Paper 2023/1497

A note on ``authenticated key agreement protocols for dew-assisted IoT systems''

Zhengjun Cao
Lihua Liu
Abstract

We show that the key agreement scheme [J. Supercomput., 78:12093-12113, 2022] is flawed. (1) It neglects the representation of a point over an elliptic curve and the basic requirement for bit-wise XOR, which results in a trivial equality. By the equality, an adversary can recover a target device's identity, which means the scheme fails to keep anonymity. (2) It falsely requires that the central server should share its master secret key with each dew server. (3) The specified certificate is almost nonsensical.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
AuthenticationKey agreementDew computingCertificateAnonymity
Contact author(s)
caozhj @ shu edu cn
liulh @ shmtu edu cn
History
2023-10-03: approved
2023-10-01: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1497
License
No rights reserved
CC0

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1497,
      author = {Zhengjun Cao and Lihua Liu},
      title = {A note on ``authenticated key agreement protocols for dew-assisted {IoT} systems''},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1497},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1497}
}
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