Paper 2024/289

SoK: Parameterization of Fault Adversary Models - Connecting Theory and Practice

Dilara Toprakhisar, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
Svetla Nikova, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
Ventzislav Nikov, NXP Semiconductors, Leuven, Belgium
Abstract

Since the first fault attack by Boneh et al. in 1997, various physical fault injection mechanisms have been explored to induce errors in electronic systems. Subsequent fault analysis methods of these errors have been studied, and successfully used to attack many cryptographic implementations. This poses a significant challenge to the secure implementation of cryptographic algorithms. To address this, numerous countermeasures have been proposed. Nevertheless, these countermeasures are primarily designed to protect against the particular assumptions made by the fault analysis methods. These assumptions, however, encompass only a limited range of the capabilities inherent to physical fault injection mechanisms. In this paper, we narrow our focus to fault attacks and countermeasures specific to ASICs, and introduce a novel parameterized fault adversary model capturing an adversary's control over an ASIC. We systematically map (a) the physical fault injection mechanisms, (b) adversary models assumed in fault analysis, and (c) adversary models used to design countermeasures into our introduced model. This model forms the basis for our comprehensive exploration that covers a broad spectrum of fault attacks and countermeasures within symmetric key cryptography as a comprehensive survey. Furthermore, our investigation highlights a notable misalignment among the adversary models assumed in countermeasures, fault attacks, and the intrinsic capabilities of the physical fault injection mechanisms. Through this study, we emphasize the need to reevaluate existing fault adversary models, and advocate for the development of a unified model.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. CT-RSA
Keywords
Adversarial ModelsFault AttacksFault Countermeasures
Contact author(s)
dilara toprakhisar @ esat kuleuven be
svetla nikova @ esat kuleuven be
venci nikov @ gmail com
History
2024-02-23: approved
2024-02-20: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/289
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/289,
      author = {Dilara Toprakhisar and Svetla Nikova and Ventzislav Nikov},
      title = {{SoK}: Parameterization of Fault Adversary Models - Connecting Theory and Practice},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/289},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/289}
}
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