Hybrid Dual Attack on LWE with Arbitrary Secrets

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Abstract. In this paper, we study the *hybrid dual attack* over Learning with Errors (LWE) problems for *any* secret distribution. Prior to our work, hybrid attacks are only considered for sparse and/or small secrets. A new and interesting result from our analysis shows that for most cryptographic use cases a hybrid dual attack outperforms a standalone dual attack, regardless of the secret distribution. We formulate our results into a framework of predicting the performance of the hybrid dual attacks. We also present a few tricks that further improve our attack. To illustrate the effectiveness of our result, we re-evaluate the security of *all* LWE related proposals in round 3 of NIST's post-quantum cryptography process, and improve the state-of-the-art cryptanalysis results by 2-14 bits, under the BKZ-core-SVP model.

Keywords: Learning with Errors, Lattice-based Cryptography, Cryptanalysis, Dual Attack, Hybrid attack, NIST PQC

1 Introduction

The Learning with Errors (LWE) problem, introduced by Regev [34] in 2005, is one of the most important problems in lattice-based cryptography. A variety of schemes, from public key encryptions and digital signatures to homomorphic encryptions, base their security on LWE family of the lattice problems. The LWE problem and its variants are conjectured to be hard to solve, even with a quantum computer. The schemes that base their security on LWE problems, are therefore, considered quantum-safe. Indeed, LWE and its variants contribute to 5 out of 15 schemes in round 3 of National Institute of Standards and Technology's post-quantum cryptography standardization process (NIST-PQC), namely Dilithium[24], Kyber[14], Saber[22], Frodo[13] and

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NTRULPrime[10]. This process has sparked a long list of cryptanalytic advancements [1,3,5,6,16,19,21,26,35], and is still calling for a better understanding of the concrete security of LWE and its variant problems.

Informally, the search version of LWE asks to recover a secret vector $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, given a matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$ and a vector $\mathbf{b} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ such, that $\mathbf{As} + \mathbf{e} = \mathbf{b} \mod q$ for a short error vector $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ sampled from some error distribution. The decision version LWE asks to distinguish between an LWE instance (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b}) and uniformly random $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n} \times \mathbb{Z}_q^m$.

In the survey paper [6], Albrecht et al. summerized three strategies to analyze the concrete hardness of LWE:

- The first one tries to recover the secret directly, for example, the algebraic attack (i.e., using the Arora-Ge algorithm) [9,2] or exhaustive search.
- The second method tries to view an LWE problem as a Bounded Distance Decoding (BDD) problem. There are two subsequent attacks: the decoding attack (i.e., using the Nearest Plane algorithm) [32] and the primal attack [5].
- The last strategy solves decisional LWE by reducing it to a Short Integer Solutions (SIS) problem. There are also two subsequent attacks: the combinatorial attack (i.e., using BKW algorithm) [4] and the dual attack [1].

In a later paper, Albrecht et al. [3] studied the security of all lattice-based schemes from round 1 candidates of NIST-PQC, and concluded that the primal attack and the dual attack are the most effective ones from the cryptanalysis standpoint.

The primal attack is to find the closest lattice vector to **b** in the lattice spanned by the columns of **A** mod q [32] via bounded distance decoding. Then, one reduces the BDD problem to a unique Shortest Vector Problem (uSVP) in a higher dimension lattice via some embedding, and solves the uSVP with lattice reductions (e.g., BKZ [18]). The lattice, as of our cryptanalysis interest, is then denoted by

$$\Lambda_{\text{primal}} = \{ \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^{m+n+1} | (\mathbf{A} | \mathbf{I}_m | \mathbf{b}) \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0} \mod q \}.$$

The dual attack is to solve the (Inhomogeneous) Short Integer Solutions ((I)SIS) problem, i.e., using a lattice reduction algorithm to find short vectors \mathbf{w} or (\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v}) in the following lattice:

$$\Lambda_{\text{dual}}^{\perp} = \left\{ \mathbf{w} \in \mathbb{Z}^m : \mathbf{w} \cdot \mathbf{A} = \mathbf{0} \mod q \right\},\$$
$$\Lambda_{\text{dual}}^E = \left\{ (\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v}) \in \mathbb{Z}^m \times \mathbb{Z}^n : \mathbf{w} \cdot \mathbf{A} = \mathbf{v} \mod q \right\}.$$

This allows one to distinguish an LWE sample **b** from a uniform vector **u** since $\langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{b} \rangle = \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{s} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{e} \rangle$ is small when **w**, **v**, **s** and **e** are all short [7].

One may additionally combine the above attacks with guessing. This method is known as the *hybrid attacks* in the literature [1,16,19,26,29,31,35,37,38]. Informally, a hybrid attack guesses part of the secret and performs some attack on the remaining part. As guess reduces the dimension of the problem, the cost of the lattice attack on the remaining part is reduced. Moreover, in general, the lattice attack component is reusable for multiple guesses; an optimal attack is achieved when the cost of guessing matches the cost of lattice attack. For simplicity, we refer to hybrid attacks where the lattice attack component is a primal attack as the *hybrid primal attack*, and accordingly, the *hybrid dual attack*.

Let us start with a typical example: we assume, with probability p, the attacker is able to guess all the entries for the guessing components. The cost of the hybrid attacks becomes that of the lattice attack components (with a success rate p). For (sparse) binary/ternary secrets, this strategy works well. For hybrid primal attacks over other secret distributions, there are mainly two obstacles. First, for secrets with more entropy, such as Gaussian, p will be reduced significantly with the increase of guessing dimension. Second, one need to solve a CVP (a decoding problem) rather than a uSVP (a primal attack) after guessing (see [35] for more details about the reduction). As a rule of thumb, a decoding attack requires better reduced lattice than a primal attack. Due to the above drawbacks, hybrid primal attacks are considered less efficient than standalone primal attacks when dealing with none (sparse) binary/ternary secrets.

Now let us turn to the focus of this paper: hybrid dual attacks. They differ from the hybrid primal attacks in that, after a guess, the resulting lattice component becomes a new LWE lattice with a smaller dimension; and the LWE lattice remains the same for all guesses. Note that the attacker does not need to solve a decoding problem. In other words, the second obstacle for the hybrid primal attack is no longer an issue for hybrid dual attack. Nonetheless, the community seems to have presumed the obstacles for the hybrid dual attack, and applying it over LWE with arbitrary secrets therefore remains a blind spot prior to this paper.

Related work. The very first hybrid attack was proposed by Howgrave-Graham [31] to analyze NTRU [30]. In the recent years, hybrid attacks have been extensively studied for LWE with sparse and/or small secrets. We summarize those results in Table 1. The first work of hybrid attack on LWE [16] combined decoding attack with meet-in-the-middle (MITM) technique. Then a similar approach was conducted on primal lattices [35]. Albrecht [1] proposed the framework of hybrid dual attack and applied it over LWE with sparse and binary/ternary secrets. Cheon et al. [19] improved guessing in this attack via an MITM technique. We note that in a hybrid dual attack, the secret and errors will increase significantly. Therefore, the proposed MITM technique requires a gigantic modulus q to incorporate the new, larger error. Recently, Espitau et al. [26] proposed a further optimization for guessing, via an efficient matrix multiplication exploiting the recursive structure of the matrix whose columns form the whole guessing space.

1.1 Contribution

In this work, we study the hybrid dual attack on LWE with *arbitrary* secrets. Our contributions are two-fold. From the theory side, we analyze the hybrid dual attack in details, and develop the following observation: 4

	Lattice	Guessing	Secret
[16]	Decoding	MITM	Small
[35]	Decoding + Primal	MITM	Small + sparse
[1]	Dual	Pruning	Small + sparse
[19]	Dual	MITM	Small + sparse
[26]	Dual	Matrix Mul.	Small
This paper	Dual	Opt. Pruning + Mat. Mul.	Arbitrary

Table 1. Hybrid attacks on LWE

For most cryptographic use cases, hybrid dual attacks out-perform dual attacks, regardless of the secret distribution.

This observation is based on a quite interesting and surprising phenomenon in our analysis that when the guessing dimension (r) increases, the BKZ blocksize (β) indeed reduces. We formulate this phenomenon into the following theorem.

Theorem 1 (Informal). For a hybrid dual attack under the core-SVP model, for most cryptographic use cases, if we increase the guessing dimensions r, the minimum BKZ blocksize β that maintains a same level of success rate will be reduced.

We will provide our intuition shortly. The proof will be present in Section 3.3. To quantify this effect, we make an additional Heuristic 3 with justification in Section 3.4.

For LWE with *short* secrets, it is straightforward to see that the observation is implied by Theorem 1. In fact, we can predict the improvement by Theorem 2 as long as Heuristic 3 holds. For LWE with *large* secrets, when enough LWE samples are given, we normalize it and invoke Theorem 2. The only remaining case is LWE with large secrets and limited samples, for which we prove separately in Section 4.

We also propose a few tricks that further improve the guessing complexity. This allows us to develop an estimator that may be of independent interest (our estimator is open sourced ⁵). For example, one may apply our estimator to other LWE based schemes, such as FHE [27,15,28] or lattice-based ZK proofs [12,25,11].

From the practical side, we re-evaluated *all* LWE-related candidates of NIST-PQC round 3, namely, Dilithium [24], Kyber [14], Saber [22], Frodo [13] and NTRULPrime [10]. Our results are summarized in Table 2. We improve state-of-the-art cryptanalyze results by 2-14 bits⁶ for these candidates, under the classi-

⁵ https://github.com/BiLei121/hybrid-dual-estimator.

⁶ NIST-PQC process has been running for 4 years. Finalists (and also the alternate candidates) and their parameters are considered mature and stable, and the security estimations are fairly conservative: even a few bits improvement on an individual candidate may be considered as a valid contribution.

	Security	(Classical		Ç	Juantum	
Name	Level	Dual	Ours	Δ	Dual	Ours	Δ
Kyber512	1	118	115	-3	107	105	-2
Kyber768	3	182	176	-6	165	161	-4
Kyber1024	5	254	245	-9	231	225	-6
Saber512	1	117	115	-2	107	105	-2
Saber768	3	189	184	-5	172	169	-3
Saber1024	5	258	250	-8	235	230	-5
Dilithium1024	2	124	122	-2	112	111	-1
Dilithium1280	3	182	179	-3	165	164	-1
Dilithium1792	5	251	247	-4	228	225	-3
Frodo640	1	142	139	-3	129	127	-2
Frodo976	3	206	202	-4	187	185	-2
Frodo1344	5	271	264	-6	245	242	-3
NTRULPrime653	1	131	125	-5	118	115	-3
NTRULPrime761	2	155	148	-7	141	137	-4
NTRULPrime857	2	177	168	-9	160	155	-5
NTRULPrime953	3	196	187	-9	178	172	-6
NTRULPrime1013	4	210	200	-10	191	185	-6
NTRULPrime1277	5	270	256	-14	245	237	-8

 Table 2. Bit-security estimations under Core-SVP Model

* Data for "Ours" uses HYBRID 2M estimator.

For a fair comparison, data for "Dual" also comes from our estimator. Our estimated results closely match the reported bit-security from their NIST-PQC documentations, with a maximum difference of 1 bits.

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cal/quantum core-SVP model [7,6,3]. We will give more details on the estimations in Section 7.

Our technique. Our baseline for comparison is the standalone dual attack. In combination with the dual attack, we propose two hybrid attacks, namely, HYBRID 1 and HYBRID 2, vary in the strategy to conduct searching.

We first compare the standalone dual attack with HYBRID 1, which exhaustively searches all candidates from the guessing space. We show that for most cryptographic use cases we can select a proper guess dimension for HYBRID 1 such that the overall cost is reduced. Therefore, HYBRID 1 can outperform the dual attack, *regardless the secret distribution*. We further assert that optimal blocksize of the BKZ decreases linearly as the guess dimension increases, i.e., Heuristic 3, and use BKZ simulator to validate this assertion. This allows us to derive a formula to estimate the improvement of HYBRID 1 compared to the dual attack on *arbitrary* secrets.

Before proceeding further, let us give our intuition of Theorem 1. When the guessing dimension r is increased, the determinant of the lattice in the hybrid attack will be reduced. Hence, we can use a larger root Hermite factor (which implies a smaller β) to produce a short vector, denoted by (\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v}) , of a similar ℓ_2 -norm. Note that although each coefficient of (\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v}) indeed increases, the ℓ_2 -norm remains unchanged (since the lattice dimension drops). From a dual attack's standpoint, Heuristic 2 says that the advantage only cares about the ℓ_2 -norm of (\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v}) , rather than its individual coefficients. Hence, so long as this ℓ_2 -norm remains stable, the success rate of the dual attack component is intact. We also remark that this is a key difference between a hybrid primal attack and a hybrid dual attack.

Our HYBRID 2 further improves upon HYBRID 1 with *optimal pruning*. This method works for center limited distributions that are common to most cryptosystems. Note that a main obstacle of hybrid dual attack for general secrets is the large secret space. The subtlety here is to find a better approach to guess instead of exhaustively searching. Straightforward methods, such as partitioning the search space, reduce the success probability of the attack (significantly). Our HYBRID 2 with a fine-tuned pruning allows for a high success probability over a fixed number of secrets; while having a minimal impact on the overall cost.

To achieve so, we present an algorithm to guess the secret with *optimal* success probability when the number of guesses is bounded. More precisely, we partition the secret space into ordered classes, sorted by the probability of a candidate being the correct secret. Then we greedily choose candidates from the class with the highest probability when the number of guesses permits. We give a theoretical analyses of this approach, as well as its impact on Hybrid 2; and show the advantage of Hybrid 2 over Hybrid 1.

As an orthogonal line of optimization, we also give an efficient algorithm for matrix multiplication which can be seen as a none-trivial generalization of the algorithm in [26]. Our improved algorithm decreases the computation time for each guess; consequently, we increase the number of guesses, given a fixed cost model. To be a bit more specific, assuming an integer multiplication takes a unit time, for an $M \times r$ matrix of arbitrary entries, and a $r \times \ell^r$ matrix whose columns consist of all vectors from Q^r , where Q is a set of ℓ numbers, [26]'s algorithm improves the matrix multiplication cost from $\mathcal{O}(M \cdot \ell^r \cdot r)$ to $\mathcal{O}(M \cdot \ell^r)$. However, this algorithm is only applicable to matrices whose columns form the whole guessing space without pruning. We generalize it to all *closed matrices* (see Def. 3). We remark that this optimization can be used for both HYBRID 1 and HYBRID 2. We refer to the attacks with this additional optimization by HYBRID 1M and HYBRID 2M.

We conclude this section with a final remark. The advantage of HYBRID 1 and HYBRID 2 over standalone dual attack is independent of the underlying BKZ cost model. For example, HYBRID 1 will always out-perform dual attack, for core-SVP model, Practical model, or Frodo model (see Section 2.2 for definitions); the actual gain will vary depending on the cost model, nonetheless. For consistency and a fair comparison, we will adopt the core-SVP model throughout the rest of the paper, unless otherwise stated.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Notations

Logarithms are base 2 if not stated otherwise. We write ln for the natural logarithm. We denote vectors in bold, e.g. \mathbf{v} and matrices in upper-case bold, e.g. \mathbf{A} . For a vector \mathbf{v} The Euclidean norm of a vector $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{R}^m$ is $||\mathbf{v}||$. We denote by $\langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle$ the usual dot product of two vectors. For a compact set $S \in \mathbb{R}^n$, we denote by $\mathcal{U}(S)$ the uniform distribution over S.

2.2 Lattices and lattice reductions

Lattice. A lattice is a discrete additive subgroup of \mathbb{R}^m for some $m \in \mathbb{N}$. In this case, m is called the *dimension* of the lattice. A lattice Λ is generated by a basis $\mathbf{B} = {\mathbf{b}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{b}_n} \subset \mathbb{R}^m$ which is a set of n linearly independent row vectors and $\Lambda = \Lambda(\mathbf{B})$ can be represented as $\Lambda(\mathbf{B}) = \mathbf{B} \cdot \mathbb{Z}^m = {\sum_{i \in [n]} z_i \cdot \mathbf{b}_i : z_i \in \mathbb{Z}}$. We say that the *rank* of the lattice is n and its *dimension* is m. If n = m, the lattice is called a *full-rank lattice*. For the lattice $\Lambda = \Lambda(\mathbf{B})$, its *fundamental parallelepiped* is defined as $\mathcal{P}(\mathbf{B}) = \mathbf{B} \cdot [-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})^n = {\sum_{i \in [n]} c_i \cdot \mathbf{b}_i : c_i \in [-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})}$. The determinant of $\Lambda = \Lambda(\mathbf{B})$ denoted by $det(\Lambda)$ is defined as the m-dimensional volume of its fundamental parallelepiped.

A non-zero vector in a lattice Λ that has the minimum norm is named as the *shortest vector*. The norm of the shortest vector is denoted as $\lambda_1(\Lambda) = \min_{\mathbf{v} \in \Lambda, \mathbf{v} \neq 0} ||\mathbf{v}||$.

Lattice reductions. When given as input some basis of a lattice, a lattice reduction algorithm is to find a basis that consists of relatively short and relatively

pairwise orthogonal vectors. The quality of basis returned by a lattice reduction algorithm is characterized by the *Hermite factor* δ_0^m :

$$\delta_0^m = \frac{||\mathbf{b}_1||}{\det(\Lambda)^{\frac{1}{m}}},$$

where \mathbf{b}_1 is the first vector in the output basis. Refer to δ_0 itself, we call it the root-Hermite factor.

The BKZ algorithm [18] is a commonly used lattice reduction algorithm.

Heuristic 1. BKZ with blocksize β yields root-Hermite factor

$$\delta_0 \approx \left(\frac{\beta}{2\pi e} (\pi\beta)^{\frac{1}{\beta}}\right)^{\frac{1}{2(\beta-1)}}$$

This heuristic is experimentally verified in [17].

BKZ cost models. To estimate the runtime of BKZ, there are several different cost models. The main differences between them are (1) whether they choose sieving or enumeration as the SVP oracle and (2) how many calls to the SVP oracle are expected to produce a vector of length $\delta_0^m \cdot det(\Lambda)^{\frac{1}{m}}$, where δ_0 is the root-Hermite factor, m is the dimension of lattice Λ . See [3] for more details.

Let us firstly list relevant cost models in this paper. As mentioned earlier, we will be focusing on the core-SVP model with sieving [7].

Core-SVP Model:
$$T_{\text{BKZ}}(m,\beta) = \begin{cases} 2^{0.292\beta}, \text{ classical} \\ 2^{0.265\beta}, \text{ quantum} \end{cases}$$

We will also briefly compare with two additional models: a practical model, used by, for exapple [1], where the number of calls is 8m rather than 1.

$$\text{Practical Model: } T_{\text{BKZ}}(m,\beta) = \begin{cases} 8m \cdot 2^{0.292\beta + 16.4}, \text{ classical} \\ 8m \cdot 2^{0.265\beta + 16.4}, \text{ quantum} \end{cases}$$

and the Frodo model [13]

Frodo Model:
$$T_{\text{BKZ}}(m,\beta) = \begin{cases} \beta \cdot 2^{0.292\beta}, \text{ classical} \\ \beta \cdot 2^{0.265\beta}, \text{ quantum} \end{cases}$$

In addition, when using sieving as the SVP oracle, [7] made an assumption on the output short vectors from BKZ. [7] pointed out that a sieving algorithm maintains a list of $2^{0.2075\beta}$ vectors. When the sieving algorithm terminates, the list of vectors should be of approximately same length as the final output.

Assumption 1 ([7]). When using sieving as the SVP oracle, BKZ algorithm with blocksize β provides $2^{0.2075\beta}$ short vectors in one run, and they are almost as short as the shortest one produced by BKZ algorithm.

This assumption has been adopted by many LWE related proposals in round 3 finalists of NIST ⁷: see Section 5.1.3 of the supporting documentation for Kyber, Section 5.2.3 for Frodo, Dilithium follows [7]; also see Section 6.1 of [22] and Section 2.3 of [26]. To give a fair comparison, we follow this line of work and adopt this assumption when analyzing the schemes in Section 7. Nonetheless, we note that Assumption 1 is very optimistic on the attacker's capability. In practice, most of the output vectors from sieving could be $\sqrt{\frac{4}{3}}$ longer than the shortest one.

Assumption 2 ([23]). When using sieving as the SVP oracle, BKZ algorithm with blocksize β provides $2^{0.2075\beta}$ short vectors in one run, and most of them are $\sqrt{\frac{4}{3}}$ longer than the shortest one produced by BKZ algorithm.

For consistency, we will focus on Assumption 1 throughout the rest of the paper, except for Section 3.5.

We emphasize that Assumption 1 and 2 marginally affect the quality of our improvement. They do not change the fact that hybrid dual attacks is better than dual attacks. More concretely, under Assumption 1, the improvement of HYBRID 2M over dual attack will be 2-14 bits; this changes to 2-15 bits under 2. See Section 7 for more details.

For completeness, in Section 3.5, we will compare our advantage under three assumptions, namely, Assumption 1, Assumption 2 and the amortized cost method [1], where the large number of short vectors are provided by using LLL instead of sieving. The advantage of HYBRID 2M over dual attack under different cost models and assumptions is given in Table 12.

2.3 The Learning with Errors problem

The Learning with Errors (LWE) problem, introduced by Regev [34], is a computational problem, whose presumed hardness (against quantum computers) gives rise to a large numbers of cryptographic constructions.

Definition 1 (LWE). Let $n, q \in \mathbb{N}$, S be an distribution over \mathbb{Z}_q^n and $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow S$ be a secret vector. Let χ be a small error distribution over \mathbb{Z} . Denote $LWE_{n,q,\mathbf{s},\chi}$ the probability distribution on $\mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q$ obtained by choosing $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbf{Z}_q^n$ uniformly

at random, choosing $e \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \chi$ and returning $(\mathbf{a}, \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle + e) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q$. Given access to the outputs from $LWE_{n,q,\mathbf{s},\chi}$ distribution, we define two problems:

- Decision-LWE. Given m instances, distinguish U(Zⁿ_q × Z_q) and LWE_{n,q,s,χ} distribution for a fixed s ← S.
- Search-LWE. Given m instances sampled from $LWE_{n,q,\mathbf{s},\chi}$ distribution with fixed $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow S$, recover \mathbf{s} .

⁷ https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/round-3-submissions

The LWE instances can be presented in the matrix form as follows:

$$(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} \mod q) \tag{1}$$

with $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}, \mathbf{A} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}, \mathbf{e} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \chi^m, \mathbf{b} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$.

A useful lemma shows that given instances from $LWE_{n,q,\mathbf{s},\chi}$ with $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, we can construct *normal-form* LWE instances, i.e., the secret follows the error distribution.

Lemma 1 ([8]). Given the instances $(\mathbf{a}, b = \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle + e)$ sampled from $LWE_{n,q,\mathbf{s},\chi}$ with $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, we can construct instances of the form $(\mathbf{a}, b = \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{e} \rangle + e)$ with $\mathbf{e} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \chi^n$ and $e \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \chi$ at the loss of n instances overall.

In this paper, we will also be dealing with LWE variant problems, such as Ring-LWE, module-LWE and module-LWR. We will treat those problems as LWE problems, following prior cryptanalysis.

Secret distributions. Practical LWE (and its variants) based cryptosystems utilize various secret and error distributions. To list a few,

- \mathcal{B}^+ the distribution on \mathbb{Z}_q^n where each component is independently sampled uniformly at random from $\{0, 1\}$.
- \mathcal{B}^- the distribution on \mathbb{Z}_q^n where each component is independently sampled uniformly at random from $\{-1, 0, 1\}$.
- \mathcal{B}_h^+ the distribution on \mathbb{Z}_q^n where each component is independently sampled uniformly at random from $\{0,1\}$ with the additional guarantee that the number of 1s is h.
- \mathcal{B}_h^- where each component is independently sampled uniformly at random from $\{-1, 0, 1\}$ with the additional guarantee that the number of 1s and -1s are both h.

In this paper, we divide the existing secret distributions into two categories:

- 1. binary/ternary secret with fixed hamming weight,
- 2. general central discrete distribution (without fixed hamming weight):

Value	0	± 1	± 2	 $\pm t$
Probability	p_0	p_1	p_2	 p_t

Note 1. If the number of values is infinite (e.g. the Gaussian distribution), we truncate the distribution at a suitable place (also denoted by $\pm t$). Looking ahead, we will treat \mathcal{B}^+ as a category 2 distribution. It shares a same behavior as a central limited distribution for our analysis.

2.4 Best known attacks on LWE

To date, primal attacks and dual attacks are considered best known attacks against LWE and it variants. Their complexity are approximately the same for most cryptosystems. **Primal Attack.** As mentioned in the introduction, the primal attack is to solve the search version LWE by viewing it as a Bounded Distance Decoding (BDD) problem. Then the attack reduces it to the unique Shortest Vector Problem (uSVP) via certain embedding technique, and solves uSVP with lattice reduction. We skip the details, since we will not focus on primal attacks in this paper.

Dual Attack. The dual attack, introduced by Micciancio and Regev [33], is to solve a decision-LWE by reducing it to a Shortest Integer Solution (SIS) problem, i.e., trying to find short vectors in the lattice

$$\Lambda_{ ext{dual}}^{\perp} = \left\{ \mathbf{w} \in \mathbb{Z}^m : \mathbf{w} \cdot \mathbf{A} = \mathbf{0} \mod q
ight\}.$$

If the input instances are from the LWE_{s, σ}, then, $\mathbf{b} = \mathbf{As} + \mathbf{e} \mod q$. In this case, given a short vector \mathbf{w} , we have

$$\langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{b}
angle = \mathbf{w} \cdot (\mathbf{As} + \mathbf{e}) = \langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{e}
angle \mod q$$

which will be short/small. Otherwise, $\langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{b} \rangle$ is uniform on $\left[-\frac{q}{2}, \frac{q}{2}\right)$. With sufficient number of distinct \mathbf{w} vectors, this attack can distinguish these two distributions with high probability.

Alkim et al. [7] presented an improved dual attack on normal-form LWE, which tries to solve an inhomogeneous SIS problem, and works over the *embedded lattice*:

$$\Lambda_{\text{dual}}^E = \{ (\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v}) \in \mathbb{Z}^m \times \mathbb{Z}^n : \mathbf{w} \cdot \mathbf{A} = \mathbf{v} \mod q \}.$$

Following the same strategy, if the instances are from the normal-form $\mathrm{LWE}_{\mathbf{s},\sigma},$ then we have

$$\langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{b} \rangle = \mathbf{w} \cdot (\mathbf{As} + \mathbf{e}) = \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{s} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{e} \rangle \mod q,$$

the right part of the equation is small as \mathbf{s} and \mathbf{e} are both small.

In general, $(\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v}) \in \Lambda_{\text{dual}}^{E}(\mathbf{A})$ is produced by BKZ. There is an assumption on the quality of this vector.

Assumption 3 ([20,26]). The coordinates of vectors produced by lattice reduction algorithms are balanced, i.e., each coordinate of $(\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v}) \in \mathbb{Z}^m \times \mathbb{Z}^n$ follows a Gaussian distribution of mean 0 and standard deviation $\frac{\ell}{\sqrt{m+n}}$, where $\ell = ||(\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v})||$.

Under this assumption, the distribution of $t := \langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{b} \rangle$ can be viewed as a Gaussian distribution \mathcal{G}_{ρ} with mean 0 and standard deviation $\rho = \ell \sigma$ [7]. Then the maximal variance distance between \mathcal{G}_{ρ} and $\mathcal{U}(-\frac{q}{2}, \frac{q}{2})$ is bounded by $\varepsilon = 4 \exp(-2\pi^2 \tau^2)$, where $\tau = \ell \sigma/q$ [7]. According to these, the advantage of the attack is summarized in the following heuristic.

Heuristic 2 ([7]). Given m normal-form LWE instances $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} \mod q)$ characterized by n, σ, q , and a vector $(\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v}) \in \Lambda^E_{dual}$ of length ℓ , the dual attack solves the decision-LWE with advantage $\varepsilon = 4 \exp(-2\pi^2 \tau^2)$ where $\tau = \frac{\ell\sigma}{q}$. The success probability of the attack can be amplified to be at least $\frac{1}{2}$ by using about $1/\varepsilon^2$ many such vectors $(\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v}) \in \Lambda^E_{dual}$ of length ℓ . By Assumption 1, when using sieving as the SVP oracle, the attack needs to repeat BKZ $\lceil \frac{1}{2^{0.2075\beta}\varepsilon^2} \rceil$ times. The analysis of Alkim et al. [7] does not specify how to distinguish a Gaussian distribution from a uniform to arrive the claimed advantage (which equals to the statistical distance between the two distributions) nor how to amplify this advantage. We present concrete algorithms in Appendix B to complete the analysis.

This attack [7] was initially designed for normal-form LWE. When the secret does not match the error distribution, the attack also works via the scaling technique by Albrecht [1]. For the remaining part of this paper, we will also adopt this technique.

Note that the [33] dual attack (referred to as *original dual attack*) works for arbitrary secrets; while the [7] dual attack (referred to as *embedded dual attack*) requires the secret to be somewhat short, so that $\langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{s} \rangle$ is small and distinguishable from uniform. Nonetheless, for practical cryptosystems (all NIST-PQC candidates use small secrets) the embedded dual attack is more efficient than the original dual attack. Therefore, for the remaining part of the paper, a (hybrid) dual attack stands for a (hybrid) embedded dual attack, unless otherwise stated.

3 Hybrid attack on short secrets

Now we are ready to proceed to our hybrid dual attack. We start with a naive strategy where we conduct "guess" via exhaustive search. We name this strategy HYBRID 1. We will be intensively comparing HYBRID 1 with a standalone dual attack.

3.1 The framework

A hybrid attack has two components, a lattice reduction phase and a guessing phase. We start with the lattice reduction phase. Given m LWE instances $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b} = \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} \mod q)$ as input, we divide the secret vector \mathbf{s} and public matrix \mathbf{A} into two parts, parameterized by r:

$$\mathbf{s} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{s}_1 \\ \mathbf{s}_2 \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^r \times \mathbb{Z}_q^{n-r}, \qquad \mathbf{A} = (\mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{A}_2) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times r} \times \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times (n-r)}.$$

Looking ahead, our guessing phase works over vectors of dimension r, and tries to identify the coefficient of s_1 .

Similar to the dual attack, we define a lattice over \mathbf{A}_2 :

$$\Lambda_{\text{dual}}^{E}(\mathbf{A}_{2}) = \left\{ (\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v}) \in \mathbb{Z}^{m} \times \mathbb{Z}^{n-r} : \mathbf{w} \cdot \mathbf{A}_{2} = \mathbf{v} \mod q \right\}.$$

 $\Lambda_{\text{dual}}^E(\mathbf{A}_2)$ has a dimension of d = m + n - r and a volume of q^{n-r} w.h.p. Then, we assume that with lattice reduction algorithms we will obtain some short

Algorithm 1: Hybrid Dual Attack

Input: $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n} \times \mathbb{Z}_q^m, r \in \mathbb{Z}$ Output: LWE distribution or Uniform **1** $\mathbf{P} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow}$ permutation matrix; 2 $(\mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{A}_2) \leftarrow \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{P}$ with $\mathbf{A}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times r}$ and $\mathbf{A}_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times (n-r)}$; 3 *M* short vectors $(\mathbf{w}_i, \mathbf{v}_i)_{i \in [M]} \leftarrow N$ calls to BKZ on $\Lambda_{\text{dual}}^E(\mathbf{A}_2)$; 4 for $i \in \{1, \dots, M\}$ do calculate $\hat{b}_i = \langle \mathbf{w}_i, \mathbf{b} \rangle \mod q$ and $\hat{\mathbf{a}}_i = \mathbf{w}_i \mathbf{A}_1 \mod q$; $\mathbf{5}$ \triangleright Eq.(2) 6 for each $\tilde{\mathbf{s}}_1 \in C$ do $\triangleright C$ is defined in Section 5.1 for $i \in \{1, \dots, M\}$ do \lfloor calculate $\tilde{e}_i = \hat{b}_i - \langle \hat{\mathbf{a}}_i, \tilde{\mathbf{s}}_1 \rangle \mod q;$ 7 8 9 if $\tilde{e}_{i \in [M]}$ follow Gaussian distribution then **return** *LWE distribution*; 10 11 return Uniform;

vector(s) $(\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v}) \in \Lambda_{\text{dual}}^E$ that allow us to calculate $\langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{b} \rangle$ as

$$\begin{aligned} \langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{b} \rangle &= \mathbf{w} (\mathbf{As} + \mathbf{e}) \\ &= \mathbf{w} \mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{s}_1 + \mathbf{w} \mathbf{A}_2 \mathbf{s}_2 + \langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{e} \rangle \\ &= \mathbf{w} \mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{s}_1 + \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{s}_2 \rangle + \langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{e} \rangle \mod q. \end{aligned}$$

This can be seen as a new LWE instance $(\hat{\mathbf{a}}, \hat{b} = \langle \hat{\mathbf{a}}, \mathbf{s}_1 \rangle + \hat{e})$, where

$$\hat{b} = \langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{b} \rangle \mod q,
\hat{\mathbf{a}} = \mathbf{w} \mathbf{A}_1 \mod q,
\hat{e} = \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{s}_2 \rangle + \langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{e} \rangle \mod q.$$
(2)

Next we proceed to the guessing phase. Denote by $\tilde{\mathbf{s}}_1$ a candidate from the guessing space. Then, $\hat{e} = \hat{b} - \langle \hat{\mathbf{a}}, \tilde{\mathbf{s}}_1 \rangle \mod q$ is from a Gaussian distribution if $\tilde{\mathbf{s}}_1$ is a correct guess. Otherwise \hat{e} must follow the uniform distribution on \mathbb{Z}_q .

In order to recover \mathbf{s}_1 completely, we will require a large number of short vectors from $\Lambda^E_{\text{dual}}(\mathbf{A}_2)$. This can be obtained from the lattice reduction phase, assuming Assumption 1.

We present the pseudo-code of the attack in Algorithm 1. Here we denote M the number of short vectors we need to sample from the dual lattice and denote N the number of calls to BKZ. Both values will be discussed in Section 3.2. In addition, we denote C a collection of the selected candidates \tilde{s}_1 and let L = |C|.

3.2 Analysis

The success probability of the attack is the product of two quantities:

- 1. $p_s :=$ the success probability of the distinguish algorithm,
- 2. $p_c :=$ the probability that C contains the right s_1 .

We present the analysis of p_s in the remaining part of this section. The analysis of p_c is deferred to Section 5.1 as it depends on the specific secret distribution.

In Algorithm 1, The goal of lines 6-11 is to recover \mathbf{s}_1 using the new LWE instances. For each guessed candidate $\tilde{\mathbf{s}}_1$, we calculate the M distinct quantities \tilde{e}_i . If the input instances are from LWE_{\mathbf{s},σ}, the distribution of \tilde{e}_i must follow a modular Gaussian distribution otherwise \tilde{e} is uniform in $\left[-\frac{q}{2}, \frac{q}{2}\right]$. In order to recover \mathbf{s}_1 , we need to correctly identify the distribution for all candidates $\tilde{\mathbf{s}}_1 \in C$.

Denote \tilde{p}_s the success probability of correctly guessing the distribution of one candidate $\tilde{\mathbf{s}}_1$, then the success probability of recovering \mathbf{s}_1 will be \tilde{p}_s^L . Similar to dual attack, using majority vote, we can amplify the success probability from $\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}$ to $\tilde{p}_s = 1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\varepsilon^2}{2}M\right)$ by using M short vectors (see Lemma 9 in supplementary material B for more details). If we target a success probability of $p_s = 1 - \frac{1}{2^{\kappa}}$ for the hybrid dual attack, for a given security parameter κ , then we have $\tilde{p}_s^L \gtrsim 1 - \frac{1}{2^{\kappa}}$ Therefore, we can derive M from $\left(1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\varepsilon^2}{2}M\right)\right)^L \approx 1 - \frac{1}{2^{\kappa}}$. As a result, when there are $M \approx \frac{\kappa + \ln L}{\varepsilon^2}$ short vectors ($\mathbf{w}_i, \mathbf{v}_i$) $\in \Lambda_{\text{dual}}^E(\mathbf{A}_2)$ of length ℓ , the success probability of Algorithm 1 is $p_s = 1 - \frac{1}{2^{\kappa}}$, where κ is the security parameter.

The cost of the attack is the sum of two main components:

- 1. $N \cdot T_{\text{BKZ}} := N$ calls to BKZ on $\Lambda_{\text{dual}}^{E}(\mathbf{A}_{2})$,
- 2. $T_{\text{guess}} := \text{evaluate all } L \text{ guesses } \tilde{\mathbf{s}}_1 \in C \text{ using the } M \text{ instances},$

According to Assumption 1, we need repeat the BKZ algorithm for $N = \lceil \frac{M}{2^{0.2075\beta}} \rceil$ times to produce M short vectors. If we use a naive way to evaluate all L guesses, we will have $T_{\text{guess}} = M \cdot L \cdot r$. We will give an improved algorithm for T_{guess} in Section 6.

In summary, under Assumption 1 and Heuristic 2 for dual attacks, we have the results for hybrid dual attacks as follows.

Lemma 2. Given $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n} \times \mathbb{Z}_q^m$, the hybrid dual attack using Algorithm 1 can decide whether they are LWE instances $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b} = \mathbf{As} + \mathbf{e}) \mod q$ characterized by n, σ, q or they are from uniform distribution. The success probability $p = p_c \cdot p_s$, where p_c is presented in Section 5.1 and $p_s = 1 - \frac{1}{2^{\kappa}}$, where κ is a security parameter. The cost of dual attack is calculated as

$$T = N \cdot T_{BKZ} + T_{guess},$$

where $N = \lceil \frac{M}{2^{0.2075\beta}} \rceil$ is the number of repeated times of the BKZ algorithm, $M = \frac{\kappa + \ln L}{\varepsilon^2}$ is the number of short vectors in the dual lattice, and $T_{guess} = M \cdot L \cdot r$ (see Section 6 for an improvement of T_{quess}).

Remark 1. In Algorithm 1, we first identify the distribution for each guess $\tilde{\mathbf{s}}_1 \in C$ independently, and then output "Uniform" if and only if all guesses are identified

as "Uniform". An alternative approach is to use Algorithm 3 to identify the combination of M samples with L guesses in one shot. However, the advantage will then become $\frac{\varepsilon}{L}$. As a result, to achieve the success probability $p_s = 1 - \frac{1}{2^{\kappa}}$, we need to set $M = \frac{\kappa L^2}{\varepsilon^2}$, which will be worse than our adopted approach.

3.3 The advantage of the hybrid dual attack

We analyze the advantage of the hybrid dual attack by comparing the dual attack and HYBRID 1. Since we always set the probability $p_s = 1 - \frac{1}{2^{\kappa}}$ with $\kappa = 128$, it is safe to ignore p_s . Then we just need to compare the running time.

Let SV be the number of short vector provided by BKZ algorithm with blocksize β using sieving as the SVP oracle. We first show that for dual attack and HYBRID 1, under the optimal parameters, we should repeat the BKZ only once, i.e., N = 1. Moreover, the number of short vectors produced by sieving (SV) should be almost the same as the number of short vectors required (M)to achieve the desired success probability p_s .

Lemma 3. If $\beta > 50$, for a fixed r such that $T_{guess} \leq 2^{50} \cdot T_{BKZ}$, ⁸ the optimal β that minimizes $T_{\text{HYBRID 1}} = N \cdot T_{BKZ} + T_{guess}$ will satisfy N = 1, $\frac{SV}{2^{0.2075}} \leq M \leq SV$, and $\varepsilon^2 \leq 2^{-0.2\beta+7}$.

Proof sketch. The full proof is deferred to supplementary material C.1. We first assume β is a real number and show that the optimal β will satisfy $M(\beta) = SV(\beta)$ and hence N = 1. Then the claim of the lemma follows when β has to be an integer. Let β^* be the real number such that $M(\beta^*) = SV(\beta^*)$. We consider two cases when $\beta \geq \beta^*$ and $\beta \leq \beta^*$, and show that in both cases the optimal β is β^* . The first case when $\beta \geq \beta^*$ is easy as in this case $N = \lceil \frac{M(\beta)}{SV(\beta)} \rceil = 1$. For the second case when $\beta \leq \beta^*$, we consider the continuous function $f(\beta)$ corresponding to $N \cdot T_{\text{BKZ}}$ defined as follows:

$$f(\beta) \coloneqq \frac{M(\beta)}{SV(\beta)} \cdot T_{\text{BKZ}(\beta)} = \frac{M(\beta)}{2^{0.2075\beta}} \cdot 2^{0.292\beta} = M(\beta) \cdot 2^{0.0845\beta}.$$

We can show that $f(\beta)$ is decreasing in β . Then the optimal β minimizing $N \cdot T_{\text{BKZ}}$ is the maximum β such that $\beta \leq \beta^*$, i.e., the optimal β is β^* . The upper bound for ε^2 is due to $M = \frac{\kappa + \ln L}{\varepsilon^2} = SV = 2^{0.2075\beta}$.

Next, we study the influence of the guessing dimension r on the number of required short vectors $M = \frac{\kappa + \ln L}{\varepsilon^2}$. In HYBRID 1 when we guess r dimensions, the benefit is that the advantage ε will be increased, which will decrease M. On the other hand, the number L of guessing candidates increases with r, which will increase M. The key problem is how does M change when r increases. Our estimator show that for all 5 schemes tested in Section 7 M decreases when r

⁸ This guarantees that we don't guess too much. In practice, we usually have $T_{\rm guess} \leq T_{\rm BKZ}$. For example, all 5 schemes tested in Section 7 have $T_{\rm guess} \leq T_{\rm BKZ}$ under the optimal parameters. So it is safe to assume that $T_{\rm guess} \leq 2^{50} \cdot T_{\rm BKZ}$.




Fig. 1. Parameter relations and their value changes from dual attack to HYBRID 1. An arrow " \rightarrow " (respectively, "-- \rightarrow ") from node A to node B means that increasing A will increase (respectively, decrease) B. " \uparrow " and " \downarrow " shows the direction that the values change from the dual attack to HYBRID 1 when r is increased and β is decreased while maintaining $M \approx SV$ and N = 1 unchanged.

increases. This can be intuitively explained by that $\ln L = r \ln R$, where R is the size of the support for each entry of the secret, increases linearly in r while ε^2 increases exponentially in r (from $2^{-\mathcal{O}(n)}$ when r = 0 to $\mathcal{O}(1)$ when r = n).

We assume for now that M is decreasing in r and use this to explain why HYBRID 1 outperforms dual attack. Then, we will show that this condition, M is decreasing in r, is satisfied by most cryptosystems.

Lemma 4. If M is decreasing in r (when β is fixed), then when we increase the guessing dimension r, the optimal BKZ blocksize β that minimizes $N \cdot T_{BKZ}$ and maintains a same level of success probability will be reduced.

Proof. To ease the analysis, we will take β as a real number (instead of an integer), and show that the optimal (real number) β will always be reduced when r increases. According to Lemma 3, the optimal β will always satisfy N = 1 and $M = SV^9$, which means that the optimal β will maintain M = SV when we increase r. Since decreasing β will increase M and decrease $SV = 2^{0.2075\beta}$, and we assume that M will be reduced when r increases, to maintain M = SV, the optimal β will be reduced when r increases.

Now we can explain why HYBRID 1 outperforms dual attack. According to Lemma 3, we have N = 1 for both dual attack and HYBRID 1, with the optimal choice of β . Hence, for dual attack we have $T_{\text{dual}} = T_{\text{BKZ-d}}$ and for HYBRID 1 we have $T_{\text{HYBRID 1}} = T_{\text{BKZ-h}} + T_{\text{guess}}$. Note that we can take dual attack as a special case of HYBRID 1 with r = 0 and $T_{\text{guess}} = 0$. According to Lemma 4, in HYBRID 1 we can increase r and decrease β while maintaining $SV \approx M$ and N = 1.

⁹ Lemma 3 claims $\frac{SV}{20.2075} \leq M \leq SV$ as β is an integer. The proof of Lemma 3 shows that M = SV when β is taken as a real number.

As a result, $T_{\rm BKZ}$ is decreased and $T_{\rm guess}$ is increased. As long as $T_{\rm guess}$ does not exceed $T_{\rm BKZ}$, we can increase r almost "for free" (at the expense of at most one bit when $T_{\rm guess} = T_{\rm BKZ}$) and decrease β such that the overall running time $T_{\rm HYBRID 1} = T_{\rm BKZ-h} + T_{\rm guess}$ decreases. Our simulations show that the optimal rand β for HYBRID 1 will satisfy $T_{\rm BKZ} \approx T_{\rm guess}$. Figure 1 shows how parameter changes from dual attack to HYBRID 1.

Example. To give a more intuitive explanation, we take Kyber1024 as an example and use a figure to show how $T_{\rm BKZ}$, $T_{\rm guess}$, and $T_{\rm HYBRID 1}$ change as r increases. In fact, $T_{\rm guess}$ and $T_{\rm HYBRID 1}$ depend on both r and β . However, since we need to guarantee N = 1 (according to Lemma 3) to minimize the the total cost $T_{\rm HYBRID 1}$, the value of β can be determined once the value of r is chosen. This allows us to estimate $T_{\rm BKZ}$, $T_{\rm guess}$, and $T_{\rm HYBRID 1}$ as functions of r. The results are shown in Figure 2. As expected, as r increases (and β decreases), $T_{\rm guess}$ increases and $T_{\rm BKZ}$ decreases. Hence, as r increases, $T_{\rm HYBRID 1}$ first deceases and then increases, and the optimal $T_{\rm HYBRID 1}$ is achieved when the two lines cross. From Figure 2, we can see that the cross point ($T_{\rm HYBRID 1}$) is smaller than the starting point, which has r = 0 and represents a standalone dual attack.




Fig. 2. Example: $T_{\text{Hybrid 1}}$, T_{BKZ} and T_{guess} for Kyber1024.

M is decreasing in r. To show this, we make two minor assumptions. First, we assume $50 < \beta < 1990$, which implies that the cost of the BKZ ranges roughly from 15 to 580 bits. This covers most cryptographic use cases, specifically, all 5 schemes tested in Section 7, whose optimal β is in (300, 1000). The second assumption is that the cost of guessing only one dimension should not exceed the cost of the standalone dual attack, as otherwise it is not helpful at all to use the hybrid framework. We state this formally in the following assumption.

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Assumption 4. Assume the cost of guessing only one dimension in HYBRID 1 is less than the cost of the standalone dual attack.

Now we can show that M decreases when r increases.

Lemma 5. If $50 < \beta < 1990$ and Assumption 4 hold, then the number of short vectors required to achieve the success probability p_s , denoted by M, is decreasing in the guessing dimension r.

The proof is deferred to supplementary material C.2. The idea is to firstly upper bound $\frac{M(r+1)}{M(r)}$ by a function that only depends on β . Then it becomes easy to derive the condition on β that ensures M decreases with r.

Combining Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, we get the following conclusion.

Theorem 1. For HYBRID 1 under the core-SVP model, for any LWE instance with arbitrary secrets, if $50 < \beta < 1990$ and Assumption 4 hold, then when we increase the guessing dimension r, the optimal BKZ blocksize β that minimizes $N \cdot T_{BKZ}$ and maintains a same level of success rate will be reduced.

Remark 2. We emphasize that the range $50 < \beta < 1990$ is a sufficient and non-necessary condition. For example, if we additionally assume $m \ge n$ (which again is true for most cryptosystems), then the range for β can be extended to (50, 10000).

3.4 Predicting improvement of Hybrid 1

We now proceed to a predictor that estimate the advantage of HYBRID 1 over dual attacks under the aforementioned core-SVP model. We give our theoretical results in Theorem 2. We also compare the predictor's outputs (i.e., advantage + dual attacks) with our HYBRID 1 estimator, for sanity checking the correctness of the predictor.

Let us first expand the result of Theorem 1. Our simulations show that, for all 5 schemes, the value of the optimal β decreases *linearly* as r increases. However, the slopes differ among the schemes. Intuitively, the slope should be close to $\frac{\beta^*}{n}$, where β^* is the optimal β for dual attack, as the optimal β decreases from β^* to 0 if we increase r from 0 to n. We could have computed the slope from m, n, σ, b and q, but it's hard to derive a concrete formula from them. For simplicity, our predictor uses pre-computed slopes that we derived from our simulations. As a consequence, our predictor relies on the following heuristic.

Heuristic 3. Fix N = 1. The optimal β decreases linearly as r increases. The slope, denoted by α , for 5 schemes are shown in Table 10.

Next, our simulations show that the optimal r and β for HYBRID 1 will satisfy $T_{\text{BKZ}} \approx T_{\text{guess}}$, i.e., we should increase r till the cost of guessing is about the same as the cost of BKZ. To ease analysis, we will assume $T_{\text{BKZ}} = T_{\text{guess}}$ and take parameters r and β as real numbers in our predictor. Since N = 1 (Lemma 3), we have $T_{\text{HYBRID 1}} = 2T_{\text{BKZ}} = 2T_{\text{guess}}$. Note that this approximation differs




Fig. 3. Example: T_{BKZ} and T_{guess} as a function of r for Kyber1024 under different cost models and assumptions.

from the optimal $T_{\text{HYBRID 1}}$ by at most one bit, since increasing r will increase T_{guess} and decreasing r will increase β , which will increase T_{BKZ} .

Finally, we are ready to present our predictor, captured via Theorem 2.

Theorem 2. Let R be the size of the support for each entry of the secret and let b_1 be the optimal β for the dual attack. Using Heuristic 3 and assuming $T_{BKZ} = T_{guess}$ for HYBRID 1, then the cost of HYBRID 1 is $T_{\text{HYBRID 1}} = 2^{0.292b_2+1}$, where $b_2 = b_1 \frac{\log R}{\log R - 0.0845\alpha}$ is the optimal β for HYBRID 1 and α is the slope, and the guess dimension is $r = \frac{0.0845b_2}{\log R}$.

Proof. According to Lemma 3, we have $M = SV = 2^{0.2075b_2}$ (when β is taken as a real number). Using $T_{\text{guess}} = T_{\text{BKZ}} = 2^{0.292b_2}$, we get $L = \frac{T_{\text{guess}}}{M} = \frac{T_{\text{BKZ}}}{SV} = 2^{0.0845b_2}$. Since $L = R^r$, we get $r = \frac{0.0845b_2}{\log R}$. According to Heuristic 3, $b_2 - b_1 = \alpha r \Rightarrow r = \frac{b_2 - b_1}{\alpha}$. Combining $r = \frac{0.0845b_2}{\log R}$ and $r = \frac{b_2 - b_1}{\alpha}$, we get $b_2 = b_1 \frac{\log R}{\log R - 0.0845\alpha}$.

We use the result of Theorem 2 to predict the bit-security of all 5 schemes. The Predictor data is computed as the sum of dual attack and the predicted advantage. The Predictor results are very close to those from our HYBRID 1 estimator, with a difference of one bit in worst cases. The results can be found in Table 10 in supplementary material.

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3.5 Advantage under different cost models and assumptions

In this section, we take Kyber1024 as an example to compare the improvement of HYBRID 1 over dual attack under different cost models, the core-SVP model and the practical model, and different assumptions, Assumption 1, Assumption 2, and Amortising cost method [1] (see Section 2.2).

In the proof of Theorem 2, we have $L = \frac{T_{\text{BKZ}}}{SV} = 2^{0.0845b_2}$. This means the guessing space (L) is determined by the gap between the running time of BKZ (T_{BKZ}) and the number of short vectors produced by sieving (SV). In addition, Theorem 2 shows $b_2 = b_1 \frac{\log R}{\log R - 0.0845\alpha}$, then $b_1 - b_2 = b_1 \frac{-0.0845\alpha}{\log R - 0.0845\alpha}$ (recall that $\alpha < 0$). If we switch to Assumption 2, then b_1 becomes larger, and hence the improvement of HYBRID 1 over dual attack ($b_1 - b_2$) will be larger.

Taking Kyber1024 as an example, Figure 3 shows $T_{\rm BKZ}$ and $T_{\rm guess}$ as a function of the guessing dimension r under different cost models and assumptions/method. For Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, the advantage of Hybrid 1 is apparent under both cost models. The advantage is slightly larger under the practical model since here the gap between $T_{\rm BKZ}$ and SV is $8d \cdot 2^{0.0845\beta+16.4}$, where d is the dimension of the dual lattice, which is greater than the gap $2^{0.0845\beta}$ under the core-SVP model.

For amortized cost method, we first run BKZ once and then run LLL M times to produce M short vectors. The optimal blocksize will balance the cost of BKZ and the cost of repeated LLL. Assume these two costs are equal, then the overall cost to produce M short vectors is close to the cost of repeating LLL M times. Then the gap between the overall cost and M is essentially the cost of running LLL once. Consequently, under the core-SVP model, the advantage of HYBRID 1 is very small as the additional cost from LLL under this cost model is only 0.584 bit; while under the practical model, the advantage of HYBRID 1 is larger as the cost of LLL under this cost model becomes larger.

4 Hybrid attack on arbitrary secrets

Essentially, there are two methods to deal with uniform secrets:

- 1. Attack the LWE samples directly with the original dual attacks;
- 2. Convert the uniform LWE samples into normal-form LWE samples (Lemma 1), and then use embedded dual attacks.

The second option requires more samples, but is believed to be more efficient in general when the number of samples permits. Via normalizing the uniform LWE, we obtain an LWE problem with short secrets. Hence we can adopt the strategy in Section 3. There are also cases where an attacker must use the original dual attacks (perhaps due to the limitation of samples, etc.). We emphasis that this setting (uniform secret and limited samples) does not reflect any real-world cryptosystem. Nonetheless, it is interesting to show that hybrid dual attacks are still better than dual attacks with both approaches, from a theoretical point of view.

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To see this, we start with the first option. We can still adopt the strategy in Section 3, and combine an original dual attack with guess to obtain a hybrid original dual attack. In addition, we can still invoke the predictor from Theorem 2, via setting R = q, and α to a value close to -1 for simplicity (Table 10 shows that α is close to -1 and the scope is (-0.6, -1). The advantage would be larger if we have larger absolute value of α .). According to Theorem 2, we have

$$r = \frac{0.0845b_2}{\log q}$$
 and $b_2 - b_1 = \frac{b_1 \cdot 0.0845\alpha}{\log q - 0.0845\alpha} \approx -\frac{0.0845b_1}{\log q}$

For a larger q the cost of guessing even a single entry becomes too high. Therefore, we can guess very few entries and the improvement is limited. Taking Regev's original scheme [34] as an example, where $q \approx n^2$ and $\sigma = \frac{q}{2\pi\sqrt{n\log^2 n}}$, we consider two different restrictions on the number of samples: the original one $m \in (0, n \log q)$ and $m \in (0, 2n)$. We see marginal improvements between 1 to 3 bits in Table 3.

For the second option, we transform the samples with \mathbf{s} uniform in \mathbb{Z}_q^n to normal-form ones at a loss of n samples. The advantage of this method is that as the secret is small, we can guess more entries than the previous option. Similarly, we present the estimations in Table 4. We see improvements across all parameter sets. Notice an anomaly from Regev1024: it occurs when there isn't sufficient number of samples. The advantage of hybrid embedded dual attack over embedded dual attack is surprisingly large when number of samples is (extremely) limited.

Table 3 and 4 show that hybrid dual attack always outperforms dual attack for uniform secrets, regardless the number of samples. In addition, the advantage of hybrid dual attacks increases (sometimes drastically) with the increase of n, when the number of samples is limited ($m \in (0, 2n)$).

									$n\log q - n)$
n	Dual	Hybrid	Dual	Hybrid	n	Dual	Hybrid	Dual	Hybrid 55 133 303
256	63	62	56	56	256	63	61	56	55
512	150	149	135	134	512	151	147	134	133
1024	343	340	306	305	1024	631	570	306	303

Table 3. (Hybrid) original dual attackTable 4. (Hybrid) embedded dual attack

5 Hybrid dual attack with optimal pruning

5.1 Guess with pruning

In this section, we show how to choose the *optimal* subset of secret candidates for different secret distributions when the hybrid dual attack becomes too expensive or unfeasible to guess all candidates. In this scenario, since our guess time need to approximate the cost of BKZ (similarly to HYBRID 1), we can only guess a limited number of candidates. To optimize the success probability p_c , we need to find a collection of certain number of candidates such that its success probability is as large as possible, i.e. we want to maximize the success probability when the number of candidates is limited. This can be formally stated as $\max_{|C| < c} p(C)$, where C is a collection of guessed candidates, c is the upper limit of |C|, and $p(C) = \Pr[\mathbf{s}_1 \in C]$ is the probability that the correct \mathbf{s}_1 is in C.

Note that the optimal parameters that minimize the target $(N \cdot T_{\text{BKZ}} + T_{\text{guess}})/p_c$ may result in $p_c < \frac{1}{2}$. To boost the success probability p_c , we can repeat the attack by guessing different parts (r dimensions) of the secret. We can repeat the attack for at least $\lfloor \frac{n}{r} \rfloor$ times. Since the optimal guess strategy may ignore some candidates with low probability, it could happen that for some instances the attack fails for all $\lfloor \frac{n}{r} \rfloor$ times. However, the probability for this to happen is very low as long as p_c is not too small. For all LWE-related proposals we test in Section 7, the probability that the attack fails after repeat is at most 2^{-19} under the optimal parameters, with an exception of NTRULPrime1277, for which the fail probability is 0.01. Therefore, the attack is valid from a practical point of view.

In the rest of the section, we will look into three different distributions.

Pruning for \mathcal{B}_{h}^{+}. Let $\mathbf{s} \in \mathcal{B}_{h}^{+}$ be a binary secret vector with hamming weight h. Denote S the set of all the candidates of $\mathbf{s}_{1} \in \{0, 1\}^{r}$. Let k_{min} and k_{max} be the lower and upper bound of the hamming weight of candidates in S. It is easy to see that $k_{min} = \max\{0, h + r - n\}$ and $k_{max} = \min\{h, r\}$.

Our goal is to greedily form the set C with candidates of high(est) success rate from S. To this end, we first partition the set S into several subsets according to the hamming weight. For each integer $k \in [k_{min}, k_{max}]$, let S_k be the set of candidates from S with hamming weight k. Then $S = \bigcup_{k \in [k_{min}, k_{max}]} S_k$. Next, we can compute the order of S_k , denoted by N(k), and the probability that S_k contains the correct \mathbf{s}_1 , denoted by p(k) for each $k \in [k_{min}, k_{max}]$ as follows:

$$N(k) = \binom{r}{k} \text{ and } p(k) = \frac{\binom{r}{k}\binom{n-r}{h-k}}{\binom{n}{h}}.$$

Since candidates in the same set S_k have the same probability to be the correct \mathbf{s}_1 , the probability for each candidate in S_k to be \mathbf{s}_1 is $\overline{p}(k) = \frac{p(k)}{N(k)} = \frac{\binom{n-r}{k-k}}{\binom{n}{k}}$. Finally, based on $\overline{p}(k)$, we can greedily choose candidates in S_k with the highest $\overline{p}(k)$ to C till $|C| \approx c$. It is easy to see that this method achieve the optimal success probability as every time when we put a vector into C, it is the one with the highest success probability $\overline{p}(k)$ in $S \setminus C$.

Note 2. If n > r + 2h, then it holds that (n - r)/2 > h - k, and hence $\overline{p}(k)$ decreases as k increases. Therefore, in this case, we should always start guessing candidates from S_k with the lowest hamming weight. Accordingly, the guessing time and success probability are

$$T_{\text{guess}} = M \cdot \sum_{i=0}^{h^*} N(i) \cdot i, \text{ and } p_c = \sum_{i=1}^{h^*} p(i),$$

where h^* satisfies $\sum_{i=1}^{h^*} N(i) < c$ and $\sum_{i=1}^{h^*+1} N(i) > c$.

Pruning for \mathcal{B}_h^-. Let $\mathbf{s} \in \mathcal{B}_h^-$ be a ternary secret vector with h number of 1 and h number of -1. Similar to the case of binary secret vector, let $S_{(k^+,k^-)}$ be a subset of S where k^+ and k^- denote the number of 1 and -1, respectively. The order of $S_{(k^+,k^-)}$ (denoted by $N(k^+,k^-)$) and the probability that $S_{(k^+,k^-)}$ contains the correct \mathbf{s}_1 (denoted by $p(k^+,k^-)$) are calculated as

$$N(k^{+},k^{-}) = \binom{r}{k^{+}}\binom{r-k^{+}}{k^{-}}, \quad p(k^{+},k^{-}) = \frac{\binom{r}{k^{+}}\binom{r-k^{+}}{k^{-}}\binom{n-r}{h-k^{+}}\binom{n-r-h+k^{+}}{h-k^{-}}}{\binom{n}{h}\binom{n-h}{h}}.$$

Also, the probability for each candidate in $S_{(k^+,k^-)}$ to be the correct \mathbf{s}_1 is

$$\overline{p}(k^+,k^-) = \frac{p(k^+,k^-)}{N(k^+,k^-)} = \frac{\binom{n-r}{h-k^+}\binom{n-r-h+k^+}{h-k^-}}{\binom{n}{h}\binom{n-h}{h}}$$

Based on $\overline{p}(k^+, k^-)$, we choose the candidates in $S_{(k^+, k^-)}$ with the highest $\overline{p}(k^+, k^-)$ to C till $C \approx c$. Accordingly, the guessing time and success probability are

$$T_{\text{guess}} = M \cdot \sum_{S_{(i^+, i^-)} \in C} N(i^+, i^-) \cdot (i^+ + i^-) \text{ and } p_c = \sum_{S_{(i^+, i^-)} \in C} p(i^+, i^-).$$

Note 3. If n > r + 3h, then $\overline{p}(k^+, k^-)$ decreases when $k^+ + k^-$ increases. Moreover, for a fixed $k^+ + k^-$, $\overline{p}(k^+, k^-)$ decreases as $|k^+ - k^-|$ increases. Therefore, in this case, we should choose the candidates following two rules: $k^+ + k^-$ is minimized, and $|k^+ - k^-|$ is minimized.

Pruning for central discrete distribution. For a general central discrete distribution with a support $S := \{0, \pm 1, \dots, \pm t\}$, we partition all candidates in S into subsets according to the appearance of each value in S. Denote $S_{(k_0,k_1,\dots,k_t)}$ the subset of candidates with k_i entries being $\pm i$ for $i \in [0, t]$. For each subset, its order, denoted by $N(k_0, k_1, \dots, k_t)$, and the probability of *each* candidate to be the correct guess, denoted by $\overline{p}(k_0, k_1, \dots, k_t)$, can be calculated as

$$N(k_0, k_1, \cdots, k_t) = \binom{r}{k_0} \binom{r-k_0}{k_1} \cdots \binom{r-k_0 - \cdots - k_{t-1}}{k_t} \cdot 2^{r-k_0},$$
$$\overline{p}(k_0, k_1, \cdots, k_t) = p_0^{k_0} p_1^{k_1} \cdots k_t^{k_t}.$$




Fig. 4. Parameter relations in HYBRID 2 and value changes from HYBRID 1 to HYBRID 2. The attack can choose the value for parameters in red color (i.e., β , r and L), which then determine the value for other parameters.

Based on $\overline{p}(k_0, k_1, \dots, k_t)$, we choose the candidates in $S_{(k_0, k_1, \dots, k_t)}$ with the highest $\overline{p}(k_0, k_1, \dots, k_t)$ to C till $C \approx c$. Accordingly, the guessing time and success probability are

$$T_{\text{guess}} = M \cdot \sum_{S_{(i_0, \dots, i_t)} \in C} N(i_0, \dots, i_t) \cdot (i_1 + \dots + i_t), p_c = \sum_{S_{(i_0, \dots, i_t)} \in C} p(i_0, \dots, i_t).$$

5.2 The advantage of optimal guess

Now we are ready to analyze the advantage of HYBRID 2 over HYBRID 1. Similar to the previous comparison in Section 3.3, it is safe to ignore p_s as it is close to 1 for both algorithms. Recall that we have $T_{\text{HYBRID 1}} = N \cdot T_{\text{BKZ-h1}} + T_{\text{guess-h1}}$ and $T_{\text{HYBRID 2}} = (N \cdot T_{\text{BKZ-h2}} + T_{\text{guess-h2}})/p_c$

Intuitively, in HYBRID 2, our guess dimension r will be larger. This decreases blocksize β , and therefore, the cost for a single attack is reduced. So long as the advantage one gains via HYBRID 2 makes it up to the loss in success probability (p_c), pruning will improve the overall cost. The detailed analysis comes as follows.

We first analyze the relation between the cost $T_{\text{HyBRID 2}}$ and the parameters r, β and L, which is shown in Figure 4. Note that the influence of r and β on the cost $T_{\text{HyBRID 2}}$ is almost the same as in HYBRID 1. The only difference is that in HYBRID 1 the number of candidates L is directly determined by r since we guess all candidates, while in HYBRID 2, L is a free parameter that the attacker can choose. This introduces a success probability p_c , i.e., the optimal probability we can achieve via optimal pruning in Section 5.1. It's easy to see that increasing r or decreasing L will decrease p_c .

A natural next step is to adjust the parameters r, β, L in Hybrid 2 to get a lower cost $T_{\text{HYBRID 2}}$ than that of HYBRID 1. Recall that in HYBRID 1, we fix N = 1, and gradually increase r from 0 (and decrease β accordingly) till $T_{\rm BKZ} = T_{\rm guess}$. We follow a similar strategy in Hybrid 2 by fixing N = 1 and gradually increase r. Once a balance between $T_{\rm BKZ}$ and $T_{\rm guess}$ is reached, we gradually decrease L (this do not change the condition that $T_{\rm BKZ} = T_{\rm guess}$) and compute the corresponding success probability p_c . We search for the point where the overall cost is minimal. Note that a deciding factor on whether there exists a minimal point (other than the starting point of L), in other words, whether HYBRID 2 can outperform HYBRID 1, is the concentration of the secret distribution.

Concentration level. As we will see in Section 7 the improvement of Hybrid 2 depends largely on the individual secret distribution. For example, for secret distributions that are more centralized, the success probability p_c are higher. To capture this quantity, we formally define a *concentration level* as a metric to indicate the effectiveness of our optimal pruning.

Definition 2. Let q(r, L) be a function of r and L, which is the optimal success probability when Hybrid 2 guesses L candidates for a secret of dimension r and distribution χ , i.e., $g(r, L) = \max_{C \subseteq D(r), |C| \leq L} p(C)$, where D(r) is the set of all candidates for the secret and p(C) is the probability that the correct secret is in C. We say q(r, L) is χ 's concentration level.

As per definition, q(r, L) characterizes how *centralized* a distribution is, or how hard it is to achieve a high success probability when guessing r dimensions and Lcandidates. For example, for two distributions χ_A and χ_B , if we guess a same r and L and we get $g_{\chi_A}(r,L) > g_{\chi_B}(r,L)$, then we can claim that χ_A is more centralized, or easier to guess. The metric g(r, L) will be used in Theorem 3.

Example. To show how the concentration level influences HYBRID 2, let us consider two typical examples:

- LAC192 with a secret distribution \mathcal{B}_h^+ for n = 1024 and h = 128; Dilithium768 whose secret is from uniform distribution.

Our estimator show that HYBRID 2 can reduce the bit complexity of LAC192 by 12 bits compared with HYBRID 1, but there is no difference between HYBRID 2 and Hybrid 1 for Dilithium768.

For each r, we should choose an appropriate β such that N = 1 and then choose L such that $T_{guess} = T_{BKZ}$. Then, for a secret distribution, the bit complexity and the optimal success probability $p_c = g(r, L)$ can be expressed as functions of r. We plot this function in the Figure 5. Specifically, the first row shows the progression of $T_{\text{HYBRID 2}}$, T_{BKZ} , and p_c as functions of r, and the second row shows the centralization function q(r, L) for the two different secret distributions. For better visualization, in Figure 5, we present the following quantities:

 $-\Delta \log T_{\text{HYBRID 2}}(r) = \log T_{\text{HYBRID 2}}(r) - \log T_{\text{HYBRID 2}}(0),$




Fig. 5. Comparison between LAC192 (left) and Dilithium768 (right). Figures in the first row plot $T_{\text{HYBRID 2}}$, T_{BKZ} , and p_c in function of r; Figures in the second row visualize the impact of centralization level over p_c .

- $-\Delta \log T_{\rm BKZ}(r) = \log T_{\rm BKZ}(r) \log T_{\rm BKZ}(0),$
- $-\Delta \log(1/p_c(r)) = \log(1/p_c(r)) \log(1/p_c(0)).$

For LAC192, when $0 \le r \le 50$, $T_{\rm BKZ}(r)$ decreases; $1/p_c(r) = 1/p_c(0) = 1$. As a result, $T_{\rm HYBRID 2}(r)$ and $T_{\rm BKZ}(r)$ behaves similarly. Indeed, during this stage, we have $T_{\rm guess}(r) < T_{\rm BKZ}(r)$. This means we have been under-guessing for HYBRID 2: we can afford to guess all candidates. The optimal r for HYBRID 1 is r = 50when $T_{\rm guess}(r) = T_{\rm BKZ}(r)$.

On the other hand, when $50 < r \leq 150$, $T_{\rm BKZ}(r)$ decreases and $1/p_c(r)$ increases. The overall cost, $T_{\rm HYBRID 2}(r)$ drops since the gain in doing less BKZ overtakes the loss of success probability. The above gain and loss balance out at r = 150, at which point, HYBRID 2 becomes optimal.

For Dilithium768, $0 \le r \le 9$ is also the under-guessing phase where HYBRID 1 \approx HYBRID 2. Beyond r = 9, $1/p_c(r)$ increases much faster due to its low concentration level, there is not a point where the gain in BKZ cost can catch up the loss in success probability. Therefore, for Dilithium768, pruning does not improve the hybrid attack.

Figure 5 (the second row) visualizes the concentration level for a fixed r = 150. Here, observe that for LAC192 a small ratio of guessed candidates is enough

to achieve a high success probability, while for Dilithium768 with uniform secrets, the success probability is proportional to the guessed candidates. For example, with a guess ratio of 2^{-50} , the success probability is close to 1 for LAC192, and remains 2^{-50} for Dilithium768.

5.3 Predicting improvement of Hybrid 2

In this section, we present a predictor for HYBRID 2's advantage. In our simulator, we observe that, similar to HYBRID 1, the optimal parameters for HYBRID 2 also satisfy that N = 1 and $T_{BKZ} = T_{guess}$. This leads to the predictor in Theorem 3. We defer the proof to supplementary material C.3.

Theorem 3. Assuming Heuristic 3 and that the optimal parameters of HYBRID 2 satisfy N = 1 and $T_{BKZ} = T_{guess}$, let b_1 the optimal β for the dual attack, then the optimal cost of HYBRID 2 when guessing r entries of the secret **s** is $f(r) = \frac{2^{0.292 \cdot b(r)+1}}{g(r, 2^{0.0845 \cdot b(r)})}$, where $b(r) = b_1 + \alpha r$ is the optimal β corresponding to r, g(r, L) is the centralization function, and α is the slope. The optimal cost of HYBRID 2 is $\min_{r>0} f(r)$.

Remark 3. As an additional sanity check, we show that Theorem 2 and 3 converge when guessing all candidates is indeed the optimal strategy. In this case we have $g(r^*, 2^{0.0845 \cdot b(r^*)}) = 1$ for some optimal point r^* . Note that $2^{0.0845 \cdot b(r^*)} = R^{r^*}$, where R is the size of the support for each entry of the secret. Combined with $b(r^*) = b_1 + \alpha r^*$, we achieve Theorem 2, that is, $b_2 \approx b_1 \frac{\log R}{\log R - 0.0845 \alpha}$.

6 An additional optimization

Recall that in the guessing stage, for each $\tilde{\mathbf{s}}_1 \in C$, we use M short vectors $(\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v}) \in \Lambda_{\text{dual}}^E(\mathbf{A}_2)$ to check the distribution of $\tilde{e} = \hat{b} - \langle \hat{\mathbf{a}}, \tilde{\mathbf{s}}_1 \rangle \mod q$ corresponding to the guesses $\tilde{\mathbf{s}}_1$ (line 9 in Algorithm 1). For all the M short vectors and all the L guessed $\tilde{\mathbf{s}}_1$, we rewrite their combinations into the matrix form as $\tilde{\mathbf{E}} = \hat{\mathbf{B}} - \hat{\mathbf{AS}} \mod q$, where $\tilde{\mathbf{E}}, \hat{\mathbf{B}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{M \times L}, \hat{\mathbf{A}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{M \times r}$ and $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{Z}^{r \times L}$. Each column of $\tilde{\mathbf{E}}$ denotes all the \tilde{e} 's to be tested of a guessed $\tilde{\mathbf{s}}_1 \in C$. Therefore, the overall cost of the guessing stage has two main parts: (1), computing the multiplication of $\hat{\mathbf{A}}$ and \mathbf{S} and (2), checking the distributions of all the L columns of $\tilde{\mathbf{E}}$. It is obvious that the multiplication cost dominants, and is therefore, the focus of optimization.

6.1 An efficient algorithm from [26]

A school book multiplication for $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{M \times r}$ and $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{Z}^{r \times L}$ takes $O(M \cdot r \cdot L)$, assuming integer multiplications take unit time. [26] improves the cost by a factor of r, when the matrix \mathbf{S} has a special form.

Lemma 6 ([26]). The product of a matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}^{M \times r}$ and a matrix \mathbf{S} of size $r \times \ell^r$ which consists of all vectors from $\{t_1, \ldots, t_\ell\}^r$ in lexicographic order can be calculated in $\mathcal{O}(M \cdot \ell^r)$ time.

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However, Lemma 6 relies on the property that the second matrix **S** of size $r \times \ell^r$ consists of all vectors from $\{t_1, \ldots, t_\ell\}^r$. As a result, Lemma 6 only works for HYBRID 1, and does not work after pruning. For example, for a central discrete distribution with a support set $\{0, \pm 1, \pm 2\}$ and $p_0 = 0.7, p_1 = 0.2, p_2 = 0.1$, an optimal guess set *C* for dimension 3 may contain (0, 0, 1) and (0, 0, 2), but not (1, 1, 1), since (0, 0, 1) and (0, 0, 2) have higher success probabilities than (1, 1, 1). Now there is no set in the form required by Lemma 6 (except for the whole set $\{0, \pm 1, \pm 2\}^3$) that contains (0, 0, 1) and (0, 0, 2) but not (1, 1, 1). In the next section, we present an improved algorithm.

6.2 An improved algorithm

Warm up. Let us begin with our intuition. Let $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, a_2, \dots, a_r)$ and $\mathbf{b} = (b_1, b_2, \dots, b_r)$ be two vectors of dimension r. Compute $\langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} \rangle$ requires O(r) time. However, if we already have the result of $\langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}' \rangle$, where $\mathbf{b}'_j = 0$ for some $j \in [r]$ and $\mathbf{b}'_i = \mathbf{b}_i$ for all other $i \neq j$, then $\langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} \rangle = \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}' \rangle + \mathbf{a}_j \mathbf{b}_j$ can be computed in constant time based on the result of $\langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}' \rangle$. To compute the product of \mathbf{a} with each column of \mathbf{S} . If all columns of the matrix \mathbf{S} have an order such that the inner product for one column can be computed recursively based on the inner product for another column, then we can drop the dimension r out in the running time.

Concrete algorithm. We start with a few new definitions. Let $D \subseteq \mathbb{Z}$ be a set of integers including 0. For two vectors $\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{v}' \in D^r$, we say \mathbf{v}' precedes \mathbf{v} , denoted as $\mathbf{v}' \prec \mathbf{v}$, if there exists $j \in [r]$ such that $\mathbf{v}'_j = 0$ and $\mathbf{v}'_i = \mathbf{v}_i$ for all $i \neq j$. Slightly abusing the notation, we use \mathbf{S} as the set of column vectors of \mathbf{S} and we write $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbf{S}$ if \mathbf{v} is a column of \mathbf{S} . Finally we can formally define the *closed* matrices.

Definition 3 (Closed Matrix). For a matrix $\mathbf{S} \in D^{r \times L}$, we say \mathbf{S} is closed if for any $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbf{S}$, we have $\mathbf{v}' \in \mathbf{S}$ for all $\mathbf{v}' \prec \mathbf{v}$.

The main result of this section is stated in the following theorem.

Theorem 4. The product of a matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}^{M \times r}$ and a closed matrix $\mathbf{S} \in D^{r \times L}$, where $D \subseteq \mathbb{Z}$ is a set of integers including 0, can be computed in $\mathcal{O}(M \cdot L)$ time.

We defer to supplementary material C.4 for the proof.

Next, we show that all the optimal subsets of candidates discussed in Section 5.1 are closed, and hence Theorem 4 can be applied. The proof of Corollary 1 is deferred to supplementary material C.5.

Corollary 1. If the guessing part \mathbf{s}_1 has dimension r and the secret distribution of the LWE problem is from one the following distributions: \mathcal{B}_h^+ with $n - r \ge 2h$, \mathcal{B}_h^- with $n - r \ge 3h$, or a central discrete distribution, then the candidate subset C^* for \mathbf{s}_1 satisfying that $C^* = \arg \max_{|C| \le c} p(C)$ is closed. Hence, the multiplication of the matrix $\hat{\mathbf{A}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{M \times r}$ and the corresponding optimal candidate matrix $\mathbf{S}^* \in \mathbb{Z}^{r \times L}$ can be computed in $\mathcal{O}(M \cdot L)$ time.

7 Security estimations

We conclude our paper with new estimations for 5 NIST-PQC candidates. Their parameters are given in Table 9. The highlight is presented in Table 2, and a full comparison is given in Table 11. The improvements under different assumptions discussed in Section 2.2 are presented in Table 12. Again, our base line for comparison is the dual attack. Then we compare it with the most optimized one, HYBRID 2M, taking into account the optimal pruning and our additional optimization. Our results are in both the core-SVP model and the practical model. We skipped the Frodo model, since its estimations will always lie in between those of core-SVP and practical models.

The number of samples allowed from each scheme is shown in Table 9. We observe that the optimal number of samples is smaller than the allowed one in our simulation, with an exception of Frodo. For Frodo, we use the optimal number of samples under the restriction of allowed samples. Nevertheless, the influence of this restriction is at most one bit. We set target $p_s = 1 - \frac{1}{2\kappa}$ with $\kappa = 128$.

In addition, we note that for the schemes whose distributions of secret \mathbf{s} and error \mathbf{e} are different, we use the "modulus switching" technique [1] (which balances the weight of \mathbf{s} and \mathbf{e}) to improve the estimation results. Among the 5 schemes we considered, we use this technique for Saber and NTRULPrime.

For all cases, HYBRID 2M is more efficient than dual attacks, regardless of the model. Although, we remark that the gain becomes more significant, if we assume a higher complexity of BKZ (i.e., the practical model). Our method reports an overall improvement between 2 to 14 bits; the actual improvement varies, depending on scheme/parameter sets, as well as the security model. Our algorithm works best on NTRULPrime1277 under the core-SVP model, which records an improvement of 14 bits with classical computation.

We want to emphasis that, the new estimations for Kyber, Saber, Dilithium and NTRULPrime are indeed lower than the corresponding security level. As a final takeaway, we believe that hybrid dual attacks (with pruning) should be considered for cryptanalysis on any future practical lattice-based cryptosystem.

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Supplemental Material

A Parameters for various cryptosystems

Parameters for various cryptosystems considered in this paper are listed in Table 5, 9, 6, 7 and 8.

Table 5. Parameters of LAC192

Name	n	q	σ	Secret distribution	Hamming weight
LAC192	1024	251	$1/\sqrt{2}$	#(-1,0,1) = (128,768,128)	256

 Table 6. Kyber's secret distribution

Name		k		Probab	oility of	
Ivame	n	к	0	± 1	± 2	± 3
Kyber512	256	2	$\frac{5}{16}$	$\frac{15}{64}$	$\frac{3}{32}$	$\frac{1}{64}$
Kyber768	256	3	$\frac{3}{8}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{1}{16}$	-
Kyber1024	256	4	$\frac{3}{8}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{1}{16}$	-

 Table 7. Saber's secret distribution

Name	n	k			Probab	oility of		
Name	π	к	0	± 1	± 2	± 3	± 4	± 5
Saber512	256	2	0.2460	0.2051	0.1172	0.0439	0.0098	0.0010
Saber768	256	3	0.2734	0.2187	0.1094	0.0313	0.0039	
Saber1024	256	4	0.3124	0.2344	0.0938	0.0156		

Name	n			Pr	obabil	ity of	(in mu	ıltipl	es of	12^{-1}	⁶)			
Name		0	± 1	± 2	± 3	± 4	± 5	± 6	± 7	± 8	± 9	± 10	± 11	± 12
Frodo640	640	9288	8720	7216	5264	3384	1918	958	422	164	56	17	4	1
Frodo976	976	11278	10277	7774	4882	2545	1101	396	118	29	6	1		
Frodo1344	1344	18286	14320	6876	2023	364	40	2						

 Table 8. Frodo's secret distribution

 Table 9. Parameters for NIST-PQC round 3 LWE-based schemes

			Paramet	ters		Secur	rity		
Name	n	k	q	σ	m^*	Secret dist.	Level	Cla	aim
	10	n	Ч	0	110	Secret dist.	Lever	Classical	Quantum
	256	2	3329	1.2	768		1	118	107
Kyber	256	3	3329	1	1024	see Table 6	3	182	165
	256	4	3329	1	1280		5	256	232
	256	2	2^{13}	2.29	768		1	118	107
Saber	256	3	2^{13}	2.29	1024	see Table 7	3	189	172
	256	4	2^{13}	2.29	1280		5	260	236
	256	4	8380417	$\sqrt{2}$	1280	uniform in $[-2, 2]$	2	123	112
Dilithium	256	5	8380417	$\sqrt{20/3}$	1536	uniform in $[-4, 4]$	3	182	165
	256	7	8380417	$\sqrt{2}$	2048	uniform in $[-2, 2]$	5	252	229
	640	-	2^{15}	2.8	640		1	150	137
Frodo	976	-	2^{16}	2.3	976	see Table 8	3	215	196
	1344	-	2^{16}	1.4	1344		5	280	255
	653	-	4621	$\sqrt{2/3}$	909	$\#(\pm 1) = 252$	1	130	118
	761	-	4591	$\sqrt{2/3}$	1017	$\#(\pm 1) = 250$	2	155	140
NTRULPrime	857	-	5167	$\sqrt{2/3}$	1113	$\#(\pm 1) = 281$	2	176	160
IN I RULF HILE	953	-	6343	$\sqrt{2/3}$	1209	$\#(\pm 1) = 345$	3	197	178
	1013	-	7177	$\sqrt{2/3}$	1269	$\#(\pm 1) = 392$	4	210	190
	1277	-	7879	$\sqrt{2/3}$	1533	$\#(\pm 1) = 429$	5	271	245

* The parameters are the secret dimension n, MLWE rank k, modulo q, standard deviation of the error σ and the distribution of secret vector s.
* m* is the maximum number of allowed samples for each scheme.
* Frodo uses the Frodo model; all the rest schemes use core-SVP model.

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B A concrete treatment of embedded dual attacks

In [7], Alkim et al. analyzed the cost and success probability of embedded dual attack. As mentioned in Section 2.4, they did not specify how to distinguish a Gaussian distribution from a uniform to achieve the claimed advantage (which equals to the statistical distance between the two distributions) nor how to amplify this advantage. In this section, we present concrete algorithms to complete the analysis in [7].

B.1 With a single short vector

Given instances (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b}) from either LWE_{s, σ} or a uniform distribution $\mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n} \times \mathbb{Z}_q)$, and a short vector $(\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v}) \in \Lambda_{\text{dual}}^E$ of length ℓ , denote $t = \langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{b} \rangle$. t may be from \mathcal{G}_{ρ} or $\mathcal{U}(-\frac{q}{2}, \frac{q}{2})$ accordingly. Let ε be the maximum variance distance between \mathcal{G}_{ρ} and $\mathcal{U}(-\frac{q}{2}, \frac{q}{2})$. In the following, we present an algorithm to distinguish the distribution of t with an advantage ε .

Denote g(x) and G(x) the probability density function and the cumulative distribution function of \mathcal{G}_{ρ} , respectively. Similarly, denote f(x) and F(x) those of $\mathcal{U}(-\frac{q}{2},\frac{q}{2})$. Let I_g be the subset of $(-\frac{q}{2},\frac{q}{2})$ where $g(x) \geq f(x)$, and accordingly, let I_f be the subset of $(-\frac{q}{2},\frac{q}{2})$ where f(x) > g(x). Denote

$$p_g \coloneqq \Pr\left[t \in I_g | t \leftarrow \mathcal{G}_\rho\right], \text{ and}$$
$$p_f \coloneqq \Pr\left[t \in I_g | t \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(-\frac{q}{2}, \frac{q}{2})\right].$$

By definition, we can compute the maximal variance distance between \mathcal{G}_{ρ} and $\mathcal{U}(-\frac{q}{2},\frac{q}{2})$ by p_g and p_f as follows.

Lemma 7. $\varepsilon = p_g - p_f$.

Proof. By definition, we have

$$\begin{split} \varepsilon &= \frac{1}{2} \int_{-q/2}^{q/2} |g(x) - f(x)| \, dx \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \left(\int_{I_g} g(x) - f(x) \, dx + \int_{I_f} f(x) - g(x) \, dx \right) \\ &= \int_{I_g} g(x) - f(x) \, dx \qquad \left(\operatorname{as} \, \int_{-q/2}^{q/2} \left(g(x) - f(x) \right) \, dx = 0 \right) \\ &= p_g - p_f. \end{split}$$

Therefore, we can first compute the subset I_g . Then, for a given target instance t, when $t \in I_g$, we label $t \leftarrow \mathcal{G}_\rho$, otherwise $t \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(-\frac{q}{2}, \frac{q}{2})$. The concrete algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2. Its success probability is shown in Lemma 8. **Lemma 8.** The success probability of Algorithm 2 is $\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}\varepsilon$.

Proof. Assume that the target instance t is sampled from either \mathcal{G}_{ρ} or $\mathcal{U}(-\frac{q}{2}, \frac{q}{2})$ with equal probability, i.e., $\frac{1}{2}$. Denote Pr[Gaussian|Gaussian] the probability that the algorithm outputs 'Gaussian' when the input instance is from \mathcal{G}_{ρ} , and Pr[Uniform|Uniform] the probability that the algorithm outputs 'Uniform' when the input instance is from $\mathcal{U}(-\frac{q}{2}, \frac{q}{2})$. Then, according to Lemma 7, the success probability can be calculated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{success}] &= \frac{1}{2} \Big(\Pr[\text{Gaussian}|\text{Gaussian}] + \Pr[\text{Uniform}|\text{Uniform}] \Big) \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \Big(p_g + 1 - p_f \Big) \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \Big(1 + \varepsilon \Big) \\ &= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the success probability of Algorithm 2 is $\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}\varepsilon$.

Algorithm	2:	Distinguish	\mathcal{G}_{α}	from \mathcal{U}	$\left(-\frac{q}{q}\right)$	$\left(\frac{q}{q}\right)$	given	one instance
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Input: $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b}), (\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v}) \in \Lambda^{E}_{\text{dual}}(\mathbf{A})$ of length ℓ **Output:** Gaussian or Uniform

1 Compute I_g ;

2 Compute $t := \langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{b} \rangle \mod q$;

3 if $t \in I_g$ then return *Gaussian*;

```
4 else return Uniform;
```

B.2 Extend to M short vectors

Recall that $p_g = \Pr\left[t \in I_g | t \leftarrow \mathcal{G}_\rho\right]$ and $p_f = \Pr\left[t \in I_g | t \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(-\frac{q}{2}, \frac{q}{2})\right]$. If the input distribution is \mathcal{G}_ρ , then $p_g M$ of instances are expected to be labeled as from Gaussian distribution; otherwise, $p_f M$. This allows us to setup a threshold $\frac{1}{2}(p_g + p_f)M$. The distinguisher will output \mathcal{G}_ρ if the threshold is reached; $\mathcal{U}(-\frac{q}{2}, \frac{q}{2})$ otherwise. The algorithm that captures the above logic is shown in Algorithm 3, and the success probability is captured via Lemma 9.

Lemma 9. Given M instances $t_{i \in [M]}$ sampled from \mathcal{G}_{ρ} or $\mathcal{U}(-\frac{q}{2}, \frac{q}{2})$, the success probability of Algorithm 3 is at least $1 - \exp(-\frac{\varepsilon^2}{2}M)$.

To prove the success probability, we will use an additional lemma of Hoeffding's inequality.

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Lemma 10 (Hoeffding's inequality.). Let Z_1, \ldots, Z_n be independent bounded random variables with $Z_i \in [a, b]$ for all i, where $-\infty < a \le b < \infty$. Then

$$\Pr\left(\frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n} (Z_i - E[Z_i]) \ge t\right) \le \exp(-\frac{2nt^2}{(b-a)^2})$$

and

$$\Pr\left(\frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n} (Z_i - E[Z_i]) \le -t\right) \le \exp(-\frac{2nt^2}{(b-a)^2})$$

for all $t \geq 0$.

Now we prove Lemma 9.

Proof. We assume that the input instances (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b}) are all from Gaussian or uniform distribution with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ respectively. Each y_i in Algorithm 3 is a indicator variable and let $Y = \sum_{i=1}^{M} y_i$. We consider the probability that the algorithm outputs the wrong distribution in the following two cases:

• Algorithm 3 outputs "Uniform" when the input instances are from Gaussian distribution. Since (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b}) are from \mathcal{G}_{ρ} , we have $\Pr[y_i = 1] = p_g$ and $E(Y) = p_g M$. Since Algorithm 3 outputs "Uniform", $Y < \frac{1}{2}(p_g + p_f)M$. Using Hoeffding's inequality, we get:

$$\Pr[Y < \frac{p_g + p_f}{2}M] = \Pr[Y - p_g M < -\frac{\varepsilon}{2}M]$$
$$\leq \exp(-\frac{\varepsilon^2}{2}M).$$

• Algorithm 3 outputs "Gaussian" when the input instances are from Uniform distribution. Since (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b}) are from $\mathcal{U}(-\frac{q}{2}, \frac{q}{2})$, we have $\Pr[y_i = 1] = p_f$ and $E(Y) = p_f M$. Since Algorithm 3 outputs "Gaussian", $Y \geq \frac{1}{2}(p_g + p_f)M$. Using Hoeffding's inequality, we get:

$$\Pr[Y > \frac{p_g + p_f}{2}M] = \Pr[Y - p_f M > \frac{\varepsilon}{2}M]$$
$$\leq \exp(-\frac{\varepsilon^2}{2}M)$$

Therefore the success probability of Algorithm 3 is at least $1 - \exp(-\frac{\varepsilon^2}{2}M)$. \Box

According to Lemma 9, if we set the target success probability of the dual attack to $1 - \frac{1}{2^{\kappa}}$, where κ is the security parameter, then, the required number of short vectors can be derived via $1 - exp(-\frac{\varepsilon^2}{2}M) = 1 - \frac{1}{2^{\kappa}}$. That is, when we use $M \approx \frac{\kappa}{\varepsilon^2}$ short vectors in $\Lambda^E_{\text{dual}}(\mathbf{A})$ of length ℓ , we can distinguish \mathcal{G}_{ρ} from random with success probability $1 - \frac{1}{2^{\kappa}}$.

Finally, based on Lemma 7, 8, 9, assuming Heuristic 1 and Assumption 1, we draw the following conclusion for dual attack.

Algorithm 3: Distinguish between Gaussian and Uniform Distribution

Input: (A, b), M short vectors $(\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v})_i \in \Lambda^E_{dual}(\mathbf{A})$ for $i \in [M]$, I_g, p_g, p_f Output: Gaussian or Uniform 1 for $i \in [M]$ do 2 $t_i = \langle \mathbf{w}_i, \mathbf{b} \rangle \mod q;$ 3 $\mathbf{if} \ t_i \in I_g \ \mathbf{then} \ y_i = 1;$ 4 $\mathbf{else} \ y_i = 0;$ 5 Calculate $Y = \sum_i^M y_i;$ 6 $\mathbf{if} \ Y \ge \frac{1}{2}(p_g + p_f)M \ \mathbf{then \ return} \ Gaussian;$ 7 $\mathbf{else \ return} \ Uniform;$

Theorem 5. Given m normal-form LWE instances $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b} = \mathbf{As} + \mathbf{e} \mod q)$ characterized by n, σ, q . Using BKZ with blocksize β to obtain a vector (\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v}) of length ℓ in the dual lattice $\Lambda^E_{dual}(\mathbf{A}) = \{(\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v}) \in \mathbb{Z}^m \times \mathbb{Z}^n : \mathbf{w} \cdot \mathbf{A} \equiv \mathbf{v} \mod q\}$, the success probability of distinguishing $t = \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{s} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{e} \rangle$ from random is at least $p = \frac{1}{2} + 2e^{-2\pi^2\tau^2}$, where $\tau = \frac{\ell\sigma}{q}$ and $\ell = \delta^m_0 q^{\frac{m}{m}}$. The success probability can be amplified to $1 - \frac{1}{2^{\kappa}}$ by using $M = \frac{\kappa}{\varepsilon^2}$ vectors of the same length ℓ , where κ is a security parameter. Accordingly, the BKZ algorithm should be repeated $N = \lceil \frac{\kappa}{2^{0.2075\beta} \cdot \varepsilon^2} \rceil$ times. Then the cost of dual attack is calculated as $T = N \cdot T_{BKZ}$.

C Additional proofs

C.1 Proof for Lemma 3

Proof. We first show that N = 1 and $\frac{SV}{2^{0.2075}} \leq M \leq SV$. Note that β is an integer. In the following analysis, we will assume β is a real number and show that the optimal β will satisfy $M(\beta) = SV(\beta)$ and hence N = 1. Then when β has to be an integer, we have that the optimal β satisfies N = 1 and $\frac{SV}{2^{0.2075}} \leq M \leq SV$, as claimed.

Let β^* be the real number such that $M(\beta^*) = SV(\beta^*)$. We consider two cases when $\beta \leq \beta^*$ and $\beta \geq \beta^*$, and show that in both cases the optimal β is β^* . Since $M(\beta)$ is decreasing in β and $SV(\beta)$ is increasing in β , $\frac{M(\beta)}{SV(\beta)}$ is decreasing in β . Then $\beta \leq \beta^* \Leftrightarrow \frac{M(\beta)}{SV(\beta)} \geq 1$ and $\beta \geq \beta^* \Leftrightarrow \frac{M(\beta)}{SV(\beta)} \leq 1$.

in β . Then $\beta \leq \beta^* \Leftrightarrow \frac{M(\beta)}{SV(\beta)} \geq 1$ and $\beta \geq \beta^* \Leftrightarrow \frac{M(\beta)}{SV(\beta)} \leq 1$. When $\beta \geq \beta^*$ and $\frac{M(\beta)}{SV(\beta)} \leq 1$, we have that $N = \left\lceil \frac{M(\beta)}{SV(\beta)} \right\rceil = 1$ and $N \cdot T_{\text{BKZ}} = T_{\text{BKZ}}$ is increasing in β . Then in this case the optimal β minimizing $N \cdot T_{\text{BKZ}} = T_{\text{BKZ}}$ is the minimum β such that $\beta \geq \beta^*$, i.e., the optimal β is β^* .

When $\beta \leq \beta^*$ and $\frac{M(\beta)}{SV(\beta)} \geq 1$, we consider the continuous function $f(\beta)$ corresponding to $N \cdot T_{\text{BKZ}}$ defined as follows:

$$f(\beta) \coloneqq \frac{M(\beta)}{SV(\beta)} \cdot T_{\text{BKZ}(\beta)} = \frac{M(\beta)}{2^{0.2075\beta}} \cdot 2^{0.292\beta} = M(\beta) \cdot 2^{0.0845\beta}.$$

We will show that $f(\beta)$ is decreasing in β . Then in this case the optimal β minimizing $N \cdot T_{\text{BKZ}}$ is the maximum β such that $\beta \leq \beta^*$, i.e., the optimal β is β^* .

Now we show that $\frac{f(\beta+1)}{f(\beta)} \leq 1$. To ease the analysis, we use the following approximation for δ_0 :

$$\delta_0 = 2^{\frac{1}{\beta}} . [36]$$

Let m_1 and m_2 be the optimal number of equations to use for β and $\beta + 1$ respectively, we have

$$\begin{split} f(\beta+1) &= \frac{\kappa + \ln L}{\varepsilon^2(\beta+1)} \cdot 2^{0.0845(\beta+1)} \\ &= \frac{\kappa + \ln L}{4e^{\frac{-4\pi^2\sigma^2 q}{q^2}\frac{2m}{m_2+n}} 2^{\frac{2(m_2+n)}{\beta+1}}} \cdot 2^{0.0845(\beta+1)} \\ &\leq \frac{\kappa + \ln L}{4e^{\frac{-4\pi^2\sigma^2 q}{q^2}\frac{2m}{m_1+n}} 2^{\frac{2(m_1+n)}{\beta+1}}} \cdot 2^{0.0845(\beta+1)} \\ &= \frac{\kappa + \ln L}{\left(\varepsilon^2(\beta)\right)^{2^{-\frac{2(m_1+n)}{\beta(\beta+1)}}}} \cdot 2^{0.0845(\beta+1)} \\ &= f(\beta) \cdot \left(\varepsilon^2(\beta)\right)^{1-2^{-\frac{2(m_1+n)}{\beta(\beta+1)}}} \cdot 2^{0.0845} \\ &\leq f(\beta) \cdot \left(\varepsilon^2(\beta)\right)^{1-2^{-\frac{2}{\beta}}} \cdot 2^{0.0845}. \end{split}$$

The first inequality holds since m_2 is the optimal number to minimize $\varepsilon(\beta + 1)$. The last inequality holds since the BKZ blocksize β should be smaller than the dimension $m_1 + n$ of the dual lattice.

Then our goal is to show that

$$g(\beta) \coloneqq \left(\varepsilon^2(\beta)\right)^{1-2^{-\frac{2}{\beta}}} \cdot 2^{0.0845} \le 1$$

when $\beta > 50$ and $\frac{M(\beta)}{SV(\beta)} \ge 1$. To this end, we give an upper bound for $\varepsilon^2(\beta)$. According to $\frac{M(\beta)}{SV(\beta)} \ge 1$, we have that $M(\beta) = \frac{\kappa + \ln L}{\varepsilon^2(\beta)} \ge SV(\beta) = 2^{0.2075\beta}$, then

$$\varepsilon^2(\beta) \le 2^{-0.2075\beta} (128 + \ln L).$$
 (3)

According to $\frac{M(\beta)}{SV(\beta)} \ge 1$ and $T_{\text{guess}} \le 2^{50} \cdot T_{\text{BKZ}}$, we can upper bound L by that

$$L = \frac{T_{\text{guess}}(\beta)}{M(\beta)} \le 2^{50} \cdot \frac{T_{\text{BKZ}}(\beta)}{SV(\beta)} = 2^{50+0.0845\beta}.$$

Then it is easy to verify that for any $\beta > 50$,

$$2^{-0.0075\beta} (128 + \ln L) \le 2^7.$$
(4)

Incorporating Equation 4 to Equation 3, we get the upper bound for $\varepsilon^2(\beta)$:

$$\varepsilon^2(\beta) \le 2^{-0.2\beta + 7}.\tag{5}$$

Incorporating Equation 5 to $g(\beta)$ we get

$$g(\beta) \le 2^{(-0.2\beta+7)(1-2^{-\frac{2}{\beta}})+0.0845}.$$

It is easy to verify that the right side is decreasing in β and for any $\beta > 50$,

$$g(\beta) < 1.$$

This finish the proof for that the optimal β will satisfy $M(\beta) = SV(\beta)$ and N = 1. For $\varepsilon^2(\beta) \leq 2^{-0.2\beta+7}$, note that we have already shown this bound in the above when assuming $\frac{M(\beta)}{SV(\beta)} \geq 1$. And we have just showed that the optimal β will satisfy $M(\beta) = SV(\beta)$, so $\varepsilon^2(\beta) \leq 2^{-0.2\beta+7}$ is satisfied by the optimal β .

C.2 Proof for Lemma 5

Proof. For a fixed r, we can find the corresponding optimal β . Then the advantage is $\varepsilon(r) = 2e^{-2\pi^2\tau^2}$, where $\tau = \frac{\ell\sigma}{q}$ and $\ell = \delta_0^{m+n-r}q^{\frac{n-r}{m+n-r}}$. Once r and β are fixed, it is easy to verify that the optimal number m of equations to use is given by

$$m = \sqrt{\frac{(n-r)\log q}{\log \delta_0}} - (n-r)[33]^{10},$$

then $\ell = (\delta_0^2) \sqrt{\frac{(n-r)\log q}{\log \delta_0}}$. So the number of samples we need is

$$F(r) \coloneqq M(r) = \frac{\kappa + \ln L(r)}{\varepsilon^2(r)} = \frac{\kappa + \ln L(r)}{4e^{\frac{-4\pi^2 \sigma^2(\delta_0^4)\sqrt{\frac{(n-r)\log q}{\log \delta_0}}}{q^2}}}$$

To ease the notation, let $X(r) = (\delta_0^4)^{\sqrt{\frac{(n-r)\log q}{\log \delta_0}}}$. Notice that

$$X(r+1) = X(r)^{\sqrt{\frac{n-r-1}{n-r}}},$$

and

$$\varepsilon^{2}(r+1) = 4e^{\frac{-4\pi^{2}\sigma^{2}X(r+1)}{q^{2}}} = (\varepsilon^{2}(r))^{X(r)\sqrt{\frac{n-r-1}{n-r}}-1}.$$

¹⁰ The formular in [33] is $\sqrt{\frac{n \log q}{\log \delta_0}}$ since [33] considers the original dual attack.

Now

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$$\frac{F(r+1)}{F(r)} = \frac{\kappa + \ln L(r+1)}{\kappa + \ln L(r)} \frac{\varepsilon^2(r)}{\varepsilon^2(r+1)} \\
= \frac{\kappa + \ln L(r+1)}{\kappa + \ln L(r)} \frac{\varepsilon^2(r)}{\left(\varepsilon^2(r)\right)^{X(r)} \sqrt{\frac{n-r-1}{n-r}}^{-1}} \\
= \frac{\kappa + \ln L(r+1)}{\kappa + \ln L(r)} \left(\varepsilon^2(r)\right)^{1-X(r)} \sqrt{\frac{n-r-1}{n-r}}^{-1}.$$
(6)

Our goal is to show that F(r) decreases when r increases. It suffices to show that $\frac{F(r+1)}{F(r)} < 1$ for any $r \ge 0$. We will upper bound $\frac{\kappa + \ln L(r+1)}{\kappa + \ln L(r)}$ and $\varepsilon^2(r)$, and lower bound $1 - X(r)\sqrt{\frac{n-r-1}{n-r}} - 1$ in Equation 6 by functions that only depend on β , and then using these upper bounds to show that $\frac{F(r+1)}{F(r)} < 1$ for any $\beta > 50$.

1. Let $R \leq q$ be the size of the support for each entry of the secret. According to Assumption 4, $R \cdot M \leq T_{\text{BKZ}}$. According to Lemma 3, $M \geq \frac{SV}{2^{0.2075}}$. Combining them we get

$$R \le \frac{T_{\rm BKZ}}{M} \le \frac{2^{0.2075} \cdot T_{\rm BKZ}}{SV} = 2^{0.0845\beta + 0.2075}.$$

Then

$$\frac{\kappa + \ln L(r+1)}{\kappa + \ln L(r)} = \frac{\kappa + (r+1)\ln R}{\kappa + r\ln R}$$

$$\leq \frac{\kappa + \ln R}{\kappa}$$

$$\leq \frac{\kappa + \ln 2^{0.0845\beta + 0.2075}}{\kappa}$$
(Assumption 4)
$$= \frac{128 + (0.0845\beta + 0.207)\ln 2}{128}$$

2. According to Lemma 3, we can upper bound $\varepsilon^2(r)$ by that

$$\varepsilon^2(r) \le 2^{-0.2\beta + 7} \tag{8}$$

3. Since $m = \sqrt{\frac{(n-r)\log q}{\log \delta_0}} - (n-r) \ge 0$, $\sqrt{\frac{(n-r)\log q}{\log \delta_0}} \ge (n-r)$. In addition, $\sqrt{\frac{n-r-1}{n-r}} - 1 \le -\frac{1}{2(n-r)}$. Combining these two inequalities, we get

$$\sqrt{\frac{(n-r)\log q}{\log \delta_0}} \left(\sqrt{\frac{n-r-1}{n-r}} - 1\right) \le -\frac{1}{2}.$$

Then

$$1 - X(r)^{\sqrt{\frac{n-r-1}{n-r}} - 1} = 1 - (\delta_0^4)^{\sqrt{\frac{(n-r)\log q}{\log \delta_0}}(\sqrt{\frac{n-r-1}{n-r}} - 1)} \\ \ge 1 - \delta_0^{-2}.$$
(9)

Note that δ_0 is a function of β .

Now incorporating Equations 7 8 9 into Equation 6, we can upper bound $\frac{F(r+1)}{F(r)}$ by a function of β :

$$\frac{F(r+1)}{F(r)} \le f(\beta) \coloneqq \frac{128 + (0.0845\beta + 0.2075)\ln 2}{128} (\frac{1}{2})^{(1-\delta_0^{-2})(0.2\beta - 7)}.$$

It is easy to verify that for any $50 < \beta < 1990$, $f(\beta) < 1$. We plot the value of $f(\beta)$ for $20 \le \beta \le 2000$ in Figure 6.




Fig. 6. The value of $f(\beta)$ for $20 \le \beta \le 2000$.

C.3 Proof for Theorem 3

Proof. According to Heuristic 3 and $T_{\text{guess}} = T_{\text{BKZ}}$, we have that the optimal β and r satisfies that $b(r) = b_1 + \alpha r$, and

$$T_{\rm guess} = T_{\rm BKZ} = 2^{0.292 \cdot b(r)}$$

Since N = 1,

$$M = SV = 2^{0.2075 \cdot b(r)},$$

then

$$L = \frac{T_{\text{guess}}}{M} = 2^{0.0845 \cdot b(r)}.$$

The success probability

$$p_c = g(r, L) = g(r, 2^{0.0845 \cdot b(r)})$$

Therefore, we get the cost of the attack

$$f(r) = \frac{T_{\text{BKZ}} \cdot N + T_{\text{guess}}}{p_c} = \frac{2T_{\text{BKZ}}}{p_c} = \frac{2^{0.292 \cdot b(r)+1}}{g(r, 2^{0.0845 \cdot b(r)})}.$$

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C.4 Proof for Theorem 4

Proof. Let \mathbf{A}_i be the *i*-th row vector of \mathbf{A} . We show that $\mathbf{A}_i \cdot \mathbf{S}$ runs in $\mathcal{O}(L)$ time. Then the claim of the theorem follows.

Denote *h* the maximum number of non-zero entries of all columns of **S**. We can partition all columns of **S** into h+1 subsets $\mathbf{S}_0, \mathbf{S}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{S}_h$, where \mathbf{S}_k consists of all columns having *k* non-zero entries. Since **S** is closed, all these subsets are non-empty. Moreover, for any $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbf{S}_k$, there is a vector $\mathbf{v}' \in \mathbf{S}_{k-1}$ such that $\mathbf{v}' \prec \mathbf{v}$. Let $j \in [r]$ be the index such that $\mathbf{v}'_j = 0$, $\mathbf{v}_j \neq 0$, and $\mathbf{v}'_i = \mathbf{v}_i$ for all $i \neq j$. Then, the product of $\langle \mathbf{A}_i, \mathbf{v} \rangle$ can be easily computed based on the product of $\langle \mathbf{A}_i, \mathbf{v}' \rangle$ as follows:

$$\langle \mathbf{A}_i, \mathbf{v}
angle = \langle \mathbf{A}_i, \mathbf{v}'
angle + \mathbf{A}_{i,j} \mathbf{v}_j$$

This can be done in constant time. Hence, when we compute the product of \mathbf{A}_i and \mathbf{S} , we can compute the product of \mathbf{A}_i and the columns of \mathbf{S} in the order of increased number of non-zero entries. The result for each column in \mathbf{S}_0 can be done in constant time, and result for each columns in \mathbf{S}_k can also be done in constant time given the results for all columns in \mathbf{S}_{k-1} . Therefore, the product of \mathbf{A}_i and \mathbf{S} can be done in $\mathcal{O}(L)$ time.

Remark 4. Note that to ensure the recursive computation in the proof, we need to maintain a function which given a column $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbf{S}$ outputs a column $\mathbf{v}' \in \mathbf{S}$ with $\mathbf{v}' \prec \mathbf{v}$. We can do this once for all A_i in $\mathcal{O}(L^2)$ time. Since under the optimal parameters, we have $ML = T_{\text{guess}} = T_{\text{BKZ}} = 2^{0.292\beta}$ and $M = 2^{0.2075\beta}$, so $L = 2^{0.0845\beta} < M$. Therefore, this additional $\mathcal{O}(L^2)$ does not influence the claimed running time.

About the increased storage space, our algorithm need at most $\mathcal{O}(2^{0.0845\beta})$ bits (recall that $L = 2^{0.0845\beta}$). At first glance, it seems that our algorithm needs ML bits to store the resulting matrix **AS**. However, it is actually not necessary to store the whole matrix since what we need is the number of entries that are in I_g for each column of **AS** (see Algorithm 3). Hence, during our algorithm, we keep a vector of length L to record this number for all columns. And at each step when computing $\mathbf{A}_i \mathbf{S}$, we need to remember at most L numbers to ensure the recursive approach. Therefore, the actual storage space is $\mathcal{O}(2^{0.0845\beta})$ bits, which is negligible compared with the exponential storage space $(\mathcal{O}(2^{0.2075\beta}))$ needed for the sieving algorithm.

C.5 Proof for Corollary 1

Proof. For any non-zero candidate vector $\mathbf{v} \in C^*$ and any vector $\mathbf{v}' \prec \mathbf{v}$, we show that $\mathbf{v}' \in C^*$. According to the definition of C^* , it suffices to show that the probability that \mathbf{v} or \mathbf{v}' is the correct \mathbf{s}_1 satisfies that $p(\mathbf{v}') \ge p(\mathbf{v})$.

For \mathcal{B}_h^+ with $n - r \ge 2h$, assume that the hamming weight of \mathbf{v} and \mathbf{v}' are k and k - 1, respectively. We have that

$$p(\mathbf{v}) = \frac{\binom{n-r}{h-k}}{\binom{n}{h}}$$
, and $p(\mathbf{v}') = \frac{\binom{n-r}{h-k+1}}{\binom{n}{h}}$

Since $n - r \ge 2h$, we have $p(\mathbf{v}') \ge p(\mathbf{v})$. For \mathcal{B}_h^- with $n - r \ge 3h$, assume that \mathbf{v} contains k^+ of 1 and k^- of -1. We have that

$$p(\mathbf{v}) = \frac{\binom{n-r}{h-k+}\binom{n-r-h+k^{+}}{h-k^{-}}}{\binom{n}{h}\binom{n-h}{h}} = \frac{\binom{n-r}{h-k-}\binom{n-r-h+k^{-}}{h-k^{+}}}{\binom{n}{h}\binom{n-h}{h}}.$$

Since $\mathbf{v}' \prec \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{v}'$ contains one less 1 or one less -1. It's easy to see that in both case we have $p(\mathbf{v})' \ge p(\mathbf{v})$.

For a central discrete distribution, assume that **v** contains k_i of $\pm i$ for $i \in [t]$. We have that 1 1 1

$$p(\mathbf{v}) = p_0^{k_0} p_1^{k_1} \cdots k_t^{k_t}.$$

Since $\mathbf{v}' \prec \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{v}'$ contains one less non-zero entry. Since $p_0 \ge p_i$ for all $i \in [t]$, we have that $p(\mathbf{v})' \ge p(\mathbf{v})$.

Therefore, for any one of these three distributions, C^* is closed, and according to Theorem 4, the multiplication of $\hat{\mathbf{A}}$ and \mathbf{S}^* can be done in $\mathcal{O}(M \cdot L)$ time. \Box

D Full results

Name]	Paramet	ers	Dual	Hybrid 1	Predictor
Name	b_1	R	α	Duai	III BRID I	Treatetor
Kyber512	404	5	-0.98	118	115	115
Kyber768	622	5	-0.96	182	177	177
Kyber1024	870	5	-0.99	254	246	246
Saber512	402	11	-0.96	117	115	116
Saber768	648	9	-0.99	189	185	185
Saber1024	885	7	-1	258	252	252
Dilithium768	424	13	-0.56	124	122	123
Dilithium1024	623	11	-0.62	182	180	180
Dilithium1280	861	7	-0.59	251	247	248
Frodo640	486	25	-0.99	142	140	140
Frodo976	705	21	-0.89	206	203	203
Frodo1344	927	13	-0.83	271	266	267
NTRULPrime653	447	3	-0.86	131	126	126
NTRULPrime761	532	3	-0.84	155	150	150
NTRULPrime857	605	3	-0.85	177	170	170
NTRULPrime953	671	3	-0.85	196	189	189
NTRULPrime1013	719	3	-0.86	210	202	202
NTRULPrime1277	925	3	-0.86	270	260	260

Table 10. Comparison of Hybrid 1 and the Predictor $% \left[{\left[{{{\mathbf{T}}_{{\mathbf{T}}}} \right]_{{\mathbf{T}}}} \right]_{{\mathbf{T}}}} \right]$

	H	able 1	1. Bit-s	Table 11. Bit-security estimations under Assumption 1	stimati	ons und	ler Assur	nption	1			
		0	ore-SV	Core-SVP Model				Ч	ractica	Practical Model		
Mamo	0	Classical		Q	Quantum		Ö	Classical		Q	Quantum	
	Dual	HYBRID	JD 2M	Dual	HYBR	Hybrid 2m	Dual	Hybrid	ID 2M	Dual	Hybrid	D 2M
	X	×	r	γ	ĸ	r	ĸ	ĸ	r	Y	γ	r
Kyber512	118	115	13	107	105	6	147	141	26	136	131	21
Kyber768	182	176	24	165	161	16	212	202	38	195	188	31
Kyber1024	254	245	34	231	225	23	284	271	49	261	252	38
Saber512	117	115	11	107	105	8	147	141	22	136	132	18
Saber768	189	184	20	172	169	13	219	211	32	202	196	25
Saber1024	258	250	30	235	230	20	289	277	43	265	257	33
Dilithium1024	124	122	14	112	111	6	154	150	27	143	140	22
Dilithium1280	182	179	15	165	164	10	213	208	24	196	193	20
Dilithium1792	251	247	29	228	225	19	283	275	43	259	254	32
Frodo640	142	139	11	129	127	9	172	167	19	159	155	15
Frodo976	206	202	17	187	185	10	236	230	27	217	213	19
Frodo1344	271	264	29	246	242	19	301	292	41	276	270	30
NTRULPrime653	131	125	26	118	115	16	160	149	48	148	140	39
NTRULPrime761	155	148	36	141	137	24	185	172	64	171	161	52
NTRULPrime857	177	168	44	160	155	30	207	192	27	190	180	63
NTRULPrime953	196	187	44	178	172	32	226	211	20	208	198	52
NTRULPrime1013	210	200	45	191	185	29	240	225	68	221	210	52
NTRULPrime1277	270	256	84	245	237	60	301	281	66	276	262	89

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	H	able 1	2. Bi	t-secu	Table 12. Bit-security estimations under different cost models and assumptions	imati	ons un	der dif	feren	t cost	models	s and	assum	ptions				
				Core-	Core-SVP Model	Iodel							Pract	Practical Model	odel			
Name	Ass	Assumption	n 1	Assi	Assumption 2	n 2	Amoi	Amortising cost	cost	Assu	Assumption	n 1	Assu	Assumption 2	n 2	Amor	Amortising cost	cost
	Dual	H2M	\bigtriangledown	Dual	H2M	Þ	Dual	H2M	∇	Dual	H2M	∇	Dual	H2M	Δ	Dual	H2M	∇
Kyber512	118	115	ς	123	120	ς	139	139	0	147	141	9	153	146	7	169	165	4
Kyber768	182	176	9	189	183	9	211	211	0	212	202	10	219	209	10	241	236	5
Kyber1024	254	245	6	264	254	10	293	293	0	284	271	13	294	281	13	323	319	4
$\operatorname{Saber512}$	117	115	2	123	120	c,	138	138	0	147	141	6	152	146	x	167	164	3
Saber 768	189	184	5	197	191	9	219	219	0	219	211	x	227	218	6	249	246	റ
Saber 1024	258	251	2	269	260	6	298	298	0	289	277	12	299	286	13	328	324	4
Dilithium1024	124	122	7	127	125	5	135	135	0	154	150	4	157	153	4	166	164	5
Dilithium1280	182	179	က	186	184	2	199	199	0	213	208	5	217	213	4	229	228	1
Dilithium1792	251	247	4	257	252	5	273	273	0	283	275	8	288	281	7	304	302	2
Frodo640	142	140	2	148	145	3	165	165	0	172	170	2	177	172	5	195	192	33
Frodo976	206	202	4	213	209	4	234	234	0	236	231	5	243	237	9	264	262	2
Frodo1344	271	264	2	279	272	2	303	303	0	301	293	8	310	300	10	334	331	3
NTRULPrime653	131	125	9	136	130	9	151	150	1	160	150	10	165	154	11	181	174	4
NTRULPrime761	155	148	2	162	154	∞	180	177	3	185	172	13	191	177	14	210	200	10
NTRULPrime857	177	168	6	183	174	6	203	200	3	207	192	15	214	198	16	233	223	10
NTRULPrime953	196	187	6	203	193	10	224	221	3	226	212	14	233	218	15	255	245	10
NTRULPrime1013	210	201	6	218	207	11	240	237	3	240	225	15	248	232	16	270	261	6
NTRULPrime1277	270	256	14	279	264	15	307	299	∞	301	281	20	310	289	21	338	323	15
* H2M means HYBRID 2M in this table.	BRID	2m in	this t	able.														

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