Dynamic Universal Accumulator with Batch Update over Bilinear Groups *

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Abstract. We propose a Dynamic Universal Accumulator in the Accumulator Manager setting for bilinear groups which extends Nguyen's positive accumulator and Au et al. [21] and Damgård and Triandopoulos non-membership proof mechanism [18]. The new features include support for batch addition and deletion operations as well as a privacy-friendly batch witness update protocol, where the witness update information is the same for all users. Together with a non-interactive zero-knowledge protocol, these make the proposed scheme suitable as an efficient and scalable Anonymous Credential System, accessible even by low-resource users. We show security of the proposed protocol in the Generic Group Model under a (new) generalized version of the t-SDH assumption and we demonstrate its practical relevance by providing and discussing an implementation realized using state-of-the-art libraries.

Keywords: accumulator, universal, dynamic, batch update, privacy-preserving KYC, anonymous credentials

1 Introduction

A cryptographic accumulator allows to aggregate many different values from a finite set into a fixed-length digest called *accumulator value*. Differently than hash functions, accumulators permit to further verify if an element is either accumulated or not in a given accumulator value by using the so-called *membership* and *non-membership witnesses*, respectively. Accumulator schemes which support membership witnesses are referred to as *positive* accumulators, the ones that support non-membership witnesses are called *negative*, while the ones that support both are called *universal* accumulators. A common requirement for the accumulator schemes is the ability to change the set of accumulated elements, hence permitting *accumulator updates*: when the accumulator allows to dynamically *add* and *delete* elements, it is said to be a *dynamic accumulator*.

Whenever addition or deletion operations occur for one or several elements (in the latter case these are called *batch additions and deletions*), already issued witnesses should be updated to be consistent with the new accumulator value.

Ideally this should be done using a short amount of *witness update data* (i.e. whose cost/size is not dependent on the number of elements involved) and with only publicly available information (i.e. without knowledge of any *secret* accumulator parameters). While there are many constructions that satisfy the public update condition, as regards to the update cost, Camacho and Hevia showed in [23] an impossibility result to have *batch witness updates* whose update data size is independent from the number of elements involved. More precisely, they showed that for an accumulator state which accumulates n elements, the witness update data size for a batch delete operation involving m elements cannot be less than $\Omega(m \log \frac{n}{m})$, thus requiring at least $\Omega(m)$ operations to update.

Our Contributions. In this paper we propose a Dynamic Universal Accumulator in the Accumulator Manager setting which supports batch operations and public batch witness updates as well as privacy preserving zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for membership and non-membership witnesses. Its features are manifold:

– **Support for Batch Operations:** Starting from Nguyen's positive accumulator and Au et al. [21] and Damgård and Triandopoulos non-membership proof mechanism [18], we state a Dynamic Universal Accumulator in the *Accumulator Manager* setting (i.e. it is managed by a central authority who knows the accumulator trapdoor) by using efficient and secure Type-III pairing-friendly elliptic curves and we extend it to fully support batch addition and deletion operations, as well as membership and non-membership batch witness updates.

– **Optimal Batch Update:** the number of operations needed to batch update witnesses equals the lower bound given by Camacho and Hevia [23] in the case of a batch deletion operation. The same complexity holds in the case of either a batch addition operation and a batch addition & deletion operation, where m new elements are added and other m elements are deleted, namely $\mathcal{O}(m)$ update time for a batch witness update information size of $m \log pq$ bits, where p is the size of the underlying bilinear group and q is the size of the underlying base field of the elliptic curve group.

– **Batch Witness Update Protocol:** we designed a batch witness update protocol where the batch witness update information published by the Accumulator Manager after a batch operation is the same for all users. This information can be pre-processed by third-party servers in order to allow users to update their witnesses in a constant number of elementary operations, even in the case many batch operations occurred from their last update. This allows the accumulator to be used even when only limited-resource devices (ex. smartphones) are available to users.

– **Security:** we introduce a weaker definition for collision resistance and a new more general definition of $t-$SDH assumption for which we provide in the Generic Group Model a lower bound complexity of a generic algorithm that solves the corresponding hardness problem. We show that our scheme along with its public batch update protocol and published information is secure under this more general security assumption and we address the relevant

recent attacks found in [34] by showing that with a proper initialization of the accumulator value, a generic algorithm has negligible probability to compute elements belonging to a certain reference string $\mathcal{RS}$, whose knowledge would allow to issue arbitrary witnesses.

– **Zero-Knowledge Friendly:** zero-knowledge protocols are supported for any operation involving witnesses: we detail an efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge protocol to show ownership of a valid witness.

– **Implementation:** to show efficiency and its practical relevance, we implemented and benchmarked the proposed accumulator using state-of-the-art libraries for pairing-friendly elliptic curves. Following feedback received from the community, we briefly report benchmarks of third-party implementations of our scheme which are already employed in production applications.

It follows that our accumulator is well suited to be the building block of an *Anonymous Credential System*, which originally motivated this work. In these systems only the users which were previously authorized by a central authority (the Accumulator Manager) can use the issued credentials to authenticate to the third-party verifier (ex. some financial service provider, like bank or an exchange). They do so by proving in zero-knowledge ownership of a valid membership or non-membership witnesses, depending if the accumulator is used as a white- or black-list. Furthermore, doing so anonymously and unlinkably, even if the verifier colludes with the accumulator manager. This could be crucial in many applications given current societal challenges of protecting user privacy on the one hand and government-imposed know-your-customer regulations on the other hand.

Limitations. Our protocol assumes a trusted Accumulator Manager that, by knowing the secret accumulator parameter α, can forge membership and non-membership witnesses at will. In practice, the secret α can be secret-shared among multiple managers, but the construction and security analysis of such scheme is left as future work. In case of a batch addition and deletion operation where m elements are added and/or deleted, the batch update data has $O(m)$ size, as in the case for non-batch operations: this is indeed a theoretical lower bound that cannot be improved, although our construction provides better constants, detailed at the end of Section 4.1, than the non-batch approach. We note, however, that our protocol support a delegation technique (not possible for non-batch operations) which allows users to safely update witnesses in constant time, if third-party servers process, on their behalf, the $O(m)$-sized public witness batch update data published by the Accumulator Manager.

Related Works. The first accumulator scheme was formalized by Benaloh and De Mare [3] in 1993 as a time-stamping protocol. Since then, many other accumulator schemes have been proposed. Currently, three main families of accumulators can be distinguished in literature: schemes designed in groups of unknown order [3, 4, 10, 15, 6, 25, 29, 30], others designed in groups of known order [13, 18, 21, 22] and hash-based constructions [2, 7, 9, 17, 28]. Relevant to this paper are the schemes belonging to the second family, where the considered group is a prime order bilinear group.

Nguyen in [13] proposed a dynamic positive accumulator for symmetric bilinear groups, where up to t elements can be accumulated assuming that the $t-$Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in the underlying group. Damgård and Triandopoulos [18] extended Nguyen's scheme, under the same security assumptions, to support non-membership proofs, thus defining a *universal* accumulator based on bilinear pairings. Soon after this work, Au *et al.* [21] extended Nguyen's scheme to a universal accumulator by proposing two possible variants: the more efficient α-based construction best suitable when a central authority $-$the Accumulator Manager$-$ keeps the accumulator updated, and the alternative more decentralized but less efficient reference string-based construction. We note that non-membership witness definition provided in the latter construction is equivalent to Damgård and Triandopoulos' one.

Recently, Biryukov, Udovenko and Vitto [34] cryptanalized both Au et al. variants and found different attacks able to either recover the accumulator secret parameter or issue arbitrary witnesses. While they consider the α-based construction insecure, they conclude that in presence of an Accumulator Manager, it is possible to safely use the witness defining equations provided in the reference string-based construction (or equivalently, the Damgård and Triandopoulos' construction) by properly initializing the accumulator value.

The Dynamic Universal Accumulator obtained by combining Nguyen's positive accumulator and Au et al. and Damgård and Triandopoulos' non-membership witness mechanism, will be the starting point of our dynamic universal accumulator scheme, which we will further extend to support batch operations and a public batch witness update protocol.

Another approach on how to build a dynamic positive accumulator based on bilinear groups is given by Camenisch *et al.* in [22] where, alternatively to Nguyen's construction, a scheme relying on the $t-$DHE assumption is proposed.

2 Preliminaries: A Dynamic Universal Accumulator for Pairing Friendly Elliptic Curves

We now summarize Nguyen's positive accumulator scheme [13] (i.e. *Membership Witness, Update and Verification*) extended with the non-membership proof system of Au *et al.* [21] and Damgård and Triandopoulos [18] (i.e. *Non-membership Witness, Update and Verification*).

Due to recent progresses in discrete logarithm computations [26, 27, 32], which weaken the security of efficient implementable elliptic curves provided with a Type-I pairing, we restate their definitions into a Type-III setting, making it best suitable for efficient and more secure pairing-friendly elliptic curves. We note that the full scheme can be easily stated to work with any bilinear group (and indeed we will later prove security under the Generic Group Model) but, motivated by its concrete implementation, we decided to define and discuss it using the concrete group representation given by Type-III elliptic curves.

In addition, we introduce new concepts (e.g. *Accumulator States, Epochs*) and parameters (e.g. `batchMax`), to make the accumulator definition coherent with

the batch operations and the batch witness update protocol we will describe starting from Section 3.

We refer to Appendix A for a summary of the notation employed hereafter.

Bilinear Group Generation.[1] Given a security parameter 1^λ, generate over a prime order finite field $\mathbb{F}_q$ an elliptic curve $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ with embedding degree k which has an efficiently computable non-degenerate bilinear map $e : G_1 \times G_2 \to G_T$ such that

- G_1 is a subgroup of $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$.
- Letting d be the cardinality of the automorphisms group of $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$, G_2 is a subgroup of $\tilde{E}(\mathbb{F}_{q^{k/d}})$ which is the unique degree-d twist of E over $\mathbb{F}_{q^{k/d}}$.
- G_T is a subgroup of $(\mathbb{F}_{q^k})^*$.
- $|G_1| = |G_2| = |G_T| = p$ is prime.
- $P, \tilde{P}, e(P, \tilde{P})$ are generators of G_1, G_2, G_T, respectively.
- There are no efficiently computable isomorphisms between G_1 and G_2.

Then denote as $\mathbb{G} = (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, P, \tilde{P}, e)$ the resulting bilinear group.

Accumulator Parameters. Uniformly sample an $\alpha \in (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$ and consider $\mathcal{ACC} = (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^* \setminus \{-\alpha\}$ as the domain of accumulatable elements. Moreover, set a bound `batchMax` to the maximum number of batch additions and/or deletions possible in each epoch (See Section 3).

The bilinear group $\mathbb{G}$, the bound `batchMax` and the point $\tilde{Q} = \alpha\tilde{P}$ are the accumulator *public parameters* and are available to all accumulator users, while α is the accumulator *secret parameter* and is known only to the Accumulator Manager.

Accumulator Initialization. Select a set $\mathcal{Y}_{V_0} \subset \mathcal{ACC}$ and let the initial accumulator value to be equal to $V_0 = \left(\prod_{y \in \mathcal{Y}_{V_0}} (y + \alpha)\right) P$. The set $\mathcal{Y}_{V_0}$ is kept secret and its elements are never removed from the accumulator.[2]

Accumulator States and Epochs. An accumulator state is a pair $(V, \mathcal{Y}_V)$ where $V \in G_1$ is the corresponding accumulator value and $\mathcal{Y}_V \subseteq \mathcal{ACC}$ denotes the set of elements accumulated into V (initialization elements excluded). We call *epoch* the period of time during which an accumulator state remains unchanged.

Given an accumulator state $(V, \mathcal{Y}_V)$, the accumulator value V is equal to $V = \left(\prod_{y \in \mathcal{Y}_V} (y + \alpha)\right) V_0 = \left(\prod_{y \in \mathcal{Y}_V \cup \mathcal{Y}_{V_0}} (y + \alpha)\right) P$ and can be computed from $\mathcal{Y}_V$ and V_0 if the secret parameter α is known.

Accumulator Update. The accumulator state $(V, \mathcal{Y}_V)$ changes when one or more elements are added or removed from the accumulator. This can be done using the following single element Addition or Deletion operations.

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[1] We refer, for example, to [24] for more technical details on how these bilinear groups can be efficiently generated and implemented.

[2] The security of the scheme strongly depends on how the elements in $\mathcal{Y}_{V_0}$ are chosen. See Section 6 for a complete discussion.

- **Addition**: if $y \in \mathcal{ACC} \setminus \mathcal{Y}_V$, the element y is added into the accumulator when the accumulator value is updated from V to V' as $V' = (y + \alpha)V$ It follows that $\mathcal{Y}_{V'} = \mathcal{Y}_V \cup \{y\}$.
- **Deletion**: if $y \in \mathcal{Y}_V$, the element y is deleted from the accumulator when the accumulator state is updated from V to V' as $V' = \frac{1}{y+\alpha}V$ It follows that $\mathcal{Y}_{V'} = \mathcal{Y}_V \setminus \{y\}$.

Membership Witness. Let $(V, \mathcal{Y}_V)$ be an accumulator state and y an element in $\mathcal{ACC}$. Then $w_{y,V}$ is a *membership witness for y with respect to the accumulator value V* if $C = \frac{1}{y+\alpha}V$ and $w_{y,V} = C$. The Accumulator Manager issues the membership witness $w_{y,V}$ to a user associated to the element y, in order to permit him to prove that y *is* accumulated into V.[3]

Non-Membership Witness. Let $(V, \mathcal{Y}_V)$ be an accumulator state and y an element in $\mathcal{ACC}$. Then $\bar{w}_{y,V}$ is a *non-membership witness for y with respect to the accumulator state V* if, by letting $f_V(x) = \prod_{y_i \in \mathcal{Y}_V \cup \mathcal{Y}_{V_0}} (y_i + x) \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}[x]$, it holds $d = f_V(-y) \mod p$ with $d \neq 0$, $C = \frac{f_V(\alpha)-d}{y+\alpha}P$ and $\bar{w}_{y,V} = (C, d)$. The Accumulator Manager issues the non-membership witness $\bar{w}_{y,V}$ to a user associated to the element y, in order to permit him to prove that y *is not* accumulated into the accumulator value V.

Witness Update. When accumulator state changes happen, users whose elements are not involved in the corresponding Addition or Deletion operations, have to update their witnesses with respect to the new accumulator state to continue being able to prove statements about their associated elements.

After an accumulator state change, users' membership and non-membership witnesses are updated according to the following operations:

- **On Addition**: suppose the accumulator state changes from $(V, \mathcal{Y}_V)$ to $(V', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ as a result of an Addition operation. Hence, for a certain $y' \in \mathcal{ACC} \setminus \mathcal{Y}_V$, $V' = (y' + \alpha)V$ and $\mathcal{Y}_{V'} = \mathcal{Y}_V \cup \{y'\}$.
  Then, for any $y \in \mathcal{Y}_V$ the membership witness $w_{y,V} = C$ is updated with respect to the accumulator state $(V', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ by computing $C' = (y' - y)C + V$ and letting $w_{y,V'} = C'$, while for any $y \notin \mathcal{Y}_V$, the non-membership $\bar{w}_{y,V} = (C, d)$ is updated, if issued, with respect to $(V', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ by computing $C' = (y' - y)C + V$, $d' = d \cdot (y' - y)$ and letting $\bar{w}_{y,V'} = (C', d')$.
- **On Deletion**: suppose the accumulator state changes from $(V, \mathcal{Y}_V)$ to $(V', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ as a result of a Deletion operation. Hence, for a certain $y' \in \mathcal{Y}_V$, $V' = \frac{1}{y'+\alpha}V$ and $\mathcal{Y}_{V'} = \mathcal{Y}_V \setminus \{y'\}$.
  Then, for any $y \in \mathcal{Y}_{V'}$, the membership witness $w_{y,V} = C$ is updated with respect to the accumulator state $(V', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ by computing $C' = \frac{1}{y'-y}C - \frac{1}{y'-y}V'$ and letting $w_{y,V'} = C'$, while for any $y \notin \mathcal{Y}_{V'}$, the non-membership witness

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[3] When the accumulator is employed as an authentication mechanism, single additions in place of batch operations lack users' privacy and expose to impersonation attacks since the membership witness C would be equal to the previous accumulator state value, while y can be deduced from the public witness update information.

$\bar{w}_{y,V} = (C, d)$ is updated, if issued, with respect to $(V', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ by computing $C' = \frac{1}{y'-y}C - \frac{1}{y'-y}V'$, $d' = d \cdot \frac{1}{y'-y}$ and letting $\bar{w}_{y,V'} = (C', d')$.

Witness Verification. A membership witness $w_y = C$ for an element $y \in \mathcal{ACC}$ is *valid* for the accumulator state $(V, \mathcal{Y}_V)$ if and only if $e(C, y\tilde{P} + \tilde{Q}) = e(V, \tilde{P})$. When w_y is a valid membership witness for the state $(V, \mathcal{Y}_V)$ we assume that $y \in \mathcal{Y}_V$ and hence $w_y = w_{y,V}$.

A non-membership witness $\bar{w}_y = (C, d)$ for an element $y \in \mathcal{ACC}$ is *valid* for the accumulator state $(V, \mathcal{Y}_V)$ if $d \neq 0$ and $e(C, y\tilde{P} + \tilde{Q})e(P, \tilde{P})^d = e(V, \tilde{P})$. When $\bar{w}_y$ is a valid non-membership witness for the state $(V, \mathcal{Y}_V)$ we assume that $y \notin \mathcal{Y}_V$ and hence $\bar{w}_y = \bar{w}_{y,V}$.

3 Adding Support for Batch Operations

We now describe how the Dynamic Universal Accumulator defined in previous Section can be further extended to coherently support batch addition and deletions operations both for accumulator and users' witnesses update.

We start by defining a family of polynomials which will help us show in a compact way correctness of our batch operations with respect to the underlying accumulator scheme.

Batch Polynomials. Given the secret accumulator parameter α and two disjoint sets $\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{D} \subseteq \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ where $\mathcal{A} = \{y_{\mathcal{A},1}, \ldots, y_{\mathcal{A},n}\}$ and $\mathcal{D} = \{y_{\mathcal{D},1}, \ldots, y_{\mathcal{D},m}\}$, we define the following polynomials in $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$:

$$v_{\mathcal{A}}(x) \doteq \sum_{s=1}^{n} \left(\prod_{i=1}^{s-1}(y_{\mathcal{A},i} + \alpha) \prod_{j=s+1}^{n}(y_{\mathcal{A},j} - x) \right)$$

$$v_{\mathcal{D}}(x) \doteq \sum_{s=1}^{m} \left(\prod_{i=1}^{s}(y_{\mathcal{D},i} + \alpha)^{-1} \prod_{j=1}^{s-1}(y_{\mathcal{D},j} - x) \right)$$

$$v_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D}}(x) \doteq v_{\mathcal{A}}(x) - v_{\mathcal{D}}(x) \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{n}(y_{\mathcal{A},i} + \alpha)$$

$$d_{\mathcal{A}}(x) \doteq \prod_{t=1}^{n}(y_{\mathcal{A},t} - x), \qquad d_{\mathcal{D}}(x) \doteq \prod_{t=1}^{m}(y_{\mathcal{D},t} - x)$$

Accumulator Batch Update. Several elements are added into or removed from the accumulator using the following Batch Addition and Batch Deletion operations.

- **Batch Addition**: if $\mathcal{A} = \{y_{\mathcal{A},1}, \ldots, y_{\mathcal{A},n}\} \subseteq \mathcal{ACC} \setminus \mathcal{Y}_V$, the elements in $\mathcal{A}$ are *batch added* into the accumulator when the accumulator value is updated from V to V' as $V' = d_{\mathcal{A}}(-\alpha) \cdot V$. It follows that $\mathcal{Y}_{V'} = \mathcal{Y}_V \cup \mathcal{A}$.

– **Batch Deletion**: if $\mathcal{D} = \{y_{\mathcal{D},1}, \ldots, y_{\mathcal{D},m}\} \subseteq \mathcal{Y}_V$, the elements in $\mathcal{D}$ are *batch deleted* from the accumulator when the accumulator state is updated from V to V' as $V' = \frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(-\alpha)} \cdot V$. It follows that $\mathcal{Y}_{V'} = \mathcal{Y}_V \setminus \mathcal{D}$.

– **Batch Addition & Deletion**: if $\mathcal{A} = \{y_{\mathcal{A},1}, \ldots, y_{\mathcal{A},n}\} \subseteq \mathcal{ACC} \setminus \mathcal{Y}_V$, $\mathcal{D} = \{y_{\mathcal{D},1}, \ldots, y_{\mathcal{D},m}\} \subseteq \mathcal{Y}_V$ and $\mathcal{A} \cap \mathcal{D} = \emptyset$, the elements in $\mathcal{A}$ are batch added into the accumulator and the elements in $\mathcal{D}$ are batch deleted from the accumulator when the accumulator state is updated from V to V'' as $V'' = \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}}(-\alpha)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(-\alpha)} \cdot V$. It follows that $\mathcal{Y}_{V''} = \mathcal{Y}_V \cup \mathcal{A} \setminus \mathcal{D}$.

Batch Witness Update. When a batch addition or deletion changes the accumulator state, users' membership and non-membership witnesses are updated according to the following operation.

– **On Batch Addition:** suppose the accumulator state changes from $(V, \mathcal{Y}_V)$ to $(V', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ as a result of an Batch Addition operation. Hence, for certain $\mathcal{A} = \{y_{\mathcal{A},1}, \ldots, y_{\mathcal{A},n}\} \subseteq \mathcal{ACC} \setminus \mathcal{Y}_V$, we have $V' = d_{\mathcal{A}}(-\alpha) \cdot V$ and $\mathcal{Y}_{V'} = \mathcal{Y}_V \cup \mathcal{A}$. Then, for any $y \in \mathcal{Y}_V$, the membership witness $w_{y,V} = C$ is updated with respect to the accumulator state $(V', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ computing $C' = d_{\mathcal{A}}(y) \cdot C + v_{\mathcal{A}}(y) \cdot V$ and letting $w_{y,V'} = C'$. While for any $y \notin \mathcal{Y}_V$, the non-membership witness $\bar{w}_{y,V} = (C, d)$ is updated with respect to $(V', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ by computing $C' = d_{\mathcal{A}}(y) \cdot C + v_{\mathcal{A}}(y) \cdot V$, $d' = d \cdot d_{\mathcal{A}}(y)$ and letting $\bar{w}_{y,V'} = (C', d')$.

Proof. See Appendix D.1.   □

– **On Batch Deletion**: suppose the accumulator state changes from $(V, \mathcal{Y}_V)$ to $(V', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ as a result of a Batch Deletion operation. Hence, for certain $\mathcal{D} = \{y_{\mathcal{D},1}, \ldots, y_{\mathcal{D},m}\} \subseteq \mathcal{Y}_V$, we have $V' = \frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(-\alpha)} V$.
Then, for any $y \in \mathcal{Y}_{V'}$, the witness $w_{y,V} = C$ is updated with respect to the accumulator state $(V', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ computing $C' = \frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} C - \frac{v_{\mathcal{D}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} V$ and letting $w_{y,V'} = C'$. While for any $y \notin \mathcal{Y}_{V'}$, the non-membership witness $\bar{w}_{y,V} = C$ is updated with respect to $(V', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ by computing $C' = \frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} \cdot C - \frac{v_{\mathcal{D}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} \cdot V$, $d' = d \cdot \frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)}$ and letting $\bar{w}_{y,V'} = (C', d')$.

Proof. See Appendix D.1.   □

– **On Batch Addition & Deletion:** suppose the accumulator state changes from $(V, \mathcal{Y}_V)$ to $(V'', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ as a result of a Batch Addition & Deletion operation. Hence for certain disjoint sets $\mathcal{A} = \{y_{\mathcal{A},1}, \ldots, y_{\mathcal{A},n}\} \subseteq \mathcal{ACC} \setminus \mathcal{Y}_V$ and $\mathcal{D} = \{y_{\mathcal{D},1}, \ldots, y_{\mathcal{D},m}\} \subseteq \mathcal{Y}_V$ we have $V'' = \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}}(-\alpha)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(-\alpha)} \cdot V$.
Then, for any $y \in \mathcal{Y}_V$, the witness $w_{y,V} = C$ is updated with respect to the accumulator state $(V', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ computing $C' = \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} \cdot C + \frac{\nu_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} \cdot V$ and letting $w_{y,V'} = C'$. While for any $y \notin \mathcal{Y}_V$, the non-membership witness $\bar{w}_{y,V} = (C, d)$ is updated with respect to the accumulator state $(V', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ by computing $C' = \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} \cdot C + \frac{\nu_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} \cdot V$, $d' = d \cdot \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)}$ and letting $\bar{w}_{y,V'} = (C', d')$.

Proof. See Appendix D.1.   □

4   The Batch Witness Update Protocol

Users cannot batch update their witnesses directly using the formula defined in previous section, since they would need the secret parameter α. However, starting from their definition, the Accumulator Manager can efficiently compute and publish some update information (more precisely, the polynomials $d_{\mathcal{A}}(x), d_{\mathcal{D}}(x)$ and an elliptic curve points vector) so that users are able to update their witnesses without requiring or leaking (see Section 4.1) any information related to α. This will allow us to define a batch membership and non-membership witness update protocol for the proposed accumulator scheme.

4.1   The Batch Witness Update Information

From now on, we will focus on the Batch Witness Update Addition & Deletion polynomial $v_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D}}(x)$ only: indeed, the polynomials $v_{\mathcal{A}}(x)$ and $v_{\mathcal{D}}(x)$ are special cases of this more general one.

We recall that our main goal is to allow users possessing a witness (C, d) for an element y with respect to the accumulator value V to compute the quantities

$$C' = \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} \cdot C + \frac{\nu_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} \cdot V \ , \qquad d' = d \cdot \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)}$$

We note that the Accumulator Manager cannot publish all the polynomials $d_{\mathcal{A}}(x)$, $d_{\mathcal{D}}(x)$ and $v_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D}}(x)$, because their coefficients can leak some information related to the secret accumulator parameter α. To give an example, suppose that after a batch addition operation, the Accumulator Manager publishes the polynomials $v_{\mathcal{A}}(x)$ and $d_{\mathcal{A}}(x)$, defined as above, with $|\mathcal{A}| > 1$. Doing simple algebra, we find that the coefficient of the $(|\mathcal{A}| - 2)-$degree monomial of $v_{\mathcal{A}}(x)$ is equal to $\alpha + \sum_{y_A \in \mathcal{A}} y_A$: extracting the roots of $d_{\mathcal{A}}(x)$ in $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ we obtain all the elements in $\mathcal{A}$ and hence the secret parameter α.

Leakages about α can be prevented by requiring the Accumulator Manager to publish in place of $v_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D}}(x)$, the vector of elliptic curve points

$$\Omega = \Omega_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D},V} = (\ c_0 V, \ c_1 V, \ \dots \ , \ c_{\texttt{batchMax}} V \ )$$

where $v_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D}}(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{\texttt{batchMax}} c_i x^i$ and $c_i = 0$ if $i > max(|\mathcal{A}|, |\mathcal{D}|)$.

Users can then update their membership witness $w_{y,V} = C$ to $w_{y,V'} = C'$ by first evaluating the two polynomials $d_{\mathcal{A}}(x)$ and $d_{\mathcal{D}}(x)$ in the element y and then computing

$$C' = \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} \cdot C + \frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} \cdot \langle \Upsilon_y, \Omega \rangle$$

where $\Upsilon_y = (1, y, y^2, ..., y^{\texttt{batchMax}})$ and $\langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle$ denotes the dot product.

Similarly, a non-membership witness $\bar{w}_{y,V} = (C, d)$ is updated to $\bar{w}_{y,V'} = (C', d')$ by computing

$$C' = \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} \cdot C + \frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} \cdot \langle \Upsilon_y, \Omega \rangle \ , \quad d' = d \cdot \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)}$$

In this scenario, assuming the Discrete Logarithm Problem to be hard in G_1 (a weaker assumption with respect to the $t-$SDH assumption under which accumulator collision resistance is shown), from the published Ω, $d_{\mathcal{A}}(x)$ and $d_{\mathcal{D}}(x)$ it is only possible, performing roots extraction on the polynomials, to compute the respective sets $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{D}$ of batch added and batch deleted elements.

It follows that witness update operations can be performed either autonomously by users or by delegating to third-party servers the computation of (some of) the values $\langle \Upsilon_y, \Omega \rangle$, $d_{\mathcal{A}}(y), d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)$. Indeed, since the required updating values are decoupled from users' previous witnesses, third-party servers which are asked to compute such values with respect to an element y, cannot impersonate the corresponding user, since they don't know any previous valid witness for y.

When the computation of the elements $\langle \Upsilon_y, \Omega \rangle$, $d_{\mathcal{A}}(y), d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)$ is delegated, users are then able to update witnesses in a constant number of elementary operations, i.e., 2 scalar-point multiplication and 1 point addition[4]. Delegation thus allows even resource-constrained devices to be able to keep users' witnesses updated.

As a side note, if third-party servers are *untrusted* (e.g. we want to prevent linkability attacks from subsequent evaluation requests for the same element y), it is possible to use Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation techniques such as [14], [31] and [8] to delegate the computation of the elliptic curve point $\langle \Upsilon_y, \Omega \rangle = v_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D}}(y) \cdot V$ and of the values $d_{\mathcal{A}}(y)$ and $d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)$, in a way that third-parties will not learn anything about y. We note however that such protocols have time complexity at least proportional to the degree of the polynomials involved and thus allow users to just save data rather than time, i.e., users are not required to download the public batch witness update data (available instead to third-party servers) and can oblivious evaluate $v_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D}}(y) \cdot V$, $d_{\mathcal{A}}(y)$ and $d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)$ with time complexities comparable to standard polynomial evaluations.

Improvements With Respect to Non-Batch Operations. Due to the lower bound showed by Camacho and Hevia in [23], in case of a batch addition and deletion operation where m elements are added and/or deleted, the batch update data cannot have size less than $O(m)$ (and thus witnesses cannot be updated in time less than $O(m)$), as in the case for non-batch operations. Our protocol, that reaches this optimal lower bound, provides, however, better constants with respect to the naive approach of iteratively adding and/or deleting each involved element at a time.

In particular, for m added and deleted elements, the public batch witness information in our protocol would have size $|\Omega| + |d_{\mathcal{A}}(x)| + |d_{\mathcal{D}}(x)|$, i.e. $m \cdot (\log q + 2 \log p)$, while the naive approach consisting in executing m addition operations followed by m deletion operations requires[5] $2m \cdot (\log q + \log p)$ data.

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[4] We note that this is not against the impossibility result of Camacho and Hevia to have batch witness update data size independent from the number of elements added/deleted, since the provided values $\langle \Upsilon_y, \Omega \rangle$, $d_{\mathcal{A}}(y), d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)$ are *per* user and not for *all* users, similarly as any constant-sized (updated) witness is.

[5] Each of these operations send users the element added/deletad and the corresponding updated accumulator value, i.e. $\log q + \log p$ data.

Epoch	Accumulator State	Witness Update Information		
0	$(V_0, \emptyset)$			
1	$(V_1, \mathcal{Y}_{V_1})$	Ω_1	$d_{\mathcal{A}_1}(x)$	$d_{\mathcal{D}_1}(x)$
$\vdots$	$\vdots$		$\vdots$	
i	$(V_i, \mathcal{Y}_{V_i})$	Ω_i	$d_{\mathcal{A}_i}(x)$	$d_{\mathcal{D}_i}(x)$

Table 1. Data published by the Accumulator Manager in each epoch.

Furthermore, as regards time complexities to update witnesses, our protocol requires $m + 2$ scalar-point multiplications, 1 point addition and 2 degree-m polynomials evaluations (possible in $2m$ multiplications and $2m$ additions), while the naive approach requires $2m$ scalar-point multiplications, $2m$ point additions and $2m$ multiplications.

To summarise, with respect to the naive approach our protocol provides, approximately, the following improvements:

- 1/4 reduction in witness update data communication;
- 1/2 reduction in running time in order to update witnesses.

4.2 Batch Witness Update Among Epochs

We now show how the adoption of the elliptic curve points vector $\Omega = \Omega_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{D}, V}$ not only permits the users to batch update their (non-)membership witnesses from the previous accumulator state, but also enables them to directly update from the accumulator state of any older epoch. This feature doesn't force users to permanently keep their witnesses updated to the latest accumulator state, enabling them to update their witnesses just right before they want to prove statements about the associated element y.

Before showing how this is possible, we extend our notation to associate accumulator and batch witness update data to a specific epoch. Given an epoch $i > 0$, we denote with $(V_i, \mathcal{Y}_{V_i})$ the corresponding accumulator state, where $\mathcal{Y}_{V_1} = \mathcal{A}_1 \setminus \mathcal{D}_1$ and $\mathcal{Y}_{V_i} = \mathcal{Y}_{V_{i-1}} \cup \mathcal{A}_i \setminus \mathcal{D}_i$ for $i > 1$, with $d_{\mathcal{A}_i}(x)$ and $d_{\mathcal{D}_i}(x)$ the addition and deletion batch witness update polynomials, respectively, and with $\Omega_i = \Omega_{\mathcal{A}_i, \mathcal{D}_i, V_i}$. An overview of the data published by the Accumulator Manager is given in Table 1.

We further denote a membership witness w_{y, V_i} for an element y with respect to the accumulator value V_i as $w_{y, V_i} = C_i$ and, similarly, a non-membership witness $\bar{w}_{y, V_i}$ as $\bar{w}_{y, V_i} = (C_i, d_i)$.

Epoch Witnesses Batch Update. A user who owns a valid non-membership witness $\bar{w}_{y, V_i} = (C_i, d_i)$ (resp. a valid membership witness $w_{y, V_i} = C_i$) with respect to the accumulator state $(V_i, \mathcal{Y}_{V_i})$ can update it to $\bar{w}_{y, V_j} = (C_j, d_j)$ (resp. $w_{y, V_j} = C_j$), for any $j > i$, as

$$C_j = \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}_{i \to j}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}_{i \to j}}(y)} \cdot C_i + \frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}_{i \to j}}(y)} \cdot \langle\, \Upsilon_y \;,\; \Omega_{i \to j}(y) \,\rangle \;, \qquad d_j = d_i \cdot \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}_{i \to j}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}_{i \to j}}(y)}$$

where

$$d_{\mathcal{A}_{a \to b}}(x) = \prod_{s=a+1}^{b} d_{\mathcal{A}_s}(x) \qquad d_{\mathcal{D}_{a \to b}}(x) = \prod_{s=a+1}^{b} d_{\mathcal{D}_s}(x)$$

$$\Omega_{i \to j}(y) = \sum_{t=i+1}^{j} \left(d_{\mathcal{D}_{i \to t-1}}(y) \cdot d_{\mathcal{A}_{t \to j}}(y) \right) \circ \Omega_t$$

Proof. See Appendix D.2. □

5   Security Proofs for the Proposed Protocol

Security of accumulator schemes is usually intended as *collision resistance*: for universal accumulators, this property requires that an adversary forges with negligible probability in the security parameter λ a valid membership witness for a not-accumulated element and, respectively, a non-membership witness for an accumulated element.

Since the outlined Dynamic Universal Accumulator is built on top of Nguyen's positive dynamic accumulator [13] and Au et al. [21] and Damgård and Triandopoulos' non-membership proof system [18], we might be tempted to generalize the security proofs provided in [13, 18] to show security of our scheme under the standard $t-$Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption.

However, there are some technicalities which prevent us to do so straightforwardly: i) in the proposed protocol, the attacker doesn't necessarily have access to the $\mathcal{RS} = \{P, \alpha P, \dots, \alpha^t P\}$ (needed in [13, 21, 18] security reductions, see Theorem 4 in Appendix B), while he has access to the batch witness update information and valid witnesses, as regular users do; ii) differently than [13, 21, 18], we allow the accumulator Manager to initialize the accumulator value to V_0 by accumulating a certain number of secret values.

To show security of our proposed accumulator scheme we then need to provide two slightly more general definitions, tailored to the data our attacker would be able to access. We propose the followings.

Definition 1. (Collision Resistance) *Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a probabilistic polynomial time adversary that has access to an oracle $\mathcal{O}$ which replies to:*

- *"Batch Addition and/or Deletion" queries that batch add non-accumulated and/or delete accumulated elements into/from the accumulator (which is initialized to V_0) and return the resulting updated accumulator value and the corresponding public batch witness update data;*
- *"Issue Witness" queries that return, for any input element y, its membership witness if y is accumulated, or, if not, its non-membership witness with respect to the latest accumulator value.*

*Then, the proposed Dynamic Universal Accumulator is collision resistant if the
probability*

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\begin{array}{cc} (\mathbb{G}, \alpha, \mathcal{Y}_{V_0}, \tilde{Q}) \leftarrow Gen(1^\lambda)\,, & f(x) = \prod_{y_i \in \mathcal{Y}_{V_0}}(y_i + x), \\ V_0 = f(\alpha) \cdot P\,, & (y, w_y, \bar{w}_y, \mathcal{Y}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}}(V_0, \mathbb{G}, \tilde{Q})\ : \\ \mathcal{Y} \subseteq (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^* & \wedge \quad V = \left(\prod_{y_i \in \mathcal{Y}}(y_i + \alpha)\right) \cdot V_0 \quad \wedge \\ \Omega(y, w_y, V, \mathtt{membership}) = 1 & \wedge \quad \Omega(y, \bar{w}_y, V, \mathtt{non\text{-}membership}) = 1 \end{array}\right)$$

is a negligible function in the security parameter λ, where w_y, $\bar{w}_y$ denote a membership and non-membership witness for y, respectively, and $\Omega(y, w, V, \mathtt{type}) = 1$ if and only if w is a valid $\mathtt{type}$ witness for y with respect to V.

Proposition 1. *Collision Resistance of Definition 1 is weaker than Au et al. Collision resistance (Definition 3 - Appendix B) when $\deg f > 0$, while it is equivalent if $\deg f = 0$.*

Proof. See Appendix B.1. □

Definition 2. (Generalized $t-$Strong Diffie-Hellman Assumption) *Let $\mathcal{G}$ be a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that, given a security parameter 1^λ, outputs a bilinear group $\mathbb{G} = (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, P, \tilde{P}, e)$. We say that the generalized $t-$Strong Diffie-Hellman Assumption holds for $\mathcal{G}$ with respect to a uniformly sampled $\alpha \leftarrow (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$ and a non-zero $f(x) \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}[x]$ if, for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and for every polynomially bounded function $t : \mathbb{Z} \to \mathbb{Z}$, the probability*

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{A}(P, \alpha f(\alpha)P, \alpha^2 f(\alpha)P, ..., \alpha^{t(\lambda)}f(\alpha)P, \tilde{P}, \alpha\tilde{P}) = \left(y, \frac{1}{y+\alpha}P\right)\right)$$

is a negligible function in λ for any freely chosen value $y \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z} \setminus \{-\alpha\}$.

To give confidence in this more general security assumption, we prove the following Theorem which gives a lower bound on the complexity of a generic algorithm that solves the Generalized $t-$SDH Assumption in the Generic Group Model [5].

We briefly recall that in the Generic Group Model [5] elements in the three groups G_1, G_2, G_T are represented with strings given by (random) unique *encoding* functions $\xi_i : G_i \to \{0,1\}^*$. Operations with groups elements (additions, pairings, isomorphism computations $\psi : G_2 \to G_1$) are performed by querying different oracles which communicates with the external word only by using ξ_i-encoding of group elements. In other words, an adversary who interacts with these oracles can only test equality among received encodings to understand relations between group elements.

Theorem 1. *Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an algorithm that solves the corresponding generalized $t-$SDH problem in the Generic Group Model, making a total of at most q_G*

queries to the oracles computing the group action in G_1, G_2, G_T, the oracle computing the isomorphism $\psi : G_2 \to G_1$ and the oracle computing the bilinear pairing e. If $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}^*$ and the encoding functions ξ_1, ξ_2, ξ_T are chosen at random, then the probability ϵ that

$$\mathcal{A}\left(p, \xi_1(1), \xi_1(f(\alpha)), \xi_1(\alpha \cdot f(\alpha)), \ldots, \xi_1(\alpha^t \cdot f(\alpha)), \xi_2(1), \xi_2(\alpha)\right)$$

outputs $\left(y, \xi_1\left(\frac{1}{y+\alpha}\right)\right)$ with $y \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}^*$ is bounded by

$$\epsilon \leq \frac{(\deg f + t) \cdot (q_G + t + 4)^2 + 1}{p}$$

Proof. We will essentially go through the original proof of Boneh and Boyen [12] of the generic security of the standard $t-$SDH assumption, by slightly readapting it to the definition of the generalized $t-$SDH assumption. The following game setting and query definitions are due to Boneh and Boyen [12] as well.

Let $\mathcal{B}$ be an algorithm that maintains three lists of pairs

$$L_j = \{(F_{j,i}, \xi_{j,i}) \ : \ i = 0, \ldots, \tau_j - 1\} \text{ with } j = 1, 2, T$$

where $F_{1,i}$, $F_{2,i}$ and $F_{T,i}$ are polynomials in $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}[x]$ verifying $\deg F_{1,i} \leq \deg f + t$, $\deg F_{2,i} \leq t$ and $\deg F_{T,i} \leq 2t$ and such that at step τ of the game $\tau_1 + \tau_2 + \tau_T = \tau + t + 3$. The lists are initialized at step $\tau = 0$ by taking $\tau_1 = t+1$, $\tau_2 = 2$, $\tau_T = 0$ and letting $F_{1,0} = 1$, $F_{1,i} = x^i \cdot f(x)$ for $0 \leq i \leq t$ and $F_{2,i} = x^i$ with $i = 0, 1$. The corresponding $\xi_{j,i}$ encodings are set to arbitrary distinct strings in $\{0, 1\}^*$. $\mathcal{B}$ then starts a game by providing $\mathcal{A}$ the $q + 3$ encodings $\xi_{1,0}, \ldots, \xi_{1,q}, \xi_{2,0}, \xi_{2,1}$ and $\mathcal{A}$'s queries go as follows:

- *Group actions*: given an add (resp. subtract) query and two operands $\xi_{1,i}, \xi_{1,j}$ with $0 \leq i, j < \tau_1$, $\mathcal{B}$ computes $F_{1,\tau_1} \leftarrow F_{1,i} + F_{1,j}$ (resp. $F_{1,i} - F_{1,j}$). If $F_{1,\tau_1} = F_{1,l}$ for some $l < \tau_1$ then $\mathcal{B}$ sets $\xi_{1,\tau_1} = \xi_{1,l}$, otherwise sets ξ_{1,τ_1} to a new distinct string in $\{0, 1\}^*$. The pair $(F_{1,\tau_1}, \xi_{1,\tau_1})$ is added in L_1, τ_1 is incremented by 1 and ξ_{1,τ_1} is returned to $\mathcal{A}$. Operations in G_2, G_T are treated similarly.
- *Isomorphism*: given an encoding $\xi_{2,i}$ with $0 \leq i < \tau_2$, $\mathcal{B}$ sets $F_{1,\tau_1} \leftarrow F_{2,i}$. If $F_{1,\tau_1} = F_{1,l}$ for some $l < \tau_1$, then $\mathcal{B}$ sets $\xi_{1,\tau_1} \leftarrow \xi_{1,l}$, otherwise sets ξ_{1,τ_1} to a new distinct string in $\{0, 1\}^*$. The pair $(F_{1,\tau_1}, \xi_{1,\tau_1})$ is added in L_1, τ_1 is incremented by 1 and ξ_{1,τ_1} is returned to $\mathcal{A}$.
- *Pairing*: given two operands $\xi_{1,i}, \xi_{2,j}$ with $0 \leq i < \tau_1$ and $0 \leq j < \tau_2$, $\mathcal{B}$ computes the product $F_{T,\tau_T} \to F_{1,i} \cdot F_{2,j} \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}[x]$. If $F_{T,\tau_T} = F_{T,l}$ for some $l < \tau_T$, then $\mathcal{B}$ sets $\xi_{T,\tau_T} \leftarrow \xi_{T,l}$, otherwise sets ξ_{T,τ_T} to a new distinct string in $\{0, 1\}^*$. The pair $(F_{T,\tau_T}, \xi_{T,\tau_T})$ is added in L_T, τ_T is incremented by 1 and ξ_{T,τ_T} is returned to $\mathcal{A}$.

$\mathcal{A}$ terminates and returns to $\mathcal{B}$ a pair $(y, \xi_{1,l})$ with $0 \leq l < \tau_1$. To show correctness of $\mathcal{A}$'s answer, $\mathcal{B}$ considers the corresponding polynomial $F_{1,l}$ in L_1 and computes the polynomial

$$F_{T,*}(x) = F_{1,l} \cdot (F_{2,1} + yF_{2,0}) = F_{1,l} \cdot (x + y) = f(x) \cdot g(x) \cdot (x + y)$$

for a certain polynomial $g(x) \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}[x]$ of degree $\leq t$. If $\mathcal{A}$'s answer is correct, then $F_{T,*}(x) = 1$ (which corresponds to check in the current framework that it results to be a correct DDH pair when representing $\xi_{1,l}$ with an element of G_1). Now, unless $\deg F_{T,*} \geq p - 2$ (due to Fermat's Little Theorem), the equation $F_{T,*}(x) - 1 = 0$ admits at most $\deg f + t + 1$ roots in $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$.

At this point, $\mathcal{B}$ chooses a random $x^* \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ and his simulation is perfect unless $x^* \leftarrow x$ creates equality relations between simulated elements not revealed to $\mathcal{A}$. Thus the success probability of $\mathcal{A}$ is bounded by the probability that any of the following conditions holds:

1. $F_{1,i}(x^*) - F_{1,j}(x^*) = 0$ for some i, j so that $F_{1,i} \neq F_{1,j}$
2. $F_{2,i}(x^*) - F_{2,j}(x^*) = 0$ for some i, j so that $F_{2,i} \neq F_{2,j}$
3. $F_{T,i}(x^*) - F_{T,j}(x^*) = 0$ for some i, j so that $F_{T,i} \neq F_{T,j}$
4. $f(x^*)g(x^*)(x^* + y) - 1 = 0$

Now since, for some fixed i, j, the polynomial $F_{1,i} - F_{1,j}$ has degree at most $\deg f + t$ while $F_{2,i} - F_{2,j}$ has degree at most t, they vanishes at x^* with probability $(\deg f + t)/p$ and t/p, respectively. Similarly, $F_{T,i} - F_{T,j}$ being a polynomial of degree at most $2t$, vanishes at x^* with probability $2t/p$. As regards $f(x^*)g(x^*)(x^*+y)-1$, it vanishes at x^* with probability $(\deg f+t+1)/p$. Hence, by summing these probabilities over all valid pairs (i, j) for the first three cases, $\mathcal{A}$ wins the game with probability

$$\epsilon \leq \binom{\tau_1}{2}\frac{\deg f + t}{p} + \binom{\tau_2}{2}\frac{t}{p} + \binom{\tau_T}{2}\frac{2t}{p} + \frac{\deg f + t + 1}{p}$$

Given that $\tau_1 + \tau_2 + \tau_T \leq q_G + t + 3$, we obtain $\epsilon \leq \frac{(\deg f + t)\cdot(q_G + t + 4)^2 + 1}{p}$

$\square$

We're now ready to prove that breaking collision resistance of our accumulator scheme in the Generic Group Model cannot be easier than breaking the generalized t-SDH assumption:

Theorem 2. *Consider a Generic Group Model instance of the Dynamic Universal Accumulator outlined in Section 2 equipped with the public Batch Witness Update protocol detailed in Section 4. If $|\mathcal{Y}_{V_0}|$ elements are accumulated to initialize the accumulator value, then the probability ϵ that an attacker $\mathcal{A}$ breaks collision resistance of Definition 1 in q_G queries to the group oracles, is bounded by*

$$\epsilon \leq \frac{(|\mathcal{Y}_{V_0}| + t) \cdot (q_G + t + 4)^2 + 1}{p}$$

where t is the maximum number of elements allowed to be accumulated simultaneously.

Proof. We refer to the proof of Theorem 1 for the definition of the game setting between $\mathcal{A}$ and the Accumulator Manager and the corresponding notation.

Since $\mathcal{Y}_{V_0}$ contains distinct elements from $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$, then at any epoch all elements in the batch witness update information Upd sent from the Accumulator

manager to $\mathcal{A}$ are of the form $\xi_1(\, g(x) \cdot f(x)\,)$ where $f(x) = \prod_{y \in \mathcal{Y}_{V_0}} (y + x)$ and $g(x) \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}[x]$ has degree $\leq t$.

Since any such polynomial $g(x) \cdot f(x)$ can be represented uniquely in the base $\{f(x), xf(x), \ldots, x^t f(x)\}$, we can assume $\mathcal{A}$ to be slightly more powerful by having initial access to all the following encodings:

$$\xi_1(1), \xi_1(f(\alpha)), \xi_1(\alpha \cdot f(\alpha)), \ldots, \xi_1(\alpha^t \cdot f(\alpha)), \xi_2(1), \xi_2(\alpha)$$

We note that accumulator values at different epochs can be obtained in polynomial time with queries to the group action oracle from the remaining update information, i.e. the elements added and deleted. All in all, this corresponds to the information the attacker would have access to under the hypothesis of Theorem 1.

Now, suppose that after q_G queries, $\mathcal{A}$ terminates and returns the tuple $(y, w_y, \bar{w}_y, \mathcal{Y})$ with $w_y = (\xi_{1,i}, 0)$ and $\bar{w}_y = (\xi_{1,j}, d)$. If the answer is correct and breaks the collision resistance property of the accumulator scheme, then the corresponding polynomials $F_{1,i}(x)$, $F_{1,j}(x)$ will satisfy

$$F_{1,i}(x) \cdot (x + y) = F_{1,j}(x) \cdot (x + y) + d$$

Note, that $\mathcal{A}$ can transform the tuple $(y, \xi_{1,i}, \xi_{1,j}, d)$ to the pair $(y, d^{-1}(\xi_{1,i} - \xi_{1,j}))$ by querying the oracles in polynomial time. This pair, if correct, would then solve the generalized $t-$SDH problem since, by letting $F_{T,*} = d^{-1}(F_{1,i} - F_{1,j})$, it holds $F_{T,*}(x) \cdot (x + y) - 1 = 0$ for all $x \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$. Hence $\mathcal{A}$ would win in q_G queries the game instantiated in the proof of Theorem 2 and, as was shown, this cannot be done with probability greater than $\frac{(|\mathcal{Y}_{V_0}| + t) \cdot (q_G + t + 4)^2 + 1}{p}$. $\qquad\square$

Relation with previous security assumptions and proofs. The proposed Generalized $t-$Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption straightforwardly reduces to the standard t-SDH assumption (see Appendix B, Definition 2) in the case when $\deg f = 0$, similarly as happens for Definition 1 of Collision Resistance and Au *et al.* Collision Resistance Definition 3 (See Proposition 1 and Appendix B.1).

Thus, when $\deg f = 0$ (without loss of generality, $f(x) = 1$), collision resistance of the scheme can be shown directly under the standard t-SDH assumption of Definition 4 without requiring the Generic Group Model and similarly as done in [21, 18]: a summary of all relevant definitions and a proof showing standard collision resistance under $t-$SDH assumption can be found in Appendix B.

Generalizing definitions and security proofs to allow for $\deg f > 0$, will ultimately permit us to address accumulator initilization, which (surprisingly) has a direct connection to the attacker ability to have access to (any element in) the $\mathcal{RS}_t$ (which can be (ab)used to compute witnesses and update the accumulator value), a circumstance that would be against our will to design an accumulator scheme suited also for authentication purposes, where only the accumulator manager can update and issue witnesses and whose construction will be finalized in next Section.

6   Accumulator Initialization

Depending on which would be the final application of the proposed accumulator scheme, it might be necessary to prevent the possibility to forge non-membership witnesses for *"never authorized"* non-accumulated elements, i.e. elements for which the Accumulator Manager did not issue witnesses.[6] This is relevant, for example, in the cases when the accumulator is used as an authentication mechanism and accumulated elements represents either white-listed or black-listed users which authenticate with respect to the accumulator value by showing possession of a valid membership or non-membership witness.

Forging witnesseses in the case when the Accumulator Manager should be the only authorized entity to do so is, in fact, what the *Witness Forgery Attack* outlined by Biryukov, Udovenko and Vitto in [34] does: a set of colluding users who share their non-membership witnesses can recover the (secret) *reference-string* sets $\mathcal{RS}_s = \{P, \alpha P, ..., \alpha^s P\}_{s>0}$, which enable them to compute membership and non-membership witnesses with respect to the latest accumulator value. Indeed, the knowledge of the set $\mathcal{RS} = \mathcal{RS}_t$ results to be functionally equivalent to the knowledge of α: it is possible to either update the accumulator value (see Lemma 1) or issue valid membership and non membership witnesses (see the reference string $\mathcal{RS}$-based construction in [34, 21]).

The Witness Forgery Attack is possible as long as the number of colluding users is equal or greater to the number of elements added to initialize the accumulator value. In fact, the countermeasure proposed in [34] is to set an upper limit `NMWitnessesMax` to the total number of issuable non-membership witnesses and initialize the accumulator by adding at least `NMWitnessesMax + 1` secret elements.

This will clearly prevent the reconstruction of the sets $\mathcal{RS}_s$, but in our protocol the attackers have access in each epoch to the witness update information (see Table 1), which in principle could help circumventing the fact that they will not be able to collect and share enough non-membership witnesses or can be used to directly compute some elements in $\mathcal{RS}_s$.

We will show that this is indeed possible, but we will prove that a generic algorithm in the Generic Group Model would compute any element in $\mathcal{RS}_t$ with negligible probability just by carefully choosing few of the the elements added to initialize the accumulator value.

We start by introducing some theoretical result. The purpose of the following Proposition is to show some properties on elements that have particular multiplicative orders in the group $(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$. These properties will be useful to prove the subsequent Theorem 3, which will give us sufficient conditions on the elements we need to add to prevent the reconstruction of the $\mathcal{RS}$ from the publicly available information. Thus, initializing the accumulator with `NMWitnessesMax + 1`

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[6] Membership witnesses for new elements would require an accumulator value update, an operation that we could assume to be executed by the Accumulator Manager that has exclusive access to the public register containing the current accumulator value. When issuing non-membership witnesses, instead, the accumulator value remains unchanged.

random elements where some of them satisfies the hypothesis of Theorem 3 will ultimately prevent any, even partial, successful execution of the Witness Forgery Attack [34].

Proposition 2. *Let $p \in \mathbb{N}$ be a prime such that $p - 1 = p_1^{e_1} \cdot ... \cdot p_n^{e_n}$ factorizes as the product of $n > 1$ powers of distinct primes $p_i \in \mathbb{N}$. Let $f(x) \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}[x]$ be a polynomial with $n \leq m < p - 1$ distinct non-zero roots $x_1, \ldots, x_m \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ such that the multiplicative order in $(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$ of x_i, for $1 \leq i \leq n$, is $p_i^{e_i}$. Then*

   i. The least $k > 0$ for which there exists $z \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ and $g(x) \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}[x]$ such that $g(x)f(x) \equiv x^k - z \mod p$ is $k = p - 1$.
  ii. The degree of the minimal-degree non-constant monomial of $f(x)$ is s with $0 < s < m$.

Proof. See Appendix D.3.   □

Theorem 3. *Let $p \in \mathbb{N}$ be a prime such that $p - 1 = p_1^{e_1} \cdot ... \cdot p_n^{e_n}$ factorizes as the product of $n > 1$ powers of distinct primes $p_i \in \mathbb{N}$. Let $f(x) \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}[x]$ be a polynomial with $n \leq m < p - 1$ distinct non-zero roots $x_1, \ldots, x_t \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ such that the multiplicative order in $(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$ of x_i, for $1 \leq i \leq n$, is $p_i^{e_i}$.*

Let $(\mathcal{V}, +)$ be the vector space of polynomials with degree lower equal $p - 2$ and $\mathcal{B} = \{1, x, \ldots, x^{p-2}\}$ its $(p - 1)-$dimensional canonical basis. Then, for every $1 \leq k < p - 1$

$$rank\left(\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ f(x) \\ xf(x) \\ \vdots \\ x^{p-m-2}f(x) \\ x^k \end{bmatrix}_{\mathcal{B}}\right) = p - m + 1$$

Proof. See Appendix D.3.   □

Corollary 1. *Let $f(x) \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}[x]$ be a polynomial satisfying the hypothesis of Theorem 3 and consider a Generic Group Model instance of the proposed Dynamic Universal Accumulator equipped with the public Batch Witness Update protocol. If the accumulator value is initialized by adding all the roots in $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ of $f(x)$, then the probability ϵ that an attacker $\mathcal{A}$ outputs in q_G queries to the group oracles the value $\xi_1\left(\alpha^k\right)$ for any $1 \leq k < p - 1$ is bounded by*

$$\epsilon \leq \frac{(\deg f + t) \cdot (q_G + t + 3)^2}{p}$$

where t is the maximum number of elements allowed to be accumulated simultaneously.

Proof. See Appendix D.3.   □

We are now ready to explicitly define the Accumulator Initialization procedure for our protocol:

Accumulator Initialization. Set an upper limit `NMWitnessesMax` to the total number of issuable non-membership witnesses. Assume p is such that $p - 1 = p_1^{e_1} \cdot ... \cdot p_n^{e_n}$ factorizes as the product of $n > 1$ powers of distinct primes p_i and consider n elements $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ such that the multiplicative order in $(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$ of x_i is $p_i^{e_i}$, for $1 \leq i \leq n$. Then, the Accumulator Manager sets

$$\mathcal{Y}_{V_0} = \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\} \cup \{\texttt{NMWitnessesMax} - n + 1 \text{ random elements in } \mathcal{ACC}\}$$

so that $|\mathcal{Y}_{V_0}| = \texttt{NMWitnessesMax} + 1$ and defines the corresponding initialization polynomial as $f_0(x) = \prod_{x_i \in \mathcal{Y}_{V_0}} (x - x_i)$, where $V_0 = f_0(\alpha)P$. He then publishes $(V_0, \emptyset)$, the accumulator state at epoch 0, and keeps secret and never deletes the elements in $\mathcal{Y}_{V_0}$.

We note that as soon as an epoch changes, the Accumulator Manager publishes the corresponding Batch Witnesses Update information: at epoch 1, for example, this corresponds to the new state $(V_1, \mathcal{Y}_{V_1})$, the updating vector Ω_1 and the polynomials $d_{\mathcal{A}_1}(x)$ and $d_{\mathcal{D}_1}(x)$. At this point, the polynomial

$$f_{V_1}(x) = f_0(x) \cdot f_1(x) = \prod_{y_i \in \mathcal{Y}_{V_0}} (y_i + x) \cdot \prod_{y_j \in \mathcal{Y}_{V_1}} (y_j + x)$$

has $|\mathcal{Y}_{V_0}| + |\mathcal{Y}_{V_1}|$ distinct non-zero roots, n of which are $x_1, \ldots, x_n$, and is such that $V_1 = f_{V_1}(\alpha)P$. Even if it is possible to obtain from Ω_1, $\mathcal{A}_1$ and $\mathcal{D}_1$ all the values $\alpha^k V_1$ for $1 \leq k < p - |\mathcal{Y}_{V_0}| - 1$ (we relax the condition $k \leq \texttt{batchMax}$) we still are under the hypothesis of Theorem 3 and Corollary 1, which assure us the infeasibility to obtain any element of the $\mathcal{RS}$. This reasoning can be easily generalized to any subsequent epoch.

One last question arises with regard to all these considerations: is it possible to obtain some elements in the $\mathcal{RS}$ combining the vectors Ω_i coming from different epochs? When the accumulator is initialized as described in Theorem 3, the answer is *no*. To show this, consider, without loss of generality, the m vectors $\Omega_1, \ldots, \Omega_m$, where the j-entry of any Ω_i is of the form $c_j V_i$. Hence a linear combination with coefficients $a_{i,j} \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ of entries of these vectors can be written as

$$\sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{j=0}^{|\texttt{batchMax}|} a_{i,j} c_j V_i = \left(\sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{j=0}^{|\texttt{batchMax}|} a_{i,j} c_j f_i(\alpha) \right) \cdot f_0(\alpha)P = g(\alpha) \cdot V_0$$

where $g(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{j=0}^{\texttt{batchMax}} a_{i,j} c_j f_i(x)$. In other words, in the luckiest situation, what we can obtain combining all these vectors is a *"basis"* made of elements of the form $\alpha^k f_0(\alpha)P = \alpha^k V_0$ with $1 \leq k \leq \texttt{batchMax}$ which, as we already discussed, does not permit to obtain any element in $\mathcal{RS}$.

7   Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge

We now explicitly show how an interactive zero-knowledge protocol can be instantiated between a Prover and a Verifier to prove the ownership of a valid non-membership witness $\bar{w}_{y,V}$ for y with respect to the accumulator state $(V, \mathcal{Y}_V)$ (the corresponding protocol to show ownership of a valid membership witness $w_{y,V}$ is similar and will not be discussed). Although different NIZK protocols for bilinear equations verification can be adopted for this purpose (e.g. Groth-Sahai [20]), we chose to detail a construction which doesn't need a trusted setup (to avoid extra storage needs on users' side) and that can be easily implemented in order to provide a reference for our benchmarks.

To this end, we will then extend the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol defined by Boneh *et al.* in [12], which proves under the Decision Linear Diffie-Hellman assumption the knowledge of a pair (y, C) such that $(y+\alpha)C = V$, in order to support tuples (y, C, d) which verify $(y + \alpha)C + dP = V$.

However, for non-membership witnesses we need to further ensure that $d \neq 0$ or, equivalently in G_1, that has a multiplicative inverse. In this regard we will then consider, for a random generator $K \in G_1$ and random $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$, the Pedersen commitments $E_d = dP + aK$ and $E_{d^{-1}} = d^{-1}P + bK$ for d and d^{-1}, respectively. Noticing that $P = dE_{d^{-1}} - dbK$, we then extend the protocol applying EQ-composition to the factor d among the values E_d and P, thus showing that $E_{d^{-1}}$ is a Pedersen commitment to the multiplicative inverse of the committed value in E_d.

Under the Random Oracle Model, we can make such proof of knowledge non-interactive and full zero-knowledge by applying Fiat-Shamir heuristic [1]. We will do so by using an heuristic variant adopted by Boneh *et al.* in [12] in order to reduce Prover's proof size. We assume that calls to the random oracle can be concretely realized through evaluations to a cryptographic hash function $H : \{0,1\}^* \to \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$.

Security proofs. By reporting the relative security proofs, we will substantially replicate the original results of the respective authors: we therefore refer to [12] and [33, Ex. 5.3.4] for the completeness, soundness and (special) honest-verifier zero-knowledgeness security proofs of Boneh et al. protocol and EQ-composition for multiplicative-inverse relation, respectively.

The resulting protocol is the following.

Setup The Prover and Verifier agree on the public values $P, X, Y, Z, K \in G_1$ and $\tilde{P}, \tilde{Q} \in G_2$, where X, Y, Z, K are distinct random generators of G_1.

Proof Of Knowledge The Prover randomly selects $\sigma, \rho, \tau, \pi \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ and computes

$$E_C = C + (\sigma + \rho)Z, \qquad E_d = dP + \tau K, \qquad E_{d^{-1}} = d^{-1}P + \pi K,$$

$$T_\sigma = \sigma X, \qquad T_\rho = \rho Y, \qquad \delta_\sigma = y\sigma, \qquad \delta_\rho = y\rho$$

A non-interactive zero knowledge Proof of Knowledge of values $(y, d, \sigma, \rho, \tau, \pi, \delta_\sigma, \delta_\rho)$ satisfying

$$P = dE_{d^{-1}} - d\pi K, \qquad E_d = dP + \tau K,$$

$$\sigma X = T_\sigma, \qquad \rho Y = T_\rho, \qquad y T_\sigma - \delta_\sigma X = O, \qquad y T_\rho - \delta_\rho Y = O,$$

$$e(E_C, \tilde{P})^y e(Z, \tilde{P})^{-\delta_\sigma - \delta_\rho} e(Z, \tilde{Q})^{-\sigma - \rho} e(K, \tilde{P})^{-\tau} = \frac{e(V, \tilde{P})}{e(E_C, \tilde{Q}) e(E_d, \tilde{P})}$$

is undertaken between Prover and Verifier as follows:

Blinding (P) The Prover randomly picks $r_y, r_u, r_v, r_w, r_\sigma, r_\rho, r_{\delta_\sigma}, r_{\delta_\rho} \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$, computes

$$R_A = r_u P + r_v K, \qquad R_B = r_u E_{d^{-1}} + r_w K,$$

$$R_E = e(E_C, \tilde{P})^{r_y} e(Z, \tilde{P})^{-r_{\delta_\sigma} - r_{\delta_\rho}} e(Z, \tilde{Q})^{-r_\sigma - r_\rho} e(K, \tilde{P})^{-r_v},$$

$$R_\sigma = r_\sigma X, \qquad R_\rho = r_\rho Y, \qquad R_{\delta_\sigma} = r_y T_\sigma - r_{\delta_\sigma} X, \qquad R_{\delta_\rho} = r_y T_\rho - r_{\delta_\rho} Y$$

Challenge (P) The Prover sets the challenge $c \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ to

$$c = H(V, E_C, E_d, E_{d^{-1}}, T_\sigma, T_\rho, R_A, R_B, R_E, R_\sigma, R_\rho, R_{\delta_\sigma}, R_{\delta_\rho})$$

Response (P) The Prover computes

$$s_y = r_y + cy, \qquad s_u = r_u + cd, \qquad s_v = r_v + c\tau, \qquad s_w = r_w - cd\pi,$$

$$s_\sigma = r_\sigma + c\sigma, \qquad s_\rho = r_\rho + c\rho, \qquad s_{\delta_\sigma} = r_{\delta_\sigma} + c\delta_\sigma, \qquad s_{\delta_\rho} = r_{\delta_\rho} + c\delta_\rho$$

and sends $(E_C, E_d, E_{d^{-1}}, T_\sigma, T_\rho, c, s_y, s_u, s_v, s_w, s_\sigma, s_\rho, s_{\delta_\sigma}, s_{\delta_\rho})$ to the Verifier.

Verify (V) The Verifier computes

$$R_A = s_u P + s_v K - c E_d, \qquad\qquad R_B = s_w K + s_u E_{d^{-1}} - c P,$$

$$R_\sigma = s_\sigma X - c T_\sigma, \qquad R_\rho = s_\rho Y - c T_\rho, \qquad R_{\delta_\sigma} = s_y T_\sigma - s_{\delta_\sigma} X, \qquad R_{\delta_\rho} = s_y T_\rho - s_{\delta_\rho} Y,$$

$$R_E = e(E_C, \tilde{P})^{s_y} \cdot e(Z, \tilde{P})^{-s_{\delta_\sigma} - s_{\delta_\rho}} \cdot e(Z, \tilde{Q})^{-s_\sigma - s_\rho} \cdot e(K, \tilde{P})^{-s_v} \cdot \left(\frac{e(V, \tilde{P})}{e(E_C, \tilde{Q}) e(E_d, \tilde{P})} \right)^{-c}$$

and accepts if $c = H(V, E_C, E_d, E_{d^{-1}}, T_\sigma, T_\rho, R_A, R_B, R_E, R_\sigma, R_\rho, R_{\delta_\sigma}, R_{\delta_\rho})$.

Complexities and possible optimizations for the above NIZK protocol are discussed in Appendix C.

8   Implementation Results

To show efficiency and its practical relevance, we implemented the proposed accumulator scheme by using the RELIC library [35]. In order to guarantee a security level of 128-bits, we selected the available pairing-friendly Type-III prime curve *B12-P446*. We then benchmarked the main features of the proposed accumulator, obtaining the following average results:

– **Accumulator Updates**: 0.75 seconds to add $1,000,000$ elements (random elements generation requires 1.46s); 0.48 seconds to delete $1,000,000$ elements.
– **Witness Issuing**: 1.9 milliseconds to issue a membership witness; 229.5 milliseconds for a non-membership witness ($1,000,000$ elements accumulated).
– **Witness Verification**: 2.2 milliseconds to verify a membership witness; 3.2 milliseconds to verify a non-membership witness.
– **Public Batch Witness Update**: 37.9 seconds to generate batch update data corresponding to a $10,000$ elements batch addition operation; 27.1 seconds for a $10,000$ elements batch deletion operation.
– **Batch Witness Update**: 2.1 seconds to update a membership or non-membership witness after a batch addition or deletion operation of $10,000$ elements.
– **Non-Batch Witness Update**: 4.4 seconds to update a membership or non-membership witness after a batch addition or deletion operation of $10,000$ elements.
– **Zero-Knowledge Proof Creation**: 5.2 milliseconds to create a zero knowledge proof of knowledge of a membership witness; 7.4 milliseconds to create a proof for a non-membership witness.
– **Zero-Knowledge Proof Verification**: 6.5 milliseconds to verify a zero knowledge proof of knowledge of a membership witness; 11.2 milliseconds to verify a proof for a non-membership witness.

These benchmarks came from running our implementation on a standard Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3770 CPU @ 3.40GHz desktop provided with 8.00GB of RAM and running Ubuntu 18.04 x64. No parallelization was used.

Our implementation can be found on GitHub at:

<div align="center">

`https://github.com/cryptolu/accumulator/`

</div>

Feedback from the community. We were contacted by a company that implemented our accumulator (including the Public Batch Witness Update and Zero-Knowledge protocols) as a revocation mechanism for verifiable credentials. Their implementation, public on GitHub[7], is used already in production applications where 10-20 millions entries remain accumulated at any given time and 1000/600 elements are added/deleted, respectively, per day. They reported to us that in their implementation (i) witness update data generation takes 17s and 99KB/day; (ii) users' witness update after 1 year offline requires 80s and 36MB

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[7] `https://github.com/mikelodder7/accumulator-rs`

of update data; (iii) witness updates work on IoT; (iv) using the pairing-friendly elliptic curve BLS12-381, RAM requirements are few megabytes. They added that our scheme "solves their scaling problem" compared to Hyperledger-Indy[8] implementation of [22], which would take hours/day and larger proof sizes.

9   Conclusions

We presented a Dynamic Universal Accumulator in the Accumulator Manager setting stated for efficient Type-III pairing-friendly elliptic curves, which supports batch operations and batch membership and non-membership public witness update.

The proposed accumulator extends a combination of previous schemes by adding batch operations, enabling users to update witnesses in optimal time. Furthermore, since batch update data is designed to be decoupled from users' witnesses, our protocol permits (privacy-preserving) witness updates delegation, thus enabling lightweight users to keep their witnesses updated with a constant number of elementary operations.

We then showed in the Generic Group Model its security in terms of collision resistance by introducing a more general version of the $t-$SDH assumption for which we give an upper bound complexity for a generic algorithm that solves the corresponding problem. We further showed how to initialize the accumulator in order to be safe from an attack which would allow to forge witnesses for non-authorized elements, an essential requirement in the case the accumulator scheme is used as an authentication mechanism under the Accumulator Manager authority.

We then described how to instantiate a zero-knowledge proof of ownership of a valid witness for a given accumulator state and we implemented the accumulator logic along with batch operations, the public witness update protocol and the zero-knowledge proof mechanism in order to show its practical relevance as an efficient and scalable privacy-preserving authentication mechanism.

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Appendix

A   Notation

Following the notation of [19], an efficiently computable non-degenerate bilinear map $e : G_1 \times G_2 \to G_T$ is said to be a Type-I pairing if $G_1 = G_2$, while it's called Type-III pairing if $G_1 \neq G_2$ and there are no efficiently computable isomorphisms between G_1 and G_2. We will denote with uppercase Roman letters (e.g. P, V) elements belonging to G_1 and with uppercase Roman letters with a tilde above (e.g. $\tilde{P}, \tilde{Q}$) elements in G_2. The identity points of G_1 and G_2 are denoted with O and $\tilde{O}$, respectively.

Sets are denoted with uppercase letters in calligraphic fonts (e.g. $\mathcal{ACC}, \mathcal{Y}$) while accumulator elements are denoted with (eventually indexed) lowercase Roman letters: y usually denotes the *reference element*, that is the one we take as an example to perform operations, while $y_\mathcal{S}$ denotes an element in the set $\mathcal{S}$. Exceptions are the membership and non-membership witness, denoted respectively with w and $\bar{w}$, and the partial non-membership witness d.

Vectors are denoted with capital Greek letters (e.g. Υ, Ω). The vector operation $\langle \Phi, \Psi \rangle$ is the dot product, that is the sum of the products of the corresponding entries of Φ and Ψ, while $a \circ \Phi$ denotes the usual scalar-vector multiplication where each entry of Φ is multiplied by a.

We also use a convention that sum and the product of a sequence of terms with starting index greater than the ending one are assumed to be equal to $\sum_i^j a_i = 0$ and $\prod_i^j b_i = 1$ when $i > j$.

B   Collision Resistance Under Standard $t-$SDH Assumption

We here report both Au *et al.* definition of collision resistance (slightly restated) and Boneh and Boyen definition of $t-$SDH assumption.

Definition 3. (Collision Resistance [21]) *The Dynamic Universal Accumulator outlined in Section 2 is collision resistant if, for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that has access to an oracle $\mathcal{O}$ which returns the accumulator value resulting from the accumulation of the elements of any given input subset of $(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$, the following probabilities*

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\begin{array}{l} (\mathbb{G}, \alpha, \tilde{Q}) \leftarrow Gen(1^\lambda), \qquad (y, w_y, \mathcal{Y}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^\mathcal{O}(\mathbb{G}, \tilde{Q}) \qquad : \\ \mathcal{Y} \subset (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^* \quad \wedge \quad V = \left(\prod_{y_i \in \mathcal{Y}}(y_i + \alpha) \right) \cdot P \quad \wedge \\ y \in (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^* \setminus \mathcal{Y} \quad \wedge \quad \Omega(y, w_y, V, \texttt{membership}) = 1 \end{array} \right)$$

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\begin{array}{cc} (\mathbb{G}, \alpha, \tilde{Q}) \leftarrow Gen(1^\lambda)\,, & (y, \bar{w}_y, \mathcal{Y}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}}(\mathbb{G}, \tilde{Q}) & : \\ \mathcal{Y} \subset (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^* & \wedge \quad V = \left(\prod_{y_i \in \mathcal{Y}} (y_i + \alpha) \right) \cdot P & \wedge \\ y \in \mathcal{Y} & \wedge \quad \Omega(y, \bar{w}_y, V, \texttt{non-membership}) = 1 & \end{array} \right)$$

are both negligible functions in the security parameter λ, where $w_y, \bar{w}_y$ denote a membership and non-membership witness for y, respectively, and $\Omega(y, w, V, \texttt{type})$ is equal to 1 if and only if w is a valid $\texttt{type}$ witness for y with respect to V.

Definition 4. ($t-$Strong Diffie-Hellman Assumption [16]) *Let $\mathcal{G}$ be a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that, given a security parameter 1^λ, outputs a bilinear group $\mathbb{G} = (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, P, \tilde{P}, e)$. We say that the $t-$Strong Diffie-Hellman Assumption holds for $\mathcal{G}$ with respect to an $\alpha \leftarrow (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$ if, for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and for every polynomially bounded function $t : \mathbb{Z} \to \mathbb{Z}$, the probability $\mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{A}(P, \alpha P, \alpha^2 P, ..., \alpha^{t(\lambda)} P, \tilde{P}, \alpha \tilde{P}) = \left(y, \frac{1}{y+\alpha} P \right) \right)$ is a negligible function in λ for any freely chosen value $y \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z} \setminus \{-\alpha\}$.*

We can see that in Definition 3, the adversary has access to an oracle $\mathcal{O}$ that outputs the accumulator value $V = \left(\prod_{y \in \mathcal{Y}_V} (y + \alpha) \right) P$ for any chosen input set $\mathcal{Y}_V$. Its purpose is to model the information the adversary can eventually get by looking at the published accumulator states, although in practice the adversary has no control over the values accumulated by the Accumulator Manager. This oracle doesn't make their attacker more powerful when compared to the requirements of the Boneh and Boyen $t-$SDH assumption (where the $\mathcal{RS}$ is directly given to the attacker) due to the following:

Lemma 1. *Having access to the oracle $\mathcal{O}$ of Definition 3 where sets of size at most t can be queried is equivalent to the knowledge of the set $\mathcal{RS} = \{P, \alpha P, ..., \alpha^t P\}$.*

Proof. $\boxed{\Rightarrow}$ Let y be a generator of $(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$. Then the polynomials $\{1, (y + x), (y+x) \cdot (y^2 + x), \ldots, \prod_{i=1}^t (y^i + x)\}$ form a basis for the additive vector space of polynomials in $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}[x]$ with degree lower equal t and, hence, for any given $1 \leq i \leq t$, there exists a linear combination of these polynomials that sums up to x^i. It follows that, iteratively calling $\mathcal{O}$ on the set $\mathcal{Y}_i = \{y, y^2, \ldots, y^i\}$, it is possible to write a linear combination of the $V_{\mathcal{Y}_i}$ values returned which is equal to $\alpha^i P$.
$\boxed{\Leftarrow}$ Suppose the set $\mathcal{RS}$ is known. Then, for any given $\mathcal{Y}_V \subset (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$ with $|\mathcal{Y}_V| \leq t$, using the $\mathcal{RS}$, it is possible to compute $V = \left(\prod_{y_i \in \mathcal{Y}_V} (y_i + \alpha) \right) P = \sum_{i=0}^{|\mathcal{Y}|} c_i \cdot (\alpha^i P)$. $\qquad\square$

Theorem 4. *Let $\mathcal{G}$ be a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that, given a security parameter 1^λ, outputs a bilinear group $\mathbb{G} = (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, P, \tilde{P}, e)$ and consider an instantiation of the Dynamic Universal Accumulator obtained using $\mathcal{G}$ for the bilinear group generation and $\alpha \in (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$ as the secret accumulator parameter. Then, the accumulator is collision resistant (Definition 3) if the $t-$Strong Diffie-Hellman Assumption (Definition 4) holds for $\mathcal{G}$ with respect to α.*

Proof. We note that a solution (y, C, d) for the pairing equation $e(C, y\tilde{P} + \tilde{Q})e(P, \tilde{P})^d = e(V, \tilde{P})$ is also a solution for the elliptic curve points equation $(y + \alpha)C + dP = V$. We will then prove the Theorem considering this last equation only, distinguishing between membership and non-membership witnesses.

Membership witnesses. By contradiction, suppose there exists a probabilistic polynomial time adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that with respect to an (non-trivial) accumulator state $(V, \mathcal{Y}_V)$ outputs with a non-negligible probability a membership witness $C \in G_1$ for an element $y \in (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^* \setminus \mathcal{Y}_V$. It follows that $(y + \alpha)C = V = f_V(\alpha)P$ where $f_V(x) = \prod_{y_i \in \mathcal{Y}_V}(y_i + x)$. Since $y \notin \mathcal{Y}_V$, we have that $(y + \alpha) \nmid f_V(x)$. Using the polynomial extended Euclidean algorithm, $\mathcal{A}$ computes $g(x) \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}[x]$ of degree $|\mathcal{Y}_V| - 1$ and $r \in (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$ such that $f_V(x) = g(x) \cdot (y + x) + r$. Therefore, $C = g(\alpha)P + \frac{r}{y+\alpha}P$ and using the $\mathcal{RS} = \{P, \alpha P, \alpha^2 P, ..., \alpha^{q(\lambda)}\}$, with $|\mathcal{Y}_V| \leq q(\lambda)$, can compute $g(x)P$ and hence $\frac{1}{y+\alpha}P = r^{-1}(C - g(\alpha)P)$, contradicting the $t-$SDH assumption.

Non-membership witnesses. Suppose there exists a probabilistic polynomial time adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that with respect to an (non-trivial) accumulator state $(V, \mathcal{Y}_V)$ outputs with a non-negligible probability a non-membership witness $(C, d) \in G_1 \times (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$ for an element $y \in \mathcal{Y}_V$. Then $(y + \alpha)C = f_V(\alpha)P - dP$. Now, since $(y + x)|f_V(x)$ we have that $(y + x) \nmid f_V(x) - d$ for any $d \neq 0$. Thus, similarly as done before, $\mathcal{A}$ uses the polynomial extended Euclidean algorithm to compute $g(x) \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}[x]$ of degree $|\mathcal{Y}_V| - 1$ and $r \in (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$ such that $f_V(x) - d = g(x) \cdot (y + x) + r$. Therefore, $C = g(\alpha)P + \frac{r}{y+\alpha}P$ and, using the $\mathcal{RS}$, $\mathcal{A}$ can compute $\frac{1}{y+\alpha}P = r^{-1}(C - g(\alpha)P)$, contradicting the $t-$SDH assumption. $\square$

B.1   Reduction Among Collision Resistance Definitions

Proposition. *Collision Resistance of Definition 1 is weaker than Au et al. Collision resistance (Definition 3) when* $\deg f > 0$, *while it is equivalent if* $\deg f = 0$.

In Lemma 1 we proved that the oracle $\mathcal{O}$ of Definition 3 gives the attacker access to the $\mathcal{RS}_t$ for some $t > 0$. By using Extended Euclidean Algorithm, the set $\mathcal{RS}_t$ further allows the attacker to issue valid membership witnesses for accumulated elements and valid non-membership witnesses for any non-accumulated element, as originally reported in [21]. In other words, if an attacker successfully breaks collision resistance of Definition 3, he can output in polynomial time using the $\mathcal{RS}_t$ a valid membership witness if forged a non-membership witness for an accumulated element y, or, similarly, the valid non-membership witness if he forged a membership witness for a non-accumulated element y. In fact, the two probabilities of Definition 3 can be combined, by equivalently requiring that

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\begin{array}{cccc} (\mathbb{G}, \alpha, \tilde{Q}) \leftarrow \mathrm{Gen}(1^\lambda), & & (y, w_y, \bar{w}_y, \mathcal{Y}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}}(\mathbb{G}, \tilde{Q}) & : \\ \mathcal{Y} \subseteq (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^* & \wedge & V = \left(\prod_{y_i \in \mathcal{Y}}(y_i + \alpha)\right) \cdot P & \wedge \\ \Omega(y, w_y, V, \mathtt{membership}) = 1 & \wedge & \Omega(y, \bar{w}_y, V, \mathtt{non\text{-}membership}) = 1 \end{array} \right)$$

is negligible in the security parameter λ.

Since the public batch update information can be computed in polynomial time from the $\mathcal{RS}_t$ (we can compute any element of the form $h(\alpha)P$, where $h(x) \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ has degree $\leq t$), it immediately follows that Definition 1 is equivalent to Definition 3 if $\deg f = 0$, i.e. $f = 1$ and thus $V_0 = P$.

If instead $\deg f > 0$, an attacker that breaks collision resistance of Definition 1 by outputting a tuple $(y, w_y, \bar{w}_y, \mathcal{Y})$, can, before terminating, query in polynomial time the corresponding oracle $\mathcal{O}$ to get $|\mathcal{Y}_{V_0}| + 1$ valid non-membership witnesses for (random) non-accumulated elements and use Lagrange interpolation to recover from the d-values the polynomial $f(x) \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$, similarly as done at the beginning of the Witness Forgery Attack outlined in [34] and briefly discussed in Section 6. Once the attacker obtains the polynomial $f(x)$, he recovers the set $\mathcal{Y}_{V_0}$ by computing its roots and can then use the tuple $(y, w_y, \bar{w}_y, \mathcal{Y} \cup \mathcal{Y}_{V_0})$ to break collision resistance of Definition 3.

C   Complexity analysis of the proposed NIZK protocol

Within the NIZK protocol described in Section 7, zero-knowledge proofs for valid non-membership witnesses consists of 5 elements in G_1 and 11 elements in $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$, while they consists of 3 elements in G_1 and 6 elements in $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ in the case of membership witnesses. Thus, if elliptic curve points compression is used, zero-knowledge non-membership and membership proofs can be represented with $5(\log q + 1) + 9 \log p$ bits and $3(\log q + 1) + 6 \log p$ bits, respectively. In our concrete instantiation (see Section 8) this translates to 4926 bits $\approx$ 616 bytes proofs for non-membership witnesses and 3135 bits $\approx$ 392 bytes proofs for membership witnesses.

As regards computational costs, if the quantities $e(Z, \tilde{P})$, $e(Z, \tilde{Q})$, $e(K, \tilde{P})$ and $e(V, \tilde{P})$ are pre-computed and stored by both Prover and Verifier, zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for non-membership witnesses are computed with 15 scalar-point multiplications in G_1, 7 point additions in G_1, 4 exponentiation in G_T and 1 pairing. We note that the Prover can reduce the cost of evaluating $e(E_C, \tilde{P})$ by computing and storing the value $e(C, \tilde{P})$. Thus, with just 1 pairing per-epoch, the Prover can compute each $e(E_C, \tilde{P})$ as $e(Z, \tilde{P})^{\sigma + \rho} \cdot e(C, \tilde{P})$ with 1 exponentiation and 1 multiplication in G_T. Using this optimization, the cost to compute a proof of knowledge of a membership witness boils down to a total of 9 scalar-point multiplications in G_1, 3 point additions in G_1, 5 exponentiation in G_T and 1 multiplication in G_T.

Similarly, the Verifier needs 16 scalar-point multiplications in G_1, 9 point additions in G_1, 4 exponentiation in G_T and 2 pairings (by merging the term $e(E_C, \tilde{P})^{s_y} e(E_C, c\tilde{Q})$ in $e(E_C, s_y\tilde{P} + c\tilde{Q})$) to verify a non-membership witness zero-knowledge proof, while he needs 10 scalar-point multiplications in G_1, 5 point additions in G_1, 3 exponentiation in G_T and 1 pairing to verify a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for a membership witness.

D   Remaining Proofs

D.1   Batch Witness Updates

When a batch addition or deletion changes the accumulator state, users' membership and non-membership witnesses are updated according to the following operation.

– **On Batch Addition:** suppose the accumulator state changes from $(V, \mathcal{Y}_V)$ to $(V', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ as a result of an Batch Addition operation. Hence, for certain $\mathcal{A} = \{y_{\mathcal{A},1}, \ldots, y_{\mathcal{A},n}\} \subseteq \mathcal{ACC}\backslash\mathcal{Y}_V$, we have $V' = d_{\mathcal{A}}(-\alpha)\cdot V$ and $\mathcal{Y}_{V'} = \mathcal{Y}_V \cup \mathcal{A}$. Then, for any $y \in \mathcal{Y}_V$, the membership witness $w_{y,V} = C$ is updated with respect to the accumulator state $(V', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ computing $C' = d_{\mathcal{A}}(y)\cdot C + v_{\mathcal{A}}(y)\cdot V$ and letting $w_{y,V'} = C'$. While for any $y \notin \mathcal{Y}_V$, the non-membership witness $\bar{w}_{y,V} = (C, d)$ is updated with respect to $(V', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ by computing $C' = d_{\mathcal{A}}(y)\cdot C + v_{\mathcal{A}}(y) \cdot V$, $d' = d \cdot d_{\mathcal{A}}(y)$ and letting $\bar{w}_{y,V'} = (C', d')$.

Proof. For the ease of notation, we will denote the elements $y_{\mathcal{A},i}$ with y_i, the accumulator value corresponding to $\left(\prod_{i=1}^{j}(y_i + \alpha)\right) V$ with V_j and, for any $y \in \mathcal{Y}_V$, the intermediate membership witnesses w_{y,V_j} with C_j.
We prove the formula by induction on n, the number of batch added elements:
$\boxed{n = 1}$: We get $C_1 = V + (y_1 - y)C$, the same formula defined for the membership witness update after a single addition operation.
$\boxed{n - 1 \to n}$: Let $b_s = \prod_{i=1}^{s-1}(y_i + \alpha) \prod_{j=s+1}^{n}(y_j - y)$. Using the inductive hypothesis for C_{n-1}, we have

$$C_n = (y_n - y)C_{n-1} + V_{n-1} = \left(\prod_{t=1}^{n}(y_t - y)\right) C + \left(\sum_{s=1}^{n-1} b_s + \prod_{t=1}^{n-1}(y_t + \alpha)\right) V$$

which is equal to $\left(\prod_{t=1}^{n}(y_t - y)\right) C + \left(\sum_{s=1}^{n} b_s\right) V$ as required. The induction on d' in the case of non-membership witnesses is straightforward.   □

– **On Batch Deletion**: suppose the accumulator state changes from $(V, \mathcal{Y}_V)$ to $(V', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ as a result of a Batch Deletion operation. Hence, for certain $\mathcal{D} = \{y_{\mathcal{D},1}, \ldots, y_{\mathcal{D},m}\} \subseteq \mathcal{Y}_V$, we have $V' = \frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(-\alpha)}V$.
Then, for any $y \in \mathcal{Y}_{V'}$, the witness $w_{y,V} = C$ is updated with respect to the accumulator state $(V', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ computing $C' = \frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)}C - \frac{v_{\mathcal{D}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)}V$ and letting $w_{y,V'} = C'$. While for any $y \notin \mathcal{Y}_{V'}$, the non-membership witness $\bar{w}_{y,V} = C$ is updated with respect to $(V', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ by computing $C' = \frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} \cdot C - \frac{v_{\mathcal{D}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} \cdot V$, $d' = d \cdot \frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)}$ and letting $\bar{w}_{y,V'} = (C', d')$.

Proof. Similarly as before, we will denote the elements $y_{\mathcal{D},i}$ with y_i, the accumulator value corresponding to $\left(\prod_{i=1}^{j}(y_i + \alpha)^{-1}\right) V$ with V_j and, for any $y \in \mathcal{Y}_{V'}$, the intermediate membership witnesses w_{y,V_j} with C_j.

We prove the formula by induction on m, the number of batch deleted elements:

$\boxed{m = 1}$: We get $C_1 = \frac{1}{y_1 - y}C - \frac{1}{(y_1 - y)(y_1 + \alpha)}V = \frac{1}{y_1 - y}(C - V_1)$, the same formula defined for the membership witness update after a single deletion operation.

$\boxed{m - 1 \to m}$: Let $b_s = \prod_{i=1}^{s}(y_i + \alpha)^{-1} \prod_{j=1}^{s-1}(y_j - y)$. Then

$$
\begin{aligned}
C_m &= \frac{1}{y_m - y}(C_{m-1} - V_m) \\
&= \frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)}C - \frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} \cdot \left(\sum_{s=1}^{m-1} b_s \right) V - \left((y_m - y)^{-1} \prod_{i=1}^{m}(y_i + \alpha)^{-1} \right) V
\end{aligned}
$$

which is equal to $\frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)}C - \frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} \cdot \left(\sum_{s=1}^{m} b_s \right) V$ as required. The induction on d' in the case of non-membership witnesses is straightforward. $\square$

– **On Batch Addition & Deletion:** suppose the accumulator state changes from $(V, \mathcal{Y}_V)$ to $(V'', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ as a result of a Batch Addition & Deletion operation. Hence for certain disjoint sets $\mathcal{A} = \{y_{\mathcal{A},1}, \ldots, y_{\mathcal{A},n}\} \subseteq \mathcal{ACC} \setminus \mathcal{Y}_V$ and $\mathcal{D} = \{y_{\mathcal{D},1}, \ldots, y_{\mathcal{D},m}\} \subseteq \mathcal{Y}_V$ we have $V'' = \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}}(-\alpha)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(-\alpha)} \cdot V$.

Then, for any $y \in \mathcal{Y}_V$, the witness $w_{y,V} = C$ is updated with respect to the accumulator state $(V', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ computing $C' = \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} \cdot C + \frac{\nu_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} \cdot V$ and letting $w_{y,V'} = C'$. While for any $y \notin \mathcal{Y}_V$, the non-membership witness $\bar{w}_{y,V} = (C, d)$ is updated with respect to the accumulator state $(V', \mathcal{Y}_{V'})$ by computing $C' = \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} \cdot C + \frac{\nu_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} \cdot V$, $d' = d \cdot \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)}$ and letting $\bar{w}_{y,V'} = (C', d')$.

Proof. Performing a batch addition and then a batch deletion, the membership witness $w_{y,V} = C$ for y with respect to the accumulator value V is iteratively updated to $\bar{w}_{y,V''} = (C'', d'')$ with respect to the updated accumulator value $V'' = \left(\frac{\prod_{i=1}^{n}(y_{\mathcal{A},i} + \alpha)}{\prod_{i=1}^{m}(y_{\mathcal{D},i} + \alpha)} \right) V$ as follows

$$
C \xrightarrow{\text{Add}} \quad C' = d_{\mathcal{A}}(y)C + v_{\mathcal{A}}(y)V \quad \xrightarrow{\text{Delete}}
$$

$$
C'' = \frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)}C' - \frac{v_{\mathcal{D}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)}V' = \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)}C + \left(\frac{v_{\mathcal{A}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} - \frac{v_{\mathcal{D}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}}(y)} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{n}(y_{\mathcal{A},i} + \alpha) \right) V
$$

where $V' = \prod_{i=1}^{n}(y_{\mathcal{A},i} + \alpha) \cdot V$. The induction on d' in the case of non-membership witnesses is straightforward. $\square$

D.2   Epoch Witnesses Batch Update

A user who owns a valid non-membership witness $\bar{w}_{y,V_i} = (C_i, d_i)$ (resp. a valid membership witness $w_{y,V_i} = C_i$) with respect to the accumulator state $(V_i, \mathcal{Y}_{V_i})$ can update it to $\bar{w}_{y,V_j} = (C_j, d_j)$ (resp. $w_{y,V_j} = C_j$), for any $j > i$, as

$$
C_j = \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}_{i \to j}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}_{i \to j}}(y)} \cdot C_i + \frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}_{i \to j}}(y)} \cdot \langle \Upsilon_y , \Omega_{i \to j}(y) \rangle , \qquad d_j = d_i \cdot \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}_{i \to j}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}_{i \to j}}(y)}
$$

where

$$d_{\mathcal{A}_{a \to b}}(x) = \prod_{s=a+1}^{b} d_{\mathcal{A}_s}(x) \qquad d_{\mathcal{D}_{a \to b}}(x) = \prod_{s=a+1}^{b} d_{\mathcal{D}_s}(x)$$

$$\Omega_{i \to j}(y) = \sum_{t=i+1}^{j} \left(d_{\mathcal{D}_{i \to t-1}}(y) \cdot d_{\mathcal{A}_{t \to j}}(y) \right) \circ \Omega_t$$

Proof. We prove the result by induction on $j > i$.

$\boxed{j = i + 1}$ A witness $\bar{w}_{y,V_i} = (C_i, d_i)$ is updated to $\bar{w}_{y,V_{i+1}} = (C_{i+1}, d_{i+1})$ as

$$C_{i+1} = \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}_{i+1}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}_{i+1}}(y)} \cdot C_i + \frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}_{i+1}}(y)} \cdot \langle \Upsilon_y , \Omega_{i+1} \rangle , \qquad d_{i+1} = d_i \cdot \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}_{i+1}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}_{i+1}}(y)}$$

obtaining the same result we get by using the formula for non-membership witnesses batch update.

$\boxed{j \Rightarrow j + 1:}$ By inductive hypothesis, we assume the formula holds for C_j. Then

$$\begin{aligned}
C_{j+1} &= \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}_{j+1}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}_{j+1}}(y)} \cdot C_j + \frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}_{j+1}}(y)} \cdot \langle \Upsilon_y , \Omega_{j+1} \rangle \\
&= \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}_{i \to j+1}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}_{i \to j+1}}(y)} \cdot C_i + \frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}_{i \to j+1}}(y)} \cdot \langle \Upsilon_y , d_{\mathcal{A}_{j+1}}(y) \circ \Omega_{i \to j} \rangle \\
&\quad + \frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}_{i \to j+1}}(y)} \cdot \langle \Upsilon_y , d_{\mathcal{D}_{i \to j}}(y) \circ \Omega_{j+1} \rangle \\
&= \frac{d_{\mathcal{A}_{i \to j+1}}(y)}{d_{\mathcal{D}_{i \to j+1}}(y)} \cdot C_i + \frac{1}{d_{\mathcal{D}_{i \to j+1}}(y)} \cdot \langle \Upsilon_y , \Omega_{i \to j+1} \rangle
\end{aligned}$$

as required, since

$$\begin{aligned}
\Omega_{i \to j+1} &= \sum_{t=i+1}^{j+1} \left(\prod_{h=i+1}^{t-1} d_{\mathcal{D}_h}(y) \prod_{k=t+1}^{j+1} d_{\mathcal{A}_k}(y) \right) \circ \Omega_t \\
&= \left(\sum_{t=i+1}^{j} \left(\prod_{h=i+1}^{t-1} d_{\mathcal{D}_h}(y) \prod_{k=t+1}^{j+1} d_{\mathcal{A}_k}(y) \right) \circ \Omega_t \right) + \left(\prod_{h=i+1}^{j} d_{\mathcal{D}_h}(y) \right) \circ \Omega_{j+1} \\
&= d_{\mathcal{A}_{j+1}}(y) \circ \Omega_{i \to j} + d_{\mathcal{D}_{i \to j}}(y) \circ \Omega_{j+1}
\end{aligned}$$

The proof on d_j is straightforward. □

D.3   Accumulator Initialization

Proposition. *Let $p \in \mathbb{N}$ be a prime such that $p - 1 = p_1^{e_1} \cdot \ldots \cdot p_n^{e_n}$ factorizes as the product of $n > 1$ powers of distinct primes $p_i \in \mathbb{N}$. Let $f(x) \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}[x]$ be a polynomial with $n \leq m < p - 1$ distinct non-zero roots $x_1, \ldots, x_m \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ such that the multiplicative order in $(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$ of x_i, for $1 \leq i \leq n$, is $p_i^{e_i}$. Then*

i. *The least $k > 0$ for which there exists $z \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ and $g(x) \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}[x]$ such that $g(x)f(x) \equiv x^k - z \mod p$ is $k = p - 1$.*
ii. *The degree of the minimal-degree non-constant monomial of $f(x)$ is s with $0 < s < m$.*

Proof. Suppose there exists $z \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ and $g(x) \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}[x]$ such that

$$g(x)f(x) \equiv x^k - z \mod p$$

Then, each root $x_1, \ldots, x_m$ of $f(x)$ must be a root for $x^k - z$ in $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$, that is

$$x_1^k \equiv \cdots \equiv x_t^k \equiv z \mod p \tag{1}$$

Since, by hypothesis $(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^* \simeq \mathbb{Z}/(p-1)\mathbb{Z} \simeq \langle x_1 \rangle \times \cdots \times \langle x_n \rangle$ with $n > 1$ we have $z \in \bigcap_{i=1}^m \langle x_i \rangle \leq \bigcap_{i=1}^n \langle x_i \rangle = \langle 1 \rangle$. Hence a solution to (1) exists only if $z \equiv 1$ and the least k for which it holds is $k = lcm(\text{ord}(x_1), \ldots, \text{ord}(x_m)) \geq lcm(\text{ord}(x_1), \ldots, \text{ord}(x_n)) = p - 1$. Since $k \leq p - 1$, we have $k = p - 1$.

It follows that as long as $m < p - 1$, there are no $z \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ such that $f(x) \equiv x^t - z \mod p$. Hence the degree of the minimal-degree non-constant monomial of $f(x)$ is s with $0 < s < m$. □

Theorem. *Let $p \in \mathbb{N}$ be a prime such that $p - 1 = p_1^{e_1} \cdot \ldots \cdot p_n^{e_n}$ factorizes as the product of $n > 1$ powers of distinct primes $p_i \in \mathbb{N}$. Let $f(x) \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}[x]$ be a polynomial with $n \leq m < p - 1$ distinct non-zero roots $x_1, \ldots, x_t \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ such that the multiplicative order in $(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$ of x_i, for $1 \leq i \leq n$, is $p_i^{e_i}$.*

Let $(\mathcal{V}, +)$ be the vector space of polynomials with degree lower equal $p - 2$ and $\mathcal{B} = \{1, x, \ldots, x^{p-2}\}$ its $(p-1)-$dimensional canonical basis. Then, for every $1 \leq k < p - 1$

$$rank\left(\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ f(x) \\ xf(x) \\ \vdots \\ x^{p-m-2}f(x) \\ x^k \end{bmatrix}_{\mathcal{B}}\right) = p - m + 1$$

Proof. The rank is maximum when the row vectors are linearly independent in $\mathcal{V}$, that is for any $a_0, \ldots, a_{p-m-2}, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ such that

$$\left(\sum_{j=0}^{p-m-2} a_j x^j f(x)\right) + bx^k + c = 0 \tag{2}$$

we have $a_0 \equiv \cdots \equiv a_{p-m-2} \equiv b \equiv c \equiv 0$.

We will prove the statement by exhaustion on the values of k.

$\boxed{1 \leq k < m:}$ The dependence relation (2) can be rewritten as $g(x)f(x) = -bx^k - c$ where $g(x) = \sum_{j=0}^{p-m-2} a_j x^j$. By hypothesis $f(x)$ has m different roots, while

$-bx^k - c$ can have at most $k < m$ distinct roots. The equation then holds only if both sides are equal to the 0 polynomial, that is $-bx^i - c = 0$ and $g(x) = 0$. This implies $a_0 \equiv \cdots \equiv a_{p-m-2} \equiv 0$ and $b \equiv c \equiv 0$ because the elements $\{1, x, \ldots, x^{p-m-2}\}$ are linearly independent vectors of $\mathcal{V}$.

$\boxed{k = m:}$ In this case the dependence relation (2) can be rewritten as $g(x)f(x) = -bx^m - c$ with $g(x)$ defined as in the previous case. By hypothesis $f(x)$ has m distinct roots, while the right side can have at most m distinct roots. This implies that $g(x) = g(0) = a_0$ is a constant polynomial or, equivalently, that $a_1 \equiv \cdots \equiv a_{p-m-2} \equiv 0$. Suppose by contradiction that $a_0 \neq 0$, then $f(x) = -a_0^{-1}bx^m - a_0^{-1}c$ is a contradiction since, by Proposition 2, the degree of the minimal-degree non-constant monomial of $f(x)$ is s with $s \neq m$ and $s > 0$. Hence $a_0 \equiv 0$, and then $-bx^m - c = 0$ which implies $b \equiv c \equiv 0$.

$\boxed{m < k < p - 1:}$ Let $k = m + k'$ with $1 \leq k' \leq p - m - 2$. From $g(x)f(x) = -bx^{m+k'} - c$ it follows that $deg(g) \leq k'$ and then, if $k' < p - m - 2$, we have $a_{k'+1} \equiv \cdots \equiv a_{p-m-2} \equiv 0$.

Assume, by contradiction, $b \neq 0$ and $c \equiv 0$. In this case the dependence relation becomes $g(x)f(x) = -bx^{m+k'}$, but the right side has only 0 as root while the left side has, by hypothesis, at least t non-zero distinct roots. This implies, similarly as before, that $g(x) = 0$ and $b \equiv 0$, a contradiction.

Let us therefore assume $b \neq 0$ and $c \neq 0$. In this case the dependence relation can be rewritten as $g'(x)f(x) = x^{m+k'} - z$ where $g'(x) = (-b)^{-1}g(x)$ and $z = (-b)^{-1}c \neq 0$.

If, by contradiction, $g'(x) \neq 0$, then, by Proposition 2, the least value for $m + k'$ such that the dependence relation holds is $m + k' = p - 1$, that is $k' = p - m - 1$, a contradiction to $1 \leq k' \leq p - m - 2$. Hence $g'(x) = 0$, which in turn implies $b \equiv c \equiv 0$, a contradiction to our assumption $b \neq 0$.

It follows that $b \equiv 0$ and then $g(x)f(x) = -c$. Since by hypothesis f has m distinct roots, this equation holds only if $c = 0$ and $g(x) = 0$, which, similarly as before, implies $a_0 \equiv \cdots \equiv a_{k'} \equiv b \equiv c \equiv 0$. $\qquad\square$

Corollary. *Let $f(x) \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}[x]$ be a polynomial satisfying the hypothesis of Theorem 3 and consider a Generic Group Model instance of the proposed Dynamic Universal Accumulator equipped with the public Batch Witness Update protocol. If the accumulator value is initialized by adding all the roots in $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ of $f(x)$, then the probability ϵ that an attacker $\mathcal{A}$ outputs in q_G queries to the group oracles the value $\xi_1(\alpha^k)$ for any $1 \leq k < p - 1$ is bounded by*

$$\epsilon \leq \frac{(\deg f + t) \cdot (q_G + t + 3)^2}{p}$$

where t is the maximum number of elements allowed to be accumulated simultaneously.

Proof. The proof proceeds similarly as done in the proof of Theorem 2. The only difference is the condition checked by the Accumulator Manager to ensure

correctness of $\mathcal{A}$'s output value $(\xi_{1,l})$. This new check corresponds to verifying the polynomial equation $F_{1,l} - x^k = 0$ where $F_{1,l} = g(x) \cdot f(x)$ with $\deg g \leq t$. The Accumulator Manager then chooses a random value $x^* \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$: by Theorem 3 the equation $F_{1,l} - x^k = 0$ vanishes in x^* with probability 0 for any $1 \leq k < p-1$, thus $\mathcal{A}$ wins the game with non-zero probability only if some of the following conditions holds:

1. $F_{1,i}(x^*) - F_{1,j}(x^*) = 0$ for some i, j so that $F_{1,i} \neq F_{1,j}$
2. $F_{2,i}(x^*) - F_{2,j}(x^*) = 0$ for some i, j so that $F_{2,i} \neq F_{2,j}$
3. $F_{T,i}(x^*) - F_{T,j}(x^*) = 0$ for some i, j so that $F_{T,i} \neq F_{T,j}$

From this we conclude, in a similar way as done at the end of the proof of Theorem 2, that $\mathcal{A}$ wins the game with the Accumulator Manager with a probability $\epsilon \leq \frac{(\deg f + t) \cdot (q_G + t + 3)^2}{p}$.

$\square$