Revisiting Oblivious Top-k Selection with Applications to Secure k-NN Classification

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Abstract. An oblivious Top-k algorithm selects the k smallest elements from d elements while ensuring the sequence of operations and memory accesses do not depend on the input. In 1969, Alekseev proposed an oblivious Top-k algorithm with complexity $O(d \log^2 k)$, which was later improved by Yao in 1980 for small $k \ll \sqrt{d}$.

In this paper, we revisit the literature on oblivious Top-k and propose another improvement of Alekseev's method that outperforms both for large $k = \Omega(\sqrt{d})$. Our construction is equivalent to applying a new truncation technique to Batcher's odd-even sorting algorithm. In addition, we propose a combined network to take advantage of both Yao's and our technique that achieves the best concrete performance, in terms of the number of comparators, for any k. To demonstrate the efficiency of our combined Top-k network, we implement a secure non-interactive k-nearest neighbors classifier using homomorphic encryption as an application. Compared with the work of Zuber and Sirdey (PoPETS 2021) where oblivious Top-k was realized with complexity $O(d^2)$, our experimental results show a speedup of up to 47 times (not accounting for difference in CPU) for d = 1000.

Keywords: Top-k selection \cdot Homomorphic encryption \cdot Machine learning \cdot k-nearest neighbors \cdot Sorting networks \cdot TFHE.

1 Introduction

Outsourcing computation has been a popular solution to resolve modern conflicts between large data collection versus limited local storage and computational power. Stimulated by regulations such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), data confidentiality received growing attention in outsourced computation. Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is a powerful cryptographic technique that allows arbitrary computations over encrypted data without decrypting intermediate values. This interesting property enables secure computations that are *non-interactive* and propels FHE into a key privacy preserving

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technology [11,16,33,27,15,14]. With promising speedup from hardware accelerators [29,4,18,5], which can be up to three orders of magnitude faster than CPUs, FHE can soon provide feasible solutions for a wider range of real-world, privacy preserving applications.

Despite its promising potential, developing efficient FHE programs remains difficult. An important part of the inefficiency is the amplification in computation complexity when a plaintext program is converted into a program operating on the corresponding FHE ciphertexts. For example, in the homomorphic evaluation of the if-else paradigm, each conditional statement needs to be executed. By extension, when traversing a binary tree, the full tree is touched instead of a single path. In other words, the data secrecy guaranteed by FHE comes at the cost of increased computational complexity, even if the overhead of FHE is low.

Data-oblivious algorithms in FHE. Fortunately, the increase in computational complexity does not apply to *data-oblivious* programs where the sequence of operations and memory accesses do not depend on the input. Therefore, data-oblivious programs can be directly translated to their low-level FHE analogue. In this sense, describing a high-level algorithm in a data-oblivious manner is an FHE-friendly paradigm.

As an example, suppose we want to sort d encrypted elements homomorphically. Then which sorting algorithm should we use? Quicksort and heapsort turn out to be not data-oblivious, and realizing those homomorphically is impractical despite their optimal time complexity of $O(d \log d)$. In contrast, Batcher's odd-even merge sort [22] is a data-oblivious algorithm with time complexity $O(d \log^2 d)$, and it can be realized homomorphically with the same complexity.

Additionally, the most appropriate cost measure depends on the FHE scheme. In BGV [7], BFV [6,17] and CKKS [12], controlling the multiplicative depth (i.e., the number of consecutive multiplications) of the sorting algorithm is crucial. On the other hand, optimizing the algorithmic complexity is more important in the TFHE [13] scheme.

Oblivious Top-k selection. Given d elements, a Top-k algorithm selects its k smallest (or largest) elements, while the output elements are not necessarily sorted. Top-k selection is an important building block for various applications, in which the k most important records in a huge information space (consisting of d records) are extracted by defining proper scoring functions and returning those with the best ranks. Widely used examples include the k-nearest neighbors classification technique [23], recommender systems [20] and genetic algorithms [26].

This work focuses on Top-k algorithms that are data-oblivious. Since oblivious programs can be visualized as networks of low-level modules, the terms Top-k network and oblivious Top-k are used interchangeably. Section 2 introduces the basics of the network visualization.

Research into oblivious Top-k has a long history. In this work, we revisit the complexity upper bounds for the oblivious Top-k algorithm derived by Alekseev in 1969 [2], which was then improved by Yao in 1980 [36]. Alekseev proposed a procedure to select the Top-k out of 2k elements, which can be generalized into

Top-k out of d elements with complexity $O(d \log^2 k)$ [22]. This method provides better asymptotic complexity than recent FHE realizations and also outperforms those in practice. Yao, on the other hand, introduced an unbalanced recursive procedure in [36, Lemma 3.2] to improve Alekseev's for small $k \ll \sqrt{d}$.

These results, however, have not received much attention so far. Recent realizations of oblivious Top-k in secure computation either use an oblivious sorting algorithm [37,34,21] or call oblivious Min (or Max) k times repeatedly [9,19,8]. The complexity in the former method is not parameterized by k since it always contains redundant comparisons, and the latter method results in complexity O(kd), which grows linearly in k.

1.1 Our contributions

Firstly, we revisit Yao's recursive approach for oblivious Top-k selection. We observe that not all parameters d and k can be reduced to the recursive base case (k = 1 or k = 2) in [36, Theorem 3.1]. Therefore, we fix this by handling one more case using symmetry. This construction results in a Top-k network with complexity $O(d \log k)$ for small $k \ll \sqrt{d}$.

Secondly, we also propose another improvement of Alekseev's method independent of Yao's. Specifically, we improve Alekseev's order-preserving merging procedure from $O(k \log^2 k)$ to $O(k \log k)$ by truncating Batcher's merge. As such, our network is essentially a truncated version of Batcher's odd-even sorting network with complexity $O(d \log^2 k)$, where redundant comparisons are removed.

Since our truncated method is better for large $k = \Omega(\sqrt{d})$ and Yao's method is better for small k, our third contribution is to introduce a combined method which takes advantage of both. For concrete values of k and d, the combined network recursively calls our truncated merge method or Yao's method, depending on which one uses fewer comparators. As such, the complexity of our combined network is upper bounded by the better method of Yao's and our truncated Top-k, and slightly improves on those methods for some parameters. If k and dare known in advance, the combined network can be preprocessed by the server.

Lastly, to demonstrate the efficiency of our combined Top-k network, we present non-interactive and secure k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN) classification as an application. We use the TFHE homomorphic encryption scheme to handle large multiplicative depth efficiently, and our protocol is implemented in the TFHE-rs⁴ library. Compared with prior work [37], where oblivious Top-k was realized with complexity $O(d^2)$, our experimental results show a speedup of up to 47 times (not accounting for difference in CPU) for d = 1000 and k = 3.

1.2 Related work

Oblivious Top-k. To simplify the explanation, we denote an oblivious Top-k out of d procedure as a (k, d)-selector. In 1969, Alekseev [2] proposed a (k, 2k)-selector using sorting as a subprocedure. This method was generalized to arbitrary d [22], which achieves a complexity of $(\lceil d/k \rceil - 1)(2S(k) + k)$ comparators

⁴ https://github.com/zama-ai/tfhe-rs

for oblivious Top-k selection. We use S(k) to denote the number of comparators in k-sorting (i.e., sorting k elements).

The above complexity was improved by Yao in 1980. Specifically, in the proof of [36, Theorem 3.1], an unbalanced recursive procedure was introduced, which yields better networks for small k. This recursive procedure will be discussed in detail in Section 3.3.

Surprisingly, the constructions above have been ignored in research over the past few decades. To our knowledge, recent data-oblivious Top-k solutions can be categorised into three types:

- The first type applies a sorting algorithm directly, and then discards the d-k irrelevant elements. For example, in a recent homomorphic k-NN realization, Zuber and Sirdey [37] use sorting of complexity $O(d^2)$ to achieve Top-k.
- The second type repeatedly finds the Min (or Max) using the so-called tournament method [19], where inputs are compared pairwise and the "winner" proceeds to the next stage. This requires O(kd) comparisons in total.
- The third type is from hardware-related research [31]. This work builds a bitonic Top-k algorithm by removing the unnecessary comparisons in bitonic sorting, thereby achieving $O(d \log^2 k)$. The number of comparators in bitonic sorting is always higher than Batcher's odd-even merge sort, but it is useful in hardware designs due to a more cache-friendly memory access pattern.

Secure k-NN classification. Chen et al. [9] proposed two secure k-NN classifiers based on a mixture of homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party computation. However, both versions use an approximate circuit for Top-k selection and therefore do not necessarily return the nearest neighbors. Additionally, their protocols are interactive, which makes them less suitable for outsourced computation in the context of cloud computing.

The most closely related work is that of Zuber and Sirdey [37], who also propose a non-interactive k-NN algorithm based on the TFHE scheme. The authors use a specialized, FHE-friendly approach to perform the Top-k selection step, known as the delta-matrix method. This technique is asymptotically worse than standard sorting algorithms. Our approach differs in this key step where we identify Top-k selection networks that involve fewer comparison operators. The delta-matrix method can be extended with a counting operation (called majority vote in [3]) to sum the results of the individual classes. However, this step is not necessary in sorting-based approaches, because they allow us to select the Top-k smallest elements directly.

Other related works are either very slow or rely on totally different security models. For example, Shaul et al. [32] implement a secure k-NN algorithm based on BGV homomorphic encryption [7] but they report an execution time of several hours for a moderately sized dataset. A completely different approach is taken by the SCONEDB model via a scalar-product-preserving encryption scheme [35]. However, this protocol computes the query result in the clear, which leaks useful information to the server. Another very recent paper proposes a lightweight k-NN solution, but it needs to distribute trust between two non-colluding servers [30].

2 Preliminaries on data-oblivious algorithms

This section introduces the network visualization of oblivious algorithms. We also give an example of Batcher's (d_1, d_2) -merging algorithm [22, Chapter 5].

A network comprises of interconnected *basic modules*. In the case of sorting and selection networks, this basic module is a comparator. Figure 1 shows the network of odd-even merge sort for d = 4, where inputs enter from the left and a vertical line compares two elements. The comparator swaps the inputs if the first one is greater than the second. By counting the number of vertical lines and the number of vertical lines in series, we know that the algorithm has 5 comparators and a depth of 3. Here the depth refers to the number of consecutive comparisons on the longest path from input to output.



Fig. 1: The basic module and the network of odd-even merge sort for d = 4.

2.1 Batcher's merging network

A crucial component of many sorting networks (and our Top-k selection network) is a *merge* procedure. Given two sorted arrays of size d_1 and d_2 , then a (d_1, d_2) -merging algorithm produces a sorted array that contains the same elements.

Batcher's merging network is specified in Algorithm 1 (vector indexing is done in subscript). This algorithm is based on a recursive decomposition of the problem: first, the input arrays are split into their even- and odd-index components. Then the even- and odd-index arrays are merged separately via two recursive calls. One can prove that, after these recursive calls, the smallest element is in array \mathbf{v} , the second and third smallest elements are either in array \mathbf{v} or \mathbf{w} (yet not in the same one), and so on. As such, the result can be reconstructed by pairwise comparison of the elements of the recursive calls.

Theorem 1. The $(2^i, 2^i)$ -merge contains $2^i \cdot i + 1$ comparators and has a comparison depth of i + 1.

3 Top-k selection networks

3.1 Revisiting Alekseev's Top-k network

Alekseev [2] proposed a merge procedure to construct a (k, 2k)-selector: partition and sort two length-k arrays to obtain **x** and **y**, then compare and interchange

$$\mathbf{x}_0$$
 with \mathbf{y}_{k-1} , \mathbf{x}_1 with \mathbf{y}_{k-2} , ..., \mathbf{x}_{k-1} with \mathbf{y}_0 . (1)

Algorithm 1 Batcher's (d_1, d_2) -merge

Input: Two sorted arrays \mathbf{x} (of size d_1) and \mathbf{y} (of size d_2) **Output:** Sorted array that contains the entries of **x** and **y** 1: function $MERGE(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$ 2: if $d_1 \cdot d_2 = 0$ then return (x, y)3: else if $d_1 \cdot d_2 = 1$ then 4: return COMPARE $(\mathbf{x}_0, \mathbf{y}_0)$ 5:6: ▷ Merge even- and odd-index components else $\mathbf{v} \leftarrow \mathrm{MERGE}((\mathbf{x}_0, \mathbf{x}_2, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{2\lceil d_1/2 \rceil - 2}), (\mathbf{y}_0, \mathbf{y}_2, \dots, \mathbf{y}_{2\lceil d_2/2 \rceil - 2}))$ 7: 8: $\mathbf{w} \leftarrow \text{MERGE}((\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_3, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{2\lfloor d_1/2 \rfloor - 1}), (\mathbf{y}_1, \mathbf{y}_3, \dots, \mathbf{y}_{2\lfloor d_2/2 \rfloor - 1}))$ 9: $\mathbf{z} \leftarrow (\mathbf{v}_0, \mathbf{w}_0, \mathbf{v}_1, \mathbf{w}_1, \dots)$ 10: for $i \leftarrow 1$ to $\lfloor (\operatorname{size}(\mathbf{z}) - 1)/2 \rfloor$ do $(\mathbf{z}_{2i-1}, \mathbf{z}_{2i}) \leftarrow \text{COMPARE}(\mathbf{z}_{2i-1}, \mathbf{z}_{2i})$ 11: end for 12:13:return z 14: end if 15: end function 16: function COMPARE(x, y)▷ Comparator module **return** $(\min(x, y), \max(x, y))$ 17:18: end function

This can be generalized into Top-k out of d elements by partitioning the inputs into $\lceil d/k \rceil$ length-k arrays and applying Alekseev's procedure (two k-sortings and k comparisons) $\lceil d/k \rceil - 1$ times as in the tournament procedure [22]. It solves the Top-k problem using $(\lceil d/k \rceil - 1)(2S(k) + k)$ comparators, where S(k)is the number of comparators for k-sorting. Realizing S(k) with practical sorting networks (e.g., Batcher's odd-even merge sort) leads to an asymptotic complexity of $S(k) = O(k \log^2 k)$, so this Top-k network consists of $O(d \log^2 k)$ comparators.

Reinterpretation as order-preserving merging. Let (d_1, d_2, k) -merge denote an order-preserving merge where the inputs are two sorted arrays of length d_1 and d_2 , and the output is the sorted Top-k out of $d_1 + d_2$ elements. Then Alekseev's Top-k procedure can be reinterpreted into three steps:

- 1. sort $\lceil d/k \rceil$ length-k arrays;
- 2. apply $\lceil d/k \rceil 2$ times (k, k, k)-merge in the tournament manner, where each merge consists of the procedure from (1) and a k-sorting of the output;
- 3. apply the procedure from (1).

In step 2, each (k, k, k)-merge has complexity S(k) + k. Using practical sorting networks, such as Batcher's odd-even sorting network, leads to complexity $O(k \log^2 k)$ for (k, k, k)-merge.

3.2 Our truncated sorting network

Our order-preserving merging. We achieve (k, k, k)-merges differently: we observe that Batcher's (d_1, d_2) -merge in Algorithm 1 is order-preserving with an

output array of length $d_1 + d_2$. Since only the Top-k smallest elements are of interest, directly running Batcher's (d_1, d_2) -merge would be excessively costly. Instead, we generalize the merging step from Algorithm 1 into Algorithm 2, which removes redundant comparisons and outputs at most k elements.

Algorithm 2 Our truncated (d_1, d_2, k) -merge

Input: Two sorted arrays \mathbf{x} (of size $d_1 \leq k$) and \mathbf{y} (of size $d_2 \leq k$) and k > 0**Output:** Sorted array that contains the entries of \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{y} , or their k smallest entries if $k < d_1 + d_2$ 1: function $MERGE(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, k)$ 2: if $d_1 \cdot d_2 = 0$ then $\mathbf{z} \leftarrow (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$ 3: 4: else if $d_1 \cdot d_2 = 1$ then 5: $\mathbf{z} \leftarrow \text{COMPARE}(\mathbf{x}_0, \mathbf{y}_0)$ \triangleright Merge even- and odd-index components 6: else 7: $\mathbf{v} \leftarrow \text{MERGE}((\mathbf{x}_0, \mathbf{x}_2, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{2\lceil d_1/2 \rceil - 2}), (\mathbf{y}_0, \mathbf{y}_2, \dots, \mathbf{y}_{2\lceil d_2/2 \rceil - 2}), \lfloor k/2 \rfloor + 1)$ 8: $\mathbf{w} \leftarrow \text{MERGE}((\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_3, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{2\lfloor d_1/2 \rfloor - 1}), (\mathbf{y}_1, \mathbf{y}_3, \dots, \mathbf{y}_{2\lfloor d_2/2 \rfloor - 1}), \lfloor k/2 \rfloor)$ 9: $\mathbf{z} \leftarrow (\mathbf{v}_0, \mathbf{w}_0, \mathbf{v}_1, \mathbf{w}_1, \dots)$ 10: for $i \leftarrow 1$ to $|(\operatorname{size}(\mathbf{z}) - 1)/2|$ do $(\mathbf{z}_{2i-1}, \mathbf{z}_{2i}) \leftarrow \text{COMPARE}(\mathbf{z}_{2i-1}, \mathbf{z}_{2i})$ 11: end for 12:end if 13:return TRUNCATE (\mathbf{z}, k) 14:15: end function 16: function TRUNCATE(\mathbf{x}, k) \triangleright Truncate to k elements 17: $i \leftarrow \min(\operatorname{size}(\mathbf{x}), k)$ 18:return $(\mathbf{x}_0,\ldots,\mathbf{x}_{i-1})$ 19: end function

Theorem 2. The truncated (k, k, k)-merge contains $O(k \log k)$ comparators and has a comparison depth of $O(\log k)$.

Note that our order-preserving merge procedure is not only asymptotically better than Alekseev's $O(k \log^2 k)$, but is also better in practice: as Figure 2 shows, it contains fewer comparisons for a small value of k = 3.



Fig. 2: Two constructions of a (3, 3, 3)-merge network.

Our truncated sorting network. Realizing step 2 in Alekseev's Top-k with our truncated (k, k, k)-merge is essentially a truncated version of Batcher's oddeven sorting algorithm, where the Top-k elements are selected in a recursive approach. As can be seen in Algorithm 3, we split the initial array into two parts, find the Top-k elements of these two parts recursively, and then call Algorithm 2 to compute the final result.

Moreover, our Algorithm 3 also improves the input partitioning in Alekseev's step 1. Specifically, we observe that the truncated network is more efficient if the chunk size is chosen as a multiple of $\mu = 2^{\lceil \log k \rceil}$. We therefore use the following heuristic: if $d > \mu$, the first chunk's size is computed as a multiple of μ that is close to d/2. Otherwise, the first chunk's size is equal to $\lceil d/2 \rceil$. The second chunk simply consists of the remaining elements (i.e., the ones that are not in the first chunk). As an example, the resulting network for d = 16 and k = 3 is shown in Figure 3, where each box represents a merging procedure.

Algorithm 3 Our truncated odd-even merge sort

Input: Array **x** (of size d > 0) and k > 0**Output:** Sorted array that contains the entries of \mathbf{x} , or its k smallest entries if k < d1: function SORT(\mathbf{x}, k) 2: if d = 1 then 3: return x \triangleright Sort two chunks separately and merge 4: else 5: $i \leftarrow \text{CHUNKSIZE}(d, k)$ 6: $\mathbf{v} \leftarrow \text{SORT}((\mathbf{x}_0, \ldots, \mathbf{x}_{i-1}), k)$ 7: $\mathbf{w} \leftarrow \text{SORT}((\mathbf{x}_i, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{d-1}), k)$ 8: return $MERGE(\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{w}, k)$ 9: end if 10: end function 11: function ChunkSize(d, k)▷ Compute size of first chunk $\mu \leftarrow 2^{\lceil \log k \rceil}$ 12:13:if $d \leq \mu$ then 14: return $\lceil d/2 \rceil$ 15:else 16:return $\mu \cdot \left[d/(2\mu) \right]$ 17:end if 18: end function

Theorem 3. Our network for finding the k smallest elements out of d has time complexity $O(d \log^2 k)$ and depth $O(\log d \cdot \log k)$.

Proof. For the ease of asymptotic analysis, we restrict the parameters d and k to powers of two. In this case, the full algorithm reduces to Batcher's odd-even sorting network until obtaining d/k sorted arrays of size k, and then performing the (k, k, k)-merge recursively as in the tournament method.



Fig. 3: Our network for finding the 3 smallest values out of 16, which has 35 comparators and depth 9. Boxes visualize our truncated (d, d, 3)-merge for d = 1, 2, 3, 3 from the leftmost to the rightmost box.

Using Theorem 2, the comparison depth is

$$1 + 2 + \ldots + \log k + O(\log k) \cdot \log \frac{d}{k} = O(\log d \cdot \log k),$$

and the total number of comparisons is

$$\sum_{i=1}^{\log k} \frac{d}{2^i} (2^{i-1}(i-1)+1) + O(k\log k) \cdot \frac{d}{k} = O\left(\sum_{i=1}^{\log k} \frac{d}{2} \cdot i + d\log k\right)$$
$$= O(d\log^2 k).$$

Note that our Algorithm 3 always outputs sorted results, but the output of the Top-
$$k$$
 problem does not need to be sorted. Therefore, two more optimizations are incorporated in the implementation: (1) if $k > d/2$, we can exchange the roles of k and $d-k$ (this will be explained in more detail in Section 3.3); (2) the last merge box can be replaced by Alekseev's merge procedure [2], where only $d_1 + d_2 - k$ comparators are used.

Comparison with related work. To the best of our knowledge, there exist three Top-k methods of complexity $O(d \log^2 k)$: Alekseev's procedure (Section 3.1), a method based on bitonic sorting [31], and our method from Algorithm 3. Despite the same asymptotic complexity, our algorithm has the fewest comparators, following the explanation in Algorithm 3 and Section 1.2. An example of d = 40 is presented in Figure 4. Note that the monotonicity in our Top-k is a result of our input partitioning optimization.

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Fig. 4: The number of comparisons U(k, d) in selecting the Top-k elements out of d = 40 using the method in SPM18 [31], Alekseev's method and our truncated network. The number of comparisons is shown only for $1 \le k \le d/2$ as U(k, d) = U(d - k, d) by symmetry.

3.3 Yao's Top-k selection network revisited

Yao [36] designed a Top-k selection network via direct recursion. Using $\lfloor d/2 \rfloor$ comparators, the input is first partitioned into two halves $\mathbf{x} = (\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{\lceil d/2 \rceil})$ and $\mathbf{y} = (\mathbf{y}_1, \dots, \mathbf{y}_{\lfloor d/2 \rfloor})$ such that $\mathbf{x}_i < \mathbf{y}_i$ for $i = 1, \dots, \lfloor d/2 \rfloor$. At most $\lfloor k/2 \rfloor$ elements of the desired output will be in array \mathbf{y} , so we can use a $(\lfloor k/2 \rfloor, \lfloor d/2 \rfloor)$ -selector to find those elements. Then the output of this selector and array \mathbf{x} are given to a $(k, \lceil d/2 \rceil + \lfloor k/2 \rfloor)$ -selector, which produces the final result. An example construction of a (4, 9)-selector is given in Figure 5.

Theorem 4 (Yao [36]). The comparator count $U_Y(k, d)$ for Top-k using Yao's recursion satisfies

 $U_Y(k,d) \le d\lceil \log (k+1) \rceil + c_k \left(\log d \right)^{\lceil \log ((k+1)/3) \rceil},$

where $c_k = O(k^{2+\lambda_k})$ and $\lambda_k = O(\log \log k)$.

For small $k \ll \sqrt{d}$, the complexity $U_Y(k, d)$ is dominated by the first term $d\lceil \log (k+1) \rceil$. This is asymptotically lower than our complexity of $O(d \log^2 k)$ (see Section 3.2). However, this is not true for $k = \Omega(\sqrt{d})$, because the second term in $U_Y(k, d)$ is asymptotically larger than $O(d \log^2 k)$.

The pseudocode for Yao's method is given in Algorithm 4. Next to the recursion described above, multiple special cases are handled:

- If k = 1 or k = 2, we directly use the tournament method (pseudocode for the tournament method is omitted for brevity).
- We observe that if k > d/2, one can reduce the number of comparators by exchanging the roles of k and d - k: instead of computing the k smallest elements, we find the d - k largest elements and return the remaining ones (made explicit by the set difference on line 8). The reverted functionality is called YAOSWAP and returns the largest entries instead of the smallest ones.



Fig. 5: Recursive construction of a (4, 9)-selector using Yao's method.

3.4 Combined network

Since our truncated method is better for large $k = \Omega(\sqrt{d})$ and Yao's method is better for small k, we combine them into one oblivious Top-k network for improved performance. More specifically, the combined network recursively calls our truncated merge method or Yao's method, depending on which one uses fewer comparators. As Figure 6 shows, the complexity of our combined network is upper bounded by the better method of Yao's and our truncated Top-k, and it slightly improves on those methods for some parameters. This improvement is only possible because the values of d and k change dynamically throughout the recursive calls of Yao's method.

Algorithm 4 Yao's Top-k selection network

Input: Array **x** (of size d > 0) and $0 < k \le d$ **Output:** Array that contains the k smallest entries of \mathbf{x} 1: function $YAO(\mathbf{x}, k)$ 2: if k = 1 then 3: $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \text{TOUR}(\mathbf{x})$ else if k = 2 then 4: $(\mathbf{x}_0, \mathbf{x}_2, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{d-1}) \leftarrow \text{TOUR}(\mathbf{x}_0, \mathbf{x}_2, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{d-1})$ 5: $(\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{d-1}) \leftarrow \text{TOUR}(\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{d-1})$ 6: 7: else if k > d/2 then \triangleright Exchange k with d - k8: return $\mathbf{x} \setminus \text{YAOSWAP}(\mathbf{x}, d-k)$ \triangleright Denote $\mathbf{x}_{i...j} = (\mathbf{x}_i, \ldots, \mathbf{x}_j)$ 9: else 10: base $\leftarrow (d \mod 2) - 1$ for $i \leftarrow 1$ to $\lfloor d/2 \rfloor$ do 11: $(\mathbf{x}_{\text{base}+i}, \mathbf{x}_{d-i}) \leftarrow \text{COMPARE}(\mathbf{x}_{\text{base}+i}, \mathbf{x}_{d-i})$ 12:end for 13:14: $\mathbf{x}_{\lceil d/2 \rceil \dots d-1} \leftarrow \text{YAO}(\mathbf{x}_{\lceil d/2 \rceil \dots d-1}, \lfloor k/2 \rfloor)$ 15: $\mathbf{x}_{0\dots\lceil d/2\rceil+\lfloor k/2\rfloor-1} \leftarrow \operatorname{YAO}(\mathbf{x}_{0\dots\lceil d/2\rceil+\lfloor k/2\rfloor-1},k)$ 16:end if return TRUNCATE (\mathbf{x}, k) 17:18: end function



Fig. 6: U(k, d) in selecting the Top-k elements out of d = 1000 using the network with our truncated merge, the network with Yao's recursion and the combined method. The number of comparisons is shown only for $1 \le k \le d/2$ as U(k, d) = U(d - k, d) by symmetry.

4 Our k-NN protocol instantiated with TFHE

We introduce our application of Top-k to secure k-NN, which consists of two phases: computation of the squared distances and finding the k closest vectors, together with the corresponding class labels. This is done based on the TFHE encryption scheme. Commonly used TFHE notations and symbols for the k-NN classification are summarized in Table 1. In particular, we use $\langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{w} \rangle$ for the dot product between two vectors \mathbf{v} and \mathbf{w} . We also define $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^N + 1)$ and $\mathcal{R}_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^N + 1)$, where q is a positive integer and N is a power of two.

Given a base g and a decomposition parameter ℓ , we define a gadget vector

$$\mathbf{g} = (1, g, \dots, g^{\ell-1})^\top$$

and a gadget matrix $\mathbf{G} = \mathbf{I}_2 \otimes \mathbf{g}$, where \otimes denotes the Kronecker product. The gadget decomposition function $\mathbf{g}^{-1}(\cdot)$ satisfies $\langle \mathbf{g}^{-1}(a), \mathbf{g} \rangle \approx a \pmod{q}$ for all $a \in \mathcal{R}_q$. The result has small entries, i.e., $\|\mathbf{g}^{-1}(a)\|_{\infty} \leq g/2$. This can be extended entry-wise to vectors, that is, $\mathbf{G}^{\top} \cdot \mathbf{G}^{-1}(b) \approx b \pmod{q}$ with $\|\mathbf{G}^{-1}(b)\|_{\infty} \leq g/2$ for all $b \in \mathcal{R}_q^2$.

4.1 Threat model and security for k-NN

Similarly to previous works [9,37] on secure k-NN classification, our threat model considers a semi-honest (honest-but-curious) server that follows the protocol correctly, but tries to obtain information about the client from publicly known data. To reach our security goals, the client encrypts its query before sending it to the server. The database itself is owned by the server and therefore does not need to be encrypted. After the homomorphic operation (via our protocol) with the server's data, the final output is also encrypted under the client's key. Since the data seen by the server is always encrypted, the client's input privacy is guaranteed by the IND-CPA property of TFHE. Our work does not consider model privacy, so the client might infer information about the server's database.

4.2 TFHE building blocks

TFHE ciphertexts and basic operations. The TFHE scheme [13] uses several ciphertext types based on the (ring) learning with errors problem [28,25]. Each ciphertext contains a noise or error term e that is added during encryption and removed during decryption. The ciphertext types are the following:

-
$$\mathsf{LWE}_{\mathbf{s}}(m) = (a_1, \dots, a_n, b) \in \mathbb{Z}_a^{n+1}$$
, where

$$b = \sum_{i=1}^{n} -a_i \cdot s_i + \Delta \cdot m + e_i$$

The message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_t$ (with $t \ll q$) is encoded in the ciphertext under a scaling factor $\Delta = q/t$. We call t the plaintext modulus and q the ciphertext modulus. For LWE ciphertexts, the secret key is a vector $\mathbf{s} = (s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_n)$.

- $\mathsf{RLWE}_s(m) = (a, b) \in \mathcal{R}^2_q$, where $b = -a \cdot s + \Delta \cdot m + e$. Both the message $m \in \mathcal{R}_t$ and the secret key s are polynomials.
- RLWE.Trivial.Noiseless $(m) = (0, \Delta \cdot m) \in \mathcal{R}_q^2$ is an RLWE ciphertext where all randomness (including the noise) is set to zero. It can be computed by a party that does not know the secret key.
- $\mathsf{RLWE}'_s(m) = \mathbf{Z} + [\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{g}] \cdot m \in \mathcal{R}_q^{\ell \times 2}$, where **Z** is a matrix, each row of which is an $\mathsf{RLWE}_s(0)$ encryption. The message and secret key have the same format as in the RLWE case.
- $\mathsf{RGSW}_s(m) = \mathbf{Z} + \mathbf{G} \cdot m \in \mathcal{R}_q^{2\ell \times 2}$, where \mathbf{Z} is a matrix, each row of which is an $\mathsf{RLWE}_s(0)$ encryption. The message and secret key have the same format as in the RLWE case. In practice, however, messages are typically restricted to the form $m = \pm X^v$ or m = 0.

To distinguish between these types, LWE ciphertexts will be written as \mathbf{c} and RLWE ciphertexts as c. Homomorphic computations are built from the following operations over the ciphertext space:

- SampleExtract $(c, i) \rightarrow \mathbf{c}$: this procedure extracts one coefficient of a plaintext element encrypted as an RLWE ciphertext into an LWE ciphertext. It takes $c = \mathsf{RLWE}_{\mathbf{s}}(M(X))$ and an index $0 \le i < N$, and outputs $\mathbf{c} = \mathsf{LWE}_{\mathbf{s}}(M_i)$,

Meaning	Symbol
The LWE/RLWE dimension	n/N
The standard deviation of the noise	σ
The gadget base/size	g/ℓ
The plaintext/ciphertext modulus	t/q
The size of the database	d
The vector dimension of the database	γ
The desired number of nearest neighbors	k

Table 1: List of symbols for the TFHE scheme and the k-NN classification.

where M_i is the *i*-th coefficient of M(X). The entries of the LWE key **s** will be equal to the coefficients of the RLWE key *s*.

- $M(X) \cdot c \rightarrow c'$: this procedure multiplies a plaintext element by an RLWE ciphertext. Specifically, it takes $M(X) \in \mathcal{R}_t$ and $c = \mathsf{RLWE}_s(m)$, and outputs $c' = \mathsf{RLWE}_s(M(X) \cdot m)$.
- $-c_1+c_2 \rightarrow c'$: this procedure adds two RLWE ciphertexts. Specifically, it takes $c_1 = \mathsf{RLWE}_s(m_1)$ and $c_2 = \mathsf{RLWE}_s(m_2)$, and outputs $c' = \mathsf{RLWE}_s(m_1+m_2)$. Note that this procedure can also take a ciphertext and a plaintext element instead of two ciphertexts.
- $\mathbf{C} \boxdot c \to c'$: this procedure computes the so-called *external product* between an RGSW and RLWE ciphertext. Specifically, it takes $\mathbf{C} = \mathsf{RGSW}_s(m_1)$ and $c = \mathsf{RLWE}_s(m_2)$, and outputs $c' = \mathbf{C}^\top \cdot \mathbf{G}^{-1}(c) = \mathsf{RLWE}_s(m_1 \cdot m_2)$.
- KeySwitch(\mathbf{c}_i , ksk) $\rightarrow c$: this procedure converts a set of LWE ciphertexts (indexed by i) to an RLWE ciphertext. The output RLWE ciphertext encrypts the same set of numbers (coefficient-wise) as the input LWE ciphertexts. The subroutine for switching one LWE ciphertext to one RLWE ciphertext is shown in Algorithm 5. This algorithm is repeated multiple times for a full key switching operation.
- Bootstrap(c, bk, f) \rightarrow c': this procedure reduces the noise of the input LWE ciphertext, while at the same time evaluating a negacyclic function f (i.e., it needs to satisfy f(m+t/2) = -f(m)). If the function is unknown, we need to initialize the procedure with an encrypted *accumulator*. This is a ciphertext RLWE_s(T(X)) that encodes the desired function, obtained via KeySwitch. The *test polynomial* T(X) depends directly on the function f. Algorithm 6 specifies the pseudocode for programmable bootstrapping.

Homomorphic computation of the squared distance. One essential building block of k-NN classification is computation of the squared distance between an encrypted target vector and a cleartext data point. We adapt the method of Zuber and Sirdey [37] to compute the squared distance between a target vector and a model vector efficiently. Their method actually computes the *difference* between two squared distances, but we need the squared distance itself to be compared in the sorting network.

Algorithm 5 Key switching from LWE to RLWE

Input: $\mathbf{c} = \mathsf{LWE}_{\mathbf{s}}(m) = (a_1, \dots, a_n, b)$ and $\mathsf{ksk} = \{\mathsf{ksk}_i = \mathsf{RLWE}'_s(s_i)\}_{i \in [n]}$ Output: $\mathsf{RLWE}_s(m)$ 1: function $\mathsf{KEYSWITCH}(\mathbf{c}, \mathsf{ksk})$ 2: for $i \leftarrow 1$ to n do 3: $c_i \leftarrow (\langle \mathbf{g}^{-1}(a_i), \mathsf{ksk}_i[1] \rangle, \langle \mathbf{g}^{-1}(a_i), \mathsf{ksk}_i[2] \rangle)$ 4: end for 5: return $(\sum_{i=1}^n c_i[1], b + \sum_{i=1}^n c_i[2])$ 6: end function

Algorithm 6 Programmable bootstrapping

Input: $\mathbf{c} = \mathsf{LWE}_{\mathbf{z}}(m) = (a_1, \dots, a_n, b), \ \mathsf{bk} = \{\mathsf{bk}_i = \mathsf{RGSW}_s(z_i)\}_{i \in [n]} \ \text{and} \ T(X)$ **Output:** LWE_s(f(m))1: function BOOTSTRAP($\mathbf{c}, \mathsf{bk}, T(X)$) 2: $b' \leftarrow \lfloor (2N/q) \cdot b \rfloor$ $ACC \leftarrow RLWE.Trivial.Noiseless(T(X) \cdot X^{-b'})$ 3: for $i \leftarrow 1$ to n do 4: $a'_i \leftarrow \lfloor (2N/q) \cdot a_i \rfloor$ 5: $\mathsf{ACC} \leftarrow \mathsf{ACC} + (X^{-a'_i} - 1) \cdot (\mathsf{bk}_i \boxdot \mathsf{ACC})$ 6: end for 7: 8: **return** SampleExtract(ACC, 0) 9: end function

We are given one target vector $c \in \mathcal{R}_q^2$ (the client's encrypted input), which is an RLWE ciphertext that encodes $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{Z}_t^{\gamma}$. And we have a model vector $\mathbf{w} \in \mathbb{Z}_t^{\gamma}$ stored in the database. We assume that the model vector is given in cleartext since the server owns the database in our scenario. The goal here is to compute $\|\mathbf{v} - \mathbf{w}\|_2^2 = \|\mathbf{v}\|_2^2 - 2 \cdot \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{w} \rangle + \|\mathbf{w}\|_2^2$ homomorphically. To do this, the model vector is encoded in two ways:

$$M(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{\gamma-1} \mathbf{w}_{\gamma-i-1} \cdot X^i \quad \text{and} \quad M'(X) = \left(\sum_{i=0}^{\gamma-1} \mathbf{w}_i^2\right) \cdot X^{\gamma-1}.$$

Similarly, the target vector \mathbf{v} is encrypted as

$$c = \mathsf{RLWE}_s \left(\sum_{i=0}^{\gamma - 1} \mathbf{v}_i \cdot X^i \right) \tag{2}$$

and

$$c' = \mathsf{RLWE}_s \left(\left(\sum_{i=0}^{\gamma-1} \mathbf{v}_i^2 \right) \cdot X^{\gamma-1} \right).$$

Then the squared distance between the encrypted target vector c and the model vector \mathbf{w} can be computed as

$$c'' = c' - 2M(X) \cdot c + M'(X).$$
(3)

The result computed in (3) is an RLWE ciphertext that encrypts a polynomial, the $(\gamma - 1)$ -th coefficient of which gives us the squared distance. Therefore, we run SampleExtract $(c'', \gamma - 1)$ to get LWE_s $(||\mathbf{v} - \mathbf{w}||_2^2)$, which works if $\gamma \leq N$.

An optimization. It is sufficient for the k-NN application to compute the squared distances between target and model vectors up to a certain constant. In particular, since the ciphertext c' is identical for each squared distance, it can simply be removed from (3) and we obtain

$$c'' = -2M(X) \cdot c + M'(X).$$
(4)

This reduces the communication between client and server by 50% as now only one RLWE ciphertext is sent.

Comparison operations. Comparing two encrypted numbers can be done with programmable bootstrapping. For example, Zuber and Chakraborty [8] proposed two homomorphic comparison operators to build min and arg min functions. Apart from the minimum and its argument, our protocol also requires the maximum and its argument, so we implement a different algorithm.

We are given four ciphertexts $\mathbf{c}_0 = \mathsf{LWE}_{\mathbf{s}}(m_0)$ and $\mathbf{c}_1 = \mathsf{LWE}_{\mathbf{s}}(m_1)$, and their corresponding labels $\mathbf{c}'_0 = \mathsf{LWE}_{\mathbf{s}}(m'_0)$ and $\mathbf{c}'_1 = \mathsf{LWE}_{\mathbf{s}}(m'_1)$. We need to compute the following four results:

- An LWE encryption of $\min(m_0, m_1)$.
- An LWE encryption of $\max(m_0, m_1)$.
- An LWE encryption of m'_i with $i = \arg \min(m_0, m_1)$.
- An LWE encryption of m'_i with $i = \arg \max(m_0, m_1)$.

First, we homomorphically compute the difference of the squared distances as $\mathbf{c}' = \mathbf{c}_0 - \mathbf{c}_1 = \mathsf{LWE}_{\mathbf{s}}(m)$, where $m = m_0 - m_1$. This ciphertext encrypts a positive number if $m_1 < m_0$. The input ciphertext of bootstrapping is set to \mathbf{c}' , which serves as a selector. The minimum can now be computed with the function

$$f(m) = \begin{cases} m_0 & \text{if } -t/4 < m \le 0\\ m_1 & \text{if } 0 \le m < t/4. \end{cases}$$
(5)

Here we only consider the domain (-t/4, t/4) to guarantee that f is negacyclic. The test polynomial can now be constructed as

$$T(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{N/2-1} m_1 \cdot X^i - \sum_{i=N/2}^{N-1} m_0 \cdot X^i,$$

where we used $f(m) = -f(m - t/2) = -m_0$ for t/4 < m < t/2. Similarly, the test polynomial for arg min can be constructed by replacing m_0 and m_1 with m'_0 and m'_1 in (5). Note that these four values are actually encrypted, so both test polynomials are obtained via KeySwitch on \mathbf{c}_0 , \mathbf{c}_1 , \mathbf{c}'_0 and \mathbf{c}'_1 . Finally, observe that the maximum can be computed as $\max(m_0, m_1) = m_0 + m_1 - \min(m_0, m_1)$ and similarly for arg max.

4.3 The protocol

Squared distance computation. First, the client encrypts the target vector using (2) and sends it to the server. Then, for each model vector, the server evaluates the formula in (4) and extracts the $(\gamma - 1)$ -th coefficient to compute its squared distance. The result of the distance computation satisfies $\|\mathbf{v}-\mathbf{w}\|_2^2 < t/4$, such that the comparators can be built using (5). Although our protocol uses the Euclidean distance between target and model vectors, one could also replace this by essentially any distance metric that can be computed efficiently with FHE.

Precision reduction (optional). The squared distances may be computed using a large plaintext modulus (t_{dist}) , but the input of programmable bootstrapping (PBS) expects a small plaintext modulus (we need $t_{\text{sort}} \ll 2N$). If the two plaintext moduli are different, we need to perform a precision reduction, which can be done with one subtraction and one bootstrapping operation for every squared distance. The subtraction is necessary because we need to "recenter" the plaintext space. For example, consider plaintext moduli $t_{\text{dist}} = 2 \cdot t_{\text{sort}}$, and their scaling factors $2 \cdot \Delta_{\text{dist}} = \Delta_{\text{sort}}$. Encoded plaintexts of the form $(m_i \cdot \Delta_{\text{dist}}, (m_i + 1) \cdot \Delta_{\text{dist}})$ are mapped to $(m_i/2) \cdot \Delta_{\text{sort}}$ since we want to reduce the precision by one bit in this example. Before bootstrapping, the center of $(m_i \cdot \Delta_{\text{dist}}, (m_i + 1) \cdot \Delta_{\text{dist}})$ needs to be at $(m_i/2) \cdot \Delta_{\text{sort}} = m_i \cdot \Delta_{\text{dist}}$. As such, we need to subtract $\Delta_{\text{dist}}/2$ from the initial plaintext and then perform bootstrapping with the identity function. This method easily generalizes to the case where t_{sort} is any multiple of t_{dist} .

Precision reduction is only necessary if γ is high or if the precision of every element in the feature vector is large in comparison to t_{sort} . Section 5 shows that precision reduction is necessary for MNIST but not for the breast cancer dataset.

The Top-k selection network. To instantiate our Top-k network for privacy preserving k-NN, we need a comparator that also outputs arg min and arg max (to represent the label) next to the minimum and maximum. This comparator is visualized in Figure 7 and its instantiation is described in Section 4.2.

Using the squared distance values as the scoring function, we then apply our combined Top-k network composed of augmented comparators. The output of this phase is a set of k LWE ciphertexts that encrypt the predicted class labels, which are sent back to the client for decryption. Finally, the client computes the most common class label in the clear via majority voting. This is acceptable for most use cases as typically k is much smaller than d.

$$\begin{array}{c} (m_0, m'_0) & \longrightarrow & (\min(m_0, m_1), m'_{\arg\min(m_0, m_1)}) \\ (m_1, m'_1) & \longrightarrow & (\max(m_0, m_1), m'_{\arg\max(m_0, m_1)}) \end{array}$$

Fig. 7: An augmented comparator, where $\arg \min(m_0, m_1)$ and $\arg \max(m_0, m_1)$ refer to the indices (either 0 or 1) of the minimum and maximum element.

Noise growth of our protocol. Programmable bootstrapping is used to lower the noise level of its input, and computing a non-linear function at the same time. However, even though homomorphic comparisons are implemented with bootstrapping, the squared distances are never refreshed during the sorting phase. This is because the accumulator is generated by KeySwitch and is therefore a noisy ciphertext. Yet, both datasets tested in the next section have an output noise that remains at least 10 bits below the 64-bit ciphertext modulus. This

is sufficient to support a plaintext precision of 10 bits without requiring extra bootstrapping operations.

5 Evaluation

5.1 Implementation and experimental setup

Our prototype implementation is written in the Rust programming language using the TFHE-rs⁵ library. The source code can be found on GitHub.⁶ All experiments in this section are executed on machines with Intel(R) Core(TM) i9-9900 CPU @ 3.10 GHz using the Ubuntu 20.04 operating system. Our implementation supports multi-threading in the sorting network, i.e., if two comparators are on the same level in the network, then they may be executed in parallel.

Our experiment uses (a reduced version of) two datasets: the MNIST⁷ and breast cancer⁸ datasets. We preprocess the MNIST dataset in two ways: (1) the images are downsized to 8×8 pixels which are feature vectors of length $\gamma = 64$; (2) elements in every feature vector are converted to ternary values. The breast cancer dataset has $\gamma = 32$ and we preprocess the feature vectors to use binary values. This kind of preprocessing is similar to [37] where the authors also convert the MNIST images to 8×8 pixels and divide values by 300.

We run our privacy preserving k-NN protocol using different values of d and k for both datasets and report the timing, accuracy and bandwidth results below. All experiments are done with the best feature vectors as the model. This is done by creating 10,000 plaintext models at random and selecting the one that gives the highest accuracy when evaluated on all the possible test vectors. Then we average prediction/inference over 200 randomly selected test vectors.

The TFHE parameters are given in Table 2. These parameters are adapted from TFHE-rs.⁹ We make a distinction between the plaintext modulus for distance computation (t_{dist}) and sorting (t_{sort}) . That is, if $t_{\text{dist}} \neq t_{\text{sort}}$, then the precision reduction step from Section 4 needs to be used. Our definition of the plaintext modulus includes the padding bit. This extra padding bit is necessary to satisfy negacyclicity when the data is encoded. For example, if the plaintext modulus is $t = 2^6$, then the message space is 5 bits since one bit is reserved for padding. The parameters from Table 2 guarantee 128 bits of security [1].

The sections below primarily report the computation time and bandwidth. Memory usage is not detailed since it is not a significant overhead in our construction. Namely, our biggest experiment $(d = 1000, k = \lfloor \sqrt{d} \rfloor)$ used only 700 MB of memory. Bootstrapping and key switching keys dominate the memory usage.

⁵ https://github.com/zama-ai/tfhe-rs

⁶ https://github.com/KULeuven-COSIC/ppknn

⁷ https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/optical+recognition+of+ handwritten+digits

⁸ https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Breast+Cancer+Wisconsin+ (Diagnostic)

⁹ https://github.com/zama-ai/tfhe-rs/blob/release/0.1.x/tfhe/src/ shortint/parameters/mod.rs

Table 2: The TFHE parameters used in our experiments. Note that when the homomorphic computation is done, the most significant bit is reserved for padding. Hence if $t = 2^i$, then the actual message uses i - 1 bits.

Parameter	Value
LWE dimension (n)	856
RLWE polynomial degree (N)	4096
LWE standard deviation (σ_{LWE})	2^{44}
RLWE standard deviation (σ_{RLWE})	2^{2}
Decomp params bootstrapping (g, ℓ)	$(2^{22},1)$
Decomp params LWE-to-LWE (g, ℓ)	$(2^3, 6)$
Decomp params LWE-to-RLWE (g, ℓ)	$(2^{23},1)$
Ciphertext modulus (q)	2^{64}
Plaintext modulus (t_{sort})	2^{6}
Plaintext modulus MNIST (t_{dist})	2^{9}
Plaintext modulus breast cancer (t_{dist})	2^{6}
Dataset message space MNIST	\mathbb{Z}_3
Dataset message space breast cancer	\mathbb{Z}_2

5.2 Computation time

The computation time and accuracy probabilities for the MNIST dataset are shown in Table 3, together with the results taken (and extrapolated) from [37]. Modulo the difference in CPU (we estimate that our CPU is at most two times faster than theirs), the wall-clock time ranges from $1.7 \times$ to over $47 \times$ faster than prior work [37] while maintaining a good level of accuracy.

The main reason for our acceleration is the performance gain in the costly Top-k selection step. In the delta-matrix method of Zuber and Sirdey [37], a $d \times d$ matrix is constructed. Each element at position (i, j) in the matrix is 0 if the target vector is closer to the *i*-th model vector than to the *j*-th vector, and 1 otherwise. As such, building the matrix itself requires $(d^2 - d)/2$ comparison operations, then additional scoring operations are needed. In comparison, our Top-k network scales linearly with d and quadratically with $\log k$.

Additionally, this experiment demonstrates the effect of precision reduction. Starting with 9 bits of precision for the distance computation, we reduce to 6 bits before the start of the sorting network. From the results, we see that this has very little effect on accuracy (note that precision reduction is not applied in the "Clear accuracy" column).

Similarly, the computation time and accuracy probabilities for the breast cancer dataset are presented in Table 4. For this dataset, there is no precision reduction step (i.e., $t_{dist} = t_{sort}$), because γ is low, the feature vectors are somewhat sparse and we preprocess the data to have binary feature vectors. Since our plaintext modulus is only 6 bits (one bit is reserved as the padding bit and another one for the sign), the squared distance cannot exceed 4 bits. As such, we have some errors when compared to the plaintext algorithm since the result

Table 3: Computation time and accuracy for the MNIST dataset. The distance computation is performed using 9 bits of precision, then it is converted to 6 bits before running the selection network. The computation times prefixed with \sim are estimated using extrapolation. The number of parallel threads is τ .

k	d	Dura [37]	ation ($\tau = 4$	s) $ \tau = 1$	Compation [37]	rators Ours	Accu Clear	racy FHE
3	40	30	8.7	17.5	780	93	0.81	0.79
	175	696	31.9	78.1	15225	431	0.94	0.94
	269	1524	47.4	119.5	36046	666	0.95	0.94
	457	4248	78.9	202.3	104196	1136	0.98	0.97
	1000	$ \sim 20837$	168.0	441.1	499500	2493	0.98	0.96
5	40	~ 33	11.6	25.5	780	125	0.74	0.73
	175	~ 636	43.1	112.7	15225	598	0.92	0.90
	269	~ 1505	62.7	173.0	36046	928	0.94	0.93
	457	~ 4351	105.0	291.1	104196	1586	0.97	0.97
	1000	~ 20859	227.5	642.3	499500	3485	0.98	0.96
$\lfloor \sqrt{d} \rfloor$	40	~ 33	13.1	28.1	780	143	0.75	0.74
	175	~ 639	68.4	171.8	15225	1015	0.89	0.89
	269	~ 1516	117.7	310.4	36046	1789	0.95	0.94
	457	$ \sim 4402$	209.0	530.2	104196	3412	0.95	0.94
	1000	$ \sim 21410$	455.8	1252	499500	9121	0.98	0.97

may overflow into the padding bit occasionally. Fortunately, the overflow does not happen often and our FHE accuracy closely trails the plaintext accuracy.

5.3 Bandwidth

Both our solution and [37] require bootstrapping for the computation, so evaluation keys should be sent at the setup phase. This costs 160 MB in our case, smaller than 200 MB of [37]. We use three different evaluation keys: two key switching keys (53.5 MB) and one bootstrapping key (107 MB) which takes the dominant part of the whole key size. On the other hand, the previous work uses two different bootstrapping keys, leading to higher memory consumption. We note that the evaluation key size is not considered as online bandwidth in both works, since it is only sent once and reused for the repeated computation.

After executing our protocol, the server returns the k selected labels, which are in the form of LWE ciphertexts. Therefore, the answer size would be k times 6.7 KB. As an optimization, we can easily pack k LWE ciphertexts into an RLWE ciphertext almost for free as long as $k \leq N$ [10]. We can also reduce the size of the answer by switching the modulus from 64 bits to 32 bits [7] and reduce the degree of the polynomials from 4096 to 1024 by key switching. The resulting answer has a size of 8 KB, which is smaller than k LWE ciphertexts for $k \geq 2$.

k	d	$\begin{vmatrix} \text{Dur} \\ [37] \end{vmatrix}$	ation au = 4	$\begin{array}{l} \text{(s)} \\ \tau = 1 \end{array}$	Compa [37]	arators Ours	Accu Clear	racy FHE
3	$ \begin{array}{r} 10 \\ 30 \\ 50 \\ 200 \end{array} $	$\begin{vmatrix} 4 \\ \sim 18 \\ \sim 51 \\ \sim 830 \end{vmatrix}$	$1.8 \\ 5.0 \\ 7.4 \\ 25.5$	$3.2 \\ 11.5 \\ 19.0 \\ 76.0$	$45 \\ 435 \\ 1225 \\ 19900$	$18 \\ 68 \\ 118 \\ 493$	$0.94 \\ 0.94 \\ 0.94 \\ 0.95$	$0.92 \\ 0.94 \\ 0.94 \\ 0.94$
5	10 30 50 200	$\begin{vmatrix} \sim 2 \\ \sim 18 \\ \sim 52 \\ \sim 831 \end{vmatrix}$	$2.2 \\ 7.5 \\ 11.6 \\ 40.2$	$4.2 \\ 16.7 \\ 28.8 \\ 114.6$	$ \begin{array}{r} 45 \\ 435 \\ 1225 \\ 19900 \end{array} $	$21 \\ 91 \\ 161 \\ 685$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.91 \\ 0.95 \\ 0.96 \\ 0.96 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.88 \\ 0.93 \\ 0.95 \\ 0.96 \end{array}$
$\lfloor \sqrt{d} \rfloor 200 \sim 836 69.9 185.7 19900 1234 0.95 0.95$								

Table 4: Computation time and accuracy for the breast cancer dataset. No precision reduction is performed. The computation times prefixed with \sim are estimated using extrapolation. The number of parallel threads is τ .

6 Conclusion and future directions

Top-k selection algorithms are broadly used in various applications, and secure computation highly benefits from the obliviousness of Top-k selection. We revisited the constructions by Alekseev (1969) and Yao (1980), and then proposed additional improvements for $k = \Omega(\sqrt{d})$. Our resulting combined Top-k network has complexity $O(d \log^2 k)$ in general and $O(d \log k)$ for small $k \ll \sqrt{d}$.

The efficiency of our combined Top-k network is demonstrated with an application: homomorphic k-NN classification. Compared with the state of the art [37], where oblivious Top-k was realized with complexity $O(d^2)$, our experimental results show a speedup of up to 47 times.

Future directions. Our TFHE instantiation of k-NN quantizes values (of 8 bits or more) down to binary or ternary values, in order to work with the restricted plaintext space. This step affects the accuracy of our secure k-NN protocol. In the future, we hope to investigate techniques that would support plaintexts with large precision, for example as proposed by Liu et al. [24].

Although our combined Top-k network has the best performance compared to existing methods, it does not give the optimal asymptotic complexity $O(d \log k)$ for all parameters. Further improvements would therefore be interesting. Moreover, many secure computation applications include oblivious Top-k as a building block. It would also be interesting to incorporate our solution to improve the performance of those applications.

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