Paper 2024/1270
Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on 4 4 Rounds of SCARF under Single-Tweak Setting
Abstract
\scarf, an ultra low-latency tweakable block cipher, is the first cipher designed for cache randomization. The block cipher design is significantly different from the other common tweakable block ciphers; with a block size of only 10 bits, and yet the input key size is a whopping $240$ bits. Notably, the majority of the round key in its round function is absorbed into the data path through AND operations, rather than the typical XOR operations. In this paper, we present a key-recovery attack on a round-reduced version of SCARF with 4 4 rounds under the single-tweak setting. Our attack is essentially a Meet-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack, where the matching phase is represented by a system of linear equations. Unlike the cryptanalysis conducted by the designers, our attack is effective under both security requirements they have outlined. The data complexity of our attack is $2^{10}$ plaintexts, with a time complexity of approximately $2^{60.63}$ 4-round of SCARF encryptions. It is important to note that our attack does not threaten the overall security of SCARF.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Low-LatencyTweakableSCARFMeet-in-the-MiddleSingle-Tweak
- Contact author(s)
-
chensiwei @ hubu edu cn
kai hu @ sdu edu cn
liuguozhen @ ucas ac cn
niuzhongfeng @ ucas ac cn
quanquan001 @ e ntu edu sg
wangshichang @ iie ac cn - History
- 2024-08-12: approved
- 2024-08-11: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1270
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1270, author = {Siwei Chen and Kai Hu and Guozhen Liu and Zhongfeng Niu and Quan Quan Tan and Shichang Wang}, title = {Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on 4 4 Rounds of {SCARF} under Single-Tweak Setting}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1270}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1270} }