Paper 2023/559
Weakening Assumptions for Publicly-Verifiable Deletion
Abstract
We develop a simple compiler that generically adds publicly-verifiable deletion to a variety of cryptosystems. Our compiler only makes use of one-way functions (or one-way state generators, if we allow the public verification key to be quantum). Previously, similar compilers either relied on the use of indistinguishability obfuscation (Bartusek et. al., ePrint:2023/265) or almost-regular one-way functions (Bartusek, Khurana and Poremba, arXiv:2303.08676).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in TCC 2023
- Keywords
- quantum cryptographypublic-key encryptioncertified deletionpublic verification
- Contact author(s)
-
bartusek james @ gmail com
dakshita @ illinois edu
giulio malavolta @ hotmail it
aporemba @ caltech edu
michael walter @ rub de - History
- 2023-10-16: revised
- 2023-04-19: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/559
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/559, author = {James Bartusek and Dakshita Khurana and Giulio Malavolta and Alexander Poremba and Michael Walter}, title = {Weakening Assumptions for Publicly-Verifiable Deletion}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/559}, year = {2023}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/559} }