Paper 2022/1038
Breaking SIDH in polynomial time
Abstract
We show that we can break SIDH in classical polynomial time, even with a random starting curve $E_0$.
Note: Detailed analysis of the dimension 4 attack (and briefly of the dimension 2 attack too)
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- attack sidh
- Contact author(s)
- damien robert @ inria fr
- History
- 2022-09-11: last of 5 revisions
- 2022-08-10: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1038
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1038, author = {Damien Robert}, title = {Breaking {SIDH} in polynomial time}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1038}, year = {2022}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1038} }