v}$. The map ϕ is a bijection, and we denote its inverse by ϕ^{-1}. An ℓ_p-norm of $\boldsymbol{v} \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$ is given by

$$\|\boldsymbol{v}\|_p := \|\phi(\boldsymbol{v})\|_p = \left(\sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{j=0}^{N-1} v_{i,j}^p \right)^{\frac{1}{p}} ,$$

where $v_{i,j}$ denotes the coefficient of X^j of the i-th entry of $\boldsymbol{v}$. Additionally, the ℓ_∞-norm of $\boldsymbol{v}$ is defined as $\|\boldsymbol{v}\|_\infty := \max_{i \in [m], j \in [0..N-1]} v_{i,j}$. For the ℓ_2-norm, we omit the subscript and denote $\|\boldsymbol{v}\|$ as the ℓ_2-norm of $\boldsymbol{v}$. Denote the conjugate transpose of $\boldsymbol{v} \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$ as $\boldsymbol{v}^\dagger := (\boldsymbol{v}^*)^T$. We define the inner product of two vectors $\boldsymbol{v}, \boldsymbol{v}' \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$ as $\langle \boldsymbol{v}, \boldsymbol{v}' \rangle := \boldsymbol{v}^\dagger \boldsymbol{v}'$. We say the two vectors are orthogonal if $\boldsymbol{v}^\dagger \boldsymbol{v}' = 0$. Also, we have $\|\boldsymbol{v}\| = \boldsymbol{v}^\dagger \boldsymbol{v}$. We say $\boldsymbol{v}$ is a unit vector if $\|\boldsymbol{v}\| = 1$.

Also, we define a map ϕ_{M} that maps each element in $K_{\mathbb{R}}$ to a matrix in $\mathbb{R}^{N \times N}$ as follows. Let $M_X := \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{0} & I_{N-1} \\ -1 & \mathbf{0} \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{R}^N$, where I_{N-1} is the identity matrix in $\mathbb{R}^{N-1}$. For each $v \in K_{\mathbb{R}}$, $\phi_{\mathsf{M}}(v) := \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} v_i M_X^i$, which can be viewed as the matrix representation of v. In particular, for ϕ and ϕ_{M}, the following properties hold: for any $v, v' \in K_{\mathbb{R}}$,

$$\phi_{\mathsf{M}}(v^*) = \phi_{\mathsf{M}}(v)^T \ , \ \phi_{\mathsf{M}}(vv') = \phi_{\mathsf{M}}(v)\phi_{\mathsf{M}}(v') \text{ and } \phi_{\mathsf{M}}(v)\phi(v') = \phi(vv') \ . \tag{1}$$

We extend the above definitions to R_q by representing each $v \in R_q$ as $v = \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} v_i X^i$, where $v_i \in \{-(q-1)/2, \ldots, (q-1)/2\}$.

For a matrix $M \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^{m \times m}$, we denote its conjugate transpose as $M^\dagger = (M^*)^T$, and we say M is *hermitian* if $M = M^\dagger$. We say M is *positive definite* if and only if M is hermitian and for all $\boldsymbol{x} \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^m \backslash \{\mathbf{0}\}$, $\boldsymbol{x}^\dagger M \boldsymbol{x}$ is a positive real number. We show the following lemma, which extends the spectral theorem to positive definite matrices over $K_{\mathbb{R}}$.

Lemma 1. *For any integer $m \geqslant 1$ and a positive definite matrix $M \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^{m \times m}$, there exists $\lambda_1, \ldots, \lambda_m \in \mathbb{R}$ and orthogonal unit vectors $\boldsymbol{v}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{v}_m \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$ such that $\lambda_i > 0$ and $M = \sum_{i=1}^m \lambda_i \boldsymbol{v}_i \boldsymbol{v}_i^\dagger$.*

Proof. Let $M' = \phi_{\mathsf{M}}(M) \in \mathbb{R}^{mN \times mN}$. We first show M' is positive definite. Since $M = M^\dagger$, we have $M' = \phi_{\mathsf{M}}(M) = \phi_{\mathsf{M}}(M^\dagger) = \phi_{\mathsf{M}}(M)^T = (M')^T$, which means M' is a symmetric matrix. Therefore, there exists $\hat{\lambda}_1, \ldots, \hat{\lambda}_{mN} \in \mathbb{R}$ and orthogonal unit vectors $\boldsymbol{r}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{r}_{mN} \in \mathbb{R}^{mN}$ such that $M' \boldsymbol{r}_i = \hat{\lambda}_i \boldsymbol{r}_i$ for $i \in [mN]$. For each $\boldsymbol{r}_i$, we know $\boldsymbol{v}_i' = \phi^{-1}(\boldsymbol{r}_i)$ is an eigenvector of M for eigenvalue $\hat{\lambda}_i$ since $\phi(M\boldsymbol{v}_i') = \phi_{\mathsf{M}}(M)\phi(\boldsymbol{v}_i') = M'\boldsymbol{r}_i = \hat{\lambda}_i \boldsymbol{r}_i = \phi(\hat{\lambda}_i \boldsymbol{v}_i')$. Also, since M is positive definite, $(\boldsymbol{v}_i')^\dagger M \boldsymbol{v}_i' = \hat{\lambda}_i \|\boldsymbol{v}_i'\| > 0$, which implies $\hat{\lambda}_i > 0$. For each eigenvalue λ, let S be the set of eigenvectors $\boldsymbol{v}_i'$ such that $\hat{\lambda}_i' = \lambda$ and let $T = \mathsf{Span}(S)$. Then, each $\boldsymbol{v} \in T$ is also an eigenvector of M with eigenvalue λ. Since for each $\boldsymbol{v}, \boldsymbol{v}' \in T$ and $a \in K_{\mathbb{R}}$, we have that $M(\boldsymbol{v} + a\boldsymbol{v}') = M\boldsymbol{v} + aM\boldsymbol{v}' = \lambda_i'(\boldsymbol{v} + a\boldsymbol{v}')$ and thus $\boldsymbol{v} + a\boldsymbol{v}' \in S$, which implies S is a $K_{\mathbb{R}}$-vector subspace of $K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$. Therefore, there exists an orthonormal $K_{\mathbb{R}}$-basis $\{\boldsymbol{v}_1^{(\lambda)}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{v}_k^{(\lambda)}\}$ of T. We find such a basis for each eigenvalue $\hat{\lambda}_i'$ and let V be

their union. Since for two different eigenvalues λ, λ', their eigenvectors are orthogonal, we know V is an orthonormal $K_{\mathbb{R}}$-basis of $K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$. Let $\{\boldsymbol{v}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{v}_m\} = V$ and λ_i be the corresponding eigenvalue of $\boldsymbol{v}_i$. Let U be a matrix in $K_{\mathbb{R}}^{m \times m}$ such that the i-th column is $\boldsymbol{v}_i$. Then, we have $U^\dagger U = I = UU^\dagger$ and thus $M = MUU^\dagger = U\Lambda U^\dagger = \sum_{i=1}^m \lambda_i \boldsymbol{v}_i \boldsymbol{v}_i^\dagger$, where Λ is a diagonal matrix with diagonal entries $\lambda_1, \ldots, \lambda_m$. □

Also, we show the following lemmas establishing the properties of the set $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{b}} := \{\pm 1, \ldots, \pm X^{N-1}\} \subseteq R$, which are used in the security analysis.

Lemma 2. *Let $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{b}} := \{\pm 1, \ldots, \pm X^{N-1}\} \subseteq R$. For any $b, \bar{b} \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{b}}$ such that $b \neq \bar{b}$, the ideal generated by $b - \bar{b}$ contains 2.*

Proof. Let $b = sX^a, \bar{b} = \bar{s}X^{\bar{a}}$ for $a, \bar{a} \in [0..N-1]$ and $s, \bar{s} \in \{-1, 1\}$. Consider two cases:

- $a = \bar{a}$: Then, $b - \bar{b} = 2X^a$ or $-2X^a$. It is easy to see that the statement holds as $(b-\bar{b})X^{N-a} = 2$ or -2.
- $a \neq \bar{a}$: W.l.o.g. assume $a > \bar{a}$. Then, $b - \bar{b}$ generates $X^{a-\bar{a}} - s\bar{s}$ since $(b-\bar{b}) \cdot (-sx^{N-\bar{a}}) = X^{a-\bar{a}} + s\bar{s}$. We can see that this generates $X^{2^e(a-\bar{a})} - 1$ for any $e \geqslant 1$, since $(x-1)(x+1) = x^2 - 1$. Since $a - \bar{a} < N$ and N is a power of 2, there exists e such that $N | 2^e(a-\bar{a})$ but $N \nmid 2^{e-1}(a-\bar{a})$. Then, $2^e(a-\bar{a}) = Na'$ for some odd a', and thus $b - \bar{b}$ generates $X^{Na'} - 1 = (-1)^{a'} - 1 = -2$, which implies the statement. □

Lemma 3. *Let $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{b}}$ be as in Lemma 2. For $b_1, \ldots, b_\ell, \bar{b}_1, \ldots, \bar{b}_\ell \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{b}}$ such that there exists $k \in [\ell]$ such that $b_j \neq \bar{b}_j$, $\left\| 1 + \sum_{i=1}^\ell b_i^* \bar{b}_i \right\|^2 \leqslant \ell^2 + 1$.*

Proof. Let $v = 1 + \sum_{i=1}^\ell b_i^* \bar{b}_i = \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} v_j X^j$. Since for any $i \in [\ell]$, $b_i^* \bar{b}_i \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{b}}$, $\|v\|_1 \leqslant \ell + 1$. Moreover, since $b_k \neq \bar{b}_k$, then either $b_k^* \bar{b}_k = -1$ or $\pm X^a$ for some $a \in [1..N-1]$. Then, we have that $|v_0| \leqslant \ell$, $\sum_{j=1}^{N-1} |v_j| \leqslant \ell$, and $|v_0| + \sum_{j=1}^{N-1} |v_j| \leqslant 1 + \ell$.

If $|v_0| = 0$, $\|v\|_2^2 \leqslant (\sum_{j=1}^{N-1} |v_j|)^2 \leqslant \ell^2$. Otherwise, $1 \leqslant |v_0| \leqslant \ell$. Thus, $\sum_{j=0}^{N-1} |v_j|^2 \leqslant |v_0|^2 + (\sum_{j=1}^{N-1} |v_j|)^2 \leqslant |v_0|^2 + (\ell + 1 - |v_0|)^2 \leqslant \ell^2 + 2\ell + 1 + 2|v_0|^2 - 2(\ell+1)|v_0| = \ell^2 + 1 + 2(|v_0| - \ell)(|v_0| - 1) \leqslant \ell^2 + 1$, where the last inequality is due to the fact that $1 \leqslant |v_0| \leqslant \ell$. □

2.3 Lattices and Discrete Gaussian Distributions

In this subsection, we give definitions for lattices and discrete Gaussian distributions over $\mathbb{R}$ and $K_{\mathbb{R}}$. An m-dimensional lattice Λ over $\mathbb{R}$ (resp. $K_{\mathbb{R}}$) is a discrete additive subgroup of $\mathbb{R}^m$ (resp. $K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$). Equivalently, $\Lambda = \mathcal{L}(\{\boldsymbol{b}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{b}_k\}) := \{\sum_{i \in [k]} x_i \boldsymbol{b}_i : x_i \in \mathbb{Z}\}$ for a set of $\mathbb{R}$-linearly independent vectors $\boldsymbol{b}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{b}_k \in \mathbb{R}^m$ (resp. $K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$), which is referred to as a basis of Λ. The size k is the *rank* of the lattice Λ. We say Λ is a *full rank* lattice if $k = m$ (resp. $k = mN$ for Λ over $K_{\mathbb{R}}$). For any $a \in \mathbb{R}^m$ (resp. $K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$), $\Lambda + a$ is a *coset* of Λ. The *dual lattice* of Λ is denoted as $\Lambda^* = \{\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathsf{Span}(\Lambda) : \forall\ y \in \Lambda, \boldsymbol{x}^T \boldsymbol{y} \in \mathbb{Z}\}$. A Λ-subspace is the linear span of some subset of Λ, i.e., a subspace S such that $S = \mathsf{Span}(S \cap \Lambda)$. For any two vectors $\boldsymbol{v} \in \mathbb{R}^m$ (resp. $K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$) and $\boldsymbol{u} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ (resp. $K_{\mathbb{R}}^n$), denote $\boldsymbol{v} \otimes \boldsymbol{u} := (v_1 u_1, \ldots, v_1 u_n, \ldots, v_m u_1, \ldots, v_m u_n) \in \mathbb{R}^{mn}$ (resp. $K_{\mathbb{R}}^{mn}$). For any two lattices $\Lambda \in \mathbb{R}^m$ (resp. $K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$) and $\Lambda' \in \mathbb{R}^n$ (resp. $K_{\mathbb{R}}^n$), denote their tensor product as $\Lambda \otimes \Lambda'$, which is the smallest lattice over $\mathbb{R}^{mn}$ (resp. $K_{\mathbb{R}}^{mn}$) that contains $\{\boldsymbol{x} \otimes \boldsymbol{y} : \boldsymbol{x} \in \Lambda, \boldsymbol{y} \in \Lambda'\}$.

Further, for a lattice $\Lambda \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$, we say Λ is a R-lattice if and only if Λ is a R-module, or equivalently, $r\boldsymbol{x} \in \Lambda$ for any $r \in R$ and $\boldsymbol{x} \in \Lambda$. For a R-lattice Λ, it can be represented as $\Lambda =$

$\mathcal{L}_R(\{\boldsymbol{b}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{b}_k\}) := \{\sum_{i\in[k]} x_i \boldsymbol{b}_i : x_i \in R\}$ for a set of $K_{\mathbb{R}}$-linearly independent vectors $\boldsymbol{b}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{b}_k \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$, which is referred to as a R-basis of Λ. Also, for a matrix $A \in R_q^{k\times m}$, we define the R-lattice $\Lambda_q^{\perp}(A) \subseteq R^m$ as

$$\Lambda_q^{\perp}(A) := \{\boldsymbol{x} \in R^m : A\boldsymbol{x} = 0 \bmod q\} .$$

We know $\Lambda_q^{\perp}(A)$ has full-rank since $qR^m \subseteq \Lambda_q^{\perp}(A)$.

For a positive definite matrix $\Sigma \in \mathbb{R}^{m\times m}$ (resp. $K_{\mathbb{R}}^{m\times m}$), there exists an invertible matrix $S \in \mathbb{R}^{m\times m}$ (resp. $K_{\mathbb{R}}^{m\times m}$ by Lemma 1) such that $\Sigma = SS^T$ (resp. $\Sigma = SS^{\dagger}$). We call S the square root of Σ and denote $S = \sqrt{\Sigma}$. Note that such S is not unique and we use $\sqrt{\Sigma}$ to refer to some arbitrary but fixed square root of Σ. For $\boldsymbol{c} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ (resp. $K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$), we define the function $\rho_{\sqrt{\Sigma},\boldsymbol{c}}$ over $\mathbb{R}^m$ (resp. $K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$) as

$$\rho_{\sqrt{\Sigma},\boldsymbol{c}}(\boldsymbol{x}) := \exp\left(-\pi \left\|\sqrt{\Sigma}^{-1}(\boldsymbol{x}-\boldsymbol{c})\right\|^2\right) = \exp\left(-\pi(\boldsymbol{x}-\boldsymbol{c})^{\dagger}\Sigma^{-1}(\boldsymbol{x}-\boldsymbol{c})\right) .$$

Then, we denote $\mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda+\boldsymbol{a},\sqrt{\Sigma},\boldsymbol{c}}$ as the discrete Gaussian distribution over a lattice coset $\Lambda + \boldsymbol{a} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$ (resp. $K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$) with covariance matrix Σ, centered at $\boldsymbol{c} \in \mathbb{R}^m$, where for $\boldsymbol{x} \in \Lambda + \boldsymbol{a}$, we define

$$\mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda+\boldsymbol{a},\sqrt{\Sigma},\boldsymbol{c}}(\boldsymbol{x}) := \mathsf{Pr}[\boldsymbol{x} \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda+\boldsymbol{a},\sqrt{\Sigma},\boldsymbol{v}}] = \frac{\rho_{\sqrt{\Sigma},\boldsymbol{c}}(\boldsymbol{x})}{\rho_{\sqrt{\Sigma},\boldsymbol{c}}(\Lambda+\boldsymbol{a})}$$

where $\rho_{\sqrt{\Sigma},\boldsymbol{c}}(\Lambda+\boldsymbol{a}) = \sum_{\boldsymbol{x}\in\Lambda+\boldsymbol{a}} \rho_{\sqrt{\Sigma},\boldsymbol{c}}(\boldsymbol{x})$. In particular, for $\Lambda + \boldsymbol{a} \subseteq R^m$, we denote $\mathscr{D}^{m,\bmod q}_{\Lambda+\boldsymbol{a},\sqrt{\Sigma},\boldsymbol{c}}(\boldsymbol{x})$ as the distribution of $(\boldsymbol{x} \bmod q) \in R_q^m$ for $\boldsymbol{x}$ sampled from $\mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda+\boldsymbol{a},\sqrt{\Sigma},\boldsymbol{c}}$.

The following lemma shows that a discrete Gaussian distribution over $K_{\mathbb{R}}$ can be viewed as a discrete Gaussian distribution over $\mathbb{R}$ via the coefficient embedding ϕ.

Lemma 4. *For a random variable $\boldsymbol{x} \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$, the distribution of $\boldsymbol{x}$ is $\mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda+\boldsymbol{a},\sqrt{\Sigma},\boldsymbol{c}}$ for some lattice coset $\Lambda + \boldsymbol{a} \subseteq K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$, positive definite matrix $\Sigma \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^{m\times m}$, and vector $\boldsymbol{c} \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$ if and only if the distribution of $\phi(\boldsymbol{x})$ is $\mathscr{D}^{mN}_{\phi(\Lambda+\boldsymbol{a}),\sqrt{\phi_{\mathsf{M}}(\Sigma)},\phi(\boldsymbol{c})}$.*

Proof. Since $\phi_{\mathsf{M}}(\sqrt{\Sigma})\phi_{\mathsf{M}}(\sqrt{\Sigma})^T = \phi_{\mathsf{M}}(\sqrt{\Sigma})\phi_{\mathsf{M}}(\sqrt{\Sigma}^{\dagger}) = \phi_{\mathsf{M}}(\sqrt{\Sigma}\sqrt{\Sigma}^{\dagger}) = \phi_{\mathsf{M}}(\Sigma)$, for any $\boldsymbol{v} \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$,

$$\begin{aligned}
\rho_{\sqrt{\phi_{\mathsf{M}}(\Sigma)},\phi(\boldsymbol{c})}(\phi(\boldsymbol{v})) &= \exp(-\pi(\phi(\boldsymbol{v})-\phi(\boldsymbol{c}))^T\phi_{\mathsf{M}}(\Sigma)^{-1}(\phi(\boldsymbol{v})-\phi(\boldsymbol{c})))\\
&= \exp\left(-\pi\left\|\phi_{\mathsf{M}}(\sqrt{\Sigma})^{-1}(\phi(\boldsymbol{v}-\boldsymbol{c}))\right\|^2\right)\\
&= \exp\left(-\pi\left\|\phi(\sqrt{\Sigma}^{-1}(\boldsymbol{v}-\boldsymbol{c}))\right\|^2\right)\\
&= \exp\left(-\pi\left\|\sqrt{\Sigma}^{-1}(\boldsymbol{v}-\boldsymbol{c})\right\|^2\right) = \rho_{\sqrt{\Sigma},\boldsymbol{c}}(\boldsymbol{v}) .
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, for any $\boldsymbol{x} \in \Lambda + \boldsymbol{a}$, $\mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda+\boldsymbol{a},\sqrt{\Sigma},\boldsymbol{c}}(\boldsymbol{x}) = \mathscr{D}^{mN}_{\phi(\Lambda+\boldsymbol{a}),\sqrt{\phi_{\mathsf{M}}(\Sigma)},\phi(\boldsymbol{c})}(\phi(\boldsymbol{x}))$. □

Also, we make some remarks about the notations we will use throughout the paper. When $\Sigma = \sigma^2 I_m$ for $\sigma \in \mathbb{R}$ (resp. $K_{\mathbb{R}}$), we will use $\rho_{\sigma,\boldsymbol{c}}$ and $\mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda+\boldsymbol{a},\sigma,\boldsymbol{c}}$ as $\rho_{\sqrt{\Sigma},\boldsymbol{c}}$ and $\mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda+\boldsymbol{a},\sqrt{\Sigma},\boldsymbol{c}}$, respectively.

Game $\mathrm{MSIS}^{\mathcal{A}}_{q,k,m,\beta}$:

$A \leftarrow\!\!\$\ R_q^{k\times m}$
$\boldsymbol{x} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(A)$
Return $(\|\boldsymbol{x}\| \leqslant \beta \ \wedge\ A\boldsymbol{x} = 0)$

Fig. 1. The module-SIS problem.

If the center $\boldsymbol{c} = 0$, then we omit the subscript $\boldsymbol{c}$ from $\rho_{\sqrt{\Sigma},\boldsymbol{c}}$ and $\mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda+\boldsymbol{a},\sqrt{\Sigma},\boldsymbol{c}}$. Moreover, when $\Lambda + \boldsymbol{a} = \mathbb{Z}^m$ (resp. $\Lambda + \boldsymbol{a} = R^m$), we omit $\Lambda + \boldsymbol{a}$ from the subscript of $\mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda+\boldsymbol{a},\sqrt{\Sigma},\boldsymbol{c}}$.

The smoothing parameter of a lattice Λ with respect to $\varepsilon > 0$, denoted by $\eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda)$, is the smallest $\sigma > 0$ such that $\rho_{1/\sigma}(\Lambda^*\backslash\{0\}) \leqslant \varepsilon$. Throughout the paper, we set $\varepsilon = 2^{-2\kappa}$.

We borrow the following lemma from [AGHS13] that bounds the ℓ_2-norm of discrete Gaussian random variables and adapt it to lattices over $K_{\mathbb{R}}$ by Lemma 4.

Lemma 5 (Lemma 3 in [AGHS13] adapted to $K_{\mathbb{R}}$). *For any $\varepsilon \in (0,1)$, a lattice $\Lambda \subseteq K^m_{\mathbb{R}}$, $\boldsymbol{c} \in K^m_{\mathbb{R}}$, and $\sigma \geqslant \eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda)$, then*

$$\mathsf{Pr}[\|\boldsymbol{x} - \boldsymbol{c}\| \geqslant \sigma\sqrt{mN} \ : \ \boldsymbol{x} \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathscr{D}_{\Lambda,\sigma,\boldsymbol{c}}] \leqslant \frac{1+\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon} \cdot 2^{-mN} \ .$$

We also borrow the following lemma from [BTT22] to bound the smoothing parameters of $\Lambda^\perp_q(A)$ for a randomly sampled A.

Lemma 6 (Lemma 2.5 of [BTT22]). *Let q be an odd integer and A a uniformly random matrix in $R_q^{k\times m}$, $k < m$. Then, for any $\varepsilon > 0$, except with probability at most 2^{-N} on the choice of A, we have*

$$\eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda^\perp_q(A)) \leqslant \frac{8}{\sqrt{\pi}} q^{\frac{k}{m}} \sqrt{N \log(2mN(1+1/\varepsilon))} \ .$$

2.4 Assumptions

We recall the module short integer solution (MSIS) problem (defined in Figure 1). The advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ for the MSIS problem is defined as

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{msis}}_{q,k,m,\beta}(\mathcal{A}) := \mathsf{Pr}\left[\mathrm{MSIS}^{\mathcal{A}}_{q,k,m,\beta} = 1\right] \ .$$

2.5 Rényi Divergence

We define the notion of Rényi Divergence between two distributions P, Q which we will use in our analysis of the scheme.

Definition 1 (Rényi Divergence). *Let P, Q be two discrete probability distributions such that $\mathrm{Supp}(P) \subseteq \mathrm{Supp}(Q)$ and $\alpha \in [1, +\infty]$. We define the Rényi Divergence of order α, for $\alpha \in (1,\infty)$ as*

$$R_\alpha\left(P\|Q\right) := \left(\sum_{x\in Supp(P)} \frac{P(x)^\alpha}{Q(x)^{\alpha-1}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha-1}} \ .$$

For $\alpha = 1$ and $\alpha = \infty$, the Rényi Divergence is defined as

$$R_1(P\|Q) := \exp\left(\sum_{x\in \mathrm{Supp}(P)} P(x)\log\frac{P(x)}{Q(x)}\right),$$
$$R_\infty(P\|Q) = \max_{x\in Supp(P)} \frac{P(x)}{Q(x)}.$$

The following lemma gives basic properties of the Rényi Divergence.

Lemma 7 (Lemma 2.27 of [ASY22]). *Let $\alpha \in [1,\infty]$ and P, Q be discrete probability distributions with $\mathrm{Supp}(P) \subseteq \mathrm{Supp}(Q)$. Then, the following properties hold:*

- ***Log Positivity:*** *$R_\alpha(P\|Q) \geqslant R_\alpha(P\|P) = 1$.*
- ***Data Processing Inequality:*** *$R_\alpha\left(P^f\|Q^f\right) \leqslant R_\alpha(P\|Q)$ for any function f, where P^f (and Q^f) denotes the distribution which samples $x \leftarrow\!\!\$\ P$ ($x \leftarrow\!\!\$\ Q$) and outputs $f(x)$.*
- ***Probability Preservation:*** *Let $E \subseteq \mathrm{Supp}(Q)$ be an arbitrary event. Then, for $\alpha \in (1,\infty)$,*

$$\mathsf{Pr}_{x\leftarrow\!\!\$\ Q}[E] \geqslant \mathsf{Pr}_{x\leftarrow\!\!\$\ P}[E]^{\alpha/(\alpha-1)}/R_\alpha(P\|Q),$$

and for $\alpha = 1$ and ∞, we have

$$\mathsf{Pr}_{x\leftarrow\!\!\$\ Q}[E] \geqslant \mathsf{Pr}_{x\leftarrow\!\!\$\ P}[E] - \sqrt{\ln R_1(P\|Q)/2}, \text{ and}$$
$$\mathsf{Pr}_{x\leftarrow\!\!\$\ Q}[E] \geqslant \mathsf{Pr}_{x\leftarrow\!\!\$\ P}[E]/R_\infty(P\|Q), \text{ respectively.}$$

- ***Weak Triangle Inequality:*** *Let P_1, P_2, P_3 be three probability distributions where $\mathrm{Supp}(P_1) \subseteq \mathrm{Supp}(P_2) \subseteq \mathrm{Supp}(P_3)$. Then, we have*

$$R_\alpha(P_1\|P_3) \leqslant \begin{cases} R_\alpha(P_1\|P_2)\cdot R_\infty(P_2\|P_3) \\ R_\infty(P_1\|P_2)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}}\cdot R_\alpha(P_2\|P_3) \quad \text{if } \alpha\in(1,\infty)\end{cases}$$

We also borrow the following lemma from [Ros20].

Lemma 8 (Proposition 2 from [Ros20]). *Let P and Q denote two distributions of a sequence of random variables $(X_1,\ldots,X_n)$. For $1 \leqslant i \leqslant n$, denote $P_{i|x_{[i-1]}}$ (resp. $Q_{i|x_{[i-1]}}$) as the conditional distribution of X_i given $X_{[i-1]} = x_{[i-1]}$. Then, for any $\alpha > 1$,*

$$R_\alpha(P\|Q) \leqslant \prod_{i\in[n]} \max_{x_{[i-1]}} R_\alpha\left(P_{i|x_{[i-1]}}\|Q_{i|x_{[i-1]}}\right).$$

The following lemma from [TT15] upperbounds the Rényi Divergence between two discrete Gaussian distributions with different centers.

Lemma 9 (Lemma 5 of [TT15]). *For any m-dimensional lattice $\Lambda \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$, $\sigma > 0$, and two vectors $\boldsymbol{c}, \boldsymbol{c}' \in \mathbb{R}^m$, let $P = \mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda,\sigma,\boldsymbol{c}}$ and $Q = \mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda,\sigma,\boldsymbol{c}'}$. If $\boldsymbol{c}, \boldsymbol{c}' \in \Lambda$, set $\varepsilon = 0$. Otherwise, fix $\varepsilon \in (0,1)$ and assume $\sigma \geqslant \eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda)$. Then,*

$$R_\alpha(P\|Q) \leqslant \left(\frac{1+\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}} \exp\left(\alpha\pi\frac{\|\boldsymbol{c}-\boldsymbol{c}'\|^2}{\sigma^2}\right).$$

By Lemma 4, we derive the following lemma, which adapts the above to lattices over rings.

Lemma 10. *For any m-dimensional lattice coset $\Lambda + \boldsymbol{a} \subseteq R^m$ and any integer $q > 0$, $\sigma > 0$, and two vectors $\boldsymbol{c}, \boldsymbol{c}' \in R_q^m$, let $P = \mathscr{D}^{m,\bmod q}_{\Lambda+\boldsymbol{a},\sigma,\boldsymbol{c}}$ and $Q = \mathscr{D}^{m,\bmod q}_{\Lambda+\boldsymbol{a},\sigma,\boldsymbol{c}'}$. If $\boldsymbol{c}, \boldsymbol{c}' \in \Lambda + \boldsymbol{a}$, set $\varepsilon = 0$. Otherwise, fix $\varepsilon \in (0,1)$ and assume $\sigma \geqslant \eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda)$. Then,*

$$R_\alpha\left(P \| Q\right) \leqslant \left(\frac{1+\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}} \exp\left(\alpha\pi \frac{\|\boldsymbol{c}-\boldsymbol{c}'\|^2}{\sigma^2}\right) .$$

Proof. We can w.l.o.g. assume $\boldsymbol{a} = \boldsymbol{0}$, since P (resp. Q) can be viewed as the distribution of $\boldsymbol{x}+\boldsymbol{a}$ for $\boldsymbol{x}$ sampled from $\mathscr{D}^{m,\bmod q}_{\Lambda,\sigma,\boldsymbol{c}-\boldsymbol{a}}$ (resp. $\mathscr{D}^{m,\bmod q}_{\Lambda,\sigma,\boldsymbol{c}'-\boldsymbol{a}}$) and thus $R_\alpha\left(P\|Q\right) = R_\alpha\left(\mathscr{D}^{m,\bmod q}_{\Lambda,\sigma,\boldsymbol{c}-\boldsymbol{a}} \| \mathscr{D}^{m,\bmod q}_{\Lambda,\sigma,\boldsymbol{c}'-\boldsymbol{a}}\right)$. For any $\boldsymbol{c}, \boldsymbol{c}' \in R_q^m$, there exists $\boldsymbol{v}, \boldsymbol{v}' \in R^m$ such that $\boldsymbol{c} \equiv \boldsymbol{v} \bmod q$, $\boldsymbol{c}' \equiv \boldsymbol{v}' \bmod q$, and $\|\boldsymbol{c}-\boldsymbol{c}'\| = \|\boldsymbol{v}-\boldsymbol{v}'\|$. Then, we have $P = \mathscr{D}^{m,\bmod q}_{\Lambda,\sigma,\boldsymbol{v}}$ and $Q = \mathscr{D}^{m,\bmod q}_{\Lambda,\sigma,\boldsymbol{v}'}$. By Lemmas 4 and 9, $R_\alpha\left(\mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda,\sigma,\boldsymbol{v}} \| \mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda,\sigma,\boldsymbol{v}'}\right) = R_\alpha\left(\mathscr{D}^{mN}_{\phi(\Lambda),\sigma,\phi(\boldsymbol{v})} \| \mathscr{D}^{mN}_{\phi(\Lambda),\sigma,\phi(\boldsymbol{v}')}\right) \leqslant \left(\frac{1+\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}} \cdot \exp\left(\alpha\pi \frac{\|\phi(\boldsymbol{v})-\phi(\boldsymbol{v}')\|^2}{\sigma^2}\right) = \left(\frac{1+\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}} \cdot \exp\left(\alpha\pi \frac{\|\boldsymbol{v}-\boldsymbol{v}'\|^2}{\sigma^2}\right)$. Therefore, by data processing inequality from Lemma 7,

$$\begin{aligned} R_\alpha\left(P\|Q\right) &= R_\alpha\left(\mathscr{D}^{m,\bmod q}_{\Lambda,\sigma,\boldsymbol{v}} \| \mathscr{D}^{m,\bmod q}_{\Lambda,\sigma,\boldsymbol{v}'}\right) \leqslant R_\alpha\left(\mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda,\sigma,\boldsymbol{v}} \| \mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda,\sigma,\boldsymbol{v}'}\right) \\ &\leqslant \left(\frac{1+\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}} \exp\left(\alpha\pi \frac{\|\boldsymbol{v}-\boldsymbol{v}'\|^2}{\sigma^2}\right) = \left(\frac{1+\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}} \exp\left(\alpha\pi \frac{\|\boldsymbol{c}-\boldsymbol{c}'\|^2}{\sigma^2}\right) . \quad \square \end{aligned}$$

2.6 Linear transformations of discrete Gaussian random variables

We adopt the notation $P \overset{\varepsilon}{\approx} Q$ from [GMPW20]: for any two distributions P, Q with the same support and $\varepsilon > 0$, we say that $P \overset{\varepsilon}{\approx} Q$ if and only if $\max_{x \in \mathrm{Supp}(P)} |\log P(x) - \log Q(x)| \leqslant \log(1+\varepsilon)$, or equivalently, $\max\left(R_\infty\left(P\|Q\right), R_\infty\left(Q\|P\right)\right) \leqslant 1+\varepsilon$. Note that if $P \overset{\varepsilon}{\approx} Q$, then the statistical distance between P and Q is bounded by $\varepsilon/2$, i.e., $\frac{1}{2}\sum_{x \in \mathrm{Supp}(P)} |P(x) - Q(x)| \leqslant \varepsilon/2$. The following lemma shows that the distribution of a linear transformation of discrete Gaussian random variables is still close to a discrete Gaussian distribution. The proof of the lemma, given in Appendix A, follows a similar proof from [GMPW20].

Lemma 11. *For any $\varepsilon \in (0,1)$ defining $\varepsilon' = 2\varepsilon/(1-\varepsilon)$, $\sigma > 0$, lattice coset $\Lambda + a \subseteq K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$, and full-row-rank matrix $T \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^{k \times m}$ such that $\ker(T)$ is a Λ-subspace and $\eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda \cap \ker(T)) \leqslant \sigma$, we have*

$$T \cdot \mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda+a,\sigma} \overset{\varepsilon'}{\approx} \mathscr{D}^k_{T\Lambda+Ta,\sigma\sqrt{TT^\dagger}} ,$$

where $T \cdot \mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda+a,\sigma}$ denotes the distribution of Tx for x sampled from $\mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda+a,\sigma}$ and $T\Lambda := \{Tx | x \in \Lambda\}$ is a lattice over $K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$.

We use the above lemma to show the following, where we consider a particular set of discrete Gaussian variables and linear transformations that are later used in our security proof.

Lemma 12. *For any constant $\varepsilon \in (0,1)$, $\sigma_0 > 0$, full-rank R-lattice Λ with $\eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda) \leqslant \sigma_0/(2\sqrt{3})$, arbitrary elements $\boldsymbol{s}_0, \boldsymbol{s}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{s}_\ell \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$ and $b_1, \bar{b}_1, \ldots, b_\ell, \bar{b}_\ell \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{b}}$ (defined in Lemma 3) such that $(b_1, \ldots, b_\ell) \neq (\bar{b}_1, \ldots, \bar{b}_\ell)$, let $\boldsymbol{r}_0, \boldsymbol{r}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{r}_\ell$ be independent samples with $\boldsymbol{r}_i \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda+\boldsymbol{s}_i,\sigma_0}$, and denote*

$T = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & b_1 & \cdots & b_\ell \\ 1 & \bar{b}_1 & \cdots & \bar{b}_\ell \end{pmatrix}$ *and* $(\boldsymbol{y}, \bar{\boldsymbol{y}}) = (T \otimes \mathbb{I}_m) \cdot (\boldsymbol{r}_0, \ldots, \boldsymbol{r}_\ell) \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^{2m}$. *Denote the joint distribution of* $(\boldsymbol{y}, \bar{\boldsymbol{y}})$ *as* D. *Then,*

$$D \overset{\varepsilon'}{\approx} \mathscr{D}^{2m}_{(T\otimes\mathbb{I}_m)\Lambda^{\ell+1}+(\boldsymbol{S},\bar{\boldsymbol{S}}),\sqrt{\Sigma\otimes\mathbb{I}_m}} ,$$

where $\varepsilon' = \frac{2((1+\varepsilon)^\ell - 1)}{2-(1+\varepsilon)^\ell}$, $\Lambda^{\ell+1} := \{(\boldsymbol{x}_0, \ldots, \boldsymbol{x}_\ell) : \forall\, i \in [0..\ell], \boldsymbol{x}_i \in \Lambda\}$, *which is a* $(\ell+1)m$*-dimensional lattice over* $K_{\mathbb{R}}$, $(\boldsymbol{S}, \bar{\boldsymbol{S}}) = (T \otimes \mathbb{I}_m) \cdot (\boldsymbol{s}_0, \ldots, \boldsymbol{s}_\ell)$, *and* $\Sigma = \sigma_0^2 T T^\dagger \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^{2\times 2}$ *is positive definite.*

Moreover, denote D_1 *as the marginal distribution of* $\boldsymbol{y}$ *and* $D_{2|\boldsymbol{y}_0}$ *as the distribution of* $\bar{\boldsymbol{y}}$ *conditioning on* $\boldsymbol{y} = \boldsymbol{y}_0$ *for any* $\boldsymbol{y}_0 \in \Lambda + \boldsymbol{S}$, *and we have*

$$D_1 \overset{\varepsilon'}{\approx} \mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda+\boldsymbol{S},\sigma=\sqrt{\Sigma_{11}}} , \; D_{2|\boldsymbol{y}_0} \overset{\varepsilon'}{\approx} \mathscr{D}^m_{\mathcal{I}\otimes\Lambda+\boldsymbol{y}_0+\bar{\boldsymbol{S}}-\boldsymbol{S},\sigma=\sqrt{\frac{\Delta(\Sigma)}{\Sigma_{11}}},\frac{\Sigma_{12}}{\Sigma_{11}}\boldsymbol{y}_0} ,$$

where $\mathcal{I} \subseteq R$ *is the ideal generated by* $b_1 - \bar{b}_1, \ldots, b_\ell - \bar{b}_\ell$, Σ_{ij} *denotes the entry in the* i*-th row and* j*-th column of* Σ, *and* $\Delta(\Sigma)$ *denotes the determinant of* Σ. *(Here since the matrix* Σ *is positive definite,* Σ_{11} *and* $\Delta(\Sigma)$ *are in* $\mathbb{R}$.*)*

Proof. We first show the statement on the distribution D. Since the distribution of $(\boldsymbol{r}_0, \ldots, \boldsymbol{r}_\ell)$ is $\mathscr{D}^{(1+\ell)m}_{\Lambda^{\ell+1}+(\boldsymbol{s}_0,\ldots,\boldsymbol{s}_\ell),\sigma_0}$, by Lemma 11, we just need to show that $T \otimes \mathbb{I}_m$ has full-row-rank and $\ker(T \otimes \mathbb{I}_m)$ is a $\Lambda^{\ell+1}$-subspace with $\eta_{\varepsilon''}(\Lambda^{\ell+1} \cap \ker(T \otimes \mathbb{I}_m)) \leqslant \sigma_0$, where $\varepsilon'' = (1+\varepsilon)^\ell - 1$. Since $(b_1, \ldots, b_\ell) \neq (\bar{b}_1, \ldots, \bar{b}_\ell)$, $T \otimes \mathbb{I}_m$ has full-row-rank. Assuming $b_1 \neq \bar{b}_1$ w.l.o.g., we can find $\ell - 1$ $K_{\mathbb{R}}$-linearly independent vectors in $\ker(T)$ as follows. For $2 \leqslant j \leqslant \ell$, denote $\boldsymbol{v}_{j-1} = (b_j\bar{b}_1 - b_1\bar{b}_j, \bar{b}_j - b_j, 0, \ldots, 0, b_1 - \bar{b}_1, 0, \ldots, 0)$, where the $(j+1)$-th entry of $\boldsymbol{v}_j$ is set to $b_1 - \bar{b}_1$. It is clear that $\boldsymbol{v}_j \in \ker(T)$ and all the vectors are $K_{\mathbb{R}}$-linearly independent. Denote $\Lambda_0 = \mathcal{L}(\{\boldsymbol{v}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{v}_{\ell-1}\}) \subseteq K_{\mathbb{R}}^{\ell+1}$. Then, we have $\Lambda_0 \subseteq \ker(T)$. Also, since for any $\boldsymbol{x} \in \Lambda$ and $(t_0, \ldots, t_\ell) \in \Lambda_0$, $(t_0\boldsymbol{x}, \ldots, t_\ell\boldsymbol{x}) \in \Lambda^{\ell+1} \cap \ker(T \otimes \mathbb{I}_m)$, we have $\Lambda_0 \otimes \Lambda \subseteq \Lambda^{\ell+1} \cap \ker(T \otimes \mathbb{I}_m)$. Since Λ is a full-rank R-lattice, $\mathsf{Span}(\Lambda_0 \otimes \Lambda)$ is a $m(\ell-1)$-dimensional subspace of $K_{\mathbb{R}}^{m(\ell+1)}$. Since $\ker(T \otimes \mathbb{I}_m)$ is also a $m(\ell-1)$-dimensional subspace of $K_{\mathbb{R}}^{m(\ell+1)}$, we know $\mathsf{Span}(\Lambda_0 \otimes \Lambda) = \ker(T \otimes \mathbb{I}_m)$. Since $\mathsf{Span}(\Lambda_0 \otimes \Lambda) \subseteq \mathsf{Span}(\Lambda^{\ell+1} \cap \ker(T \otimes \mathbb{I}_m)) \subseteq \ker(T \otimes \mathbb{I}_m)$, $\mathsf{Span}(\Lambda^{\ell+1} \cap \ker(T \otimes \mathbb{I}_m)) = \ker(T \otimes \mathbb{I}_m)$, which means $\ker(T \otimes \mathbb{I}_m)$ is a $\Lambda^{\ell+1}$-subspace.

Since $\Lambda_0 \otimes \Lambda \subseteq \Lambda^{\ell+1} \cap \ker(T \otimes \mathbb{I}_m)$, $\eta_{\varepsilon''}(\Lambda^{\ell+1} \cap \ker(T \otimes \mathbb{I}_m)) \leqslant \eta_{\varepsilon''}(\Lambda_0 \otimes \Lambda)$. Therefore, we only need to show that $\eta_{\varepsilon''}(\Lambda_0 \otimes \Lambda) \leqslant \sigma_0$. Let $\tilde{\boldsymbol{v}}_i$ be the projection of $\boldsymbol{v}_i$ on the orthogonal space of $\{\boldsymbol{v}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{v}_{i-1}\}$ for $i \in [\ell-1]$, where in particular $\tilde{\boldsymbol{v}}_1 = \boldsymbol{v}_1$. Denote $\boldsymbol{v} \otimes \Lambda := \{\boldsymbol{v} \otimes \boldsymbol{x} : \boldsymbol{x} \in \Lambda\}$. For any two lattices $\Lambda_1, \Lambda_2 \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$, denote their direct sum as $\Lambda_1 + \Lambda_2 := \{\boldsymbol{x} + \boldsymbol{y} : \boldsymbol{x} \in \Lambda_1, \boldsymbol{y} \in \Lambda_2\}$. Also, we say Λ_1 is orthogonal to Λ_2 if and only if for any $\boldsymbol{x} \in \Lambda_1$ and $\boldsymbol{y} \in \Lambda_2$, $\boldsymbol{x}^\dagger \boldsymbol{y} = 0$. It is clear that $\tilde{\boldsymbol{v}}_i \otimes \Lambda$ is a lattice and $\tilde{\boldsymbol{v}}_1 \otimes \Lambda + \cdots + \tilde{\boldsymbol{v}}_{\ell-1} \otimes \Lambda = \Lambda_0 \otimes \Lambda$. Moreover, for any $i \neq j \in [\ell-1]$, since $\tilde{\boldsymbol{v}}_i$ is orthogonal to $\tilde{\boldsymbol{v}}_j$, it holds that for any $\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y} \in \Lambda$, $(\tilde{\boldsymbol{v}}_i \otimes \boldsymbol{x})^\dagger (\tilde{\boldsymbol{v}}_j \otimes \boldsymbol{y}) = \sum_{i' \in [\ell+1]} \tilde{v}^*_{i,i'} \tilde{v}_{j,i'} \boldsymbol{x}^\dagger \boldsymbol{y} = (\tilde{\boldsymbol{v}}_i^\dagger \tilde{\boldsymbol{v}}_j) \cdot (\boldsymbol{x}^\dagger \boldsymbol{y}) = 0$, which means $\tilde{\boldsymbol{v}}_i \otimes \Lambda$ is orthogonal to $\tilde{\boldsymbol{v}}_j \otimes \Lambda$. By applying the following lemma from [MP13] $\ell - 1$ times, we have $\eta_{\varepsilon''}(\Lambda_0 \otimes \Lambda) \leqslant \eta_{(1+\varepsilon)^{\ell-1}-1}(\Lambda_0 \otimes \Lambda) \leqslant \max_{i \in [\ell-1]} \eta_\varepsilon(\tilde{\boldsymbol{v}}_j \otimes \Lambda)$.

Lemma 13 (Lemma 2.6 [MP13] adapted to $K_{\mathbb{R}}$). *For any lattices* $\Lambda_1, \Lambda_2 \subseteq K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$ *that are orthogonal and any* $\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2 > 0$, *we have*

$$\eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda_1 + \Lambda_2) \leqslant \max\{\eta_{\varepsilon_1}(\Lambda_1), \eta_{\varepsilon_2}(\Lambda_2)\} ,$$

where $\varepsilon = (1+\varepsilon_1)(1+\varepsilon_2) - 1$.

For any $i \in [\ell-1]$, since $\|\boldsymbol{v}_i\| \leqslant 2\sqrt{3}$, we have $\eta_\varepsilon(\tilde{\boldsymbol{v}}_i \otimes \Lambda) \leqslant \|\tilde{\boldsymbol{v}}_i\| \cdot \eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda) \leqslant \|\boldsymbol{v}\| \cdot \eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda) \leqslant 2\sqrt{3} \cdot \eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda) \leqslant \sigma_0$, which implies $\eta_{\varepsilon''}(\Lambda_0 \otimes \Lambda) \leqslant \sigma_0$.

For the statement on D_1, denote $T_1 = (1, b_1, \ldots, b_\ell)$, which is the first row of T. Following a similar proof as the first part, we know $D_1 \overset{\varepsilon'}{\approx} \mathscr{D}^m_{(T_1 \otimes \mathbb{I}_m)\Lambda^{\ell+1} + \boldsymbol{S}, \sigma_0\sqrt{T_1 T_1^\dagger}}$, and we can show the statement since $(T_1 \otimes \mathbb{I}_m)\Lambda^{\ell+1} = \Lambda + b_1\Lambda + \cdots b_\ell\Lambda = \Lambda$ and $\sigma_0\sqrt{T_1 T_1^\dagger} = \sqrt{\Sigma_{11}}$.

For $D_{2|\boldsymbol{y}_0}$, we just need to show that assuming $(\boldsymbol{y}, \bar{\boldsymbol{y}})$ is sampled from $\mathscr{D}_{(T \otimes \mathbb{I}_m)\Lambda^{\ell+1} + (\boldsymbol{S}, \bar{\boldsymbol{S}}), \sqrt{\Sigma \otimes \mathbb{I}_m}}$, the distribution of $\bar{\boldsymbol{y}}$ conditioning on $\boldsymbol{y} = \boldsymbol{y}_0$ is identical to the target distribution for any $\boldsymbol{y}_0 \in \Lambda + \boldsymbol{S}$. It is clear that $\boldsymbol{y}$ is distributed over the lattice coset $C = \{\boldsymbol{x} : (\boldsymbol{y}_0, \boldsymbol{x}) \in (T \otimes \mathbb{I}_m)\Lambda^{\ell+1} + (\boldsymbol{S}, \bar{\boldsymbol{S}})\}$. We first show that $C = \mathcal{I} \otimes \Lambda + \boldsymbol{y}_0 + \bar{\boldsymbol{S}} - \boldsymbol{S}$. For any $\boldsymbol{x} \in C$, there exists $\boldsymbol{z}_0, \ldots, \boldsymbol{z}_\ell \in \Lambda$ such that $\boldsymbol{y}_0 = \boldsymbol{z}_0 + \boldsymbol{S} + \sum_{i \in [\ell]} b_i \boldsymbol{z}_i$ and $\boldsymbol{x} = \boldsymbol{z}_0 + \bar{\boldsymbol{S}} + \sum_{i \in [\ell]} \bar{b}_i \boldsymbol{z}_i$. Therefore, $\boldsymbol{x} = \boldsymbol{y}_0 + \bar{\boldsymbol{S}} - \boldsymbol{S} + \sum_{i \in [\ell]} (\bar{b}_i - b_i)\boldsymbol{z}_i \in \mathcal{I} \otimes \Lambda + \boldsymbol{y}_0 + \bar{\boldsymbol{S}} - \boldsymbol{S}$, which implies $C \subseteq \mathcal{I} \otimes \Lambda + \boldsymbol{y}_0 + \bar{\boldsymbol{S}} - \boldsymbol{S}$. Also, for any $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{I} \otimes \Lambda + \boldsymbol{y}_0 + \bar{\boldsymbol{S}} - \boldsymbol{S}$, we can represent $\boldsymbol{x} = \boldsymbol{y}_0 + \bar{\boldsymbol{S}} - \boldsymbol{S} + \sum_{i \in [\ell]} (\bar{b}_i - b_i) r_i \boldsymbol{z}_i$ for $r_i \in R$ and $\boldsymbol{z}_i \in \Lambda$. Let $\boldsymbol{z}_0 = \boldsymbol{y}_0 - \boldsymbol{S} - \sum_{i \in [\ell]} b_i r_i \boldsymbol{z}_i \in \Lambda$. Then, $(\boldsymbol{y}_0, \boldsymbol{x}) = (\boldsymbol{z}_0 + \boldsymbol{S} + \sum_{i \in [\ell]} b_i r_i \boldsymbol{z}_i, \boldsymbol{z}_0 + \bar{\boldsymbol{S}} + \sum_{i \in [\ell]} \bar{b}_i r_i \boldsymbol{z}_i) \in C$, which implies that $\mathcal{I} \otimes \Lambda + \boldsymbol{y}_0 + \bar{\boldsymbol{S}} - \boldsymbol{S} \subseteq C$ and thus the two lattice cosets are identical.

It is left to compute the probability of $\bar{\boldsymbol{y}}$ conditioning on $\boldsymbol{y} = \boldsymbol{y}_0$. Since $\Sigma^{-1} = \frac{1}{\Delta(\Sigma)} \begin{pmatrix} \Sigma_{22} & -\Sigma_{21} \\ -\Sigma_{12} & \Sigma_{11} \end{pmatrix}$ and $\Sigma_{12} = \Sigma_{21}^*$, the probability of $(\boldsymbol{y}, \bar{\boldsymbol{y}})$ is proportional to

$$\begin{aligned}
\rho_{\sqrt{\Sigma \otimes \mathbb{I}_m}}(\boldsymbol{y}, \bar{\boldsymbol{y}}) &= \exp\left(-\pi \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{y} \\ \bar{\boldsymbol{y}} \end{pmatrix}^\dagger (\Sigma^{-1} \otimes \mathbb{I}_m) \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{y} \\ \bar{\boldsymbol{y}} \end{pmatrix}\right) \\
&= \exp\left(-\frac{\pi}{\Delta(\Sigma)} \left(\Sigma_{22} \boldsymbol{y}^\dagger \boldsymbol{y} - \Sigma_{12} \bar{\boldsymbol{y}}^\dagger \boldsymbol{y} - \Sigma_{21} \boldsymbol{y}^\dagger \bar{\boldsymbol{y}} + \Sigma_{11} \bar{\boldsymbol{y}}^\dagger \bar{\boldsymbol{y}}\right)\right) \\
&= \exp\left(-\frac{\pi}{\Delta(\Sigma)} \left(\Sigma_{11} \left(\bar{\boldsymbol{y}} - \frac{\Sigma_{21}}{\Sigma_{11}} \boldsymbol{y}\right)^\dagger \left(\bar{\boldsymbol{y}} - \frac{\Sigma_{21}}{\Sigma_{11}} \boldsymbol{y}\right) + \left(\Sigma_{22} - \frac{\Sigma_{21}^* \Sigma_{21}}{\Sigma_{11}}\right) \boldsymbol{y}^\dagger \boldsymbol{y}\right)\right) .
\end{aligned}$$

Thus, the probability of $\bar{\boldsymbol{y}}$ conditioning on $\boldsymbol{y} = \boldsymbol{y}_0$ is proportional to $\exp\left(-\pi \frac{\Sigma_{11}}{\Delta\Sigma} \left\|\bar{\boldsymbol{y}} - \frac{\Sigma_{21}}{\Sigma_{11}} \boldsymbol{y}_0\right\|^2\right)$, which implies the statement. □

3 Linear Secret Sharing Schemes with Small Coefficients

In this section, we first define, in Section 3.1, the notion of linear threshold secret sharing schemes with small coefficients for an abelian group $\mathbb{G}$ (which for our use case $\mathbb{G} = R_q^m$ with its additions as the group operations) and discuss the properties required by our construction. Then, we consider a secret sharing scheme which satisfies the desired properties in Section 3.2 and discuss why other secret sharing schemes do not apply to our case in Section 3.3.

3.1 Definitions

We first give a brief explanation on the notations used in this section. We consider the group $\mathbb{G}$ as a $\mathbb{Z}$-module and adopt the additive notation with 0 as the neutral element. Additionally, for a vector $\boldsymbol{g} \in \mathbb{G}^K$ and a matrix $M \in \mathbb{Z}^{L \times K}$, $M\boldsymbol{g}$ denotes $(\sum_{j=1}^K M_{1,j} \cdot g_j, \ldots, \sum_{j=1}^K M_{L,j} \cdot g_j)^T \in \mathbb{G}^L$, and for $g \in \mathbb{G}$ and a vector $\boldsymbol{u} \in \mathbb{Z}^K$, $\boldsymbol{u} \cdot g$ denotes $(u_1 \cdot g, \ldots, u_K \cdot g)^T$. Now, we give the following definition for linear threshold secret sharing schemes with small coefficients.

Definition 2 (Linear Threshold Secret Sharing with Small Coefficients). *Let $1 < t \leqslant n, L$, and K be positive integers and $\mathbb{G}$ be an abelian group. A t-out-of-n linear threshold secret sharing scheme $\mathsf{SecSha}_{t,n}$ for $\mathbb{G}$ consists of two algorithms $(\mathsf{Share}, \mathsf{Recon})$ with the following syntax:*

- $\mathsf{Share}(s \in \mathbb{G}; \boldsymbol{\rho} \in \mathbb{G}^K) \Rightarrow (\mathsf{ss}_j)_{j\in[L]} \in \mathbb{G}^L$*: takes as input a secret $s \in \mathbb{G}$ and a randomness vector $\boldsymbol{\rho} \in \mathbb{G}^K$ (sampled uniformly from $\mathbb{G}^K$), and returns the secret shares $(\mathsf{ss}_j)_{j\in[L]}$. We note that each party $i \in [n]$ has a subset of indices $T_i \subseteq [L]$ such that the share of party i is $(\mathsf{ss}_j)_{j\in T_i}$. We say that the individual share size for the i-th share is $|T_i|$, the total share size is L, and the randomness size is K.*
- $\mathsf{Recon}(U, (\mathsf{ss}_j)_{j\in\bigcup_{i\in U} T_i}) \Rightarrow s \in \mathbb{G}$*: takes as input a set $U \subseteq [n]$ with $|U| \geqslant t$ and the secret shares corresponding to each party in U, and returns the reconstructed secret s.*

We require that $\mathsf{SecSha}_{t,n}$ satisfies the following properties:

- ***Linearity**: The sharing algorithm Share can be written as an integer matrix $M \in \mathbb{Z}^{L\times(K+1)}$ mapping a vector $\boldsymbol{v} = (s, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_K)^T \in \mathbb{G}^{K+1}$ to $M\boldsymbol{v} \in \mathbb{G}^L$. Moreover, for any $U \subseteq [n]$ denote M_U as the matrix M restricted to the rows indexed with $\bigcup_{i\in U} T_i$, the following is also true:*
  - *For $U \subseteq [n], |U| \geqslant t$, there exists a **reconstruction coefficient** vector $\boldsymbol{\lambda}^U \in \mathbb{Z}^L$ such that $\lambda^U_j = 0$ for $j \notin \bigcup_{i\in U} T_i$ and $(\boldsymbol{\lambda}^U)^T M = (1, 0, \ldots, 0)$. Then, the output of the reconstruction algorithm $\mathsf{Recon}(U, \cdot)$ on input $(\mathsf{ss}_j)_{j\in\bigcup_{i\in U} T_i}$ can be written as $\sum_{i\in U}\sum_{j\in T_i} \lambda^U_j \mathsf{ss}_j$. Hence, for $(\mathsf{ss}_j)_{j\in[L]} \leftarrow \mathsf{Share}(s; \boldsymbol{\rho})$ for any $s \in \mathbb{G}$ and $\boldsymbol{\rho} \in \mathbb{G}^K$, we have that $\sum_{i\in U}\sum_{j\in T_i} \lambda^U_j \mathsf{ss}_j = s$.*
  - *For any $U \subseteq [n]$ with $|U| < t$, there exists a vector $\boldsymbol{u} \in \mathbb{Z}^{K+1}$ such that $u_1 = 1$ and $M_U\boldsymbol{u} = \boldsymbol{0}$. We call such $\boldsymbol{u}$ the **sweeping vector** of M_U.*
- ***Small Coefficients**: For the sharing matrix M, its entries are bounded by B_M and the number of non-zero entries in each row is bounded by B_{row}. For any $U \subseteq [n]$ and $|U| \geqslant t$, the reconstruction coefficient vector λ^U has $\|\lambda^U\|_\infty \leqslant B_\lambda$. For any $U \subseteq [n]$ and $|U| < t$, there exists a sweeping vector $\boldsymbol{u}$ of M_U such that $\|\boldsymbol{u}\|_\infty \leqslant B_u$.*

We point out that our definition differs from prior works in that we did not define correctness and privacy properties (since we will not use them in the proofs of our construction), and instead give two properties: linearity and small coefficients. We note that the linearity property already implies correctness and privacy, as shown in prior works [KW93, Bei96, CF02] which related linear secret sharing schemes and span programs. In particular, the first bullet point of linearity implies correctness, while the second bullet point implies privacy.

The small coefficients property is required by the following lemma, which establishes a crucial property used in the security proof of our threshold signature. Notably, fixing two secret keys $\mathsf{sk}, \mathsf{sk}' \in R_q^m$ with bounded norms and a corrupted subset $U \subseteq [n]$ with $|U| < t$, one can construct a bijection $\Phi_{\mathsf{sk},\mathsf{sk}',U}$ between the set of the randomness used to generate the secret shares of sk and sk' such that: the secret shares given to the corrupted parties is unchanged (item (1)), and the distance between the reconstructed shares for any party is bounded (item (2)).

Lemma 14. *Let $(\mathsf{Share}, \mathsf{Recon})$ be a t-out-of-n linear threshold secret sharing with small coefficients for $\mathbb{G} = R_q^m$. In particular, let $M \in \mathbb{Z}^{L\times(K+1)}$ be the sharing matrix, and $B_M, B_{\mathsf{row}}, B_\lambda, B_u$ be the bounds for the small coefficients property. Fix any $U \subseteq [n]$ with $|U| < t$, a matrix $A \in R_q^{k\times m}$ and any $\mathsf{sk}, \mathsf{sk}' \in R_q^m$ such that $A\mathsf{sk} = A\mathsf{sk}'$ and $\|\mathsf{sk}\|_\infty, \|\mathsf{sk}'\|_\infty \leqslant \sigma_{\mathsf{sk}}$. Then, there exists a bijection $\Phi_{\mathsf{sk},\mathsf{sk}',U} : (R_q^m)^K \to (R_q^m)^K$, such that for any $\boldsymbol{\rho} \in (R_q^m)^K$ and $\boldsymbol{\rho}' = \Phi_{\mathsf{sk},\mathsf{sk}',U}(\boldsymbol{\rho})$, the secret shares $(\mathsf{ss}_j)_{j\in[L]} \leftarrow \mathsf{Share}(\mathsf{sk}; \boldsymbol{\rho})$ and $(\mathsf{ss}_j)_{j\in[L]} \leftarrow \mathsf{Share}(\mathsf{sk}'; \boldsymbol{\rho}')$ satisfy:*

(1) $(\mathsf{ss}_j)_{j\in\bigcup_{i\in U} T_i} = (\mathsf{ss}'_j)_{j\in\bigcup_{i\in U} T_i}$

(2) *For any* $S \subseteq [n]$ *with* $|S| \geqslant t$, *let* $\boldsymbol{\lambda}^S \in \mathbb{Z}^L$ *be the reconstruction coefficients for* $\mathsf{Recon}(S,\cdot)$. *Also, for* $i \in S$, *define* $\boldsymbol{v}_i = \sum_{j\in T_i} \lambda_j^S \mathsf{ss}_j$ *and* $\boldsymbol{v}'_i = \sum_{j\in T_i} \lambda_j^S \mathsf{ss}'_j$, *we have that* $A\boldsymbol{v}_i = A\boldsymbol{v}'_i$, *and*

$$\left\|\boldsymbol{v}_i - \boldsymbol{v}'_i\right\|_\infty \leqslant B_{\mathsf{ss}}\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}} \ ,$$

where $B_{\mathsf{ss}} = 2|T_i|B_M B_{\mathsf{row}} B_u B_\lambda$.

Proof. Let $\boldsymbol{u} \in \mathbb{Z}^{K+1}$ be the sweeping vector for M_U. Consider the map $\Phi_{\mathsf{sk},\mathsf{sk}',U}$ defined as $\Phi_{\mathsf{sk},\mathsf{sk}',U}(\boldsymbol{\rho}) = \boldsymbol{\rho} + (u_2,\ldots,u_{K+1})^T \cdot (\mathsf{sk}' - \mathsf{sk})$, which we can see is a bijection on $(R_q^m)^K$ as it only shifts $\boldsymbol{\rho}$ by some fixed amount. Now, fix a $\boldsymbol{\rho} \in (R_q^m)^K$ and $\boldsymbol{\rho}' = \Phi_{\mathsf{sk},\mathsf{sk}',U}(\boldsymbol{\rho}) = \boldsymbol{\rho} + (u_2,\ldots,u_{K+1})^T \cdot (\mathsf{sk}' - \mathsf{sk})$. Then, consider the secret shares generated using these two randomness. For any $j \in [L]$, denote M_j as the j-th row of M, then

$$\begin{aligned}\mathsf{ss}'_j - \mathsf{ss}_j &= M_j(\mathsf{sk}', \boldsymbol{\rho}'^T)^T - M_j(\mathsf{sk}, \boldsymbol{\rho}^T)^T \\ &= M_j(\mathsf{sk}' - \mathsf{sk}, u_2 \cdot (\mathsf{sk}' - \mathsf{sk}), \ldots, u_{K+1} \cdot (\mathsf{sk}' - \mathsf{sk}))^T = (M_j\boldsymbol{u}) \cdot (\mathsf{sk}' - \mathsf{sk}) \ .\end{aligned}$$

Then, since $M_U\boldsymbol{u} = \boldsymbol{0}$, we have that (1) is true as follows

$$(\mathsf{ss}'_j)_{j\in\bigcup_{i\in U} T_i} = (\mathsf{ss}_j)_{j\in\bigcup_{i\in U} T_i} + (M_U\boldsymbol{u}) \cdot (\mathsf{sk}' - \mathsf{sk}) = (\mathsf{ss}_j)_{j\in\bigcup_{i\in U} T_i} \ .$$

To show (2), for $i \in [n]$, consider $\boldsymbol{v}_i$ and $\boldsymbol{v}'_i$ as defined in the lemma statement. Then,

$$\boldsymbol{v}'_i - \boldsymbol{v}_i = \sum_{j\in T_i} \lambda_j^S(\mathsf{ss}'_j - \mathsf{ss}_j) = \sum_{j\in T_i} \lambda_j^S (M_j\boldsymbol{u}) \cdot (\mathsf{sk}' - \mathsf{sk})$$

Since $\sum_{j\in T_i} \lambda_j^S (M_j\boldsymbol{u}) \in \mathbb{Z}$, we have that $A\boldsymbol{v}'_i - A\boldsymbol{v}_i = \left(\sum_{j\in T_i} \lambda_j^S (M_j\boldsymbol{u})\right) \cdot (A\mathsf{sk}' - A\mathsf{sk}) = \boldsymbol{0} \in R_q^k$, so $A\boldsymbol{v}'_i = A\boldsymbol{v}_i$. Moreover, we have that

$$\left\|\boldsymbol{v}_i - \boldsymbol{v}'_i\right\|_\infty \leqslant \left\|\sum_{j\in T_i} \lambda_j^S (M_j\boldsymbol{u})(\mathsf{sk}' - \mathsf{sk})\right\|_\infty \leqslant B_{\mathsf{ss}}\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}} \ ,$$

with $B_{\mathsf{ss}} = 2|T_i|B_M B_{\mathsf{row}} B_u B_\lambda$. □

3.2 Instantiation

One secret sharing scheme satisfying Definition 2 is the general construction from Benaloh and Leichter [BL90] which derives a linear secret sharing scheme for any monotone access structure (i.e., for any set S of parties that can recover the secret, any set that contains S can also recover the secret) from a monotone Boolean formula (i.e., a Boolean circuit with only AND and OR gates of fan-in 2 and fan-out 1, but the input wires may have multiple fan-out) f computing such access structure. Damgård and Thorbek [DT06] pointed out that Benaloh-Leichter secret sharing satisfies the following properties:

(1) Both the number of randomness K and total share size L is at most the size of the formula f.
(2) The sharing matrix M has binary entries, and the number of 1's in each row is at most the depth of f.

(3) The reconstruction coefficients are in $\{-1, 0, 1\}$.
(4) For any $U \subseteq [n]$ with $|U| < t$, the sweeping vector $\boldsymbol{u}$ of M_U has entries in $\{-1, 0, 1\}$.

Regarding the formula computing threshold access structure, a seminal work by Valiant [Val84] gave a probabilistic construction of a monotone formula for majority function ($(n/2, n)$-threshold function) of size $O(n^{5.3})$ and depth $5.3 \log n + O(1)$. Then, Boppana [Bop85] generalized this result to a monotone formula for (t, n)-threshold function of size $O(t'^{4.3} n (\log \frac{en}{t'})^2)$ and depth $\log n + 4.3 \log t' + 2 \log\log \frac{en}{t'} + O(1)$ where $t' = \min(t, n - t)$. Hoory, Magen, and Pitassi [HMP06] improved this to a monotone *circuit* of size $O(t'^2 n \log n)$ and depth $O(\log n)$. However, as pointed out in [BS23], this construction is not a formula (namely, the gates in this circuit have multiple fan-out), so it does not imply a linear secret sharing scheme. Also, it is worth noting that these are probabilistic constructions with success probability $1/2$ of realizing the majority/threshold functions. Still for small n (e.g., $n = 5, 32$ as we considered in this work), we can exhaustively check whether a constructed formula correctly computes the threshold function on all inputs.

The following lemma then formalizes the existence of a secret sharing scheme constructed by applying Benaloh and Leichter's construction to Boppana's monotone formula for threshold function.

Lemma 15. *There exists a t-out-of-n linear threshold secret sharing with small coefficients with total share size $L = O(t'^{4.3} n (\log \frac{en}{t'})^2)$ making the individual share size $|T_i| \leqslant O(t'^{4.3} n (\log \frac{en}{t'})^2)$ for $t' = \min(t, n - t)$ and the small coefficient bounds*

$$B_M = B_\lambda = B_u = 1 \text{ and } B_{\mathsf{row}} = \log n + 4.3 \log t' + 2 \log\log \frac{en}{t'} + O(1) ,$$

which result in the bound B_{ss} from Lemma 14 of $B_{\mathsf{ss}} = O(t'^{4.3} n (\log \frac{en}{t'})^2 \log n)$.

3.3 Discussion on other secret sharing schemes

We also consider whether other secret sharing schemes, such as Shamir's secret sharing [Sha79] and a recent ramp/near-threshold secret sharing scheme [ANP23], apply to our use case. Below, we discuss the issues of these schemes, which mainly are caused by the size of entries in the sweeping vector. Note that since R_q^m is a $\mathbb{Z}_q$-module, we can consider the entries of the sharing matrix, the reconstruction coefficients, and the sweeping vector in $\mathbb{Z}_q$ instead.

Shamir's secret sharing: One can view the sharing algorithm of Shamir's secret sharing scheme for the t-out-of-n case as a matrix M of the form

$$M = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \dots & 1^{t-1} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 1 & \dots & n^{t-1} \end{pmatrix}$$

The reconstruction coefficients for a subset S with $|S| \geqslant t$ and a party $i \in S$ is $\lambda_i^S = \prod_{i' \in S \setminus \{i\}} i'(i' - i)^{-1}$ which can be arbitrarily large in $\mathbb{Z}_q$, since each $(i' - i)^{-1}$ is not guaranteed to be bounded.

For the sweeping vector, we first fix a subset $U \subseteq [n]$ where $|U| < t$ and consider a vector $\boldsymbol{u}'$ which corresponds to the coefficients of the polynomial $\prod_{i \in U}(x - i)$. This results in $M_U \boldsymbol{u}' = \boldsymbol{0}$ as it corresponds to evaluating the polynomial at each $i \in U$. Then, we have a sweeping vector of M_U defined as $\boldsymbol{u} = (-1)^{|U|} \prod_{i \in U} i^{-1} \boldsymbol{u}' \mod q$ where $u_1 = 1$. However, similar problems occur as with the reconstruction coefficients, since $\prod_{i \in U} i^{-1}$ can be large in $\mathbb{Z}_q$.

Applebaum, Nir, and Pinkas [ANP23] give a ramp/near-threshold black-box secret sharing scheme where a set of at least $t_c n$ parties is guaranteed to recover a secret, while privacy is guaranteed for any set of less than $t_p n$ parties with $0 < t_p < t_c < 1$. Their secret sharing scheme has the sharing matrix M of the form

$$M = \begin{pmatrix} 0^{L-1} & G \\ 1 & \boldsymbol{a}^T \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{Z}^{L \times (K+1)}$$

where $L, K = O(n)$, $G \in \mathbb{Z}^{(L-1)\times K}$ is a matrix with binary entries and each entry of $\boldsymbol{a} \in \mathbb{Z}^K$ is bounded by some constant c. We also remark that the share corresponding to the last row of M is public in their scheme. Their reconstruction can be modeled as a $O(n)$-size addition circuit, which in the worst case, can result in reconstruction coefficients of size $2^{O(n)}$. However, they claimed that their additive reconstruction circuit has depth $O(\log n)$ and size $O(n)$, translating to a bound of $\mathsf{poly}(n)$ on the reconstruction coefficients.

For the sweeping vector, fixing a subset $U \subseteq [n]$ where $|U| < t_p n$ and letting M_U and G_U denote the rows of the matrices M and G of which the shares are known to U, they showed that there exists a vector $\boldsymbol{u}' \in \mathbb{Z}^K$ with each entry bounded by some constant b where $G_U \boldsymbol{u}' = \boldsymbol{0}$ and $v = \boldsymbol{a}^T \cdot \boldsymbol{u}' \neq 0 \mod q$ for any prime $q > 2bcK$ (see Claim 4.1 of [ANP23]). This gives us a vector $(-v, \boldsymbol{u}'^T)^T$ with $|v| \leqslant bcK$ such that $M_U(-v, \boldsymbol{u}'^T)^T = 0$. However, since v is not necessarily 1, we only get a sweeping vector $\boldsymbol{u} = v^{-1}(v, -\boldsymbol{u}'^T)^T \mod q$ of which the entries are not guaranteed to be bounded, because v^{-1} can be large in $\mathbb{Z}_q$.

Remark. Recall that for our use case, we want the secret sharing scheme to satisfy the properties in Lemma 14. In particular, we want the distance between the reconstructed shares $\boldsymbol{v}_i \in R_q^m$ and $\boldsymbol{v}'_i \in R_q^m$ for a party $i \in S$, for $S \subseteq [n]$ and $|S| \geqslant t$, with respect to two secret keys sk and sk' to be small. From the proof of Lemma 14, we showed that $\boldsymbol{v}'_i - \boldsymbol{v}_i = \sum_{j \in T_i} \lambda_j^S (M_j \boldsymbol{u}) \cdot (\mathsf{sk}' - \mathsf{sk})$, so one can accommodate the division by scaling the secret keys by the division factor in both λ_j^S and $\boldsymbol{u}$. Note however that the scaling needs to accommodate for every factor as we want to ensure that the lemma is true for any corrupted set $U \subseteq [n]$ and $|U| < t$. We can then consider the magnitude of scaling for each of the schemes above. For Shamir's secret sharing, this means scaling up the secret by $(n!)^3$ to accommodate both the terms $\prod_{i' \in S \setminus \{i\}} (i' - i)^{-1}$ in the reconstruction coefficients and $\prod_{i \in U} i^{-1}$ in the sweeping vector. For the scheme from [ANP23], we need to ensure that division by any integer v with $|v| \leqslant bcK = O(n)$ is accounted for. Thus, the scaling would be the least common multiple of $(1, \ldots, bcK)$ which can be estimated as $2^{O(n)}$.[2]

4 Threshold Signatures

In this section, we first give formal syntax and security definitions for threshold signatures, then present our construction and the security analysis, and finally discuss the concrete parameters and efficiency.

4.1 Syntax and security

We use the formalization proposed by Bellare et al. [BCK+22], which is also used in [TZ23].

[2] The natural logarithm of $LCM(1, \ldots, x)$ is the second Chebyshev's function which is bounded by $1.03883x$ [RS62].



Fig. 2. The TS-COR game for a threshold signature scheme TS with threshold t.

SYNTAX. A (partially) non-interactive threshold signature schemes for n signers and threshold t is a tuple of efficient (randomized) algorithms $\mathsf{TS} = (\mathsf{Setup}, \mathsf{KeyGen}, \mathsf{SPP}, \mathsf{LPP}, \mathsf{LR}, \mathsf{PS}, \mathsf{Agg}, \mathsf{Vf})$ that behave as follows. Signers involved are a leader and n signers. In real-world scenarios, the leader can be one of the signers. The setup algorithm $\mathsf{Setup}(1^\kappa)$ initializes the state st_i for each signer $i \in [n]$ and st_0 for the leader and returns a system parameter par. We assume par is given to all other algorithms implicitly. The key generation algorithm $\mathsf{KeyGen}()$ returns a public verification key pk, and a secret key sk_i for each signer i.

The signing protocol consists of two rounds: a message-independent offline round and an online signing round. In the offline round, any signer i can run $\mathsf{SPP}(\mathsf{st}_i)$ to generate a pre-processing token pp, which is sent to the leader, and the leader runs $\mathsf{LPP}(i, pp, \mathsf{st}_0)$ to update its state st_0 to incorporate token pp. In the online round, for any signer set $SS \subseteq [n]$ with size t and message $\mu \in \{0,1\}^*$, the leader runs $\mathsf{LR}(\mu, SS, \mathsf{st}_0)$ to generate a leader request lr with $lr.\mathsf{msg} = \mu$ and $lr.\mathsf{SS} = SS$ and sends lr to each signer $i \in SS$. Then, each signer i runs $\mathsf{PS}(lr, i, \mathsf{st}_i)$ to generate its partial signature $psig_i$. Finally, the leader computes a signature sig for μ by running $\mathsf{Agg}(\{psig_i\}_{i\in SS})$. In summary, the signing protocol between signers in SS and the leader to sign a message $\mu \in \{0,1\}^*$ is represented by the following experiment:

$$\begin{aligned}
&(pp_i, \mathsf{st}_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SPP}(\mathsf{st}_i)\ ,\ \mathsf{st}_0 \leftarrow \mathsf{LPP}(i, pp_i, \mathsf{st}_0)\ ,\ \text{for each } i \in SS\ ,\\
&(lr, \mathsf{st}_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{LR}(\mu, SS, \mathsf{st}_0)\ ,\\
&(psig_i, \mathsf{st}_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{PS}(lr, i, \mathsf{st}_i)\ ,\ \text{for each } i \in SS\ ,\\
&sig \leftarrow \mathsf{Agg}(\{psig_i\}_{i\in SS})\ .
\end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

The (deterministic) verification algorithm $\mathsf{Vf}(\mathsf{pk}, \mu, sig)$ outputs a bit that indicates whether sig is valid for (pk, μ). We say that TS is *correct* with correctness error δ if for any adversary $\mathcal{A}$ for the game TS-COR (defined in Figure 2), we have $\mathsf{Pr}[\text{TS-COR}^{\mathcal{A}}_{\mathsf{TS}}(\kappa) = 1] \leqslant \delta$.

SECURITY. A hierarchy for security notions of threshold signatures is proposed in [BCK+22]. In this paper, we consider TS-UF-0, which guarantees that an adversary can generate a valid signature sig for μ only if it receives partial signatures from at least one honest signer for μ. We also note that the same security notion is also used in all the prior lattice-based works, such as [GKS23, dPKM+24].



Fig. 3. The TS-UF-0 game for a threshold signature scheme TS.

Formally, the TS-UF-0 game is defined in Figure 3, where TS.HF denotes the space of the hash functions used in TS from which the random oracle is drawn. The advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ for the TS-UF-0 game is defined as $\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{ts-uf-0}}_{\mathsf{TS}}(\mathcal{A}, \kappa) := \Pr\left[\text{TS-UF-0}^{\mathcal{A}}_{\mathsf{TS}}(\kappa) = 1\right]$.

4.2 Construction

Our threshold signature scheme TSL[SecSha] is shown in Figure 4, where SecSha is a linear secret sharing scheme with small coefficients (see Definition 2). Each T_i and $\lambda_j^{lr.SS}$ are defined by the scheme SecSha. In particular, the secret key $\mathsf{sk} \in R_q^m$ is shared into L secret shares $\{\mathsf{ss}_j\}_{j\in[L]}$, and for each party $i \in [n]$, its secret key share is $\{\mathsf{ss}_j\}_{j\in T_i}$. For a signer set SS where $|SS| \geqslant t$, by the linearity property of SecSha, the secret key can be reconstructed as $\mathsf{sk} \leftarrow \sum_{i\in SS}\sum_{j\in T_i}\lambda_j^{SS}\mathsf{ss}_j$. For the signing protocol, in the offline round, each signer generates $\ell+1$ nonces $\{\boldsymbol{R}_j\}_{j\in[0..\ell]}$ as a pre-processing token, where $\boldsymbol{R}_j \leftarrow A\boldsymbol{r}_j$ for a uniformly sampled $A \in R_q^{k\times m}$ generated during the setup phase and $\boldsymbol{r}_j$ sampled from the discrete Gaussian distribution $\mathscr{D}^m_{\sigma_\mathsf{r}}$. In the online round, given a leader request lr, each signer computes an aggregated nonce $\boldsymbol{R}$ from a list of tokens generated by signers in $lr.SS$ using coefficients $\{b_j \in R\}_{j\in[\ell]}$ output from a hash function H_1 and computes a challenge $c \in R$ from another hash function H_2 as described in the algorithm CompPar. Each signer then returns its partial signature $(\boldsymbol{R}, \boldsymbol{z})$. It is worth noting that we put $\boldsymbol{R}$ in partial signatures for the simplicity of presenting our protocol. In actual implementations, each signer only needs to send back $\boldsymbol{z}$ since the leader can compute $\boldsymbol{R}$ from lr by itself.

PARAMETERS. In Figure 5, we give the description of the parameters used in the protocol. We set ℓ and σ_c such that the sizes of $\mathcal{S}^\ell_\mathsf{b}$ and $\mathcal{S}_\mathsf{c}$ are at least $2^{2\kappa}$. We set m according to Lemma 18 such that except for a negligible probability, for a secret key uniformly sampled from $\mathscr{B}^m_{\sigma_\mathsf{sk}}$, there exists another secret key in $\mathscr{B}^m_{\sigma_\mathsf{sk}}$ such that their corresponding public keys are the same. We set σ_z according to the correctness proof and σ_r according to the unforgeability proof.

CORRECTNESS AND UNFORGEABILITY. The following theorems establish the correctness and unforgeability of TSL. The correctness of the scheme is proved in Section 4.4, while we show TS-UF-0 under the MSIS assumption in the random oracle model below.

Theorem 1 (Correctness of TSL). *The threshold signature scheme* TSL *is correct with correctness error* $\delta = (2 + 4t(\ell+1)) \cdot 2^{-2\kappa}$.

$\underline{\mathsf{Setup}(1^\kappa):}$
$A \leftarrow\!\!\$\ R_q^{k\times m}$
$par \leftarrow\!\!\$\ A$
For $i \in [n]$ do
  $\mathsf{st}_0.\mathrm{curPP}_i \leftarrow \varnothing$
  $\mathsf{st}_i.\mathrm{mapPP} \leftarrow ()$
Return par

$\underline{\mathsf{KeyGen}():}$
$\mathsf{sk} \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathscr{B}^m_{\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}}}$
$\mathsf{pk} \leftarrow A\mathsf{sk} \bmod q$
$\{\mathsf{ss}_j\}_{j\in[L]} \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathsf{SecSha.Share}(\mathsf{sk})$
For $i \in [n]$ do
  $\mathsf{sk}_i \leftarrow \{\mathsf{ss}_j\}_{j\in T_i}$
Return $(\mathsf{pk}, \{\mathsf{sk}_i\}_{i\in[n]})$

$\underline{\mathsf{SPP}(\mathsf{st}_i):}$
For $j \in [0..\ell]$ do $\boldsymbol{r}_j \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathscr{D}^m_{\sigma_r}$
For $j \in [0..\ell]$ do $\boldsymbol{R}_j \leftarrow A\boldsymbol{r}_j \bmod q$
$pp \leftarrow \{\boldsymbol{R}_j\}_{j\in[0..\ell]}$
$\mathsf{st}_i.\mathrm{mapPP}(pp) \leftarrow \{\boldsymbol{r}_j\}_{j\in[0..\ell]}$
Return (pp, st_i)

$\underline{\mathsf{LPP}(i, pp, \mathsf{st}_0):}$
$\mathsf{st}_0.\mathrm{curPP}_i \leftarrow \mathsf{st}_0.\mathrm{curPP}_i \cup \{pp\}$
Return st_0

$\underline{\mathsf{LR}(\mu, SS, \mathsf{st}_0):}$
If $\exists\, i \in SS : \mathsf{st}_0.\mathrm{curPP}_i = \varnothing$ then
  Return $\perp$
$lr.\mathsf{msg} \leftarrow \mu$; $lr.\mathsf{SS} \leftarrow SS$
For $i \in SS$ do
  Pick pp_i from $\mathsf{st}_0.\mathrm{curPP}_i$
  $lr.\mathsf{PP}(i) \leftarrow pp_i$
  $\mathsf{st}_0.\mathrm{curPP}_i \leftarrow \mathsf{st}_0.\mathrm{curPP}_i \backslash \{pp_i\}$
Return (lr, st_0)

$\underline{\mathsf{CompPar}(\mathsf{pk}, lr):}$
$\mu \leftarrow lr.\mathsf{msg}$
For $i \in lr.\mathsf{SS}$ do
  $\{b_j\}_{j\in[\ell]} \leftarrow \mathrm{H}_1(\mathsf{pk}, lr)$
  $\{\boldsymbol{R}_{i,j}\}_{j\in[0..\ell]} \leftarrow lr.\mathsf{PP}(i)$
$\boldsymbol{R} \leftarrow \sum_{i\in lr.\mathsf{SS}} \left(\boldsymbol{R}_{i,0} + \sum_{j\in[\ell]} b_j \boldsymbol{R}_{i,j}\right)$
$c \leftarrow \mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, \mu, \boldsymbol{R})$
Return $(\boldsymbol{R}, c, \{b_j\}_{j\in[\ell]})$

$\underline{\mathsf{PS}(lr, i, \mathsf{st}_i):}$
$pp_i \leftarrow lr.\mathsf{PP}(i)$
If $\mathsf{st}_i.\mathrm{mapPP}(pp_i) = \perp$ then
  Return $(\perp, \mathsf{st}_i)$
$\{\boldsymbol{r}_j\}_{j\in[0..\ell]} \leftarrow \mathsf{st}_i.\mathrm{mapPP}(pp_i)$
$\mathsf{st}_i.\mathrm{mapPP}(pp_i) \leftarrow \perp$
$(\boldsymbol{R}, c, \{b_j\}_{j\in[\ell])}) \leftarrow \mathsf{CompPar}(\mathsf{st}_i.\mathsf{pk}, lr)$
$\{\mathsf{ss}_j\}_{j\in T_i} \leftarrow \mathsf{st}_i.\mathsf{sk}$
$\boldsymbol{z} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{r}_0 + \sum_{j\in[\ell]} b_j \cdot \boldsymbol{r}_j$
  $+ 2c \cdot \sum_{j\in T_i} \lambda_j^{lr.\mathsf{SS}} \mathsf{ss}_j \bmod q$
Return $((\boldsymbol{R}, \boldsymbol{z}), \mathsf{st}_i)$

$\underline{\mathsf{Agg}(\mathrm{PS}, \mathsf{st}_0):}$
$\boldsymbol{R} \leftarrow \perp$; $\boldsymbol{z} \leftarrow 0$
For $(\boldsymbol{R}', \boldsymbol{z}') \in \mathrm{PS}$ do
  If $\boldsymbol{R} = \perp$ then $\boldsymbol{R} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{R}'$
  If $\boldsymbol{R} \neq \boldsymbol{R}'$ then return $(\perp, \mathsf{st}_0)$
  $\boldsymbol{z} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{z} + \boldsymbol{z}'$
Return $((\boldsymbol{R}, \boldsymbol{z}), \mathsf{st}_0)$

$\underline{\mathsf{Vf}(\mathsf{pk}, \mu, sig):}$
$(\boldsymbol{R}, \boldsymbol{z}) \leftarrow sig$
If $\|\boldsymbol{z}\| > \sigma_{\mathsf{z}}$ then
  Return 0
$c \leftarrow \mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, \mu, \boldsymbol{R})$
Return $(A\boldsymbol{z} = \boldsymbol{R} + 2c \cdot \mathsf{pk} \bmod q)$

Fig. 4. Lattice-based t-out-of-n threshold signatures $\mathsf{TSL}[\mathsf{SecSha}]$, where SecSha is a linear secret sharing scheme with small coefficients (see Definition 2). Here, $\mathrm{H}_1 : \{0,1\}^* \to \mathcal{S}_{\mathrm{b}}^{\ell}$ and $\mathrm{H}_2 : \{0,1\}^* \to \mathcal{S}_{\mathrm{c}}$. Also, T_i denotes the set of shares of party i and $\lambda_j^{lr.\mathsf{SS}}$ denotes the reconstruction coefficient. Also, we remark that, as stated earlier, the system parameter par is implicitly given to all algorithms except Setup.

Theorem 2 (TS-UF-0 **of** TSL). *For any integers $q = q(\kappa), k = k(\kappa), m = m(\kappa)$ and any* TS-UF-0 *adversary $\mathcal{A}$ making at most $\mathsf{q}_s = \mathsf{q}_s(\kappa)$ queries to* PPO *and $\mathsf{q}_h = \mathsf{q}_h(\kappa)$ queries to* RO*, there exists an* MSIS *adversary $\mathcal{B}$ running in time roughly two times that of $\mathcal{A}$ such that, for any $\alpha \geqslant 2$,*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{ts-uf-0}}_{\mathsf{TSL}}(\mathcal{A}, \kappa) \leqslant \sqrt{\mathsf{q}\left(2\alpha\delta_\alpha \mathsf{Adv}^{\text{msis}}_{q,k,m,\beta}(\mathcal{B}, \kappa)\right)^{1-\frac{1}{\alpha}} + \mathsf{q}(2 + 8\mathsf{q}^2)2^{-2\kappa}}\ .$$

where $\mathsf{q} = \mathsf{q}_h + \mathsf{q}_s + 1$, $\beta = 2\sigma_{\mathsf{z}} + 4\sqrt{mN}\sigma_{\mathsf{c}}\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}}$, and $\delta_\alpha = (1 + 160\ell\mathsf{q} \cdot 2^{-2\kappa}) \cdot e^{\alpha}$.

To prove the above theorem, we use the following variant of the forking lemma from [BTZ22], which is proved in Appendix B. The only difference is that here each h_i might be sampled inde-

Parameter	Description
κ	The security parameter
n	Number of parties
t	Threshold for signing
L	Total size of the secret shares
$N \geqslant 2\kappa$	A power of two defining the degree of $f(X)$
$f(X) = X^N + 1$	The $2N$-th cyclotomic polynomial
q	Prime modulus
$R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(f(X))$	Cyclotomic Ring
$R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(f(X))$	Ring
σ_{sk}	The maximum ℓ_∞-norm of the secret key sk
k	The number of rows of A
$m = (2\kappa/N + k\log q)/\log(2\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}})$	The number of columns of A
$\ell + 1 = 2\kappa/\log(2N) + 1$	The number of nonces for each signer
$e_i = X^i \in R$	
$\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{b}} = \{\pm e_0, \ldots, \pm e_{N-1}\}$	The set for the aggregating coefficients b_j
σ_{c} chosen such that $2^{\sigma_{\mathsf{c}}}\binom{N}{\sigma_{\mathsf{c}}} \geqslant 2^{2\kappa}$	The ℓ_1-norm of the challenge c
$\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{c}} = \{c \in R : \|c\|_\infty = 1, \|c\|_1 \leqslant \sigma_{\mathsf{c}}\}$	The set of the challenges c
$\mathscr{B}_{\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}}} = \{s \in R : \|s\|_\infty \leqslant \sigma_{\mathsf{sk}}\}$	The set of elements with bounded ℓ_∞-norm
B_{ss}	The ℓ_∞-norm bound of SecSha according to Lemma 14
$\sigma_{\mathsf{r}} = \max\{\sqrt{32\pi\mathsf{q}_s mN}\sigma_{\mathsf{c}} B_{\mathsf{ss}}\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}}, \frac{16\sqrt{3}}{\sqrt{\pi}} q^{\frac{k}{m}}\sqrt{N(\log(2mN)+2\kappa)}\}$	The standard deviation of the preimages $\boldsymbol{r}_{i,j}$ for $j \in [0..\ell]$
$\sigma_{\mathsf{z}} = \sqrt{mN}(\sqrt{t(\ell+1)}\sigma_{\mathsf{r}} + 2\sigma_{\mathsf{c}}\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}})$	The maximum ℓ_2-norm for the aggregated $\boldsymbol{z}$

Fig. 5. Table showing the parameters for the scheme TSL.

pendently from a different distribution. We require it in our proof since the ranges of H_1 and H_2 are different.

Lemma 16. *Let $q \geqslant 1$ be an integer, $S \subseteq [1..q]$ be a set, and HG be an algorithm that outputs $h_1, \ldots, h_q$ where each h_i is independently sampled. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a randomized algorithm that on input $x, h_1, \ldots, h_q$ outputs a pair (I, Out), where $I \in \{\perp\} \cup S$ and Out is a side output. Let IG be a randomized algorithm that generates x. The accepting probability of $\mathcal{A}$ is defined as*

$$\mathrm{acc}(\mathcal{A}) = \mathsf{Pr}_{x \leftarrow\$ \mathsf{IG}, h_1, \ldots, h_q \leftarrow\$ \mathsf{HG}}[(I, \mathrm{Out}) \leftarrow\$ \mathcal{A}(x, h_1, \ldots, h_q) \ : \ I \neq \perp] \ .$$

Consider algorithm $\mathsf{Fork}^{\mathcal{A}}$ described in Figure 6. The accepting probability of $\mathsf{Fork}^{\mathcal{A}}$ is defined as

$$\mathrm{acc}(\mathsf{Fork}^{\mathcal{A}}) = \mathsf{Pr}_{x \leftarrow\$ \mathsf{IG}}[\alpha \leftarrow\$ \mathsf{Fork}^{\mathcal{A}}(x) \ : \ \alpha \neq \perp] \ .$$

Then, $\mathrm{acc}(\mathsf{Fork}^{\mathcal{A}}) \geqslant \mathrm{acc}(\mathcal{A})^2/|S|$.

Proof (of Theorem 2). Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a TS-UF-0 adversary described in the theorem. W.l.o.g. we assume that $\mathcal{A}$ is deterministic and corrupts exactly $t-1$ signers. Also, we assume if $\mathcal{A}$ returns $(\mu^*, (\boldsymbol{R}^*, \boldsymbol{z}^*))$, the RO query $\mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, \mu^*, \boldsymbol{R}^*)$ was made by $\mathcal{A}$, which adds at most one RO query. Also, since the game makes at most one RO query to H_1 and H_2 respectively for each signing query, the total number of RO queries to each one of H_1 and H_2 is bounded $\mathsf{q} = \mathsf{q}_h + \mathsf{q}_s + 1$. We first construct an algorithm $\mathcal{C}$ compatible with the syntax in Lemma 16 and then construct $\mathcal{B}$ from

$\underline{\mathsf{Fork}^{\mathcal{A}}(x)}$:
Pick the random coin ρ of $\mathcal{A}$ at random
$(h_1, \ldots, h_q), (\bar{h}_1, \ldots \bar{h}_q) \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathsf{HG}$
$(I, \mathrm{Out}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(x, h_1, \ldots, h_q; \rho)$
If $I = \perp$ then return $\perp$
$(\bar{I}, \overline{\mathrm{Out}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(x, h_1, \ldots, h_{I-1}, \bar{h}_I, \ldots, \bar{h}_q; \rho)$
If $I \neq \bar{I}$ then return $\perp$
Return $(I, \mathrm{Out}, \overline{\mathrm{Out}})$

Fig. 6. The forking algorithm build from $\mathcal{A}$.

$\mathsf{Fork}^{\mathcal{C}}$. The input of $\mathcal{C}$ consists of $par = A$, public key pk, secret key shares $\{\mathsf{sk}_i\}_{i\in[n]}$, the random nonces $\{\boldsymbol{r}_j^{(i)}\}_{i\in[\mathsf{q}_s],j\in[0..\ell]}$, and the random RO outputs $h_1, \ldots, h_{2\mathsf{q}}$, where $h_{2i-1} \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{b}}$ and $h_{2i} \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{c}}$ for $i \in [\mathsf{q}]$. To start with, $\mathcal{C}$ does initialization exactly as in the game TS-UF-0 and then runs $\mathcal{A}$ with access to oracles Init, PPO, PSignO simulated in the same manner as in the game TS-UF-0 (the random nonces $\{\boldsymbol{r}_j^{(i)}\}_{j\in[0..\ell]}$ are used for the i-th signing query to PPO) and the RO oracle $\widetilde{\mathrm{RO}}$, which is simulated as follows.

$\widetilde{\mathrm{RO}}$ query $\mathrm{H}_1(x)$: If $\mathrm{H}_1(x) \neq \perp$, $\mathcal{C}$ returns $\mathrm{H}_1(x)$. Otherwise, parse x as $(\widetilde{\mathsf{pk}}, lr)$. If the parsing fails or $\widetilde{\mathsf{pk}} \neq \mathsf{pk}$, $\mathcal{C}$ sets $\mathrm{H}_1(x) \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathcal{S}_{\mathrm{hash}}$ and returns $\mathrm{H}_1(x)$. Otherwise, $\mathcal{C}$ increases ctr_h by 1, sets $\mathrm{H}_1(x) \leftarrow h_{2\mathrm{ctr}_h-1}$. Also, $\mathcal{C}$ computes $\boldsymbol{R} \leftarrow \sum_{i\in lr.\mathsf{SS}}(\boldsymbol{R}_{i,0} + \sum_{j\in[\ell]} b_j \cdot \boldsymbol{R}_{i,j})$, where $(\boldsymbol{R}_{i,j})_{j\in[0..\ell]} \leftarrow lr.\mathsf{PP}(i)$ and $\{b_j\}_{j\in[\ell]} \leftarrow h_{2\mathrm{ctr}_h-1}$. If $\mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, lr.\mathsf{msg}, \boldsymbol{R}) = \perp$, $\mathcal{C}$ sets $\mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, lr.\mathsf{msg}, \boldsymbol{R}) \leftarrow h_{2\mathrm{ctr}_h}$. Finally, $\mathcal{C}$ returns $\mathrm{H}_1(x)$.

$\widetilde{\mathrm{RO}}$ query $\mathrm{H}_2(x)$: If $\mathrm{H}_2(x) \neq \perp$, $\mathcal{C}$ returns $\mathrm{H}_2(x)$. Otherwise, parse x as $(\widetilde{\mathsf{pk}}, \mu, \boldsymbol{R})$. If the parsing fails or $\widetilde{\mathsf{pk}} \neq \mathsf{pk}$, $\mathcal{C}$ sets $\mathrm{H}_2(x) \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathcal{S}_{\mathrm{hash}}$ and returns $\mathrm{H}_2(x)$. Otherwise, $\mathcal{C}$ increases ctr_h by 1 and sets $\mathrm{H}_2(x) \leftarrow h_{2\mathrm{ctr}_h}$. Finally, $\mathcal{C}$ returns $\mathrm{H}_2(x)$.

After receiving the output $(\mu^*, (\boldsymbol{R}^*, \boldsymbol{z}^*))$ from $\mathcal{A}$, $\mathcal{C}$ aborts if $\mathcal{A}$ does not win the TS-UF-0 game. Otherwise $\mathcal{C}$ finds the index I such that $\mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, \mu^*, \boldsymbol{R}^*)$ is set to h_I during the simulation. By our assumption of $\mathcal{A}$, we know such I must exist. Then, $\mathcal{C}$ returns $(I, \mathrm{Out} = (\mu^*, \boldsymbol{R}^*, \boldsymbol{z}^*))$.

Analysis of $\mathcal{C}$. To use Lemma 16, we define $S := \{2j\}_{j\in[\mathsf{q}]}$ and IG as the algorithm that runs $A \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathsf{Setup}(1^\kappa)$, $(\mathsf{pk}, \{\mathsf{sk}_i\}_{i\in[n]}) \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathsf{KeyGen}()$, samples $\{\boldsymbol{r}_j^{(i)}\}_{i\in[\mathsf{q}_s],j\in[\ell]}$ such that each $\boldsymbol{r}_j^{(i)}$ is sampled independently from $\mathscr{D}_{\sigma_{\mathsf{r}}}^m$, and returns $(A, \mathsf{pk}, \{\mathsf{sk}_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \{\boldsymbol{r}_j^{(i)}\}_{i\in[\mathsf{q}_s],j\in[0..\ell]})$. We define HG as the algorithm that samples $h_1, h_3, \ldots, h_{2\mathsf{q}-1}$ uniformly from $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{b}}$ and $h_2, h_4, \ldots, h_{2\mathsf{q}}$ uniformly from $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{c}}$. From the simulation, we know the output index I of $\mathcal{C}$ is always in S. Also, it is not hard to see that $\mathcal{C}$ simulates the game TS-SUF-0 perfectly, which implies $\mathrm{acc}(\mathcal{C}) \geqslant \mathsf{Adv}^{\text{ts-uf-0}}_{\mathsf{TSL}}(\mathcal{A}, \kappa)$. By Lemma 16,

$$\mathrm{acc}(\mathsf{Fork}^{\mathcal{C}}) \geqslant \mathsf{Adv}^{\text{ts-uf-0}}_{\mathsf{TSL}}(\mathcal{A}, \kappa)^2/\mathsf{q} \ .$$

Construct $\mathcal{B}$ from $\mathsf{Fork}^{\mathcal{C}}$. We now give a construction of the MSIS adversary $\mathcal{B}$ using $\mathsf{Fork}^{\mathcal{C}}$. To start with, $\mathcal{B}$ receives $A \in R_q^{k\times m}$ from the MSIS game, follows the algorithm $\mathsf{KeyGen}()$ to generate $(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{sk}, \{\mathsf{sk}_i\}_{i\in[n]})$, and samples $\{\boldsymbol{r}_j^{(i)}\}_{i\in[\mathsf{q}_s],j\in[0..\ell]}$ exactly as in IG. Then, $\mathcal{B}$ runs $\mathsf{Fork}^{\mathcal{C}}$. If $\mathsf{Fork}^{\mathcal{C}}$ outputs $(I, \mathrm{Out} = (\mu^*, \boldsymbol{R}^*, \boldsymbol{z}^*), \overline{\mathrm{Out}} = (\bar{\mu}^*, \bar{\boldsymbol{R}}^*, \bar{\boldsymbol{z}}^*))$, $\mathcal{B}$ returns $\boldsymbol{z}^* - \bar{\boldsymbol{z}}^* - 2(h_I - \bar{h}_I)\mathsf{sk}$. Otherwise, $\mathcal{B}$ aborts.

By the execution of $\mathsf{Fork}^{\mathcal{C}}$, we know $(\mu^*, \boldsymbol{R}^*) = (\bar{\mu}^*, \bar{\boldsymbol{R}}^*)$, $A\boldsymbol{z}^* = \boldsymbol{R}^* + 2h_I \cdot \mathsf{pk}$ and $A\bar{\boldsymbol{z}}^* = \bar{\boldsymbol{R}}^* + 2\bar{h}_I \cdot \mathsf{pk}$. Therefore, $A(\boldsymbol{z}^* - \bar{\boldsymbol{z}}^* - 2(h_I - \bar{h}_I)\mathsf{sk}) = 0$. Also, it is clear that $\|\boldsymbol{z}^* - \bar{\boldsymbol{z}}^* - 2(h_I - \bar{h}_I)\mathsf{sk}\| \leqslant$

$2\sigma_{\mathsf{z}} + 2\sqrt{mN}\left\|(h_I - \bar{h}_I)\mathsf{sk}\right\|_\infty \leqslant 2\sigma_{\mathsf{z}} + 4\sqrt{mN}\sigma_{\mathsf{c}}\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}}$, where the last inequality is due to the fact that $\left\|(h_I - \bar{h}_I)\mathsf{sk}\right\|_\infty \leqslant \|h_I\mathsf{sk}\|_\infty + \left\|\bar{h}_I\mathsf{sk}\right\|_\infty \leqslant 2\sigma_{\mathsf{c}}\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}}$.

It is left to show that $\boldsymbol{z}^* - \bar{\boldsymbol{z}}^* - 2(h_I - \bar{h}_I)\mathsf{sk} \neq 0$ with high probability. Denote Win as the event that $\mathcal{B}$ returns and $\boldsymbol{z}^* - \bar{\boldsymbol{z}}^* - 2(h_I - \bar{h}_I)\mathsf{sk} \neq 0$, which means that $\mathcal{B}$ wins the MSIS game, and Zero as the event that $\mathcal{B}$ returns and $\boldsymbol{z}^* - \bar{\boldsymbol{z}}^* - 2(h_I - \bar{h}_I)\mathsf{sk} = 0$. Since $\mathcal{B}$ returns if $\mathsf{Fork}^{\mathcal{C}}$ returns,

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Win} \ \vee \ \mathsf{Zero}] = \mathrm{acc}(\mathsf{Fork}^{\mathcal{C}}) \geqslant \mathsf{Adv}^{\text{ts-uf-0}}_{\mathsf{TSL}}(\mathcal{A}, \kappa)^2/\mathsf{q} \ . \tag{3}$$

Denote $\mathsf{BadHash}$ as the event that there exist two of $h_1, \bar{h}_1, \ldots, h_{2\mathsf{q}}, \bar{h}_{2\mathsf{q}}$ that are equal. Denote $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gA}}$ as the set of MSIS challenge $A \in R_q^{k\times m}$ that $\eta_\varepsilon(A) \leqslant \sigma_{\mathsf{r}}/(2\sqrt{3})$. Denote $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gk},A}$ as the set of secret key $\mathsf{sk} \in \mathscr{B}_{\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}}}$ such that there exists another key $\mathsf{sk}' \neq \mathsf{sk}$ and $A\mathsf{sk}' = A\mathsf{sk}$. Then, denote Good as the event that $\mathsf{BadHash}$ does not occur, $A \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gA}}$, and $\mathsf{sk} \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gk},A}$. We show that $\Pr[\mathsf{Win}]$ is high using the following main lemma. We defer the proof of the lemma to Section 4.3.

Lemma 17. *For any $\alpha \geqslant 2$,*

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Win} \ \wedge \ \mathsf{Good}] \geqslant \Pr[\mathsf{Zero} \ \wedge \ \mathsf{Good}]^{\alpha/(\alpha-1)}/\delta_\alpha \ ,$$

where $\delta_\alpha = (1 + 160\ell\mathsf{q} \cdot 2^{-2\kappa}) \cdot e^\alpha$.

We now show that Good occurs except for negligible probability. By Lemma 6, $\Pr[A \notin \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gA}}] \leqslant 2^{-N} \leqslant 2^{-2\kappa}$. Since $h_1, h_3, \ldots, h_{2\mathsf{q}-1}$ are sampled uniformly from $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{b}}$ and $h_2, h_4, \ldots, h_{2\mathsf{q}}$ are sampled uniformly from $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{c}}$, we know $\Pr[\mathsf{BadHash}] \leqslant (2\mathsf{q})^2/|\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{b}}| + (2\mathsf{q})^2/|\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{c}}| \leqslant 8\mathsf{q}^2 2^{-2\kappa}$. Also, by the following lemma, $\Pr[\mathsf{sk} \notin \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gk},A}] \leqslant 2^{-2\kappa}$.

Lemma 18. *For any $A \in R_q^{k\times m}$ and σ_{sk}, if $m \geqslant (2\kappa/N + k\log q)/\log(2\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}})$, we have that for $\mathsf{sk} \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathscr{B}_{\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}}}$, with probability at least $1 - 2^{-2\kappa}$, there exists $\mathsf{sk}' \in \mathscr{B}_{\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}}}$ such that $\mathsf{sk} \neq \mathsf{sk}'$ and $A\mathsf{sk} = A\mathsf{sk}'$.*

Proof. Here, one only has to show that the size of $\mathscr{B}_{\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}}}$ is much larger than R_q^k. Since there is at most q^{kN} possible values of $A\mathsf{sk}$, with probability at most $q^{kN}/(2\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}})^{mN}$, the sampled sk would not satisfy the condition in the lemma. Thus, with $m \geqslant 2\kappa/N\log\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}} + k\log q/\log\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}}$, the statement is true. □

Therefore, $\Pr[\neg\mathsf{Good}] \leqslant (2 + 8\mathsf{q}^2)2^{-2\kappa}$. Finally, by Lemma 17 and Equation (3), we conclude our theorem, since

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr[\mathsf{Win}] &\geqslant \Pr[\mathsf{Win} \ \wedge \ \mathsf{Good}] \\
&\geqslant \frac{1}{2}\left(\Pr[\mathsf{Win} \ \wedge \ \mathsf{Good}] + \Pr[\mathsf{Zero} \ \wedge \ \mathsf{Good}]^{\alpha/(\alpha-1)}/\delta_\alpha\right) \\
&\geqslant \frac{\alpha-1}{2\alpha\delta_\alpha}(\Pr[\mathsf{Win} \ \wedge \ \mathsf{Good}] + \Pr[\mathsf{Zero} \ \wedge \ \mathsf{Good}])^{\alpha/(\alpha-1)} \\
&\geqslant \frac{1}{2\alpha\delta_\alpha}(\Pr[(\mathsf{Win} \ \vee \ \mathsf{Zero}) \ \wedge \ \mathsf{Good}])^{\alpha/(\alpha-1)} \\
&\geqslant \frac{1}{2\alpha\delta_\alpha}\left(\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{ts-uf-0}}_{\mathsf{TSL}}(\mathcal{A}, \kappa)^2/\mathsf{q} - (2 + 8\mathsf{q}^2)2^{-2\kappa}\right)^{\alpha/(\alpha-1)} \ ,
\end{aligned}$$

where the third inequality is due to Lemma 21 and the fact that $\delta_\alpha > 1$. □

4.3 Proof of Lemma 17

By the definition of $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gk},A}$, there exists a bijection $f_A : \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gk},A} \to \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gk},A}$ such that $f_A(\mathsf{sk}) \neq \mathsf{sk}$ and $A \cdot f(\mathsf{sk}) = A \cdot \mathsf{sk}$. Denote a random variable $T_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{h}}$ as the view of $\mathcal{A}$ during its interaction with $\mathcal{B}$ given the MSIS challenge being A, the secret key being sk and the hash values being $\boldsymbol{h} = (h_1, \ldots, h_{2\mathsf{q}_h}, \bar{h}_1, \ldots, \bar{h}_{2\mathsf{q}_h})$ for answering RO queries. More concretely, $T_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{h}}$ contains the public key pk, the secret key shares of corrupted signers $\{\mathsf{sk}_j\}_{j\in CS}$, the transcripts of all queries to the oracles PPO, PSignO, RO, and the outputs of $\mathcal{A}$ in both executions. Denote $W_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{h}}$ as the distribution of $T_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{h}}$. Denote $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gh}}$ as the set of hash values $\boldsymbol{h}$ such that $\mathsf{BadHash}$ does not occur.

We first show that the lemma holds *if the Rényi divergence* $R_\alpha\left(W_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{h}} \| W_{A,f_A(\mathsf{sk}),\boldsymbol{h}}\right) \leqslant \delta_\alpha$ *for any* $A \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gA}}$, $\mathsf{sk} \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gk},A}$ *and* $\boldsymbol{h} \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gh}}$. Given a view T, we denote $(\mu^*, \boldsymbol{R}^*, \boldsymbol{z}^*)$ and $(\bar{\mu}^*, \bar{\boldsymbol{R}}^*, \bar{\boldsymbol{z}}^*)$ as the outputs of $\mathcal{A}$ in T, and we follow the execution of $\mathcal{C}$ to find an index I such that $\mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, \mu^*, \boldsymbol{R}^*)$ is set to h_I if $\mathcal{A}$ wins during the first execution. Denote $\bar{I}$ as such an index for the second execution of $\mathcal{A}$. We define the event E_{sk} as $\mathcal{A}$ wins in both executions and $I = \bar{I} \wedge \boldsymbol{z}^* - \bar{\boldsymbol{z}}^* - 2(h_I - \bar{h}_I)\mathsf{sk} = 0$.

For any fixed $A \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gA}}, \mathsf{sk} \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gk},A}, \boldsymbol{h} \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gh}}$ and $T \leftarrow\!\!\$\, W_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{h}}$, if $\mathsf{E}_{f_A(\mathsf{sk})}$ occurs, since $\mathsf{sk} \neq f_A(\mathsf{sk})$ and $\boldsymbol{h} \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gh}}$ which implies $h_I - \bar{h}_I \neq 0$, we know $\boldsymbol{z}^* - \bar{\boldsymbol{z}}^* - 2(h_I - \bar{h}_I)\mathsf{sk} \neq \boldsymbol{z}^* - \bar{\boldsymbol{z}}^* - 2(h_I - \bar{h}_I)f_A(\mathsf{sk}) = 0$, which means that $\mathcal{B}$ wins the MSIS game given $(A, \mathsf{sk}, \boldsymbol{h}, T)$. Therefore, $\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{Win}|A, \mathsf{sk}, \boldsymbol{h}] \geqslant \mathsf{Pr}_{T \leftarrow\!\!\$\, W_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{h}}}[\mathsf{E}_{f_A(\mathsf{sk})}]$, where $\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{Win}|A, \mathsf{sk}, \boldsymbol{h}]$ denotes the probability that Win occurs given the MSIS challenge being A, the secret key being sk, and the hash values being $\boldsymbol{h}$. For $T \leftarrow\!\!\$\, W_{A,f_A(\mathsf{sk}),\boldsymbol{h}}$, if $\mathsf{E}_{f_A(\mathsf{sk})}$ occurs, we know the event Zero occurs given the secret key being $f_A(\mathsf{sk})$ and the view of $\mathcal{A}$ being T, which means $\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{Zero}|A, f_A(\mathsf{sk}), \boldsymbol{h}] = \mathsf{Pr}_{T \leftarrow\!\!\$\, W_{A,f_A(\mathsf{sk}),\boldsymbol{h}}}[\mathsf{E}_{f_A(\mathsf{sk})}]$. Therefore, by Lemma 7,

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{Win}|A, \mathsf{sk}, \boldsymbol{h}] &\geqslant \Pr_{T \leftarrow\!\!\$\, W_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{h}}}[\mathsf{E}_{f_A(\mathsf{sk})}] \\
&\geqslant \Pr_{T \leftarrow\!\!\$\, W_{A,f_A(\mathsf{sk}),\boldsymbol{h}}}[\mathsf{E}_{f_A(\mathsf{sk})}]^{\alpha/(\alpha-1)} / R_\alpha\left(W_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{h}} \| W_{A,f_A(\mathsf{sk}),\boldsymbol{h}}\right) \\
&\geqslant \mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{Zero}|A, f(\mathsf{sk}), \boldsymbol{h}]^{\alpha/(\alpha-1)} / \delta_\alpha \ ,
\end{aligned}
$$

which implies

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{Win}|\mathsf{Good}] &= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{h}) \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gA}} \times \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gk},A} \times \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gh}}} [\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{Win}|A, \mathsf{sk}, \boldsymbol{h}]] \\
&\geqslant \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{h}) \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gA}} \times \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gk},A} \times \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gh}}} [\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{Zero}|A, f_A(\mathsf{sk}), \boldsymbol{h}]^{\alpha/(\alpha-1)} / \delta_\alpha] \\
&\geqslant \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{h}) \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gA}} \times \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gk},A} \times \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gh}}} [\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{Zero}|A, f_A(\mathsf{sk}), \boldsymbol{h}]]^{\alpha/(\alpha-1)} / \delta_\alpha \\
&= \mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{Zero}|\mathsf{Good}]^{\alpha/(\alpha-1)} / \delta_\alpha \ ,
\end{aligned}
$$

where the second inequality is due to Jensen's inequality and the last equation is due to the fact that f_A is a bijection. Therefore,

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{Win} \ \wedge \ \mathsf{Good}] &= \mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{Win}|\mathsf{Good}]\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{Good}] \\
&\geqslant \mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{Good}] \cdot \mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{Zero}|\mathsf{Good}]^{\alpha/(\alpha-1)} / \delta_\alpha \\
&\geqslant (\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{Good}] \cdot \mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{Zero}|\mathsf{Good}])^{\alpha/(\alpha-1)} / \delta_\alpha \\
&= (\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{Zero} \ \wedge \ \mathsf{Good}])^{\alpha/(\alpha-1)} / \delta_\alpha \ ,
\end{aligned}
$$

where the second inequality is due to $\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{Good}] \leqslant 1$ and $\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1} > 1$.

Analysis of $R_\alpha\left(W_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{h}} \| W_{A,f_A(\mathsf{sk}),\boldsymbol{h}}\right)$. We first define a more fine-grained view $T_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho},\boldsymbol{h}}$ by further fixing the randomness $\boldsymbol{\rho}$ used for generating the shares of the secret key. We can view $W_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{h}}$ as the distribution of $T_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho},\boldsymbol{h}}$ for $\boldsymbol{\rho}$ uniformly sampled from $(R_q^m)^K$.

We also extend the bijection f_A to a bijection f'_A that additionally takes the randomness $\boldsymbol{\rho}$ as input such that f'_A maps $(\mathsf{sk}, \boldsymbol{\rho})$ to $(f_A(\mathsf{sk}), \boldsymbol{\rho}')$ such that the shares of corrupted signers CS given $(\mathsf{sk}, \boldsymbol{\rho})$ are the same as that given $(f_A(\mathsf{sk}), \boldsymbol{\rho}')$.[3] By Lemma 14, we construct the bijection as $f'_A(\mathsf{sk}, \boldsymbol{\rho}) := (f_A(\mathsf{sk}), \Phi_{\mathsf{sk},f_A(\mathsf{sk}),CS}(\boldsymbol{\rho}))$. As a result, $W_{A,f_A(\mathsf{sk}),\boldsymbol{h}}$ can be viewed as the distribution of $T_{A,f'_A(\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho}),\boldsymbol{h}}$ for uniformly sampled $\boldsymbol{\rho}$.

Denote $W_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho},\boldsymbol{h}}$ as the distribution of $T_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho},\boldsymbol{h}}$. Denote P as the distribution of $(\boldsymbol{\rho}, T_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho},\boldsymbol{h}})$ and Q as the distribution of $(\boldsymbol{\rho}, T_{A,f'_A(\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho}),\boldsymbol{h}})$ for uniformly sampled $\boldsymbol{\rho}$. By the data processing inequality from Lemma 7, $R_\alpha\left(W_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{h}} \| W_{A,f_A(\mathsf{sk}),\boldsymbol{h}}\right) \leqslant R_\alpha\left(P \| Q\right)$. By Lemma 8, denoting P_1 as the uniform distribution of $\boldsymbol{\rho}$ and $P_{2|\boldsymbol{\rho}}$ as the distribution of $T_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho},\boldsymbol{h}}$ conditioned on the value of $\boldsymbol{\rho}$ (Q_1 and $Q_{2|\boldsymbol{\rho}}$ are defined analogously), then

$$\begin{aligned} R_\alpha\left(P \| Q\right) &\leqslant R_\alpha\left(P_1 \| Q_1\right) \cdot \max_{\boldsymbol{\rho}} R_\alpha\left(P_{2|\boldsymbol{\rho}} \| Q_{2|\boldsymbol{\rho}}\right) \\ &= \max_{\boldsymbol{\rho}} R_\alpha\left(W_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho},\boldsymbol{h}} \| W_{A,f'_A(\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho}),\boldsymbol{h}}\right) \ . \end{aligned}$$

Therefore,

$$R_\alpha\left(W_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{h}} \| W_{A,f_A(\mathsf{sk}),\boldsymbol{h}}\right) \leqslant \max_{\boldsymbol{\rho}} R_\alpha\left(W_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho},\boldsymbol{h}} \| W_{A,f'_A(\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho}),\boldsymbol{h}}\right) \ ,$$

and we can conclude the lemma by the following claim.

Claim. For any $A \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gA}}$, $\mathsf{sk} \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gk},A}$, $\boldsymbol{\rho} \in (R_q^m)^K$, and $\boldsymbol{h} \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gh}}$,

$$R_\alpha(W_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho},\boldsymbol{h}} \| W_{A,f'_A(\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho}),\boldsymbol{h}}) \leqslant (1 + 160\ell\mathsf{q} \cdot 2^{-2\kappa}) \cdot e^\alpha \ .$$

Proof. Denote $(\mathsf{sk}', \boldsymbol{\rho}') = f'_A(\mathsf{sk}, \boldsymbol{\rho})$ and denote $\{\mathsf{ss}_i\}_{i\in[L]}$ and $\{\mathsf{ss}'_i\}_{i\in[L]}$ as the secret shares generated by $\mathsf{SecSha.Share}(\mathsf{sk}; \boldsymbol{\rho})$ and $\mathsf{SecSha.Share}(\mathsf{sk}'; \boldsymbol{\rho}')$, respectively. Since $\mathcal{A}$ is deterministic, $T_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho},\boldsymbol{h}}$ is determined by the nonces $\{\boldsymbol{R}_0^{(j)}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{R}_\ell^{(j)}\}_{j\in[\mathsf{q}_s]}$ and the outputs $(\boldsymbol{R}, \boldsymbol{z})$ of queries to oracle PSignO. Therefore, we only need to consider the marginal distribution of those variables when comparing the two distributions. We further ignore $\boldsymbol{R}$ from the outputs of PSignO queries since it is determined given $\{\boldsymbol{R}_0^{(j)}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{R}_\ell^{(j)}\}_{j\in[\mathsf{q}_s]}$ and $\boldsymbol{h}$.

We now use Lemma 8 to bound $R_\alpha(W_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho},\boldsymbol{h}} \| W_{A,f'_A(\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho}),\boldsymbol{h}})$ by defining random variables $X_0, \ldots, X_{2\mathsf{q}_s}$ as follows. Let $X_0 := \{\boldsymbol{R}_0^{(j)}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{R}_\ell^{(j)}\}_{j\in[\mathsf{q}_s]}$. For $j \in [\mathsf{q}_s]$, let X_j be the output $\boldsymbol{z}$ of the j-th query to PSignO made by $\mathcal{A}$ during the first execution, and let X_j be $\perp$ if $\mathcal{A}$ makes less than j queries to PSignO during the first execution. Similarly, let X_{q_s+j} be the output $\boldsymbol{z}$ of the j-th query to PSignO made by $\mathcal{A}$ during the second execution, and let X_{q_s+j} be $\perp$ if $\mathcal{A}$ does not win during the first execution or makes less than j queries to PSignO during the second execution. We denote D as the distribution of $X_0, \ldots, X_{2\mathsf{q}_s}$ sampled from $W_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho},\boldsymbol{h}}$ and D' as the distribution of $X_0, \ldots, X_{2\mathsf{q}_s}$ sampled from $W_{A,f'_A(\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho}),\boldsymbol{h}}$.

By Lemma 8, denoting $D_{j|x_{[0..j-1]}}$ as the distribution of X_j conditioned on $x_{[0..j-1]}$ ($D'_{j|x_{[0..j-1]}}$ is defined analogously), we just need to bound $R_\alpha(D_{j|x_{[0..j-1]}} \| D'_{j|x_{[0..j-1]}})$ for each j and $x_{[0..j-1]}$. For

[3] The corrupted set CS is fixed here since we assume that $\mathcal{A}$ is deterministic.

simplicity of our explanation, we denote $\delta_{\alpha,j} := \max_{x_{[0..j-1]}} R_\alpha(D_{j|x_{[0..j-1]}} \| D'_{j|x_{[0..j-1]}})$. Also, when $x_{[0..j-1]}$ is clear from the context, we write D_j and D'_j instead for readability.

For $j = 0$, since $\{\boldsymbol{R}_0^{(j)}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{R}_\ell^{(j)}\}_{j\in[\mathsf{q}_s]}$ are sampled independently of $\mathsf{sk}, \boldsymbol{\rho}$, D_0 and D'_0 are the same distributions, which implies $\delta_{\alpha,j} = 1$.

For $1 \leqslant j \leqslant \mathsf{q}_s$, given $X_{[0..j-1]} = x_{[0..j-1]}$ for some $x_{[0..j-1]}$, we know $T_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho},\boldsymbol{h}}$ and $T_{A,f'_A(sk,\boldsymbol{\rho}),\boldsymbol{h}}$ are identical prior to the j-th PSignO query in the first execution. Denote the j-th query to PSignO as (i, lr). We say that the query corresponds to the j'-th token if $lr.\mathrm{PP}(i) = (\boldsymbol{R}_0^{(j')}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{R}_\ell^{(j')})$. Suppose that the query is valid, i.e., the query corresponds to the j'-th token for some $j' \in [\mathsf{q}_s]$ and there is no prior PSignO query corresponding to the same token. Let $(c, b_1, \ldots, b_\ell)$ be the parameters computed from $\mathsf{CompPar}(\mathsf{pk}, lr)$. Let $\boldsymbol{s}_{i'} \in R^m$ be an arbitrary vector such that $A\boldsymbol{s}_{i'} = \boldsymbol{R}_{i'}^{(j')}$ for $i' \in [0..\ell]$. Then, the distribution of $\boldsymbol{r}_{i'}^{(j')}$ given $\boldsymbol{R}_{i'}^{(j')}$ is $\mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda_q^\perp(A)+\boldsymbol{s}_{i'},\sigma_\mathsf{r}}$ for $i' \in [0..\ell]$. Let $\boldsymbol{v} := \sum_{j''\in T_i} \lambda_{j''}^{lr.SS}\mathsf{ss}_{j''}$. Since $X_j = \boldsymbol{r}_0^{(j')} + \sum_{i'\in[\ell]} b_{i'}\boldsymbol{r}_{i'}^{(j')} + 2c\boldsymbol{v}$ and $\eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda_q^\perp(A)) \leqslant \sigma_\mathsf{r}/(2\sqrt{3})$, by Lemma 12, we have $D_j \overset{\varepsilon'}{\approx} \mathscr{D}^{m,\bmod q}_{\Lambda_q^\perp(A)+\boldsymbol{S}+2c\boldsymbol{v},\sigma',2c\boldsymbol{v}}$,[4] where $\varepsilon' = \frac{2((1+\varepsilon)^\ell-1)}{2-(1+\varepsilon)^\ell}$, $\boldsymbol{S} = \boldsymbol{s}_0 + \sum_{i'\in[\ell]} b_{i'}\boldsymbol{s}_{i'}$ and $\sigma'^2 = \sigma_\mathsf{r}^2(1 + \sum_{i'\in[\ell]} b_{i'}^\dagger b_{i'})$. Similarly, $D'_j \overset{\varepsilon'}{\approx} \mathscr{D}^{m,\bmod q}_{\Lambda_q^\perp(A)+\boldsymbol{S}+2c\boldsymbol{v}',\sigma',2c\boldsymbol{v}'}$, where $\boldsymbol{v}' = \sum_{j''\in T_i} \lambda_{j''}^{lr.SS}\mathsf{ss}'_{j''}$. Using weak triangle inequality from Lemma 7, we have that

$$\delta_{\alpha,j} \leqslant (1+\varepsilon')^{1+\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}} R_\alpha\left(\mathscr{D}^{m,\bmod q}_{\Lambda_q^\perp(A)+\boldsymbol{S}+2c\boldsymbol{v},\sigma',2c\boldsymbol{v}} \| \mathscr{D}^{m,\bmod q}_{\Lambda_q^\perp(A)+\boldsymbol{S}+2c\boldsymbol{v}',\sigma',2c\boldsymbol{v}'}\right)$$

Since for any $b \in \mathcal{S}_\mathsf{b}$, $b^\dagger b = 1$, we have $\sigma'^2 = (1+\ell)\sigma_\mathsf{r}^2$. By Lemma 14, we have $A\boldsymbol{v} = A\boldsymbol{v}'$, which implies $2c(\boldsymbol{v}-\boldsymbol{v}') \in \Lambda_q^\perp(A)$, and thus the two lattice cosets $\Lambda_q^\perp(A) + \boldsymbol{S} + 2c\boldsymbol{v}$ and $\Lambda_q^\perp(A) + \boldsymbol{S} + 2c\boldsymbol{v}'$ are the same. Then, by Lemma 14, we have $\|\boldsymbol{v}-\boldsymbol{v}'\| \leqslant B_{\mathsf{ss}}\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}}\sqrt{Nm}$. Thus, by Lemma 10,

$$\begin{aligned}\delta_{\alpha,j} &\leqslant (1+\varepsilon')^{1+\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}} \exp\left(\alpha\pi\frac{\|2c(\boldsymbol{v}-\boldsymbol{v}')\|^2}{\sigma'^2}\right)\\ &\leqslant (1+\varepsilon')^3 \exp\left(\frac{4\alpha\pi\sigma_\mathsf{c}^2 B_{\mathsf{ss}}^2\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}}^2 Nm}{(1+\ell)\sigma_\mathsf{r}^2}\right) \leqslant (1+\varepsilon')^3 e^{\alpha/(2\mathsf{q})}\,, \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

where the last inequality is due to the fact that σ_r is set as shown in Figure 5. If the j-query is not valid or $\mathcal{A}$ makes less than j queries to PSignO in the first execution, we have $X_j = \perp$ in both distributions, which means $R_\alpha\left(D_j \| D'_j\right) = 1$.

For $\mathsf{q}_s + 1 \leqslant j \leqslant 2\mathsf{q}_s$, given $X_{[0..j-1]} = x_{[0..j-1]}$ for some $x_{[0..j-1]}$, we know $T_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho},\boldsymbol{h}}$ and $T_{A,f'_A(sk,\boldsymbol{\rho}),\boldsymbol{h}}$ are identical prior to the $(j-\mathsf{q}_s)$-th PSignO query in the second execution. W.l.o.g. we assume $\mathcal{A}$ wins the TS-UF-0 game during the first execution since otherwise $X_j = \perp$ in both D_j and D'_j and $\delta_{\alpha,j} = 1$. Also, w.l.o.g. we assume $\mathcal{A}$ makes at least $(j-\mathsf{q}_s)$ queries to PSignO and the $(j-\mathsf{q}_s)$-th query is valid during the second execution since otherwise $X_j = \perp$. We denote the query as $(i, \bar{lr})$ and let $(\bar{c}, \bar{b}_1, \ldots, \bar{b}_\ell)$ be the parameters computed from $\mathsf{CompPar}(\mathsf{pk}, \bar{lr})$. Suppose the query corresponds to the j'-th token. There are three cases:

- The adversary does not make a PSignO query that corresponds to the j'-th token during the first execution. Since X_j is the distribution of $\bar{z}$ conditioning on $\{\boldsymbol{R}_0^{(j')}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{R}_\ell^{(j')}\}$, we can use the same analysis as the case for the first execution and get the same bound on $\delta_{\alpha,j}$ as Equation (4).

[4] This follows from Lemma 12 showing that $X_j - 2c\boldsymbol{v}$ is distributed closely to $\mathscr{D}^{m,\bmod q}_{\Lambda_q^\perp(A)+\boldsymbol{S},\sigma'}$.

- Otherwise, the adversary makes a valid PSIGNO query that also corresponds to the j'-th token during the first execution. Denote the query as (i, lr), and suppose it is the $\tilde{j}$-th PSIGNO query. (Since the query corresponds to the j'-th token, it must be for signer i too.) Let $(c, b_1, \ldots, b_\ell)$ be the parameters computed from $\mathsf{CompPar}(\mathsf{pk}, lr)$ during the first execution. Denote J as the index such that $(b_1, \ldots, b_\ell) = h_J$. If $lr = \bar{lr}$ and $J < I$, where we recall that I denotes the index such that $\mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, \mu^*, \boldsymbol{R}^*) = h_I$ and $(\mu^*, (\boldsymbol{R}^*, \boldsymbol{z}^*))$ denotes the output of A during the first execution, we have $(\bar{b}_1, \ldots, \bar{b}_\ell) = h_J$.
  Denote J' as the index such that $c = h_{J'}$. By the simulation of the random oracles, J' is either $J+1$ or less than J. Since $\mathcal{A}$ wins the TS-UF-0 game during the first execution, $\mu^* \neq lr.\mathsf{msg}$, which implies $J' \neq I$ and thus $J' < I$. Therefore, from the algorithm $\mathsf{CompPar}$, we know $c = h_{J'} = \bar{c}$, which implies that the answer to the $(j - \mathsf{q})$-th PSIGNO query during the second execution is the same as the $\tilde{j}$-th PSIGNO query during the first execution. Thus, $X_j = X_{\tilde{j}} = x_{\tilde{j}}$ for both D_j and D'_j and $\delta_{\alpha,j} = 1$.
- Otherwise, either $lr \neq \bar{lr}$ or $J > I$. Since $\boldsymbol{h} \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{gh}}$, in either of the cases, $(b_1, \ldots, b_\ell) \neq (\bar{b}_1, \ldots, \bar{b}_\ell)$. We denote the output of the $\tilde{j}$-th PSIGNO query during the first execution as $\boldsymbol{z}$ and define $\{\boldsymbol{s}_{i'}\}_{i' \in [0..\ell]}$, and $(\boldsymbol{v}, \boldsymbol{v}')$ for the query following the analysis of the first execution. Then, $X_j = \boldsymbol{r}_0 + \sum_{i' \in [\ell]} \bar{b}_{i'} \boldsymbol{r}_{i'} + 2\bar{c}\bar{\boldsymbol{v}}$, where $\bar{\boldsymbol{v}} = \sum_{j'' \in T_i} \lambda_{j''}^{\bar{lr}.SS} \mathsf{ss}_{j''}$ and each $\boldsymbol{r}_{i'}$, for $i' \in [0..\ell]$, is independently sampled from $\mathscr{D}^{m, \bmod q}_{\Lambda_q^\perp(A) + \boldsymbol{s}_{i'}, \sigma_{\mathsf{r}}}$ conditioning on $\boldsymbol{r}_0 + \sum_{i' \in [\ell]} b_{i'} \boldsymbol{r}_{i'} = \boldsymbol{z} - 2c\boldsymbol{v}$. By Lemma 12,

$$D_j \overset{\varepsilon'}{\approx} \mathscr{D}^{m, \bmod q}_{\mathcal{I} \otimes \Lambda_q^\perp(A) + \boldsymbol{z} - 2c\boldsymbol{v} + \boldsymbol{S} + 2\bar{c}\bar{\boldsymbol{v}}, \sigma'' = \sqrt{\frac{\Delta(\Sigma)}{\Sigma_{11}}}, \frac{\Sigma_{12}}{\Sigma_{11}}(\boldsymbol{z} - 2c\boldsymbol{v}) + 2\bar{c}\bar{\boldsymbol{v}}}$$

  where $\boldsymbol{S} = \sum_{i' \in [\ell]} (\bar{b}_{i'} - b_{i'}) \boldsymbol{s}_{i'}$, $\mathcal{I}$ denotes the ideal generated by $b_1 - \bar{b}_1, \ldots, b_n - \bar{b}_n$, and

$$\Sigma = \sigma_{\mathsf{r}}^2 \begin{pmatrix} 1 + \sum_{i' \in [\ell]} b_{i'}^\dagger b_{i'} & 1 + \sum_{i' \in [\ell]} \bar{b}_{i'} b_{i'}^\dagger \\ 1 + \sum_{i' \in [\ell]} \bar{b}_{i'}^\dagger b_{i'} & 1 + \sum_{i' \in [\ell]} \bar{b}_{i'}^\dagger \bar{b}_{i'} \end{pmatrix} .$$

  Similarly, $D'_j \overset{\varepsilon'}{\approx} \mathscr{D}^{m, \bmod q}_{\mathcal{I} \otimes \Lambda_q^\perp(A) + \boldsymbol{z} - 2c\boldsymbol{v}' + \boldsymbol{S} + 2\bar{c}\bar{\boldsymbol{v}}', \sigma'', \frac{\Sigma_{12}}{\Sigma_{11}}(\boldsymbol{z} - 2c\boldsymbol{v}') + 2\bar{c}\bar{\boldsymbol{v}}'}$, where $\bar{\boldsymbol{v}}' = \sum_{j'' \in T_i} \lambda_{j''}^{\bar{lr}.SS} \mathsf{ss}'_{j''}$. Since $(b_1, \ldots, b_\ell) \neq (\bar{b}_1, \ldots, \bar{b}_\ell)$, we know $2 \in \mathcal{I}$ by Lemma 2. Since $c(\boldsymbol{v} - \boldsymbol{v}') + \bar{c}(\bar{\boldsymbol{v}} - \bar{\boldsymbol{v}}') \in \Lambda_q^\perp(A)$ by Lemma 14, we know $2c(\boldsymbol{v} - \boldsymbol{v}') + 2\bar{c}(\bar{\boldsymbol{v}} - \bar{\boldsymbol{v}}') \in 2\Lambda_q^\perp(A) \subset \mathcal{I} \otimes \Lambda_q^\perp(A)$, which implies $\mathcal{I} \otimes \Lambda_q^\perp(A) + \boldsymbol{z} - 2c\boldsymbol{v} + \boldsymbol{S} + 2\bar{c}\bar{\boldsymbol{v}}$ and $\mathcal{I} \otimes \Lambda_q^\perp(A) + \boldsymbol{z} - 2c\boldsymbol{v}' + \boldsymbol{S} + 2\bar{c}\bar{\boldsymbol{v}}'$ are the same lattice cosets. Also, since $b^\dagger b = 1$ for any $b \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{b}}$, we have $\Sigma_{11} = \Sigma_{22} = (1 + \ell)\sigma_{\mathsf{r}}^2$. Also, by Lemma 3, we have $\left\| 1 + \sum_{i' \in [\ell]} \bar{b}_{i'}^\dagger b_{i'} \right\|^2 \leqslant \ell^2 + 1$. Therefore, $\Sigma_{21}\Sigma_{12} = \left\| \sigma_{\mathsf{r}}^2 + \sigma_{\mathsf{r}}^2 \sum_{i' \in [\ell]} \bar{b}_{i'}^\dagger b_{i'} \right\|^2 \leqslant \sigma_{\mathsf{r}}^4(\ell^2 + 1)$. Thus, $\Delta(\Sigma) = \Sigma_{11}\Sigma_{22} - \Sigma_{21}\Sigma_{12} \geqslant (\ell + 1)^2\sigma_{\mathsf{r}}^4 - \sigma_{\mathsf{r}}^4(\ell^2 + 1) \geqslant 2\ell\sigma_{\mathsf{r}}^4$, which implies $\sigma'' \geqslant \sqrt{\frac{2\ell}{\ell+1}}\sigma_{\mathsf{r}} \geqslant \sigma_{\mathsf{r}}$. Since $2\Lambda_q^\perp(A) \subset \mathcal{I} \cdot \Lambda_q^\perp(A)$, $\eta_\varepsilon(\mathcal{I} \cdot \Lambda_q^\perp(A)) \leqslant 2\eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda_q^\perp(A)) \leqslant \sigma_{\mathsf{r}} \leqslant \sigma''$. By Lemma 10 and using weak-triangle inequality as in the case of the first execution, we have

$$\delta_{\alpha,j} \leqslant (1 + \varepsilon')^{1 + \frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1}} \left(\frac{1 + \varepsilon}{1 - \varepsilon} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1}} \cdot \exp\left(\alpha\pi \frac{\left\| \frac{\Sigma_{12}}{\Sigma_{11}} 2c(\boldsymbol{v} - \boldsymbol{v}') + 2\bar{c}(\bar{\boldsymbol{v}} - \bar{\boldsymbol{v}}') \right\|^2}{\sigma_{\mathsf{r}}^2} \right) .$$

  Also, by Lemma 14, $\|\boldsymbol{v} - \boldsymbol{v}'\| \leqslant B_{\mathsf{ss}}\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}}\sqrt{mN}$ and $\|\bar{\boldsymbol{v}} - \bar{\boldsymbol{v}}'\| \leqslant B_{\mathsf{ss}}\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}}\sqrt{mN}$, and since

$$\left\| 1 + \sum_{i' \in [\ell]} \bar{b}_{i'}^\dagger b_{i'} \right\|_1 \leqslant 1 + \ell ,$$

we know $\left\|\frac{\Sigma_{21}}{\Sigma_{11}}\right\|_1 \leqslant \frac{\sigma_{\mathsf{r}}^2(\ell+1)}{\sigma_{\mathsf{r}}^2(\ell+1)} \leqslant 1$. Therefore, by how σ_{r} is set in Figure 5,

$$\delta_{\alpha,j} \leqslant (1+\varepsilon')^3 \left(\frac{1+\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon}\right)^2 \cdot \exp\left(\frac{16\alpha\pi\sigma_{\mathsf{c}}^2 B_{\mathsf{ss}}^2 \sigma_{\mathsf{sk}}^2 mN}{\sigma_{\mathsf{r}}^2}\right) \leqslant (1+\varepsilon')^3 \left(\frac{1+\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon}\right)^2 \cdot e^{\alpha/(2\mathsf{q})} \ . \tag{5}$$

Since $\varepsilon = 2^{-2\kappa}$ and $\ell \leqslant 2\kappa$, we know $\varepsilon' \leqslant 8\ell \cdot 2^{-2\kappa}$ and $(1+\varepsilon)/(1-\varepsilon) \leqslant 1+4\cdot 2^{-2\kappa}$. From the above analysis, $R_\alpha\left(D_0 \| D_0'\right) = 1$ and by Equation (4) and Equation (5), for any $j \in [2\mathsf{q}_s]$ and $x_{[0..j-1]}$,

$$R_\alpha\left(D_{j|x_{[0..j-1]}} \| D'_{j|x_{[0..j-1]}}\right) \leqslant (1+8\ell\cdot 2^{-2\kappa})^5 e^{\alpha/(2\mathsf{q})} \ .$$

Therefore, by Lemma 8,

$$R_\alpha(W_{A,\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho},\boldsymbol{h}} \| W_{A,f'_A(\mathsf{sk},\boldsymbol{\rho}),\boldsymbol{h}}) \leqslant (1+8\ell\cdot 2^{-2\kappa})^{10\mathsf{q}} e^{\alpha} \leqslant (1+160\ell\mathsf{q}\cdot 2^{-2\kappa})\cdot e^{\alpha} \ .$$

□

4.4 Proof of Theorem 1 (Correctness of TSL)

Let sk be the secret key and $\mathsf{pk} = A\mathsf{sk}$ be the corresponding public key, denote $\{\mathsf{ss}_j\}_{j\in[L]}$ be the output of the secret sharing algorithm and $\mathsf{sk}_i = \{\mathsf{ss}_j\}_{j\in T_i}$ for each signer $i \in [n]$ denotes its secret key share. To show the correctness of the scheme, we consider any signing interaction with any message μ and any signer set $SS \subseteq [n]$ such that $|SS| \geqslant t$ and a message μ. Then, we have to show the following two points: (1) the aggregated signature $(\boldsymbol{R}, \boldsymbol{z})$ satisfies $A\boldsymbol{z} = \boldsymbol{R} + 2\mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, \mu, \boldsymbol{R})\cdot \mathsf{pk}$, and (2) with overwhelming probability, $\|\boldsymbol{z}\| \leqslant \sigma_{\mathsf{z}}$.

For the first point, we start by considering how each $\boldsymbol{z}_i$ for $i \in SS$ is generated. Each signer $i \in SS$ first generates $\boldsymbol{r}_{i,0} \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathscr{D}_{\sigma_0}^m$ and $\boldsymbol{r} \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathscr{D}_{\sigma_{\mathsf{r}}}^m$ for $j \in [\ell]$, and sets $\boldsymbol{R}_{i,j} \leftarrow A\boldsymbol{r}_{i,j}$ for $j \in [0..\ell]$. Then, in the second round on the same leader request lr where $lr.SS = SS$, each signer computes the aggregating coefficients $\{b_j\}_{j\in[\ell]} \leftarrow \mathrm{H}_1(\mathsf{pk}, lr)$ and the challenge $c \leftarrow \mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, \mu, \boldsymbol{R})$ where $\boldsymbol{R} \leftarrow \sum_{i\in SS}\boldsymbol{R}_{i,0} + \sum_{j\in[\ell]} b_j \boldsymbol{R}_{i,j}$. Then, the returned response $\boldsymbol{z}_i$ is $\boldsymbol{r}_{i,0} + \sum_{j\in[\ell]} b_j \boldsymbol{r}_{i,j} + 2c\cdot(\sum_{j\in T_i}\lambda_j^{SS}\mathsf{ss}_j)$. Assuming that all the parties are honest, so the aggregated nonce $\boldsymbol{R}$ is the same for all parties. By the linearity property of SecSha, it is easy to see that the aggregated $\boldsymbol{z}$ is

$$\boldsymbol{z} = \sum_{i\in SS}\boldsymbol{z}_i = \sum_{i\in SS}\left(\boldsymbol{r}_{i,0} + \sum_{j\in[\ell]} b_j \boldsymbol{r}_{i,j}\right) + 2c\cdot\mathsf{sk} \ . \tag{6}$$

Moreover, from Equation (6), we have

$$\begin{aligned} A\boldsymbol{z} &= \sum_{i\in SS}\left(A\boldsymbol{r}_{i,0} + \sum_{j\in[\ell]} b_j A\boldsymbol{r}_{i,j}\right) + 2c\cdot(A\mathsf{sk}) \\ &= \sum_{i\in SS}\boldsymbol{R}_{i,0} + \sum_{j\in[\ell]} b_j A\boldsymbol{R}_{i,j} + 2c\cdot\mathsf{pk} \\ &= \boldsymbol{R} + 2\mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, \mu, \boldsymbol{R})\cdot\mathsf{pk} \ , \end{aligned}$$

showing that the check on $A\boldsymbol{z}$ is satisfied.

n	q	k	m	σ_{sk}	σ_{r}	σ_{z}	$\lvert\mathsf{pk}\rvert$	$\lvert sig\rvert$	Comm.
5	2^{88}	6	33	2^{15}	$2^{76.16}$	$2^{86.72}$	33.72KB	219.20KB	1.10MB
32	2^{112}	7	46	2^{16}	2^{94}	$2^{106.13}$	49.85KB	377.42KB	1.67MB

Fig. 7. The concrete parameters and estimated efficiency for $\kappa = 128$ and $n = 5, 32$. In both cases, we use $(N, \ell, \sigma_{\mathsf{c}}) = (512, 26, 64)$. The last column denotes the communication complexity per signer.

It is left to show that with overwhelming probability $\|\boldsymbol{z}\| \leqslant \sigma_{\mathsf{z}}$. Let the distribution of $\boldsymbol{z}$ as defined by Equation (6) be $D_{\boldsymbol{z}}$. Then, by Lemma 12, we have that $D_{\boldsymbol{z}} \overset{\varepsilon'}{\approx} \mathscr{D}^m_{\sigma, 2c\mathsf{sk}}$ for $\varepsilon' = \frac{2((1+\varepsilon)^{t(\ell+1)-1}-1)}{2-(1+\varepsilon)^{t(\ell+1)-1}}$ and $\sigma^2 = t(1+\ell)\sigma_{\mathsf{r}}^2$, assuming that $|SS| = t$. Thus, $D_{\boldsymbol{z}}$ has statistical distance $\varepsilon'/2$ from $\mathscr{D}^m_{\sigma, 2c\mathsf{sk}}$. By Lemma 5 and by how σ_{r} is set, the error probability that $\|\boldsymbol{z} - 2c \cdot \mathsf{sk}\| \geqslant \sigma\sqrt{mN}$ is at most $\left(\frac{1+\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon}\right) 2^{-mN}$. Therefore, we have that

$$\|\boldsymbol{z}\| \leqslant \sigma\sqrt{mN} + \|2 \cdot c \cdot \mathsf{sk}\| \leqslant \sigma_{\mathsf{r}}\sqrt{tmN(1+\ell)} + 2\sigma_{\mathsf{c}}\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}}\sqrt{mN} \leqslant \sigma_{\mathsf{z}} \ ,$$

except with error probability

$$\left(\frac{1+\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon}\right) 2^{-mN} + \frac{\varepsilon'}{2} \leqslant 2 \cdot 2^{-mN} + 4t(\ell+1) \cdot 2^{-2\kappa} \leqslant (2 + 4t(\ell+1)) \cdot 2^{-2\kappa} = \delta \ .$$

The first inequality follows from $\varepsilon = 2^{-2\kappa}$ and $(1+\varepsilon)^{t(\ell+1)-1} \leqslant 1 + 2t(\ell+1)\varepsilon$, so that $\varepsilon' \leqslant 8t(\ell+1) \cdot 2^{-2\kappa}$ and $(1+\varepsilon)/(1-\varepsilon) \leqslant 1 + 4 \cdot 2^{-2\kappa} \leqslant 2$. Then, the next inequality follows from $N \geqslant 2\kappa$. □

4.5 Concrete instantiation and efficiency analysis

We analyze the concrete efficiency of our protocol in the setting considered by [GKS23], where the security parameter is $\kappa = 128$, the maximum number of signing sessions is $\mathsf{q}_s = 2^{64}$ (which is commonly used in other related works [dPKM+24] following NIST recommendations), and $n = 5$. We consider arbitrary threshold $1 \leqslant t \leqslant n$ here. We set $N = 512$ and $k = 6$. We set q such that the logarithm of β, the ℓ_2-norm of the short solution, satisfies $\log \beta \leqslant 2\sqrt{kN \log q \log \delta}$, according to [MR09]. We use $\delta = 1.005$ as in [GKS23] so that we get roughly 128-bit security of the MSIS problem. Note that we are not choosing the MSIS parameters according to the concrete bounds of Theorem 2, but rather we are choosing parameters so that MSIS gives 128 bits of security. This follows common practice, and it is justified by the fact that our bound is likely not tight due to the use of the Forking Lemma. We will see that the estimated $\beta \leqslant 2^{87.72}$, so we set $q \geqslant 2^{88}$. We set $\sigma_{\mathsf{sk}} = 2^{15}$ and then, according to Figure 5, we set $\sigma_c = 64$, $m = 33$, $\ell = 26$. We set $\sigma_{\mathsf{r}} = 2^{76.16}$ due to the first term of the maximum function[5] with $B_{\mathsf{ss}} \approx 7200$ by Lemma 15. Then, we set $\sigma_{\mathsf{z}} = 2^{86.72}$. By Theorem 2, we have that β is bounded by $2^{87.72}$. Then, our public key size is $|\mathsf{pk}| = kN \log q = 33.72$KB, the signature size is $|sig| = (m+k)N \log q = 219.20$KB, and the communication complexity per signer is $((\ell+1)k + m)N \log q = 1.10$MB. We summarize the parameters in Figure 7, where we also show the concrete parameters and efficiency for $n = 32$ estimated in the same manner as above.

[5] The second term is much smaller given the parameters we set.

Acknowledgments

This research was partially supported by NSF grants CNS-2026774, CNS-2154174, a JP Morgan Faculty Award, a CISCO Faculty Award, and a gift from Microsoft.

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A Proof of Lemma 11

We first state the two following lemmas borrowed from [GMPW20] and used in our proof. The latter one is adapted to our Gaussian notation, which we give a proof for completeness.

Lemma 19 (Corollary 2.7 of [GMPW20]). *For any lattice $\Lambda \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$ and $\varepsilon \in (0,1)$ where $\eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda) \leqslant 1$, we have that for any $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathbb{R}^m$,*

$$\rho(\Lambda + \boldsymbol{x}) \in [1-\varepsilon, 1+\varepsilon]\frac{\rho(\boldsymbol{x}_{\perp\Lambda})}{\Delta(\Lambda)}$$

where $\boldsymbol{x}_{\perp\Lambda}$ is the projection of $\boldsymbol{x}$ orthogonal to Λ and $\Delta(\Lambda)$ is the determinant of the lattice Λ defined as the volume of its fundamental parallelepiped $\mathcal{P}(\{\boldsymbol{b}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{b}_k\}) := \{\sum_{i=1}^m x_i \boldsymbol{b}_i : \forall i \in [k], x_i \in [0,1)\}$ for any basis $\{\boldsymbol{b}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{b}_k\}$ of Λ.

Lemma 20 (Lemma 2.3 of [GMPW20] adapted to our notations). *For any lattice coset $A = \Lambda + \boldsymbol{a} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$ and any full-row-rank $T \in \mathbb{R}^{k\times m}$ such that T is injective on A, we have that the distributions $T \cdot \mathscr{D}_A^m$ and $\mathscr{D}^k_{TA,\sqrt{TT^T}}$ are identical.*

Proof. First, because T is injective on A, for each $\boldsymbol{y} \in TA$, one can write it as $T\boldsymbol{x}$ for a unique $\boldsymbol{x} \in A$. Hence, it suffices to show that for any $\boldsymbol{y} = T\boldsymbol{x} \in TA$, $\rho_{\sqrt{TT^T}}(\boldsymbol{y}) = \rho(\boldsymbol{x})$ to conclude the proof. Then, consider

$$\rho_{\sqrt{TT^T}}(\boldsymbol{y}) = \exp(-\pi \boldsymbol{y}^T (TT^T)^{-1}\boldsymbol{y}) = \exp(-\pi \boldsymbol{x}^T T^T (TT^T)^{-1} T\boldsymbol{x}) \,.$$

Next, we will show that $\boldsymbol{x}^T T^T (TT^T)^{-1} T\boldsymbol{x} = \|\boldsymbol{x}\|^2$ for any $\boldsymbol{x} \in A$. By singular value decomposition, we can write T as $T = UDV^T$ for orthonormal matrices $U \in \mathbb{R}^{k\times k}, V \in \mathbb{R}^{m\times m}$ (i.e., $UU^T = \mathbb{I}_k, VV^T = \mathbb{I}_m$) and a rectangular diagonal matrix $D \in \mathbb{R}^{k\times m}$. Also, with T being full-row-rank, $D_{11}, \ldots, D_{kk} \neq 0$. This means that the first k columns of V span a subspace of $\mathbb{R}^m$ on which T is injective (we can see this by considering $T\boldsymbol{v}_i = D_{ii}\boldsymbol{u}_i$ for each column vector $\boldsymbol{v}_i$ of V for $i \in [k]$, so $\{T\boldsymbol{v}_i\}_{i\in[k]}$ spans $\mathbb{R}^k$). Therefore, $\boldsymbol{x} \in A$ can be written as $\sum_{i=1}^k c_i \boldsymbol{v}_i$ and $\|x\|^2 = \sum_{i=1}^k c_i^2$. Then, see that $(TT^T)^{-1} = U(DD^T)^{-1}U^T$, so $T^T(TT^T)^{-1}T = VI'V^T$ where $I' \in \mathbb{R}^{m\times m}$ is a diagonal matrix with 1 in its first k diagonal entries and 0 otherwise. Finally, we conclude that $\boldsymbol{x}^T VI'V^T\boldsymbol{x} = \sum_{j=1}^k c_j^2 = \boldsymbol{x}^T\boldsymbol{x}$, proving the lemma. □

Proof (of Lemma 11). We note first that because T is full-row-rank, any vector $\boldsymbol{x} \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^m \backslash \{0\}$ gives $\boldsymbol{x}^\dagger T \neq \mathbf{0}$, so $\Sigma = TT^\dagger$ is positive definite. Now, denote $T' = \phi_{\mathsf{M}}(T) \in \mathbb{R}^{kN \times mN}$. We can see that since T is full-row-rank (i.e., surjective), T' is also full rank (due to the embedding ϕ being a bijection between $K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$ and $\mathbb{R}^{mN}$). Also, $\ker(T') = \phi(\ker(T))$ since for any $\boldsymbol{x} \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^m$ that $T\boldsymbol{x} = \mathbf{0}$, $\phi_{\mathsf{M}}(T)\phi(\boldsymbol{x}) = \mathbf{0}$, and similarly for any $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathbb{R}^{mN}$ that $T'\boldsymbol{x} = \mathbf{0}$, $T\phi^{-1}(\boldsymbol{x}) = \mathbf{0}$. Additionally, because $\ker(T)$ is a Λ-subspace, (i.e., $\mathsf{Span}(\Lambda \cap \ker(T)) = \ker(T)$), we have that $\ker(T') = \phi(\ker(T)) = \phi(\mathsf{Span}(\Lambda \cap \ker(T))) = \mathsf{Span}(\phi(\Lambda) \cap \phi(\ker(T))) = \mathsf{Span}(\phi(\Lambda) \cap \ker(T'))$, so $\ker(T')$ is $\phi(\Lambda)$-subspace.

Then, we consider the coefficient embedding of the two distributions, which by Lemma 4, we can see that the coefficient embedding of values from $T \cdot \mathscr{D}^m_{\Lambda+a,\sigma}$ and $\mathscr{D}^k_{T\Lambda+Ta,\sigma\sqrt{TT^\dagger}}$ have the same distribution as $T' \cdot \mathscr{D}^{mN}_{\phi(\Lambda+\boldsymbol{a}),\sigma}$ and $\mathscr{D}^{kN}_{\phi(T\Lambda+T\boldsymbol{a}),\sigma\phi_{\mathsf{M}}(\sqrt{TT^\dagger})}$, respectively. We note that $\phi(T\Lambda + T\boldsymbol{a}) = T'\phi(\Lambda) + \phi(\boldsymbol{a})$ and $\phi_{\mathsf{M}}(\sqrt{TT^\dagger}) = \sqrt{T'T'^T}$. Additionally, denote $\Lambda' = \frac{1}{\sigma}\phi(\Lambda) \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{mN}$, $\boldsymbol{a}' = \frac{1}{\sigma}\phi(\boldsymbol{a}) \in \mathbb{R}^{mN}$ and $A' = \Lambda' + \boldsymbol{a}'$. Then, $T' \cdot \mathscr{D}^{mN}_{\phi(\Lambda+\boldsymbol{a}),\sigma} = \sigma T' \cdot \mathscr{D}^{mN}_{A'}$ and $\mathscr{D}^{kN}_{T'\phi(\Lambda+a),\sigma\phi_{\mathsf{M}}(\sqrt{TT^\dagger})} = \sigma \cdot \mathscr{D}^{kN}_{T'A',\sqrt{T'T'^T}}$. Note that $\eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda') \leqslant 1$ since $\eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda) \leqslant \sigma$. Thus, our goal now is to show that

$$\sigma T' \cdot \mathscr{D}^{mN}_{A'} \overset{\varepsilon'}{\approx} \sigma \cdot \mathscr{D}^{kN}_{T'A',\sqrt{T'T'^T}} .$$

To do this, let $P = \ker(T')$ and consider the projection $\boldsymbol{x}_{\perp P}$ of any $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathbb{R}^{mN}$ orthogonal to P. Observe that for any $\boldsymbol{x}$, $T'\boldsymbol{x} = T'\boldsymbol{x}_{\perp P}$. Then, for a distribution $(\mathscr{D}^{mN}_{A'})_{\perp P}$ of $\boldsymbol{x}_{\perp P}$ obtained by projecting $\boldsymbol{x}$ sampled from to $\boldsymbol{x}_{\perp P}$, we have that $\sigma T' \cdot (\mathscr{D}^{mN}_{A'})_{\perp P}$ is identically distributed to $\sigma T' \cdot \mathscr{D}^{mN}_{A'}$. Also, consider a lattice coset $A'_{\perp P}$ which is obtained by projecting each vector in A' orthogonally to P (this is a well-defined lattice coset, because P is a Λ'-subspace). Also, since T' is injective on $A'_{\perp P}$, by Lemma 20, $T' \cdot \mathscr{D}^{mN}_{A'_{\perp P}}$ and $\mathscr{D}^{kN}_{T'A'_{\perp P},\sqrt{T'T'^T}}$ are identically distributed. Hence, we only need to show that $\sigma T' \cdot (\mathscr{D}^{mN}_{A'})_{\perp P} \overset{\varepsilon'}{\approx} \sigma T' \cdot \mathscr{D}^{mN}_{A'_{\perp P}}$, which can be done by applying the data processing property of R_∞ (Lemma 7) and showing that

$$(\mathscr{D}^{mN}_{A'})_{\perp P} \overset{\varepsilon'}{\approx} \mathscr{D}^{mN}_{A'_{\perp P}} .$$

To show this final step, first see that both distributions have the same support $A'_{\perp P}$. Then, for each $\boldsymbol{x} \in A'_{\perp P}$, consider the probability that we sample $\boldsymbol{x}$ from $(\mathscr{D}^{mN}_{A'})_{\perp P}$ and $\mathscr{D}^{mN}_{A'_{\perp P}}$ respectively. Also, let $\Lambda_P = \Lambda' \cap P$ and $\boldsymbol{w}' \in A'$ be some vector where $\boldsymbol{w}'_{\perp P} = \boldsymbol{x}$. Then, $(\mathscr{D}^{mN}_{A'})_{\perp P}(\boldsymbol{x}) = \frac{\rho(\{\boldsymbol{w} \in A' : \boldsymbol{w}_{\perp P} = \boldsymbol{x}\})}{\rho(A')} = \frac{\rho(\boldsymbol{w}' + \Lambda_P)}{\rho(A')} \in [1-\varepsilon, 1+\varepsilon] \cdot \frac{\rho(\boldsymbol{w}'_{\perp P})}{\rho(A')\Delta(\Lambda_P)}$, where the last step follows from Lemma 19 and that $\eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda') \leqslant 1$. Next, $\mathscr{D}^{mN}_{A'_{\perp P}}(\boldsymbol{x}) = \rho(\boldsymbol{x})/\rho(A'_{\perp P})$, so we can write $\frac{\rho(\boldsymbol{w}'_{\perp P})}{\rho(A')\Delta(\Lambda_P)}$ as $C \cdot \mathscr{D}^{mN}_{A'_{\perp P}}(\boldsymbol{x})$ where $C = \frac{\rho(A'_{\perp P})}{\rho(A')\Delta(\Lambda_P)}$. By summing over all $\boldsymbol{x} \in A'_{\perp P}$, we have that $C \in [\frac{1}{1+\varepsilon}, \frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}]$. Thus, $(\mathscr{D}^{mN}_{A'})_{\perp P}(\boldsymbol{x}) \in [\frac{1-\varepsilon}{1+\varepsilon}, \frac{1+\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon}] \cdot \mathscr{D}^{mN}_{A'_{\perp P}}(\boldsymbol{x})$ for any $\boldsymbol{x} \in A'_{\perp P}$, implying $(\mathscr{D}^{mN}_{A'})_{\perp P} \overset{\varepsilon'}{\approx} \mathscr{D}^{mN}_{A'_{\perp P}}$. □

B Proof of Lemma 16

Proof. First, let H_i denote the distribution where h_i is sampled from according to HG. One can view HG as independently sampling $h_i \leftarrow H_i$ for $i \in [q]$. For any $i \in S$, $h_1, \ldots, h_{i-1}$, and input x, define

$$Y_i(x, h_1, \ldots, h_{i-1}) := \Pr_{h_i \leftarrow H_i, \ldots, h_q \leftarrow H_q}[I = i : (I, \mathrm{Out}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(x, h_1, \ldots, h_q)] .$$

Then, we have

$$\begin{aligned}\mathrm{acc}(\mathcal{A}) &= \sum_{i\in S} \mathop{\mathsf{Pr}}_{\substack{x\leftarrow\mathsf{IG},\\(h_1,\ldots,h_q)\leftarrow\mathsf{HG}}} [I = i : (I, \mathrm{Out}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(x, h_1, \ldots, h_q)] \\ &= \sum_{i\in S} \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\substack{x\leftarrow\mathsf{IG},\\ h_1\leftarrow H_1,\ldots,h_{i-1}\leftarrow H_{i-1}}} [Y_i(x, h_1, \ldots, h_{i-1})] \,.\end{aligned}$$

Thus, we have

$$\begin{aligned}\mathrm{acc}(\mathsf{Fork}^{\mathcal{A}}) &= \sum_{i\in S} \mathop{\mathsf{Pr}}_{\substack{x\leftarrow\mathsf{IG},(h_1,\ldots,h_q)\leftarrow\mathsf{HG},\\ \bar{h}_i\leftarrow H_i,\ldots,\bar{h}_q\leftarrow H_q}} \left[I = \bar{I} = i : \begin{array}{l}(I, \mathrm{Out}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(x, h_1, \ldots, h_q),\\ (\bar{I}, \overline{\mathrm{Out}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(x, h_1, \ldots, h_{i-1}, \bar{h}_i, \ldots, \bar{h}_q)\end{array} \right] \\ &= \sum_{i\in S} \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\substack{x\leftarrow\mathsf{IG},\\ h_1\leftarrow H_1,\ldots,h_{i-1}\leftarrow H_{i-1}}} [Y_i(x, h_1, \ldots, h_{i-1})^2] \\ &\geqslant \sum_{i\in S} \left(\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\substack{x\leftarrow\mathsf{IG},\\ h_1\leftarrow H_1,\ldots,h_{i-1}\leftarrow H_{i-1}}} [Y_i(x, h_1, \ldots, h_{i-1})] \right)^2 \\ &\geqslant \frac{1}{|S|} \cdot \left(\sum_{i\in S} \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\substack{x\leftarrow\mathsf{IG},\\ h_1\leftarrow H_1,\ldots,h_{i-1}\leftarrow H_{i-1}}} [Y_i(x, h_1, \ldots, h_{i-1})] \right)^2 \\ &= \frac{\mathrm{acc}(\mathcal{A})^2}{|S|} \,,\end{aligned}$$

where the first inequality is due to the fact that $\mathsf{E}[X^2] \geqslant (\mathsf{E}[X])^2$ and the second inequality is due to the fact that $\sum_{i=1}^n a_i^2 \geqslant \frac{1}{n} \left(\sum_{i=1}^n a_i\right)^2$. □

C A useful inequality

Lemma 21. *For any $a, b \geqslant 0$ such that $a + b \leqslant 1$ and $\alpha \geqslant 1$, we have $a + b^\alpha \geqslant \frac{1}{\alpha}(a + b)^\alpha$.*

Proof. Let $f(x) = x + b^\alpha$ and $g(x) = \frac{1}{\alpha}(x + b)^\alpha$. Since $f(0) = b^\alpha \geqslant \frac{1}{\alpha} b^\alpha = g(0)$ and $f'(x) = 1 \geqslant (x + b)^{\alpha-1} = g'(x)$ for $x \geqslant 0$, we know $f(x) \geqslant g(x)$ for $0 \leqslant x \leqslant 1 - b$, we have $f(x) \geqslant g(x)$ for $0 \leqslant x \leqslant 1 - b$, which shows the statement. □