A new approach based on quadratic forms to attack the McEliece cryptosystem

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Abstract. We introduce a novel algebraic approach for attacking the McEliece cryptosystem which is currently at the 4-th round of the NIST competition. The contributions of the article are twofold. (1) We present a new distinguisher on alternant and Goppa codes working in a much broader range of parameters than [FGO$^+$11]. (2) With this approach we also provide a polynomial–time key recovery attack on alternant codes which are distinguishable with the distinguisher [FGO$^+$11].
These results are obtained by introducing a subspace of matrices representing quadratic forms. Those are associated with quadratic relations for the component-wise product in the dual of the Goppa (or alternant) code of the cryptosystem. It turns out that this subspace of matrices contains matrices of unusually small rank in the case of alternant or Goppa codes (2 or 3 depending on the field characteristic) revealing the secret polynomial structure of the code. MinRank solvers can then be used to recover the secret key of the scheme. We devise a dedicated algebraic modeling in characteristic 2 where the Gröbner basis techniques to solve it can be analyzed. This computation behaves differently when applied to the matrix space associated with a random code rather than with a Goppa or an alternant code. This gives a distinguisher of the latter code families, which contrarily to the one proposed in [FGO$^+$11] working only in a tiny parameter regime is now able to work for code rates above $\frac{2}{3}$. It applies to most of the instantiations of the McEliece cryptosystem in the literature. It coincides with the one of [FGO$^+$11] when the latter can be applied (and is therefore of polynomial complexity in this case). However, its complexity increases significantly when [FGO$^+$11] does not apply anymore, but stays subexponential as long as the co-dimension of the code is sublinear in the length (with an asymptotic exponent which is below those of all known key recovery or message attacks). For the concrete parameters of the McEliece NIST submission [ABC$^+$22], its complexity is way too complex to threaten the cryptosystem, but is smaller than known key recovery attacks for most of the parameters of the submission. This subspace of quadratic forms can also be used in a different manner to give a polynomial time attack of the McEliece cryptosystem based on generic alternant codes or Goppa codes provided that these codes are distinguishable by the method of [FGO$^+$11], and in the Goppa case we need the additional assumption that its degree is less than $q-1$, where q is the alphabet size of the code.

1 Introduction

The McEliece Cryptosystem

The McEliece encryption scheme [McE78], which is only a few months younger than RSA [RSA78], is a code-based cryptosystem built upon the family of binary Goppa codes. It is equipped with very fast encryption and decryption algorithms and has very small ciphertexts but large public key size. Contrarily to RSA which is broken by quantum computers [Sho94], it is also widely viewed as a viable quantum-safe cryptosystem. A variation of this public key cryptosystem intended to be IND-CCA secure and an associated key exchange protocol [ABC$^+$22] is one of the three remaining code-based candidates in the fourth round of the NIST post-quantum competition on post-quantum cryptography. Its main selling point for being standardized is that it is the oldest public key cryptosystem which has resisted all possible attacks be they classical or quantum so far, this despite very significant efforts to break it.

The consensus right now about this cryptosystem is that key-recovery attacks that would be able to exploit the underlying algebraic structure are way more expensive than message-recovery attacks that use decoding algorithms for generic linear codes. Because of this reason, the parameters of McEliece encryption scheme are chosen according to the latest algorithms for decoding a linear code. This is also actually another selling point for this cryptosystem, since despite significant efforts on improving the algorithms for decoding linear codes, all the classical algorithms for performing this task are of exponential complexity and this exponent has basically only decreased by less than 20 percent for most parameters of interest after more than 60 years of research [Pra62, Ste88, Dum89, CC98, MMT11, BJMM12, MO15, BM17]. The situation is even more stable when it comes to quantum algorithms [Ber10, KT17].

Key Recovery Attacks

The best key recovery attack has not changed for many years. It was given in [LS01] and consists in checking all Goppa polynomials and all possible supports with the help of [Sen00]. Its complexity is also exponential with an exponent which is much bigger than the one obtained for message recovery attacks. There has been some progress on this issue, not on the original McEliece cryptosystem, but on variations of it. This concerns very high rate binary Goppa codes for devising signature schemes [CFS01], non-binary Goppa codes over large alphabets [BLP10, BLP11], or more structured versions of the McEliece system, based on quasi-cyclic alternant codes [BCGO09, CBB$^+$17] (a family of algebraic codes containing Goppa codes retaining the essential algebraic features of Goppa codes) or on quasi-dyadic Goppa codes such as [MB09, BLM11, BBB$^+$17].

The quasi-cyclic or quasi-dyadic alternant/Goppa codes have been attacked in [FOPT10, GUL09, BC18] by providing a suitable algebraic modeling for the secret key and then solving the algebraic system with Gröbner bases techniques. This algebraic modeling tries to recover the underlying polynomial structure of

these codes coming from the underlying generalized Reed-Solomon structure by using just an arbitrary generator matrix of the alternant or Goppa code which is given by the public key of the scheme. This is basically the secret key of the scheme. It allows to decode the alternant or Goppa code and therefore all possible ciphertexts. Recall that a generalized Reed-Solomon code is defined by

Definition 1 (Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) code). *Let* $\boldsymbol{x} = (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in \mathbb{F}^n$ *be a vector of pairwise distinct entries and* $\boldsymbol{y} = (y_1, \ldots, y_n) \in \mathbb{F}^n$ *a vector of nonzero entries, where* $\mathbb{F}$ *is a finite field. The* generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) code *over* $\mathbb{F}$ *of dimension* k *with* support $\boldsymbol{x}$ *and* multiplier $\boldsymbol{y}$ *is*

$$\mathbf{GRS}_k(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}) \stackrel{def}{=} \{(y_1 P(x_1), \ldots, y_n P(x_n)) \mid P \in \mathbb{F}[z], \deg P < k\}.$$

Alternant codes are defined as subfield subcodes of GRS codes, meaning that an alternant code $\mathscr{A}$ of length n is defined over some field $\mathbb{F}_q$ whereas the underlying GRS code $\mathscr{C}$ is defined over an extension field $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$ of degree m. The alternant code is defined in this case as the set of codewords of the GRS code whose entries all belong to the subfield $\mathbb{F}_q$, *i.e*

$$\mathscr{A} = \mathscr{C} \cap \mathbb{F}_q^n.$$

Rather than trying to recover the polynomial structure of the underlying GRS code, the algebraic attack in [FOPT10] actually recovers the polynomial structure of the *dual code*. Recall that the dual code of a linear code is defined by

Definition 2 (dual code). *The dual* $\mathscr{C}^\perp$ *of a linear code* $\mathscr{C}$ *of length* n *over* $\mathbb{F}_q$ *is the subspace of* $\mathbb{F}_q^n$ *defined by* $\mathscr{C}^\perp \stackrel{def}{=} \{\boldsymbol{d} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n : \boldsymbol{d} \cdot \boldsymbol{c} = 0,\ \forall \boldsymbol{c} \in \mathscr{C}\}$, *where* $\boldsymbol{d} \cdot \boldsymbol{c} = \sum_{i=1}^n c_i d_i$ *with* $\boldsymbol{c} = (c_i)_{1 \leqslant i \leqslant n}$ *and* $\boldsymbol{d} = (d_i)_{1 \leqslant i \leqslant n}$.

The dual code of an alternant code has also a polynomial structure owing to the fact that the dual of a GRS code is actually a GRS code:

Proposition 1 ([MS86, Theorem 4, p. 304]). *Let* $\mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$ *be a GRS code of length* n. *Its dual is also a GRS code. In particular* $\mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^\perp = \mathbf{GRS}_{n-r}(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}^\perp)$, *with* $\boldsymbol{y}^\perp \stackrel{def}{=} \left(\frac{1}{\pi'_{\boldsymbol{x}}(x_1) y_1}, \ldots, \frac{1}{\pi'_{\boldsymbol{x}}(x_n) y_n}\right)$, *where* $\pi_{\boldsymbol{x}}(z) \stackrel{def}{=} \prod_{i=1}^n (z - x_i)$ *and* $\pi'_{\boldsymbol{x}}$ *is its derivative.*

It is actually the dual of the underlying GRS code which serves to define the multiplier and the support of an alternant code as shown by

Definition 3 (alternant code). *Let* $n \leqslant q^m$, *for some positive integer* m. *Let* $\mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$ *be the GRS code over* $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$ *of dimension* r *with support* $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^n$ *and multiplier* $\boldsymbol{y} \in (\mathbb{F}_{q^m}^*)^n$. *The* alternant code *with support* $\boldsymbol{x}$ *and multiplier* $\boldsymbol{y}$, degree r *over* $\mathbb{F}_q$ *is*

$$\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}) \stackrel{def}{=} \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^\perp \cap \mathbb{F}_q^n = \mathbf{GRS}_{n-r}(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}^\perp) \cap \mathbb{F}_q^n.$$

The integer m *is called* extension degree *of the alternant code.*

It is much more convenient to recover with an algebraic modeling the support and the multiplier of the dual of the underlying GRS code because *any* codeword $\boldsymbol{c} = (c_i)_{1 \leqslant i \leqslant n}$ of the alternant code $\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$ is readily seen to be orthogonal to any codeword $\boldsymbol{d}$ of $\mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$, *i.e.* $\boldsymbol{c} \cdot \boldsymbol{d} = 0$. The algebraic modeling of [FOPT10] is based on such equations where the unknowns are the entries of $\boldsymbol{x}$ and $\boldsymbol{y}$. Goppa codes can be recovered from this approach too, since they are particular alternant codes:

Definition 4 (Goppa code). *Let $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^n$ be a support vector and $\Gamma \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}[z]$ a polynomial of degree r such that $\Gamma(x_i) \neq 0$ for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$. The* Goppa code *of degree r with support $\boldsymbol{x}$ and* Goppa polynomial *Γ is defined as $\mathscr{G}(\boldsymbol{x}, \Gamma) \stackrel{def}{=} \mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$, where $\boldsymbol{y} \stackrel{def}{=} \left(\frac{1}{\Gamma(x_1)}, \ldots, \frac{1}{\Gamma(x_n)}\right)$.*

The algebraic modeling approach of [FOPT10] worked because the quasi cyclic/ dyadic structure allowed to reduce drastically the number of unknowns of the algebraic system when compared to the original McEliece cryptosystem. A variant of this algebraic modeling was introduced in [FPdP14] to attack certain parameters of the variant of the McEliece cryptosystem [BLP10, BLP11] based on wild Goppa codes/wild Goppa codes incognito. It only involves equations on the multiplier $\boldsymbol{y}$ of the Goppa code induced by the wild Goppa structure. The McEliece cryptosystem based on plain binary Goppa codes seems immune to both the approaches of [FOPT10] and [FPdP14]. The first one because the degree and the number of variables of the resulting system are most certainly too big to make such an approach likely to succeed if not at the cost of a very high exponential complexity (but this has to be confirmed by a rigorous analysis which is hard to perform because Gröbner bases techniques perform here very differently from a generic system). The second one because this modeling does not apply to binary Goppa codes. In particular, it needs a very small extension degree and a code alphabet size that are prime powers rather than prime.

It was also found that Gröbner bases techniques when applied to the algebraic system [FOPT10] behaved very differently when the system corresponds to a Goppa code instead of a random linear code of the same length and dimension. This approach led to [FGO$^+$11] that gave a way to distinguish high-rate Goppa codes from random codes. It is based on the kernel of a linear system related to the aforementioned algebraic system. It was shown there to have an unexpectedly high dimension when instantiated with Goppa codes or the more general family of alternant codes rather than with random linear codes. Another interpretation was later on given to this distinguisher in [MP12], where it was proved that the kernel dimension is related to the dimension of the square of the dual of the Goppa code. Very recently, [MT22] revisited [FGO$^+$11] and gave rigorous bounds for the dimensions of the square codes of Goppa or alternant codes and a better insight into the algebraic structure of these squares. Recall here that the component-wise/Schur product/square of codes is defined from the component-wise/Schur product of vectors $\boldsymbol{a} = (a_i)_{1 \leqslant i \leqslant n}$ and $\boldsymbol{b} = (b_i)_{1 \leqslant i \leqslant n}$

$$\boldsymbol{a} \star \boldsymbol{b} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (a_1 b_1, \ldots, a_n b_n)$$

by

Definition 5. *The* component-wise product of codes $\mathscr{C}, \mathscr{D}$ *over* $\mathbb{F}$ *with the same length* n *is defined as*

$$\mathscr{C} \star \mathscr{D} \stackrel{def}{=} \langle \boldsymbol{c} \star \boldsymbol{d} \mid \boldsymbol{c} \in \mathscr{C}, \boldsymbol{d} \in \mathscr{D} \rangle_{\mathbb{F}}.$$

If $\mathscr{C} = \mathscr{D}$*, we call* $\mathscr{C}^{\star 2} \stackrel{def}{=} \mathscr{C} \star \mathscr{C}$ *the* square code *of* $\mathscr{C}$*.*

The reason why Goppa codes behave differently from random codes for this product is essentially because the underlying GRS code behaves very abnormally with respect to the component-wise product. Indeed,

Proposition 2 ([CGG$^+$14]). *Let* $\mathbf{GRS}_k(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$ *be a GRS code with support* $\boldsymbol{x}$*, multiplier* $\boldsymbol{y}$ *and dimension* k*. We have* $\mathbf{GRS}_k(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{\star 2} = \mathbf{GRS}_{2k-1}(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y} \star \boldsymbol{y})$*. Hence, if* $k \leqslant \frac{n+1}{2}$*,* $\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}(\mathbf{GRS}_k(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}))^{\star 2} = 2k - 1$*.*

On the other hand, random linear codes behave very differently, because they attain with probability close to 1 [CCMZ15] the general upper bound on the dimension given by $\dim_{\mathbb{F}} \mathscr{C}^{\star 2} \leqslant \min\left(n, \binom{\dim_{\mathbb{F}} \mathscr{C}+1}{2}\right)$. In other words, the dimension of the square of a random linear code scales quadratically as long as the dimension is $k = \mathcal{O}(\sqrt{n})$ and attains after this the full dimension n, whereas the dimension of the square of a GRS code of dimension k increases only linearly in k. This peculiar property of GRS codes survives in an attenuated form in the square of the dual of an alternant/Goppa code as shown by [MT22].

This tool was also instrumental in another breakthrough in this area, namely that for the first time a polynomial attack [COT14, COT17] was found on the McEliece scheme when instantiated with Goppa codes. This was done by using square code considerations. However, this attack required very special parameters to be carried out: (i) the extension degree should be 2, (ii) the Goppa code should be a wild Goppa code. It is insightful to remark that this attack exploits the unusually low dimension of the square of wild Goppa codes when their dimension is low enough whereas the distinguisher of [FGO$^+$11] actually uses the small dimension of the square of the *dual* of a Goppa or alternant code. The dual of such codes has a much more involved structure, in particular it loses a lot of the nice polynomial structure of the Goppa code (this was essential in the attack performed in [COT14]). This is probably the reason why for a long time the distinguisher of [FGO$^+$11] has not turned into an actual attack. However, recently in [BMT23] it has been found out that in certain cases (i) very small field size $q = 2$ or $q = 3$ over which the code is defined, (ii) being a *generic alternant code* rather than being in the special case of Goppa code, (iii) being in the region of parameters where the distinguisher of [FGO$^+$11] applies, then this distinguisher can actually be turned into a polynomial-time attack. Note that [BMT23] also made some crucial improvements in the algebraic modeling of [FOPT10] (in particular by adding low-degree equations that take into account that the multiplier and support of the alternant/Goppa code should satisfy certain constraints).

A new approach

A first idea: non generic quadratic relations on the extended dual alternant/Goppa code. We devise in this work a radically new approach toward attacking the McEliece cryptosystem when it is based on alternant or Goppa codes. This leads to two new contributions : (1) a new distinguisher on alternant and Goppa codes and (2) a polynomial time key-recovery attack on the alternant and part of the Goppa codes that are distinguishable by [FGO$^+$11]. Both exploit the structure of the extension over a larger field of the dual of an alternant/Goppa code. The extension of a code over a field extension is given by

Definition 6 (Extension of a code over a field extension). *Let $\mathscr{C}$ be a linear code over $\mathbb{F}_q$. We denote by $\mathscr{C}_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}$ the $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$-linear span of $\mathscr{C}$ in $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}^n$.*

Definition 7 (Image of a code by the Frobenius map). *Let $\mathscr{C} \subseteq \mathbb{F}_{q^m}$ be a code, we define $\mathscr{C}^{(q)}$ as*

$$\mathscr{C}^{(q)} \stackrel{def}{=} \{(c_1^q, \dots, c_n^q) \mid (c_1, \dots, c_n) \in \mathscr{C}\}.$$

It turns out that the extension of the dual of an alternant code actually contains GRS codes and their images by the Frobenius map:

Proposition 3 ([BMT23]). *Let $\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$ be an alternant code over $\mathbb{F}_q$. Then $\big(\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^\perp\big)_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} = \sum_{j=0}^{m-1} \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^j)} = \sum_{j=0}^{m-1} \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}^{q^j}, \boldsymbol{y}^{q^j})$.*

Observe now that a GRS code contains non-zero codewords $\boldsymbol{c}_1$, $\boldsymbol{c}_2$, $\boldsymbol{c}_3$ satisfying a very peculiar property, namely

$$\boldsymbol{c}_1 \star \boldsymbol{c}_3 = \boldsymbol{c}_2^{\star 2}. \tag{1}$$

This can be seen by choosing $\boldsymbol{c}_1 = \boldsymbol{y}\boldsymbol{x}^a = (y_i x_i^a)_{1 \leqslant i \leqslant n}$, $\boldsymbol{c}_2 = \boldsymbol{y}\boldsymbol{x}^b = (y_i x_i^b)_{1 \leqslant i \leqslant n}$ and $\boldsymbol{c}_3 = \boldsymbol{y}\boldsymbol{x}^c = (y_i x_i^c)_{1 \leqslant i \leqslant n}$ for any a, b, c in $[\![0, r-1]\!]$ satisfying $b = \frac{a+c}{2}$. Such a relation is unlikely to hold in a random linear code of dimension k, unless it is of rate k/n close to 1. Therefore the dual code of our alternant or Goppa code contains very peculiar codewords. The issue is now how to find them?

A new concept: the code of quadratic relations. Equation (1) can be viewed as a quadratic relation between codewords. There is a natural object that can be brought in that encodes in a natural way quadratic relations

Definition 8 (Code of quadratic relations). *Let $\mathscr{C}$ be an $[n, k]$ linear code over $\mathbb{F}$ and let $\mathcal{V} = \{\boldsymbol{v}_1, \dots, \boldsymbol{v}_k\}$ be a basis of $\mathscr{C}$. The **code of relations between the Schur's products with respect to $\mathcal{V}$** is*

$$\mathscr{C}_{rel}(\mathcal{V}) \stackrel{def}{=} \{\boldsymbol{c} = (c_{i,j})_{1 \leqslant i \leqslant j \leqslant k} \mid \sum_{i \leqslant j} c_{i,j} \boldsymbol{v}_i \star \boldsymbol{v}_j = 0\} \subseteq \mathbb{F}^{\binom{k+1}{2}}.$$

Such an element $\boldsymbol{c} = (c_{i,j})_{1 \leqslant i \leqslant j \leqslant k}$ of $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{rel}}(\mathcal{V})$ defines a quadratic form as

$$Q_{\boldsymbol{c}}(x_1, \cdots, x_k) = \sum_{i \leqslant j} c_{i,j} x_i x_j.$$

When a basis $\mathcal{V}$ containing the aforementioned $\boldsymbol{c}_i$'s is chosen, there exists an element in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{rel}}(\mathcal{V})$ whose associated quadratic form is of the form $x_i x_j - x_\ell^2$ (for $\boldsymbol{v}_i = \boldsymbol{c}_1$, $\boldsymbol{v}_j = \boldsymbol{c}_3$, $\boldsymbol{v}_\ell = \boldsymbol{c}_2$). In other words, this quadratic form is of rank 3 (in odd characteristic). To find such non–generic elements in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{rel}}(\mathcal{V})$, it is convenient to represent the elements of $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{rel}}(\mathcal{V})$ as matrices corresponding to the bilinear map given by the polar form of the quadratic form, i.e. the matrix $\boldsymbol{M}_{\boldsymbol{c}}$ corresponding to $\boldsymbol{c} \in \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{rel}}(\mathcal{V})$ that satisfies for all $\boldsymbol{x}$ and $\boldsymbol{y}$ in $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}^k$

$$\boldsymbol{x}\boldsymbol{M}_{\boldsymbol{c}}\boldsymbol{y}^{\intercal} = Q_{\boldsymbol{c}}(\boldsymbol{x} + \boldsymbol{y}) - Q_{\boldsymbol{c}}(\boldsymbol{x}) - Q_{\boldsymbol{c}}(\boldsymbol{y}). \tag{2}$$

This definition allows to have a matrix definition of the quadratic form which works both in odd characteristic and characteristic 2 and which satisfies the crucial relation (3) when the basis is changed. Note that $\boldsymbol{M}_{\boldsymbol{c}}$ is symmetric in odd characteristic, whereas it is skew-symmetric in characteristic 2.

Remark 1. By *skew symmetric* matrices in characteristic 2 we mean symmetric matrices with zero diagonal.

Definition 9 (Matrix code of relations). *Let $\mathscr{C}$ be an $[n, k]$ linear code over $\mathbb{F}$ and let $\mathcal{V} = \{\boldsymbol{v}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{v}_k\}$ be a basis of $\mathscr{C}$. The* ***matrix code of relations between the Schur's products with respect to*** *$\mathcal{V}$ is*

$$\mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{V}) \stackrel{def}{=} \{\boldsymbol{M}_{\boldsymbol{c}} = (m_{i,j})_{\substack{1 \leqslant i \leqslant k \\ 1 \leqslant j \leqslant k}} \mid \boldsymbol{c} = (c_{i,j})_{1 \leqslant i \leqslant j \leqslant k} \in \mathscr{C}_{rel}(\mathcal{V})\} \subseteq \mathbf{Sym}(k, \mathbb{F}),$$

where $\boldsymbol{M}_{\boldsymbol{c}}$ is defined as $\begin{cases} m_{i,j} \stackrel{def}{=} m_{j,i} \stackrel{def}{=} c_{i,j}, & 1 \leqslant i < j \leqslant k, \\ m_{i,i} \stackrel{def}{=} 2c_{i,i}, & 1 \leqslant i \leqslant k. \end{cases}$

The previous discussion shows that if $\mathcal{V}$ contains the triple $\boldsymbol{c}_1$, $\boldsymbol{c}_2$, $\boldsymbol{c}_3$, then there exists a matrix of rank 3 in the matrix code of relations in odd characteristic. Note that the matrix is of rank 2 in characteristic 2 since the polar form corresponding to the quadratic form $Q(\boldsymbol{x}) = x_i x_j - x_\ell^2$ is given by $(x_i + y_i)(x_j + y_j) - (x_\ell + y_\ell)^2 - x_i x_j + x_\ell^2 - y_i y_j + y_\ell^2 = x_i y_j + x_j y_i$.

Now the point is that even if we do not have a basis containing the $\boldsymbol{c}_i$'s, there are still rank 3 (or 2) matrices in the matrix code of relations. This holds because a change of basis basically amounts to a congruent matrix code. Indeed if $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$ are two different bases of the same code, there exists (see Proposition 4) an invertible $\boldsymbol{P} \in \mathbb{F}^{k \times k}$ such that

$$\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A}) = \boldsymbol{P}^{\intercal} \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B}) \boldsymbol{P}. \tag{3}$$

Therefore for any choice of basis, there exists a rank 3 matrix in the corresponding matrix code of relations. Finding such matrices can be viewed as a MinRank problem for rank 3 with symmetric matrices

Problem 1 (Symmetric MinRank problem for rank r). Let $\boldsymbol{M}_1, \cdots, \boldsymbol{M}_K$ be K symmetric matrices in $\mathbb{F}^{N\times N}$. Find an $\boldsymbol{M} \in \langle \boldsymbol{M}_1, \cdots, \boldsymbol{M}_K \rangle_{\mathbb{F}}$ of rank r.

Of course, the dimension of the matrix code could be so large that there are rank 3 (or 2) matrices which are here by chance and which are not induced by these unusual quadratic relations between codewords of the GRS code. We will study this problem and will give in Section 4 bounds on the parameters of the problem which rule out this possibility. Basically, the parameters that we will encounter for breaking McEliece-type systems will avoid this phenomenon.

A dedicated algebraic approach for finding rank 2 elements in a skew-symmetric matrix code. There are many methods which can be used to solve the MinRank problem, be they combinatorial [GC00], based on an algebraic modeling and solving them with Gröbner basis or XL type techniques, such as [KS99, FLP08, FSEDS10, VBC$^+$19, BBC$^+$20] or hybrid methods [BBB$^+$22]. Basically all of them can be adapted to the symmetric MinRank problem. One of the most attractive methods for solving the problem for the parameters we have is the Support Minors approach introduced in [BBC$^+$20]. Unfortunately due to the symmetric or skew-symmetric form of the matrix space, solving the corresponding system with the proposed XL type approach behaves very differently from a generic matrix space and its complexity seems very delicate to predict. For this reason, we have devised another way of solving the corresponding MinRank problem in characteristic 2. First, we took advantage that the algebraic system describing the variety of skew-symmetric matrices of rank $\leqslant 2$ has already been studied in the literature and Gröbner bases are known. Next, we add to this Gröbner basis the linear equations expressing that the skew-symmetric matrix should also belong to the matrix code of relations. This allows us to understand the complexity of solving the corresponding algebraic system. It turns out that the Gröbner basis computation behaves very differently when applied to the skew-symmetric matrix space associated with a random code rather than with a Goppa or an alternant code. This clearly yields a way to distinguish a Goppa code or more generally an alternant code from a random code. Contrarily to the distinguisher that has been devised in [FGO$^+$11] which works only for a very restricted set of parameters, this new distinguisher basically works already for rates above $\frac{2}{3}$. This concerns an overwhelming proportion of code parameters that have been proposed (and all parameters of the NIST submission [ABC$^+$22]). Interestingly enough, for the code parameters where [FGO$^+$11] works, our new distinguisher coincides with it. Despite the fact that its complexity increases significantly when [FGO$^+$11] does not apply anymore, it stays subexponential as long as the co-dimension of the code is sublinear in the length. Interestingly enough in this regime, its asymptotic exponent is below those of all known key recovery or message attacks. For the concrete parameters of the McEliece NIST submission [ABC$^+$22], its complexity is too complex to threaten the cryptosystem, but is smaller than known key recovery attacks for most of the parameters of the submission.

A new attack exploiting rank defective matrices in the matrix code of relations. There is another way to exploit this matrix code which consists in observing that for a restricted set of code parameters (i) the degree r of the alternant code is less than $q+1$ or $q-1$ in the Goppa case, (ii) the code is distinguishable with the method of [FGO$^+$11], a rank defective matrix in the matrix code of relations leaks information on the secret polynomial structure of the code. This can be used to mount a simple attack by just (i) looking for such matrices by picking enough random elements in the matrix code and verifying if they are rank defective (ii) and then exploiting the information gathered here to recover the support and multiplier of the alternant/Goppa code.

Summary of the contributions. In a nutshell, our contributions are

- We introduce a new concept, namely the matrix code of quadratic relations which can be derived from the extended dual of the Goppa/alternant code for which we want to recover the polynomial structure. This is a subspace of symmetric or skew-symmetric matrices depending on the field characteristic over which the code is defined which has the particular feature of containing very low-rank matrices (rank 3 in odd characteristic, rank 2 in characteristic 2) which are related to the secret key of the corresponding McEliece cryptosystem.
- We devise a dedicated algebraic approach for finding these low-rank matrices in characteristic 2 when this subspace of matrices is formed by skew-symmetric matrices. It takes advantage of the fact that we know a Gröbner basis for the algebraic system expressing the fact that a skew-symmetric matrix is of rank $\leqslant 2$ based on the nullity of all minors of size greater than 2. This system can be solved with the help of Gröbner bases techniques. It turns out that the solving process behaves differently when applied to the matrix code of quadratic relations associated with a random linear code rather than with a Goppa or an alternant code. This gives a way to distinguish a Goppa code or more generally an alternant code from a random code which contrarily to the distinguisher of [FGO$^+$11, FGO$^+$13] works for virtually all code parameters relevant to cryptography (recall that the latter works only for very high rate Goppa or alternant codes). Moreover, the complexity of this system solving can be analyzed and an upper bound on the complexity of the distinguisher can be given. It is polynomial in the same regime of parameters when the distinguisher of [FGO$^+$11] works. Even if its complexity increases significantly outside this regime, it is less complex than all known attacks in the sublinear co-dimension regime. For the concrete NIST submission parameters [ABC$^+$22] its complexity is very far away from representing a threat, but is below the known key attacks for most of these parameters. This can be considered as a breakthrough in this area.
- Rank defective elements in this matrix space also reveal something about the hidden polynomial structure of the Goppa or alternant code in a certain parameter regime, namely when (i) the degree r of the alternant code is less than $q+1$ or $q-1$ in the Goppa case, (ii) the code is distinguishable with the

method of [FGO+11]. We use this to give a polynomial-time attack in such a case by just looking for rank defective elements with a random search. This complements nicely the polynomial attack which has been found in [BMT23] which also needs that the code is distinguishable with [FGO+11], but works in the reverse parameter regime $r \geqslant q+1$ (and has also additional restrictions, code alphabet size either binary or ternary and it does not work for Goppa codes). Note that in conjunction with the filtration of [BMT23], this new attack works for *any* distinguishable generic alternant code. This gives yet another example of a case when the distinguisher of [FGO+11] turns into an actual attack of the scheme.

2 Notation and preliminaries

2.1 Notation

General notation $[\![a, b]\!]$ indicates the closed integer interval between a and b. We will make use of two notations for finite fields, $\mathbb{F}_q$ denotes the finite field with q elements, but sometimes we do not indicate the size of it when it is not important to do so and simply write $\mathbb{F}$. Instead, a general field (not necessarily finite) is denoted by $\mathbb{K}$ and its algebraic closure by $\overline{\mathbb{K}}$.

Vector and matrix notation. Vectors are indicated by lowercase bold letters $\boldsymbol{x}$ and matrices by uppercase bold letters $\boldsymbol{M}$. Given a function f acting on $\mathbb{F}$ and a vector $\boldsymbol{x} = (x_i)_{1 \leqslant i \leqslant n} \in \mathbb{F}$, the expression $f(\boldsymbol{x})$ is the component-wise mapping of f on $\boldsymbol{x}$, i.e. $f(\boldsymbol{x}) = (f(x_i))_{1 \leqslant i \leqslant n}$. We will even apply this with functions f acting on $\mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F}$: for instance for two vectors $\boldsymbol{x}$ and $\boldsymbol{y}$ in $\mathbb{F}^n$ and two positive integers a and b we denote by $\boldsymbol{x}^a \boldsymbol{y}^b$ the vector $(x_i^a y_i^b)_{1 \leqslant i \leqslant n}$. We will use the same operation over matrices, but in order to avoid confusion with the matrix product, we use for a matrix $\boldsymbol{A} = (a_{i,j})_{i,j}$ the notation $\boldsymbol{A}^{(q)}$ which stands for the entries of $\boldsymbol{A}$ all raised to the power q, i.e. the entry (i, j) of $\boldsymbol{A}^{(q)}$ is equal to $a_{i,j}^q$. The scalar product between $\boldsymbol{x} = (x_i)_{1 \leqslant i \leqslant n} \in \mathbb{F}^n$ and $\boldsymbol{y} = (y_i)_{1 \leqslant i \leqslant n} \in \mathbb{F}^n$ is denoted by $\boldsymbol{x} \cdot \boldsymbol{y}$ and is defined by $\boldsymbol{x} \cdot \boldsymbol{y} = \sum_{i=1}^n x_i y_i$.

Symmetric and skew-symmetric matrices. The set of $k \times k$ symmetric matrices over $\mathbb{F}$ is denoted by $\mathbf{Sym}(k, \mathbb{F})$, whereas the corresponding set of skew-symmetric matrices is denoted by $\mathbf{Skew}(k, \mathbb{F}_q)$.

Vector spaces. Vector spaces are indicated by $\mathscr{C}$. For two vector spaces $\mathscr{C}$ and $\mathscr{D}$, the notation $\mathscr{C} \oplus \mathscr{D}$ means that the two vector spaces are in direct sum, i.e. that $\mathscr{C} \cap \mathscr{D} = \{0\}$. The $\mathbb{F}$-linear space generated by $\boldsymbol{x}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{x}_m \in \mathbb{F}^n$ is denoted by $\langle \boldsymbol{x}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{x}_m \rangle_{\mathbb{F}}$.

Codes. A linear code $\mathscr{C}$ of length n and dimension k over $\mathbb{F}$ is a k dimensional subspace of $\mathbb{F}^n$. We refer to it as an $[n, k]$-code.

Ideals. Ideals are indicated by calligraphic $\mathcal{I}$. Given a sequence S of polynomials, $\mathcal{I}(S)$ refers to the polynomial ideal generated by such sequence. Given the polynomials $f_1, \ldots, f_m$, we denote by $\mathcal{I}(f_1, \ldots, f_m)$ the ideal generated by them. The variety associated with a polynomial ideal $\mathcal{I} \subseteq \mathbb{K}[x_1, \ldots, x_n]$ is indicated by $\boldsymbol{V}(\mathcal{I})$ and defined as $\boldsymbol{V}(\mathcal{I}) = \{\boldsymbol{a} \in \overline{\mathbb{K}}^n \mid \forall f \in \mathcal{I},\ f(\boldsymbol{a}) = 0\}$.

2.2 Distinguishable Alternant or Goppa Code

We will frequently use here the term *distinguishable alternant/Goppa* (in the sense of [FGO$^+$11]) code. They are defined as

Definition 10 (Square–distinguishable alternant/Goppa code). *A (generic) alternant code $\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$ of length n over $\mathbb{F}_q$ and extension degree m is said to be* square–distinguishable *if*

$$n > \binom{rm+1}{2} - \frac{m}{2}(r-1)\left((2e_{\mathscr{A}}+1)r - 2\frac{q^{e_{\mathscr{A}}+1}-1}{q-1}\right) \tag{4}$$

where $e_{\mathscr{A}} \stackrel{def}{=} \max\{i \in \mathbb{N} \mid r \geqslant q^i + 1\} = \left\lfloor \log_q(r-1) \right\rfloor$.
A Goppa code $\mathscr{G}(\boldsymbol{x}, \Gamma)$ of the same parameters is said to be square–distinguishable *if*

$$n > \binom{rm+1}{2} - \frac{m}{2}(r-1)(r-2), \qquad \text{if } r < q-1 \tag{5}$$

$$n > \binom{rm+1}{2} - \frac{m}{2}r\left((2e_{\mathscr{G}}+1)r - 2(q-1)q^{e_{\mathscr{G}}-1} - 1\right), \qquad \text{otherwise,} \tag{6}$$

where $e_{\mathscr{G}} \stackrel{def}{=} \min\{i \in \mathbb{N} \mid r \leqslant (q-1)^2 q^i\} + 1 = \left\lceil \log_q\left(\frac{r}{(q-1)^2}\right)\right\rceil + 1$.

This definition is basically due to the fact that there is a way to distinguish such codes from random codes in this case [FGO$^+$11]. For our purpose, it is better to use the point of view of [MT22] and to notice that they are distinguishable because the computation of the dimension of the square of the dual code leads to a result which is different from n and $\binom{rm+1}{2}$ (which is the expected dimension of the square of a dual code of dimension rm). This is shown by

Theorem 1 ([MT22]) *For an alternant code $\mathbb{F}_q$ of length n and extension degree m we have*

$$\dim_{\mathbb{F}_q}(\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{\perp})^{\star 2} \leqslant \min\left\{n, \binom{rm+1}{2} - \frac{m}{2}(r-1)\left((2e_{\mathscr{A}}+1)r - 2\frac{q^{e_{\mathscr{A}}+1}-1}{q-1}\right)\right\}. \tag{7}$$

where $e_{\mathscr{A}} \stackrel{def}{=} \max\{i \in \mathbb{N} \mid r \geqslant q^i + 1\} = \left\lfloor \log_q(r-1) \right\rfloor$.
For a Goppa code $\mathscr{G}(\boldsymbol{x}, \Gamma)$ of length n over $\mathbb{F}_q$ with Goppa polynomial $\Gamma(X) \in$

$\mathbb{F}_{q^m}[X]$ *of degree* r *we have*

$$\dim(\mathscr{G}(\boldsymbol{x},\Gamma)^{\perp})^{\star 2} \leqslant \min\left\{n, \binom{rm+1}{2} - \frac{m}{2}(r-1)(r-2)\right\}, \quad \text{if } r < q-1 \tag{8}$$

$$\dim(\mathscr{G}(\boldsymbol{x},\Gamma)^{\perp})^{\star 2} \leqslant \min\left\{n, \binom{rm+1}{2} - \frac{m}{2}r\left((2e_{\mathscr{G}}+1)r - 2(q-1)q^{e_{\mathscr{G}}-1} - 1\right)\right\}, \quad \text{otherwise,} \tag{9}$$

where $e_{\mathscr{G}} \stackrel{def}{=} \min\{i \in \mathbb{N} \mid r \leqslant (q-1)^2 q^i\} + 1 = \left\lceil \log_q\left(\frac{r}{(q-1)^2}\right)\right\rceil + 1$.

3 Invariants of the Matrix Code of Quadratic Relations

3.1 Changing the basis

The fundamental objects that we have introduced, namely the code of relations $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{rel}}(\mathcal{V})$ and the corresponding matrix code $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{V})$ both depend on the basis $\mathcal{V}$ which is chosen. However, all these matrix codes are isometric for the rank metric, namely the metric d between matrices given by

$$d(\boldsymbol{X},\boldsymbol{Y}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{X}-\boldsymbol{Y}).$$

This holds because of the following result:

Proposition 4. *Let* $\mathcal{A}$ *and* $\mathcal{B}$ *be two bases of a same* $[n,k]$ $\mathbb{F}$*-linear code* $\mathscr{C}$*, with* $\mathbb{F}$*. Then* $\mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{A})$ *and* $\mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{B})$ *are isometric matrix codes, i.e. there exists* $\boldsymbol{P} \in \mathbf{GL}_k(\mathbb{F})$ *such that*

$$\mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{A}) = \boldsymbol{P}^{\intercal}\mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{B})\boldsymbol{P}. \tag{10}$$

The matrix $\boldsymbol{P}$ *coincides with the change of basis matrix between* $\mathcal{A}$ *and* $\mathcal{B}$*.*

This Proposition is proved in Appendix B. This result implies that there are several fundamental quantities which stay invariant when considering different bases, such as for instance

- the distribution of ranks $\{n_i, 0 \leqslant i \leqslant k\}$ where n_i is the number of matrices in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{V})$ of rank i;
- the dimension of $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{V})$.

We will sometime avoid specifying the basis, and simply write $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}$, when referring to invariants for the code.

3.2 Dimension

We can be a little bit more specific concerning the dimension. In general, two different bases of a same code provide different codes of relations. The corresponding dimension, instead, is an invariant:

Proposition 5. *Let $\mathscr{C} \subseteq \mathbb{F}^n$ be an $[n,k]$ linear code with ordered basis $\mathcal{V}$. Then*

$$\dim_{\mathbb{F}} \mathscr{C}_{rel}(\mathcal{V}) = \binom{k+1}{2} - \dim_{\mathbb{F}} \mathscr{C}^{\star 2}$$
$$\dim_{\mathbb{F}} \mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{V}) = \dim_{\mathbb{F}} \mathscr{C}_{rel}(\mathcal{V}).$$

Proof. The first point directly follows by applying the rank-nullity theorem with respect to the map $T\colon \mathbb{F}^{\binom{k+1}{2}} \to \mathbb{F}^n$, $T(\boldsymbol{c}) = \sum_{i \leqslant j} c_{i,j} \boldsymbol{v}_i \star \boldsymbol{v}_j$:

$$\binom{k+1}{2} = \dim_{\mathbb{F}} \mathbb{F}^{\binom{k+1}{2}} = \dim_{\mathbb{F}} \mathrm{Im}(T) + \dim_{\mathbb{F}} \ker(T) = \dim_{\mathbb{F}} \mathscr{C}^{\star 2} + \dim_{\mathbb{F}} \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{rel}}(\mathcal{V}).$$

For the second point, consider the linear map

$$\begin{cases} \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{rel}}(\mathcal{V}) \longrightarrow \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{V}) \\ \boldsymbol{c} \quad \longmapsto \quad \boldsymbol{M}_{\boldsymbol{c}}, \end{cases}$$

where $\boldsymbol{M}_{\boldsymbol{c}}$ is defined in Definition 9. Note that $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{V})$ is defined as the image of the above map, hence the map is surjective by design. Let us prove that it is injective. In odd characteristic, it is straightforward to see that the kernel of this map is zero. In even characteristic the kernel of this map is composed of "diagonal" relations, *i.e.*, relations of the form

$$\sum_{i=1}^{k} c_{i,i} \boldsymbol{v}_i \star \boldsymbol{v}_i = 0. \tag{11}$$

Note that writing $\boldsymbol{v}_i = (v_{i1}, \ldots, v_{in})$ we have $\boldsymbol{v}_i \star \boldsymbol{v}_i = (v_{i1}^2, \ldots, v_{in}^2)$ which is nothing but the vector $\boldsymbol{v}_i^{(2)}$ obtained by applying the componentwise Frobenius map on the entries of $\boldsymbol{v}_i$. Next, by the additivity of the Frobenius map, relation (11) becomes

$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} c_{i,i}^{1/2} \boldsymbol{v}_i \right)^{(2)} = 0 \quad \text{and hence,} \quad \sum_{i=1}^{n} c_{i,i}^{1/2} \boldsymbol{v}_i = 0.$$

The latter identity is a linear relation between the $\boldsymbol{v}_i$'s which form a basis of $\mathcal{V}$, hence, we deduce that $c_{i,i} = 0$ for all i. Thus, the kernel of the map is also zero in characteristic 2. □

4 Low-rank matrices in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathbf{mat}}$

4.1 Low-rank matrices from quadratic relations in [FGO+13]

By Proposition 4, all the matrix codes $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ are isometric for any choice of basis $\mathcal{B}$. We will be interested here in showing that the matrix code of quadratic relations associated to the extension over $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$ of the dual of an alternant code $\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$ defined over $\mathbb{F}_q$ contains many low rank matrices. This is due to the

fact that this code contains the GRS codes $\mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}^{q^i}, \boldsymbol{y}^{q^i})$ for all $i \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$ (Proposition 3). This will be clear if we choose the basis appropriately. We can namely choose the ordered basis

$$\mathcal{A} = (\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{x}\boldsymbol{y}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{x}^{r-1}\boldsymbol{y}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{y}^{q^{m-1}}, (\boldsymbol{x}\boldsymbol{y})^{q^{m-1}}, \ldots, (\boldsymbol{x}^{r-1}\boldsymbol{y})^{q^{m-1}}). \tag{12}$$

We call this the *canonical basis*. It will be convenient to denote the r first basis elements by $\boldsymbol{a}_0 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \boldsymbol{y}$, $\boldsymbol{a}_1 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \boldsymbol{x}\boldsymbol{y}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{a}_{r-1} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \boldsymbol{x}^{r-1}\boldsymbol{y}$ and view the basis as

$$\mathcal{A} = (\boldsymbol{a}_0, \cdots, \boldsymbol{a}_{r-1}, \boldsymbol{a}_0^q, \cdots, \boldsymbol{a}_{r-1}^q, \cdots, \boldsymbol{a}_0^{q^{m-1}}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{a}_{r-1}^{q^{m-1}}).$$

There are simple quadratic relations between the $\boldsymbol{a}_i^{q^j}$ owing to the trivial algebraic relations introduced in [FGO+13]: $(\boldsymbol{x}^a\boldsymbol{y})^{q^l} \star (\boldsymbol{x}^b\boldsymbol{y})^{q^u} = (\boldsymbol{x}^c\boldsymbol{y})^{q^l} \star (\boldsymbol{x}^d\boldsymbol{y})^{q^u}$ if $aq^l + bq^u = cq^l + dq^u$. This amounts to the quadratic relation between the basis elements

$$\boldsymbol{a}_a^{q^l} \star \boldsymbol{a}_b^{q^u} - \boldsymbol{a}_c^{q^l} \star \boldsymbol{a}_d^{q^u} = 0. \tag{13}$$

It is readily seen that matrix of $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ corresponding to this quadratic relation is of rank 4 with the exception of the case $c = d$ and $l = u$ where it is of rank 3 (odd characteristic) or rank 2 (characteristic 2). Indeed, if we reorder the basis $\mathcal{B}$ such that it starts with $\boldsymbol{a}_a^{q^l}$, $\boldsymbol{a}_b^{q^l}$, $\boldsymbol{a}_c^{q^l}$, then it is readily seen that the matrix $\boldsymbol{M} \in \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ corresponding to (13) has only zeros with the exception of the first 3×3 block $\boldsymbol{M}'$ which is given by

$$\boldsymbol{M}' = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & -2 \end{bmatrix} \text{ (odd characteristic)}, \quad \boldsymbol{M}' = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \text{ (characteristic 2)}.$$

This leads to the following fact

Fact 1 *Consider the alternant code $\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$ of extension degree m and let $\mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{A})$ be the corresponding matrix code associated to the basis choice* (12)*. Let $l \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$ and a, b, c in $[\![0, r-1]\!]$ be such that $a + b = 2c$. Then the matrix of $\mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{A})$ corresponding to the quadratic relation $\boldsymbol{a}_a^{q^l} \star \boldsymbol{a}_b^{q^l} - \left(\boldsymbol{a}_c^{q^l}\right)^{\star 2} = 0$ is of rank 3 in odd characteristic and of rank 2 in characteristic 2.*

This already shows that there are many rank 2 or 3 matrices in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}$ corresponding to an alternant code. But it will turn out some subsets of the set of rank $\leqslant 2$ matrices of $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}$ form a vector space of matrices. Moreover, depending on the fact that the alternant code has a Goppa structure we will have even more low rank matrices as we show below. We namely have in characteristic 2

Proposition 6. *Let $\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$ be an alternant code of extension degree m and order r over a field of characteristic 2. Then $\mathscr{C}_{mat}$ contains $\left\lfloor \frac{r-1}{2} \right\rfloor$-dimensional subspaces of rank-($\leqslant 2$) matrices. If $\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$ is a binary Goppa code with a square-free Goppa polynomial, then $\mathscr{C}_{mat}$ contains $(r-1)$-dimensional subspaces of rank-($\leqslant 2$) matrices.*

This proposition is proved in Appendix §C.1. We can also give a lower bound on the number of such matrices as shown by

Proposition 7. *Let $\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$ be an alternant code in characteristic 2 and extension degree m. The matrix code of quadratic relationships $\mathscr{C}_{mat}$ contains at least $\Omega(m(q^{m(r-2)})$ matrices of rank 2.*

In the particular case of binary Goppa codes associated to a square-free polynomial (i.e. the standard choice in a McEliece cryptosystem) we have

Proposition 8. *Let $\mathscr{G}(\boldsymbol{x}, \Gamma)$ be a binary Goppa code of extension degree m with Γ a square-free polynomial of degree r. Then $\mathscr{C}_{mat}$ contains at least*

$$m\frac{(q^{mr}-1)(q^{m(r-1)}-1)}{q^{2m}-1}$$

matrices of rank 2.

These propositions are proved in Appendix §C.1. It also turns out that for the "canonical" choice mentioned above (namely when choosing the basis $\mathcal{A}$ given in (12)) under certain circumstances, $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}$ contains the subspace of block diagonal skew symmetric matrices with blocks of size r

Proposition 9. *Let $\mathscr{G}(\boldsymbol{x}, \Gamma)$ be a binary $[n, n-rm]$ Goppa code with Γ a square-free polynomial of degree r and let $\mathcal{A}$ be the canonical basis of $\mathscr{G}(\boldsymbol{x}, \Gamma)^{\perp}_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}$ given in (12) with $\boldsymbol{y} = \frac{1}{\Gamma(\boldsymbol{x})}$. Then $\mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{A})$ contains the space of block-diagonal skew-symmetric matrices with $r \times r$ blocks.*

4.2 The random case

We have described in the previous subsection a family of matrices in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ with a small rank. In particular, we found rank 3 matrices for odd characteristic and rank 2 matrices for even characteristic. In the case of binary Goppa codes with square-free Goppa polynomial, the subspace generated by such rank 2 matrices is even bigger. Since the two codes $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ and $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ have the same weight distribution, the same number of low-rank matrices must exist for $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ as well. We may wonder if such low-rank matrices exist in the matrix code of relationships $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{R})$ of an $[n, rm]$ random $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$-linear code $\mathscr{R}$ with basis $\mathcal{R}$. This can be determined by computing the Gilbert-Varshamov distance d_{GV} for spaces of symmetric (resp. skew-symmetric) matrices, which is the smallest d such that

$$|\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{R})||B_d^{(\mathbf{Sym})}| \geqslant |\mathbf{Sym}(rm, \mathbb{F}_{q^m})|, \tag{14}$$

$$|\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{R})||B_d^{(\mathbf{Skew})}| \geqslant |\mathbf{Skew}(rm, \mathbb{F}_{q^m})|, \tag{15}$$

where $B_d^{(\mathbf{Sym})}$ (resp. $B_d^{(\mathbf{Skew})}$) is the ball of radius d (with respect to the rank metric) of the space of symmetric (resp. skew-symmetric) matrices. The rationale of this definition is that it can be proved that for a random linear code $\mathscr{C}$ the

probability of having a non zero matrix of rank $\leqslant d$ in $\mathscr{C}$ is upper-bounded by the ratio $\frac{|\mathscr{C}||B_d^{(\mathbf{Sym})}|}{|\mathbf{Sym}(rm,\mathbb{F}_{q^m})|}$ in the symmetric case. A similar bound holds in the skew-symmetric case. In a low dimension scenario, more precisely when $\binom{rm+1}{2} \leqslant n$, the code $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{R})$ is expected to be trivial. This corresponds indeed to the square distinguishable regime. We will then assume $\binom{rm+1}{2} > n$.

Proposition 10. *Let $\mathscr{R} \subset \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^n$ be a random code of dimension rm with basis $\mathcal{R}$ and let $\binom{rm+1}{2} > n$. Under the assumption that $\mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{R})$ has the same the rank weight distribution as a random linear matrix code, it contains matrices of rank $\leqslant d$ with non-negligible probability iff*

$$n \leqslant drm - \binom{d}{2} \qquad \textit{(symmetric case)}$$

$$n \leqslant (d+1)rm - \binom{d+1}{2} \qquad \textit{(skew-symmetric case)}$$

This proposition is proved in §C.2. In particular, we expect rank-3 symmetric matrices in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{R})$ for

$$n \leqslant 3rm - 3 \tag{16}$$

and rank-2 skew-symmetric matrices in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{R})$ in characteristic 2 for

$$n \leqslant (2+1)rm - \binom{2+1}{2} = 3rm - 3$$

as well. We observe that for all security levels of Classic McEliece [ABC+22], the code rate is such that $n = \alpha rm$ with $\alpha \in (3.5, 5)$. This means that any algorithm that finds low-rank matrices in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{R})$ represents a distinguisher between Goppa codes (and more in general alternant codes) and random linear codes for Classic McEliece rates.

5 A New Distinguisher of Alternant and Goppa Codes in Characteristic 2

We are going to focus here on the particular case of characteristic 2 where we want to find rank 2 matrices in the matrix code of quadratic relations. We are going to consider a particular algebraic modeling for finding matrices of this kind for which we can estimate the running time of Gröbner bases algorithms for solving it. We will show that the behavior of the Gröbner basis computation is quite different when applied to the matrix code corresponding to an alternant (or a Goppa) code rather than to the matrix code corresponding to a random code of the same dimension and length as the alternant/Goppa code. This provides clearly a distinguisher of an alternant or Goppa code whose complexity can be estimated. Interestingly enough, it coincides with the square distinguisher of [FGO+11] for the parameters where the latter applies, but it also permits to distinguish other parameters and can distinguish Goppa or alternant codes of rate in the range $[\frac{2}{3}, 1]$, contrarily to the former which works only for rate extremely close to 1.

5.1 A modeling coming from the Pfaffian ideal.

We are first going to give an algebraic modelling expressing that a skew-symmetric matrix $\boldsymbol{M}$ with arbitrary entries is of rank $\leqslant 2$. To do so, we express the fact that all minors of size 4 should be zero. This implies that $\boldsymbol{M}$ should be of rank $\leqslant 2$, because any skew-symmetric matrix is of even rank and therefore cannot have rank 3. In other words, let us consider the generic skew-symmetric matrix $\boldsymbol{M} = (m_{i,j})_{i,j} \in \mathbf{Skew}(s, \mathbb{F}_{q^m})$, whose entries $m_{i,j}$ with $1 \leqslant i < j \leqslant s$ are independent variables. Let $\boldsymbol{m} = (m_{i,j})_{1 \leqslant i < j \leqslant s}$. We will write sometimes $m_{j,i}$ with $i < j$, this must just be seen as an alias for $m_{i,j}$ and not as another variable. We denote by $\mathbf{Minors}(\boldsymbol{M}, d)$ the set of all minors of $\boldsymbol{M}$ of size d. The set of specializations of $\boldsymbol{M}$ that provide rank 2 matrices is the variety of the determinantal ideal generated by $\mathbf{Minors}(\boldsymbol{M}, 3)$. We refer the reader to [MS05, § 15.1] Since there do not exist rank 3 matrices in $\mathbf{Sym}(s, \mathbb{F}_{q^m})$, the ideal generated by each possible 4×4 minor of $\boldsymbol{M}$ leads to the same variety:

$$\boldsymbol{V}(\mathcal{I}(\mathbf{Minors}(\boldsymbol{M}, 3))) = \boldsymbol{V}(\mathcal{I}(\mathbf{Minors}(\boldsymbol{M}, 4))).$$

The homogeneous ideal $\mathcal{I}(\mathbf{Minors}(\boldsymbol{M}, 2l))$ is not radical. The determinant of a generic skew-symmetric matrix of size $2l \times 2l$ is the square of a polynomial of degree l, called *Pfaffian* [Wim12, § 1.1]. It is well-known that the corresponding radical ideal is generated by the square roots of a subset of minors, namely those corresponding to a submatrix with the same subset for row and column indexes. Note that such matrices are skew-symmetric as well, and thus their determinant is the square of a Pfaffian polynomial. In particular, we define

Definition 11 (Pfaffian ideal for rank 2). *The Pfaffian ideal of rank 2 for $\boldsymbol{M}$ in characteristic 2 is*

$$\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M}) \stackrel{def}{=} \mathcal{I}\left(m_{i,j}m_{k,l} + m_{i,k}m_{j,l} + m_{i,l}m_{j,k} \mid 1 \leqslant i < j < k < l \leqslant s\right), \quad (17)$$

Remark 2. Note that in the definition of the Pfaffian ideal (17), the 4-tuple (i, j, k, l) is given by distinct values. Indeed, if two indexes are equal then the following expression

$$m_{i,j}m_{k,l} + m_{i,k}m_{j,l} + m_{i,l}m_{j,k}$$

vanishes identically. Thus these equations do not have to be considered.

We have

Proposition 11 ([HT92, Theorem 5.1]). *The basis $\{m_{i,j}m_{k,l} + m_{i,k}m_{j,l} + m_{i,l}m_{j,k} \mid 1 \leqslant i < j < k < l \leqslant s\}$ is a Gröbner basis of $\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M})$ with respect to a suitable order.*

Another straightforward result is that

Proposition 12. *We have $\boldsymbol{V}(\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M})) = \boldsymbol{V}(\mathcal{I}(\mathbf{Minors}(\boldsymbol{M}, 4)))$.*

Proof. One can verify that for any $f \in \mathbf{Minors}(\boldsymbol{M}, 4)$, $f \in \mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M})$ and for any f in the basis of $\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M})$, $f \in \sqrt{\mathcal{I}(\mathbf{Minors}(\boldsymbol{M}, 4))}$. By Hilbert's Nullstellensatz, the thesis follows. □

Our modeling takes advantage of the deep knowledge we have about this ideal. We express now the fact that a matrix $\boldsymbol{M}$ of size s belongs to some matrix code $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}$ associated to an $[n, k]$ code (which implies that $s = n - k$ since we are looking at quadratic relations on the *dual* code) by $t \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \binom{s}{2} - \dim \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}$ linear equations $L_1 = 0, \ldots, L_t = 0$ linking the $m_{i,j}$'s. The linear relations can be obtained as follows:

- We start from a parity–check matrix $\boldsymbol{H} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{s \times n}$ of the code.
- We compute a basis of the code of quadratic relations described in Definition 8 and deduce basis of the space space $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}$ of symmetric (resp. skew symmetric) matrices as described in Definition 9.
- Once we have a basis of $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}$, we compute a basis of its dual which can be described as a basis of symmetric (resp. skew symmetric) matrices $\boldsymbol{D}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{D}_t$ satisfying
$$\forall \boldsymbol{M} \in \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}},\ \forall i \in \{1, \ldots, t\}, \quad \mathrm{Tr}(\boldsymbol{D}_i \boldsymbol{M}) = 0.$$
This provides the expected t linear relations $L_1, \ldots, L_t$ on symmetric (resp. skew symmetric) which are satisfied by the elements of $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}$.

The algebraic modeling we use to express that an element $\boldsymbol{M}$ of $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}$ is of rank $\leqslant 2$ uses these t linear equations and the Gröbner basis of the Pfaffian ideal. In other words, we have the following algebraic modeling

Modeling 1 ($\boldsymbol{M} \in \mathscr{C}_{\mathbf{mat}}$, $\mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{M}) \leqslant 2$)

- $\binom{s}{4}$ *quadratic equations* $m_{i,j}m_{k,l} + m_{i,k}m_{j,l} + m_{i,l}m_{j,k} = 0$ *where* $1 \leqslant i < j < k < l \leqslant s$
- $t \stackrel{def}{=} \binom{s}{2} - \dim \mathscr{C}_{mat}$ *linear equations* $L_1 = 0, \ldots, L_t = 0$ *linking the* m_{ij}*'s expressing the fact that* $\boldsymbol{M}$ *belongs to* $\mathscr{C}_{mat}$.

5.2 Gröbner bases and Hilbert series

We will be interested in computing the Hilbert series of the ideal corresponding to Modeling 1 because it will turn out to behave differently depending on the code we use for defining the associated matrix code $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}$. This will lead to a distinguisher of alternant or Goppa codes. Given a homogeneous ideal $\mathcal{I} \in \mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{z}]$, $\boldsymbol{z} = (z_1, \ldots, z_n)$, the Hilbert function of the ring $R = \mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{z}]/\mathcal{I}$ is defined as

$$HF_R(d) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \dim_{\mathbb{K}}(R) = \dim_{\mathbb{K}}(\mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{z}]_d) - \dim_{\mathbb{K}}(\mathcal{I}_d),$$

where $\mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{z}]_d = \{f \in \mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{z}] \mid \deg(f) = d\}$ and $\mathcal{I}_d = \mathcal{I} \cap \mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{z}]_d$. Then the Hilbert series of R is the formal series

$$HS_R(t) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{d \geqslant 0} HF_R(d) t^d.$$

We are interested in computing individual terms $HF_R(d)$. This can be done by computing the rank of the Macaulay matrix at degree d by taking m generators of the ideal $\mathcal{I}$ (see Appendix A). An upper bound on its cost can therefore be derived directly from [BFS15, Proposition 1]:

Proposition 13. *Let $F = \{f_1, \ldots, f_m\} \subset \mathbb{K}[z_1, \ldots, z_n]$ be a homogeneous system. Let $\mathcal{I}$ be the corrresponding ideal. The term $HF_R(d)$ of degree d of the Hilbert function of $R = \mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{z}]/\mathcal{I}$ can be computed in time bounded by*

$$\mathcal{O}\left(md\binom{n+d-1}{d}^{\omega}\right),$$

where ω is the linear algebra exponent.

Fortunately, the Hilbert function for our Pfaffian ideal is known. We define the quotient ring

$$R(\boldsymbol{M}) = \mathbb{F}_{q^m}[\boldsymbol{m}]/\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M}).$$

The Hilbert function (or equivalently the Hilbert series) of $R(\boldsymbol{M})$ is well-known:

Proposition 14 ([GK04, (from) Theorem 1]). *Let $\boldsymbol{M} = (m_{i,j})_{i,j}$ be the generic $s \times s$ skew-symmetric matrix over $\mathbb{F}$. Then $\dim \boldsymbol{V}(\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M})) = 2s-3$ and*

$$HF_{R(\boldsymbol{M})}(d) = \binom{s+d-2}{d}^2 - \binom{s+d-2}{d+1}\binom{s+d-2}{d-1},$$

$$HS_{R(\boldsymbol{M})}(z) = \frac{\sum_{d=0}^{s-3}\left(\binom{s-2}{d}^2 - \binom{s-3}{d-1}\binom{s-1}{d+1}\right)z^d}{(1-z)^{2s-3}}.$$

The term corresponding to $HF_{R(\boldsymbol{M})}(d)$ can also be rewritten as a Narayana number:

$$HF_{R(\boldsymbol{M})}(d) = \frac{1}{s+d-1}\binom{s+d-1}{d+1}\binom{s+d-1}{d}.$$

Modeling 1 adds linear equations to it expressing the fact that the matrix should also be in the matrix code of quadratic relations. There is one handy tool that allows to compute the Hilbert series obtained by enriching with polynomials an ideal whose Hilbert series is known.

Proposition 15 ([Bar04, Lemma 3.3.2]). *As long as there are no reductions to 0 in the F5 algorithm, the Hilbert function $HF_{\mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{x}]/\mathcal{I}(f_1,\ldots,f_m)}(d)$ satisfies the following recursive formula:*

$$HF_{\mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{x}]/\mathcal{I}(f_1,\ldots,f_m)}(d) = HF_{\mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{x}]/\mathcal{I}(f_1,\ldots,f_{m-1})}(d) - HF_{\mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{x}]/\mathcal{I}(f_1,\ldots,f_{m-1})}(d-d_m)$$

where $d_m = \deg(f_m)$.

Essentially, reductions to 0 in F5 correspond to "non generic" reductions to 0 and experimentally we have not observed this behavior for Modeling 1 when we add the linear equations expressing that $\boldsymbol{M}$ belongs to the matrix code $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}$ of relations associated to a random linear code.

5.3 Analysis of the Hilbert series for the Pfaffian ideal

We will from now on consider that the matrix code $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}$ of quadratic relations is associated to a code $\mathscr{C}$ over $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$ of parameters $[n, mr]$ which are the same as those of the extended dual code $\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{\perp}_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}$ of an alternant code $\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{\perp}$ of length n over $\mathbb{F}_q$ and extension degree m which we assume to be of generic dimension $k = n - mr$. We will from now on also assume that the $[n, mr]$ code $\mathscr{C}$ we consider satisfies

$$\dim \mathscr{C}^{\star 2} = n. \tag{18}$$

Equivalently, we suppose that the code is not square distinguishable and will look for another and more powerful distinguisher. This corresponds to the generic case of a random code as soon as $\binom{rm+1}{2} \geqslant n$ and to duals of alternant codes/Goppa codes that are not square–distinguishable. Recall that, from Proposition 5,

$$\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{V}) = \binom{mr+1}{2} - \dim_{\mathbb{F}} \mathscr{C}^{\star 2} = \binom{mr}{2} + mr - n = \binom{mr}{2} - k,$$

where $k \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} n - rm$ is given above and corresponds to the dimension of the alternant code we are interested in. Notice that k is also the cardinality of the set of independent linear equations expressing in Modeling 1 that the $rm \times rm$ matrix $\boldsymbol{M}$ belongs to $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}$ since $\binom{rm}{2} - \dim \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}} = k$. We are now going to show that the Hilbert function of the ring $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}[\boldsymbol{m}]/(\mathcal{P}(\boldsymbol{M}) + \langle L_i \rangle_i)$ differs starting from some degree $\bar{d}$ depending on how the linear relations L_i's are defined (coming from $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}$ associated to a random $\mathscr{C}$ or to the extended dual of an alternant or Goppa code). We will assume that the parameters of our matrix code are such that we do not expect a matrix or rank 2 when $\mathscr{C}$ is random, which according to Proposition 10 holds as soon as $n > 3rm - 3$, *i.e* essentially for $k/n > 2/3$.

Random case. We assume that there are no reductions to 0 in F5 and that we can apply Proposition 15

$$\begin{aligned} HF_{\mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{z}]/(\mathcal{I}+\mathcal{I}(L_1,\ldots,L_\ell))}(d) &= HF_{\mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{z}]/(\mathcal{I}+\mathcal{I}(L_1,\ldots,L_{\ell-1}))}(d) - HF_{\mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{z}]/(\mathcal{I}+\mathcal{I}(L_1,\ldots,L_{\ell-1}))}(d-1) \\ &= \cdots \\ &= HF_{\mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{z}]/\mathcal{I}}(d) - \sum_{i=0}^{\ell-1} HF_{\mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{z}]/(\mathcal{I}+\mathcal{I}(L_1,\ldots,L_i))}(d-1), \end{aligned}$$

which, by induction, leads to

$$HF_{\mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{z}]/(\mathcal{I}+\mathcal{I}(L_1,\ldots,L_\ell))}(d) = \sum_{i=0}^{d} (-1)^i \binom{\ell}{i} HF_{\mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{z}]/\mathcal{I}}(d-i).$$

This holds as long as there are no reductions to 0 in F5. When there are, we expect that the Hilbert series at this degree is zero, which means that the induction formula should be

$$HF_{\mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{z}]/(\mathcal{I}+\mathcal{I}(f))}(d) = \max(HF_{\mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{z}]/\mathcal{I}}(d) - HF_{\mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{z}]/\mathcal{I}}(d-\bar{d}), 0).$$

This leads to the following conjecture, experimentally supported.

Conjecture 1 (Random case) *Let $L_1, \ldots, L_k$ be the $k = n - rm$ linear relations relative to the matrix code $\mathscr{C}_{mat}$ associated to a random $[n, rm]$-code as above. Let $\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M}) \stackrel{def}{=} \mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M}) + \mathcal{I}(L_1, \ldots, L_k)$. If $HF_{\mathbb{F}[\boldsymbol{m}]/\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})}(d') > 0$ for all $d' < d$, then*

$$\begin{aligned} HF_{\mathbb{F}[\boldsymbol{m}]/\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})}(d) &= \max\left(0, \sum_{i=0}^{d} (-1)^i \binom{k}{i} HF_{\mathbb{F}[\boldsymbol{m}]/\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M})}(d-i)\right) \\ &= \max\left(0, \sum_{i=0}^{d} \frac{(-1)^i}{rm+d-i-1} \binom{k}{i} \binom{rm+d-i-1}{d-i+1} \binom{rm+d-i-1}{d-i}\right). \end{aligned} \tag{19}$$

Otherwise $HF_{\mathbb{F}[\boldsymbol{m}]/\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})}(d) = 0$.

Because we assume that Modeling 1 has only zero for solution in the case of a random code, there exists a d such that $HF_{\mathbb{F}[\boldsymbol{m}]/\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})}(d) = 0$. Experiments (see Appendix D.2) lead to conjecture the following behavior:

Conjecture 2 *Let $\mathscr{C}_{mat}$ be the matrix code of relations originated by a random $[n, rm]$ code as above. Let $\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})$ the corresponding Pfaffian ideal and $d_{reg} = \min\{d : HF_{\mathbb{F}[\boldsymbol{m}]/\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})}(d) = 0\}$. Then*

$$d_{reg} \sim c\frac{(rm)^2}{n - rm}$$

for a constant c equal or close to $\frac{1}{4}$.

The value d_{reg} is known in the literature as the **degree of regularity**.

Alternant/Goppa case. In the alternant/Goppa case however the Hilbert series never vanishes because the variety of solutions has always positive dimension. We can even lower its dimension by a rather large quantity.

Proposition 16. *Let $\mathscr{C}_{mat}$ be the matrix code of quadratic relations corresponding to the extended dual of an $[n, n - rm]$ binary Goppa code with a square-free Goppa polynomial. Let $\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})$ be the corresponding Pfaffian ideal. Then* $\dim \boldsymbol{V}(\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})) \geqslant 2r - 3$.

Proof. Consider the matrix space $\mathscr{D}$ of all skew-symmetric matrices that are 0 outside the top-left $r \times r$ diagonal block and let $\boldsymbol{M}'$ be the generic matrix in this space. We have that $\dim \boldsymbol{V}(\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M}')) = \dim \boldsymbol{V}(\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{N}))$, where $\boldsymbol{N}$ is the generic skew-symmetric matrix of size $r \times r$. We recall from Proposition 14 that the dimension of the variety of the generic Pfaffian ideal $\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{N})$ is $2r-3$. Proposition 9 states that $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ contains the subspace of block-diagonal skew-symmetric matrices (with $r \times r$ blocks). This implies $\mathscr{D} \subseteq \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ and thus

$$\dim \boldsymbol{V}(\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})) \geqslant \dim \boldsymbol{V}(\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M}')) = \dim \boldsymbol{V}(\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{N})) = 2r - 3.$$

□

More in general, we can upper bound the dimension of the variety using the following proposition, whose proof is given in Appendix D.1.

Proposition 17. *Let $\mathscr{C}_{mat}$ be the matrix code of quadratic relations corresponding to the extended dual of an $[n, n-rm]$ alternant code over a field of even characteristic. Let $\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})$ be the corresponding Pfaffian ideal. Then* $\dim \boldsymbol{V}(\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})) \geqslant r-2$.

Remark 3. Equalities in the two previous propositions were met in the experiments we performed. Note that, comparing with Proposition 6, the Pfaffian ideal contains subspaces of dimension roughly half the dimension of the variety.

Now, as a consequence of the variety not being trivial, we have

Proposition 18. *Let $\mathscr{C}_{mat}$ be the matrix code of quadratic relations corresponding to the extended dual of an $[n, n-rm]$ alternant code. Let $\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})$ be the corresponding Pfaffian ideal. For all $d \in \mathbb{N}$, $HF_{\mathbb{F}[\boldsymbol{m}]/\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})}(d) > 0$.*

Proof. Assume by contradiction that $\exists d \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $HF_{\mathbb{F}[\boldsymbol{m}]/\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})}(d) = 0$. Therefore

$$\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}(\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M}))_d = \dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} \mathbb{F}_{q^m}[\boldsymbol{m}]_d,$$

i.e. all the monomials of degree d belong to $\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})$, in particular all the monomials $m_{i,j}^d$. This implies that the only element in the variety of $\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})$ is the zero matrix (with some multiplicity). This is in contradiction with the existence of rank 2 matrices in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}$ that must therefore be solutions of the Pfaffian system. □

Computing the Hilbert function up to some degree d provides a distinguisher as soon as it assumes a different value depending on whether it refers to random or alternant/Goppa codes. Thanks to Proposition 18, this will happen at the latest at the degree of regularity d_{reg} corresponding to a random code.

An extension of the distinguisher of [FGO$^+$11]. All these considerations lead to a very simple distinguisher of alternant or more specifically of Goppa codes, we compute for a code $HF_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}[\boldsymbol{m}]/\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})}(d)$ at a certain degree (where $\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})$ is the associated Pfaffian ideal), and say that it does not behave like a random code if this Hilbert function evaluated at degree d does not coincide with the formula we expect from a random code which is given in Conjecture 1. This leads us to the following definition

Definition 12 (d-distinguishable). *An $[n, rm]$ $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$-linear code $\mathscr{C}$ is said to be d-distinguishable from a generic $[n, rm]$ linear code over $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$ when the following holds*

$$HF_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}[\boldsymbol{m}]/\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})}(d) \neq \max\left(0, \sum_{i=0}^{d} \frac{(-1)^i}{rm+d-i-1}\binom{n-rm}{i}\binom{rm+d-i-1}{d-i+1}\binom{rm+d-i-1}{d-i}\right)$$

where $\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})$ is the Pfaffian ideal associated to $\mathscr{C}$.

Note that in general

$$HF_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}[\boldsymbol{m}]/\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})}(1) = \dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B}).$$

Hence, a different evaluation of the Hilbert function in degree 1 witnesses an unusually large dimension of $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ and consequently an atypically small dimension of the square code. Indeed, this corresponds to the square distinguisher from [FGO$^+$11]. Being 1-distinguishable is therefore being square-distinguishable. In this sense, this new distinguisher generalizes the square-distinguisher of [FGO$^+$11].

We can readily find examples of codes which are not square-distinguishable (or what is the same 1-distinguishable), but are distinguishable for higher values of d. For instance, Table 1 gives examples of generic alternant codes which are not 1-distinguishable for the lengths $n \leqslant 124$ but which are 2-distinguishable in the range $n \in [\![76, 256]\!]$. Goppa codes are for the same parameters not 1-distinguishable as soon as $n \leqslant 96$, but are distinguishable in the range $n \in [\![75, 256]\!]$. Note that in the same range we can even distinguish a generic alternant code from a Goppa code. As was the case for the square distinguisher of [FGO$^+$11], Goppa codes are easier to distinguish from random codes than generic alternant codes. This also holds for our new distinguisher. We give in Table 2 an example of this kind. The binary Goppa codes in this table are 2-distinguishable in the length range $n \in [\![59, 64]\!]$, whereas the generic alternant codes are not distinguishable at all. Note that none of the examples in this table are square-distinguishable.

$HF_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}[\boldsymbol{m}]/\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})}(2)$	$256 \geqslant n \geqslant 77$	$n = 76$	$n = 75$	$n = 74$	$n = 73$	...
Random code	0	10	71	133	196	...
Alternant code	**20**	**20**	71	133	196	...
Goppa code	**80**	**80**	**80**	133	196	...

Table 1: Hilbert function at degree 2 with respect to random, alternant and Goppa codes with parameters $q = 4, m = 4, r = 4$. The evaluations in bold correspond to distinguishable lengths.

$HF_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}[\boldsymbol{m}]/\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})}(2)$	$n = 64$	$n = 63$	$n = 62$	$n = 61$	$n = 60$	$n = 59$	$n = 58$	...
Random code	2718	2826	2935	3045	3156	3268	3381	...
Alternant code	2718	2826	2935	3045	3156	3268	3381	...
Goppa code	**2971**	**2971**	**2971**	**3048**	**3158**	**3269**	3381	...

Table 2: Hilbert function at degree 2 with respect to random, alternant and Goppa codes with parameters $q = 2, m = 6, r = 3$. The evaluations in bold correspond to distinguishable lengths.

For the time being, we have only a limited understanding of how $HF_{\mathbb{F}[\boldsymbol{m}]/\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})}(d)$ behaves for alternant/Goppa codes. However in the case of binary square-free Goppa code, *i.e.* those used in McEliece's schemes, we can significantly improve upon the $HF_{\mathbb{F}[\boldsymbol{m}]/\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})}(d) > 0$ lower bound as shown by

Theorem 2 *Let $\mathscr{G}(\boldsymbol{x}, \Gamma)$ be a non distinguishable binary $[n, k = n - rm]$ Goppa code with Γ a square-free polynomial of degree r and extension degree m. Let $\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})$ be the corresponding Pfaffian ideal. Then, for all $d > 0$,*

$$HF_{\mathbb{F}_{2^m}[\boldsymbol{m}]/\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})}(d) \geqslant m\left(\binom{r+d-2}{d}^2 - \binom{r+d-2}{d+1}\binom{r+d-2}{d-1}\right).$$

The proof is given in Appendix D. Theorem 2 has some theoretical interest, because it shows that the distinguisher can be further improved by analyzing the matrix code of relations obtained from a Goppa code.

5.4 Complexity of computing the distinguisher and comparison with known key and message attacks

Complexity of computing the distinguisher. The complexity of computing the distinguisher is upper-bounded by using Proposition 13

Proposition 19. *The computation of $HF_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}[\boldsymbol{m}]/\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})}(d)$ for the Pfaffian ideal associated to an $[n, mr]$-code has complexity*

$$\mathcal{O}\left(d\left(n - rm + \binom{rm}{4}\right)\binom{\binom{rm}{2} + d - 1}{d}^{\omega}\right),$$

where ω is the linear algebra exponent.

Proof. This proposition follows on the spot from Proposition 13, since the number of variables is $\binom{rm}{2}$ (the number of independent entries in a skew symmetric of size rm), the number of independent linear equations is $n - rm$ and the number of quadratic equations is $\binom{rm}{4}$. □

However, in the case at hand, we can use Wiedemann's algorithm, because (i) we know the Hilbert function for the Pfaffian ideal associated to an $[n, mr]$ random code, and know when it is equal to 0, namely for $d = d_{\text{reg}}$ (ii) we only have to check whether at degree $d = d_{\text{reg}}$ the Macaulay matrix $\text{Mac}(F, d_{\text{reg}})$ has a non zero kernel, (iii) this Macaulay matrix is sparse, since the Pfaffian equations contain only 3 quadratic monomials, and therefore the number of entries in a row of $\text{Mac}(F, d_{\text{reg}})$ is upper-bounded with the number of nonzero entries of the polynomial $\boldsymbol{m}^{\alpha} L(\boldsymbol{m})$, where $\boldsymbol{m}$ is the variable vector of the matrix entries, $L = 0$ is one of the k linear equations and α is a multi-index exponent of multi-degree $d_{\text{reg}} - 1$. This quantity clearly coincides with the number of nonzero entries of L itself and can be upper bounded by $\binom{rm}{2} - k + 1$ thanks to Gaussian elimination. Therefore the complexity of the sparse linear algebra approach becomes by using Wiedemann's algorithm

Proposition 20. *Checking whether a code is an alternant code or a generic linear code can be performed with a complexity upper-bounded by*

$$\mathcal{O}\left(\left(\binom{rm}{2}-k+1\right)\binom{\binom{rm}{2}+d_{reg}-1}{d_{reg}}^2\right).$$

Complexity of the standard approach for key recovery. Recall that it consists in guessing the irreducible Goppa polynomial Γ and the support set of coordinates. After that, the Support Splitting Algorithm (SSA) [Sen00] checks whether the public code is permutation equivalent to the guessed Goppa code. The cost of the SSA on the Goppa code $\mathscr{C}$ has been estimated with

$$\mathcal{O}\left(n^3+q^h n^2\log(n)\right),$$

where n is the code length and $h \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \dim(\mathscr{C}\cap\mathscr{C}^{\perp})$. Despite being exponential in the hull dimension, the latter is typically trivial or it has a very small dimension. Therefore the permutation equivalence code verification usually boils down to a polynomial-time subroutine and we ignore its cost in the comparison. The number of possible support coordinate sets is $\binom{q^m}{n}$, while the number of irreducible degree-r polynomials over $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$ is given by

$$\frac{1}{r}\sum_{a|r}\mu(a)(q^m)^{\frac{r}{a}},$$

where μ is the Möbius function. Therefore the total complexity of this approach can be estimated as

$$\mathcal{O}\left(\frac{\binom{q^m}{n}}{r}\sum_{a|r}\mu(a)(q^m)^{\frac{r}{a}}\right). \tag{20}$$

Comparison of distinguisher with the key-attack. The comparison of all the methods we have just presented is given in Table 3 with respect to Classic McEliece parameters. We remark that, using sparse linear algebra, we can improve upon the classical method for all parameters except those for category 5. Note that in this case the Goppa code is full-support and therefore the support coordinates do not need to be guessed, leading to a big improvement upon non-full support instances. However, our distinguisher suffers less than the standard key-recovery algorithm from taking instances that are not full support. Indeed, if we consider the same r and m used in Category 5, but a smaller length n, then our distinguisher approach outperforms the previous one. In fact, this can be seen directly from Category 3, which shares the same r and m with Category 5, but it is not full support.

We also remark that our distinguishing modeling works for any alternant code, while the classical key-recovery procedure described here is specific for Goppa codes. Indeed, guessing a valid pair of support $\boldsymbol{x}$ and multiplier $\boldsymbol{y}$ for a

Category	n	r	m	d_{reg}	R	classical key-recovery $\mathbb{C} = \frac{\binom{2^m}{n}}{r} \sum_{a\mid r} \mu(a)(2^m)^{\frac{r}{a}}$	dense linear algebra $\mathbb{C} = \binom{rm}{4} d_{\mathrm{reg}} \binom{\binom{rm}{2}-k+d_{\mathrm{reg}}-1}{d_{\mathrm{reg}}}^{\omega}$	sparse linear algebra $\mathbb{C} = 3(\binom{rm}{2}-k+1)\binom{\binom{rm}{2}+d_{\mathrm{reg}}-1}{d_{\mathrm{reg}}}^{2}$
1	3488	64	12	84	0.7798	$2^{2476} \cdot 2^{762} = 2^{3238}$	2^{3141}	2^{2231}
2	4608	96	13	212	0.7292	$2^{8093} \cdot 2^{1241} = 2^{9334}$	2^{7931}	2^{5643}
3	6688	128	13	229	0.7512	$2^{5629} \cdot 2^{1657} = 2^{7286}$	2^{9030}	2^{6425}
4	6960	119	13	169	0.7777	$2^{4997} \cdot 2^{1540} = 2^{6537}$	2^{6779}	2^{4822}
5	8192	128	13	154	0.7969	$2^{0} \cdot 2^{1657} = 2^{1657}$	2^{6329}	2^{4501}

Table 3: Computational cost comparison between *this* distinguisher and retrieving the permutation equivalence

generic alternant code is dramatically more costly for two reasons. First of all, the n multiplier coordinates y_i's are independent and do not have a compact representation through a degree-r polynomial. Moreover, in order to guess a correct code permutation, the support and multiplier coordinate indexes must correspond.

In Figure 1 we show the growth of the degree of regularity d_{reg} for a random $[n = 2^m, n - rm]$ code, for fixed m. The graph is defined on the integer interval whose endpoints are given by the smallest value of r for which [FGO+11] is not able to distinguish a binary Goppa code and the largest value for which this new modeling is able to distinguish respectively. Note that in this case the rate is decreasing. On the other hand, Figure 2 provides the degree of regularity d_{reg} and the complexity estimate using sparse linear algebra, for m fixed, r growing and $n = 5rm$, *i.e.* for the fixed rate $R = 4/5$. The domain of the graph is computed in the same way as for Figure 1.



(a) d_{reg} (b) complexity (logarithmic scale)

Figure 1: Growth of the degree regularity in function of r for fixed m



(a) d_{reg} (b) complexity (logarithmic scale)

Figure 2: Degree of regularity and complexity cost with respect to sparse linear algebra for the fixed rate $R = 4/5$

Sublinear regime. It is insightful to study the asymptotic complexity of distinguishing an $[n, rm]$-code in the sublinear regime, when the dimension rm is sublinear in the codelength n and to compare it with key and message attacks. Assume that $rm = \Theta(n^\alpha)$ where $\alpha \in [\frac{1}{2}, 1)$. We will also be interested in the case where the code is a binary Goppa code. To simplify a little bit the discussion and to minimize the complexity of the known key attack, we will assume that we have a Goppa code of full support, i.e. $n = 2^m$.

A binary Goppa code of length n, extension degree m and degree r allows to correct r errors. Because the number of errors to decode is sublinear in the codelength, the complexity C_{mess} of message attacks for binary $[n, n-mr]$ Goppa codes (namely that of decoding r errors in an $[n, n-mr]$ code) is of the form $2^{-r\log_2(1-R)(1+o(1))}$ for the best known generic decoding algorithms by [CS16] where R is the code rate, i.e. $R = \frac{n-mr}{n}$. We clearly have $\log_2(\mathrm{C}_{\text{mess}}) = (1-\alpha)rm(1+o(1))$ since $-\log_2(1-R) = -\log_2\left(\frac{rm}{n}\right) = (1-\alpha)\log n(1+o(1))$.

On the other hand, the complexity C_{key} of key attacks is of the form $\mathcal{O}\left(2^{rm(1+o(1))}\right)$ in the full support case. Here we have $\log_2(\mathrm{C}_{\text{key}}) = rm(1+o(1))$. Our distinguisher has complexity C_{dist} which can be estimated through Proposition 20 and d_{reg} by Conjecture 2, from which we readily obtain that $\log_2(\mathrm{C}_{\text{dist}}) = 4\alpha c\frac{(rm)^2}{n}\log n(1+o(1))$, where c is the constant appearing in Conjecture 2. This whole discussion is summarized in Table 4. The complexity of key attacks is bigger than the complexity of message attacks, however now asymptotically the complexity of the distinguisher is *significantly lower* than both attacks: message attacks gain a constant factor $1-\alpha$ in the exponent when compared to key attacks, whereas the distinguisher gains a *polynomial factor* $\Theta\left(\frac{rm}{n}\log n\right) = o(1)$ in the exponent with respect to both key and message attacks.

type	Key attack	Message attack	distinguisher
$\log_2 C$	$rm(1+o(1))$	$(1-\alpha)rm(1+o(1))$	$4\alpha c\frac{(rm)^2}{n}\log n(1+o(1))$

Table 4: Logarithm of the complexity C of different attacks for full support $n = 2^m$ binary $[n, n-mr]$ Goppa codes in the sublinear codimension regime $rm = \Theta(n^\alpha)$, where $\alpha \in [\frac{1}{2}, 1)$.

6 An attack on distinguishable random alternant codes, without the use of Gröbner bases

We are going to present now a polynomial time attack on square-distinguishable generic alternant codes defined over $\mathbb{F}_q$ as soon as the degree r satisfies $r < q+1$ by using this new notion of the matrix code of quadratic relations. We also recall that a square-distinguishable alternant code must have degree $r \geqslant 3$ [FGO$^+$11]. If we combine this together with the filtration technique of [BMT23] which allows to compute from a square-distinguishable alternant code of degree r satisfying $r \geqslant q+1$ an alternant code with the same support but of degree $r-1$ we obtain an attack on all square-distinguishable generic alternant codes. This is a big improvement on the attack presented in [BMT23] which needed two conditions to hold (1) a square-distinguishable alternant code (2) q is either 2 or 3. Moreover [BMT23] could not handle the subcase where the alternant code is actually a Goppa code, whereas our new attack is able to treat this case at least in the case $r < q-1$. We present in Table 5 a summary of the attacks. In other words, all square-distinguishable generic alternant codes can now be attacked. The reason why for the time being the square-distinguishable Goppa codes are out of reach, is that the filtration technique of [BMT23] for reducing the degree of the code does not work for the special case of Goppa codes.

code	technique/paper	$r(\geqslant 3)$	q
(generic) square-distinguishable alternant code	[BMT23]	any	$\in \{2,3\}$
(generic) square-distinguishable alternant code	this paper	$< q+1$	any
(generic) square-distinguishable alternant code	this paper + filtration techn. of [BMT23]	any	any
square-distinguishable Goppa codes	this paper	$< q-1$	any

Table 5: Summary of the attacks against square-distinguishable codes . The column q corresponds to the restrictions on q for the attack to work and the column r has the same meaning for the parameter r.

Thus, from now on, we will consider an alternant code $\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}) \subseteq \mathbb{F}_q^n$ of extension degree m which is such that $r < q+1$. For generic alternant codes, this corresponds to the square-distinguisher case with $e = 0$. If instead the alternant code is also Goppa, then we restrict ourselves to the case of $r < q-1$. We will show now how to recover $\boldsymbol{x}$ and $\boldsymbol{y}$ from the knowledge of a generator matrix of

this code by making use of the matrix code of quadratic relations associated to the extended dual code over $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$.

The idea

We first present the underlying idea by picking the canonical basis $\mathcal{A}$ (12) and the parity-check matrix $\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{A}}$ of $\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{y})_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}$ whose rows correspond to the elements of $\mathcal{A}$ in that same order. Recall that this basis can be written as

$$\mathcal{A} = (\boldsymbol{a}_1, \cdots, \boldsymbol{a}_r, \boldsymbol{a}_1^q, \cdots, \boldsymbol{a}_r^q, \cdots, \boldsymbol{a}_1^{q^{m-1}}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{a}_r^{q^{m-1}}).$$

We also assume q is odd for now. The crucial point is that, with the assumption of a square-distinguishable generic alternant code (resp. Goppa code) with $r < q+1$ (resp. $r < q-1$), the analysis provided in [FGO$^+$11] implies that the matrix code is generated by *all and only* relations of the kind

$$\boldsymbol{y}^{q^l}\boldsymbol{x}^{aq^l} \star \boldsymbol{y}^{q^l}\boldsymbol{x}^{bq^l} = \boldsymbol{y}^{q^l}\boldsymbol{x}^{cq^l} \star \boldsymbol{y}^{q^l}\boldsymbol{x}^{dq^l}$$

where l is arbitrary in $[\![0, m-1]\!]$ and a, b, c, d in $[\![0, r-1]\!]$ such that $a+b = c+d$. This corresponds to the quadratic relation

$$\boldsymbol{a}_{a+1}^{q^l} \star \boldsymbol{a}_{b+1}^{q^l} - \boldsymbol{a}_{c+1}^{q^l} \star \boldsymbol{a}_{d+1}^{q^l} = 0.$$

The related code of relations $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ has therefore a block diagonal structure with blocks of size r, *i.e.*, for each element in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$, the entries outside the m diagonal blocks of size $r \times r$ are 0. Thus, an element $\boldsymbol{A}$ of $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ has the following block shape:

$$\boldsymbol{A} = \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_{0,0} & & & \\ & \boldsymbol{A}_{1,1} & & \boldsymbol{0} \\ & & \ddots & \\ & \boldsymbol{0} & & \boldsymbol{A}_{m-1,m-1} \end{bmatrix} \tag{21}$$

where the diagonal blocks $\boldsymbol{A}_{i,i}$ are symmetric and of size r. Clearly $\mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{A}_{i,i}) \leqslant r$ and, because of the block diagonal shape, $\mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{A}) = \sum_i \mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{A}_{i,i})$. Now assume that $\boldsymbol{A}$ happens to be minimally rank defective, i.e.

$$\mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{A}) = rm - 1.$$

It means that for exactly one index $j \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$, $\mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{A}_{j,j}) = r-1$, and for all $i \in [\![0, m-1]\!] \backslash \{j\}$, $\mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{A}_{i,i}) = r$. We consider the left kernel of (the map corresponding to) the matrix $\boldsymbol{A}$, simply denoted by $\ker(\boldsymbol{A})$. Note that, if we identify row vectors with column vectors, left and right kernels are the same in this case, as $\boldsymbol{A}$ is symmetric. Since $\mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{A}) = rm-1$, we have $\dim(\ker(\boldsymbol{A})) = 1$. Let $\boldsymbol{v} = (\boldsymbol{v}_0, \ldots, \boldsymbol{v}_{m-1}) \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^{rm}$ be a generator of $\ker(\boldsymbol{A})$, with $\boldsymbol{v}_i \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^r$. Because of the block diagonal structure of $\boldsymbol{A}$, $\boldsymbol{v}$ must satisfy

$$\boldsymbol{v} = (\boldsymbol{0}_r, \ldots, \boldsymbol{0}_r, \boldsymbol{v}_j, \boldsymbol{0}_r, \ldots, \boldsymbol{0}_r).$$

In other words, the computation of this nullspace provides information about the position of the vectors generating a single GRS code $\mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}^{q^j}, \boldsymbol{y}^{q^j})$. The key idea is that if enough of such vectors are found, a basis of the corresponding GRS code can be retrieved.

6.1 Choosing $\mathcal{B}$ with a special shape

Consider an ordered basis

$$\mathcal{B} = (\boldsymbol{b}_1, \dots, \boldsymbol{b}_r, \boldsymbol{b}_1^q, \dots, \boldsymbol{b}_r^q, \dots, \boldsymbol{b}_1^{q^{m-1}}, \dots, \boldsymbol{b}_r^{q^{m-1}}) \tag{22}$$

of $\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{\perp}_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}$. Such a basis can be computed by drawing $\boldsymbol{b}_1, \dots, \boldsymbol{b}_r \in \mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{\perp}_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}$ at random, applying the Frobenius map $m-1$ times and checking if the obtained family generates $\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{\perp}_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}$, or equivalently if its dimension is rm. If not, draw another r-tuple $\boldsymbol{b}_1, \dots, \boldsymbol{b}_r$ at random until the construction provides a basis. We remark that even sampling a basis as in (22) does not provide a basis with the same properties of $\mathcal{A}$, *i.e.* $(\boldsymbol{b}_1, \dots, \boldsymbol{b}_r)$ is not an ordered basis of $\mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$, except with negligible probability.

When $\mathcal{B}$ is chosen as in (22), the transition matrix $\boldsymbol{P}$ has a special shape.

Lemma 1. *The matrix $\boldsymbol{P}$ is blockwise Dickson. That is to say, there exist $\boldsymbol{P}_0, \dots, \boldsymbol{P}_{m-1} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^{r \times r}$ such that*

$$\boldsymbol{P} = \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{P}_0 & \boldsymbol{P}_1 & \cdots & \boldsymbol{P}_{m-1} \\ \boldsymbol{P}_{m-1}^{(q)} & \boldsymbol{P}_0^{(q)} & \cdots & \boldsymbol{P}_{m-2}^{(q)} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \boldsymbol{P}_1^{(q^{m-1})} & \boldsymbol{P}_2^{(q^{m-1})} & \cdots & \boldsymbol{P}_0^{(q^{m-1})} \end{pmatrix}. \tag{23}$$

Proof. This is a direct consequence of the structure of the bases $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$. □

Let $\boldsymbol{S} \in \mathbf{GL}_{mr}(\mathbb{F}_{q^m})$ be the right r-cyclic shift matrix, *i.e.*

$$\boldsymbol{S} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{pmatrix} & \boldsymbol{I}_r & & \\ & & \boldsymbol{I}_r & \boldsymbol{0} \\ & & \boldsymbol{0} & \ddots \\ & & & & \boldsymbol{I}_r \\ \boldsymbol{I}_r & & & \end{pmatrix}. \tag{24}$$

Note that $\boldsymbol{S}^{-1} = \boldsymbol{S}^{\intercal}$ is the left r-cyclic shift matrix. The block-wise Dickson structure of $\boldsymbol{P}$ can be re-interpreted as follows:

Proposition 21. *Let $\boldsymbol{S}$ be defined as in* (24) *and $\boldsymbol{P}$ satisfy the blockwise Dickson structure of* (23)*. Then $\boldsymbol{P} = \boldsymbol{S}^{\intercal} \boldsymbol{P}^{(q)} \boldsymbol{S}$.*

Proof. Direct computation. □

The following result will also be used frequently in what follows

Algorithm 1 Sketch of the attack in odd characteristic

Input: (a basis of) an alternant code $\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$
Output: a pair $(\boldsymbol{x}', \boldsymbol{y}')$ of support and multiplier for $\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$

Choose a basis $\mathcal{B} = (\boldsymbol{b}_1, \dots, \boldsymbol{b}_r, \boldsymbol{b}_1^q, \dots, \boldsymbol{b}_r^q, \dots, \boldsymbol{b}_1^{q^{m-1}}, \dots, \boldsymbol{b}_r^{q^{m-1}})$ for $\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{\perp_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}}$.
$\mathscr{S}_{aux} \leftarrow \{0\}$
repeat
  Sample $\boldsymbol{B} \in \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ of rank $rm - 1$ at random
  $\boldsymbol{v} \leftarrow$ generator of $\ker(\boldsymbol{B})$
  $\mathscr{S}_{aux} \leftarrow \mathscr{S}_{aux} + \left\langle \boldsymbol{v}, \boldsymbol{v}^q \boldsymbol{S}, \dots, \boldsymbol{v}^{q^{m-1}} \boldsymbol{S}^{m-1} \right\rangle_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}$
until $\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} \mathscr{S}_{aux} = (r-1)m$
Sample $\boldsymbol{B}_1 \in \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ of rank $rm - 1$ at random
$\boldsymbol{u}_1 \leftarrow$ generator of $\ker(\boldsymbol{B}_1)$
$\mathscr{V} \leftarrow \langle \boldsymbol{u}_1 \rangle$
for $j \in [\![2, r]\!]$ **do**
  Sample $\boldsymbol{B}_j \in \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ of rank $rm - 1$ at random
  $\boldsymbol{u}_j \leftarrow$ generator of $\ker(\boldsymbol{B}_j)$
  repeat
    $\boldsymbol{u}_j \leftarrow \boldsymbol{u}_j^q \boldsymbol{S}$
  until $\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} \mathscr{S}_{aux} + \langle \boldsymbol{u}_1, \boldsymbol{u}_j \rangle = (r-1)m + 1$
  $\mathscr{V} \leftarrow \mathscr{V} + \langle \boldsymbol{u}_j \rangle$
$\mathscr{D} \leftarrow \mathscr{V}^{\perp}$
$\mathscr{G} \leftarrow \mathscr{D}$
for $j \in [\![1, m-2]\!]$ **do**
  $\mathscr{D} \leftarrow \mathscr{D}^{(q)} \boldsymbol{S}$
  $\mathscr{G} \leftarrow \mathscr{G} \cap \mathscr{D}$
Apply the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack [SS92] on $\mathscr{G} \cdot \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}}$
Return the support-multiplier pair $(\boldsymbol{x}', \boldsymbol{y}')$ found from Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack

Proposition 22. *Whenever a basis $\mathcal{B}$ has the form given in* (22)*, $\mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{B})$ is stable by the operation*

$$\boldsymbol{M} \longmapsto \boldsymbol{S}^{\intercal} \boldsymbol{M}^{(q)} \boldsymbol{S}.$$

The proof is given in Appendix E. Note that $\boldsymbol{S}^{(q^i)} = \boldsymbol{S}$ for any i. Therefore, by applying i times the map $\boldsymbol{M} \longmapsto \boldsymbol{S}^{\intercal} \boldsymbol{M}^{(q)} \boldsymbol{S}$, we obtain $\boldsymbol{M} \longmapsto (\boldsymbol{S}^{\intercal})^i \boldsymbol{M}^{(q^i)} (\boldsymbol{S})^i$. We say that $\boldsymbol{M}$ and $(\boldsymbol{S}^{\intercal})^i \boldsymbol{M}^{(q^i)} (\boldsymbol{S})^i$ are *blockwise Dickson shift* of each other.

6.2 The full algorithm with respect to a public basis $\mathcal{B}$

Algorithm 1 provides a sketch of the attack in the case of odd chacteristic field size. We will then justify why this algorithm is supposed to work with non-negligible probability, elaborate on some subroutines (as sampling matrices of rank $rm - 1$) and adapt it to the even characteristic case. We now show the structure of the attack. Starting form a public basis, compute a basis as in (22), *i.e.*, a basis of the following form

$$\mathcal{B} = (\boldsymbol{b}_1, \dots, \boldsymbol{b}_r, \boldsymbol{b}_1^q, \dots, \boldsymbol{b}_r^q, \dots, \boldsymbol{b}_1^{q^{m-1}}, \dots, \boldsymbol{b}_r^{q^{m-1}}).$$

How to compute such a basis has already been explained in a previous section. Similarly to $\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{A}}$, we define $\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}}$ as the parity-check matrix of $\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{y})_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}$ whose rows correspond to the elements of $\mathcal{B}$ in that same order. The correctness of the whole algorithm follows immediately from the following propositions whose proofs can be found in Appendix D. The first one explains why when we have one kernel element in Algorithm 1 at line 6 we can find $m-1$ other ones.

Proposition 23. *Let $\boldsymbol{v}$ be in the kernel of a matrix $\boldsymbol{B}$ in $\mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{B})$ of rank $rm-1$. Then $\boldsymbol{v}^q\boldsymbol{S},\dots,\boldsymbol{v}^{q^{m-1}}\boldsymbol{S}^{m-1}$ are $m-1$ elements that are also kernel elements of matrices in $\mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{B})$ of rank $rm-1$ which are respectively $\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal\boldsymbol{B}^{(q)}\boldsymbol{S},\cdots,$ $(\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^{m-1}\boldsymbol{B}^{(q^{m-1})}\boldsymbol{S}^{m-1}$.*

Then we are going to give a description of the space $\mathscr{V}$ produced in line 17. Basically this a vector space of elements that correspond to a similar GRS code, in the following sense.

Definition 13. *Let $\mathcal{A},\mathcal{B}$ be the two bases introduced before and $\boldsymbol{P}$ the change of basis, i.e. $\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}}=\boldsymbol{P}\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{A}}$. Let $\boldsymbol{u}_1,\boldsymbol{u}_2\in\mathbb{F}_{q^m}^{rm}$ be two vectors such that*

$$\forall t\in\{1,2\},\quad \boldsymbol{u}_t(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal\boldsymbol{P}^{-1}\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}}\in\mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{y})^{q^{j_t}}$$

*for some values $j_t\in[\![0,m-1]\!]$. We say that $\boldsymbol{u}_1$ and $\boldsymbol{u}_2$ **correspond to the same GRS code with respect to the basis** $\mathcal{B}$ if and only if $j_1=j_2$.*

Two vectors $\boldsymbol{u}_1$ and $\boldsymbol{u}_2$ obtained by computing the nullspaces of rank $rm-1$ matrices may or may not correspond to the same GRS code. In any case, from them, we can easily exhibit two vectors corresponding to the same GRS code by choosing among their shifts $\boldsymbol{u}_t^{q^i}\boldsymbol{S}^i$. More precisely, we have

Proposition 24. *Let $\mathcal{A},\mathcal{B}$ be the two bases introduced before and $\boldsymbol{P}$ the change of basis, i.e. $\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}}=\boldsymbol{P}\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{A}}$. Let $\boldsymbol{u}_1,\boldsymbol{u}_2\in\mathbb{F}_{q^m}^{rm}$ be two vectors such that*

$$\forall t\in\{1,2\},\quad \boldsymbol{u}_t(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal\boldsymbol{P}^{-1}\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}}\in\mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{y})^{(q^{j_t})}$$

for some values $j_t\in[\![0,m-1]\!]$. There exists a unique $l\in[\![0,m-1]\!]$ such that $\boldsymbol{u}_1$ and $\boldsymbol{u}_2^{q^l}\boldsymbol{S}^l$ correspond to the same GRS code.

To detect which shift of $\boldsymbol{u}_2$ corresponds to the same GRS code of $\boldsymbol{u}_1$, we rely on the following proposition.

Proposition 25. *Let $\boldsymbol{v}_1,\dots,\boldsymbol{v}_{r-1},\boldsymbol{u}_1,\boldsymbol{u}_2\in\mathbb{F}_{q^m}^{rm}$ be the generators of the kernels of $\boldsymbol{B}_1,\dots,\boldsymbol{B}_{r-1},\boldsymbol{B}',\boldsymbol{B}''\in\mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{B})$ respectively, for randomly sampled matrices of rank $rm-1$. Define*

$$\mathscr{S}_{aux}\stackrel{def}{=}\left\langle \boldsymbol{v}_j^{q^l}\boldsymbol{S}^l\mid j\in[\![1,r-1]\!],l\in[\![0,m-1]\!]\right\rangle_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}.$$

If the following conditions are satisfied:

- $\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} \mathscr{S}_{aux} = (r-1)m$ *(i.e. the* $(r-1)m$ *vectors that generate* $\mathscr{S}_{aux}$ *are linearly independent);*
- $\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} \mathscr{S}_{aux} + \langle \boldsymbol{u}_t \rangle_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} = (r-1)m+1, \quad t = 1, 2;$

then the two following statements are equivalent:

1. $\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} \mathscr{S}_{aux} + \left\langle \boldsymbol{u}_1, \boldsymbol{u}_2^{q^l} \boldsymbol{S}^l \right\rangle_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} = (r-1)m+1;$
2. $\boldsymbol{u}_1$ *and* $\boldsymbol{u}_2^{q^l} \boldsymbol{S}^l$ *correspond to the same GRS code with respect to* $\mathcal{B}$.

We are therefore able to construct a space of dimension r whose elements all correspond to a same GRS code. Then we use

Proposition 26. *Let* $j \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$. *Let* $\mathscr{V}_j$ *be the* $[rm, r]$ *linear code generated by* r *linearly independent vectors corresponding to the same GRS code* $\mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^j)}$ *with respect to* $\mathcal{B}$. *Then the linear space* $\mathscr{V}_j^{\perp}$ *orthogonal to* $\mathscr{V}_j$ *is such that*

$$\mathscr{V}_j^{\perp} \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}} = \sum_{i \in [\![0, m-1]\!] \setminus \{j\}} \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^i)}. \tag{25}$$

Given $\mathscr{V}_j^{\perp}$, the other codes $\mathscr{V}_i^{\perp} \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}}$ that are sums of $m-1$ GRS codes can be obtained according to the the following chain of equalities

$$\sum_{i \in [\![0, m-1]\!] \setminus \{j+l \mod m\}} \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^i)}$$

$$= \left(\sum_{i \in [\![0, m-1]\!] \setminus \{j\}} \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^i)} \right)^{(q^l)} = (\mathscr{V}_j^{\perp} \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}})^{(q^l)} = (\mathscr{V}_j^{\perp})^{(q^l)} \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}}^{(q^l)} = (\mathscr{V}_j^{\perp})^{(q^l)} \boldsymbol{S} \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}}.$$

After this, we are ready to compute a basis of a GRS code.

Proposition 27. *Let* $\mathscr{V}_j^{\perp}$ *be a linear space satisfying Equation* (25), *for all* $j \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$. *Then with the standard assumption that all* $\mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^j)}$ *are in direct sum, we obtain, for any* $j \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$,

$$\mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^j)} = \bigcap_{i \in [\![0, m-1]\!] \setminus \{j\}} \mathscr{V}_i^{\perp} \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}}.$$

Remark 4. In the q odd case, the only exception to what was said until now occurs for $r = 3$. In this case a non-full rank diagonal block $\boldsymbol{B}_{j,j}$ becomes the null block, because there are no matrices of rank 1 or 2. In this case, the kernel of a rank $r(m-1) = 3m-3$ matrix is a three-dimensional subspace, which immediately provides the subspace $\mathscr{V}_j$ from which to recover the associated GRS codes.

How to sample matrices in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathbf{mat}}(\boldsymbol{\mathcal{B}})$ of rank $\boldsymbol{rm-1}$

This is the most costly part of the algorithm. We first address the case of odd characteristic, as the case of even characteristic needs an ad hoc discussion. It is not too difficult to estimate that the density of rank $rm-1$ matrices inside $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ is of order q^{-m} (see E.7) and therefore it is desirable to have a better technique than just a brute force approach. We proceed instead as follows. We take two matrices $\boldsymbol{D}_1, \boldsymbol{D}_2$ at random in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ and solve over $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$ the equation

$$\det(w\boldsymbol{D}_1 + \boldsymbol{D}_2) = 0.$$

The determinant $\det(w\boldsymbol{D}_1 + \boldsymbol{D}_2)$ is a univariate polynomial of degree rm and since w is taken over $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$ we can expect to have solutions with non-negligible probability. A root w_0 of $\det(w\boldsymbol{D}_1+\boldsymbol{D}_2)$ determines a matrix $w_0\boldsymbol{D}_1+\boldsymbol{D}_2$ whose rank is strictly smaller than rm but not necessarily equal to $rm-1$. However, the rank $rm-1$ is by far the most likely outcome. Repeating the process enough times ($\Theta(1)$ times on average) then provides a matrix of rank $rm-1$.

6.3 Complexity

The bottelneck of the attack is the computation of rank $rm-1$ matrices in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ which is explained in the previous paragraph. The computation of the polynomial $\det(w\boldsymbol{D}_1 + \boldsymbol{D}_2)$ can be done by choosing rm distinct elements $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{rm}$ of $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$, compute the values $\det(\alpha_1\boldsymbol{D}_1 + \boldsymbol{D}_2), \ldots, \det(\alpha_{rm}\boldsymbol{D}_1 + \boldsymbol{D}_2)$ and then recover the polynomial $\det(w\boldsymbol{D}_1 + \boldsymbol{D}_2)$ by interpolation. This represents the calculation of $rm = \mathcal{O}(n)$ determinants of $rm \times rm$ matrices and hence a cost $O(n^{\omega+1})$, where ω is the complexity exponent of linear algebra. Once this polynomial (in the variable w) is computed, the cost of the root–finding step is negligible compared to that of the previous calculation.

Since the latter process should be repeated $\mathcal{O}(n)$ times, we get an overall complexity of

$$\mathcal{O}(n^{\omega+2}) \text{ operations in } \mathbb{F}_{q^m}.$$

6.4 Even characteristic

This case is treated in Appendices E.8, E.9 and E.10.

7 Conclusion

A general methodology for studying the security of the McEliece cryptosystem with respect to key–recovery attacks. Trying to find an attack on the key of the McEliece scheme based on Goppa codes, has turned out over the years to be a formidable problem. The progress on this issue has basically been non existent for many years and it was for a long time judged that the McEliece scheme was immune against this kind of attacks. This changed a little bit when many variants of the original McEliece came out, either by turning

to a slightly larger class of codes namely the alternant codes which retain the main algebraic structure of the Goppa code and/or adding additional structure on it [BCGO09, BBB$^+$17], changing the alphabet [BLP10, BLP11], or going to extreme parameters [CFS01]. This has lead to devise many tools to attack these variants such as algebraic modeling to recover the alternant stucture of a Goppa code which is basically enough to recover its structure [FOPT10], using square code considerations [COT14, COT17, BC18], or trying to solve a simpler problem which is to distinguish these algebraic codes from random codes [FGO$^+$11, FGO$^+$13, MT22]. We actually believe that in order to make further progress on this very hard problem, it is desirable to move away now from studying particular schemes proposed in the literature, by exploring and developing systematically tools for solving this problem and study the region of parameters (alphabet size q, code length n, degree r of the code, extension degree m) where these methods work. We suggest the following research plan

- Studying the slightly more general problem of attacking alternant codes might be the right way to go because it retains the essential algebraic features of Goppa codes and it allows to find attacks that might not work in the subcase of Goppa codes where the additional structure can be a nuisance. An example which is particularly enlightening here is the recent work [BMT23] (attack on generic alternant codes in a certain parameter regime which amazingly does not work in the particular case of Goppa codes where the additional structure prevents the attack to work).
- A particularly fruitful research thread is to study the potentially easier problem of finding a distinguisher for alternant/Goppa codes first.
- Turn later on this distinguisher into an attack (such as [BMT23] for the distinguisher of [FGO$^+$11]).

This is the research plan we have followed to some extent here.

A distinguisher in odd characteristic. It is clear that any algebraic modeling for solving the symmetric MinRank problem for rank 3 could be used to attack the problem in odd characteristic. The Support Minors modeling of [BBC$^+$20] would be for instance a good candidate for this. The difficulty is here to predict the complexity of system solving, since the fact that the matrices are symmetric gives many new linear dependencies that do not happen in the generic MinRank case. This is clearly a promising open problem.

Turning the distinguisher of §5 into an attack. The Pfaffian modeling for the distinguisher can be used in principle to attack the key-recovery problem as well. This problem is strictly harder than just distinguishing because of the algebraic structure in the code $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ that is much stronger than in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{R})$ (random case). In particular, rank 2 matrices are found at a potentially larger degree than $\bar{d}$ at which the Hilbert function in the random case becomes 0. The fact that the solution space is very large, in particular it contains a rather large vector space (see Section 4), suggests though that we can safely specialize a

rather large number of variables to speed up the system solving. Once a rank 2 matrix is found, the attack is not finished yet, but it is tempting to conjecture that the main bottleneck is to find such a matrix first and that some of the tools developed in the attack given in Section 6 might be used to finish the job.

Indeed, since rank 2 matrices in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ are identically zero outside the main block diagonal, we can consider a matrix subcode spanned by many of them, obtained by solving the Pfaffian system with different specializations. This subcode will have a block diagonal shape and that is why the attack of the last section is expected to apply on such subspace.

A Gröbner bases and Computing the Hilbert Series

Gröbner basis techniques are the main tool at hand to solve multivariate polynomial systems and therefore to perform algebraic cryptanalysis. One crucial notion for this kind of computation and for the complexity analysis is the Macaulay matrix [Mac94]. We give the definition that is relevant in the homogeneous case.

Definition 14 (Macaulay Matrix [Mac94]). *Let $F = \{f_1, \ldots, f_m\} \subset \mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{x}]$ be a homogeneous system such that $\deg(f_i) = d_i$. Let d be a positive integer. The (homogeneous) Macaulay matrix $Mac(F, d)$ of F in degree d is a matrix whose rows are each indexed by a polynomial $m_j f_i$, for any $f_i \in F$ and any monomial m_j of degree $d - d_i$, and whose columns are indexed by all the monomials of degree d. The entry corresponding to the row indexed by $m_j f_i$ and column indexed by m_l is the coefficient of m_l in $m_j f_i$. In particular, if $m_j f_i = \sum_{\alpha \in \mathbb{N}^n} a_\alpha \boldsymbol{x}^\alpha$ and $m_l = \boldsymbol{x}^\beta$, then the corresponding entry of $Mac(F, d)$ is a_β:*

$$Mac(F,d) = \begin{array}{c} \\ m_j f_i \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} m_l \end{array} \\ \begin{bmatrix} \vdots \\ \cdots\, a_\beta \,\cdots \\ \vdots \end{bmatrix} \end{array}.$$

A Gröbner basis can be computed using linear algebra, in particular [Laz83] showed that it is enough to perform Gaussian elimination on a Macaulay matrix in degree equal to the degree of regularity d_{reg}. Several algorithms and variants are linear-algebra based, for instance F4 [Fau99], F5 [Fau02] or XL [CKPS00]. Differently from methods not exploiting the Macaulay matrix construction, this approach allows to derive complexity estimates for this task. Computing the Hilbert series can also be done with these methods and this is the only result we need here, which is derived from [BFS15, Proposition 1] as

Proposition 13. *Let $F = \{f_1, \ldots, f_m\} \subset \mathbb{K}[z_1, \ldots, z_n]$ be a homogeneous system. Let $\mathcal{I}$ be the corrresponding ideal. The term $HF_R(d)$ of degree d of the Hilbert function of $R = \mathbb{K}[\boldsymbol{z}]/\mathcal{I}$ can be computed in time bounded by*

$$\mathcal{O}\left(md\binom{n+d-1}{d}^{\omega}\right),$$

where ω is the linear algebra exponent.

Furthermore, these methods can take advantage of algorithms that benefit from matrix sparsity [Wie86],[CCNY12]. The cost of the XL Wiedemann algorithm to solve a Macaulay matrix in degree d has been evaluated [DY09, Proposition 3, p. 219] with

$$3n_r\binom{n+d-1}{d}^2,$$

where n_r is the average weight of a row in $\mathrm{Mac}(F, d)$.

B Proof related to Section 3

Let us recall the proposition we prove.

Proposition 4. *Let $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$ be two bases of a same $[n,k]$ $\mathbb{F}$-linear code $\mathscr{C}$, with $\mathbb{F}$. Then $\mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{A})$ and $\mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{B})$ are isometric matrix codes, i.e. there exists $\boldsymbol{P} \in \mathbf{GL}_k(\mathbb{F})$ such that*

$$\mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{A}) = \boldsymbol{P}^{\intercal}\mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{B})\boldsymbol{P}. \tag{10}$$

The matrix $\boldsymbol{P}$ coincides with the change of basis matrix between $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$.

Proof. Let $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$ be related as $\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}} = \boldsymbol{P}\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{A}}$. where $\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{A}}$, resp. $\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}}$ is a matrix whose rows are the basis elements of $\mathcal{A}$, resp. $\mathcal{B}$. It will be helpful to view an element $\boldsymbol{c} = (c_{i,j})_{1\leqslant i\leqslant j\leqslant k}$ of $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{rel}}$ as a matrix $\boldsymbol{C} = (C_{i,j})_{\substack{1\leqslant i\leqslant k\\ 1\leqslant j\leqslant k}}$ where $C_{ij} = c_{ij}$ for $i \leqslant j$ and $C_{ij} = 0$ otherwise. We can write the matrix $\boldsymbol{M}_{\boldsymbol{c}}$ of $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}$ corresponding to $\boldsymbol{c}$ as $\boldsymbol{M}_{\boldsymbol{c}} = \boldsymbol{C} + \boldsymbol{C}^{\intercal}$. Consider an element $\boldsymbol{M} \in \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$. By definition of $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ there is an element $\boldsymbol{c} = (c_{i,j})_{1\leqslant i\leqslant j\leqslant k}$ of $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{rel}}(\mathcal{B})$ such that $\boldsymbol{M} = \boldsymbol{M}_{\boldsymbol{c}}$. Consider the matrix $\boldsymbol{C}$ corresponding to $\boldsymbol{c}$ that we just introduced. By definition of $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{rel}}(\mathcal{B})$ we have

$$\sum_{1\leqslant i\leqslant j\leqslant k} c_{i,j}\boldsymbol{b}_i \star \boldsymbol{b}_j = 0. \tag{26}$$

We have for all i in $[\![1,k]\!]$: $\boldsymbol{b}_i = \sum_{s=1}^{k} p_{is}\boldsymbol{a}_s$, where $p_{i,j}$ denotes the entry (i,j) of $\boldsymbol{P}$. Therefore

$$\begin{aligned}
\sum_{1\leqslant i\leqslant j\leqslant k} c_{i,j}\boldsymbol{b}_i \star \boldsymbol{b}_j &= \sum_{1\leqslant i\leqslant j\leqslant k} c_{i,j}\left(\sum_{s\in[\![1,k]\!]} p_{i,s}\boldsymbol{a}_s\right) \star \left(\sum_{t\in[\![1,k]\!]} p_{j,t}\boldsymbol{a}_t\right)\\
&= \sum_{s,t\in[\![1,k]\!]} \left(\sum_{1\leqslant i\leqslant j\leqslant k} p_{i,s}p_{j,t}c_{i,j}\right)\boldsymbol{a}_s \star \boldsymbol{a}_t\\
&= \sum_{1\leqslant s<t\leqslant k} \left(\sum_{1\leqslant i\leqslant j\leqslant k} (p_{i,s}p_{j,t} + p_{i,t}p_{j,s})c_{i,j}\right)\boldsymbol{a}_s \star \boldsymbol{a}_t\\
&\quad + \sum_{s\in[\![1,k]\!]} \left(\sum_{1\leqslant i\leqslant j\leqslant k} p_{i,s}p_{j,s}c_{i,j}\right)\boldsymbol{a}_s \star \boldsymbol{a}_s
\end{aligned}$$

Let $\boldsymbol{D} = (d_{s,t})_{\substack{1\leqslant s\leqslant k\\ 1\leqslant t\leqslant k}}$ where

$$\begin{aligned}
d_{s,t} &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{1\leqslant i\leqslant j\leqslant k} (p_{i,s}p_{j,t} + p_{i,t}p_{j,s})c_{i,j} \quad \text{for } 1 \leqslant s < t \leqslant k\\
d_{s,s} &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{1\leqslant i\leqslant j\leqslant k} p_{i,s}p_{j,s}c_{i,j} \quad \text{for } s \in [\![1,k]\!]\\
d_{s,t} &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} 0 \quad \text{otherwise.}
\end{aligned}$$

$\boldsymbol{d} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (d_{i,j})_{1\leqslant i\leqslant j\leqslant k}$ is because of (26) an element of $\mathscr{C}_{\text{rel}}(\mathcal{A})$. Now from the definition of $\boldsymbol{D}$ is clear that we have $\boldsymbol{D}+\boldsymbol{D}^{\intercal} = \boldsymbol{P}^{\intercal}(\boldsymbol{C}+\boldsymbol{C}^{\intercal})\boldsymbol{P}$. In other words, the matrix $\boldsymbol{M}_{\boldsymbol{d}}$ in $\mathscr{C}_{\text{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ corresponding to $\boldsymbol{d}$ satisfies

$$\begin{aligned}\boldsymbol{M}_{\boldsymbol{d}} &= \boldsymbol{D}+\boldsymbol{D}^{\intercal}\\ &= \boldsymbol{P}^{\intercal}(\boldsymbol{C}+\boldsymbol{C}^{\intercal})\boldsymbol{P}\\ &= \boldsymbol{P}^{\intercal}\boldsymbol{M}_{\boldsymbol{c}}\boldsymbol{P}.\end{aligned}$$

This holds for any $\boldsymbol{c}$ in $\mathscr{C}_{\text{rel}}(\mathcal{B})$. This leads to $\boldsymbol{P}^{\intercal}\mathscr{C}_{\text{mat}}(\mathcal{B})\boldsymbol{P} \subseteq \mathscr{C}_{\text{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$. Since $\boldsymbol{P}$ is invertible, this implies $\mathscr{C}_{\text{mat}}(\mathcal{A}) = \boldsymbol{P}^{\intercal}\mathscr{C}_{\text{mat}}(\mathcal{B})\boldsymbol{P}$. □

C Proofs of some results given in Section 4

C.1 Proofs of the results given in §4.1

For all the proofs given here we recall that we have fixed the basis

$$\mathcal{A} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{x}\boldsymbol{y}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{x}^{r-1}\boldsymbol{y}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{y}^{q^{m-1}}, (\boldsymbol{x}\boldsymbol{y})^{q^{m-1}}, \ldots, (\boldsymbol{x}^{r-1}\boldsymbol{y})^{q^{m-1}}\}.$$

We will also consider the following block form of the matrices $\boldsymbol{M} \in \mathscr{C}_{\text{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$:

$$\boldsymbol{M}_{\boldsymbol{c}} = \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{M}_{0,0} & \boldsymbol{M}_{0,1} \ldots & \boldsymbol{M}_{0,m-1} \\ \boldsymbol{M}_{1,0} & \ddots & \\ \vdots & & \vdots \\ \boldsymbol{M}_{m-1,0} & \ldots & \boldsymbol{M}_{m-1,m-1} \end{pmatrix},$$

with $\boldsymbol{M}_{l,u} = (m_{i,j}^{(l,u)})_{\substack{0\leqslant i\leqslant r-1\\ 0\leqslant j\leqslant r-1}} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^{r\times r}$.

We are first going to prove Proposition 9 which is given by

Proposition 9. *Let $\mathscr{G}(\boldsymbol{x}, \Gamma)$ be a binary $[n, n-rm]$ Goppa code with Γ a square-free polynomial of degree r and let $\mathcal{A}$ be the canonical basis of $\mathscr{G}(\boldsymbol{x}, \Gamma)^{\perp}_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}$ given in* (12) *with $\boldsymbol{y} = \frac{1}{\Gamma(\boldsymbol{x})}$. Then $\mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{A})$ contains the space of block-diagonal skew-symmetric matrices with $r \times r$ blocks.*

Proof. Recall from [Pat75] that, if $\mathscr{G}(\boldsymbol{x}, \Gamma) = \mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$ and Γ is a square-free polynomial of degree r, then

$$\mathscr{G}(\boldsymbol{x}, \Gamma) = \mathscr{G}(\boldsymbol{x}, \Gamma^2) = \mathscr{A}_{2r}(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}^2).$$

Thus

$$\boldsymbol{x}^{i2^l}\boldsymbol{y}^{2^{(l+1 \mod m)}} \in \mathscr{G}(\boldsymbol{x}, \Gamma)^{\perp}_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}},$$

for all $i \in [\![0, 2r-1]\!], l \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$. Consequently each equation

$$(\boldsymbol{x}^a\boldsymbol{y})^{2^l}(\boldsymbol{x}^b\boldsymbol{y})^{2^l} = (\boldsymbol{x}^{a+b}\boldsymbol{y}^2)^{2^{l-1}}(\boldsymbol{x}^{a+b}\boldsymbol{y}^2)^{2^{l-1}}, \tag{27}$$

with $l \in [\![1, m]\!], 0 \leqslant b < a < r$ corresponds to a codeword $\boldsymbol{c}$ in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{rel}}(\mathcal{A})$. Let us fix (a, b, l). Since $(\boldsymbol{x}^{a+b}\boldsymbol{y}^2)^{2^{l-1}}(\boldsymbol{x}^{a+b}\boldsymbol{y}^2)^{2^{l-1}}$ is a square and the field characteristic is 2, the matrix $\boldsymbol{M} \in \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ corresponding to the relation (27) is such that

$$\boldsymbol{M}_{u,v} = \boldsymbol{0}_{r\times r}, \quad \text{if } (u, v) \neq (l, l)$$

and

$$m_{i,j}^{(l,l)} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } (i, j) \in \{(a, b), (b, a)\} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases},$$

where $\boldsymbol{M}_{u,v} = (m_{i,j}^{(u,v)}) \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^{r\times r}$ is the block of $\boldsymbol{M}$ with row-column block index (u, v). Hence

$$\mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{M}) = \mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l}) = 2.$$

It is trivial to check that the set of matrices obtained by any possible choice of a, b and l generates the space of all block-diagonal skew-symmetric matrices with $r \times r$ blocks. □

Let us prove Proposition 6 that we recall here

Proposition 6. *Let $\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$ be an alternant code of extension degree m and order r over a field of characteristic 2. Then $\mathscr{C}_{mat}$ contains $\left\lfloor \frac{r-1}{2} \right\rfloor$-dimensional subspaces of rank-($\leqslant 2$) matrices. If $\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$ is a binary Goppa code with a square-free Goppa polynomial, then $\mathscr{C}_{mat}$ contains $(r-1)$-dimensional subspaces of rank-($\leqslant 2$) matrices.*

Proof. Let us consider the matrix subspace originated by choosing all the matrices corresponding to (13) for a fixed $l = u$ and such that $c = d$, $a + b = 2c$, a and b are even and one of them equals a fixed even value j (alternatively one can choose a, b both odd and one equal to an odd j). Any matrix $\boldsymbol{M}$ in this subspace is zero outside the union of the $(lr + j + 1)$-th column and the $(lr + j + 1)$-th row. Its rank is therefore upper bounded by 2. In other words, any such matrix $\boldsymbol{M}$ has the following shape

$$\boldsymbol{M} = \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} & & & & \\ & \ddots & & \boldsymbol{0} & \\ & & \boldsymbol{M}_{l,l} & & \\ & \boldsymbol{0} & & \ddots & \\ & & & & \boldsymbol{0} \end{bmatrix}, \quad \text{with} \quad \boldsymbol{M}_{l,l} = \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} & * & & \boldsymbol{0} & \\ & 0 & & & \\ * & 0 & 0 & 0 * 0 * 0 & \leftarrow (j+1)\text{-th row} \\ & 0 & & & \\ & * & & & \\ \boldsymbol{0} & 0 & & \boldsymbol{0} & \\ & * & & & \\ & 0 & & & \end{bmatrix}, \tag{28}$$

where all the $*$'s in the $(j+1)$-th row of $\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l}$ can be chosen independently. Thus, the subspace dimension is $\left\lfloor \frac{r-1}{2} \right\rfloor$, because each of the $\left\lfloor \frac{r+1}{2} \right\rfloor$ odd entries of the $(j + 1)$-th column of $\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l}$ is a $*$, with the exception of the $(j + 1, j + 1)$ entry, which is 0.

If $\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$ is a Goppa code $\mathscr{G}(\boldsymbol{x}, \Gamma)$, we consider instead the matrix subspace originated by choosing all the matrices corresponding to (27) for a fixed l and such that one element among a, b equals a fixed value j. Any matrix $\boldsymbol{M}$ in this subspace is null outside the union of the $(lr + j + 1)$-th column and the $(lr + j + 1)$-th row. Its rank is therefore upper bounded by 2. In other words, any such matrix $\boldsymbol{M}$ has the following shape

$$\boldsymbol{M} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{0} & & & \\ & \ddots & & \mathbf{0} \\ & & \boldsymbol{M}_{l,l} & \\ & \mathbf{0} & & \ddots \\ & & & \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix}, \quad \text{with} \quad \boldsymbol{M}_{l,l} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{0} & * & \mathbf{0} \\ & * & \\ * & * & 0 & * & * & * & * & * \\ & * & & & & & \\ & * & & & & & \\ \mathbf{0} & * & \mathbf{0} & & & & \\ & * & & & & & \\ & * & & & & & \end{bmatrix} \leftarrow (j+1)\text{-th row}, \tag{29}$$

where all the $*$'s in the $(j+1)$-th row of $\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l}$ can be chosen independently. Thus, the subspace dimension is $r - 1$, because each of the r entries of the $(j + 1)$-th column of $\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l}$ is a $*$, with the exception of the $(j + 1, j + 1)$ entry, which is 0. □

We will prove now Proposition 7 that we recall here

Proposition 7. *Let $\mathscr{A}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$ be an alternant code in characteristic 2 and extension degree m. The matrix code of quadratic relationships $\mathscr{C}_{mat}$ contains at least $\Omega(m(q^{m(r-2)})$ matrices of rank 2.*

Proof. It directly follows from Lemmas 2 and 3 that we will give below. □

To understand what is going on in this case, it is insightful to have a look at some examples first. Let us fix a value $l = u \in [\![0, m - 1]\!]$ and consider the subspace of $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ spanned by all the matrices corresponding to a quadratic relation

$$(\boldsymbol{x}^a \boldsymbol{y})^{q^l} \star (\boldsymbol{x}^b \boldsymbol{y})^{q^l} = (\boldsymbol{x}^c \boldsymbol{y})^{q^l} \star (\boldsymbol{x}^d \boldsymbol{y})^{q^l},$$

for any possible choice of $r - 1 \geqslant a > c \geqslant d > b \geqslant 0$. It follows from the analysis of the distinguisher in [FGO+13] and [MT22] that this space has dimension $\binom{r-1}{2}$. Let $\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l}(\boldsymbol{u})$ be the generic diagonal block matrix of such subspace, where $\boldsymbol{u} = (u_1, \ldots, u_{\binom{r-1}{2}})$ is the vector of coefficients with respect to the basis. We give examples for some small values of r.

Example 1. – For $r = 3$:

$$\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l}(\boldsymbol{u}) = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & u_1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ u_1 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}. \tag{30}$$

– For $r = 4$:

$$\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l}(\boldsymbol{u}) = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & u_1 & u_2 \\ 0 & 0 & u_2 & u_3 \\ u_1 & u_2 & 0 & 0 \\ u_2 & u_3 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}. \tag{31}$$

– For $r = 5$:

$$\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l}(\boldsymbol{u}) = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & u_1 & u_2 & u_4 \\ 0 & 0 & u_2 & u_3 & u_5 \\ u_1 & u_2 & 0 & u_5 & u_6 \\ u_2 & u_3 & u_5 & 0 & 0 \\ u_4 & u_5 & u_6 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}. \tag{32}$$

– For $r = 6$:

$$\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l}(\boldsymbol{u}) = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & u_1 & u_2 & u_4 & u_7 \\ 0 & 0 & u_2 & u_3 & u_5 + u_7 & u_8 \\ u_1 & u_2 & 0 & u_5 & u_6 & u_9 \\ u_2 & u_3 & u_5 & 0 & u_9 & u_{10} \\ u_4 & u_5 + u_7 & u_6 & u_9 & 0 & 0 \\ u_7 & u_8 & u_9 & u_{10} & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}. \tag{33}$$

Table 6 illustrates the experimental number of rank 2 matrices in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ such that $\mathbf{Rank}(M_{1,1}) = 2$ and all the other blocks are null, for small values of r and over the field $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$.

Size $r \times r$	3	4	5	6	7	8
n. of rank 2 matrices	$q^m - 1$	$q^{2m} - 1$	$2q^{3m} - q^{2m} - 1$	$2q^{4m} - q^{2m} - 1$	$3q^{5m} - q^{4m} - q^{2m} - 1$	$3q^{6m} - q^{5m} - q^{2m} - 1$

Table 6: Number of rank-2 block matrices

Table 6 suggests that these blocks have a number of rank 2 specializations that roughly grows as $\left\lfloor \frac{r-1}{2} \right\rfloor (q^m)^{r-2}$. We are now going to show the shape of a number of rank-2 matrices in the order of $(q^m)^{r-2}$. Despite not being all the rank-2 matrices, this is interesting in order to determine the dimension of the variety corresponding to a determinantal ideal, which indeed can be proved to be at least $r - 2$. The explanation can be split into odd and even matrix sizes.

From the matrices $\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l}(\boldsymbol{u})$ with odd size $r \times r$, by specializing some of the $\boldsymbol{u}$ variables and selecting some row/column indexes, we can determine submatrices of size $\lceil r/2 \rceil \times \lceil r/2 \rceil$ that are skew-symmetric but without any other additional relation. Again, we first give examples for some small values of r.

Example 2. – For $r = 3$, the submatrix of (30) obtained by taking row/column indexes in $\{1, 3\}$ is

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 & u_1 \\ u_1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}.$$

– For $r = 5$, the submatrix of (32) obtained by taking row/column indexes in $\{1, 3, 5\}$ is

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 & u_1 & u_4 \\ u_1 & 0 & u_6 \\ u_4 & u_6 & 0 \end{bmatrix}.$$

More generally, it is enough to build the $\lceil r/2 \rceil \times \lceil r/2 \rceil = \frac{r+1}{2} \times \frac{r+1}{2}$ submatrix selecting the odd row/column indexes. By specializing all the u_i's not appearing in the submatrix, this gives a lower bound on the number of matrices of rank 2. In particular

Lemma 2. *The number of choices of $\boldsymbol{u}$ for which $\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l}(\boldsymbol{u})$ (r odd) has rank 2 is lower bounded by $N_0\left(\frac{r+1}{2}, 2\right)$, where $N_0(s, r)$ stands for the number of skew-symmetric matrices of size s over $\mathbb{F}_q$ and rank r.*

Since (see Proposition 29)

$$N_0\left(\frac{r+1}{2}, 2\right) = (q^m)^{2\frac{r+1}{2}-3} + o((q^m)^{2\frac{r+1}{2}-3}) = q^{m(r-2)} + o(q^{m(r-2)}),$$

and we have m blocks, we expect that the number of solutions is at least in the order of $mq^{m(r-2)}$. Analogously for $\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l}(\boldsymbol{u})$ matrices with even size, we do not construct generic skew-symmetric submatrices but we provide specializations of $\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l}(\boldsymbol{u})$ related to such submatrices. We first give the examples for some small values of r.

Example 3. – For $r = 4$:

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & u_1 & \lambda u_1 \\ 0 & 0 & \lambda u_1 & \lambda^2 u_1 \\ u_1 & \lambda u_1 & 0 & 0 \\ \lambda u_1 & \lambda^2 u_1 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix},$$

i.e. we take in (31)the specialization

$$\begin{cases} u_2 = \lambda u_1 \\ u_3 = \lambda^2 u_1 \end{cases},$$

with the parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}$.

– For $r = 6$:

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & u_1 & \lambda u_1 & u_4 & \lambda u_4 \\ 0 & 0 & \lambda u_1 & \lambda^2 u_1 & \lambda u_4 & \lambda^2 u_4 \\ u_1 & \lambda u_1 & 0 & 0 & u_6 & \lambda u_6 \\ \lambda u_1 & \lambda^2 u_1 & 0 & 0 & \lambda u_6 & \lambda^2 u_6 \\ u_4 & \lambda u_4 & u_6 & \lambda u_6 & 0 & 0 \\ \lambda u_4 & \lambda^2 u_4 & \lambda u_6 & \lambda^2 u_6 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix},$$

i.e. we take in (33)the specialization

$$\begin{cases} u_2 = \lambda u_1 \\ u_3 = \lambda^2 u_1 \\ u_5 = 0 \\ u_7 = \lambda u_4 \\ u_8 = \lambda^2 u_4 \\ u_9 = \lambda u_6 \\ u_{10} = \lambda^2 u_6 \end{cases},$$

with the parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}$.

More generally we can replace each entry u_i of a generic anti-symmetric matrix of size $\frac{r}{2} \times \frac{r}{2}$ with the 2×2 block $\begin{bmatrix} u_i & \lambda u_i \\ \lambda u_i & \lambda^2 u_i \end{bmatrix}$ and each null element of the diagonal with the null 2×2 block. It is clear that if the starting $\frac{r}{2} \times \frac{r}{2}$ matrix has rank 2, then the same occurs for the $r \times r$ block matrix. Moreover, the variable λ adds one degree of freedom. Hence we have

Lemma 3. *The number of choices for u_i's such that the specialized $r \times r$ matrix $W^{(\boldsymbol{u})}$ (r even) has rank 2 is lower bounded by $q^m \cdot N_0(\frac{r}{2}, 2)$.*

Since

$$q^m \cdot N_0\left(\frac{r}{2}, 2\right) = (q^m) \cdot (q^m)^{2\frac{r}{2}-3} + o((q^m) \cdot (q^m)^{2\frac{r}{2}-3}) = q^{m(r-2)} + o(q^{m(r-2)}),$$

and we have m blocks, we have proved that the number of rank-2 matrices in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ is again at least in the order of $mq^{m(r-2)}$.

We are now going to prove a refinement of this counting for binary Goppa codes

Proposition 8. *Let $\mathscr{G}(\boldsymbol{x}, \Gamma)$ be a binary Goppa code of extension degree m with Γ a square-free polynomial of degree r. Then $\mathscr{C}_{mat}$ contains at least*

$$m\frac{(q^{mr}-1)(q^{m(r-1)}-1)}{q^{2m}-1}$$

matrices of rank 2.

Proof. We have seen that each choice of (a, b, l) from (27) leads to a different matrix $\boldsymbol{M}$ in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ which is null outside the diagonal block $\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l}$ and such that $\mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{M}) = \mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l}) = 2$. Furthermore, the block submatrix $\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l}$ is such that only one element below the diagonal is nonzero, *i.e.* the entry $(a+1, b+1)$. Hence the set over all possible choices of (a, b, l) of these matrices generates the full subspace of skew-symmetric block diagonal matrices. Therefore, by counting the rank-2 matrices in this subspace, the number of rank-2 matrices in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ can be lower bounded by

$$mN_0(r, 2) = m\frac{(q^{mr}-1)(q^{m(r-1)}-1)}{q^{2m}-1}.$$

□

C.2 Proof of Proposition 10

Let us first recall this proposition.

Proposition 10. *Let $\mathscr{R} \subset \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^n$ be a random code of dimension rm with basis $\mathcal{R}$ and let $\binom{rm+1}{2} > n$. Under the assumption that $\mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{R})$ has the same the rank weight distribution as a random linear matrix code, it contains matrices of rank $\leqslant d$ with non-negligible probability iff*

$$n \leqslant drm - \binom{d}{2} \qquad \textit{(symmetric case)}$$

$$n \leqslant (d+1)rm - \binom{d+1}{2} \qquad \textit{(skew-symmetric case)}$$

For this proof, we will need the following results giving the number of symmetric/skew-symmetric matrices of a given rank. The number of symmetric matrices over a finite field of a given rank can be found in [Mas69].

Proposition 28 ([Mac69, Theorem 2]). *Let $N(t,r)$ denote the number of symmetric matrices of size $t \times t$, rank r, with entries in $\mathbb{F}_q$. Then*

$$N(t,2s) = \prod_{i=1}^{s} \frac{q^{2i}}{q^{2i}-1} \prod_{i=0}^{2s-1} (q^{t-i}-1), \quad 2s \leqslant t$$

$$N(t,2s+1) = \prod_{i=1}^{s} \frac{q^{2i}}{q^{2i}-1} \prod_{i=0}^{2s} (q^{t-i}-1), \quad 2s+1 \leqslant t.$$

When the field characteristic is 2, the number of skew-symmetric matrices has also been computed.

Proposition 29 ([Mac69, Theorem 3]). *Let $N_0(t,r)$ denote the number of symmetric matrices of size $t \times t$, rank r, with entries in $\mathbb{F}_q$, $q = 2^n$, and 0 on the main diagonal. Then*

$$N_0(t,2s) = \prod_{i=1}^{s} \frac{q^{2i-2}}{q^{2i}-1} \prod_{i=0}^{2s-1} (q^{t-i}-1), \quad 2s \leqslant t$$

$$N_0(t,2s+1) = 0.$$

Remark 5. Proposition 29 implies that skew-symmetric matrices defined over a field of characteristic 2 have always even rank.

We are ready now to give a proof of Proposition 10.

Proof (of Proposition 10). For a random code $\mathscr{R}$ with basis $\mathcal{R}$, $\dim(\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{R})) = \binom{rm+1}{2} - n$ is expected with probability $1 - o(1)$ when $\binom{rm+1}{2} > n$ [CCMZ15].

From Propositions 28,29 we have respectively

$$\begin{aligned}|B_d^{(\mathbf{Sym})}| \sim & N(rm,d)\\ &= \prod_{i=1}^{\lfloor d/2\rfloor} \frac{(q^m)^{2i}}{(q^m)^{2i}-1} \prod_{i=0}^{d-1}((q^m)^{rm-i}-1)\\ &\sim \prod_{i=0}^{d-1}(q^m)^{rm-i}\\ &=(q^m)^{drm-\binom{d}{2}}.\end{aligned}$$

and (in characteristic 2)

$$\begin{aligned}|B_d^{(\mathbf{Skew})}| \sim & N_0(rm, 2\lfloor d/2\rfloor)\\ &= \prod_{i=1}^{\lfloor d/2\rfloor} \frac{(q^m)^{2i-2}}{(q^m)^{2i}-1} \prod_{i=0}^{2\lfloor d/2\rfloor-1}((q^m)^{rm-i}-1)\\ &\sim (q^m)^{-2\lfloor d/2\rfloor} \prod_{i=0}^{d-1}(q^m)^{rm-i}\\ &=(q^m)^{2\lfloor d/2\rfloor rm-\binom{2\lfloor d/2\rfloor+1}{2}}.\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, from Gilbert-Varshamov bounds (14),(15) we get that rank-d matrices belong to $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{R})$ with non negligible probability iff

– (for symmetric matrices)

$$\begin{aligned}&(q^m)^{\binom{rm+1}{2}-n}(q^m)^{drm-\binom{d}{2}} \geqslant (q^m)^{\binom{rm+1}{2}}\\ \iff &\binom{rm+1}{2}-n+drm-\binom{d}{2} \geqslant \binom{rm+1}{2}\\ \iff &n \leqslant drm-\binom{d}{2}.\end{aligned}$$

– (for skew-symmetric matrices in characteristic 2)

$$\begin{aligned}&(q^m)^{\binom{rm+1}{2}-n}(q^m)^{d-\binom{d+1}{2}} \geqslant (q^m)^{\binom{rm}{2}}\\ \iff &\binom{rm+1}{2}-n+drm-\binom{d+1}{2} \geqslant \binom{rm}{2}\\ \iff &n \leqslant (d+1)rm-\binom{d+1}{2}.\end{aligned}$$

□

D Proofs and experimental evidence corresponding to Section 5

D.1 Proof of Proposition 17

Let us first recall the Proposition.

Proposition 17. *Let $\mathscr{C}_{mat}$ be the matrix code of quadratic relations corresponding to the extended dual of an $[n, n-rm]$ alternant code over a field of even characteristic. Let $\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})$ be the corresponding Pfaffian ideal. Then* $\dim \boldsymbol{V}(\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})) \geqslant r-2$.

Proof. We recall from Proposition 14 that the dimension of the variety of the generic Pfaffian ideal $\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M})$ is $2s-3$, where s is the matrix size. The result follows from the construction given in Appendix §C.1, for estimating the number of rank 2 matrices, where we have shown that $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ contains subspaces of matrices that are isomorphic to the full space of skew-symmetric matrices for some smaller size. This allows to lower bound $\dim \boldsymbol{V}(\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M}))$ in terms of $\dim \boldsymbol{V}(\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{N}))$, where $\boldsymbol{N}$ is the generic skew-symmetric matrix of smaller size. More precisely:

- if r is odd: let $\boldsymbol{N}$ be the generic skew-symmetric matrix of size $\frac{r+1}{2} \times \frac{r+1}{2}$. Then the construction explained before Lemma 2 in Appendix §C.1 implies that
$$\dim \boldsymbol{V}(\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})) \geqslant \dim \boldsymbol{V}(\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{N})) = 2\frac{r+1}{2} - 3 = r-2;$$
- if r is even: this is the most subtle case, because we do not construct generic skew-symmetric matrices. Let $\boldsymbol{N}$ be the generic skew-symmetric matrix of size $\frac{r}{2} \times \frac{r}{2}$ and $\boldsymbol{N}'$ be the skew-symmetric matrix of size $r \times r$ with indeterminates given as in the construction explained before Lemma 3 in Appendix §C.1. We identify $n_{i,j} = n'_{2i-1,2j-1}$ and define the function $f(i) = \begin{cases} 0 & i \text{ odd} \\ 1 & i \text{ even} \end{cases}$. Using the ideintification above, we can rewrite the generators of the Pfaffian ideal for $\boldsymbol{N}'$ in function of $n_{i,j}$'s and λ. If i,j,k,l are such that there are not two consecutive indexes with the smallest being odd, then
$$\begin{aligned}
&n'_{i,j}n'_{k,l} + n'_{i,k}n'_{j,l} + n'_{i,l}n'_{j,k} \\
=&\lambda^{f(i)+f(j)} n_{\lceil \frac{i}{2} \rceil, \lceil \frac{j}{2} \rceil} \lambda^{f(k)+f(l)} n_{\lceil \frac{k}{2} \rceil, \lceil \frac{l}{2} \rceil} + \lambda^{f(i)+f(k)} n_{\lceil \frac{i}{2} \rceil, \lceil \frac{k}{2} \rceil} \lambda^{f(j)+f(l)} n_{\lceil \frac{j}{2} \rceil, \lceil \frac{l}{2} \rceil} \\
&+ \lambda^{f(i)+f(l)} n_{\lceil \frac{i}{2} \rceil, \lceil \frac{l}{2} \rceil} \lambda^{f(j)+f(k)} n_{\lceil \frac{j}{2} \rceil, \lceil \frac{k}{2} \rceil} \\
=&\lambda^{f(i)+f(j)+f(k)+f(l)} \big(n_{\lceil \frac{i}{2} \rceil, \lceil \frac{j}{2} \rceil} n_{\lceil \frac{k}{2} \rceil, \lceil \frac{l}{2} \rceil} + n_{\lceil \frac{i}{2} \rceil, \lceil \frac{k}{2} \rceil} n_{\lceil \frac{j}{2} \rceil, \lceil \frac{l}{2} \rceil} + n_{\lceil \frac{i}{2} \rceil, \lceil \frac{l}{2} \rceil} n_{\lceil \frac{j}{2} \rceil, \lceil \frac{k}{2} \rceil} \big).
\end{aligned}$$
Otherwise, if for instance $j = i+1$, i odd, then
$$n'_{i,j}n'_{k,l} + n'_{i,k}n'_{j,l} + n'_{i,l}n'_{j,k} = 0 \cdot n'_{k,l} + n'_{i,k}(\lambda n'_{i,l}) + n'_{i,l}(\lambda n'_{i,k}) = 0$$
Therefore $\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{N}') = \mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{N})$ seen as ideals in $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}[(n_{i,j})_{i,j}, \lambda]$. Hence
$$\dim \boldsymbol{V}(\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})) \geqslant \dim \boldsymbol{V}(\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{N})') = 1 + \dim \boldsymbol{V}(\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{N})) = 1 + 2\frac{r}{2} - 3 = r-2,$$
where the summand 1 corresponds to the free parameter λ used in the construction.

□

D.2 Experiments about the Hilbert function convergence

In Conjecture 2, we claimed that $d_0 \sim c\frac{s^2}{k}$ for some constant c. We experimentally verified this in the following way. We define $k = \lfloor \beta s^\alpha \rfloor$ for several positive values of β and $\alpha \in (1,2)$. We start from a value $s = 2^i$ such that the parameters are above Gilbert-Varshamov bound and not distinguishable and then we let s double each time and update k accordingly. The ratio $\frac{d_0 k}{s^2}$ is eventually a decreasing function and seems to converge to $c = \frac{1}{4}$ (or something very close to it) from above, even though with a different speed depending on α. In particular, let us choose $\beta = 1$ and let us test the convergence for different values of α in Table 7.

α	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9
$\frac{d_0 k}{s^2} < 0.28$ starting from	$s = 2^{18}$	$s = 2^{14}$	$s = 2^{14}$	$s = 2^{15}$	$s = 2^{18}$	$s = 2^{24}$	$s = 2^{36}$	$s = 2^{72}$
$\frac{d_0 k}{s^2} < 0.255$ starting from		$s = 2^{21}$	$s = 2^{20}$	$s = 2^{23}$	$s = 2^{29}$	$s = 2^{38}$	$s = 2^{57}$	$s = 2^{114}$
$\frac{d_0 k}{s^2} < 0.252$ starting from			$s = 2^{23}$	$s = 2^{28}$	$s = 2^{34}$	$s = 2^{45}$	$s = 2^{67}$	$s = 2^{133}$
$\frac{d_0 k}{s^2} < 0.251$ starting from					$s = 2^{37}$	$s = 2^{50}$		

Table 7: Experiments for the convergence of the Hilbert function

D.3 Proof of Theorem 2

Let us first recall the Theorem.

Theorem 2 *Let $\mathscr{G}(\boldsymbol{x}, \Gamma)$ be a non distinguishable binary $[n, k = n - rm]$ Goppa code with Γ a square-free polynomial of degree r and extension degree m. Let $\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})$ be the corresponding Pfaffian ideal. Then, for all $d > 0$,*

$$HF_{\mathbb{F}_{2^m}[\boldsymbol{m}]/\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})}(d) \geqslant m\left(\binom{r+d-2}{d}^2 - \binom{r+d-2}{d+1}\binom{r+d-2}{d-1}\right).$$

Proof. For our convenience we denote $R \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbb{F}_{2^m}[\boldsymbol{m}]$. Define $\boldsymbol{m}^{(l)} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (m_{i,j})_{lr+1 \leqslant i < j \leqslant (l+1)r}$ and $\boldsymbol{m}^{(\setminus l)}$ the sequence of monomials that are in $\boldsymbol{m}$ but not in $\boldsymbol{m}^{(l)}$, for all $l \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$. Moreover, we define the sequence of variables $\boldsymbol{m}^{(out)}$ that are not in any of the $\boldsymbol{m}^{(l)}$'s. We consider the corresponding polynomial rings $R_l \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbb{F}_{2^m}[\boldsymbol{m}^{(l)}]$, $R_{\setminus l} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbb{F}_{2^m}[\boldsymbol{m}^{(\setminus l)}]$ and $R_{out} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbb{F}_{2^m}[\boldsymbol{m}^{(out)}]$ and, with some abuse of notation, the monomial ideals over $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}[\boldsymbol{m}]$ generated by these sequences of variables: $\mathcal{I}^{(l)} = \mathcal{I}(\boldsymbol{m}^{(l)}), \mathcal{I}^{(\setminus l)} = \mathcal{I}(\boldsymbol{m}^{(\setminus l)}), \mathcal{I}^{(out)} = \mathcal{I}(\boldsymbol{m}^{(out)})$. Finally, we define the monomial ideal $\mathcal{I}^{(quad)}$ generated by all possible quadratic monomials with two unknowns belonging to two different diagonal blocks. We recall from Proposition 9 that each skew-symmetric block diagonal matrix belongs to $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$. Therefore, the homogeneous linear relations L_i's such that

$\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M}) = \mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M}) + \langle L_i \rangle_i$ can be chosen in such a way that only the variables in $\boldsymbol{m}^{(out)}$ can appear in them, *i.e.* $L_j \in \mathcal{I}^{(out)}$.

Let us take an element in the basis of $\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M})$ as in (17):

$$Q_{a,b,c,d} = m_{a,b}m_{c,d} + m_{a,c}m_{b,d} + m_{a,d}m_{b,c}.$$

We analyze two cases:

- If there exists $l \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$ such that $lr + 1 \leqslant a < b < c < d \leqslant (l+1)r$, then $Q_{a,b,c,d} \in \mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l})$, *i.e.* the Pfaffian ideal corresponding to the $(l+1)$-th diagonal block submatrix.
- Otherwise, the monomials $m_{a,b}m_{c,d}, m_{a,c}m_{b,d}$ and $m_{a,d}m_{b,c}$ belong to either $\mathcal{I}^{(out)}$ or $\mathcal{I}^{(quad)}$.

In both cases we obtain

$$Q_{a,b,c,d} \in \left(\sum_{i=0}^{m-1} \mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l}) \right) + \mathcal{I}^{(out)} + \mathcal{I}^{(quad)}.$$

Hence

$$\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M}) = \mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M}) + \langle L_1, \ldots, L_k \rangle \subseteq \left(\sum_{l=0}^{m-1} \mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l}) \right) + \mathcal{I}^{(out)} + \mathcal{I}^{(quad)}.$$

One can readily verify that, for any $l \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$, the monomial ideal $\mathcal{I}^{(\setminus l)}$ contains:

- $\mathcal{I}^{(out)}$;
- $\mathcal{I}^{(quad)}$;
- $\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M}_{l',l'})$, for all $l' \in [\![0, m-1]\!] \setminus \{l\}$.

This results in

$$\left(\sum_{l=0}^{m-1} \mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l}) \right) + \mathcal{I}^{(out)} + \mathcal{I}^{(quad)} \subseteq \bigcap_{l \in [\![0, m-1]\!]} \left(\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l}) + \mathcal{I}^{(\setminus l)} \right).$$

Note now that, for any $\bar{l} \in [\![1, m-1]\!]$,

$$\bigcap_{l \in [\![0, \bar{l}-1]\!]} \left(\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l}) + \mathcal{I}^{(\setminus l)} \right) + \mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M}_{\bar{l},\bar{l}}) + \mathcal{I}^{(\setminus \bar{l})} = \langle \boldsymbol{m} \rangle \tag{34}$$

and

$$HS_{R/\langle \boldsymbol{m} \rangle}(z) = HS_{\mathbb{F}_{2^m}}(z) = 1.$$

By applying recursively relation (34) on the quotient rings, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned}
HF_{R/\mathcal{P}_2^+(\boldsymbol{M})}(d) \geqslant & HF_{R/\bigcap_{l\in[\![0,m-1]\!]}\left(\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l})+\mathcal{I}^{(\setminus l)}\right)}(d) \\
= & HF_{R/\bigcap_{l\in[\![0,m-2]\!]}\left(\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l})+\mathcal{I}^{(\setminus l)}\right)}(d) + HF_{R/\left(\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M}_{m-1,m-1})+\mathcal{I}^{(\setminus m-1)}\right)}(d) - HF_{\mathbb{F}_{2^m}}(d) \\
= & HF_{R/\bigcap_{l\in[\![0,m-3]\!]}\left(\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l})+\mathcal{I}^{(\setminus l)}\right)}(d) + HF_{R/\left(\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M}_{m-2,m-2})+\mathcal{I}^{(\setminus m-2)}\right)}(d) \\
& + HF_{R/\left(\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M}_{m-1,m-1})+\mathcal{I}^{(\setminus m-1)}\right)}(d) - 2HF_{\mathbb{F}_{2^m}}(d) \\
= & \dots \\
= & \sum_{l=0}^{m-1} HF_{R/\left(\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l})+\mathcal{I}^{(\setminus l)}\right)}(d) - (m-1)HF_{\mathbb{F}_{2^m}}(d) \\
= & \sum_{l=0}^{m-1} HF_{R_l/\mathcal{P}_2(\boldsymbol{M}_{l,l})}(d) - (m-1)HF_{\mathbb{F}_{2^m}}(d) \\
= & \begin{cases} m-(m-1)=1 & \text{if } d=0 \\ m\left(\binom{r+d-2}{d}^2 - \binom{r+d-2}{d+1}\binom{r+d-2}{d-1}\right) & \text{if } d>0 \end{cases}.
\end{aligned}$$

□

E Proofs for some of the Results of Section 6

E.1 Proof of Proposition 22

Let us recall first the proposition

Proposition 22. *Whenever a basis $\mathcal{B}$ has the form given in (22), $\mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{B})$ is stable by the operation*

$$\boldsymbol{M} \longmapsto \boldsymbol{S}^\intercal \boldsymbol{M}^{(q)} \boldsymbol{S}.$$

Proof. Let $\boldsymbol{B} = (b_{i,j})_{i,j} \in \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B}) \subseteq \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^{rm\times rm}$. Then, by definition,

$$\sum_{i<j} 2b_{i,j}\boldsymbol{b}_i \star \boldsymbol{b}_j + \sum_i b_{i,i}\boldsymbol{b}_i \star \boldsymbol{b}_i = 0.$$

Then, by applying the Frobenius map $z \mapsto z^q$ component-wise,

$$0 = \sum_{i<j} 2^q b_{i,j}^q \boldsymbol{b}_i^q \star \boldsymbol{b}_j^q + \sum_i b_{i,i}^q \boldsymbol{b}_i^q \star \boldsymbol{b}_i^q = \sum_{i<j} 2b_{i,j}^q \boldsymbol{b}_i^q \star \boldsymbol{b}_j^q + \sum_i b_{i,i}^q \boldsymbol{b}_i^q \star \boldsymbol{b}_i^q.$$

From now on, the indexes are considered modulo rm. The structure of the basis $\mathcal{B}$ yields

$$\sum_{i<j} 2b_{i,j}^q \boldsymbol{b}_{i+r}^q \star \boldsymbol{b}_{j+r}^q + \sum_i b_{i,i}^q \boldsymbol{b}_{i+r}^q \star \boldsymbol{b}_{i+r}^q = 0$$

and hence

$$\sum_{i<j} 2b_{i-r,j-r}^q \boldsymbol{b}_i^q \star \boldsymbol{b}_j^q + \sum_i b_{i-r,i-r}^q \boldsymbol{b}_i^q \star \boldsymbol{b}_i^q = 0$$

The matrix $(b_{i-r,j-r}^q)_{i,j}$ is nothing but $\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal \boldsymbol{B}^{(q)} \boldsymbol{S}$ and hence $\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal \boldsymbol{B}^{(q)} \boldsymbol{S} \in \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$.

□

E.2 Proof of Proposition 23

Let us recall this proposition

Proposition 23. *Let $\boldsymbol{v}$ be in the kernel of a matrix $\boldsymbol{B}$ in $\mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{B})$ of rank $rm-1$. Then $\boldsymbol{v}^q\boldsymbol{S}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{v}^{q^{m-1}}\boldsymbol{S}^{m-1}$ are $m-1$ elements that are also kernel elements of matrices in $\mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{B})$ of rank $rm-1$ which are respectively $\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal\boldsymbol{B}^{(q)}\boldsymbol{S}, \cdots,$ $(\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^{m-1}\boldsymbol{B}^{(q^{m-1})}\boldsymbol{S}^{m-1}$.*

Proof. Given $\boldsymbol{B} \in \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$, it follows from Proposition 22 that

$$(\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}^{(q^i)}(\boldsymbol{S})^i \in \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B}), \quad \text{for any } i \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$$

and all these matrices have the same rank, namely $rm-1$. Moreover, if $\boldsymbol{v}$ generates the nullspace of $\boldsymbol{B}$, then $\boldsymbol{v}^{q^i}\boldsymbol{S}^i$ is in the kernel of $(\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i$ since

$$\begin{aligned}
&(\boldsymbol{v}^{q^i}\boldsymbol{S}^i)\cdot(\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i\\
=&\boldsymbol{v}^{q^i}\boldsymbol{B}^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i\\
=&(\boldsymbol{v}\boldsymbol{B})^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i\\
=&0.
\end{aligned}$$

□

E.3 Proof of Proposition 24

The proposition states that

Proposition 24. *Let $\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}$ be the two bases introduced before and $\boldsymbol{P}$ the change of basis, i.e. $\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}} = \boldsymbol{P}\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{A}}$. Let $\boldsymbol{u}_1, \boldsymbol{u}_2 \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^{rm}$ be two vectors such that*

$$\forall t \in \{1,2\}, \quad \boldsymbol{u}_t(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal\boldsymbol{P}^{-1}\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}} \in \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{y})^{(q^{j_t})}$$

for some values $j_t \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$. There exists a unique $l \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$ such that $\boldsymbol{u}_1$ and $\boldsymbol{u}_2^{q^l}\boldsymbol{S}^l$ correspond to the same GRS code.

Proof. Let $\boldsymbol{B} \in \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ such that $\boldsymbol{u}_2$ generates $\ker(\boldsymbol{B})$. By Proposition 23, we know that $\boldsymbol{u}_2^{q^l}\boldsymbol{S}^l$ generates the kernel of $(\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^l\boldsymbol{B}^{(q^l)}\boldsymbol{S}^l$. We get

$$\begin{aligned}
0 =&\boldsymbol{u}_2^{q^l}\boldsymbol{B}^{(q^l)}\\
=&\boldsymbol{u}_2^{q^l}(\boldsymbol{P}^{(q^l)^\intercal})^{-1}\boldsymbol{A}^{(q^l)}(\boldsymbol{P}^{(q^l)})^{-1}\\
=&\boldsymbol{u}_2^{q^l}(\boldsymbol{P}^{(q^l)^\intercal})^{-1}(\boldsymbol{S}^l(\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^l)\boldsymbol{A}^{(q^l)}(\boldsymbol{S}^l(\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^l)(\boldsymbol{P}^{(q^l)})^{-1}\\
=&(\boldsymbol{u}_2^{q^l}(\boldsymbol{P}^{(q^l)^\intercal})^{-1}\boldsymbol{S}^l)((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^l\boldsymbol{A}^{(q^l)}\boldsymbol{S}^l)(\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^l(\boldsymbol{P}^{(q^l)})^{-1}\\
=&(\boldsymbol{u}_2^{q^l}((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^l\boldsymbol{P}^{(q^l)^\intercal})^{-1})((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^l\boldsymbol{A}^{(q^l)}\boldsymbol{S}^l)(\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^l(\boldsymbol{P}^{(q^l)})^{-1} \quad \text{by Proposition 21}\\
=&(\boldsymbol{u}_2^{q^l}\boldsymbol{S}^l\boldsymbol{P}^{\intercal-1})((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^l\boldsymbol{A}^{(q^l)}\boldsymbol{S}^l)(\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^l(\boldsymbol{P}^{(q^l)})^{-1},
\end{aligned}$$

which implies

$$(\boldsymbol{u}_2^{q^l}\boldsymbol{S})\boldsymbol{P}^{\intercal-1}\boldsymbol{P}^{-1}\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}} = (\boldsymbol{u}_2^{q^l}\boldsymbol{S}\boldsymbol{P}^{\intercal-1})\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{A}} \in \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{y})^{(q^{j_2+l})},$$

since the diagonal block of rank $r-1$ in $(\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^l\boldsymbol{A}^{(q^l)}\boldsymbol{S}^l$ is the one indexed by j_2+l mod m. Therefore, $\boldsymbol{u}_1$ and $\boldsymbol{u}_2^{q^l}\boldsymbol{S}^l$ correspond to the same GRS code with respect to $\mathcal{B}$ for the unique value $l \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$ such that $j_1 = j_2 + l \mod m$. □

E.4 Proof of Proposition 25

This proposition says that

Proposition 25. *Let $\boldsymbol{v}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{v}_{r-1}, \boldsymbol{u}_1, \boldsymbol{u}_2 \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^{rm}$ be the generators of the kernels of $\boldsymbol{B}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{B}_{r-1}, \boldsymbol{B}', \boldsymbol{B}'' \in \mathscr{C}_{mat}(\mathcal{B})$ respectively, for randomly sampled matrices of rank $rm-1$. Define*

$$\mathscr{S}_{aux} \stackrel{def}{=} \left\langle \boldsymbol{v}_j^{q^l}\boldsymbol{S}^l \mid j \in [\![1, r-1]\!], l \in [\![0, m-1]\!] \right\rangle_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}.$$

If the following conditions are satisfied:

- $\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} \mathscr{S}_{aux} = (r-1)m$ *(i.e. the $(r-1)m$ vectors that generate $\mathscr{S}_{aux}$ are linearly independent);*
- $\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} \mathscr{S}_{aux} + \langle \boldsymbol{u}_t \rangle_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} = (r-1)m+1, \quad t = 1, 2;$

then the two following statements are equivalent:

1. $\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} \mathscr{S}_{aux} + \left\langle \boldsymbol{u}_1, \boldsymbol{u}_2^{q^l}\boldsymbol{S}^l \right\rangle_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} = (r-1)m+1;$
2. *$\boldsymbol{u}_1$ and $\boldsymbol{u}_2^{q^l}\boldsymbol{S}^l$ correspond to the same GRS code with respect to $\mathcal{B}$.*

Proof. Let $j \in [\![0, r-1]\!]$. For each $i \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$, there exists a unique $\boldsymbol{v}_j^{(q^l)}\boldsymbol{S}^l$, $l \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$, such that

$$\boldsymbol{v}_j^{q^l}\boldsymbol{S}^l(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal\boldsymbol{P}^{-1}\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}} \subseteq \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{y})^{(q^i)}.$$

As this holds for all $j \in [\![0, r-1]\!]$, we obtain that

$$\mathscr{S}_{aux}(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal\boldsymbol{P}^{-1}\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}} = \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} \mathscr{G}_i,$$

where $\mathscr{G}_i$ is an $[n, r-1]$ linear code contained into $\mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{y})^{(q^i)}$. From the standard assumption that all the codes $\mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{y})^{(q^i)}$'s are in direct sum, we get $\mathscr{S}_{aux}(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal\boldsymbol{P}^{-1}\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}} = \bigoplus_{i=0}^{m-1}\mathscr{G}_i$. Analogously for $\boldsymbol{u}_t$, $t = 1, 2$, we have

$$\boldsymbol{u}_t(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal\boldsymbol{P}^{-1}\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}} \in \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{y})^{(q^{it})}.$$

The condition $\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} \mathscr{S}_{aux} + \langle \boldsymbol{u}_t \rangle_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} = (r-1)m+1 = \dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} \mathscr{S}_{aux} + 1$ implies that

$$\left(\mathscr{S}_{aux} + \langle \boldsymbol{u}_t \rangle_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}\right) (\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal \boldsymbol{P}^{-1} \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}} = \left(\bigoplus_{i \in [\![0,m-1]\!] \setminus \{i_t\}} \mathscr{G}_i \right) \oplus \mathscr{G}'_{i_t},$$

with $\mathscr{G}'_{i_t} \subseteq \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^{i_t})}$. But

$$\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} \mathscr{G}'_{i_t} = \dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} \mathscr{S}_{aux} + \langle \boldsymbol{u}_t \rangle_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} - \dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} \bigoplus_{i \in [\![0,m-1]\!] \setminus \{i_t\}} \mathscr{G}_i = (r-1)m+1-(r-1)(m-1) = r,$$

hence $\mathscr{G}'_{i_t} = \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^{i_t})}$. Note that, with the same argument,

$$\begin{aligned} &\left(\mathscr{S}_{aux} + \left\langle \boldsymbol{u}_2^{q^l} \boldsymbol{S}^l \right\rangle_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}\right) (\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal \boldsymbol{P}^{-1} \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}} \\ &= \left(\bigoplus_{i \in [\![0,m-1]\!] \setminus \{(i_2+l) \mod m\}} \mathscr{G}_i \right) \oplus \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^{i_2+l})}. \end{aligned}$$

We can conclude that

$$\begin{aligned} &\left(\mathscr{S}_{aux} + \left\langle \boldsymbol{u}_1, \boldsymbol{u}_2^{q^l} \boldsymbol{S}^l \right\rangle_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}\right) (\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal \boldsymbol{P}^{-1} \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}} \\ &= \left(\bigoplus_{i \in [\![0,m-1]\!] \setminus \{i_1, (i_2+l) \mod m\}} \mathscr{G}_i \right) \oplus \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^{i_1})} \oplus \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^{i_2+l})}. \end{aligned}$$

Hence

$$\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} \mathscr{S}_{aux} + \left\langle \boldsymbol{u}_1, \boldsymbol{u}_2^{q^l} \boldsymbol{S}^l \right\rangle_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} = \begin{cases} (r-1)m+1 & \text{if } i_1 = i_2 + l \mod m \\ (r-1)m+2 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

and the first case is equivalent to say that

$$\left\langle \boldsymbol{u}_1, \boldsymbol{u}_2^{q^l} \boldsymbol{S}^l \right\rangle_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} (\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal \boldsymbol{P}^{-1} \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}} \subseteq \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^{i_1})},$$

i.e. $\boldsymbol{u}_1$ and $\boldsymbol{u}_2^{q^l} \boldsymbol{S}^l$ correspond to the same GRS code with respect to $\mathcal{B}$. □

E.5 Proof of Proposition 26

Let us recall this proposition

Proposition 26. *Let $j \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$. Let $\mathscr{V}_j$ be the $[rm, r]$ linear code generated by r linearly independent vectors corresponding to the same GRS code $\mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^j)}$ with respect to $\mathcal{B}$. Then the linear space $\mathscr{V}_j^\perp$ orthogonal to $\mathscr{V}_j$ is such that*

$$\mathscr{V}_j^\perp \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}} = \sum_{i \in [\![0,m-1]\!] \setminus \{j\}} \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^i)}. \tag{25}$$

Proof. Since $\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}(\mathscr{V}_j) = r$ and each of its elements correspond to the j-th GRS code, a generator matrix of $\mathscr{V}_j(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal$ is

$$[\mathbf{0}_{r\times r} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{0}_{r\times r} \mid \underbrace{\boldsymbol{I}_r}_{j\text{-th block}} \mid \mathbf{0}_{r\times r} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{0}_{r\times r}].$$

Let us pick $\boldsymbol{v}^\perp \in \mathscr{V}_j^\perp$. For any $\boldsymbol{v} \in \mathscr{V}_j$, we can write

$$\begin{aligned} 0 =& \langle \boldsymbol{v}, \boldsymbol{v}^\perp \rangle \\ =& \langle \boldsymbol{v}\boldsymbol{I}_{rm}, \boldsymbol{v}^\perp \rangle \\ =& \langle \boldsymbol{v}(\boldsymbol{P}^\intercal)^{-1}\boldsymbol{P}^\intercal, \boldsymbol{v}^\perp \rangle \\ =& \langle \boldsymbol{v}(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal, \boldsymbol{v}^\perp \boldsymbol{P} \rangle. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore $\boldsymbol{v}^\perp\boldsymbol{P}$ is zero on the j-th block. Hence

$$\mathscr{V}_j^\perp \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}} = (\mathscr{V}_j^\perp \boldsymbol{P})\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{A}} \subseteq \sum_{i\in[\![0,m-1]\!]\setminus\{j\}} \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{y})^{(q^i)},$$

and since $\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}(\mathscr{V}_j^\perp) = rm - \dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} \mathscr{V}_j = (r-1)m$,

$$\mathscr{V}_j^\perp \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}} = \sum_{i\in[\![0,m-1]\!]\setminus\{j\}} \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{y})^{(q^i)}.$$

□

E.6 Proof of Proposition 27

Let us recall this proposition

Proposition 27. *Let $\mathscr{V}_j^\perp$ be a linear space satisfying Equation* (25)*, for all $j \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$. Then with the standard assumption that all $\mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{y})^{(q^j)}$ are in direct sum, we obtain, for any $j \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$,*

$$\mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{y})^{(q^j)} = \bigcap_{i\in[\![0,m-1]\!]\setminus\{j\}} \mathscr{V}_i^\perp \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}}.$$

Proof. Since $\mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{y})^{(q^j)} \subset \mathscr{V}_i^\perp$ for all $i \neq j$, it follows that

$$\mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{y})^{(q^j)} \subseteq \bigcap_{i\in[\![0,m-1]\!]\setminus\{j\}} \mathscr{V}_i^\perp \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}}.$$

On the other hand, since the GRS codes are in direct sum, we get

$$\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} \bigcap_{i\in[\![0,m-1]\!]\setminus\{j\}} \mathscr{V}_i^\perp = r(m-1) - r(m-2) = r,$$

which leads to the equality. □

E.7 Estimate of matrices of rank $rm-1$ in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathbf{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$

We start by recalling that $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ and $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ have the same weight distribution, thus it is convenient to consider the block diagonal structure of $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$. Let us also define the matrix space containing all possible block diagonal (with m blocks of size $r \times r$) symmetric matrices $\mathscr{D} \subset \mathbf{Sym}(rm, \mathbb{F}_{q^m})$. The ratio of rank $rm-1$ matrices in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{D})$ is given by

$$\frac{N(r, r-1) \cdot N(r,r)^{m-1}}{(q^m)^{m\binom{r+1}{2}}},$$

where N is defined as in Proposition **??**. Note that, for $q^m \to \infty$,

$$N(t,s) \to \prod_{i=0}^{s-1} (q^m)^{t-i} = (q^m)^{\sum_{i=0}^{s-1} t-i} = (q^m)^{\binom{t+1}{2}-\binom{t-s+1}{2}} = (q^m)^{ts-s^2/2+s/2}.$$

Hence the ratio above tends to

$$\frac{N(r,r-1)N(r,r)^{m-1}}{(q^m)^{m\binom{r+1}{2}}} \to \frac{(q^m)^{r(r-1)-(r-1)^2/2+(r-1)/2}(q^m)^{(m-1)(r^2-r^2/2+r/2)}}{(q^m)^{m\binom{r+1}{2}}} = \frac{1}{q^m}.$$

The ratios of matrices of a given rank in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ is not the same as for $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{D})$, and a more detailed analysis would be useful to derive the exact probability of sampling matrices of rank $rm-1$. However, we expect the distribution not to deviate too much from this behavior. We provide in Table 8 the number of different diagonal blocks in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ of a given rank in for small values of q^m (odd case) and r. Note that the total number is given by $(q^m)^{\binom{r-1}{2}}$.

E.8 Characteristic 2

Recall that skew-symmetric matrices in characteristic 2 can only have even rank. This immediately invalidates the search arguments explained before: either rank rm or $rm-1$ do not exist in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ and $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$. The same constraint occurs for the $r \times r$ diagonal blocks with respect to the canonical basis $\mathcal{A}$, on which we focus now. However, the previous strategy can be adapted to even characteristic by limiting the search to even-rank matrices. Indeed, in our setting, the maximum rank achievable in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ is $2\left\lfloor \frac{r}{2} \right\rfloor m$, because for each $r \times r$ diagonal block the rank is at most the largest even integer bounded by r, *i.e.* $2\left\lfloor \frac{r}{2} \right\rfloor$. Consequently, the second largest rank achievable by a matrix in $\boldsymbol{A} \in \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ with the block diagonal structure as in (21) is

$$2\left\lfloor \frac{r}{2} \right\rfloor m - 2.$$

- In the case where r is even, $2\left\lfloor \frac{r}{2} \right\rfloor m - 2 = rm - 2$, and $\boldsymbol{A}$ as in (21) is such that there exists a unique $j \in [\![1, m]\!]$ for which $\mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{A}_{j,j}) = r-2$

r	q^m	[rank 0, rank 1, ..., rank r]
3	3	[1, 0, 0, 2]
3	5	[1, 0, 0, 4]
3	7	[1, 0, 0, 6]
3	9	[1, 0, 0, 8]
3	11	[1, 0, 0, 10]
4	3	[1, 0, 0, 8, 18]
4	5	[1, 0, 0, 24, 100]
4	7	[1, 0, 0, 48, 294]
4	9	[1, 0, 0, 80, 648]
4	11	[1, 0, 0, 120, 1210]
5	3	[1, 0, 0, 44, 378, 306]
5	5	[1, 0, 0, 224, 5500, 9900]
5	7	[1, 0, 0, 636, 30870, 86142]
5	9	[1, 0, 0, 1376, 110808, 419256]
5	11	[1, 0, 0, 2540, 306130, 1462890]
6	3	[1, 0, 0, 152, 4374, 18072, 36450]
6	5	[1, 0, 0, 1224, 157500, 1919400, 7687500]
7	3	[1, 0, 0, 638, 55566, 587502, 4754538, 8950662]

Table 8: Experimental number of different diagonal blocks in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ of a given rank (q^m odd case).

and $\mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{A}_{j,j}) = r$ otherwise. Indeed, the parity constraint on the skew-symmetric matrices prohibits having two diagonal blocks of rank $r-1$. This time, the nullspace of $\boldsymbol{A}$ is generated by two linearly independent vectors $\boldsymbol{u}$ and $\boldsymbol{v}$, and these vectors are zero outside the same j-th length-r blocks:

$$\boldsymbol{v} = (\mathbf{0}, \ldots, \mathbf{0}, \boldsymbol{v}_i, \mathbf{0}, \ldots, \mathbf{0})$$

and

$$\boldsymbol{u} = (\mathbf{0}, \ldots, \mathbf{0}, \boldsymbol{u}_i, \mathbf{0}, \ldots, \mathbf{0}).$$

With similar arguments to the q odd case, it is therefore possible to retrieve a basis of a GRS code $\mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{q^j}$. We only need to give an estimate of the ratio of rank $rm-2$ matrices in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$, to ensure that we can find them with non-negligible probability.
We consider the $rm \times rm$ matrix space $\mathscr{D} \subset \mathbf{Skew}(rm, \mathbb{F}_{q^m})$ containing all possible block diagonal (with m blocks of size $r \times r$) skew-symmetric matrices. The ratio of rank $rm-2$ matrices in $\mathscr{D}$ is given by

$$\frac{N_0(r, r-2) \cdot N_0(r,r)^{m-1}}{(q^m)^{m\binom{r}{2}}}. \tag{35}$$

Note that for $q \to \infty$,

$$N_0(t, 2s) \to \prod_{i=0}^{s} \frac{1}{q^2} \prod_{i=0}^{2s-1} (q^m)^{t-i} = (q^m)^{-2s+\sum_{i=0}^{2s-1} t-i} = (q^m)^{\binom{t+1}{2}-\binom{t-2s+1}{2}-2s} = (q^m)^{s(2t-2s-1)}.$$

Hence the ratio above tends to

$$\frac{N_0(r,r-2)\cdot N_0(r,r)^{m-1}}{(q^m)^{m\binom{r}{2}}} \to \frac{(q^m)^{\frac{(r+1)(r-2)}{2}}(q^m)^{(m-1)\binom{r}{2}}}{(q^m)^{m\binom{r}{2}}} = \frac{1}{q^m},$$

i.e. the same as for rank $rm-1$ matrices in the q odd case. The approach for finding matrices of rank $rm-1$ described above is therefore expected to work with high probability in this case as well.

Remark 6. In the case of a binary Goppa code with a square-free Goppa polynomial, we have shown in Proposition 9 that $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ contains the space of block-diagonal skew-symmetric matrices with $r \times r$ blocks. Under the condition that $r < q-1$, these matrices generates $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$, *i.e.* $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A}) = \mathscr{D}$. Therefore, in this special case, (35) provides the exact ratio of rank $rm-2$ matrices in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ (or $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$).

Similarly to what done for the q odd case, we provide in Table 9 the number of different diagonal blocks in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ (when the latter is not originated by a binary Goppa code with square-free polynomial) of a given rank in for small values of q^m (even case) and r (even case). The total number is given by $(q^m)^{\binom{r-1}{2}}$, as before.

r	q^m	[rank 0, rank 1, ..., rank r]
4	2	[1, 0, 3, 0, 4]
4	4	[1, 0, 15, 0, 48]
4	8	[1, 0, 63, 0, 448]
6	2	[1, 0, 27, 0, 612, 0, 384]
6	4	[1, 0, 495, 0, 286224, 0, 761856]
8	2	[1, 0, 171, 0, 51348, 0, 1181376, 0, 864256]

Table 9: Experimental number of different diagonal blocks in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ of a given rank (q^m even, r even case).

Remark 7. In all instances where a filtration has been initially applied, $r = q$ is even, therefore they fall in this case.

The case q even and r even requires only small changes in Algorithm 1. At lines 5,9 and 13, the vectors $\boldsymbol{v}$, $\boldsymbol{u}_1$ and $\boldsymbol{u}_j$ respectively are defined as generators of kernels of rank $rm-1$ matrices. However, the nullspace of a square matrix of rank $rm-2$ and size rm is generated by two linearly independent elements. In this case, it suffices to define such vectors as any non-zero element in the kernel and the algorithm still works correctly. It is even possible to exploit the knowledge that two linearly independent generators of a kernel correspond to the same GRS code and roughly halve the number of matrices of rank $rm-2$ that need to be sampled.

– In the case where r is even, $2\left\lfloor \frac{r}{2} \right\rfloor m - 2 = (r-1)m - 2$ and a similar computation shows that the ratio of rank $r(m-1)-2$ matrices in $\mathscr{D}$ is given by

$$\frac{N_0(r, r-3) \cdot N_0(r, r-1)^{m-1}}{(q^m)^{m\binom{r}{2}}} \tag{36}$$

and, for $q \to \infty$,

$$\frac{N_0(r, r-3) \cdot N_0(r, r-1)^{m-1}}{(q^m)^{m\binom{r}{2}}} \to \frac{(q^m)^{\frac{(r+2)(r-3)}{2}} (q^m)^{(m-1)\binom{r}{2}}}{(q^m)^{m\binom{r}{2}}} = \frac{1}{(q^m)^3}.$$

Remark 8. Similarly to the r even case, for binary Goppa codes with square-free Goppa polynomials, (36) provides the exact ratio of rank $(r-1)m-2$ matrices in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ (or $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$).

We provide in Table 10 the number of different diagonal blocks in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ (when the latter is not originated by a binary Goppa code with square-free polynomial) of a given rank in for small values of q^m (even case) and r (odd case). The total number is given by $(q^m)^{\binom{r-1}{2}}$, as before.

r	q^m	[rank 0, rank 1, ..., rank r]
3	2	[1, 0, 1, 0]
3	4	[1, 0, 3, 0]
3	8	[1, 0, 7, 0]
5	2	[1, 0, 11, 0, 52, 0]
5	4	[1, 0, 111, 0, 3984, 0]
5	8	[1, 0, 959, 0, 261184, 0]
7	2	[1, 0, 75, 0, 5748, 0, 26944, 0]

Table 10: Experimental number of different diagonal blocks in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ of a given rank (q^m even, r odd case).

Rank $rm-3$ matrices are therefore less probable to be sampled. This issue can be overcome at an asymptotic cost of a factor q^{3m}. Furthermore, a Gröbner basis approach leads in practice to an even better complexity. More specifically, we can generalize the argument for the previous cases by sampling at random $\boldsymbol{B}_1, \boldsymbol{B}_2, \boldsymbol{B}_3, \boldsymbol{B}_4 \in \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ and solving the trivariate affine polynomial $\det(w_1\boldsymbol{B}_1 + w_2\boldsymbol{B}_2 + w_3\boldsymbol{B}_3 + \boldsymbol{B}_4)$ with Gröbner basis techniques. As the number of variables is small and constant, this approach seems to be much more efficient than brute force. However, there is another more problematic issue. The nullspace of a matrix $\boldsymbol{A} \in \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ has in this case dimension $rm - ((r-1)m-2) = m+2$ and its generators are not all zero outside a length-r block. Therefore the strategy explained before does not apply directly here. We treat this case in E.9.

E.9 The attack for q even and r odd

As already mentioned, the case where q is even and r is odd raises the additional problem that the nullspace of a matrix $\boldsymbol{A} \in \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ of rank $(r-1)m-2$ is not zero outside a length-r block. The key idea to adapt the attack is that such nullspace is still "unbalanced" with respect to the m blocks. Indeed, let us consider $\boldsymbol{B} = (\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^{\intercal}\boldsymbol{A}(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1}) \in \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ of rank $(r-1)m-2$. Since $\mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{B}) = \mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{A}) = \sum_{l=0}^{m-1} \mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{A}_{l,l})$ and for any l, $\mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{A}_{l,l}) \leqslant r-1$ and it is even, we have that

$$\exists! l \in [\![0, m-1]\!] \text{ s.t. } \mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{A}_{l,l}) = r-3 \wedge \forall i \in [\![0, m-1]\!] \backslash \{l\},\ \mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{A}_{i,i}) = r-1.$$

Therefore, the kernel can be written as

$$\ker \boldsymbol{B} = \langle \boldsymbol{v}_0, \ldots, \boldsymbol{v}_{l-1}, \boldsymbol{v}_{l,1}, \boldsymbol{v}_{l,2}, \boldsymbol{v}_{l,3}, \boldsymbol{v}_{l+1}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{v}_{m-1} \rangle$$

so that for all $i \in \{1, 2, 3\}$

$$\boldsymbol{v}_{l,i}(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^{\intercal}\boldsymbol{P}^{-1}\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}} = \boldsymbol{v}_{l,i}(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^{\intercal}\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{A}} \in \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^l)},$$

and for all $j \in [\![0, m-1]\!] \backslash \{l\}$

$$\boldsymbol{v}_j(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^{\intercal}\boldsymbol{P}^{-1}\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}} = \boldsymbol{v}_j(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^{\intercal}\boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{A}} \in \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^j)}.$$

We do not know how to identify such vectors, though. Assume, however, that we are able to determine different matrices $\boldsymbol{B}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{B}_s$ of rank $(r-1)m-2$ in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ such that their counterparts in $\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{A})$ have the rank-$(r-3)$ block indexed by the same $j \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$, for some value $s < r$ that we are going to determine later. We will see how to achieve this in E.10. We define the $[rm, \leqslant s(m-1) + \min(3s, r)]$ linear code $\mathscr{V}_j \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{i=1}^{s} \ker \boldsymbol{B}_i$. This construction can be seen as an adaptation of the definition given in Proposition 26, where $\mathscr{V}_j$ is spanned by r vectors, each generating the nullspace of a matrix of rank $rm-1$. If the matrices $\boldsymbol{B}_i$'s have been sampled independently, as is the case, we expect, with a non-negligible probability, that a generator matrix of the code $\mathscr{V}_j(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^{\intercal}$ is the block diagonal matrix

$$\begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{G}_{0,0} & & & \\ & \boldsymbol{G}_{1,1} & & \boldsymbol{0} \\ & & \ddots & \\ \boldsymbol{0} & & & \boldsymbol{G}_{m-1,m-1} \end{bmatrix}$$

where $\boldsymbol{G}_{j,j}$ has $\min(3s, r)$ rows while $\boldsymbol{G}_{i,i}$ has s rows (and they all have r columns). This is equivalent to say that $\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} \mathscr{V}_j = s(m+2)$. Hence, by sampling $s \geqslant \lceil r/3 \rceil$, we ensure $\boldsymbol{G}_{j,j} = \boldsymbol{I}_r$ with non-negligible probability. From now on, we then assume that $\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} \mathscr{V}_j = s(m-1) + r$. We define the $[rm, (r-s)(m-1)]$ dual code $\mathscr{V}_j^{\perp}$ and, by repeating the computation made in the proof

of Proposition 26, we get that, for any $\boldsymbol{v}^\perp \in \mathscr{V}_j^\perp$, $\boldsymbol{v}^\perp \boldsymbol{P}$ is zero on the j-th block. However, this time we can only assert that

$$\mathscr{V}_j^\perp \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}} = (\mathscr{V}_j^\perp \boldsymbol{P}) \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{A}} \subseteq \sum_{i \in [\![1,m]\!] \setminus \{j\}} \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^i)}$$

with $\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}(\mathscr{V}_j^\perp \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}}) = \dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}(\mathscr{V}_j^\perp) = (r-s)(m-1)$. In order to obtain the code $\sum_{i \in [\![1,m]\!] \setminus \{j\}} \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^i)}$ it is then enough to repeat the process and analogously compute other linear codes $\mathscr{V}_j', \mathscr{V}_j'', \ldots$ such that $(\mathscr{V}_j')^\perp \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}} \subseteq \sum_{i \in [\![1,m]\!] \setminus \{j\}} \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^i)}$ as well (by sampling each time different matrices of rank $(r-1)m-2$). Since all these codes are constructed independently, we expect at some point

$$(\mathscr{V}_j + \mathscr{V}_j' + \mathscr{V}_j'' + \ldots)^\perp \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}} = \sum_{i \in [\![1,m]\!] \setminus \{j\}} \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^i)}.$$

Since $(\mathscr{V}_j + \mathscr{V}_j' + \mathscr{V}_j'' + \ldots)^\perp \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathcal{B}} \subseteq \sum_{i \in [\![1,m]\!] \setminus \{j\}} \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^i)}$, one can put $\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}(\mathscr{V}_j + \mathscr{V}_j' + \ldots)^\perp = (r-1)m$ as an exit condition for the construction of such codes.

Remark 9. A good choice for s is $\frac{r-1}{2}$. In this way, $\boldsymbol{G}_{j,j} = \boldsymbol{I}_r$ with very high probability and at the same time, since $2(rm - s(m-1) - \min(3s, r)) \geqslant 2(r-s)(m-1) \geqslant r(m-1)$, computing just two codes $\mathscr{V}_j$ and $\mathscr{V}_j'$ is typically enough to recover $\sum_{i \in [\![1,m]\!] \setminus \{j\}} \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^i)}$.

Once the codes $\sum_{i \in [\![1,m]\!] \setminus \{j\}} \mathbf{GRS}_r(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})^{(q^i)}$ have been retrieved for any $j \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$, a GRS block code can be obtained from intersections as done previously according to Proposition 27.

E.10 Computing $\mathscr{V}_j$

In this technical subsection, we tackle the problem of determining, given two matrices $\boldsymbol{B}_1, \boldsymbol{B}_2 \in \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ of rank $(r-1)m-2$, which blockwise Dickson shift of $\boldsymbol{P}^\intercal \boldsymbol{B}_2 \boldsymbol{P}$ has the diagonal block of rank $r-3$ for the same index l as $\boldsymbol{B}_1$. This represents the basic step to produce elements in $\mathscr{V}_j$ in this case.

Remark 10. Note that, in the q odd case, this would be equivalent to determining which shift of $\boldsymbol{v}_2$ corresponds to the same GRS code of $\boldsymbol{v}_1$ where $\boldsymbol{v}_1$ and $\boldsymbol{v}_2$ are the generators of the kernels of two matrices $\boldsymbol{B}_1$ and $\boldsymbol{B}_2$ respectively of rank $rm-1$. In the case we examine now, however, the dimension of the nullspace is larger than 1 and not all its elements belong to the same GRS code. This explains why we need to move to the matrix formalism. Analogously, in the q odd case, vectors corresponding to the same GRS code were identified by making use of an auxiliary linear code $\mathscr{S}_{aux}$ spanned by kernel generators of a set of matrices. We will see that here we directly employ a set of auxiliary matrices $\boldsymbol{B}_{aux,i}$'s instead.

Analogously to what shown in Proposition 23, we still have that if $\boldsymbol{v}\boldsymbol{B} = 0$, then

$$(\boldsymbol{v}^{q^i}\boldsymbol{S}^i)\cdot(\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i = (\boldsymbol{v}\boldsymbol{B})^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i = 0,$$

therefore the nullspaces of blockwise Dickson shift matrices can be easily computed from the others. Let r_1, r_2 be the unique integers such that $r = r_1(m+2) + r_2$ with $r_2 \in [\![1, m+2]\!]$. We split the analysis into different cases:

– **Case** $4 \leqslant r_2 \leqslant m+2$**.** Let $\boldsymbol{B}_1, \boldsymbol{B}_2 \in \mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$ of rank $(r-1)m-2$. Let us first consider the case $r_1 = 0$. Consider the linear code

$$\left(\sum_{i=0}^{r-4} \ker\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}_2^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i\right)\right).$$

A generator matrix of $\left(\sum_{i=0}^{r-4} \ker\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}_2^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i\right)\right)(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal$ can be written as

$$\begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{G}_{0,0} & & & \\ & \boldsymbol{G}_{1,1} & & \boldsymbol{0} \\ & & \ddots & \\ \boldsymbol{0} & & & \boldsymbol{G}_{m-1,m-1} \end{bmatrix} \tag{37}$$

where $r-3$ cyclically consecutive diagonal blocks have $r-1$ rows while the others have $r-3$ rows (and they all have r columns). A generator matrix of $\ker(\boldsymbol{B}_1)(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal$ is instead given by

$$\begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{v}_1 & & \boldsymbol{0} & \boldsymbol{0} \\ & \ddots & & \\ & & \boldsymbol{v}_{l,1} & \\ \boldsymbol{0} & & \boldsymbol{v}_{l,2} & \boldsymbol{0} \\ & & \boldsymbol{v}_{l,3} & \\ & & & \ddots \\ \boldsymbol{0} & & \boldsymbol{0} & \boldsymbol{v}_m \end{bmatrix} \tag{38}$$

for some $l \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$. If $\mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{G}_{l,l}) = r-1$, then

$$\begin{aligned} \dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}\left(\ker(\boldsymbol{B}_1) + \sum_{i=0}^{r-4}\ker\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}_2^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i\right)\right) &= \dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}\left(\left(\ker(\boldsymbol{B}_1) + \sum_{i=0}^{r-4}\ker\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}_2^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i\right)\right)(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal\right) \\ &\leqslant (r-4)((r-1)+1) + (r) + (m-r+3)((r-3)+1) \\ &= rm + 2r - 2m - 6. \end{aligned}$$

On the other hand, if $\mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{G}_{l,l}) = r-3$, then we expect with good probability that the dimension of $\ker(\boldsymbol{B}_1) + \sum_{i=0}^{r-4}\ker\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}_2^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i\right)$ attains

$$\begin{aligned} &(r-3)((r-1)+1) + (m-r+2)((r-3)+1) + ((r-3)+3) \\ =&rm + 2r - 2m - 4. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, by computing the dimension of $\ker(\boldsymbol{B}_1)+\sum_{i=0}^{r-4}\ker\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}_2^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i\right)$ we determine whether the rank-$(r-3)$ block of $\boldsymbol{B}_1$ corresponds to a rank-$(r-3)$ block of some of the $\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}_2^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i\right)$'s for some $i\in[\![0,r-4]\!]$. By replacing $[\![0,r-4]\!]$ with other subsets of $[\![0,m-1]\!]$ of cardinality $r-3$ and repeating the process, we finally detect the sought $\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}_2^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i\right)$. In the case where $r_1>0$, we need to sample independent rank-$((r-1)m-2)$ matrices $\boldsymbol{B}_{aux,1},\dots,\boldsymbol{B}_{aux,r_1}\in\mathscr{C}_{\mathrm{mat}}(\mathcal{B})$. In this case a generator matrix of

$$\left(\sum_{j=1}^{r_1}\sum_{i=0}^{m-1}\ker\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}_{aux,j}^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i\right)+\sum_{i=0}^{r_2-4}\ker\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}_2^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i\right)\right)(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal$$

is with non-negligible probability as in (**??**), where r_2-3 cyclically consecutive diagonal blocks have $r_1(m+2)+r_2-1=r-1$ rows while the others have $r_1(m+2)+r_2-3=r-3$ rows (and they all have r columns). Hence, the computation of

$$\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}\ker(\boldsymbol{B}_1)+\sum_{j=1}^{r_1}\sum_{i=0}^{m-1}\ker\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}_{aux,j}^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i\right)+\sum_{i=0}^{r_2-4}\ker\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}_2^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i\right)$$

$$\begin{cases}\leqslant & (r_2-4)((r-1)+1)+(r)+(m-r_2+3)((r-3)+1)\\ & =rm+2r_2-2m-6 \quad \text{if } \mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{G}_{l,l})=r-1,\\ = & (r_2-3)((r-1)+1)+(m-r_2+2)((r-3)+1)+((r-3)+3)\\ & =rm+2r_2-2m-4 \quad \text{otherwise (with high probability)}\end{cases}$$

reveals again whether the rank-$(r-3)$ block of $\boldsymbol{B}_1$ corresponds or not to one of the rank-$(r-3)$ blocks of the $\ker\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}_2^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i\right)$'s.

– **Case $r_2=1$ and $r_1\geqslant 1$.** The reasoning is very similar to the one in the previous case. An analogous computation shows that

$$\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}\ker(\boldsymbol{B}_1)+\sum_{j=1}^{r_1-1}\sum_{i=0}^{m-1}\ker\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}_{aux,j}^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i\right)+\sum_{i=0}^{m-2}\ker\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}_2^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i\right)$$

$$\begin{cases}\leqslant & (m-2)((r-2)+1)+(r)+((r-4)+1)\\ & =rm-m-1 \quad \text{if } \mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{G}_{l,l})=r-2,\\ = & (m-1)((r-2)+1)+((r-4)+3)\\ & =rm-m \quad \text{otherwise (with high probability)}\end{cases},$$

for the index $l\in[\![0,m-1]\!]$ such that a generator matrix of $\ker(\boldsymbol{B}_1)(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal$ is as in (38) and a generator matrix of $\left(\sum_{j=1}^{r_1-1}\sum_{i=0}^{m-1}\ker\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}_{aux,j}^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i\right)+\sum_{i=0}^{m-2}\ker\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}_2^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i\right)\right)(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal$ is as in (37), with $m-1$ cyclically consecutive diagonal blocks having $r-2$ rows while the other having $r-4$ rows (and they all have r columns). Hence we can distinguish the case $\mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{G}_{l,l})=r-2$ from $\mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{G}_{l,l})=r-4$.

– **Case $r_2 = 2$ and $r_1 \geqslant 1$.** In this case, we take two consecutive blockwise Dickson shifts of $\boldsymbol{B}_1$, *i.e.* $\boldsymbol{B}_1$ and $\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal \boldsymbol{B}_1^{(q)} \boldsymbol{S}$. Therefore a generator matrix of $\left(\ker(\boldsymbol{B}_1) + \ker(\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal \boldsymbol{B}_1^{(q)} \boldsymbol{S})\right) (\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal$ is given by either

$$\begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{V}_{0,0} & & & \\ & \boldsymbol{V}_{1,1} & & \boldsymbol{0} \\ & & \ddots & \\ \boldsymbol{0} & & & \boldsymbol{V}_{m-1,m-1} \end{bmatrix}$$

where 2 cyclically consecutive diagonal blocks have 4 rows while the others have 2 rows (and they all have r columns). Let us say that the two blocks with 4 rows are indexed by l and $l+1 \mod m$, for some $l \in [\![0, m-1]\!]$. Then we get

$$\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} \ker(\boldsymbol{B}_1) + \ker(\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal \boldsymbol{B}_1^{(q)} \boldsymbol{S}) + \sum_{j=1}^{r_1-1} \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} \ker\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i \boldsymbol{B}_{aux,j}^{(q^i)} \boldsymbol{S}^i\right) + \sum_{i=0}^{m-2} \ker\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i \boldsymbol{B}_2^{(q^i)} \boldsymbol{S}^i\right)$$

$$\begin{cases} \leqslant & (m-3)((r-3)+2) + (2r) + ((r-5)+2) \\ & = rm - m \quad \text{if } \mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{G}_{l,l}) = r-3 \wedge \mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{G}_{l+1 \mod m, l+1 \mod m}) = r-3, \\ = & (m-2)((r-3)+2) + (r) + ((r-5)+3+1) \\ & = rm - m + 1 \quad \text{otherwise (with high probability)} \end{cases}$$

where a generator matrix of $\left(\sum_{j=1}^{r_1-1} \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} \ker\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i \boldsymbol{B}_{aux,j}^{(q^i)} \boldsymbol{S}^i\right) + \sum_{i=0}^{m-2} \ker\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i \boldsymbol{B}_2^{(q^i)} \boldsymbol{S}^i\right)\right) (\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal$ is as in (37), with $m-1$ cyclically consecutive diagonal blocks having $r-3$ rows while the other having $r-5$ rows (and they all have r columns). Hence we can distinguish the case $\mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{G}_{l,l}) = r-3 \wedge \mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{G}_{l+1 \mod m, l+1 \mod m}) = r-3$ from $\mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{G}_{l,l}) = r-5 \vee \mathbf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{G}_{l+1 \mod m, l+1 \mod m}) = r-5$. Repeating the process at most m times for different pairs of consecutive diagonal block shifts of $\boldsymbol{B}_1$, solves our problem.

– **Case $r_2 = 3$.** If $r_1 = 0$, the kernel of a single matrix $\boldsymbol{B}$ already defines $\mathscr{V}_j$ (note that we can choose $s = \left\lceil \frac{r}{3} \right\rceil = \frac{r-1}{2} = 1$). Otherwise, let $\boldsymbol{B}_1$ and $\boldsymbol{B}_2$ such that generator matrices of $\ker(\boldsymbol{B}_1)(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal$ and $\ker(\boldsymbol{B}_2)(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal$ respectively are given by

$$\begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{v}_1 & & \boldsymbol{0} & & \boldsymbol{0} \\ & \ddots & & & \\ & & \boldsymbol{v}_{l_1,1} & & \\ \boldsymbol{0} & & \boldsymbol{v}_{l_1,2} & & \boldsymbol{0} \\ & & \boldsymbol{v}_{l_2,3} & & \\ & & & \ddots & \\ \boldsymbol{0} & & \boldsymbol{0} & & \boldsymbol{v}_m \end{bmatrix} \quad \text{and} \quad \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{u}_1 & & \boldsymbol{0} & & \boldsymbol{0} \\ & \ddots & & & \\ & & \boldsymbol{u}_{l_2,1} & & \\ \boldsymbol{0} & & \boldsymbol{u}_{l_2,2} & & \boldsymbol{0} \\ & & \boldsymbol{u}_{l_2,3} & & \\ & & & \ddots & \\ \boldsymbol{0} & & \boldsymbol{0} & & \boldsymbol{u}_m \end{bmatrix}. \tag{39}$$

A generator matrix of $\left(\sum_{j=1}^{r_1}\sum_{i=0}^{m-1}\ker\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}_{aux,j}^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i\right)\right)(\boldsymbol{P}^{-1})^\intercal$ is expected to be as in (37), with all the block have $r-3$ rows (and r columns). Therefore

$$\dim_{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}}\ker(\boldsymbol{B}_1)+\ker((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^l\boldsymbol{B}_2^{(q^l)}(\boldsymbol{S})^l)+\sum_{j=1}^{r_1}\sum_{i=0}^{m-1}\ker\left((\boldsymbol{S}^\intercal)^i\boldsymbol{B}_{aux,j}^{(q^i)}\boldsymbol{S}^i\right)$$

$$\begin{cases}\leqslant & (m-1)((r-3)+2)+(r)\\ & =rm-m+1 \quad \text{if } l_1=l_2+l \mod m,\\ = & (m-2)((r-3)+2)+(2r)+((r-5)+3+1)\\ & =rm-m+2 \quad \text{otherwise (with high probability)}\end{cases}$$

Repeating the process at most m times for different values of l solves our problem.

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