Paper 2022/1275

DiAE: Re-rolling the DiSE

Alexandre Duc, IICT, School of Management and Engineering Vaud, HES-SO University of Applied Sciences and Arts Western Switzerland
Robin Müller, IICT, School of Management and Engineering Vaud, HES-SO University of Applied Sciences and Arts Western Switzerland
Damian Vizár, Swiss Center for Electronics and Microtechnology (CSEM)
Abstract

The notion of distributed authenticated encryption was formally introduced by Agrawal et al. in ACM CCS 2018. In their work, they propose the DiSE construction building upon a distributed PRF (DPRF), a commitment scheme and a PRG. We show that most of their constructions do not meet some of the claimed security guarantees. In fact, all the concrete instantiations of DiSE, as well as multiple follow-up papers (one accepted at ACM CCS 2021), fail to satisfy their strongly-secure definitions. We give simple fixes for these constructions and prove their security. We also propose a new construction DiAE using an encryptment instead of a commitment. This modification dispenses with the need to buffer the entire message throughout the encryption protocol, which in turn enables implementations with constant RAM footprint and online message encryption. This is particularly interesting for constrained IoT devices. Finally, we implement and benchmark DiAE and show that it performs similarly to the original DiSE construction.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Threshold Cryptography Authenticated Encryption Internet of Things
Contact author(s)
alexandre duc @ heig-vd ch
robin muller @ heig-vd ch
damian vizar @ csem ch
History
2022-09-26: approved
2022-09-26: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1275
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1275,
      author = {Alexandre Duc and Robin Müller and Damian Vizár},
      title = {{DiAE}: Re-rolling the {DiSE}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1275},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1275}
}
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