Paper 2021/920

Non-malleable Commitments against Quantum Attacks

Nir Bitansky
Huijia Lin
Omri Shmueli
Abstract

We construct, under standard hardness assumptions, the first non-malleable commitments secure against quantum attacks. Our commitments are statistically binding and satisfy the standard notion of non-malleability with respect to commitment. We obtain a $\log^\star(\lambda)$-round classical protocol, assuming the existence of post-quantum one-way functions. Previously, non-malleable commitments with quantum security were only known against a restricted class of adversaries known as synchronizing adversaries. At the heart of our results is a new general technique that allows to modularly obtain non-malleable commitments from any extractable commitment protocol, obliviously of the underlying extraction strategy (black-box or non-black-box) or round complexity. The transformation may also be of interest in the classical setting.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
A minor revision of an IACR publication in EUROCRYPT 2022
Keywords
post-quantum non-malleability commitments
Contact author(s)
omrishmueli @ mail tau ac il
History
2022-06-18: revised
2021-07-09: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/920
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/920,
      author = {Nir Bitansky and Huijia Lin and Omri Shmueli},
      title = {Non-malleable Commitments against Quantum Attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/920},
      year = {2021},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/920}
}
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