Paper 2022/1255

PLUME: An ECDSA Nullifier Scheme for Unique Pseudonymity within Zero Knowledge Proofs

Aayush Gupta, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 0xPARC
Kobi Gurkan, Geometry Research
Abstract

ZK-SNARKs (Zero Knowledge Succinct Noninteractive ARguments of Knowledge) are one of the most promising new applied cryptography tools: proofs allow anyone to prove a property about some data, without revealing that data. Largely spurred by the adoption of cryptographic primitives in blockchain systems, ZK-SNARKs are rapidly becoming computationally practical in real-world settings, shown by i.e. tornado.cash and rollups. These have enabled ideation for new identity applications based on anonymous proof-of-ownership. One of the primary technologies that would enable the jump from existing apps to such systems is the development of deterministic nullifiers. Nullifiers are used as a public commitment to a specific anonymous account, to forbid actions like double spending, or allow a consistent identity between anonymous actions. We identify a new deterministic signature algorithm that both uniquely identifies the keypair, and keeps the account identity secret. In this work, we will define the full DDH-VRF construction, and prove uniqueness, secrecy, and existential unforgeability. We will also demonstrate a proof of concept of our Pseudonymously Linked Unique Message Entity (PLUME) scheme.

Note: Edited some wordings and added PLUME to the title

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
zero knowledgezk proofnullifierddh-vrfvrfpseudonymityethereumbitcoinecdsasecp256k1plumesignature
Contact author(s)
aayushgupta @ mit edu
kobi @ geometryresearch xyz
History
2023-03-27: last of 4 revisions
2022-09-21: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1255
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1255,
      author = {Aayush Gupta and Kobi Gurkan},
      title = {{PLUME}: An {ECDSA} Nullifier Scheme for Unique Pseudonymity within Zero Knowledge Proofs},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1255},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1255}
}
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