Paper 2019/357

Lattice-based proof of a shuffle

Núria Costa, Ramiro Martínez, and Paz Morillo

Abstract

In this paper we present the first fully post-quantum proof of a shuffle for RLWE encryption schemes. Shuffles are commonly used to construct mixing networks (mix-nets), a key element to ensure anonymity in many applications such as electronic voting systems. They should preserve anonymity even against an attack using quantum computers in order to guarantee long-term privacy. The proof presented in this paper is built over RLWE commitments which are perfectly binding and computationally hiding under the RLWE assumption, thus achieving security in a post-quantum scenario. Furthermore we provide a new definition for a secure mixing node (mix-node) and prove that our construction satisfies this definition.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. 4th Workshop on Advances in Secure Electronic Voting (VOTING'19)
Keywords
mix-netse-votingpost-quantumRLWE encryptionRLWE commitmentproof of a shuffle
Contact author(s)
ramiro martinez @ upc edu
History
2020-10-21: last of 2 revisions
2019-04-10: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/357
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/357,
      author = {Núria Costa and Ramiro Martínez and Paz Morillo},
      title = {Lattice-based proof of a shuffle},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/357},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/357}
}
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