Compressing Vector OLE*

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Abstract. Oblivious linear-function evaluation (OLE) is a secure two-party protocol allowing a receiver to learn a secret linear combination of a pair of field elements held by a sender. OLE serves as a common building block for secure computation of arithmetic circuits, analogously to the role of oblivious transfer (OT) for boolean circuits.
A useful extension of OLE is *vector* OLE (VOLE), allowing the receiver to learn a linear combination of two *vectors* held by the sender. In several applications of OLE, one can replace a large number of instances of OLE by a smaller number of long instances of VOLE. This motivates the goal of amortizing the cost of generating long instances of VOLE.
We suggest a new approach for fast generation of pseudo-random instances of VOLE via a deterministic local expansion of a pair of short correlated seeds and no interaction. This provides the first example of compressing a non-trivial and cryptographically useful correlation with good concrete efficiency. Our VOLE generators can be used to enhance the efficiency of a host of cryptographic applications. These include secure arithmetic computation and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs with reusable preprocessing.
Our VOLE generators are based on a novel combination of function secret sharing (FSS) for multi-point functions and linear codes in which decoding is intractable. Their security can be based on variants of the learning parity with noise (LPN) assumption over large fields that resist known attacks. We provide several constructions that offer tradeoffs between different efficiency measures and the underlying intractability assumptions.

Keywords. Secure computation, correlation generators, FSS, OLE, LPN, NIZK

1 Introduction

Secret correlated randomness is a valuable resource for cryptographic protocols. For instance, a pair of identical secret random strings can be used for fast and perfectly secure communication, and more complex correlations such as "multiplication triples" [Bea92, BDOZ11, DPSZ12] provide an analogous speedup for secure computation. A major difference between these two types of correlations is that while the former can be easily expanded locally from a short common seed by using any pseudorandom generator, it seems much harder to apply a similar compression procedure to the latter without compromising security.

More generally, consider the following loosely defined notion of a *pseudorandom correlation generator*. For a "long" target two-party correlation (Z_0, Z_1), we would like to locally expand a pair of correlated "short" strings $(\mathsf{seed}_0, \mathsf{seed}_1)$ into a pair of outputs (z_0, z_1), where $z_0 = \mathsf{Expand}(\mathsf{seed}_0)$ and $z_1 = \mathsf{Expand}(\mathsf{seed}_1)$. This should be done so that the joint output is indistinguishable from (Z_0, Z_1) not only to the outside world, but also to an *insider* who learns one seed seed_b and is trying to infer information about the other output z_{1-b} beyond what is implied by its output z_b.

For non-trivial two-party correlations, such correlation generators were only constructed using indistinguishability obfuscation [HIJ+16], homomorphic secret sharing [BCG+17], and key-homomorphic pseudorandom functions [Sch18]. However, despite optimization efforts, none of these constructions is sufficiently efficient to offer a competitive alternative to traditional interactive protocols.

* This is a full version of [BCGI18].

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The focus of this work is on a special type of correlation related to *oblivious linear-function evaluation* (OLE). The OLE functionality allows a receiver to learn a secret linear combination of two field elements held by a sender. OLE is a common building block for secure computation of arithmetic circuits [NP06, IPS09, DGN+17], analogously to the role of oblivious transfer (OT) for boolean circuits [GMW87, Kil88, IPS08, DGN+17].

A useful extension of OLE is *vector* OLE (VOLE), allowing the receiver to learn a linear combination of two *vectors* held by the sender. In several applications of OLE, one can replace a large number of instances of OLE by a small number of long instances of VOLE [ADI+17]. This motivates the goal of amortizing the cost of implementing long VOLE. Despite recent progress (see Section 1.3 below), the concrete communication and computation costs of the best VOLE protocols still leave much to be desired.

Motivated by the above goal, we study the question of compressing a random VOLE correlation, or VOLE *correlation* for short. In a VOLE correlation of length n over a finite field $\mathbb{F}$, the sender P_0 obtains a pair of random vectors $Z_0 = (\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v})$, where $\boldsymbol{u}$ and $\boldsymbol{v}$ are uniformly distributed over $\mathbb{F}^n$, and the receiver P_1 obtains a random linear combination of the two vectors, namely $Z_1 = (x, \boldsymbol{u}x + \boldsymbol{v})$ for $x \in_R \mathbb{F}$. A VOLE correlation can be used to realize the VOLE functionality via a simple and efficient protocol, similarly to protocol implementing string OT from a random string OT [Bea95]. In fact, string OT is *equivalent* to VOLE over the field $\mathbb{F} = \mathbb{F}_2$.

A natural approach for generating a VOLE correlation is via reduction to random string OT. Indeed, random string OT correlation can be easily compressed using any pseudorandom generator (PRG), and moreover a length-n VOLE over $\mathbb{F}$ can be realized with perfect security (against a semi-honest adversary) using $\ell = \lceil \log_2 \mathbb{F} \rceil$ instances of string OT of length $n\ell$ each [Gil99]. The factor-ℓ communication overhead of this reduction can be significant for computations over large fields, which often arise in applications. But more importantly, the construction of VOLE from string OT requires the sender to feed the OT oracle with *correlated* random strings, even when the goal is to obtain a random instance of VOLE. This correlation makes the natural reduction of random VOLE to random string OT fail in the non-interactive setting we consider here.

1.1 Our Contribution

We give simple and efficient constructions of VOLE correlation generators based on conservative variants of the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) assumption over large fields.[1] As far as we know, our work gives the first non-trivial example for a useful correlation generator with good concrete efficiency.

To give just one example, we estimate that for a field $\mathbb{F}$ with $\lceil \log_2 |\mathbb{F}| \rceil = 128$, we can generate a length-10^6 VOLE correlation from a pair of correlated seeds whose length is less than 1000 field elements using about 100 milliseconds[2] of local computation on a standard laptop using a single core and a common GPU.

Our VOLE generators can be useful in a variety of cryptographic applications. We discuss a few such applications below.

[1] Roughly speaking, the LPN assumption says that in a random linear code, a noisy random codeword is pseudo-random. Unlike the case of LWE, here the noise is restricted to have low Hamming weight. LPN can be equivalently formulated by requiring that the *syndrome* of a random low-weight noise vector is pseudo-random. Our constructions require a slightly sub-constant noise rate, but otherwise can be quite flexible about the choice of the code and its information rate. See Section 2.3 for more details.

[2] This and other running time estimates have not been empirically validated, and only take the cost of arithmetic and cryptographic operations into account (ignoring, e.g., possible cache misses). Their accuracy also depends on our estimates for the concrete security of the underlying LPN variants, which should be further studied.

Rate 1/2 VOLE. As a direct application, we get a standard VOLE protocol in the plain model with unique efficiency features. This protocol is obtained by using general-purpose (OT-based) secure two-party computation to distribute the seed generation, locally expanding the seeds, and then using the simple reduction from VOLE to random VOLE. The protocol has asymptotic rate 1/2 (namely, the asymptotic communication complexity is dominated by communicating $2n$ field elements) and almost the entire computational work can be performed offline, following the seed generation, without any interaction. Beyond its direct efficiency benefits, this "local preprocessing" feature has several other advantages, including the ability to make decisions about who to interact with in the future (and how much) without revealing these decisions to the outside world. See [BCG+17] for further discussion. Our protocol can be compared to the recent VOLE protocol from [ADI+17], which under similar assumptions achieves rate 1/3 and does not enjoy the local preprocessing feature. An additional unique feature of our protocol (unlike other VOLE protocols from the literature) is that achieving security against malicious parties has vanishing amortized cost. As long as the seed generation sub-protocol is secure against malicious parties, the entire VOLE protocol is secure.

Secure arithmetic computation and beyond. Our efficient implementation of VOLE can serve as a useful building block in secure computation protocols. For instance, given an additively shared scalar $x \in \mathbb{F}$ and an additively shared vector $\boldsymbol{u} \in \mathbb{F}^n$, one can securely compute an additive sharing of $\boldsymbol{u}x$ via two invocations of length-n VOLE. Such scalar-vector multiplications are common in applications that involve linear algebra. See [IPS09, MZ17, ADI+17, DGN+17, JVC18] and references therein. More generally, VOLE is useful for secure computation of arithmetic circuits in which multiplication gates have a large fan-out, as well as round-efficient secure arithmetic computation via arithmetic garbling [AIK11]. Finally, VOLE can be helpful even for secure computation tasks that are not arithmetic in nature. For instance, OLE has been applied for efficiently realizing secure keyword search [FIPR05] and set intersection [GN17]. These applications can benefit from long instances of VOLE, e.g., when securely computing the intersection of one set with many other sets.

NIZK with reusable setup. Finally, we demonstrate the usefulness of VOLE generators in the context of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZK). We consider the following setting for NIZK with reusable interactive setup. In an offline setup phase, before the statements to be proved are known, the prover and the verifier interact to securely generate correlated random seeds. The seeds can then be used to prove any polynomial number of statements by having the prover send a single message to the verifier for each statement. In this setting, we can leverage our fast VOLE generators towards NIZK proofs for arithmetic circuit satisfiability in which the proof computation and verification involve just a small number of field operations per gate, and the setup cost is comparable to the circuit complexity of (a single instance of) the verification predicate.

Our NIZK protocols are based on simple *honest-verifier* zero-knowledge protocols for arithmetic circuit satisfiability that consist of parallel calls to VOLE, where the honest verifier's VOLE inputs are independent of the statement being proved. Such protocols, in turn, can be obtained from linear PCPs for circuit satisfiability [IKO07, GGPR13, BCI+13]. This application of VOLE generators crucially relies on the field being large for eliminating selective failure attacks. (Similar NIZK protocols based on OT [KMO89, IKOS09] are not fully reusable because they are susceptible to such attacks.) The honest-verifier VOLE-based NIZK protocols we use are simplified variants of a NIZK protocol from [CDI+18], which provides security against malicious verifiers using only parallel calls to VOLE and no additional interaction. The price we pay for the extra simplicity is that our setup phase

needs to rely on general-purpose interactive MPC for ensuring that the verifier's (reusable) VOLE inputs are well formed.

We conclude by summarizing the two advantages of VOLE correlation over the string OT correlation which is easier to generate. A *quantitative* advantage is that VOLE natively supports arithmetic computations without the $\log_2 |\mathbb{F}|$ communication overhead of the OT-based approach discussed above. A *qualitative* advantage is that in certain applications (such as the NIZK protocol from [CDI+18] and our honest-verifier variants), VOLE can be used to eliminate selective failure attacks by ensuring that every adversarial strategy is either harmless or leads to failure with overwhelming probability.

1.2 Overview of the Techniques

Our VOLE generators are based on a novel combination of function secret sharing (FSS) [BGI15] and noisy linear encodings. For the purpose of explaining the technique, it is convenient to view a VOLE correlation as a "shared vector-scalar product." That is, the sender knows a random vector $\boldsymbol{u} \in \mathbb{F}^n$, the receiver knows a random scalar $x \in \mathbb{F}$, and they both hold additive shares of $\boldsymbol{u}x$. The key idea is that efficient PRG-based FSS techniques allow compressing this correlation in the special case where $\boldsymbol{u}$ is sparse, namely it has few nonzero entries. However, this alone is not enough, since $\boldsymbol{u}$ must be pseudorandom to the receiver, which is certainly not the case for a sparse vector.

To convert "sparse" to "pseudorandom" we rely on the LPN assumption. This can be achieved in two different ways. In the *primal variant* of our construction, we achieve this by adding to the sparse $\boldsymbol{u}$ a random vector in a linear code C in which the LPN assumption is conjectured to hold. To do this, the sender gets a short message $\boldsymbol{a}$ and $\boldsymbol{a}x$ is shared between the parties. By locally applying the linear encoding of C to $\boldsymbol{a}$ and the shares of $\boldsymbol{a}x$, the VOLE correlation is maintained, except that the sparse $\boldsymbol{u}$ is masked with a random codeword $C(\boldsymbol{a})$ where both $\boldsymbol{u}$ and the codeword are unknown to the receiver. If C satisfies the LPN assumption with the level of noise corresponding to the sparsity of $\boldsymbol{u}$, the sum looks pseudorandom to the receiver.

The main advantage of the primal construction is that it is conjectured to be secure even with a code C that has constant locality, namely each codeword symbol is a linear combination of a constant number of message symbols [Ale03, ADI+17]. This enables fast incremental generation of VOLE, one entry at a time. Its main disadvantage is that its output size can be at most quadratic in the seed size. Indeed, a higher stretch would make it possible to guess a sufficiently large number of noiseless coordinates to allow efficient decoding via Guassian elimination.

To achieve an arbitrary polynomial stretch, one can use the *dual variant* of our construction. Here the parties shrink both the sparse $\boldsymbol{u}$ and the shares of $\boldsymbol{u}x$ by applying a public *compressive* linear mapping H. If H is a parity check matrix of a code for which LPN holds, the output of H looks pseudorandom even when given H. A disadvantage of the dual approach is that the compressive mapping H cannot have constant locality.

We propose several different optimizations of the above approaches. These include LPN-friendly mappings C and H that can be computed in linear time, improved implementations of the FSS component of the construction, and secure protocols for distributing the setup algorithm that generates the seeds. Under plausible variants of the LPN assumption, the asymptotic time complexity of the seed expansion is linear in the output size. We discuss further optimizations and give some concrete efficiency estimates in Section 5.

1.3 Related Work

The idea of compressing cryptographically useful correlations was first put forward in [GI99], who focused on the case of multi-party correlations that are distributed uniformly over a linear space. This idea was generalized in [CDI05]. The problem of compressing useful two-party correlations was studied in [BCG+17], who presented solutions that rely on "group-based" homomorphic secret sharing. However, the compression schemes from [BCG+17] have poor concrete efficiency, despite significant optimization efforts.

Variants of the LPN assumption were used as a basis for secure arithmetic computation in several previous works [NP06, IPS09, ADI+17, DGN+17]. The core idea is to use the homomorphic property of a linear code to compute a linear function on a noisy encoded message, and then filter out the noisy coordinates using OT. This technique is quite different from ours. In particular, it inherently relies on erasure-decoding that we completely avoid.

Finally, it is instructive to compare our notion of a VOLE*generator* with the notion of OT *extension* [Bea96, IKNP03]. While OT extension protocols reduce the amortized *computational* cost of n instances of OT, their communication complexity grows linearly with n even if one settles for producing pseudo-random OT correlation instances. In contrast, a VOLE generator implies a *sublinear-communication* protocol for generating a length-n VOLE correlation, or alternatively a non-interactive algorithm for creating a long pseudo-random instance of a VOLE correlation from a pair of short correlated seeds.

2 Preliminaries

We consider algorithms that take inputs and produce outputs from a finite field $\mathbb{F}$ or finite Abelian group $\mathbb{G}$. All of our protocols are fully *arithmetic* in that they only require a black-box access to the underlying algebraic structure in the same sense as in [IPS09, ADI+17]. In particular, the number of arithmetic operations performed by our protocols does not grow with the field or group size. By default vectors $\boldsymbol{v}$ are interpreted as row vectors.

2.1 Vector OLE

Vector OLE (VOLE) is the arithmetic analogue of string OT. Concretely, the VOLE functionality is a two-party functionality that takes a pair of vectors from the *sender* P_0, and allows the *receiver* P_1 to learn a chosen linear combination of these vectors. More formally, given a finite field $\mathbb{F}$, the VOLE functionality takes a pair of vectors $(\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v}) \in \mathbb{F}^n \times \mathbb{F}^n$ from P_0 and a scalar $x \in \mathbb{F}$ from P_1. It outputs $\boldsymbol{w} = \boldsymbol{u}x + \boldsymbol{v}$ to P_1. We will also consider a randomized version of VOLE where the sender's inputs $(\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v})$ are picked at random by the functionality and delivered as outputs to the sender. The deterministic VOLE functionality can be easily reduced to the randomized one analogously to the reduction of OT to random OT [Bea95] (see Section 6.1).

We note that our results can apply to generating VOLE over non-field rings (e.g., $\mathbb{Z}_{2^k}$) under suitable variants of the underlying intractability assumptions [IPS09]. This can be useful in turn for secure arithmetic computation over rings [CFIK03, IPS09, CDE+18]. For simplicity, we focus here on the case of VOLE over fields.

2.2 Function Secret Sharing

Informally, a function secret sharing (FSS) scheme [BGI15] splits a function $f : I \to \mathbb{G}$ into two functions f_0 and f_1 such that $f_0(x) + f_1(x) = f(x)$ for every input x, and each f_b computationally hides f. In this work we rely on efficient constructions of FSS schemes for simple classes of functions, including multi-point functions and comparison functions.

Definition 1 (Adapted from [BGI16]). *A 2-party* function secret sharing *(FSS) scheme for a class of functions $\mathcal{F} = \{f : I \to \mathbb{G}\}$ with input domain I and output domain an abelian group $(\mathbb{G}, +)$, is a pair of PPT algorithms $\mathsf{FSS} = (\mathsf{FSS.Gen}, \mathsf{FSS.Eval})$ with the following syntax:*

- $\mathsf{FSS.Gen}(1^\lambda, f)$*, given security parameter λ and description of a function $f \in \mathcal{F}$, outputs a pair of keys (K_0, K_1);*
- $\mathsf{FSS.Eval}(b, K_b, x)$*, given party index $b \in \{0,1\}$, key K_b, and input $x \in I$, outputs a group element $y_b \in \mathbb{G}$.*

Given an allowable leakage function $\mathsf{Leak} : \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$, the scheme FSS should satisfy the following requirements:

- ***Correctness.*** *For any $f : I \to \mathbb{G}$ in $\mathcal{F}$ and $x \in I$, we have $\Pr[(K_0, K_1) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{FSS.Gen}(1^\lambda, f) : \sum_{b\in\{0,1\}} \mathsf{FSS.Eval}(b, K_b, x) = f(x)] = 1$.*
- ***Security.*** *For any $b \in \{0,1\}$, there exists a PPT simulator Sim such that for any polynomial-size function sequence $f_\lambda \in \mathcal{F}$, the distributions $\{(K_0, K_1) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{FSS.Gen}(1^\lambda, f_\lambda) : K_b\}$ and $\{K_b \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{Sim}(1^\lambda, \mathsf{Leak}(f_\lambda))\}$ are computationally indistinguishable.*

Unless otherwise specified, we assume that for $f : I \to \mathbb{G}$, the allowable leakage $\mathsf{Leak}(f)$ outputs $(I, \mathbb{G})$, namely a description of the input and output domains of f.

Some applications of FSS require applying the evaluation algorithm on *all inputs*. Given an FSS $(\mathsf{FSS.Gen}, \mathsf{FSS.Eval})$, we denote by $\mathsf{FSS.FullEval}$ an algorithm which, on input a bit b, and an evaluation key K_b, outputs a list of $|I|$ elements of $\mathbb{G}$ corresponding to the evaluation of $\mathsf{FSS.Eval}(b, K_b, \cdot)$ on every input $x \in I$ (in some arbitrary specified order). While $\mathsf{FSS.FullEval}$ can always be realized with $|I|$ invocations of $\mathsf{FSS.Eval}$, it is typically possible to obtain a more efficient construction. Below, we recall some results from [BGI16] on FSS schemes for useful classes of functions.

Distributed Point Functions. A distributed point function (DPF) [GI14] is an FSS scheme for the class of point functions $f_{\alpha,\beta} : \{0,1\}^\ell \to \mathbb{G}$ which satisfy $f_{\alpha,\beta}(\alpha) = \beta$, and $f_{\alpha,\beta}(x) = 0$ for any $x \neq \alpha$. A sequence of works [GI14, BGI15, BGI16] has led to highly efficient constructions of DPF schemes from any pseudorandom generator (PRG), which can be implemented in practice using block ciphers such as AES.

Theorem 2 ([BGI16]). *Given a PRG $G : \{0,1\}^\lambda \to \{0,1\}^{2\lambda+2}$, there exists a DPF for point functions $f_{\alpha,\beta} : \{0,1\}^\ell \to \mathbb{G}$ with key size $\ell \cdot (\lambda + 2) + \lambda + \lceil \log_2 |\mathbb{G}| \rceil$ bits. For $m = \lceil \frac{\log |\mathbb{G}|}{\lambda+2} \rceil$, the key generation algorithm Gen invokes G at most $2(\ell + m)$ times, the evaluation algorithm Eval invokes G at most $\ell + m$ times, and the full evaluation algorithm $\mathsf{FullEval}$ invokes G at most $2^\ell(1 + m)$ times.*

Note that a naive construction of $\mathsf{FullEval}$ from Eval would require $2^\ell(\ell+m)$ invocations of G.

FSS for Multi-Point Functions Our results crucially rely on FSS schemes for multi-point functions, a natural generalization of point functions. A t-point function evaluates to 0 everywhere, except on t specified points. When specifying multi-point functions we often view the domain of the function as $[n]$ for $n = 2^\ell$ instead of $\{0,1\}^\ell$. Formally:

Definition 3 (Multi-Point Function). *An (n, t)-multi-point function over an abelian group $(\mathbb{G}, +)$ is a function $f_{S,\boldsymbol{y}} : [n] \to \mathbb{G}$, where $S = \{s_1, \cdots, s_t\}$ is a subset of $[n]$ of size t, $\boldsymbol{y} = (y_1, \cdots, y_t) \in \mathbb{G}^{kt}$, and $f_{S,\boldsymbol{y}}(s_i) = y_i$ for any $i \in [t]$, and $f_{S,y}(x) = 0$ for any $x \in [n] \setminus S$.*

We assume that the description of S includes the input domain $[n]$ so that $f_{S,\boldsymbol{y}}$ is fully specified.

A *Multi-Point Function Secret Sharing* (MPFSS) is an FSS scheme for the class of multi-point functions, where a point function $f_{S,\boldsymbol{y}}$ is represented in a natural way. An MPFSS can be easily obtained by adding t instances of DPF. We discuss optimizations of this simple MPFSS construction in Section 4.

We assume that an MPFSS scheme leaks not only the input and output domains but also the number of points t that the multi-point function specifies.

2.3 Learning Parity with Noise

Our constructions rely on variants of the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) assumption over large fields. Unlike the LWE assumption, here the noise is assumed to have a small Hamming weight: namely it takes a random value from the field in a small fraction of the coordinates and 0 elsewhere. Similar assumptions have been previously used in the context of secure arithmetic computation [NP06, IPS09, ADI+17, DGN+17, GNN17]. Unlike most of these works, the flavors of LPN on which we rely do not require the underlying code to have an algebraic structure and are thus not susceptible to algebraic (list-)decoding attacks.

For a finite field $\mathbb{F}$, we denote by $\mathsf{Ber}_r(\mathbb{F})$ the Bernoulli distribution obtained by sampling a uniformly random element of $\mathbb{F}$ with probability r, and 0 with probability $1-r$. We define below the Learning Parity with Noise assumption over a field $\mathbb{F}$.

Definition 4. *Let* $\mathbf{C}$ *be a probabilistic code generation algorithm such that* $\mathbf{C}(k, q, \mathbb{F})$ *outputs (a description of) a matrix* $A \in \mathbb{F}^{k\times q}$*. For dimension* $k = k(\lambda)$*, number of queries (or block length)* $q = q(\lambda)$*, and noise rate* $r = r(\lambda)$*, the* $\mathsf{LPN}(k, q, r)$ *assumption with respect to* $\mathbf{C}$ *states that for any polynomial-time non-uniform adversary* $\mathcal{A}$*, it holds that*

$$\begin{aligned}&\Pr[\mathbb{F} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda), A \xleftarrow{R} \mathbf{C}(k, q, \mathbb{F}), \boldsymbol{e} \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{Ber}_r(\mathbb{F})^q,\\ &\boldsymbol{s} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{F}^k, \boldsymbol{b} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{s} \cdot A + \boldsymbol{e} : \mathcal{A}(A, \boldsymbol{b}) = 1]\\ \approx &\Pr[\mathbb{F} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda), A \xleftarrow{R} \mathbf{C}(k, q, \mathbb{F}), \boldsymbol{b} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{F}^q : \mathcal{A}(A, \boldsymbol{b}) = 1].\end{aligned}$$

By default, we assume that $\mathbf{C}$ *outputs a uniformly random matrix, but other distributions of codes will be used for better efficiency.*

Note that the decision LPN assumption, given above, can be reduced in polynomial time to its search variant (where the attacker must find the secret vector $\boldsymbol{s}$). While this reduction is not tight, in practice, no substantially better attacks are known on decision LPN compared to search LPN. Note also that the LPN assumption is equivalent to its dual version, which states that it is infeasible to distinguish $\boldsymbol{e} \cdot B$ from a random vector, where $\boldsymbol{e}$ is a noise vector and B is the *parity-check matrix* of the matrix $A \in \mathbb{F}^{k\times q}$ (i.e., B is a full-rank matrix in $\mathbb{F}^{q\times(q-k)}$ such that $A \cdot B = 0$). The equivalence to LPN follows immediately from the relation $\boldsymbol{e} \cdot B = (\boldsymbol{s} \cdot A + \boldsymbol{e}) \cdot B$ for any $\boldsymbol{s} \in \mathbb{F}^k$. The dual variant of LPN is also known as the *syndrome decoding problem.*

Attacks on the LPN Problem. In spite of its extensive use in cryptography, few cryptanalytic results are known for the general LPN assumption. We briefly outline below the main results; we refer the reader to [EKM17] for a more comprehensive overview.

- **Gaussian elimination.** The most natural attack on LPN recovers $\boldsymbol{s}$ from $\boldsymbol{b} = \boldsymbol{s} \cdot A + \boldsymbol{e}$ by guessing k non-noisy coordinates of $\boldsymbol{b}$, and inverting the corresponding subsystem to verify whether the guess was correct. This approach recovers $\boldsymbol{s}$ in time at least $(1/(1-r))^k$ using at least $O(k/r)$ samples. For low-noise LPN, with noise rate $1/k^c$ for some constant $c \geq 1/2$, this translates to a bound on attacks of $O(e^{k^{1-c}})$ time using $O(k^{1+c})$ samples.
- **Information Set Decoding (ISD) [Pra62].** Breaking LPN is equivalent to solving its dual variant, which can be interpreted as the task of decoding a random linear code from its syndrome. The best algorithms for this task are improvements of Prange's ISD algorithm, which attempts to find a size-t subset of the rows of B (the parity-check matrix of the code) that spans $\boldsymbol{e} \cdot B$, where $t = rq$ is the number of noisy coordinates.
- **The BKW algorithm [BKW00].** This algorithm is a variant of Gaussian elimination which achieves subexponential complexity even for high-noise LPN (e.g. constant noise rate), but requires a subexponential number of samples: the attack solves LPN over $\mathbb{F}_2$ in time $2^{O(k/\log(k/r))}$ using $2^{O(k/\log(k/r))}$ samples.
- **Combinations of the above [EKM17].** The authors of [EKM17] conducted an extended study of the security of LPN, and described combinations and refinements of the previous three attacks (called the *well-pooled Gauss attack*, the *hybrid attack*, and the *well-pooled MMT attack*). All these attacks achieve subexponential time complexity, but require as many sample as their time complexity.
- **Scaled-down BKW [Lyu05].** This algorithm is a variant of the BKW algorithm, tailored to LPN with polynomially-many samples. It solves LPN in time $2^{O(k/\log\log(k/r))}$, using $k^{1+\varepsilon}$ samples (for any constant $\varepsilon > 0$) and has worse performance in time and number of samples for larger fields.
- **Low-Weight Parity Check [Zic17].** Eventually, all the previous attacks recover the secret $\boldsymbol{s}$. A more efficient attack (by a polynomial factor) can be used if one simply wants to distinguish $\boldsymbol{b} = \boldsymbol{s} \cdot A + \boldsymbol{e}$ from random: by the singleton bound, the minimal distance of the dual code of $\mathbf{C}$ is at most $k+1$, hence there must be a parity-check equation for $\mathbf{C}$ of weight $k+1$. Then, if $\boldsymbol{b}$ is random, it passes the check with probability at most $1/|\mathbb{F}|$, whereas if $\boldsymbol{b}$ is a noisy encoding, it passes the check with probability at least $((q-k-1)/q)^{rq}$.

In this paper, we will rely on the LPN assumption with high dimension k, low-noise (noise rate $1/k^{\varepsilon}$ for some constant ε), and a polynomially bounded number of samples ($q < k^2$, or even $q = k + o(k)$). We note that in this regime of parameters, no improvement is known over the standard Gaussian elimination attack for the search version of LPN, both in the asymptotic setting (BKW and the attacks of [EKM17] require a subexponential number of samples, and the attack of [Lyu05] does not perform well on low-noise LPN), and in the concrete setting for any reasonable parameters (according to the detailed recent estimations of [EKM17]). For a very limited number of samples (which is the case in our setting), variants of ISD are expected to provide relatively good results. However, they do not perform well in our specific scenario: when the LPN instance has high dimension and very low error rate ($r(\lambda) \to 0$ when $\lambda \to \infty$), according to the analysis of [TS16], all known variants of ISD (e.g. [Pra62, Ste88, FS09, BLP11, MMT11, BJMM12, MO15]) have essentially the same asymptotic complexity $2^{cw(1+o(1))}$ for a constant $c \approx -\log(1-k/q)$ (with $w = rq$ the number of noisy coordinates). Therefore, their gain compared to the initial algorithm of Prange vanishes in our setting.

For the decision version of LPN, the low-weight parity check attack essentially eliminates the need for solving a large linear system (which is only necessary to fully recover the seed), hence it improves upon Gaussian elimination by polynomial factors in general.

In the concrete instances we consider, we estimated the security of the corresponding LPN instance using low-weight parity check, Gaussian attacks, and ISD (using the detailed concrete efficiency analysis of ISD given in [HOSSV18]).

LPN-friendly codes For the purpose of optimizing the computational complexity of LPN-based constructions, one can use a code generator $\mathbf{C}$ that outputs (the description of) an encoding matrix C such that encoding is fast and yet LPN is still conjectured to hold. (For the dual version of the construction, we need LPN to hold for the dual code.) For instance, if C is a random Toeplitz matrix, encoding can be done in quasi-linear time but no better attacks on LPN are known compared to a random choice of C. There are in fact candidates for asymptotically good LPN-friendly codes that can be encoded by linear-size circuits over $\mathbb{F}$ [DI14, ADI+17]. Finally, since we do not require the code to have good minimal distance or support fast erasure-decoding, there is a big space of heuristic LPN-friendly encoding procedures whose systematic exploration remains for further study.

3 Pseudorandom VOLE Generator

In this section, we formally define our main notion of a pseudorandom VOLE generator (or VOLE generator for short), and provide two constructions that are dual to each other (in a sense that will be made formal). These constructions form the core technical contribution of our paper.

3.1 Defining VOLE Generator

Informally, a VOLE generator allows stretching a pair of short, correlated seeds into a long (pseudo)random VOLE, by locally applying a deterministic function Expand to the seeds. Defining the security notion for this primitive requires some care. Ideally, we would have liked to require that the protocol in which a trusted dealer distributes the seeds and the parties output the result of applying Expand to be a secure realization of the VOLE correlation according to the standard real vs. ideal paradigm for defining secure computation. However, as pointed out in [GI99], this security notion cannot be achieved in general. Intuitively, this stems from the fact that each party holds a *short representation* of its correlated string. For instance, consider a very simple correlation, where both parties should obtain the same long pseudorandom string. Then any generator for this correlation will reveal to the first party a short representation of the string of the other party, which cannot happen in an ideal implementation.

To overcome this issue, we rely on an alternative security notion, which roughly asserts the following. Consider the real-world experiment of distributing the two seeds and locally expanding them. We require that the seed seed_σ observed by party σ together with the expanded second output $\mathsf{Expand}(\mathsf{seed}_{1-\sigma})$ are indistinguishable from seed_σ together with a random output of party $1-\sigma$ conditioned on $\mathsf{Expand}(\mathsf{seed}_\sigma)$ in a perfect VOLE correlation. We prove that this notion suffices for securely instantiating the standard protocol for computing a chosen-input VOLE from a random VOLE (see Section 6.1), and is hence sufficient for the applications we consider.

We allow the setup algorithm of the VOLE generator to fix the receiver's input x rather than choose it at random. This stronger flavor of VOLE generator, which is needed by some of the applications, is formalized below.

Definition 5 (Pseudorandom VOLE generator). *A pseudorandom* VOLE *generator is a pair of algorithms* (Setup, Expand) *with the following syntax:*

- $\mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, x)$ *is a PPT algorithm that given a security parameter* λ*, field* $\mathbb{F}$*, output length* n*, and scalar* $x \in \mathbb{F}$ *outputs a pair of seeds* $(\mathsf{seed}_0, \mathsf{seed}_1)$*, where* seed_1 *includes* x*;*
- $\mathsf{Expand}(\sigma, \mathsf{seed}_\sigma)$ *is a polynomial-time algorithm that given party index* $\sigma \in \{0,1\}$ *and a seed* seed_σ*, outputs a pair* $(\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v}) \in \mathbb{F}^n \times \mathbb{F}^n$ *if* $\sigma = 0$*, or a vector* $\boldsymbol{w} \in \mathbb{F}^n$ *if* $\sigma = 1$*;*

The algorithms $(\mathsf{Setup}, \mathsf{Expand})$ *should satisfy the following:*

- ***Correctness.*** *For any field* $\mathbb{F}$ *and* $x \in \mathbb{F}$*, for any pair* $(\mathsf{seed}_0, \mathsf{seed}_1)$ *in the image of* $\mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, x)$ *(for some* n*), denoting* $(\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Expand}(0, \mathsf{seed}_0)$*, and* $\boldsymbol{w} \leftarrow \mathsf{Expand}(1, \mathsf{seed}_1)$*, it holds that* $\boldsymbol{u}x + \boldsymbol{v} = \boldsymbol{w}$*.*
- ***Security.*** *For any (stateful, nonuniform) polynomial-time adversary* $\mathcal{A}$*, it holds that*

$$\begin{aligned}&\Pr\left[\begin{array}{ll}(\mathbb{F}, 1^n, x, x') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda), & \\ (\mathsf{seed}_0, \mathsf{seed}_1) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, x) & : \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{seed}_0) = 1\end{array}\right] \\ \approx &\Pr\left[\begin{array}{ll}(\mathbb{F}, 1^n, x, x') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda), & \\ (\mathsf{seed}_0, \mathsf{seed}_1) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, x') & : \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{seed}_0) = 1\end{array}\right].\end{aligned}$$

Similarly, for any (stateful, nonuniform) adversary $\mathcal{A}$*, it holds that*

$$\begin{aligned}&\Pr\left[\begin{array}{ll}(\mathbb{F}, 1^n, x) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda), & \\ (\mathsf{seed}_0, \mathsf{seed}_1) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, x), & : \mathcal{A}(\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v}, \mathsf{seed}_1) = 1 \\ (\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Expand}(0, \mathsf{seed}_0) & \end{array}\right] \\ \approx &\Pr\left[\begin{array}{ll}(\mathbb{F}, 1^n, x) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda), \boldsymbol{u} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{F}^n, & \\ (\mathsf{seed}_0, \mathsf{seed}_1) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, x), & : \mathcal{A}(\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v}, \mathsf{seed}_1) = 1 \\ \boldsymbol{w} \leftarrow \mathsf{Expand}(1, \mathsf{seed}_1), \boldsymbol{v} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{w} - \boldsymbol{u}x & \end{array}\right].\end{aligned}$$

The reader might observe that one can trivially realize the above definition, simply by letting Setup directly output $\mathsf{seed}_0 \leftarrow (\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v})$, and $\mathsf{seed}_1 \leftarrow \boldsymbol{u}x + \boldsymbol{v}$, and defining Expand to be the identity function. We will be interested in non-trivial realizations of VOLE generators, where the seed produced by Setup is *significantly shorter* than the number n of the pseudorandom VOLE instances being produced.

3.2 Primal VOLE Generator

We present the first of two VOLE generator constructions. To simplify the presentation, we introduce a "spreading function" spread_n (for any integer n) which takes as input a subset $S = \{s_1, \cdots, s_{|S|}\}$ of $[n]$ (with $s_1 < s_2 < \cdots < s_{|S|}$) and a vector $\boldsymbol{y} = (y_1, \cdots, y_{|S|}) \in \mathbb{F}^{|S|}$, such that $\mathsf{spread}_n(S, \boldsymbol{y})$ is the vector $\boldsymbol{z}$ satisfying $z_j = 0$ for any $j \in [n] \setminus S$, and $z_{s_i} = y_i$ for $i = 1$ to $|S|$. Note that the function $\mathsf{spread}_n(S, \cdot)$ is a linear function. Our construction of a pseudorandom VOLE generator G_{primal} is given in Figure 2.

Theorem 6. *Let* $n = n(\lambda), k = k(\lambda), t = t(\lambda), \mathbb{F} = \mathbb{F}(\lambda)$ *be such that* $\mathsf{LPN}(k, n, t/n)$ *holds over* $\mathbb{F}$ *with respect to the code with generating matrix* $C_{k,n}$*, and let* MPFSS *be a secure MPFSS scheme. Then* G_{primal} *is a secure* VOLE *generator.*

In the following, we prove Theorem 6.

VOLE **Generator** G_{primal}

- **Parameters:** dimension $k = k(\lambda)$, noise parameter $t = t(\lambda)$
- **Building blocks:** a code generator $\mathbf{C}$, such that $\mathbf{C}(k, n, \mathbb{F})$ defines a public matrix $C_{k,n} \in \mathbb{F}^{k \times n}$, and a multi-point function secret sharing $\mathsf{MPFSS} = (\mathsf{MPFSS.Gen}, \mathsf{MPFSS.Eval}, \mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval})$.
- $G_{\mathsf{primal}}.\mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, x)$: pick a random size-t subset S of $[n]$, two random vectors $(\boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{b}) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathbb{F}^k \times \mathbb{F}^k$, and a random vector $\boldsymbol{y} \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathbb{F}^t$. Let $s_1 < s_2 < \cdots < s_t$ denote the elements of S. Set $\boldsymbol{c} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{a}x + \boldsymbol{b}$. Compute $(K_0, K_1) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{MPFSS.Gen}(1^\lambda, f_{S,x\boldsymbol{y}})$. Set $\mathsf{seed}_0 \leftarrow (\mathbb{F}, n, K_0, S, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{b})$ and $\mathsf{seed}_1 \leftarrow (\mathbb{F}, n, K_1, x, \boldsymbol{c})$. Output $(\mathsf{seed}_0, \mathsf{seed}_1)$.
- $G_{\mathsf{primal}}.\mathsf{Expand}(\sigma, \mathsf{seed}_\sigma)$:
  If $\sigma = 0$, parse seed_0 as $(\mathbb{F}, n, K_0, S, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{b})$. Set $\boldsymbol{\mu} \leftarrow \mathsf{spread}_n(S, \boldsymbol{y})$. Compute $\boldsymbol{\nu_0} \leftarrow \mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval}(0, K_0)$. Output $(\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v}) \leftarrow (\boldsymbol{a} \cdot C_{k,n} + \boldsymbol{\mu}, \boldsymbol{b} \cdot C_{k,n} - \boldsymbol{\nu_0})$.
  If $\sigma = 1$, parse seed_1 as $(\mathbb{F}, n, K_1, x, \boldsymbol{c})$. Compute $\boldsymbol{\nu_1} \leftarrow \mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval}(1, K_1)$, and set $\boldsymbol{w} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{c} \cdot C_{k,n} + \boldsymbol{\nu_1}$. Output $\boldsymbol{w}$.

Fig. 1. VOLE Generator G_{primal}

Correctness. By the MPFSS correctness, it holds that

$$\begin{aligned}&\mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval}(0, K_0)\\ &\qquad + \mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval}(1, K_1) = \mathsf{spread}_n(S, x\boldsymbol{y}) = \boldsymbol{\mu}x.\end{aligned}$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned}\boldsymbol{u}x + \boldsymbol{v} &= (\boldsymbol{a} \cdot C_{k,n} + \boldsymbol{\mu})x + \boldsymbol{b} \cdot C_{k,n} - \boldsymbol{\nu_0}\\ &= (\boldsymbol{a}x + \boldsymbol{b}) \cdot C_{k,n} + \boldsymbol{\mu}x - \mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval}(0, K_0)\\ &= \boldsymbol{c} \cdot C_{k,n} + \boldsymbol{\mu}x + \mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval}(1, K_1) - \boldsymbol{\mu}x\\ &= \boldsymbol{c} \cdot C_{k,n} + \boldsymbol{\nu}_1 = \boldsymbol{w},\end{aligned}$$

which concludes the proof of correctness.

Security. We start by proving that G_{primal} satisfies the first security requirement of VOLE generators under the secrecy property of the MPFSS. Recall that this first requirement states that no PPT adversary can distinguish the pair (seed_0, x) from (seed_0, x'), where $(\mathbb{F}, 1^n, x, x') \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)$ and $(\mathsf{seed}_0, \mathsf{seed}_1) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, x)$, for a field $\mathbb{F}$ and a size parameter n chosen by $\mathcal{A}$. Note that the only part of $\mathsf{seed}_0 = (\mathbb{F}, n, K_0, S, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{b})$ which depends on x is the MPFSS key K_0. By the secrecy property of the MPFSS, there exists a simulator which, given only the allowable leakage $(\mathbb{F}, n, t)$, outputs a key K_0' which is indistinguishable from K_0. As this simulator does not know any information about x, this immediately implies the first requirement.

We now turn our attention to the second requirement, which states that no efficient adversary $\mathcal{A}$ can distinguish $(\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v}, \mathsf{seed}_1)$ from $(\boldsymbol{u'}, \boldsymbol{v'}, \mathsf{seed}_1)$, where $(\mathsf{seed}_0, \mathsf{seed}_1) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, x)$, $(\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Expand}(0, \mathsf{seed}_0)$, $\boldsymbol{u'} \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathbb{F}^n$, and $\boldsymbol{v'} \leftarrow \mathsf{Expand}(1, \mathsf{seed}_1) - \boldsymbol{u'}x$, with $(\mathbb{F}, n, x)$ chosen by $\mathcal{A}$.

Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a stateful PPT adversary, and let $(\mathbb{F}, 1^n, x) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)$. We prove the second security requirement through a sequence of games.

- **Game 0.** Compute $(\mathsf{seed}_0, \mathsf{seed}_1) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, x)$, set $(\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Expand}(0, \mathsf{seed}_0)$, and send $(\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v}, \mathsf{seed}_1)$ to $\mathcal{A}$. Denote β_0 the output of $\mathcal{A}$ in this game. Note that the input

of $\mathcal{A}$ in this game is $\mathsf{seed}_1 = (\mathbb{F}, n, K_1, x, \boldsymbol{c})$, $\boldsymbol{u} = \boldsymbol{a} \cdot C_{k,n} + \boldsymbol{\mu}$, and $\boldsymbol{v} = \boldsymbol{b} \cdot C_{k,n} + \boldsymbol{\nu_0} = \boldsymbol{b} \cdot C_{k,n} + \boldsymbol{\nu_1} - \boldsymbol{\mu}x = \boldsymbol{c} \cdot C_{k,n} + \boldsymbol{\nu_1} - (\boldsymbol{a} \cdot C_{k,n} + \boldsymbol{\mu})x$ (using the fact that $\boldsymbol{c} = \boldsymbol{a}x + \boldsymbol{b}$ and $\boldsymbol{\nu_0} + \boldsymbol{\nu_1} = \boldsymbol{\mu}x$).

- **Game 1.** In this game, compute the input of $\mathcal{A}$ as before, except that K_1 is now computed solely from $(\mathbb{F}, n, t)$ using the simulator for the secrecy of the MPFSS. Note that in this game, K_1 carries no information whatsoever about $\boldsymbol{\mu}$. Denote β_1 the output of $\mathcal{A}$ in this game; by the secrecy of the MPFSS, $|\Pr[\beta_1 = 1] - \Pr[\beta_0 = 1]| = \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$.
- **Game 2.** In this game, pick $\boldsymbol{u'} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{F}^n$ and set $\boldsymbol{v'} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{c} \cdot C_{k,n} + \boldsymbol{\nu_1} - \boldsymbol{u'}x = \mathsf{Expand}(1, \mathsf{seed}_1) - \boldsymbol{u'}x$. Note that the only difference between this game and the previous one is that we replaced $\boldsymbol{u} = \boldsymbol{a} \cdot C_{k,n} + \boldsymbol{\mu}$ by a uniformly random vector $\boldsymbol{u'}$. Observe that $\boldsymbol{u}$ is exactly a noisy linear encoding of $\boldsymbol{a}$, using the linear code $C_{k,n} \in \mathbb{F}^{k(\lambda) \times n}$, with noise vector $\boldsymbol{\mu}$. Since seed_1 carries no information about $\boldsymbol{\mu}$, $\boldsymbol{u}$ is therefore a noisy linear encoding of $\boldsymbol{a}$, where the number of noisy coordinates is exactly $t(\lambda)$ (as $\boldsymbol{\mu} = \mathsf{spread}_n(S, \boldsymbol{y})$ and $|\boldsymbol{y}| = k$), and each noisy coordinate is masked by a uniformly random element of $\mathbb{F}$. Therefore, distinguishing Game 2 from Game 1 is equivalent to breaking the LPN assumption of dimension $k(\lambda)$ over $\mathbb{F}$, with n samples and a noise rate $t(\lambda)/n$: denoting β_2 the output of $\mathcal{A}$ in this game, under the $\mathsf{LPN}(k(\lambda), n, t(\lambda)/n)$ assumption over $\mathbb{F}$, $|\Pr[\beta_1 = 1] - \Pr[\beta_2 = 1]| = \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$; this concludes the proof of security of G_{primal}.

Efficiency. Instantiating the MPFSS with the PRG-based construction outlined in Section 2.2, the setup algorithm of G_{primal} outputs seeds of size $t \cdot (\lceil \log n \rceil (\lambda + 2) + \lambda) + (t + k) \cdot \log_2 |\mathbb{F}| = \tilde{O}(\lambda \cdot (k + t))$ for a field of size $|\mathbb{F}| = 2^{O(\lambda)}$. Asymptotically, the best known attacks on $\mathsf{LPN}(k, n, t/n)$ are the Gaussian elimination attack, which takes time $O((1 - t/n)^k)$, and the low-weight parity check attack, which takes time $O((1 - k/n)^t)$. This implies that, over a large field $\mathbb{F}$ (such that $\log_2 |\mathbb{F}| \geq \lambda$), the optimal expansion factor is obtained by setting $k = t = O(n^{1/2+\varepsilon})$ for some $\varepsilon > 0$, in which case the Expand algorithm of the VOLE generator expands a seed of size $\tilde{O}(n^{1/2+\varepsilon})$ into a pseudorandom VOLE of size $O(n)$ (counting size as a number of elements of $\mathbb{F}$), and the best known attack takes subexponential time $O(e^{n^{2\varepsilon}})$. Regarding computational efficiency, expanding the seed requires $O((k + t) \cdot n)$ arithmetic operations, and $t \cdot n$ PRG evaluations.

Instantiating G_{primal} with parameters (k, n, t) over a field $\mathbb{F}$ yields a VOLE generator with seed length $t \cdot (\lceil \log n \rceil (\lambda + 2) + \lambda) + (t + k) \cdot \log_2 |\mathbb{F}|$ bits and output length $2n$ group elements (for $\mathsf{Expand}(0, \cdot)$) or n group elements (for $\mathsf{Expand}(1, \cdot)$). This VOLE generator is (T, ε)-secure iff $\mathsf{LPN}(k, n, t/n)$ with code $C_{k,n}$ is (T', ε)-secure and the MPFSS is (T'', ε)-secure, with $T' = T - O((k + t) \cdot n \cdot \log_2 |\mathbb{F}| + t \cdot n \cdot \lambda)$ and $T'' = T - O((k + t) \cdot n \cdot \log_2 |\mathbb{F}|)$.

A downside of this approach is that the expansion factor of the VOLE generator is limited to subquadratic. Below, we describe an alternative "dual" approach which overcomes this limitation and allows for an arbitrary polynomial expansion.

3.3 Dual VOLE Generator

Theorem 7. *Let $n = n(\lambda), n' = n'(\lambda), t = t(\lambda), \mathbb{F} = \mathbb{F}(\lambda)$ be such that $\mathsf{LPN}(n' - n, n', t/n')$ holds over $\mathbb{F}$ with respect to the code with parity-check matrix $H_{n',n}$, and let MPFSS be a secure MPFSS scheme. Then G_{dual} is a secure VOLE generator.*

In the following, we prove Theorem 7.

Correctness. $\boldsymbol{u}x + \boldsymbol{v} = (\boldsymbol{\mu}x - \boldsymbol{\nu_0}) \cdot H_{n',n} = (\boldsymbol{\mu}x + \boldsymbol{\nu_1} - \boldsymbol{\mu}x) \cdot H_{n',n} = \boldsymbol{\nu_1} \cdot H_{n',n} = \boldsymbol{w}$.

VOLE **Generator** G_{dual}

- **Parameters:** noise parameter $t = t(\lambda)$.
- **Building blocks:** a (dual) code generator $\mathbf{C}'$ (which generates on input $(n, n', \mathbb{F})$ a public matrix $H_{n',n} \in \mathbb{F}^{n' \times n}$, a random matrix by default), and a multi-point function secret sharing $\mathsf{MPFSS} = (\mathsf{MPFSS.Gen}, \mathsf{MPFSS.Eval}, \mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval})$.
- $G_{\mathsf{dual}}.\mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, n', x)$: pick a random size-$t(\lambda)$ subset S of $[n']$, and a random vector $\boldsymbol{y} \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathbb{F}^t$. Let $s_1 < s_2 < \cdots < s_t$ denote the elements of S. Compute $(K_0, K_1) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{MPFSS.Gen}(1^\lambda, f_{S,x\boldsymbol{y}})$. Set $\mathsf{seed}_0 \leftarrow (\mathbb{F}, n, n', K_0, S, \boldsymbol{y})$ and $\mathsf{seed}_1 \leftarrow (\mathbb{F}, n, n', K_1, x)$. Output $(\mathsf{seed}_0, \mathsf{seed}_1)$.
- $G_{\mathsf{dual}}.\mathsf{Expand}(\sigma, \mathsf{seed}_\sigma)$.
  If $\sigma = 0$, parse seed_0 as $(\mathbb{F}, n, n', K_0, S, \boldsymbol{y})$. Set $\boldsymbol{\mu} \leftarrow \mathsf{spread}_n(S, \boldsymbol{y})$. Compute $\boldsymbol{\nu_0} \leftarrow \mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval}(0, K_0)$. Output $(\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v}) \leftarrow (\boldsymbol{\mu} \cdot H_{n',n}, -\boldsymbol{\nu_0} \cdot H_{n',n})$.
  If $\sigma = 1$, parse seed_1 as $(\mathbb{F}, n, n', K_1, x)$. Compute $\boldsymbol{\nu_1} \leftarrow \mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval}(1, K_1)$, and set $\boldsymbol{w} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{\nu_1} \cdot H_{n',n}$. Output $\boldsymbol{w}$.

Fig. 2. VOLE Generator G_{dual}.

Security. The first security requirement follows from the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 6. We now turn our attention to the second requirement.

Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a stateful PPT adversary, and let $(\mathbb{F}, n, n', x) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)$. We now prove the second security requirement. Consider the following game: compute $(\mathsf{seed}_0, \mathsf{seed}_1) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, n', x)$, set $(\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Expand}(0, \mathsf{seed}_0)$, and send $(\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v}, \mathsf{seed}_1)$ to $\mathcal{A}$. Denote by β_0 the output of $\mathcal{A}$ in this game. Note that the input of $\mathcal{A}$ in this game is $\mathsf{seed}_1 = (\mathbb{F}, n, n', K_1, x)$, $\boldsymbol{u} = \boldsymbol{\mu} \cdot H_{n',n}$, and $\boldsymbol{v} = -\boldsymbol{\nu_0} \cdot H_{n',n} = \boldsymbol{\nu_1} \cdot H_{n',n} - \boldsymbol{\mu} x \cdot H_{n',n}$. Under the secrecy of the MPFSS, the key K_1 can be simulated solely from $(\mathbb{F}, n, n')$. It remains to show that the distribution of $(\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v})$ is indistinguishable from the following distribution: pick $\boldsymbol{u'} \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathbb{F}^n$, set $\boldsymbol{v'} \leftarrow \mathsf{Expand}(1, \mathsf{seed}_1) - \boldsymbol{u'} x = \boldsymbol{\nu_1} \cdot H_{n',n} - \boldsymbol{u'} x$, and output $(\boldsymbol{u'}, \boldsymbol{v'})$. To show it, it suffices to show that the distribution of $\boldsymbol{\mu} \cdot H_{n',n}$ is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over $\mathbb{F}^n$.

Let $D_{n'-n,n} \in \mathbb{F}^{n'-n \times n'}$ be a generating matrix of the dual code of $H_{n',n}$ (*i.e.*, $D_{n'-n,n} \cdot H_{n',n} = 0^{n'-n \times n}$). Observe that for any vector $\boldsymbol{a} \in \mathbb{F}^{n'-n}$, it holds that $\boldsymbol{\mu} \cdot H_{n',n} = (\boldsymbol{\mu} + \boldsymbol{a} \cdot D_{n'-n,n}) \cdot H_{n',n}$. As $\boldsymbol{\mu}$ is a uniformly random noise vector with k non-zero coordinates over $\mathbb{F}^{n'}$ (given that the simulated K_1 is independent of $\boldsymbol{\mu}$), it holds that $\boldsymbol{\mu} + \boldsymbol{a} \cdot D_{n'-n,n}$ is indistinguishable from a uniformly random vector over $\boldsymbol{n'}$, under the $\mathsf{LPN}(n'-n, n, t/n')$ over $\mathbb{F}$ (using the fact that the dual matrix of a uniformly random matrix is itself a uniformly random matrix). Therefore, the distribution of $\boldsymbol{\mu} \cdot H_{n',n}$ is indistinguishable from the distribution obtained by picking $\boldsymbol{a'} \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathbb{F}^{n'}$ and outputting $\boldsymbol{a'} \cdot H_{n',n}$, which is exactly the uniform distribution over $\mathbb{F}^n$. This concludes the proof of security of G_{dual}.

Efficiency. Instantiating the MPFSS with the PRG-based construction outlined in Section 2.2, the setup algorithm of G_{dual} outputs seeds of size $t \cdot (\lceil \log n \rceil (\lambda + 2) + \lambda + \log_2 |\mathbb{F}|)$ bits, which amounts to $\tilde{O}(t)$ field elements over a large field ($\log_2 |\mathbb{F}| = O(\lambda)$). The low-weight parity check attack on $\mathsf{LPN}(n' - n, n', t/n')$ takes time $O((n'/n)^t)$, the Gaussian elimination attack takes time $O(1/(1 - t/n')^{n'-n}) \approx O(e^{(n'-n) \cdot t/n'})$ when t/n' is sufficiently small, and the ISD attack takes time $2^{f(n/n') \cdot t}$, where $f(n/n') \approx -\log_2(1 - n/n')$ when t/n' is sufficiently small [TS16]. This implies that this approach leads to a VOLE generator with arbitrary expansion factor; furthermore, taking n' to be a small multiple of n, e.g. $n' = 2n$, leads to a (conjectured) security of $2^{O(t)}$ which does not degrade with the expansion factor (and depends only on the seed size t). However, expanding the seed

requires more work than for G_{primal}: it involves $t \cdot n'$ PRG evaluations and $O(n \cdot n') > n^2$ arithmetic operations.

Instantiating G_{dual} with parameters (t, n, n') over a field $\mathbb{F}$ yields a VOLE generator with seed length $t \cdot (\lceil \log n \rceil (\lambda + 2) + \lambda + \log_2 |\mathbb{F}|)$ bits and output length $2n$ group elements (for $\mathsf{Expand}(0, \cdot)$) or n group elements (for $\mathsf{Expand}(1, \cdot)$). This VOLE generator is (T, ε)-secure iff $\mathsf{LPN}(n' - n, n', t/n')$ with code $D_{n'-n,n}$ is (T', ε)-secure and the MPFSS is (T'', ε)-secure, with $T' = T - O(n' \cdot (t\lambda + n \log_2 |\mathbb{F}|))$ and $T'' = T - O(n' \cdot n \cdot \log_2 |\mathbb{F}|)$.

3.4 Optimizations via Structured Matrices

We describe optimizations to the VOLE generators described so far. These optimizations allow us to obtain VOLE generators with *constant computational overhead*.

A downside of using both G_{primal} and G_{dual} with a random code is that this incurs quadratic computational complexity. Ideally, we would like to be able to compute $G_{\mathsf{primal}}.\mathsf{Expand}$ and $G_{\mathsf{dual}}.\mathsf{Expand}$ in time $O(n)$ (counted as a number of arithmetic operations and PRG evaluations).

Note that the complexity of $G_{\mathsf{primal}}.\mathsf{Expand}$ and $G_{\mathsf{dual}}.\mathsf{Expand}$ is dominated by multiplication by the matrix $C_{k,n}$ (or $H_{n',n}$) as well as evaluation of $\mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval}$. In Section 4, we discuss optimization of $\mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval}$. We now discuss an approach for decreasing the cost of the matrix-vector multiplication. These optimizations together allow us to reduce the computational complexity of both VOLE generators from quadratic to linear in the size parameter n.

Primal construction A significant optimization of G_{primal} can be obtained by replacing the uniformly random matrix $C_{k,n}$ with a local linear code, where each column contains a small (constant) number of random non-zero coordinates. We note that using local alternatives to random linear encoding is relatively standard and is not known to weaken the security. Similar hardness conjectures were made in [Ale03, ADI+17]. Using such codes, computing $\boldsymbol{a} \cdot C_{k,n}$ for any vector $\boldsymbol{a}$ can be done using $O(n)$ arithmetic operations. Note that arithmetic pseudorandom generators with constant computational overhead can be obtained from the LPN assumption for some linear-time encodable code, see, e.g., [IKOS08]. This is needed for implementing the primal construction in linear time.

Dual construction In the dual case, we need the matrix $H_{n',n}$ to define a compressive linear mapping, such that the code whose parity-check matrix is $H_{n',n}$ satisfies the LPN assumption. There are several alternative possibilities to implement this compressive mapping in linear time, which we outline below.

- One possibility is to use the transpose of the (randomized) linear-time encodeable code from [DI14]. As discussed in [DI14], LPN is a plausible assumption for these linear-time encodable codes as well as their dual codes. Moreover, the (compressive) transpose mapping can be computed with the same circuit complexity as the encoding (cf. [IKOS08]).
- Alternatively, one can replace the code from [DI14] by an LDPC code. The parity-check matrix of an LDPC code is a sparse matrix, for which LPN is conjectured to hold [Ale03, ADI+17]. Furthermore, while a naive encoding of an LDPC code requires quadratic time, recent results have established the existence of very efficient linear-time encoding algorithms for LDPC codes, both in the binary case [LM10] and in the general case, for codes over arbitrary fields [KS12]. The latter requires at most $n' \cdot \mathsf{rw}(D_{n'-n,n}) + \mathsf{w}(D_{n'-n,n})$ field multiplications, where $D_{n'-n,n}$ is the parity check

matrix of $H_{n',n}$, $\mathsf{rw}(D_{n'-n,n})$ denotes the row-weight of $D_{n'-n,n}$, and $\mathsf{w}(D_{n'-n,n})$ denotes its total weight (i.e., the number of its non-zero elements); for $n' = O(n)$, this gives a linear time algorithm since $D_{n'-n,n}$ is sparse.
- Eventually, we observe that the only property we require from the encoding is to "sufficiently mix" the encoded vector: we do not require any structure or decoding properties. Hence, we conjecture that any suitable (linear-time) heuristic mixing strategy should work. A possibility is to apply a sequence of random atomic operations (switching two coordinates, multiplication by a constant, summing two coordinates). A better heuristic procedure (which achieves a better randomization with fewer steps) can be obtained using a mixing strategy based on expander graphs, such as the approach developped by Spielman in [Spi96].

4 MPFSS Constructions

An (n,t)-MPFSS for a multi-point function $f_{S,\boldsymbol{y}} : [n] \to \mathbb{G}$ can be readily constructed using t invocations to a DPF over $\mathbb{G}$:

- $\mathsf{MPFSS.Gen}(1^\lambda, f_{S,\boldsymbol{y}})$: denoting $s_1, \cdots, s_t$ (an arbitrary ordering of) the elements of S, for any $i \leq t$, compute $(K_0^i, K_1^i) \xleftarrow{\text{R}} \mathsf{DPF.Gen}(1^\lambda, f_{s_i,y_i})$, where f_{s_i,y_i} is the point function over $\mathbb{G}$ which evaluates to y_i on s_i and to 0 otherwise. Output $(K_0, K_1) \leftarrow ((K_0^i)_{i\leq t}, (K_1^i)_{i\leq t})$.
- $\mathsf{MPFSS.Eval}(\sigma, K_\sigma, x)$: parse K_σ as $(K_\sigma^i)_{i\leq t}$ and compute $z_\sigma \leftarrow \sum_{i=1}^t \mathsf{DPF.Eval}(\sigma, K_\sigma^i, x)$.

As with DPF, we can enhance an MPFSS with a full domain evaluation algorithm $\mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval}$ which, on input (σ, K_σ), outputs the vector $(\mathsf{MPFSS.Eval}(\sigma, K_\sigma, x))_{x\in[n]}$.

Plugging the construction of Theorem 2 leads to an (n,t)-MPFSS with key size $t \cdot (\lceil \log n \rceil(\lambda + 2) + \log_2 |\mathbb{G}|)$, where the computational cost of the evaluation algorithm is dominated by t group operations and $t\lceil \log n \rceil$ evaluations of a PRG, and the cost of a full domain evaluation is dominated by tn group operations and evaluations of a PRG.

4.1 Optimizing MPFSS Evaluation

The above simple reduction means that in $\mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval}$ the parties must make t passes over the entire domain $[n]$ for privately "writing" t entries (corresponding to the noisy coordinates) in a shared size-n vector. Below, we show how to improve this asymptotically, to writing a batch of t coordinates making a constant number of passes on the data. We discuss two alternatives: a concretely efficient approach which relies on a stronger (yet well-established) assumption than LPN, namely, the *regular syndrome decoding* assumption, and an asymptotically efficient approach using *batch codes* [IKOS04] which relies directly on LPN. Intuitively, the idea for the second approach is the following: evaluating $\mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval}$ on a vector shared between two parties can be seen as *writing* t entries (the noisy coordinates, known to the party who holds x) at secret locations (known to the other party), on a database secretly shared between the parties. A naive writing strategy makes t passes over the entire database, each pass writing a single entry at a secret position. Our goal, therefore, is to write a batch of t entries at secret positions using only a constant number of passes on the database.

A closely related problem involves secretly *reading* a batch of t secret entries from a database shared between several servers. This problem has been studied at length (see [IKOS04] and follow ups), and can be solved using a combinatorial object called *batch codes*. Our solution essentially applies the same strategy, formulating the task as a private writing problem, and shows that the same batch-code-based strategy can similarly be used for this related task.

Optimized MPFSS Evaluation using Regular Syndrome Decoding (RSD) The RSD assumption is a strengthening of the LPN assumption which was introduced in [AFS03] as the assumption underlying the security of a candidate for the SHA-3 competition, and which has been studied at length (see [HOSSV18] for a recent survey about the cryptanalysis of the RSD assumption and a detailed discussion about its security). It states that LPN remains hard, even if the sparse noise vector is *regular*, meaning that it is divided into t blocks of size n/t each, each block containing a single random 1, and zeroes everywhere else. Furthermore, there is a smooth tradeoff between the underlying assumption (from LPN to RSD) and the complexity (from tn to n operations): one can consider overlapping subsets instead of disjoint subsets, with larger subsets leading to a longer MPFSS evaluation time but a noise pattern closer to uniform (hence an assumption closest to plain LPN).

While the noise distribution obtained with this procedure is not uniform anymore, it seems to resist all known attacks [HOSSV18]. In particular, note that it is not broken by the attack of [AG10], (which, in particular, does not apply when we use random large enough overlapping subsets instead of small non-overlapping subsets): the attack of [AG10] requires at least a quadratic number of samples (note that for G_{dual}, the number of samples is $N + o(N)$, where $N = n' - n$ is the dimension).

Using a regular noise pattern instead of a random noise pattern directly allows to reduce $\mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval}$ to t calls to a DPF on length-n/t vectors, for a total cost of n operations in the underlying field $\mathbb{F}$ and at most $n(1 + \lceil \log |\mathbb{F}|/(\lambda + 2) \rceil)$ PRG evaluations [BGI16]. However, this comes at the cost of relying on the stronger RSD assumption; below, we outline an alternative strategy which also leads to an $O(n)$ cost, without relying on RSD.

Batch Codes. We first recall the definition of batch codes, from [IKOS04].

Definition 8 (Batch Code [IKOS04]). *An (n, N, t, m)-batch code over an alphabet Σ encodes any string $x \in \Sigma^n$ into an m-tuple of strings $(z_1, \cdots, z_m) \in \Sigma^*$ (called* buckets*) of total length N, such that any t-tuple of coordinates of x can be recovered by reading at most a single entry from each bucket.*

Specifically, we will rely on a *combinatorial batch code* (CBC) [IKOS04, SWP09], a special type of batch code in which an encoding of a string x consists only of replicating the coordinates of x over "buckets" (*i.e.*, each bucket contains a subset of the coordinates of x).

A CBC can be represented by a bipartite graph, with n left-nodes, m right-nodes, and N edges. Each string z_j, $j \in [m]$ corresponds to the j-th right-node, where the value of z_j is set to the concatenation of (x_i) for $i \in [n]$ such that (i, j) is an edge (with some canonical ordering). The CBC requirement states that any subset of t left-nodes has a matching to the m right nodes. By Hall's theorem, such a bipartite graph represents an (n, N, t, m)-CBC if and only if it satisfies the following weak expansion property: each subset S of at most t left-nodes has at least $|S|$ neighbors on the right.

From CBC to Better MPFSS Assume for now that, for given parameters t and $n = O(t^s)$ (for some constant expansion factor s), there is a $(n, N = O(n), t, m = t^{1+\varepsilon})$-CBC (for some constant $\varepsilon > 0$).

Loosely speaking we use such a batch code to construct an efficient $\mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval}$ by the following steps. Instead of t instances of DPF with domain size n, we will use m DPF instances, each with domain size $|z_j|$ (for $j \in [m]$). Namely, the multi-point function over $[n]$ maps $n - t$ inputs to 0 and t values to group elements. Concatenating these n values together we obtain a string x which can be batch-encoded into m strings $z_1, \ldots, z_m$

with total length N. By the property of batch codes the t points defined by the multi-point function can be recovered by reading one entry of each of the m strings. Therefore, $\mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval}$ can be implemented by running $\mathsf{DPF.FullEval}$ m times, with the domain size of the j-th invocation corresponding to the length of z_j for a total length of $O(N)$ (instead of total length tn in the simple reduction of $\mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval}$ to $\mathsf{DPF.FullEval}$). The details follow.

Let $T_1, \cdots, T_m \subset [n]$ denote the left neighbors of each right-node of the graph associated to the CBC. Let $f_{S,\boldsymbol{y}} : [n] \to \mathbb{F}$ be a t-point function, with $S = \{s_1, \cdots, s_t\}$. Let $\mathsf{DPF} = (\mathsf{DPF.Gen}, \mathsf{DPF.Eval}, \mathsf{DPF.FullEval})$ be a function secret sharing for the class of all point functions from $|z_j|$ to $\mathbb{F}$.

- $\mathsf{MPFSS.Gen}(1^\lambda, f_{S,\boldsymbol{y}})$: let $I = \{i_1, \cdots, i_m\}$ denote a size-m subset of $[n]$ such that $i_j \in T_j$ for any $j \leq m$, and $S \subset I$ (such a subset necessarily exists by definition of a CBC). For $j = 1$ to m, define $f_j : [|z_j|] \to \mathbb{F}$ to be the following function: if there exists ℓ such that $s_\ell = i_j$, f_j is the point function that outputs y_ℓ on i_j, and 0 otherwise. Else, f_j is the all-zero function, which is a point function with a 0 value defined for the designated point. Compute $(K_0^j, K_1^j) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{DPF.Gen}(1^\lambda, f_j)$. Output $(K_0, K_1) \leftarrow ((K_0^j)_{i \leq m}, (K_1^j)_{i \leq m})$.
- $\mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval}(\sigma, K_\sigma)$: parse K_σ as $(K_\sigma^j)_{i \leq m}$. Output

$$\boldsymbol{\alpha} = \sum_{j=1}^{m} \mathsf{DPF.FullEval}(\sigma, K_\sigma^j).$$

The correctness of the above construction immediately follows from the CBC property. Regarding efficiency, a key that $\mathsf{MPFSS.Gen}$ outputs is slightly longer compared to the simple construction outlined in the beginning of this section (the length is $O(t(\lambda\lceil \log n \rceil + \log |G|))$ in the simple construction and $O(t^{1+\varepsilon}(\lambda\lceil \log n/t \rceil + \log |G|))$ in the batch-code based construction). However, the computational cost of the simple construction is dominated by $O(tn)$ PRG evaluations while the batch-code based method requires $O(\sum_{j=1}^{m} |z_i|) = O(n)$ PRG evaluations saving a factor of $O(t)$ in computation.

Instantiating CBC. Unfortunately, known explicit constructions of (provable) expander graphs fail to match our efficiency requirements. We outline below two standard ways of getting around this issue.

- First, consider a random construction of the graph, as follows: pick any constant ε, set $d \leftarrow (1+s) \cdot \varepsilon + 1$, and $m \leftarrow t^{1+\varepsilon}$. For each left-node u, repeat the following d times: pick a uniformly random right-node v, and add the edge (u, v) to the graph if it does not already exist. By a standard union bound, with probability at least $1 - t^{-2(d-1)}$, the graph will satisfy the required expansion property. Note that this is a one-time setup, which fails with a probability $1/t^{\Omega(d)}$ that can be made as small as we want, and which is independent of both the running time of any adversary, and the number of executions of the MPFSS algorithms.
- Second, one can consider a heuristic approach using some fixed sequence of bits (say, e.g., the digits of π) and interpreting it as the graph of a (n, N, k, m)-CBC under some fixed translation. Assuming that this heuristic leads to a graph with the required expansion property can be viewed as a relatively weak combinatorial assumption, which we refer to as the existence of *explicit polynomially unbalanced bipartite expanders*. This assumption has been made (either explicitly or implicitly) in prior works on expander-based cryptography [Gol00, IKOS08, App12, AL16, ADI+17].

Indeed, in the context of this work, this issue is in fact even less of a concern. Observe that if the graph of the CBC fails to be sufficiently expanding then the noise distribution will slightly deviate from being uniform. However, the LPN assumption for such slightly skewed noise distributions remains a very conservative assumption. Therefore, we get the following guarantee: either a simple combinatorial assumption holds, and our VOLE generators are secure under the standard LPN assumption; or it fails, in which case our VOLE generators remain secure assuming a plausible variant of LPN.

5 Efficiency of VOLE Generation

In this section, we discuss the asymptotic and concrete efficiency we can obtain with the VOLE generators G_{primal} and G_{dual}.

We start with asymptotic efficiency. Using an "LPN-friendly" code which is linear-time encodable (alternatively, its dual is linear-time encodable for the dual construction), and using the CBC-based MPFSS (alternatively, using the "regular noise" variant of LPN, as in Section 4.1) our VOLE generators can be computed using $O(n)$ arithmetic operations. This is captured by the following theorem.

Theorem 9. *Assume the existence of explicit constant-degree polynomially unbalanced bipartite expanders (see Section 4.1). Then the following holds.*

- **Primal.** *For any $\varepsilon > 0$ and $1 < c < 2$, under the $\mathsf{LPN}(n^{1/c}, n, n^{\varepsilon-1/c})$ assumption over $\mathbb{F}$ for a linear-time encodable code, there exists a VOLE generator G_{primal} over $\mathbb{F}$ with seed length $n^{1/c}$ field elements and output length n.*
- **Dual.** *For any $\varepsilon > 0$ and $c > 1$, under the $\mathsf{LPN}(n/2, n, n^{\varepsilon-1/c})$ assumption over $\mathbb{F}$ for a code whose dual H is linear-time encodable, there exists a VOLE generator G_{dual} over $\mathbb{F}$ with seed length $n^{1/c}$ field elements and output length n.*

In both cases, computation of G requires $O(n)$ field operations. Furthermore, using the regular syndrome decoding assumption instead of LPN (with the same parameters) removes the need for explicit expanders.

We note that the random local encoding of Alekhnovich or the code ensemble from [DI14] (see [ADI+17] and Section 3.4) can be used to instantiate the linear-time LPN assumption.

5.1 Minimizing Seed Size

We turn to analyze the concrete efficiency of our VOLE generators, starting with a concrete optimization of the seed size. By the overview in Section 2.3, the three main attacks that apply in our setting are the inverse syndrom decoding (ISD) attack, the Gaussian elimination attack, and the low-weight parity-check attack. We represent on Table 1 and Table 2 the optimal choices of parameters to minimize the size of the seed for a given output size, for G_{primal} and G_{dual}, under the constraint that the corresponding LPN problem requires 2^{80} arithmetic operations to be solved with either low-weight parity check, Gaussian elimination, or ISD. The corresponding seed size is counted as a number of field elements (bitsize divided by 128) to facilitate comparison with the trivial solution (directly sharing the output vector-OLE). Ratio is n divided by the seed size (in field elements); it measures the gain in storage with respect to the trivial solution.

For G_{primal}, the corresponding LPN instance is $\mathsf{LPN}(k, n, t)$, where n is the target output size, t is the number of noisy coordinates, and k is the message length of the code. The seed length is $t \cdot (\lceil \log n \rceil (\lambda+2)/\log_2 |\mathbb{F}| + \lambda) + t + k$. Setting $\lambda = \log_2 |\mathbb{F}| = 128$, the optimal seed

size is obtained by solving a 2-dimensional optimization problem over the integers, with constraints $0 \leq k \leq n$, $0 \leq t \leq n$, and the constraints given by the requirement that the low-weight parity check attack, the Gaussian elimination attack, and the ISD attack, all require at least 2^{80}. This is a highly non-convex constrained optimization problem, with a very large number of local minima, making the estimation of the global minimum relatively complex. We used extensive numerical analysis to compute (close to) minimal seed sizes offering 80 bits of security against each of the attacks; in Table 1, we report values (t, k) at which a local minimum is attained, which is expected to be very close to the global minimum.

For G_{dual}, the corresponding LPN instance is $\mathsf{LPN}(n'-n, n', t/n')$, where n is the target output size, t is the number of noisy coordinates, and n' is a parameter that can be set arbitrarily. We let $c \leftarrow n'/n$; the seed size is equal to $(t \cdot \lceil \log_2 n \rceil \cdot (\lambda+2) + \lambda)/\log_2 |\mathbb{F}| + 1$. We give in Table 2 the minimal value of t (the number of noisy coordinates), for fixed n and $c = n'/n$, such that all three attacks (ISD, Gaussian, parity-check) require at least 2^{80} operations with the above analysis. We arbitrarily set $c = 4$; higher values of c allow to choose slightly smaller values for t, leading to slightly reduced seed sizes, but negatively impact the computational efficiency.

Below, we provide formulas to upper-bound the cost of all three attacks in our setting. We consider an LPN instance with dimension n_0, number of queries n_1, and number of noisy coordinates t. The bounds for G_{primal} are obtained by setting $(n_0, n_1) \leftarrow (k, n)$. The bounds for G_{dual} are obtained by setting $(n_0, n_1) \leftarrow (n'-n, n')$.

Gaussian Elimination. The Gaussian elimination attack requires on average $(1/(1 - t/n_1))^{n_0}$ iterations, where the adversary must invert an $n_0 \times n_0$ matrix, which takes time at least $n_0^{2.8}$ using Strassen's matrix multiplication algorithm (algorithms with a smaller exponent perform less well in our range of parameters, due to their huge hidden constants). The entry "Gaussian cost" in Table 1 and Table 2 provides a lower bound on the bit-security of the LPN instance with respect to the Gaussian elimination attack, computed as

$$\log_2 \left(n_0^{2.8} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{1 - t/n_1} \right)^{n_0} \right).$$

Low-Weight Parity-Check. The low-weight parity-check attack requires $(n_1/(n_1 - n_0 - 1))^t$ iterations on average, where at each iteration the adversary must compute a weight-(n_0+1) parity-check, which requires (n_0+1) arithmetic operations. The entry "parity-check cost" in Table 1 and Table 2 provides a lower bound on the bit-security of the LPN instance with respect to the low-weight parity check attack, computed as

$$\log_2 \left((n_0 + 1) \cdot \left(\frac{n_1}{n_1 - n_0 - 1} \right)^t \right).$$

Inverse Syndrome Decoding. We now turn our attention to the ISD attack. Many variants of the attack have been developped in the past years, and the asymptotic costs of these attacks are often non-trivial to estimate. However, in our parametter setting, the noise rate t/n_1 is tiny, and the advantages of the variants of the original algorithm of Prange [Pra62] vanish in this situation, as shown in the analysis of [TS16]. We will therefore focus on bounding the cost of the original algorithm of Prange; since we will find this attack to have much worst performances than the Gaussian elimination and low-weight parity-check attacks, this leaves a large security gap. We rely on the detailed concrete efficiency

Table 1. Optimal parameters of G_{primal} for a given output size n. Both the security parameter λ and the bitsize of field elements $\log_2 |\mathbb{F}|$ are set to 128. The parameters are optimized under the constraint that solving the corresponding LPN instance must require at least 2^{80} arithmetic operations with either low-weight parity check, Gaussian elimination, or ISD.

n	t	k	ISD cost	Gaussian cost	parity-check cost	seed size	ratio
2^{10}	57	652	115	80	93	1288	0.8
2^{12}	98	1589	104	85	80	2881	1.4
2^{14}	198	3482	108	94	80	6495	2.5
2^{16}	389	7391	112	99	80	14101	4.6
2^{18}	760	15336	117	103	80	29990	8.7
2^{20}	1419	32771	121	106	80	63013	16.6
2^{22}	2735	67440	126	108	80	131285	31.9

Table 2. Optimal parameters of G_{dual} for a given output size n. Both the security parameter λ and the bitsize of field elements $\log_2 |\mathbb{F}|$ are set to 128. The parameters are optimized under the constraint that solving the corresponding LPN instance must require at least 2^{80} arithmetic operations with either low-weight parity check, Gaussian elimination, or ISD.

n	t	$c = n'/n$	ISD cost	Gaussian cost	parity-check cost	seed size	ratio
2^{10}	44	4	117	80	100	535	1.9
2^{12}	39	4	112	80	92	553	7.4
2^{14}	34	4	107	80	84	551	29.7
2^{16}	32	4	109	84	82	584	112
2^{18}	31	4	112	88	82	629	417
2^{20}	30	4	116	93	82	669	1566
2^{22}	29	4	120	97	82	706	5941

analysis of ISD given in [HOSSV18], which shows that the bit-security of the LPN instance with respect to Prange's algorithm is upper-bounded by

$$\log_2 \left(\frac{\binom{n_1}{t}}{\binom{n_1-n_0}{t}} \cdot (n_1 - n_0)^{2.8} \right),$$

using again Strassen's algorithm for the Gaussian elimination step. We use this upper bound to calculate the entry "ISD cost" in Table 1 and Table 2. The ratios obtained in Table 1 and Table 2 show that G_{dual} performs considerably better than G_{primal} in terms of optimal seed size; however, this comes at the cost of a worst computational efficiency.

5.2 Time-Complexity Optimizations

In this section, we describe optimizations that improve the computational efficiency of G_{primal} and G_{dual}. While using uniformly random matrices $C_{k,n}$ and $H_{n',n}$ in G_{primal} and G_{dual} reduces their security to the standard LPN assumption, this choice is wasteful in terms of computation since a random linear mapping takes quadratic time to compute. We discuss different methods to improve the computational complexity by using LPN-friendly codes that are efficiently encodable.

Efficiently Encodable LPN-Friendly Codes. While the standard LPN assumption is defined with respect to uniformly random linear codes, it is common to assume the hardness of LPN with respect to other kinds of codes. We list below a few possible alternatives.

– *Local Codes.* The hardness of LPN for *local* linear codes is a well-established assumption [Ale03]. A local linear code with a (constant) locality parameter d is one where

each codeword symbol is a linear combination of d message symbols. Equivalently, each row of the generating matrix has at most d nonzero entries. Such local codes have a trivial linear-time encoding algorithm. Consider implementing G_{primal} with a d-local code. By the analysis of [ADI+17], picking $d = 10$ leads to a reasonable security level with respect to known attacks, provided that the dimension is sufficiently large (as it will be in our concrete estimations). With a d-local code, the primal linear mapping can be computed using $d \cdot n$ multiplications over $\mathbb{F}$.

However, local codes cannot be used with G_{dual}: in G_{dual}, we require the dual code to be LPN-friendly. The dual code of a local code is an LDPC code, for which efficient decoding algorithms exist, hence LPN does not hold with respect to such codes.

- *LDPC Codes.* An alternative that works for G_{dual} is to use the transpose of an LDPC encoder (we need to transpose since we want to define a compressing mapping), hence obtaining a security reduction to the hardness of LPN with respect to local codes [Ale03]. While the encoding matrix of an LDPC code is not sparse, it admits a linear-time encoding algorithms over arbitrary fields [KS12]. By the transposition principle (see e.g. [Bor57, IKOS08]) the transposed mapping can be computed with essentially the same circuit complexity as the encoding (it essentially consists in reversing the computation while interchanging XORs and fan-out operations). Using this code, computing the compressive linear mapping requires at most $d \cdot (2n' - n)$ multiplications (since it is bounded by $n' \cdot \mathsf{rw}(D_{n'-n,n}) + \mathsf{w}(D_{n'-n,n})$, $\mathsf{rw}(D_{n'-n,n}) = d$, see Section 3.4, and $\mathsf{w}(D_{n'-n,n}) < (n' - n) \cdot \mathsf{rw}(D_{n'-n,n}) = d \cdot (n' - n)$). Using $n' = c \cdot n$ gives a cost of $(2c - 1) \cdot d \cdot n$ multiplications over $\mathbb{F}$, where here too we choose $d = 10$.
- *MDPC Codes.* A more conservative variant of the above is to rely on MDPC codes (medium-density parity-check codes), where the parity-check matrix has row weight $O(\sqrt{n})$ (instead of constant). MDPC codes have been thoroughly studied, since they are used in optimized variants of the famous McEliece cryptosystem [MTSB12].
- *Quasi-Cyclic Codes.* A third alternative option is to rely on quasi-cyclic codes, which admit fast (albeit superlinear) encoding algorithms. Quasi-cyclic codes have been recently used to construct optimized variants of the LPN-based cryptosystem of Alekhnovich and the code-based cryptosystem of McEliece [ABD+16, MBD+18].
- *Druk-Ishai Codes.* Another possibility is to rely on the linear-time encodable codes developped by Druk and Ishai in [DI14]. Their construction of linear-time encodable code is essentially a concatenation of good a linear encoding and its transpose, intertwined with random local mixing. This design strategy leads to codes satisfying the combinatorial properties of random linear codes (e.g. meeting the Gilbert-Varshamov bound) and do not support efficient decoding, while having a fast (linear-time) encoding algorithm; this makes it a strong candidate in our scenario.
- *Other Codes.* As mentioned in Section 3.4, many other alternatives can be envisioned: since we do not require the code to have structure, or decoding algorithms. Therefore, any sufficiently good heuristic mixing strategy (e.g. a strategy based on expander graphs, such as the approach developped by Spielman in [Spi96]) will likely lead to a secure LPN instance in our setting.

In the following, we will provide time-complexity estimations for the computational efficiency of G_{primal} and G_{dual}. In our estimates, we will consider implementing G_{primal} with a local code (with $d = 10$) and G_{dual} with an LDPC code (with $d = 10$). Other choices of codes would lead to different running times; in particular, more conservative choices (quasi-cyclic codes, MDPC codes) should lead to worst performances (albeit remaining quite efficient), and Druk-Ishai codes should lead to somewhat comparable performances

(but this would heavily depend on the exact choice of parameters, since Druk-Ishai codes are a family of codes, and not a specific code).

Simplified Full Domain Evaluation. To unify the discussion, we define m to be equal to n in the case of G_{primal}, and to $n' = c \cdot n$ in the case of G_{dual}. We described in Section 4.1 a strategy to optimize the full evaluation procedure of the MPFSS. Using, e.g., the RSD-based solution, the entire cost of $\mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval}$ is $2m$ PRG evaluations for field sizes that are roughly the size of the security parameter.

Time Complexity Estimates. The computational cost of our VOLE generators is dominated by computing a linear mapping over the field $\mathbb{F}$ and by computing $\mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval}$. The following estimates of the running time are *not* based on an actual implementation. Instead, they are based on the cost of standard arithmetic and cryptographic operations on a powerful personal computer, using benchmarks available in the literature for the running time of these operations. We believe that our parameters should not incur significant cache misses, however this has not been empirically validated. Our reported numbers should therefore be viewed as rough estimates that count only the cost of atomic operations on the standard hardware specified below.

Emmart et al. [ELWW16] report 12.2 billion modular multiplications per second over a field $\mathbb{F}_p$ for a 128-bit prime p using a common graphics card (Nvidia GTX 980 Ti). Hence, the linear mapping can be performed in approximately $T/(12.2 \cdot 10^9)$ seconds on a personal computer with the appropriate graphics card (note that this estimation ignores cache-misses), where T is the number of multiplications over $\mathbb{F}$ (for example, $T = d \cdot n$ using a d-local code for G_{primal}, and $T \leq (2c-1)d \cdot n$ using an LDPC code for G_{dual} with $n' = cn$).

Implementing the PRG using AES[3], each PRG evaluation amounts to 2 calls to AES (hence 256 bits of AES ciphertexts). A computer equipped with an Intel i7-6700 can encrypt 2607 megabytes per second using AES-128-GCM.[4] Therefore, a computer equipped with the same processor can execute a heuristically optimized full domain evaluation, dominated by $4m$ AES encryption operations in $m/(4.27 \cdot 10^7)$ seconds. We report running time estimates for G_{primal} and G_{dual} in Table 3.

As an example for this estimate, consider a VOLE output size of 2^{20} field elements for a prime field with a 128-bit prime. In the primal generator, the linear mapping part requires $d \cdot 2^{20}/12.2 \cdot 10^9 \approx 0.085 \cdot d$ milliseconds. In the same setting, the MPFSS scheme uses $4 \cdot 2^{20}$ AES operations which require 24.5 milliseconds. Taken together the time for the primal VOLE generation for P_1 is approximately $0.085 \cdot d + 24.5$ milliseconds (e.g. for $d = 10$, the running time is approximaltely 25.4 milliseconds; it's slightly larger for P_0, since P_0 must evaluate a linear mapping twice). For the dual generator with the same n and $\mathbb{F}$ we have that $m = c \cdot 2^{20}$ (denoting $c = n'/n$) and therefore the linear mapping takes $(2c-1) \cdot 2^{20} \cdot d/12.2 \cdot 10^9 \approx (2c-1) \cdot 0.085d$ ms, $\mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval}$ takes $c \cdot 24.5$ ms and the total is $(2c-1) \cdot 0.085d + c \cdot 24.5$ ms (e.g. for $c = 4$ and $d = 10$, we get 102ms).

Note that for a smaller field size, e.g. a prime field of length 64 bits, the $\mathsf{MPFSS.FullEval}$ is about twice as fast, using the "early termination" optimization of [BGI16]. This opti-

[3] The PRG can either be defined to use AES in counter mode, i.e. $\mathrm{PRG}(s)$ is $\mathrm{AES}_{s||0}(0)$, $\mathrm{AES}_{s||0}(1)$ for a seed $s \in \{0,1\}^{127}$ or a fixed key alternative $\mathrm{AES}_{k_0}(s||0) \oplus s||0$, $\mathrm{AES}_{k_1}(s||0) \oplus s||0$ for fixed keys k_0, k_1. The choice of AES is motivated by the hardware support for AES encryption and decryption in modern CPUs.

[4] See `https://calomel.org/aesni_ssl_performance.html`. Note that using AES-GCM is an overkill here, since fixed-key AES suffices for distributed point functions, hence this choice leads to a conservative estimate.

Table 3. Estimated running time of G_{primal} and G_{dual}, for a 128-bit field size. G_{primal} is instantiated with a local code, while G_{dual} is instantiated with an LDPC code. We use $d = 10$ and $c = 4$ in the calculations. We use the reported number [ELWW16] of 12.2 billion modular multiplications per second using a common graphics card (Nvidia GTX 980 Ti), and the reported number of 2607 megabytes per second using AES-128-GCM over an Intel i7-6700 processor (see the footnote).

G_{primal}

n	2^{10}	2^{12}	2^{14}	2^{16}	2^{18}	2^{20}	2^{22}
Linear Mapping (ms)	0.001	0.003	0.013	0.054	0.21	0.86	3.44
Full domain evaluation (ms)	0.024	0.10	0.38	1.53	6.14	24.5	98.2
Total running time for P_0 (ms)	0.026	0.11	0.41	1.65	6.56	26.3	105
Total running time for P_1 (ms)	0.025	0.10	0.40	1.59	6.35	25.4	102

G_{dual}

n	2^{10}	2^{12}	2^{14}	2^{16}	2^{18}	2^{20}	2^{22}
Linear Mapping (ms)	0.006	0.02	0.09	0.38	1.50	6.02	24.1
Full domain evaluation (ms)	0.10	0.38	1.53	6.14	24.5	98.2	393
Total running time for P_0 (ms)	0.11	0.43	1.72	6.89	27.6	110	441
Total running time for P_1 (ms)	0.10	0.41	1.63	6.51	26.1	104	417

Table 4. Actual running times for evaluating a compressive quasi-cyclic mapping which maps $4n$ ring elements to n ring elements, over a ring whose modulus is a product of two 62-bit primes, on one core of a personal computer equipped with a 2.8 GHz Intel i7-7600U.

n	2^{10}	2^{12}	2^{14}	2^{16}	2^{18}	2^{20}
QC-code encoding (ms)	0.14	0.67	2.9	14.4	66	338

mization results (for $\lambda = 127$ and $|\mathbb{F}| \leq 2^{64}$) in halving the time of MPFSS.FullEval and therefore requiring about 13 ms for the primal generator (with $d = 10$ and $n = 2^{20}$).

Conservative Estimates from Quasi-Cyclic Codes. The above estimates are based on reported running times for field multiplications, and ignore potential cache-misses. We complement the above estimation with a much more conservative estimate, based on the actual running time for encoding with quasi-cyclic codes. Quasi-cyclic codes exhibit good performances, although they perform much worse than LDPC codes or sparse codes (in particular, they do not admit linear-time encoding). Therefore, the numbers below should only be seen as a (very) conservative upper-bound on the running time of the linear-mapping part (the running times given in the previous paragraphs for the full domain evaluation are already conservative).

The encoding with quasi-cyclic codes were ran on one core of a personal computer equipped with a 2.8 GHz Intel i7-7600U, with simple preprocessing and optimizations to reduce the number of NTTs, using the library NFLLib. It is likely that the numbers could be further improved with additional optimizations. The running time estimates are reported on Table 4. As shown by the table, the actual running time of the linear mapping for G_{dual} with (non-heavily optimized) quasi-cyclic codes is about twenty times slower than our estimates with LDPC codes. For example, for $n = 2^{20}$, the total running time for P_0 would be about 437 ms. We note that using variants of LPN with quasi-cyclic codes has been widely investigated in the literature.

5.3 Distributed Generation of MPFSS

So far we thought of the VOLE generator Setup as being performed by a trusted dealer who samples and sends seed_0 and seed_1 to the respective parties. In practice, the trusted dealer can be emulated via secure two-party computation. For both of our VOLE generator constructions, the complexity of Setup is dominated by the execution of MPFSS.Gen which in turn consists of a series of executions of DPF.Gen. More specifically, for each DPF.Gen, one party (VOLE sender) selects and knows the *position* of the designated DPF point and the *evaluation* of the DPF is taken to be the product of the noise value y_i known to the VOLE sender and the secret x known to the second party (VOLE receiver). Note that this is also the case for the batch-code based and RSD based constructions of MPFSS.

In the DPF.Gen construction of [BGI16] for point functions over the domain $\mathbb{F}^n$ the two output keys are $K_0 = (s_0^{(0)}, cw_1, \ldots, cw_{\nu+1})$ and $K_1 = (s_1^{(0)}, cw_1, \ldots, cw_{\nu+1})$ where $s_0^{(0)}, s_1^{(0)}$ are two random seeds for the PRG and $\nu = \min\{\lceil \log n - \log \frac{\lambda}{\log |\mathbb{F}|} \rceil, \log n\}$. Gen proceeds in $\nu+1$ steps. In the i-th step it expands $s_0^{(i-1)}$ and $s_1^{(i-1)}$ by using one PRG invocation for each seed and obtains $s_0^{(i)}, s_1^{(i)}$ and cw_i. In the final step the algorithm computes $cw_{\nu+1}$ as a function of the expanded seeds and the target value. We discuss and analyze two different approaches for distributing DPF.Gen.

Generic 2PC. Any protocol for 2PC can be used to compute the output of Gen securely. Both the communication and computation of the protocol are dominated by two factors: $\lambda+\nu$ OTs for a seed and location of the designated point and by $2(\nu+\mu)$ secure evaluations of the PRG for $\mu = \lceil \frac{\log |\mathbb{G}|}{\lambda+2} \rceil$. Setting $\lambda = 127$ and the PRG to two AES evaluations, as suggested previously, results in $127 + \nu$ OTs and $4(\nu + \mu)$ secure evaluations of AES (with secret-shared inputs and outputs).

Assume that securely evaluating AES is implemented by an efficient protocol such as [RR16] or [WRK17]. Wang, Ranellucci and Katz [WRK17] use an Amazon EC2 c4.8xlarge instance over a LAN, with statistical security parameter $\rho = 2^{-40}$, and securely evaluate a single AES instance in 16.6 milliseconds, while the amortized cost of 1024 AES evaluations is 6.66 milliseconds in the malicious model. In the semi-honest model they achieve a single evaluation in 2.1 milliseconds. The evaluation of the base OTs for an AES evaluation requires about 20 milliseconds. OT extension beyond the base OTs can be done at much higher rate, 500,000 per second in [NNOB12].

The amortized communication complexity reported in [WRK17] for securely computing an AES circuit in the malicious model is 2.62 Mbytes. In the semi-honest model, assuming an AES circuit of 6800 AND gates [WRK17] and using the free-XOR [KS08] and half-gate [ZRE15] optimizations, the garbled circuit is of size $6800 \cdot 2 \cdot 16 = 217.6$ Kbytes.

Assuming that the amortized cost of an AES evaluation for our likely range of parameters, i.e. several hundred AES evaluations, is about 7 milliseconds in the malicious setting implies that the total execution time of the protocol (without OT) is about $28(\nu + \mu)$ milliseconds in the malicious setting and $8.4(\nu+\mu)$ milliseconds in the semi-honest setting.

For example, if $n = 2^{20}$ and $|\mathbb{F}| \leq 2^{128}$ then $\nu = 20, \mu = 1$ and by Table 2 the number of times that DPF.Gen is executed in the dual generator is $t = 30$. Therefore, the running time in the malicious setting is estimated to be $30 \cdot 588$ ms for computing AES circuits and $20 + 30(21 + 127)/500000$ ms for the OTs, which together give roughly 18 seconds. The running time in the semi-honest setting is roughly 5 seconds. The total communication in the malicious setting is about 78.6 Mbytes and the total communication in the semi-honest setting is 6.5 Mbytes.[5]

[5] The OTs add only marginally to this number, see calculation in the next section.

These numbers can be further improved using an MPC-friendly PRG with few AND gates instead of AES; e.g., using LowMC [ARS+15] would give approximately a 23-time improvement for communication and computation of the setup.

Black-Box Approach. The most expensive part of using generic 2PC to distribute DPF.Gen is the multiple evaluations of AES. An alternative approach which treats the PRG as a black box was offered by Doerner and shelat in [DS17]. The method works only in the semi-honest model, but in that model it is quite competitive with the generic 2PC approach for concrete parameter ranges of interest.

The idea is to compute the seed by a communication round for each level of the tree described by DPF.FullEval. In each such level, if both parties expand all the strings in the level then the only difference between the expanded strings is the result of the two expanded seeds along the path to the designated point. That difference is exactly maintained if each party XORs all the left children into one 128-bit string and all the right children into another 128-bit string. Computing the correction cw_i for the i-th level is possible using two OTs of 129-bit strings. In our case, where one party knows the location of the special path (as opposed to secret shares of the path bits, as in [DS17]), this can be further simplified to just one string OT per level.

The total computation time of this protocol to distribute DPF.Gen is dominated by $(\nu + 1)$ string OTs for 129-bit strings and $2^{\nu+1}$ locally computed AES operations. The communication is dominated by the $(\nu + 1)$ string OTs. Using the RSD assumption with output n' and noise t/n' (where $n' = c \cdot n$; we choose as before $c = 4$ in our estimations), the seed which the distributed Gen algorithm outputs is exactly t seeds of DPF.Gen with output length n'/t. Therefore, the running time and communication of the protocol are dominated by $t(\nu_t + 1)$ OTs for $\nu_t = \min\{\lceil \log n'/t - \log \frac{\lambda}{\log |\mathbb{F}|} \rceil, \log n'/t\}$ and $t2^{\nu_t+1}$ local AES operations.

For the example of output size $n = 2^{20}$ and field size $|\mathbb{F}| \leq 2^{128}$ we get for the dual generator that $t = 30$ and $\nu_t = 17$. Therefore, the distributed generation protocol requires $18 \cdot 30 = 540$ OTs and 2.23 million AES operations.

Using the previous estimate of 2607 MBPS for AES on a standard PC we get that the computation requires about 13 ms for the AES operations and about 20 ms for the OTs or 23 ms together. The communication for each of the base OTs can be as low as $4 \cdot 256$ bits using the Naor-Pinkas OT [NP01] and for the rest of the OTs $\lambda + 2m$ for a security parameter λ and string length m, which can be reduced to $\lambda + m$ since we only require correlated OTs [ALSZ13]. Since in our case $\lambda = 128$ and $m = 129$ the communication complexity of this protocol is 27 Kbytes.

6 Applications

As discussed in the Introduction, VOLE generators can be used as a general-purpose tool in any application that benefits from large VOLE instances. We discuss several such applications below.

6.1 Secure Arithmetic Computation

There are numerous applications of secure computation that benefit from representing the function being computed as an arithmetic circuit. See, e.g., [IPS09, MZ17, ADI+17, DGN+17, JVC18] and reference therein. Many of these applications involve multiplying a secret scalar by a secret vector, where the two inputs can either be held by a single party of

secret-shared by the two parties. Such scalar-vector multiplication is a useful building block for more complex protocols that involve matrix-vector or matrix-matrix multiplication.

More concretely, suppose that a scalar $x \in \mathbb{F}$ and vector $\boldsymbol{u} \in \mathbb{F}^n$ are additively shared between P_0 and P_1. Let x_0, x_1 and $\boldsymbol{u}_0, \boldsymbol{u}_1$ denote the shares. Then, an additive sharing of $x \cdot \boldsymbol{u}$ can be obtained via two invocations of VOLE, by breaking the product $(x_0+x_1)(\boldsymbol{u}_0+\boldsymbol{u}_1)$ into four terms and using the two VOLE instances to obtain additive shares of the cross-terms $x_0 \cdot \boldsymbol{u}_1$ and $x_1 \cdot \boldsymbol{u}_0$ (the other two terms can be computed locally). Other than being directly useful for secure linear algebra, this sub-protocol can be used to speed up protocols for arithmetic circuits that have a large multiplication fan-out.

Vector OLE from Pseudorandom VOLE Generator. We now describe and analyze the standard method for converting random VOLE into standard VOLE (cf. [IPS09]), and prove its security when using the output of the VOLE generator to produce a random VOLE. This justifies the security notion of VOLE generators we put forward in Definition 5.

We start by recalling the standard protocol for implementing VOLE from an ideal random VOLE correlation.

Preprocessing. A trusted dealer picks $(\boldsymbol{r_u}, \boldsymbol{r_v}, r_x) \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{F}^n \times \mathbb{F}^n \times \mathbb{F}$, sets $\boldsymbol{r_w} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{r_u} r_x + \boldsymbol{r_v}$, and outputs $(\boldsymbol{r_u}, \boldsymbol{r_v})$ to P_0 and $(\boldsymbol{r_w}, r_x)$ to P_1.
Input. P_0 has input $(\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v})$, and P_1 has input x.
Protocol. P_1 sends $m_x \leftarrow x - r_x$. P_0 sends $\boldsymbol{m_u} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{u} - \boldsymbol{r_u}$ and $\boldsymbol{m_v} \leftarrow m_x \boldsymbol{r_u} + \boldsymbol{v} - \boldsymbol{r_v}$. P_1 outputs $\boldsymbol{w} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{m_u} x + \boldsymbol{m_v} + \boldsymbol{r_w}$.

Correctness: $\boldsymbol{w} = \boldsymbol{m_u} x + \boldsymbol{m_v} + \boldsymbol{r_w} = (\boldsymbol{u} - \boldsymbol{r_u})x + (x - r_x)\boldsymbol{r_u} + \boldsymbol{v} - \boldsymbol{r_v} + \boldsymbol{r_u} r_x + \boldsymbol{r_v} = \boldsymbol{u}x + \boldsymbol{v}$. Security is straightforward.

We now consider a modification of the above protocol that replaces the ideal random VOLE correlation by the output of the VOLE generator:

Preprocessing. A trusted dealer picks $r_x \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{F}$, proceeds to compute $(\mathsf{seed}_0, \mathsf{seed}_1) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, r_x)$, and outputs seed_0 to P_0 and (r_x, seed_1) to P_1.
Offline Expansion. P_0 computes $(\boldsymbol{r_u}, \boldsymbol{r_v}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Expand}(0, \mathsf{seed}_0)$ and P_1 computes $\boldsymbol{r_w} \leftarrow \mathsf{Expand}(1, \mathsf{seed}_1)$.
Input. P_0 has input $(\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v})$, and P_1 has input x.
Protocol Π_{VOLE}. P_1 sends $m_x \leftarrow x - r_x$. P_0 sends $\boldsymbol{m_u} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{u} - \boldsymbol{r_u}$ and $\boldsymbol{m_v} \leftarrow m_x \boldsymbol{r_u} + \boldsymbol{v} - \boldsymbol{r_v}$. P_1 outputs $\boldsymbol{w} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{m_u} x + \boldsymbol{m_v} + \boldsymbol{r_w}$.

Correctness follows from the correctness of the VOLE generator and the same analysis as before.

Proposition 10. *Assuming* $(\mathsf{Setup}, \mathsf{Expand})$ *is a secure* VOLE *generator (as in Definition 5), the protocol* Π_{VOLE} *is a secure vector-*OLE *protocol in the preprocessing model.*

Proof. We exhibit a simulator Sim that generates a view indistinguishable from an honest run of the protocol as long as a single party is corrupted.

Case 1: P_0 is corrupted. In the preprocessing phase, Sim picks a random $r_x \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{F}$, computes $(\mathsf{seed}_0, \mathsf{seed}_1) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, r_x)$, and outputs seed_0 to P_0. In the online phase, Sim sends $m_x \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{F}$. Observe that the view of P_0 in this simulated protocol is perfectly equivalent to an honest run of the protocol where P_1 would pick a uniformly random r'_x and send $m_x \leftarrow x - r'_x$ instead of computing $m_x \leftarrow x - r_x$ using the random r_x received from the trusted dealer. This implies that distinguishing the simulated protocol from the real one is equivalent to distinguishing a run of the protocol with the random r_x picked by the

dealer from a run of the protocol with a fresh random r'_x. Therefore, the indistinguishability between the simulated protocol and the real protocol follows immediately from the first security requirement of the VOLE generator.

Case 2: P_1 is corrupted. In the preprocessing phase, Sim picks a random $r_x \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{F}$, computes $(\mathsf{seed}_0, \mathsf{seed}_1) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, r_x)$, and outputs (r_x, seed_1) to P_1. In the online phase, Sim receives m_x from P_1, and the target output $\boldsymbol{w}$ of P_1. Sim computes $\boldsymbol{r_w} \leftarrow \mathsf{Expand}(1, \mathsf{seed}_1)$, and sets $\boldsymbol{m_w} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{w} - \boldsymbol{r_w}$ and $x \leftarrow m_x + r_x$. Sim picks $\boldsymbol{m_u} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{F}^n$ and set $\boldsymbol{m_v} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{m_w} - \boldsymbol{m_v}x$. Sim sends $(\boldsymbol{m_u}, \boldsymbol{m_v})$ to P_1. The indistinguishability between the simulated protocol and the real protocol follows immediately from the second security requirement of the VOLE generator.

Malicious Security. An attractive feature of Π_{VOLE} is that as long as the preprocessing is trusted then Π_{VOLE} is secure against a malicious adversary. The reason is that if one of the players is corrupt then any deviation it makes from the protocol can be simulated by a corresponding change of input in the ideal model. This effectively means that our VOLE generator can be used as a plug-and-play alternative to ideal VOLE, as long as the setup implementation is secure (e.g., it is distributed between the parties using maliciously secure two-party computation).

In more detail, if P_1 is corrupted then since the only message it sends in the protocol is $m_x = x - r_x$ its only possible deviation is to change that message to some m'_x. The trusted setup outputs r_x and therefore an honest player would send the message m'_x on input $x' = m'_x + r_x$ and output $\boldsymbol{w'} = \boldsymbol{u}x' + \boldsymbol{v}$. As a consequence the simulator for P_1 with input x' in the semi-honest setting simulates the malicious adversary with input x, which proves that in this case the protocol is secure in the malicious setting.

If P_0 is corrupted then it can only output two messages $\boldsymbol{m'_u}$ and $\boldsymbol{m'_v}$ that are different from the real vectors. An honest player would send $\boldsymbol{m'_u}$ on input $\boldsymbol{u'} = \boldsymbol{m'_u} + \boldsymbol{r_u}$ and $\boldsymbol{m'_v}$ on input $\boldsymbol{v'} = \boldsymbol{m'_v} - \leftarrow m_x\boldsymbol{r_u} + \boldsymbol{r_v}$ and the output would be $\boldsymbol{w'} = \boldsymbol{u'}x + \boldsymbol{v'}$. Again there exists a simulator for a malicious adversary since a simulator exists in the semi-honest case with inputs $\boldsymbol{u'}$ and $\boldsymbol{v'}$.

Rate-1/2 VOLE protocol in the plain model. By distributing the setup of our (primal or dual) VOLE generators using general-purpose protocols for secure two-party computation, we get VOLE protocols in the plain model with attractive efficiency features. The protocols can be implemented in a constant number of rounds and have asymptotic communication rate of 1/2. That is, the communication complexity is dominated by the cost of communicating two vectors in $\mathbb{F}^n$. Using the dual construction, the protocol can be based on OT together with LPN with a linear number of samples $n = O(k)$ (in fact, $n = k + o(k)$ samples suffice) and a slightly sublinear noise ($n^{1-\epsilon}$ noisy samples). This is strictly better than the flavor of LPN known to imply public-key encryption [Ale03].

Combined with linear-time encodable LPN-friendly codes, we get VOLE protocols in the plain model that have constant computational overhead and make a black-box use of the underlying field. Compared to the recent constant-overhead VOLE protocols from [ADI+17], the protocol Π_{VOLE} obtained by combining Proposition 10 and Theorem 9 has the qualitative advantage of non-interactive generation and the quantitative advantage of asymptotic rate of 1/2 (compared to 1/3 in [ADI+17]). The underlying LPN assumption is similar but technically incomparable: our protocol requires LPN with a slightly sub-constant noise rate (compared to constant noise rate in [ADI+17]) but also uses a smaller number of samples (linear vs. super-quadratic). Another advantage of our protocol is that it avoids any kind of erasure decoding or Gaussian elimination that were required in [ADI+17] and in other

previous protocols. Finally, a unique feature of our protocol is that it can achieve security against malicious parties at a vanishing amortized cost.

Focusing on communication complexity alone, VOLE with rate 1 could be previously obtained via the Damgård-Jurik encryption scheme, and rate 1/2 could be obtained from LWE, DDH, or Paillier via homomorphic secret sharing [BGI17,DHRW16,FGJI17,BCG+17]. Note that since neither our flavor of LPN nor OT are known to imply collision-resistant hashing (CRH), rate 1/2 seems to be a barrier under these assumptions. Indeed, using the techniques of [IKO05] one can show that any constant-round (semi-honest) VOLE protocol that achieves better than 1/2 rate implies *constant-round* statistically hiding commitment, which currently can only be based on CRH.

6.2 Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge with Reusable Correlated Randomness Setup

Consider the following model for non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) with setup. In an offline phase, before the statements to be proved are known, the prover and the verifier receive correlated randomness from a trusted dealer. Alternatively, they may generate this correlated randomness on their own using an interactive secure computation protocol that is carried out once and for all during a preprocessing phase. Then, in the online phase, the prover can prove each NP-statement *non-interactively*, by sending a single message to the verifier.

We would like the setup to be *reusable* in the sense that the number of statements that can be proved is polynomially larger than the communication cost of the setup. Moreover, the soundness of the protocol should hold even if the prover can learn whether the verifier accepts or rejects a maliciously generated proof. NIZK protocols based on OT (e.g., [KMO89, IKOS09]) fail to satisfy this property, since the prover can gradually learn the verifier's OT selections via small perturbations of an honest prover's strategy.

We observe that a suitable type of zero-knowledge linear PCPs for NP, which exist unconditionally, can be compiled in a simple way into information-theoretic reusable NIZK protocols in the VOLE-hybrid model. Concretely, proving n instances of satisfiability of an arithmetic circuit of size s over $\mathbb{F}$ requires $O(s)$ instances of VOLE of length $O(n)$ each, where the verifier's VOLE inputs are assumed to be honestly generated. (This is a simplified version of a similar construction from [CDI+18] which is zero-knowledge against a malicious verifier.) Applying our VOLE generator, the cost of the setup depends only on s and not on n, and each circuit satisfiability instance consumes only a constant number of entries from each of the $O(s)$ VOLE instances.

Following the local expansion of the VOLE seeds, which does not require interaction, generating and verifying each proof involves only $O(s)$ field operations on both sides (and no "cryptographic" computations), and the proof consists of $O(s)$ elements of $\mathbb{F}$. This should be contrasted with traditional approaches to SNARGs, which can have sublinear communication[6] and verifier computation, but on the other hand are much heavier in terms of prover computation. Our NIZK constructions are particularly attractive in settings where the prover and verifier have comparable computational resources and where communication is relatively cheap.

Zero-Knowledge Linear Interactive Proofs. We now define the notion of linear proof systems on which we rely, which is a variant of the "linear interactive proof" model

[6] Since our NIZK protocols are *proof* systems for NP (rather than arguments), there is no hope to make them succinct [GVW02]. Moreover, the assumptions on which we rely (LPN and OT) are not known to imply even collision-resistant hash functions, let alone succinct arguments for NP.

from [BCI+13]. At a high level, such a proof system proceeds by multiplying a proof matrix Π picked by the prover by an *independently chosen* query vector $\boldsymbol{q}$ picked by the verifier, where the verifier decides whether to accept or reject based on $\boldsymbol{q} \cdot \Pi$ alone. Note that unconditional zero-knowledge is possible in this model because of the restricted mode of interaction. We will later use a VOLE generator to securely realize such proofs non-interactively with reusable setup.

Definition 11 (HVZK-LIP). *An* honest-verifier zero-knowledge linear interactive proof *(HVZK-LIP) is a triple of algorithms* $(\mathsf{Prove}, \mathsf{Query}, \mathsf{Verify})$ *with the following syntax:*

- $\mathsf{Prove}(\mathbb{F}, C, x, w)$ *is a PPT algorithm that given an arithmetic verification circuit* $C : \mathbb{F}^\ell \times \mathbb{F}^L \to \mathbb{F}$*, an input (NP-statement)* $x \in \mathbb{F}^\ell$*, and witness* $w \in \mathbb{F}^L$*, outputs a proof matrix* $\Pi \in \mathbb{F}^{m \times d}$*, where* d *and* m *depend only on* C*.*
- $\mathsf{Query}(\mathbb{F}, C)$ *is a PPT algorithm that given an arithmetic verification circuit* C *outputs a query vector* $\boldsymbol{q} \in \mathbb{F}^m$*.*
- $\mathsf{Verify}(\mathbb{F}, x, \boldsymbol{q}, \boldsymbol{a})$ *is a polynomial-time algorithm that given input* $x \in \mathbb{F}^\ell$*, query vector* $\boldsymbol{q}$*, and answer vector* $\boldsymbol{a}$*, outputs* acc *or* rej*.*

The algorithms $(\mathsf{Prove}, \mathsf{Query}, \mathsf{Verify})$ *should satisfy the following:*

- ***Completness.*** *For any arithmetic circuit* $C : \mathbb{F}^\ell \times \mathbb{F}^L \to \mathbb{F}$*, input* $x \in \mathbb{F}^\ell$ *and witness* $w \in \mathbb{F}^L$ *such that* $C(x, w) = 0$ *we have* $\Pr[\Pi \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{Prove}(\mathbb{F}, C, x, w), \boldsymbol{q} \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{Query}(\mathbb{F}, C) : \mathsf{Verify}(\mathbb{F}, x, \boldsymbol{q}, \boldsymbol{q} \cdot \Pi) = \mathsf{acc}] = 1$*.*
- ***Reusable*** ϵ***-soundness.*** *For any* $C : \mathbb{F}^\ell \times \mathbb{F}^L \to \mathbb{F}$*, input* $x \in \mathbb{F}^\ell$ *such that* $C(x, w) \neq 0$ *for all* $w \in \mathbb{F}^L$*, adversarially chosen* $\Pi^* \in \mathbb{F}^{m \times d}$ *and vector* $\boldsymbol{b}^* \in \mathbb{F}^d$*, we have* $\Pr[\boldsymbol{q} \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{Query}(\mathbb{F}, C) : \mathsf{Verify}(\mathbb{F}, x, \boldsymbol{q}, \boldsymbol{q} \cdot \Pi^* + \boldsymbol{b}^*) = \mathsf{acc}] \leq \epsilon$*. Moreover, for every* $\mathbb{F}, C, x, \Pi^*, \boldsymbol{b}^*$ *the probability of* Verify *accepting (over the choice of* $\boldsymbol{q}$*) is either 1 or* $\leq \epsilon$*. Unless otherwise specified, we assume that* $\epsilon \leq O(|C|/|\mathbb{F}|)$*.*
- ***Honest-verifier zero-knowledge.*** *There exists a PPT simulator* Sim *such that for any arithmetic circuit* $C : \mathbb{F}^\ell \times \mathbb{F}^L \to \mathbb{F}$*, input* $x \in \mathbb{F}^\ell$*, and witness* $w \in \mathbb{F}^L$ *such that* $C(x, w) = 0$*, the output of* $\mathsf{Sim}(\mathbb{F}, C, \boldsymbol{q}, x)$ *is a vector* $\boldsymbol{a}$ *such that* $\{(\boldsymbol{q}, \boldsymbol{a}) : \boldsymbol{q} \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{Query}(\mathbb{F}, C), \boldsymbol{a} \leftarrow \mathsf{Sim}(\mathbb{F}, C, \boldsymbol{q}, x)\}$ *and* $\{(\boldsymbol{q}, \boldsymbol{a}) : \Pi \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{Prove}(\mathbb{F}, C, x, w), \boldsymbol{q} \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{Query}(\mathbb{F}, C), \boldsymbol{a} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{q} \cdot \Pi\}$ *are identically distributed.*

Note that the final requirement in the definition of reusable soundness guarantees that even by observing the verifier's behavior on a maliciously chosen input x^* and proof Π^*, the prover cannot obtain significant information about the query $\boldsymbol{q}$. This ensures that $\boldsymbol{q}$ can be reused without compromising soundness. We note that our proofs also satisfy the *knowledge* property as defined in [BCI+13]. We focus here on soundness for simplicity.

NIZKs with Reusable Setup. Below, we formally define non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments with reusable correlated randomness setup.

Definition 12 (NIZKs with Reusable Setup.). *A* non-interactive zero-knowledge argument with reusable correlated randomness setup *(RS-NIZK) is a triple of algorithms* $(\mathsf{NIZKSetup}, \mathsf{NIZKProve}, \mathsf{NIZKVerify})$ *with the following syntax:*

- $\mathsf{NIZKSetup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, C, T)$ *is a PPT algorithm that, given a security parameter (in unary)* 1^λ*, a field* $\mathbb{F}$*, an arithmetic verification circuit* $C : \mathbb{F}^\ell \times \mathbb{F}^L \to \mathbb{F}$*, and a polynomial bound* $T = T(\lambda)$ *on the number of statements, outputs a pair* $(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{vk})$ *where* pk *is the proving key, and* vk *is the verification key.*

- $\mathsf{NIZKProve}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbb{F}, C, j, x^j, w^j)$ *is a PPT algorithm that given a proving key* pk*, a field* $\mathbb{F}$*, an arithmetic verification circuit* $C : \mathbb{F}^\ell \times \mathbb{F}^L \to \mathbb{F}$*, a proof index* $1 \le j \le T$*, an input (NP-statement)* $x^j \in \mathbb{F}^\ell$*, and witness* $w^j \in \mathbb{F}^L$*, outputs a proof* π^j*.*
- $\mathsf{NIZKVerify}(\mathsf{vk}, \mathbb{F}, j, x^j, \pi^j)$ *is a PPT algorithm that given a verification key* vk*, a field* $\mathbb{F}$*, a proof index* $1 \le j \le T$*, an input* $x^j \in \mathbb{F}^\ell$*, and a proof* π^j*, outputs* acc *or* rej*.*

The algorithms $(\mathsf{NIZKSetup}, \mathsf{NIZKProve}, \mathsf{NIZKVerify})$ *should satisfy the following:*

- ***Completness.*** *For any arithmetic circuit* $C : \mathbb{F}^\ell \times \mathbb{F}^L \to \mathbb{F}$*, bound* T*, index* $1 \le j \le T$*, input* $x \in \mathbb{F}^\ell$ *and witness* $w \in \mathbb{F}^L$ *such that* $C(x, w) = 0$ *we have* $\Pr[(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{vk}) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{NIZKSetup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, C, T), \pi \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{NIZKProve}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbb{F}, C, j, x, w) : \mathsf{NIZKVerify}(\mathsf{vk}, \mathbb{F}, j, x, \pi) = \mathsf{acc}] = 1$.
- ***Adaptive reusable*** ϵ***-soundness.*** *For any* $C : \mathbb{F}^\ell \times \mathbb{F}^L \to \mathbb{F}$ *with* $|C| = \mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$*, polynomial bound* T*, index* $1 \le j \le T$*, and PPT adversary* $\mathcal{A}$*, it holds that*

$$\Pr[(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{vk}) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{NIZKSetup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, C, T), (x, \pi) \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}_j[\mathsf{vk}]}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbb{F}, C, j) : (\exists w, C(x, w) = 1) \wedge \mathsf{NIZKVerify}(\mathsf{vk}, \mathbb{F}, j, x, \pi) = \mathsf{acc}] \le \varepsilon,$$

  where $\mathsf{O}_j[\mathsf{vk}]$ *is a stateful oracle initialized with* $k = 1$ *which, on input* (x^k, π^k)*, returns* $\mathsf{NIZKVerify}(\mathsf{vk}, \mathbb{F}, k, x^k, \pi^k)$ *and sets* $k \leftarrow k+1$ *if* $k \le j$*, and ignores the query otherwise.*
- ***Adaptive multi-theorem zero-knowledge.*** *There exists a PPT simulator* $\mathsf{NIZKSim}$ *such that for any stateful PPT* $\mathcal{A}$*, any index* $1 \le j \le T$*, and any arithmetic circuit* $C : \mathbb{F}^\ell \times \mathbb{F}^L \to \mathbb{F}$ *with* $|C| = \mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$*, it holds that*

$$|\Pr[(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{vk}) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{NIZKSetup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, C, T) : \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}_0[\mathsf{pk}]}(\mathsf{vk}, \mathbb{F}, C, j) = 1] - \Pr[(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{vk}) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{NIZKSetup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, C, T) : \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}_1[\mathsf{vk}]}(\mathsf{vk}, \mathbb{F}, C, j), = 1]| = \mathsf{negl}(\lambda).$$

  where the oracles are defined as follows:
  $\mathsf{O}_0[\mathsf{pk}]$ *is a stateful oracle defined as follows: it is initialized with* $k = 1$*. On input* (x, w)*, if* $C(x, w) = 1$ *and* $k \le T$*, it outputs* $\mathsf{NIZKProve}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbb{F}, k, x, w)$*, and sets* $k \leftarrow k + 1$*; it does nothing otherwise.*
  $\mathsf{O}_1[\mathsf{vk}]$ *is a stateful oracle defined as follows: it is initialized with* $k = 1$*. On input* (x, w)*, if* $C(x, w) = 1$ *and* $k \le T$*, it outputs* $\mathsf{NIZKSim}(\mathsf{vk}, \mathbb{F}, k, x)$*, and sets* $k \leftarrow k + 1$*; it does nothing otherwise.*

From HVZK-LIP to reusable NIZK over VOLE. We now describe a simple transformation from any HVZK-LIP to reusable NIZK in the VOLE-hybrid model, where the prover plays the role of the VOLE sender P_0 and the verifier plays the role of the VOLE receiver P_1. The verifier's VOLE inputs x_i depend only on the query $\boldsymbol{q}$. This allows us to reuse the same x_i for multiple proofs, where each proof instance j uses fresh values of $(\boldsymbol{u}_i^j, \boldsymbol{v}_i^j)$ to mask the proof matrix Π.

The main idea behind the transformation is that the matrix-vector product $\boldsymbol{a} = \boldsymbol{q} \cdot \Pi$ can be encoded by $\boldsymbol{a}_i = (q_i \cdot \Pi_i + \boldsymbol{b}_i)$, $1 \le i \le m$, together with $\boldsymbol{c} = \sum \boldsymbol{b}_i$, where Π_i is the i-th row of Π and the $\boldsymbol{b}_i$ are random vectors in $\mathbb{F}^d$. Indeed, it is easy to check that $\boldsymbol{a} = \sum_{i=1}^m \boldsymbol{a}_i - \boldsymbol{c}$, and the information available to the verifier (namely, $\boldsymbol{q}, \boldsymbol{a}_i, \boldsymbol{c}$) reveals no information about Π other than $\boldsymbol{a}$. Thus, the value of $\boldsymbol{a}$ can be transferred to the prover via m instances of VOLE of length d, where the VOLE inputs of the prover (sender) are $(\Pi_i, \boldsymbol{b}_i)$ and the VOLE inputs of the verifier (receiver P_1) are q_i. Completeness and honest-verifier zero-knowledge are directly inherited from the HVZK-LIP via the properties of the encoding discussed above. Soundness follows by observing that any maliciously chosen

$(\boldsymbol{u}_i^*, \boldsymbol{v}_i^*)$ that the prover feeds as inputs to the VOLE instances in the NIZK protocol and any message $\boldsymbol{c}^*$ have the same effect as using the matrix Π^* such that $\Pi_i^* = \boldsymbol{u}_i^*$ and the offset $\boldsymbol{b}^* = \sum \boldsymbol{v}_i^* - \boldsymbol{c}^*$ in the HVZK-LIP protocol. This construction of NIZK from a VOLE generator is formally described in Figure 3.

NIZK protocol from VOLE generator

- **Building blocks:** VOLE generator $(\mathsf{Setup}, \mathsf{Expand})$; HVZK-LIP $(\mathsf{Prove}, \mathsf{Query}, \mathsf{Verify})$ with answer length d.
- $\mathsf{NIZKSetup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, C, T)$: Given a verification circuit C over $\mathbb{F}$ and a bound T on the number of statements, securely generate the following correlated randomness:
  - Let $\boldsymbol{q} = (q_1, \ldots, q_m) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Query}(\mathbb{F}, C)$.
  - For $i = 1, \ldots, m$ and $n = dT$, let $(\mathsf{seed}_0^i, \mathsf{seed}_1^i) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, q_i)$.
  - Set $\mathsf{pk} \leftarrow (\mathsf{seed}_0^i)_{i \le m}$ and $\mathsf{vk} \leftarrow (\boldsymbol{q}, (\mathsf{seed}_1^i)_{i \le m})$.
- **Local computation:** For $i = 1, \ldots, m$, Prover computes $(\boldsymbol{u}_i, \boldsymbol{v}_i) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Expand}(0, \mathsf{seed}_0^i)$ and Verifier computes $\boldsymbol{w}_i = \mathsf{Expand}(1, \mathsf{seed}_1^i)$. Parse each $\boldsymbol{u}_i$ as $(\boldsymbol{u}_i^j)$, $1 \le j \le T$, where $\boldsymbol{u}_i^j \in \mathbb{F}^d$, and similarly for $\boldsymbol{v}_i, \boldsymbol{w}_i$.
- $\mathsf{NIZKProve}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbb{F}, C, j, x^j, w^j)$: Set $\Pi^j \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Prove}(\mathbb{F}, C, x^j, w^j)$. Output $\pi^j = (\boldsymbol{a}_1^j, \ldots, \boldsymbol{a}_m^j, \boldsymbol{c} = \sum_{i=1}^m \boldsymbol{v}_i^j)$, where $\boldsymbol{a}_i^j = \Pi_i^j - \boldsymbol{u}_i^j$.
- $\mathsf{NIZKVerify}(\mathsf{vk}, \mathbb{F}, j, x^j, \pi^j)$: Set $\boldsymbol{a}^j = \sum_{i=1}^m (q_i \cdot \boldsymbol{a}_i^j + \boldsymbol{w}_i^j) - \boldsymbol{c}$. Output $\mathsf{Verify}(\mathbb{F}, x^j, \boldsymbol{q}, \boldsymbol{a}^j)$.

Fig. 3. NIZK with reusable setup from VOLE generator.

Theorem 13. *Let λ be a security parameter, and $\mathbb{F}$ be a field of size $2^{\omega(\lambda)}$. The protocol given on Figure 3 is a non-interactive zero-knowledge argument with reusable setup, where both adaptive reusable $\mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$-soundness and adaptive multi-theorem zero-knowledge reduce to the security of the underlying VOLE generator.*

Proof. For completeness, observe that

$$\begin{aligned}
\boldsymbol{a}^j &= \sum_{i=1}^m (q_i \cdot \boldsymbol{a}_i^j + \boldsymbol{w}_i^j) - \boldsymbol{c} = \sum_{i=1}^m (q_i \cdot \boldsymbol{a}_i^j + \boldsymbol{w}_i^j - \boldsymbol{v}_i^j) \\
&= \sum_{i=1}^m q_i \cdot \Pi_i^j + \sum_{i=1}^m (\boldsymbol{w}_i^j - (q_i \cdot \boldsymbol{u}_i^j + \boldsymbol{v}_i^j)) \\
&= \sum_{i=1}^m q_i \cdot \Pi_i^j \text{ by correctness of the VOLE generator} \\
&= \boldsymbol{q} \cdot \Pi^j,
\end{aligned}$$

hence completeness follows from the completeness of the HVZK-LIP. We now prove adaptive reusable ε-soundness. We first consider the 'base case', where the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ is not given access to a verification oracle. Let $C : \mathbb{F}^\ell \times \mathbb{F}^L \to \mathbb{F}$ be a verification circuit, T be a bound, $1 \le j \le T$ be an index, and $\mathcal{A}$ be a PPT adversary. Set $(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{vk}) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{NIZKSetup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, C, T)$ and $(x^*, \pi^*) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbb{F}, C, j)$. Parse $(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{vk})$ as $((\mathsf{seed}_0^i)_{i \le m}, \boldsymbol{q}, (\mathsf{seed}_1^i)_{i \le m})$ and π^* as $(\boldsymbol{a}_1^j, \ldots, \boldsymbol{a}_m^j, \boldsymbol{c})$. Compute $(\boldsymbol{u}_i, \boldsymbol{v}_i) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Expand}(0, \mathsf{seed}_0^i)$ and $\boldsymbol{w}_i = \mathsf{Expand}(1, \mathsf{seed}_1^i)$. Parse each $\boldsymbol{u}_i$ as $(\boldsymbol{u}_i^j)$, $1 \le j \le T$, where $\boldsymbol{u}_i^j \in \mathbb{F}^d$, and similarly for $\boldsymbol{v}_i, \boldsymbol{w}_i$. Define Π^* to

be the matrix whose i-th row is $\boldsymbol{a}_i^j + \boldsymbol{u}_i^j$, and $\boldsymbol{b}^*$ to be $\sum_{i=1}^m \boldsymbol{v}_i^j) - \boldsymbol{c}$. It holds that

$$\begin{aligned}\boldsymbol{a}^j &= \sum_{i=1}^m (q_i \cdot \boldsymbol{a}_i^j + \boldsymbol{w}_i^j) - \boldsymbol{c} \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^m (q_i \cdot (\boldsymbol{a}_i^j + \boldsymbol{u}_i^j) + \boldsymbol{v}_i^j) - \boldsymbol{c} \text{ by correctness of the } \mathsf{VOLE} \text{ generator} \\ &= \boldsymbol{q} \cdot \boldsymbol{\Pi}^* + \boldsymbol{b}^*.\end{aligned}$$

By the reusable ε-soundness of the HVZK-LIP, it holds that for any $C : \mathbb{F}^\ell \times \mathbb{F}^L \to \mathbb{F}$, input $x \in \mathbb{F}^\ell$ such that $C(x, w) \neq 0$ for all $w \in \mathbb{F}^L$, adversarially chosen $\boldsymbol{\Pi}^* \in \mathbb{F}^{m \times d}$ and vector $\boldsymbol{b}^* \in \mathbb{F}^d$, we have $\Pr[\boldsymbol{q}' \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Query}(\mathbb{F}, C) : \mathsf{Verify}(\mathbb{F}, x, \boldsymbol{q}', \boldsymbol{q}' \cdot \boldsymbol{\Pi}^* + \boldsymbol{b}^*) = \mathsf{acc}] \leq \epsilon$. Furthermore, by the security of the VOLE generator,

$$\begin{aligned}&\Pr\begin{bmatrix}(\mathbb{F}, 1^n, x, x') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda), \\ (\mathsf{seed}_0, \mathsf{seed}_1) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, x)\end{bmatrix} : \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{seed}_0) = 1\Bigg] \\ \approx &\Pr\begin{bmatrix}(\mathbb{F}, 1^n, x, x') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda), \\ (\mathsf{seed}_0, \mathsf{seed}_1) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, x')\end{bmatrix} : \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{seed}_0) = 1\Bigg].\end{aligned}$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned}&\Pr[(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{vk}) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{NIZKSetup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, C, T), (x, \pi) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbb{F}, C, j) : \\ &(\exists w, C(x, w) = 1) \wedge \mathsf{NIZKVerify}(\mathsf{vk}, \mathbb{F}, j, x, \pi) = \mathsf{acc}] \\ =&\Pr[\boldsymbol{q} \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Query}(\mathbb{F}, C), ((\mathsf{seed}_0^i, \mathsf{seed}_1^i) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, q_i))_{i \leq m}, \\ &(x, \pi) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathcal{A}((\mathsf{seed}_0^i)_{i \leq m}, \mathbb{F}, C, j) : (\exists w, C(x, w) = 1) \wedge \mathsf{Verify}(\mathbb{F}, x, \boldsymbol{q}, \boldsymbol{q} \cdot \boldsymbol{\Pi}^* + \boldsymbol{b}^*) = \mathsf{acc}] \\ =&\Pr[\boldsymbol{q} \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Query}(\mathbb{F}, C), \boldsymbol{q}' \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Query}(\mathbb{F}, C), ((\mathsf{seed}_0^i, \mathsf{seed}_1^i) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, q_i'))_{i \leq m}, \\ &(x, \pi) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathcal{A}((\mathsf{seed}_0^i)_{i \leq m}, \mathbb{F}, C, j) : (\exists w, C(x, w) = 1) \wedge \mathsf{Verify}(\mathbb{F}, x, \boldsymbol{q}', \boldsymbol{q}' \cdot \boldsymbol{\Pi}^* + \boldsymbol{b}^*) = \mathsf{acc}] \\ =&\Pr[\boldsymbol{q} \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Query}(\mathbb{F}, C), \boldsymbol{q}' \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Query}(\mathbb{F}, C), ((\mathsf{seed}_0^i, \mathsf{seed}_1^i) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, q_i))_{i \leq m}, \\ &(x, \pi) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathcal{A}((\mathsf{seed}_0^i)_{i \leq m}, \mathbb{F}, C, j) : (\exists w, C(x, w) = 1) \wedge \mathsf{Verify}(\mathbb{F}, x, \boldsymbol{q}', \boldsymbol{q}' \cdot \boldsymbol{\Pi}^* + \boldsymbol{b}^*) = \mathsf{acc}] \\ &\text{by the security of the } \mathsf{VOLE} \text{ generator (this requires } m \text{ hybrids to replace each } q_i' \text{ by } q_i) \\ \leq&\varepsilon \text{ by the reusable } \varepsilon\text{-soundness of the HVZK-LIP.}\end{aligned}$$

The same strategy can also be used to show that $\Pr[(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{vk}) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{NIZKSetup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, C, T), (x, \pi) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbb{F}, C, j) : \mathsf{NIZKVerify}(\mathsf{vk}, \mathbb{F}, j, x, \pi) = \mathsf{acc}]$ is either 1 or bounded above by ε, using the second part of the reusable ε-soundness property of the HVZK-LIP. Note that $\boldsymbol{q}'$ is chosen independently of everything else in the last probability of the above argument (and in particular, independently of the inputs of $\mathcal{A}$), hence the reusable soundness of the HVZK-LIP applies even though the word x is adversarially chosen.

We now move to the general case, where $\mathcal{A}$ is given oracle access to $\mathsf{O}_j[\mathsf{vk}]$. We further assume that $|\mathbb{F}| = 2^{\omega(\lambda)}$ and that the HVZK-LIP satisfies $O(|C|/|\mathbb{F}|)$-reusable soundness; note that $|C|/|\mathbb{F}| = \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$. We proceed through a sequence of $j + 1$ hybrids H_t for $t = 0$ to j, where the oracle $\mathsf{O}_j[\mathsf{vk}]$ is replaced by the following stateful oracle $\mathsf{O}_j^t[\mathsf{vk} = (\boldsymbol{q}, (\mathsf{seed}_1^i)_{1 \leq m})]$: it is initialized with $k = 1$ and, on input (x^k, π^k), it proceeds as follows ($\boldsymbol{w}_i = \mathsf{Expand}(1, \mathsf{seed}_1^i)$ is divided into blocks $\boldsymbol{w}_i^j \in \mathbb{F}^d$):

- If $k \leq t$, it picks $\boldsymbol{q}' \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Query}(\mathbb{F}, C)$, $((\mathsf{seed}'^i_0, \mathsf{seed}'^i_1) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, q_i'))_{i \leq m}$, sets $\boldsymbol{w}_i' = \mathsf{Expand}(1, \mathsf{seed}'^i_1)$, divides it into blocks $\boldsymbol{w}'^k_i \in \mathbb{F}^d$, sets $\boldsymbol{a}^k = \sum_{i=1}^m (q_i' \cdot \boldsymbol{a}_i^k + \boldsymbol{w}'^k_i) - \boldsymbol{c}$, returns $\mathsf{Verify}(\mathbb{F}, x^k, \boldsymbol{q}', \boldsymbol{a}^k)$, and sets $k \leftarrow k + 1$;

- If $k > t$ and $k \leq j$, it sets $\boldsymbol{a}^k = \sum_{i=1}^m (q_i \cdot \boldsymbol{a}_i^k + \boldsymbol{w}_i^k) - \boldsymbol{c}$, returns $\mathsf{Verify}(\mathbb{F}, x^k, \boldsymbol{q}, \boldsymbol{a}^k)$, and sets $k \leftarrow k+1$;
- If $k > j$, it ignores the query.

Note that $\mathsf{O}_j^0[\mathsf{vk}] \equiv \mathsf{O}_j[\mathsf{vk}]$. The indistinguishability between H_t and H_{t+1} follows from the fact that the only difference between $\mathsf{O}_j^t[\mathsf{vk}]$ and $\mathsf{O}_j^{t+1}[\mathsf{vk}]$ is their answer to the t-th query, which are equal with overwhelming probability since

$$\Pr[\boldsymbol{q} \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Query}(\mathbb{F}, C), \boldsymbol{q}' \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Query}(\mathbb{F}, C), ((\mathsf{seed}_0^i, \mathsf{seed}_1^i) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{F}, n, q_i))_{i \leq m},$$
$$(x, \pi) \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathcal{A}((\mathsf{seed}_0^i)_{i \leq m}, \mathbb{F}, C, j) : \wedge \mathsf{Verify}(\mathbb{F}, x, \boldsymbol{q}', \boldsymbol{q}' \cdot \boldsymbol{\Pi}^* + \boldsymbol{b}^*) = \mathsf{acc}]$$

is either 1 or bounded above by $\varepsilon = \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$. Furthermore, the answers of the oracle $\mathsf{O}_j^j[\mathsf{vk}]$ are entirely independent of vk, hence can be simulated without using it. Therefore, the hybrid H_j corresponds exactly to the base case, where $\mathcal{A}$ is not given access to any oracle, which concludes the proof.

We now turn our attention to adaptive multi-theorem zero-knowledge. The simulator $\mathsf{NIZKSim}$, on input $(\mathsf{vk}, \mathbb{F}, k, x)$, simulates $\pi^k = (\boldsymbol{a}_1^k, \ldots, \boldsymbol{a}_m^k, \boldsymbol{c} = \sum_{i=1}^m \boldsymbol{v}_i^k)$ as follows: from $\mathsf{vk} = (\boldsymbol{q}, (\mathsf{seed}_1^i)_{i \leq m})$, it computes $(\boldsymbol{w}_i)_{i \leq m} \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Expand}(1, \mathsf{seed}_1^i)_{i \leq m}$. Then, it sets $\boldsymbol{a}^k \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Sim}(\mathbb{F}, C, \boldsymbol{q}, x)$, using the simulator of the honest-verifier zero-knowledge property of the HVZK-LIP. It picks $(\boldsymbol{a}_1^k, \ldots, \boldsymbol{a}_m^k)$ uniformly at random, and sets $\boldsymbol{c} \leftarrow \sum_{i=1}^m (q_i \cdot \boldsymbol{a}_i^k + \boldsymbol{w}_i^k) - \boldsymbol{a}^k$.

To show that $\mathsf{NIZKSim}$ produces proofs indistinguishable from honest proofs, we proceed through a sequence of hybrids. H_0 corresponds to the initial game, where $\mathcal{A}$ is given oracle access to $\mathsf{O}_0[\mathsf{pk}]$, and H_1 to the game where $\mathcal{A}$ is given oracle access to $\mathsf{O}_1[\mathsf{vk}]$. In the hybrid $H_{0.i}$, we modify $\mathsf{O}_0[\mathsf{pk}]$ as follows: instead of using the $(\boldsymbol{u}_i, \boldsymbol{v}_i)$ given by extending the seed_0^i, the oracle has vk hardcoded, computes the $\boldsymbol{w}_i$ and $\boldsymbol{q}$ from vk, and picks uniformly random vectors $\boldsymbol{u}_i$. Then, it sets $v_i \leftarrow \boldsymbol{w}_i - q_i \boldsymbol{u}_i$. Note that distinguishing $H_{0.i}$ from $H_{0.i-1}$ corresponds exactly to breaking the security property of the VOLE generator (more precisely, the second requirement of its security property) with respect to the i-th seed. In hybrid $H_{0.m}$, the oracle does not use pk anymore.

We define the hybrid $H_{0.m+1}$ to be one in which the oracle computes $\boldsymbol{a}^k$ as follows: it picks $\boldsymbol{\Pi}^k \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathsf{Prove}(\mathbb{F}, C, x, w)$, and sets $\boldsymbol{a}^k \leftarrow \boldsymbol{q} \cdot \boldsymbol{\Pi}^k$. Then, it picks $(\boldsymbol{a}_1^k, \ldots, \boldsymbol{a}_m^k)$ uniformly at random, and sets $\boldsymbol{c} \leftarrow \sum_{i=1}^m (q_i \cdot \boldsymbol{a}_i^k + \boldsymbol{w}_i^k) - \boldsymbol{a}^k$. Observe that $H_{0.m+1}$ is distributed identically to $H_{0.m}$. Now, the only difference between $H_{0.m+1}$ and H_1 is that $\boldsymbol{a}^k$ is computed as $\boldsymbol{q} \cdot \boldsymbol{\Pi}^k$ in $H_{0.m+1}$, and as $\mathsf{Sim}(\mathbb{F}, C, \boldsymbol{q}, x)$ in H_1. Therefore, $H_{0.m+1}$ and H_1 are perfectly indistinguishable, since distinguishing them corresponds exactly to breaking the honest-verifier zero-knowledge property of the HVZK-LIP. This concludes the proof.

Instantiations. As shown in [BCI+13], any linear PCP with bounded verification degree can be compiled into an HVZK-LIP with a small overhead. In particular, the QAP-based linear PCP of GGPR [GGPR13] implies an HVZK-LIP proving the satisfiability of arithmetic circuit C of size s over $\mathbb{F}$ with parameters $m = O(s)$, $d = 4$, and $\epsilon = O(s/|\mathbb{F}|)$, where the proof $\boldsymbol{\Pi}$ is generated from (x, w) in time quasi-linear in s. This results in NIZK protocols in which $O(s)$ instances of a VOLE generator can be used to non-interactively prove any polynomial number of statements $C(x^j, \cdot)$, and where each proof contains $O(s)$ field elements. One can further improve the prover's time complexity from quasi-linear to linear by partitioning the circuit gates into constant-size blocks and applying an instance of the GGPR-based LPCP (or even the simpler "Hadamard-based LPCP" [IKO07, BCI+13]) separately to each block. This optimization exploits the fact that we give up on succinctness in our setting. We leave the refined tuning of parameters and implementation of our NIZK technique to future work.

Comparison with other NIZK flavors. It is instructive to compare our NIZK protocols to other flavors of NIZK from the literature. First, whereas in standard multi-theorem NIZK the computational cost of proving each theorem is independent of the number of theorems being proved, we only achieve this in an *amortized* sense. This is due to the fact that our dual construction does not provide a PRF-like "random access" to the VOLE entries, and needs to generate all of them together. We stress, however, that the cost of implementing the (reusable) correlated randomness setup is independent of the number of theorems that can be proved based on this setup. Our setup is similar to the basic variant of the preprocessing model used in the recent lattice-based NIZK protocols from [KW18]. It is strictly stronger than the setup required by *designated-verifier* NIZK protocols: see [CC18, CDI+18] and references therein. Whereas in standard designated-verifier NIZK a verifier can post a public key that can be used by many different provers, our setup requires correlated randomness or interaction between a designated verifier and a designated prover. However, in cases where the same prover proves many statements to the same verifier, the amortized cost of this setup is small. The main advantage of our protocol is that its online phase is very lightweight and does not involve public key cryptography. In fact, if the Expand function of the VOLE generator is invoked in the offline phase (without any interaction), computing and verifying each proof is less efficient than evaluating $C(x, w)$ in the clear by only a small constant factor. Our protocols are the first (reusable) NIZK protocols of any kind to rely on (non-binary) LPN, or alternatively LPN and OT if the setup is generated by a distributed protocol. Moreover, the flavor of LPN on which we rely is not known to imply public-key encryption.

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