

On Enabling Attribute-Based Encryption to Be Traceable against Traitors

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Abstract. Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) is a versatile one-to-many encryption primitive, which enables fine-grained access control over encrypted data. Due to its promising applications in practice, ABE schemes with high efficiency, security and expressivity have been continuously emerging. On the other hand, due to the nature of ABE, a malicious user may abuse its decryption privilege. Therefore, being able to identify such a malicious user is crucial towards the practicality of ABE. Although some specific ABE schemes in the literature enjoys the tracing function, they are only proceeded case by case. Most of the ABE schemes do not support traceability. It is thus meaningful and important to have a *generic way of equipping any ABE scheme with traceability*. In this work we partially solve the aforementioned problem. Namely, we propose a way of transforming (non-traceable) ABE schemes satisfying certain requirements to *fully collusion-resistant black-box traceable* ABE schemes, which adds only $O(\sqrt{\mathcal{K}})$ elements to the ciphertext where \mathcal{K} is the number of users in the system. And to demonstrate the practicability of our transformation, we show how to convert a couple of existing non-traceable ABE schemes to support traceability.

Keywords: Attribute-Based Encryption, Traitor Tracing, Framework

1 Introduction

Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE), introduced by Sahai and Waters [27], is a versatile one-to-many encryption primitive which enables fine-grained access control over encrypted data. Due to its promising applications in practice, ABE has been attracting much attention in the community and undergoing a significant development. Among the recently proposed ABE schemes [27,13,5,9,12,29,18,25,14,3,19,30,15,26,16,1], progress has been made on the schemes' security, access policy expressivity, and efficiency. For example, Lewko et al. [18] proposed the first *fully secure* ABE schemes, Lewko and Waters [19] proposed a new proof technique for achieving full security for ABE, Attrapadung et al. [3] proposed the first expressive Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) with *constant-size ciphertexts*, Rouselakis and Waters [26] proposed the first *large universe* ABE⁵ schemes which impose no limitations on the attribute sets or the access policies, Waters [30] proposed the first ABE scheme supporting *regular languages* to be the access policy while the previous works support at most boolean formulas, and Attrapadung [1] proposed a series of fully secure ABE schemes which support regular languages, constant size ciphertexts, or large universe.

As security, access policy expressivity, and efficiency are the three preliminary directions for ABE research, *traitor tracing* is a compulsory requirement for *practical* ABE schemes. In particular, using Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE) [13,5] as an example, ciphertext access policies do not have to contain any receivers' identities, and more commonly, a CP-ABE policy is role-based and attributes are *shared* between multiple

⁵ In a large universe ABE scheme, the attribute universe could be exponentially large, so that any string can be used as an attribute, and attributes do not need to be pre-specified during setup.

users. For example, the user with attributes {Bob, Mathematics, PhD Student} and the user with attributes {Carl, Mathematics, PhD Student} are sharing the attributes {Mathematics, PhD Student} and both of them can decrypt the ciphertext with policy “(Mathematics AND (PhD Student OR Alumni))”. In practice, a malicious user, with attributes shared with multiple other users, might leak a decryption blackbox/device, which is made of the user’s decryption key, for the purpose of financial gain or some other forms of incentives, as the malicious user has little risk of being identified out of all the users who can build a decryption blackbox with identical decryption capability. Being able to identify this malicious user (refer to as ‘traitor’) is crucial towards the practicality of an ABE system.

With a series of work [21,20,23,24], Liu et al. formalized the problem of traitor tracing for ABE well and proposed the counterparts supporting traitor tracing for some existing appealing ABE schemes. For example, [20,23] add fully collusion-resistant blackbox traceability⁶ to the fully secure CP-ABE scheme in [18], and [24] adds fully collusion-resistant blackbox traceability to the large universe CP-ABE scheme in [26]. Note that fully collusion-resistant blackbox traceability provides more solid confidence to security and applicability than t -collusion-resistant traceability⁷ does, this paper focuses on the fully collusion-resistant blackbox traceability in ABE.

While Liu et al. [21,20,23,24] transformed several existing appealing ABE schemes to their traceable counterparts, there are still many other appealing ABE schemes for which no traceable counterparts are proposed, for example, the fully secure ABE schemes in [1] which support regular languages, large universe, or constant size ciphertexts. Furthermore, we believe that in the future more and newer ABE schemes with better security, expressivity, efficiency and other appealing features will appear, and to be practical, these existing and future ABE schemes also need to be traceable against traitors. Investigating these schemes and proposing the traceable counterparts one by one will be a heavy workload.

In this paper, we make an attempt to propose a framework to transform ABE schemes to their traceable counterparts in a generic manner. In particular, by specifying some requirements on the structure of the ABE constructions, we propose an ABE template, and show that any ABE scheme satisfying this template can be transformed to a fully collusion-resistant blackbox traceable ABE scheme in a generic manner, at the cost of sublinear overhead, while keeping the appealing properties of the underlying ABE schemes, such as fine-grained access control on encrypted data, highly expressive access policy, short ciphertext, and so on. The contributions of our framework are two folds as below.

- For the existing ABE schemes satisfying the template, the traceable counterparts can be obtained directly by applying the transformation framework.
- For the existing ABE schemes not satisfying the template and ABE schemes to be proposed in the future, this framework provides a ‘target’ which they can try to achieve and then could be transformed to a traceable version.

1.1 Our Results

To enable ABE schemes to be fully collusion-resistant blackbox traceable, we follow the approach in [20,23], namely, as shown in Fig. 1, converting a non-traceable ABE scheme to an Augmented ABE scheme, and then applying a generic transformation from Augmented ABE to traceable ABE. As shown in the dash line part of the Fig. 1, Liu et al. [20,23] introduced the concept of Augmented ABE and established a generic transformation from Augmented ABE to traceable ABE. While Liu et al. [20,22,23,24] proposed several ad hoc Augmented ABE constructions from existing non-traceable ABE schemes, in this paper, we propose an ABE template which covers a major branch of (non-traceable) ABE designs, and propose a generic transformation from this ABE template to Augmented ABE, as shown in the bold line part of Fig. 1. Thus,

⁶ Fully collusion-resistant traceability means that the number of colluding users in constructing a decryption device is not limited and can be arbitrary, and the system remains traceable no matter how many keys are at the disposal of the device.

⁷ A t -collusion-resistant scheme has a limitation that the number of colluding users could not exceeds a predefined system parameter t , i.e., once the number of colluding users exceeds t , the scheme will not be secure any more.




Fig. 1. Outline

following our ABE template and generic transformation from the ABE template to Augmented ABE in this paper, as well as the generic transformation from Augmented ABE to traceable ABE by Liu et al. [20,23], a generic transformation that enables ABE schemes to be fully collusion-resistant blackbox traceable is established.

In Sec. 2, we review the definitions of conventional (non-traceable) ABE, Traceable ABE, and Augmented ABE, as well as the generic transformation from Augmented ABE to Traceable ABE. Then we present our work as below.

- In Sec. 3, we define an ABE template for conventional (non-traceable) ABE. The template represents a type of ABE construction techniques, so that this template covers not only many existing important ABE schemes with appealing properties, but also some possible ABE schemes in the future, which consider this template and corresponding construction techniques when designed.
- Also in Sec. 3, we propose a generic framework that transforms the ABE template to Augmented ABE. All the ABE schemes satisfying the template can be transformed to their traceable counterparts, enjoying their original appealing properties and additional fully collusion-resistant blackbox traceability.
 - The overhead for the transformation (i.e. the overhead for the fully collusion-resistant blackbox traceability) is sublinear with the number of users in the system.
 - We prove the security of the resulting Augmented ABE in the standard model. (The outline for the security analysis is given later in Fig. 3.)
- While the ABE template and generic transformation in Sec. 3 are described on composite order groups, to be more general, in Sec. 4 we show that the template, the transformation, and the proof also work well for the schemes on prime order groups.
- In Sec. 5, we show some existing appealing ABE schemes with different virtues, indeed satisfy our ABE template. We obtain the traceable counterparts for these appealing ABE schemes, by applying our generic transformation framework.

Notice that, our method/framework considers and works for a subset of pairing-based ABE schemes, namely, those ABE schemes satisfying our non-traceable ABE template, rather than all the ABE schemes. For example, our framework is not applicable to the lattice-based ABE schemes (e.g. [8]). Actually, as far as we know, there is not known results on lattice-based ABE schemes with traitor tracing property. We would like to view our asymptotic result mainly as a stepping stone towards building practical ABE schemes. In particular, in retrospect, the ABE schemes by Waters [29], Lewko et al. [18], Lewko and Waters

[19], Rouselakis and Waters [26], Attrapadung [1], and so on, represent one of the main branches of ABE development, as well as a branch of pairing-based ABE design/construction method, and it is reasonable to believe that new ABE schemes in this branch will be proposed in future. While these ABE schemes have been getting better security, policy expressivity, and/or efficiency, they did not consider or support traitor tracing, and this seriously limits their applicability in practice. Our asymptotic result makes the ABE schemes following this branch to have traitor tracing functionality, while leaving it as future work to further reduce the overhead incurred by traitor tracing functionality and make other types of ABE schemes (e.g. the lattice-based ones) to support traitor tracing.

1.2 Related Work

Boneh and Naor [7] showed that any collusion-resistant binary fingerprinting code [28] gives rise to a collusion-resistant traitor tracing system [10] with constant size ciphertexts, but the cost is that the secret key size is linear in the codeword length l , which is quite large, namely, even in the most efficient fingerprinting code to date (e.g., [6]), $l = \tilde{O}(t^2)$ for t -collusion-resistance and $l = \tilde{O}(\mathcal{K}^2)$ for fully collusion-resistance, where \mathcal{K} is the number of users in the system. Recently, Lai and Tang [17] adapted the techniques of [7] to the setting of CP-ABE, namely, given a collusion-resistant fingerprinting code, any CP-ABE scheme can be transferred to a traceable CP-ABE scheme. The resulting traceable CP-ABE in [17] takes small cost on the ciphertext size, but has extremely large secret key and public key sizes, which are proportional to the codeword length l of the underlying fingerprinting code. Table 1 shows a comparison of the key and ciphertext sizes between the resulting fully collusion-resistant traceable CP-ABE schemes generated by the transformation methods in [17] and this paper. Note that even using the most efficient fingerprinting code to date, say [6], the resulting fully collusion-resistant CP-ABE in [17] has public key and secret key sizes proportional to $\tilde{O}(\mathcal{K}^2)$, which are extremely large. In addition, it is worth mentioning that the tracing algorithm in [17] requires a secret tracing key so that only a trusted party which knows the tracing key can run the tracing algorithm. In this paper, our transformation method achieves public traceability, i.e., the tracing algorithm does not need any secrets and anyone can perform the tracing.

¹	Public Key Size	Ciphertext Size	Secret Key Size	Public Traceability
[17] ²	$ \text{PK} + \tilde{O}(\mathcal{K}^2)$	$2 \text{CT} $	$ \text{SK} \cdot \tilde{O}(\mathcal{K}^2)$	\times
this work ³	$ \text{PK} - 1 + 4\sqrt{\mathcal{K}}$	$ \text{CT} - 1 + (15 + d_0)\sqrt{\mathcal{K}}$	$ \text{SK} + 1$	\checkmark

¹ $|\text{PK}|$, $|\text{SK}|$, and $|\text{CT}|$ are the public key size, secret key size, and ciphertext size of the underlying (non-traceable) CP-ABE, respectively.

² The public key size, ciphertext size, and secret key size of the traceable CP-ABE scheme in [17] are (approximately) $|\text{PK}| + l$, $2|\text{CT}|$, and $|\text{SK}| \cdot l$, respectively, where l is the codeword length of the underlying fingerprinting code. For the most efficient fingerprinting code [6] to date, $l = \tilde{O}(\mathcal{K}^2)$ for fully collusion-resistance.

³ In this work, d_0 is a constant that describes the (non-traceable) ABE template. For existing ABE schemes satisfying the template, $d_0 = 1$ or $d_0 = 2$.

Table 1. Comparison of the key and ciphertext sizes

2 Preliminaries

In this section, following the roadmap of [20,23], we review the definitions of conventional (non-traceable) ABE, (blackbox) Traceable ABE, and Augmented ABE which acts as a bridge that transfers non-traceable ABE to traceable ABE.

In retrospect, as shown in Fig. 2, a 'functional' ABE is defined by extending conventional (non-traceable) ABE, namely by predefining the number of users in the system and indexing the users with unique indexes.

Then Traceable ABE is defined by extending ‘functional’ ABE, namely by adding a Trace algorithm and defining the traceability. Further, Augmented ABE is defined by extending ‘functional’ ABE, namely by extending the Encrypt algorithm and defining message-hiding and index-hiding properties. Liu et al. [20,23] proved that an Augmented ABE construction implies a Traceable ABE construction, by a generic transformation. In this work, we investigate how to transfer conventional (non-traceable) ABE constructions to Augmented ABE constructions in a generic manner.

Below we first review ‘functional’ ABE and its security, then review the definitions of non-traceable ABE, traceable ABE, and Augmented ABE based on this functional ABE.

To be as general as possible, in these definitions we use the terms ‘ciphertext tag’ and ‘key tag’, rather than ‘access policy’ and ‘attributes’. When the ciphertext tag is an attribute set and the key tag is a Boolean formula, it is a KP-ABE supporting Boolean formula as policy; when ciphertext tag is a Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA) and the key tag is a string, it is a CP-ABE supporting DFA as policy, and so on.




Fig. 2. Outline of Definitions and Framework

2.1 ‘Functional’ Attribute-Based Encryption

Attribute-Based Encryption Syntax. Given integers a and b where $a \leq b$, let $[a, b]$ be the set $\{a, a + 1, \dots, b\}$. Also, we use $[b]$ to denote the set $\{1, 2, \dots, b\}$. Let relation $\Gamma : \mathbb{X} \times \mathbb{Y} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be a predicate function that maps a pair of key tag in a space \mathbb{X} and ciphertext tag in a space \mathbb{Y} to $\{0, 1\}$. An Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) scheme for predicate Γ consists of following algorithms:

Setup($\lambda, \Gamma, \mathcal{K}$) \rightarrow (PP, MSK). On input a security parameter λ , a predicate Γ , and the number of users \mathcal{K} in the system, the algorithm runs in polynomial time in λ , and outputs a public parameter PP and a master secret key MSK.

KeyGen(PP, MSK, X) \rightarrow $SK_{k,X}$. On input PP, MSK, and a *key tag* $X \in \mathbb{X}$, the algorithm outputs a secret key $SK_{k,X}$ corresponding to X . The secret key is assigned and identified by a unique index $k \in [\mathcal{K}]$.

Encrypt(PP, M, Y) \rightarrow CT_Y . On input PP, a message M , and a *ciphertext tag* $Y \in \mathbb{Y}$, the algorithm outputs a ciphertext CT_Y . Y is included in CT_Y .

Decrypt(PP, $CT_Y, SK_{k,X}$) \rightarrow M or \perp . On input PP, a ciphertext CT_Y , and a secret key $SK_{k,X}$, the algorithm outputs a message M or \perp indicating the failure of decryption.

Correctness. For all $X \in \mathbb{X}$, $Y \in \mathbb{Y}$, and messages M , suppose $(PP, MSK) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\lambda, \Gamma, \mathcal{K})$, $SK_{k,X} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(PP, MSK, X)$, $CT_Y \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}(PP, M, Y)$. If $\Gamma(X, Y) = 1$ then $\text{Decrypt}(PP, CT_Y, SK_{k,X}) = M$.

Security. The security of an ABE scheme for predicate Γ is defined using the following message-hiding game, which is a typical semantic security game.

Game_{MH}. The message-hiding game is defined between a challenger and an adversary \mathcal{A} as follows:

Setup. The challenger runs $\text{Setup}(\lambda, \Gamma, \mathcal{K})$ and gives the public parameter PP to \mathcal{A} .

Phase 1. For $i = 1$ to Q_1 : \mathcal{A} adaptively submits (index, key tag) pair (k_i, X_{k_i}) to ask for secret key for key tag X_{k_i} , and the challenger responds with a secret key $\text{SK}_{k_i, X_{k_i}}$, which corresponds to key tag X_{k_i} and has index k_i .

Challenge. \mathcal{A} submits two equal-length messages M_0, M_1 and a ciphertext tag Y^* . The challenger flips a random coin $b \in \{0, 1\}$, and sends $CT_{Y^*} \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}(\text{PP}, M_b, Y^*)$ to \mathcal{A} .

Phase 2. For $i = Q_1 + 1$ to Q : \mathcal{A} adaptively submits (index, key tag) pair (k_i, X_{k_i}) to ask for secret key for key tag X_{k_i} . and the challenger responds with a secret key $\text{SK}_{k_i, X_{k_i}}$, which corresponds to key tag X_{k_i} and has index k_i .

Guess. \mathcal{A} outputs a guess $b' \in \{0, 1\}$ for b .

\mathcal{A} wins the game if $b' = b$ under the **restriction** that none of the queried $\{(k_i, X_{k_i})\}_{i=1}^Q$ can satisfy $\Gamma(X_{k_i}, Y^*) = 1$. The advantage of \mathcal{A} is defined as $\text{MHAdv}_{\mathcal{A}} = |\Pr[b' = b] - \frac{1}{2}|$. Note that to capture that each secret key has a unique index in $[\mathcal{K}]$, it is required that $Q \leq \mathcal{K}$, $k_i \in [\mathcal{K}]$, and $k_i \neq k_j \forall 1 \leq i \neq j \leq Q$. But we do not require $X_{k_i} \neq X_{k_j}$, i.e., different users/keys may have the same key tag.

Definition 1. A \mathcal{K} -user ABE scheme for predicate Γ is secure if for all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversaries \mathcal{A} , $\text{MHAdv}_{\mathcal{A}}$ is negligible in λ .

We say that a \mathcal{K} -user ABE scheme for predicate Γ is *selectively* secure if we add an **Init** stage before **Setup** where the adversary commits to the challenge ciphertext tag Y^* .

2.2 Conventional (non-traceable) ABE

The definitions of **conventional (non-traceable) ABE** (e.g. in [30,26,1]) are identical to that of the above functional ABE, except that (1) the number of users in the system is not predefined in the **Setup**; and (2) the secret keys are not assigned unique indexes.

Actually, the definitions of the above functional ABE are obtained by modifying the definitions of conventional (non-traceable) ABE, and the modifications (i.e. predefining the number of users in the system and assigning each secret key a unique index) are necessary settings for an ABE scheme to be blockbox traceable, and as discussed in [20,23], these settings do not weaken the virtues of ABE or limit its applications.

2.3 Traceable ABE

For an ABE scheme, a *ciphertext-tag-specific* decryption blackbox \mathcal{D} is described by a ciphertext tag $Y_{\mathcal{D}}$ and a noticeable probability value ϵ (i.e. $\epsilon = 1/f(\lambda)$ for some polynomial f), and this blackbox \mathcal{D} can decrypt ciphertexts generated under $Y_{\mathcal{D}}$ with probability at least ϵ . As discussed in [20,23], such a blackbox can reflect most practical scenarios, which include the key-like decryption blackbox for sale and decryption blackbox “found in the wild”.

Syntax. A (blackbox) **Traceable ABE** scheme for predicate Γ consists of the four algorithm (**Setup**, **KeyGen**, **Encrypt**, **Decrypt**) of the ‘functional’ ABE in Sec. 2.1 and the following **Trace** algorithm:

$\text{Trace}^{\mathcal{D}}(\text{PP}, Y_{\mathcal{D}}, \epsilon) \rightarrow \mathbb{K}_T \subseteq [\mathcal{K}]$. *Trace* is an oracle algorithm that interacts with a ciphertext-tag-specific decryption blackbox \mathcal{D} . By given the public parameter PP , a ciphertext tag $Y_{\mathcal{D}}$, and a probability value ϵ , the algorithm runs in time polynomial in λ and $1/\epsilon$, and outputs an index set $\mathbb{K}_T \subseteq [\mathcal{K}]$ which identifies the set of malicious users. Note that ϵ has to be polynomially related to λ , i.e. $\epsilon = 1/f(\lambda)$ for some polynomial f .

Correctness. The correctness of traceable ABE is exactly identical to that of the ‘functional’ ABE in Sec. 2.1.

Security. The security definition of traceable ABE is exactly identical to that of the ‘functional’ ABE in Sec. 2.1, i.e. as in Def. 1.

Traceability. The following tracing game captures the notion of fully collusion-resistant traceability against ciphertext-tag-specific decryption blackbox.

Game_{TR}. The tracing game is defined between a challenger and an adversary \mathcal{A} as follows:

Setup. The challenger runs $\text{Setup}(\lambda, \Gamma, \mathcal{K})$ and gives the public parameter PP to \mathcal{A} .

Key Query. For $i = 1$ to Q : \mathcal{A} adaptively submits (index, key tag) pair (k_i, X_{k_i}) to ask for secret key for key tag X_{k_i} , and the challenger responds with a secret key $\text{SK}_{k_i, X_{k_i}}$, which corresponds to key tag X_{k_i} and has index k_i .

Decryption Blackbox Generation. \mathcal{A} outputs a decryption blackbox \mathcal{D} associated with a ciphertext tag $Y_{\mathcal{D}}$ and a non-negligible probability value ϵ .

Tracing. The challenger runs $\text{Trace}^{\mathcal{D}}(\text{PP}, Y_{\mathcal{D}}, \epsilon)$ to obtain an index set $\mathbb{K}_T \subseteq [\mathcal{K}]$.

Let $\mathbb{K}_{\mathcal{D}} = \{k_i | 1 \leq i \leq Q\}$ be the index set of secret keys corrupted by the adversary. We say that \mathcal{A} wins the game if the following two conditions hold:

1. $\Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Encrypt}(\text{PP}, M, Y_{\mathcal{D}})) = M] \geq \epsilon$, where the probability is taken over the random choices of message M and the random coins of \mathcal{D} . A decryption blackbox satisfying this condition is said to be a *useful ciphertext-tag-specific decryption blackbox*.
2. $\mathbb{K}_T = \emptyset$, or $\mathbb{K}_T \not\subseteq \mathbb{K}_{\mathcal{D}}$, or $(\Gamma(X_{k_t}, Y_{\mathcal{D}}) \neq 1 \forall k_t \in \mathbb{K}_T)$.

Let $\text{TRAdv}_{\mathcal{A}}$ denote the probability that \mathcal{A} wins.

Definition 2. A \mathcal{K} -user ABE scheme for predicate Γ is traceable against ciphertext-tag-specific decryption blackbox if for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} , $\text{TRAdv}_{\mathcal{A}}$ is negligible in λ .

We say that a \mathcal{K} -user ABE scheme for predicate Γ is *selectively* traceable against ciphertext-tag-specific decryption blackbox if we add an **Init** stage before **Setup** where the adversary commits to the ciphertext tag $Y_{\mathcal{D}}$.

Note that the Trace algorithm does not need any secrets and anyone can perform the tracing, i.e. the above definition models the public traceability.

2.4 Augmented ABE

Syntax. An Augmented ABE (or AugABE for short) scheme has four algorithms ($\text{Setup}_{\mathcal{A}}$, $\text{KeyGen}_{\mathcal{A}}$, $\text{Encrypt}_{\mathcal{A}}$, $\text{Decrypt}_{\mathcal{A}}$). The setup algorithm $\text{Setup}_{\mathcal{A}}$, the key generation algorithm $\text{KeyGen}_{\mathcal{A}}$, and the decryption algorithm $\text{Decrypt}_{\mathcal{A}}$ are the same as that of ‘functional’ ABE in Sec. 2.1, respectively. For the encryption algorithm, it takes one more parameter $\bar{k} \in [\mathcal{K} + 1]$ as input, and is defined as follows.

$\text{Encrypt}_{\mathcal{A}}(\text{PP}, M, Y, \bar{k}) \rightarrow CT_Y$. On input PP , a message M , a ciphertext tag Y , and an index $\bar{k} \in [\mathcal{K} + 1]$, the algorithm outputs a ciphertext CT_Y . Y is included in CT_Y , but the value of \bar{k} is not.

Correctness. For all $X \in \mathbb{X}$, $Y \in \mathbb{Y}$, $\bar{k} \in [\mathcal{K} + 1]$, and messages M , suppose $(\text{PP}, \text{MSK}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda, \Gamma, \mathcal{K})$, $\text{SK}_{k, X} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\mathcal{A}}(\text{PP}, \text{MSK}, X)$, $CT_Y \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}_{\mathcal{A}}(\text{PP}, M, Y, \bar{k})$. If $(\Gamma(X, Y) = 1) \wedge (k \geq \bar{k})$ then $\text{Decrypt}_{\mathcal{A}}(\text{PP}, CT_Y, \text{SK}_{k, X}) = M$.

Note that during decryption, as long as $\Gamma(X, Y) = 1$, the decryption algorithm outputs a message, but only when $k \geq \bar{k}$, the output message is equal to the correct message, that is, $k \geq \bar{k}$ is an additional condition and if $(\Gamma(X, Y) = 1) \wedge (k \geq \bar{k})$, can $\text{SK}_{k, X}$ correctly decrypt a ciphertext under (Y, \bar{k}) .

Security. The security of AugABE is defined by the following three games. The first game is a **message-hiding game** and says that a ciphertext created using index 1 is unreadable to the users whose key tags do not satisfy the ciphertext tag. The second game is a **message-hiding game** and says that a ciphertext created using index $\mathcal{K} + 1$ is unreadable by anyone. The third game is an **index-hiding game** and captures the intuition that a ciphertext created using index \bar{k} reveals no non-trivial information about \bar{k} .

Game_{MH1}^A. The message-hiding game $\text{Game}_{\text{MH1}}^{\text{A}}$ is similar to Game_{MH} except that the **Challenge** phase is

Challenge. \mathcal{A} submits two equal-length messages M_0, M_1 and a ciphertext tag Y^* . The challenger flips a random coin $b \in \{0, 1\}$, and sends $CT_{Y^*} \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}_A(\text{PP}, M_b, Y^*, 1)$ to \mathcal{A} .

\mathcal{A} wins the game if $b' = b$ under the **restriction** that none of the queried $\{(k_i, X_{k_i})\}_{i=1}^Q$ can satisfy $\Gamma(X_{k_i}, Y^*) = 1$. The advantage of \mathcal{A} is defined as $\text{MH}_1^A \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}} = |\Pr[b' = b] - \frac{1}{2}|$.

Definition 3. A \mathcal{K} -user Augmented ABE scheme for predicate Γ is Type-I message-hiding if for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} the advantage $\text{MH}_1^A \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}$ is negligible in λ .

We say that an Augmented ABE scheme for predicate Γ is *selectively* Type-I message-hiding if we add an **Init** stage before **Setup** where the adversary commits to the challenge ciphertext tag Y^* .

$\text{Game}_{\text{MH}_2}^A$. The message-hiding game $\text{Game}_{\text{MH}_2}^A$ is similar to Game_{MH} except that the **Challenge** phase is

Challenge. \mathcal{A} submits two equal-length messages M_0, M_1 and a ciphertext tag Y^* . The challenger flips a random coin $b \in \{0, 1\}$, and sends $CT_{Y^*} \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}_A(\text{PP}, M_b, Y^*, \mathcal{K} + 1)$ to \mathcal{A} .

\mathcal{A} wins the game if $b' = b$. The advantage of \mathcal{A} is defined as $\text{MH}_2^A \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}} = |\Pr[b' = b] - \frac{1}{2}|$.

Definition 4. A \mathcal{K} -user Augmented ABE scheme for predicate Γ is Type-II message-hiding if for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} the advantage $\text{MH}_2^A \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}$ is negligible in λ .

$\text{Game}_{\text{IH}}^A$. The index-hiding game defines that, for any ciphertext tag Y^* , without a secret key $\text{SK}_{\bar{k}, X_{\bar{k}}}$ such that $\Gamma(X_{\bar{k}}, Y^*) = 1$, an adversary cannot distinguish between a ciphertext under (Y^*, \bar{k}) and $(Y^*, \bar{k} + 1)$. The game proceeds as follows:

Setup. The challenger runs $\text{Setup}_A(\lambda, \Gamma, \mathcal{K})$ and gives the public parameter PP to \mathcal{A} .

Key Query. For $i = 1$ to Q : \mathcal{A} adaptively submits (index, key tag) pair (k_i, X_{k_i}) to ask for secret key for key tag X_{k_i} , and the challenger responds with a secret key $\text{SK}_{k_i, X_{k_i}}$, which corresponds to key tag X_{k_i} and has index k_i .

Challenge. \mathcal{A} submits a message M and a ciphertext tag pair Y^* . The challenger flips a random $b \in \{0, 1\}$, and sends $CT_{Y^*} \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}_A(\text{PP}, M, Y^*, \bar{k} + b)$ to \mathcal{A} .

Guess. \mathcal{A} outputs a guess $b' \in \{0, 1\}$ for b .

\mathcal{A} wins the game if $b' = b$ under the **restriction** that none of the queried pairs $\{(k_i, X_{k_i})\}_{i=1}^Q$ can satisfy $(k_i = \bar{k}) \wedge (\Gamma(X_{k_i}, Y^*) = 1)$. The advantage of \mathcal{A} is defined as $\text{IH}^A \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}[\bar{k}] = |\Pr[b' = b] - \frac{1}{2}|$.

Definition 5. A \mathcal{K} -user Augmented ABE scheme for predicate Γ is index-hiding if for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} the advantages $\text{IH}^A \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}[\bar{k}]$ for $\bar{k} = 1, \dots, \mathcal{K}$ are negligible in λ .

We say that an Augmented ABE scheme for predicate Γ is *selectively* index-hiding if we add an **Init** stage before **Setup** where the adversary commits to the challenge ciphertext tag Y^* .

2.5 The Reduction of Traceable ABE to Augmented ABE

Let $\Sigma_A = (\text{Setup}_A, \text{KeyGen}_A, \text{Encrypt}_A, \text{Decrypt}_A)$ be an AugABE, define

- $\text{Encrypt}(\text{PP}, M, Y) = \text{Encrypt}_A(\text{PP}, M, Y, 1)$.
- $\text{Trace}^{\mathcal{D}}(\text{PP}, Y_{\mathcal{D}}, \epsilon) \rightarrow \mathbb{K}_T \subseteq [\mathcal{K}]$. Given a ciphertext-tag-specific decryption blackbox \mathcal{D} associated with a ciphertext tag $Y_{\mathcal{D}}$ and probability $\epsilon > 0$, the tracing algorithm works as follows:
 1. For $k = 1$ to $\mathcal{K} + 1$, do the following:
 - (a) Repeat the following $8\lambda(N/\epsilon)^2$ times:
 - i. Sample M from the message space at random.
 - ii. Let $CT_{Y_{\mathcal{D}}} \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}_A(\text{PP}, M, Y_{\mathcal{D}}, k)$.
 - iii. Query oracle \mathcal{D} on input $CT_{Y_{\mathcal{D}}}$, and compare the output of \mathcal{D} with M .

- (b) Let \hat{p}_k be the fraction of times that \mathcal{D} decrypted the ciphertexts correctly.
2. Let \mathbb{K}_T be the set of all $k \in [\mathcal{K}]$ for which $\hat{p}_k - \hat{p}_{k+1} \geq \epsilon/(4\mathcal{K})$. Output \mathbb{K}_T as the index set of the decryption keys of malicious users.

Let $\Sigma = (\text{Setup}_A, \text{KeyGen}_A, \text{Encrypt}, \text{Decrypt}_A, \text{Trace})$, we have the following two theorems:

Theorem 1. *If Σ_A is Type-I message-hiding (resp. selectively Type-I message-hiding), then Σ is secure (resp. selectively secure).*

Proof. Note that Σ is a special case of Σ_A where the encryption algorithm always set $\bar{k} = 1$. Hence, Game_{MH} for Σ , including the restrictions, is exactly identical to $\text{Game}_{\text{MH}_1}^A$ for Σ_A , which implies MHAdv_A for Σ in Game_{MH} is equal to $\text{MH}_1^A \text{Adv}_A$ for Σ_A in $\text{Game}_{\text{MH}_1}^A$, i.e. if Σ_A is Type-I message-hiding, then Σ is secure (w.r.t. Def. 1). The selective case is similar.

Theorem 2. *If Σ_A is Type-II message-hiding and index-hiding (resp. selectively index-hiding), then Σ is traceable (resp. selectively traceable) w.r.t. Def. 2.*

Proof. The proof is similar to that in [20,23]. For completeness, we give the the proof sketch below.

We show that if the blackbox output by the adversary is a useful one then \mathbb{K}_T will satisfy $(\mathbb{K}_T \neq \emptyset) \wedge (\mathbb{K}_T \subseteq \mathbb{K}_{\mathcal{D}}) \wedge (\exists k_t \in \mathbb{K}_T \text{ s.t. } \Gamma(X_{k_t}, Y_{\mathcal{D}}) = 1)$ with overwhelming probability, which implies that the adversary cannot win Game_{TR} , i.e., TRAdv_A is negligible. The selective case will be similar.

Let \mathcal{D} be the ciphertext-tag-specific decryption blackbox output by the adversary, and $Y_{\mathcal{D}}$ be the ciphertext tag describing \mathcal{D} . Define

$$p_{\bar{k}} = \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Encrypt}_A(\text{PP}, M, Y_{\mathcal{D}}, \bar{k})) = M],$$

where the probability is taken over the random choice of message M and the random coins of \mathcal{D} .

We have that $p_1 \geq \epsilon$ and $p_{\mathcal{K}+1}$ is negligible (for simplicity let $p_{\mathcal{K}+1} = 0$). The former follows from the fact that \mathcal{D} is useful, and the latter is because Σ_A is message-hiding in $\text{Game}_{\text{MH}}^A$. Then there must exist some $k \in [1, \mathcal{K}]$ such that $p_k - p_{k+1} \geq \epsilon/(2\mathcal{K})$. By the Chernoff bound it follows that with overwhelming probability, $\hat{p}_k - \hat{p}_{k+1} \geq \epsilon/(4\mathcal{K})$. Hence, we have $\mathbb{K}_T \neq \emptyset$.

For any $k \in \mathbb{K}_T$ (i.e., $\hat{p}_k - \hat{p}_{k+1} \geq \frac{\epsilon}{4\mathcal{K}}$), we know, by Chernoff, that with overwhelming probability $p_k - p_{k+1} \geq \epsilon/(8\mathcal{K})$. Clearly $(k \in \mathbb{K}_{\mathcal{D}}) \wedge (\Gamma(X_k, Y_{\mathcal{D}}) = 1)$ since otherwise, \mathcal{D} can directly be used to win the index-hiding game for Σ_A . Hence, we have $(\mathbb{K}_T \subseteq \mathbb{K}_{\mathcal{D}}) \wedge (\Gamma(X_k, Y_{\mathcal{D}}) = 1 \forall k \in \mathbb{K}_T)$.

3 Transform a Non-Traceable ABE to an Augmented ABE

In this section, we first formalize the notation of Pair Encoding Scheme in Sec. 3.1, which is the core components of the conventional (non-traceable) ABE template we propose in Sec. 3.2. Then in Sec. 3.3 we propose the generic transformation from the ABE template to the Augmented ABE and in Sec. 3.4 we prove the security of the resulting Augmented ABE.

Note that the ABE template, the transformation, and the proof in this section are described in composite order bilinear groups, but as shown later in Sec. 4, all these also work well in prime order bilinear groups.

3.1 Pair Encoding Scheme

The notion of pair encoding scheme here is inspired by the work of Attrapdung [1]. Attrapdung [1] proposed the notion of pair encoding scheme, including syntax and security definitions, and proved the full security of some Functional Encryption schemes based on the security of corresponding pair encoding scheme instantiations. Here we borrow the term of pair encoding scheme, and actually we *only use the syntax* to abstract the *structures* of the non-traceable ABE schemes which we aim to transform to AugABE, while not considering or using the security properties of pair encoding scheme.

A Pair Encoding Scheme for predicate Γ consists of four deterministic algorithms given by $(\text{SysParam}, \text{KeyParam}, \text{CiperParam}, \text{DecPair})$:

- $\text{SysParam}(\Gamma) \rightarrow (d, d_0)$. It takes as input a predicate $\Gamma : \mathbb{X} \times \mathbb{Y} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ and outputs two integers d and d_0 . d is used to specify the number of *common variables* in KeyParam and CiperParam , and $d_0 (\leq d)$ will be used to specify the requirements of the ABE template. For the default notation, let α and $\beta = (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_d)$ denote the list of common variables.
- $\text{KeyParam}(X, N) \rightarrow (\phi = (\phi_0, \phi_1, \dots, \phi_{d_k}), d_\delta)$. It takes as inputs $N \in \mathbb{N}$ and a key tag $X \in \mathbb{X}$, and outputs a sequence of polynomials $\phi = (\phi_0, \phi_1, \dots, \phi_{d_k})$ with coefficients in \mathbb{Z}_N and an integer d_δ that specifies the number of its own variables. Let $\delta = (\delta_1, \dots, \delta_{d_\delta})$ be the variables, we require that each polynomial $\phi_z (0 \leq z \leq d_k)$ is a *linear combination of monomials* $\alpha, \delta_i, \delta_i \beta_j$, where $\alpha, \beta = (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_d)$ are the common variables. For simplicity, we write $\phi(\alpha, \beta, \delta) = (\phi_0(\alpha, \beta, \delta), \phi_1(\alpha, \beta, \delta), \dots, \phi_{d_k}(\alpha, \beta, \delta))$.
- $\text{CiperParam}(Y, N) \rightarrow (\psi = (\psi_1, \dots, \psi_{d_c}), d_\pi)$. It takes as inputs $N \in \mathbb{N}$ and a ciphertext tag $Y \in \mathbb{Y}$, and outputs a sequence of polynomials $\psi = (\psi_1, \dots, \psi_{d_c})$ with coefficients in \mathbb{Z}_N and an integer d_π that specifies the number of its own variables. Let $\pi = (\pi, \pi_1, \dots, \pi_{d_\pi})$ be the variables, we require that each polynomial $\psi_z (1 \leq z \leq d_c)$ is a *linear combination of monomials* $\pi, \pi_i, \pi \beta_j, \pi_i \beta_j$, where $\beta = (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_d)$ are the common variables. For simplicity, we write $\psi(\beta, \pi) = (\psi_1(\beta, \pi), \dots, \psi_{d_c}(\beta, \pi))$.
- $\text{DecPair}(X, Y, N) \rightarrow \mathbf{E}$. It takes as inputs $N \in \mathbb{N}$, a key tag $X \in \mathbb{X}$, and a ciphertext tag $Y \in \mathbb{Y}$, and outputs $\mathbf{E} \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{(d_k+1) \times d_c}$.

Correctness. The correctness requirement is defined as follows.

- First, for any $N \in \mathbb{N}, X \in \mathbb{X}, Y \in \mathbb{Y}$, let $(\phi = (\phi_0, \phi_1, \dots, \phi_{d_k}), d_\delta) \leftarrow \text{KeyParam}(X, N)$, $(\psi = (\psi_1, \dots, \psi_{d_c}), d_\pi) \leftarrow \text{CiperParam}(Y, N)$, and $\mathbf{E} \leftarrow \text{DecPair}(X, Y, N)$, if $\Gamma(X, Y) = 1$, then for any $\alpha, \beta = (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_d), \delta = (\delta_1, \dots, \delta_{d_\delta}), \pi = (\pi, \pi_1, \dots, \pi_{d_\pi})$, we have $\phi(\alpha, \beta, \delta) \mathbf{E} \psi(\beta, \pi)^T = \alpha \pi$, where the equality holds symbolically. Note that since $\phi(\alpha, \beta, \delta) \mathbf{E} \psi(\beta, \pi)^T = \sum_{i \in [0, d_k], j \in [1, d_c]} E_{i,j} \phi_i \psi_j$, this correctness amounts to check if there is a linear combination of $\phi_i \psi_j$ terms summed up to $\alpha \pi$.
- Second, for p that divides N , if we let $\text{KeyParam}(X, N) \rightarrow (\phi = (\phi_0, \phi_1, \dots, \phi_{d_k}), d_\delta)$ and $\text{KeyParam}(X, p) \rightarrow (\phi' = (\phi'_0, \phi'_1, \dots, \phi'_{d_k}), d_\delta)$, then it holds that $\phi \bmod p = \phi'$. The requirement for CiperParam is similar.

Remark. We mandate that the variables used in KeyParam and those in CiperParam are different except only the common variables α and β . We remark that in the syntax, all variables are only *symbolic*: no probability distributions have been assigned to them yet. (We will assign these in the later ABE template construction). Note that d_δ, d_k , can depend on X and d_π, d_c can depend on Y . We also remark that each polynomial in ϕ, ψ has no constant terms.

3.2 A Template for Non-traceable ABE

Below, we first review the composite order bilinear groups and some notations. Then, from a pair encoding scheme, by adding some additional requirements, we define a template for conventional (non-traceable) ABE constructions, which works on composite order bilinear groups. We would like to point out, as shown later in Sec. 4, the template can be easily changed to one on prime order bilinear groups, and the transformation from the non-traceable ABE template to Augmented ABE, as well as the proof, work well on prime order bilinear groups.

Composite Order Bilinear Groups. Let \mathcal{G} be a group generator, which takes a security parameter λ and outputs $(p_1, p_2, p_3, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$ where p_1, p_2, p_3 are distinct primes, \mathbb{G} and \mathbb{G}_T are cyclic groups of order $N = p_1 p_2 p_3$, and $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ is a map such that: (1) (Bilinear) $\forall g, h \in \mathbb{G}, a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_N, e(g^a, h^b) = e(g, h)^{ab}$, (2) (Non-Degenerate) $\exists g \in \mathbb{G}$ such that $e(g, g)$ has order N in \mathbb{G}_T . Assume that group operations in \mathbb{G} and \mathbb{G}_T as well as the bilinear map e are computable in polynomial time with respect to λ . Let $\mathbb{G}_{p_1}, \mathbb{G}_{p_2}$ and \mathbb{G}_{p_3} be the subgroups of order p_1, p_2 and p_3 in \mathbb{G} , respectively. These subgroups are “orthogonal” to each other under the bilinear map e : if $h_i \in \mathbb{G}_{p_i}$ and $h_j \in \mathbb{G}_{p_j}$ for $i \neq j$, then $e(h_i, h_j) = 1$ (the identity element in \mathbb{G}_T).

Notations. For a given vector $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \dots, v_d) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^d$ and $g \in \mathbb{G}$, by $g^{\mathbf{v}}$ we mean the vector $(g^{v_1}, \dots, g^{v_d}) \in \mathbb{G}^d$. For two vectors $\mathbf{V} = (V_1, \dots, V_d), \mathbf{W} = (W_1, \dots, W_d) \in \mathbb{G}^d$, by $\mathbf{V} \cdot \mathbf{W}$ we mean the vector $(V_1 \cdot W_1, \dots, V_d \cdot W_d) \in \mathbb{G}^d$, i.e. it performs component-wise multiplication. Furthermore, by $e_d(\mathbf{V}, \mathbf{W})$ we mean

$\prod_{k=1}^d e(V_k, W_k)$. Particularly, for $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \dots, v_d), \mathbf{w} = (w_1, \dots, w_d) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^d$, we have $g^{\mathbf{v}} \cdot g^{\mathbf{w}} = g^{\mathbf{v}+\mathbf{w}}$, and $e_d(g^{\mathbf{v}}, g^{\mathbf{w}}) = \prod_{k=1}^d e(g^{v_k}, g^{w_k}) = e(g, g)^{(\mathbf{v} \cdot \mathbf{w})}$, where $(\mathbf{v} \cdot \mathbf{w})$ is the inner product of \mathbf{v} and \mathbf{w} . Sometimes we omit the subscript d of $e_d(\mathbf{V}, \mathbf{W})$. For a vector $\mathbf{V} = (V_1, \dots, V_d) \in \mathbb{G}_d$ and a matrix $\mathbf{A} = (A_{i,j})_{d \times t} \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{d \times t}$, by $\mathbf{V}^{\mathbf{A}}$ we mean $(\prod_{i=1}^d V_i^{A_{i,1}}, \prod_{i=1}^d V_i^{A_{i,2}}, \dots, \prod_{i=1}^d V_i^{A_{i,t}}) \in \mathbb{G}^t$.

Non-traceable ABE template. The template consists of four algorithms as follows:

$\text{Setup}_{\text{NT}}(\lambda, \Gamma) \rightarrow (\text{PP}, \text{MSK})$. Run $(N, p_1, p_2, p_3, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(\lambda)$. Pick generators $g \in \mathbb{G}_{p_1}, X_3 \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$. Run $(d, d_0) \leftarrow \text{SysParam}(\Gamma)$, where $1 \leq d_0 \leq d$. Pick random $\boldsymbol{\beta} = (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_d) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^d$. Pick random $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_N$. The public parameter is

$$\text{PP} = ((N, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e), g, g^{\boldsymbol{\beta}}, X_3, e(g, g)^\alpha).$$

The master secret key is $\text{MSK} = (\alpha)$.

$\text{KeyGen}_{\text{NT}}(\text{PP}, \text{MSK}, X) \rightarrow \text{SK}_X$. On input a key tag X , run $(\phi = (\phi_0, \phi_1, \dots, \phi_{d_k}), d_\delta) \leftarrow \text{KeyParam}(X, N)$. Pick random $\boldsymbol{\delta} = (\delta_1, \dots, \delta_{d_\delta}) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{d_\delta}$, $\mathbf{R} = (R_0, \dots, R_{d_k}) \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}^{d_k+1}$. Output a secret key SK_X as

$$\text{SK}_X = (X, \mathbf{K} = g^{\phi(\alpha, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\delta})} \cdot \mathbf{R}).$$

To satisfy the template, it is required that for any key tag X and variables $\boldsymbol{\delta} = (\delta_1, \dots, \delta_{d_\delta})$,

1. $d_k \geq d_0$.
2. for $z \in [2, d_k]$, $\phi_z(\alpha, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\delta})$ does not contain α or $\beta_1 \delta_1$. For simplicity, we write them as $\phi_z(\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\delta})$, as they do not contain α .
3. $\phi_1(\alpha, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\delta}) = \delta_1$, $\phi_0(\alpha, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\delta}) = \alpha + \beta_1 \delta_1 + \sum_{\tilde{d}=2}^{d_0} \beta_{\tilde{d}} \phi_{\tilde{d}}(\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\delta})$.

That is,⁸

$$\begin{aligned} \text{SK}_X = (X, & (K_0 = g^\alpha g^{\beta_1 \delta_1} \prod_{\tilde{d}=2}^{d_0} g^{\beta_{\tilde{d}} \phi_{\tilde{d}}(\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\delta})} R_0, \quad K_1 = g^{\delta_1} \cdot R_1, \\ & K_2 = g^{\phi_2(\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\delta})} \cdot R_2, \quad \dots, \quad K_{d_k} = g^{\phi_{d_k}(\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\delta})} \cdot R_{d_k})). \end{aligned}$$

$\text{Encrypt}_{\text{NT}}(\text{PP}, M, Y) \rightarrow CT_Y$. On input a ciphertext tag Y , run $(\boldsymbol{\psi} = (\psi_1, \dots, \psi_{d_c}), d_\pi) \leftarrow \text{CiperParam}(Y, N)$. Pick random $\boldsymbol{\pi} = (\pi, \pi_1, \dots, \pi_{d_\pi}) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{d_\pi+1}$. Set $\mathbf{P} = g^{\boldsymbol{\psi}(\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\pi})}$. Output a ciphertext CT_Y as

$$CT_Y = (Y, \mathbf{P}, C = M \cdot e(g, g)^{\alpha \pi}).$$

Note that \mathbf{P} can be computed from $g^{\boldsymbol{\beta}}$ and $\boldsymbol{\pi}$ since $\boldsymbol{\psi}(\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\pi})$ contains only linear combinations of monomials $\pi, \pi_i, \pi \beta_j, \pi_i \beta_j$.

To satisfy the template, it is required that for any ciphertext tag Y and variables $\boldsymbol{\pi} = (\pi, \pi_1, \dots, \pi_{d_\pi})$,

1. $\psi_1(\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\pi}) = \pi$.
2. $\psi_2(\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\pi}) = \beta_2 \pi, \dots, \psi_{d_0}(\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\pi}) = \beta_{d_0} \pi$.

That is, the first d_0 components of \mathbf{P} are $P_1 = g^\pi, P_2 = g^{\beta_2 \pi}, \dots, P_{d_0} = g^{\beta_{d_0} \pi}$.

$\text{Decrypt}_{\text{NT}}(\text{PP}, CT_Y, \text{SK}_X) \rightarrow M$ or \perp . Obtain X, Y from SK_X, CT_Y . Suppose $\Gamma(X, Y) = 1$ (if $\Gamma(X, Y) \neq 1$, output \perp). Run $\mathbf{E} \leftarrow \text{DecPair}(X, Y, N) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{(d_k+1) \times d_c}$. Compute $e(g, g)^{\alpha \pi} = e(\mathbf{K}^{\mathbf{E}}, \mathbf{P})$, and output $M \leftarrow C / e(g, g)^{\alpha \pi}$.

To satisfy the template, it is required that there is an algorithm DecPair_1 such that:

- For any $N \in \mathbb{N}, X \in \mathbb{X}, Y \in \mathbb{Y}$, let $(\phi = (\phi_0, \phi_1, \dots, \phi_{d_k}), d_\delta) \leftarrow \text{KeyParam}(X, N)$, $(\boldsymbol{\psi} = (\psi_1, \dots, \psi_{d_c}), d_\pi) \leftarrow \text{CiperParam}(Y, N)$, for any variables $\alpha, \boldsymbol{\beta} = (\beta_1, \beta_2, \dots, \beta_d), \boldsymbol{\delta} = (\delta_1, \delta_2, \dots, \delta_{d_\delta}), \boldsymbol{\pi} = (\pi, \pi_1, \dots, \pi_{d_\pi})$, let $\mathbf{E}_1 \leftarrow \text{DecPair}_1(X, Y, N) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{(d_k+1) \times d_c}$, if $\Gamma(X, Y) = 1$ we have that $\phi \mathbf{E}_1 \boldsymbol{\psi}^T = \beta_1 \delta_1 \pi$, i.e., there is a linear combination of $\phi_i \psi_j$ terms summed up to $\beta_1 \delta_1 \pi$.

Later we will show that a series of ABE schemes with appealing features satisfy this template.

⁸ Note that to cover as many ABE schemes as possible, we only specify the *necessary* requirements which we may use in the constructions and proofs of our generic transformation framework. Here we do not require $\phi_{\tilde{d}}(\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\delta})$ (for $\tilde{d} = 2$ to d_0) to contain only linear combination of monomials δ_i . Actually, if $\phi_{\tilde{d}}(\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\delta})$ contained β_j , K_0 could still be computed, by putting $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ in MSK.

3.3 Augmented ABE Transformed from Non-traceable ABE

Notations. Suppose that the number of users \mathcal{K} in the system equals to m^2 for some m . In practice, if \mathcal{K} is not a square, we can add some “dummy” users until it pads to the next square. We arrange the users in an $m \times m$ matrix and uniquely assign a tuple (i, j) , where $i, j \in [1, m]$, to each user. A user at position (i, j) of the matrix has index $k = (i - 1) * m + j$. For simplicity, we directly use (i, j) as the index where $(i, j) \geq (\bar{i}, \bar{j})$ means that $((i > \bar{i}) \vee (i = \bar{i} \wedge j \geq \bar{j}))$. The use of pairwise notation (i, j) is purely a notational convenience, as $k = (i - 1) * m + j$ defines a bijection between $\{(i, j) | i, j \in [1, m]\}$ and $[1, \mathcal{K}]$. Given a bilinear group order N , one can randomly choose $r_x, r_y, r_z \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and set $\chi_1 = (r_x, 0, r_z)$, $\chi_2 = (0, r_y, r_z)$, $\chi_3 = \chi_1 \times \chi_2 = (-r_y r_z, -r_x r_z, r_x r_y)$. Let $span\{\chi_1, \chi_2\} = \{\nu_1 \chi_1 + \nu_2 \chi_2 | \nu_1, \nu_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}$ be the subspace spanned by χ_1 and χ_2 . We can see that χ_3 is orthogonal to the subspace $span\{\chi_1, \chi_2\}$ and $\mathbb{Z}_N^3 = span\{\chi_1, \chi_2, \chi_3\} = \{\nu_1 \chi_1 + \nu_2 \chi_2 + \nu_3 \chi_3 | \nu_1, \nu_2, \nu_3 \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}$. For any $\mathbf{v} \in span\{\chi_1, \chi_2\}$, $(\chi_3 \cdot \mathbf{v}) = 0$, and for random $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{Z}_N^3$, $(\chi_3 \cdot \mathbf{v}) \neq 0$ happens with overwhelming probability.

Below we propose our AugABE construction, which is transformed from the conventional (non-traceable) ABE template in above Sec. 3.2. Note that the parts written in the box are the same as the conventional (non-traceable) ABE template, and we add/modify some additional parts to form our generic AugABE construction.

$Setup_A(\lambda, \Gamma, \mathcal{K} = m^2) \rightarrow (PP, MSK)$.

Run $(N, p_1, p_2, p_3, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(\lambda)$. Pick generators $g \in \mathbb{G}_{p_1}$, $X_3 \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$.
Run $(d, d_0) \leftarrow SysParam(\Gamma)$, where $1 \leq d_0 \leq d$. Pick random $\beta = (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_d) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^d$.
Pick random $\{\alpha_i, r_i, z_i \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{i \in [m]}$, $\{c_j \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{j \in [m]}$. The public parameter is

$$PP = ((N, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e), g, \mathbf{h} = g^\beta, X_3, \{E_i = e(g, g)^{\alpha_i}, G_i = g^{r_i}, Z_i = g^{z_i}\}_{i \in [m]}, \{H_j = g^{c_j}\}_{j \in [m]}).$$

The master secret key is $MSK = (\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_m, r_1, \dots, r_m, c_1, \dots, c_m)$.

A counter $ctr = 0$ is implicitly included in MSK .

$KeyGen_A(PP, MSK, X) \rightarrow SK_{(i,j),X}$.

Upon input a key tag X , run $(\phi = (\phi_0, \phi_1, \dots, \phi_{d_k}), d_\delta) \leftarrow KeyParam(X, N)$.
Pick random $\delta = (\delta_1, \dots, \delta_{d_\delta}) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{d_\delta}$, $\mathbf{R} = (R_0, \dots, R_{d_k}) \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}^{d_k+1}$.

Pick random $R'_0 \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$. Set $ctr = ctr + 1$ and then compute the corresponding index in the form of (i, j) where $1 \leq i, j \leq m$ and $(i - 1) * m + j = ctr$. Output a secret key $SK_{(i,j),X}$ as

$$SK_{(i,j),X} = ((i, j), X, \mathbf{K} = g^{\phi(r_i c_j + \alpha_i, \beta, \delta)} \cdot \mathbf{R}, K'_0 = Z_i^{\delta_1} R'_0),$$

Note the requirements stated in $KeyGen_{NT}$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} SK_{(i,j),X} = ((i, j), X, (K_0 = g^{r_i c_j + \alpha_i} g^{\beta_1 \delta_1} \prod_{\bar{d}=2}^{d_0} g^{\beta_{\bar{d}} \phi_{\bar{d}}(\beta, \delta)} R_0, K_1 = g^{\delta_1} R_1, \\ K_2 = g^{\phi_2(\beta, \delta)} \cdot R_2, \dots, K_{d_k} = g^{\phi_{d_k}(\beta, \delta)} \cdot R_{d_k}), \\ K'_0 = Z_i^{\delta_1} R'_0). \end{aligned}$$

$Encrypt_A(PP, M, Y, (\bar{i}, \bar{j})) \rightarrow CT_Y$.

- Upon input a ciphertext tag Y , run $(\psi = (\psi_1, \dots, \psi_{d_\pi}), d_\pi) \leftarrow CiperParam(Y, N)$.
Pick random $\pi = (\pi, \pi_1, \dots, \pi_{d_\pi}) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{d_\pi+1}$. Set $\mathbf{P} = g^{\psi(\beta, \pi)}$.
Note that \mathbf{P} can be computed from g^β and π since $\psi(\beta, \pi)$ contains only linear combinations of monomials $\pi, \pi_i, \pi \beta_j, \pi_i \beta_j$.

- Pick random

$$\kappa, \tau, s_1, \dots, s_m, t_1, \dots, t_m \in \mathbb{Z}_N,$$

$$\mathbf{v}_c, \mathbf{w}_1, \dots, \mathbf{w}_m \in \mathbb{Z}_N^3.$$

Pick random $r_x, r_y, r_z \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and set $\chi_1 = (r_x, 0, r_z)$, $\chi_2 = (0, r_y, r_z)$, $\chi_3 = \chi_1 \times \chi_2 = (-r_y r_z, -r_x r_z, r_x r_y)$.
Pick random

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{v}_i &\in \mathbb{Z}_N^3 \quad \forall i \in \{1, \dots, \bar{i}\}, \\ \mathbf{v}_i &\in \text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2\} \quad \forall i \in \{\bar{i} + 1, \dots, m\}. \end{aligned}$$

For each row $i \in [m]$:

- if $i < \bar{i}$: randomly choose $\hat{s}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, and set

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{R}_i &= g^{\mathbf{v}_i}, \quad \mathbf{R}'_i = g^{\kappa \mathbf{v}_i}, \quad Q_i = g^{s_i}, \quad Q_{i,1} = (g^{\beta_1})^{s_i} Z_i^{t_i} (g^{\beta_1})^\pi, \\ Q_{i,2} &= (g^{\beta_2})^{s_i}, \dots, Q_{i,d_0} = (g^{\beta_{d_0}})^{s_i}, \\ Q'_i &= g^{t_i}, \quad T_i = E_i^{\hat{s}_i}. \end{aligned}$$

- if $i \geq \bar{i}$: set

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{R}_i &= G_i^{s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, \quad \mathbf{R}'_i = G_i^{\kappa s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, \quad Q_i = g^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}, \quad Q_{i,1} = (g^{\beta_1})^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)} Z_i^{t_i} (g^{\beta_1})^\pi, \\ Q_{i,2} &= (g^{\beta_2})^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}, \dots, Q_{i,d_0} = (g^{\beta_{d_0}})^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}, \\ Q'_i &= g^{t_i}, \quad T_i = M \cdot E_i^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}. \end{aligned}$$

For each column $j \in [m]$:

- if $j < \bar{j}$: randomly choose $\mu_j \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and set $\mathbf{C}_j = H_j^{\tau(\mathbf{v}_c + \mu_j \chi_3)} \cdot g^{\kappa \mathbf{w}_j}$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = g^{\mathbf{w}_j}$.
- if $j \geq \bar{j}$: set $\mathbf{C}_j = H_j^{\tau \mathbf{v}_c} \cdot g^{\kappa \mathbf{w}_j}$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = g^{\mathbf{w}_j}$.

3. Output the ciphertext CT_Y as $CT_Y = \langle Y, \mathbf{P}, (\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{R}'_i, Q_i, \{Q_{i,\bar{d}}\}_{\bar{d}=1}^{d_0}, Q'_i, T_i)_{i=1}^m, (\mathbf{C}_j, \mathbf{C}'_j)_{j=1}^m \rangle$.

$\text{Decrypt}_A(\text{PP}, CT_Y, \text{SK}_{(i,j),X}) \rightarrow M$ or \perp . Parse CT_Y to $CT_Y = \langle Y, \mathbf{P}, (\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{R}'_i, Q_i, \{Q_{i,\bar{d}}\}_{\bar{d}=1}^{d_0}, Q'_i, T_i)_{i=1}^m, (\mathbf{C}_j, \mathbf{C}'_j)_{j=1}^m \rangle$ and $\text{SK}_{(i,j),X}$ to $\text{SK}_{(i,j),X} = ((i, j), X, \mathbf{K} = (K_0, \dots, K_{d_k}), K'_0)$. Obtain Y, X from CT_Y , $\text{SK}_{(i,j),X}$. Suppose $\Gamma(X, Y) = 1$ (if $\Gamma(X, Y) \neq 1$, output \perp).

1. Run $\mathbf{E}_1 \leftarrow \text{Pair}_1(X, Y, N)$. Compute $D_P \leftarrow e(\mathbf{K}^{\mathbf{E}_1}, \mathbf{P})$.
2. Compute

$$D_I \leftarrow \frac{e(K_0, Q_i) \cdot e(K'_0, Q'_i)}{e(K_1, Q_{i,1}) \cdot \prod_{\bar{d}=2}^{d_0} e(K_{\bar{d}}, Q_{i,\bar{d}})} \cdot \frac{e_3(\mathbf{R}'_i, \mathbf{C}'_j)}{e_3(\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{C}_j)}.$$

3. Computes $M \leftarrow T_i / (D_P \cdot D_I)$ as the output message. Suppose that the ciphertext is generated from message M' and encryption index (\bar{i}, \bar{j}) , it can be verified that only when $(i > \bar{i})$ or $(i = \bar{i} \wedge j \geq \bar{j})$, $M = M'$. This is because for $i > \bar{i}$, we have $(\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \chi_3) = 0$ (since $\mathbf{v}_i \in \text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2\}$), and for $i = \bar{i}$, we have that $(\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \chi_3) \neq 0$ happens with overwhelming probability (since \mathbf{v}_i is randomly chosen from \mathbb{Z}_N^3). The **correctness** is referred to Appendix A.

3.4 Security of Augmented ABE

Let $\Sigma_{\text{NT}} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{NT}}, \text{KeyGen}_{\text{NT}}, \text{Encrypt}_{\text{NT}}, \text{Decrypt}_{\text{NT}})$ be a non-traceable ABE scheme satisfying the template in Sec. 3.2, and $\Sigma_A = (\text{Setup}_A, \text{KeyGen}_A, \text{Encrypt}_A, \text{Decrypt}_A)$ be an Augmented ABE scheme derived from Σ_{NT} as shown in Sec. 3.3. As shown in Fig. 3, Theorem 3, Theorem 4, and Theorem 5 state that the AugABE proposed above is Type-I message-hiding, Type-II message-hiding, and selectively index-hiding, respectively. Below we prove Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 in a framework manner. For the Theorem 5, we prove it in a framework manner partially, namely, we prove Claim 2 in a framework manner, while proving Lemma 1 case by case for the concrete underlying conventional (non-traceable) ABE schemes, and the proof of Claim 1 will be identical to that of Lemma 1.




Fig. 3. Outline for Security Analysis

Theorem 3. If Σ_{NT} is secure (resp. selectively secure), then Σ_{A} is Type-I message-hiding (resp. selectively Type-I message-hiding).

Proof. Suppose there is a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} that can break Σ_{A} in $\text{Game}_{\text{MH}_1}^{\text{A}}$ with non-negligible advantage $\text{MH}_1^{\text{A}} \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}$, we construct a PPT algorithm \mathcal{B} to break Σ_{NT} with advantage $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}} \Sigma_{\text{NT}}$, which equals to $\text{MH}_1^{\text{A}} \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}$.

Setup. \mathcal{B} receives the public parameter $\text{PP}^{\text{NT}} = ((N, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e), g, g^{\beta}, X_3, E = e(g, g)^{\alpha})$ from the challenger, where $g \in \mathbb{G}_{p_1}$ and $X_3 \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$ are the generators of subgroups \mathbb{G}_{p_1} and \mathbb{G}_{p_3} respectively, $\beta = (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_d) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^d$ (for $(d, d_0) \leftarrow \text{SysParam}(T)$) and $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ are randomly chosen. \mathcal{B} picks random $\{\alpha'_i, r_i, z_i \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{i \in [m]}$, $\{c_j \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{j \in [m]}$, then gives \mathcal{A} the public parameter PP :

$$\text{PP} = ((N, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e), g, g^{\beta}, X_3, \{E_i = E \cdot e(g, g)^{\alpha'_i}, G_i = g^{r_i}, Z_i = g^{z_i}\}_{i \in [m]}, \{H_j = g^{c_j}\}_{j \in [m]}).$$

Note that \mathcal{B} implicitly chooses $\{\alpha_i \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{i \in [m]}$ such that $\{\alpha + \alpha'_i \equiv \alpha_i \pmod{p_1}\}_{i \in [m]}$.

Phase 1. To respond to \mathcal{A} 's query for $((i, j), X_{(i,j)})$, \mathcal{B} submits $X_{(i,j)}$ to the challenger, and receives a secret key

$$\text{SK}_{X_{(i,j)}}^{\text{NT}} = (X_{(i,j)}, (\tilde{K}_0 = g^{\alpha} g^{\beta_1 \delta_1} \prod_{\tilde{d}=2}^{d_0} g^{\beta_{\tilde{d}} \phi_{\tilde{d}}(\beta, \delta)} R_0, \tilde{K}_1 = g^{\delta_1} \cdot R_1, \tilde{K}_2 = g^{\phi_2(\beta, \delta)} \cdot R_2, \dots, \tilde{K}_{d_k} = g^{\phi_{d_k}(\beta, \delta)} \cdot R_{d_k})),$$

where $(\phi = (\phi_0, \phi_1, \dots, \phi_{d_k}), d_{\delta}) \leftarrow \text{KeyParam}(X_{(i,j)}, N)$, $\delta = (\delta_1, \dots, \delta_{d_{\delta}}) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{d_{\delta}}$, $\mathbf{R} = (R_0, \dots, R_{d_k}) \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}^{d_k+1}$.

\mathcal{B} picks random $\tilde{R}'_0 \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$, then responses \mathcal{A} with a secret key $\text{SK}_{(i,j), X_{(i,j)}}$ as

$$\text{SK}_{(i,j), X_{(i,j)}} = ((i, j), X_{(i,j)}, (K_0 = \tilde{K}_0 \cdot g^{r_i c_j + \alpha'_i}, K_1 = \tilde{K}_1,$$

$$K_2 = \tilde{K}_2, \dots, K_{d_k} = \tilde{K}_{d_k},$$

$$K'_0 = \tilde{K}'_1 \tilde{R}'_0).$$

Note that such a secret key has the same distribution as the secret key in the real Augmented ABE scheme, i.e. $\text{SK}_{(i,j),X_{(i,j)}} = ((i,j), X_{(i,j)}, \mathbf{K} = g^{\phi(r_i c_j + \alpha_i, \beta, \delta)} \cdot \mathbf{R}, K'_0 = Z_i^{\sigma_{i,j}} R'_0)$, where $R'_0 = R_1^{z_i} \tilde{R}'_0$.

Challenge. \mathcal{A} submits to \mathcal{B} a ciphertext tag Y^* and two equal length messages M_0, M_1 . \mathcal{B} submits (Y^*, M_0, M_1) to the challenger, and receives the challenge ciphertext in the form of

$$CT^{\text{NT}} = \langle Y^*, \tilde{\mathbf{P}} = g^{\psi(\beta, \tilde{\pi})}, \tilde{C} = M \cdot e(g, g)^{\alpha \tilde{\pi}} \rangle,$$

where $(\psi = (\psi_1, \dots, \psi_{d_c}), d_\pi) \leftarrow \text{CiperParam}(Y^*, N)$, $\tilde{\pi} = (\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{\pi}_1, \dots, \tilde{\pi}_{d_\pi}) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{d_\pi+1}$.

Note that $\psi(\beta, \tilde{\pi})$ contains only linear combinations of monomials $\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{\pi}_i, \tilde{\pi} \beta_j, \tilde{\pi}_i \beta_j$, and the first d_0 components of $\tilde{\mathbf{P}}$ are $\tilde{P}_1 = g^{\tilde{\pi}}, \tilde{P}_2 = g^{\beta_2 \tilde{\pi}}, \dots, \tilde{P}_{d_0} = g^{\beta_{d_0} \tilde{\pi}}$. \mathcal{B} creates a challenge ciphertext for $(\bar{i}, \bar{j}) = (1, 1)$ as follows:

1. \mathcal{B} picks random $\pi' = (\pi', \pi'_1, \dots, \pi'_{d_\pi}) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{d_\pi+1}$, then sets $\mathbf{P} = g^{\psi(\beta, \pi')} \cdot (\tilde{\mathbf{P}})^{-1}$.

Here $(\tilde{\mathbf{P}})^{-1}$ means $(\tilde{P}_1^{-1}, \dots, \tilde{P}_{d_c}^{-1})$. Note that $\psi(\beta, \tilde{\pi})$ contains only linear combinations of monomials $\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{\pi}_i, \tilde{\pi} \beta_j, \tilde{\pi}_i \beta_j$, we have $(\tilde{\mathbf{P}})^{-1} = g^{\psi(\beta, -\tilde{\pi})}$. Note that $\psi(\beta, \pi')$ contains only linear combinations of monomials $\pi', \pi'_i, \pi' \beta_j, \pi'_i \beta_j$, we have that $\mathbf{P} = g^{\psi(\beta, \pi' - \tilde{\pi})}$.

2. \mathcal{B} picks random

$$\kappa, \tau, s'_1, \dots, s'_m, t_1, \dots, t_m \in \mathbb{Z}_N,$$

$$\mathbf{v}_c, \mathbf{w}_1, \dots, \mathbf{w}_m \in \mathbb{Z}_N^3.$$

\mathcal{B} picks random $r_x, r_y, r_z \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and sets $\chi_1 = (r_x, 0, r_z)$, $\chi_2 = (0, r_y, r_z)$, $\chi_3 = \chi_1 \times \chi_2 = (-r_y r_z, -r_x r_z, r_x r_y)$. \mathcal{B} picks random $\mathbf{v}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_N^3$, $\mathbf{v}_i \in \text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2\} \forall i \in \{2, \dots, m\}$.

For each row $i \in [m]$: note that $i \geq \bar{i}$ (since $\bar{i} = 1$), \mathcal{B} sets

$$\mathbf{R}_i = G_i^{s'_i \mathbf{v}_i} \cdot \tilde{P}_1^{\frac{r_i}{\tau(\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)} \mathbf{v}_i}, \quad \mathbf{R}'_i = G_i^{\kappa s'_i \mathbf{v}_i} \cdot \tilde{P}_1^{\frac{r_i \kappa}{\tau(\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)} \mathbf{v}_i},$$

$$Q_i = g^{\tau s'_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)} \tilde{P}_1, \quad Q_{i,1} = (g^{\beta_1})^{\tau s'_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)} Z_i^{t_i} (g^{\beta_1})^{\pi'},$$

$$Q_{i,2} = (g^{\beta_2})^{\tau s'_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)} \cdot \tilde{P}_2, \quad \dots, \quad Q_{i,d_0} = (g^{\beta_{d_0}})^{\tau s'_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)} \cdot \tilde{P}_{d_0},$$

$$Q'_i = g^{t_i}, \quad T_i = \tilde{C} \cdot e(g^{\alpha'_i}, \tilde{P}_1) \cdot E_i^{\tau s'_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}.$$

For each column $j \in [m]$: note that $j \geq \bar{j}$ (since $\bar{j} = 1$), \mathcal{B} sets

$$\mathbf{C}_j = H_j^{\tau \mathbf{v}_c} \cdot g^{\kappa \mathbf{w}_j}, \quad \mathbf{C}'_j = g^{\mathbf{w}_j}.$$

3. \mathcal{B} outputs the ciphertext CT_{Y^*} as $CT_{Y^*} = \langle Y^*, \mathbf{P}, (\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{R}'_i, Q_i, \{Q_{i,\bar{d}}\}_{\bar{d}=1}^{d_0}, Q'_i, T_i)_{i=1}^m, (\mathbf{C}_j, \mathbf{C}'_j)_{j=1}^m \rangle$. Note that this CT_{Y^*} is a well-formed ciphertext for ciphertext tag Y^* and encryption index $(\bar{i}, \bar{j}) = (1, 1)$, with implicitly setting $s_1, \dots, s_m \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and $\pi = (\pi, \pi_1, \dots, \pi_{d_\pi}) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{d_\pi+1}$ by

$$s'_i + \frac{\tilde{\pi}}{\tau(\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)} \equiv s_i \pmod{p_1} \quad \forall i \in \{1, \dots, m\}, \quad \pi' - \tilde{\pi} \equiv \pi \pmod{p_1}.$$

Phase 2. Same with Phase 1.

Guess. \mathcal{A} gives \mathcal{B} a b' . \mathcal{B} gives b' to the challenger.

Note that the distributions of the public parameter, secret keys and challenge ciphertext that \mathcal{B} gives \mathcal{A} are same as the real scheme, we have $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}} \Sigma_{\text{NT}} = \text{MH}_1^{\mathbf{A}} \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}$.

Theorem 4. $\Sigma_{\mathbf{A}}$ is Type-II message-hiding.

Proof. The argument for message-hiding in $\text{Game}_{\text{MH}_2}^{\text{A}}$ is straightforward since an encryption to index $\mathcal{K} + 1$ (i.e. $(m + 1, 1)$) contains no information about the message. The simulator simply runs Setup_{A} and KeyGen_{A} and encrypts M_b under the challenge ciphertext tag Y^* and index $(m + 1, 1)$. Since for all $i = 1$ to m , $T_i = E_i^{\hat{s}_i}$ contains no information about the message, the bit b is perfectly hidden and $\text{MH}_2^{\text{A}} \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}} = 0$.

Now we investigate the Theorem 5 where we prove the index-hiding property. As shown in Fig. 3, Theorem 5 follows Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, and we need to prove Lemma 1 case by case. Here we use ‘Assumption X’ to represent the assumption(s) that Lemma 1 is based on, and we will present the concrete assumptions when we prove Lemma 1 concretely.

Theorem 5. *Suppose that the Assumption X, the D3DH, and the DLIN Assumption hold.*⁹ *Then no PPT adversary can (selectively) win $\text{Game}_{\text{IH}}^{\text{A}}$ with non-negligible advantage.*

Proof. It follows Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 below.

Lemma 1. *If the Assumption X hold, then for $\bar{j} < m$, no PPT adversary can (selectively) distinguish between an encryption to (\bar{i}, \bar{j}) and $(\bar{i}, \bar{j} + 1)$ in $\text{Game}_{\text{IH}}^{\text{A}}$ with non-negligible advantage.*

Proof. In $\text{Game}_{\text{IH}}^{\text{A}}$ with index (\bar{i}, \bar{j}) , let Y^* be the challenge ciphertext tag, the restriction is that the adversary \mathcal{A} does not query a secret key for (index, key tag) pair $((i, j), X_{(i,j)})$ such that $((i, j) = (\bar{i}, \bar{j})) \wedge (\Gamma(X_{(i,j)}, Y^*) = 1)$. Under this restriction, there are two ways for \mathcal{A} to take:

Case I: In Key Query phase, \mathcal{A} does not query a secret key with index (\bar{i}, \bar{j}) .

Case II: In Key Query phase, \mathcal{A} queries a secret key with index (\bar{i}, \bar{j}) . Let $X_{(\bar{i}, \bar{j})}$ be the corresponding key tag. The restriction requires that $\Gamma(X_{(\bar{i}, \bar{j})}, Y^*) \neq 1$.

Case I is easy to handle as the adversary does not query a secret key with the challenge index (\bar{i}, \bar{j}) . **Case II** captures the index-hiding requirement in that even if a user has a key with index (\bar{i}, \bar{j}) he cannot distinguish between an encryption to $(Y^*, (\bar{i}, \bar{j}))$ and $(Y^*, (\bar{i}, \bar{j} + 1))$, if the corresponding key tag does not satisfies $\Gamma(X_{(\bar{i}, \bar{j})}, Y^*) = 1$. This is the most challenging part of achieving strong traceability. Actually, this is the only part where we cannot handle in a framework manner, and we have to prove this lemma for different schemes case by case.

Lemma 2. *If the Assumption X, the D3DH, and the DLIN Assumption hold, then for $1 \leq \bar{i} \leq m$, no PPT adversary can (selectively) distinguish between an encryption to (\bar{i}, m) and $(\bar{i} + 1, 1)$ in $\text{Game}_{\text{IH}}^{\text{A}}$ with non-negligible advantage.*

Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 6.3 in [11], to prove this lemma we define the following hybrid experiment: H_1 : encrypt to $(\bar{i}, \bar{j} = m)$; H_2 : encrypt to $(\bar{i}, \bar{j} = m + 1)$; and H_3 : encrypt to $(\bar{i} + 1, 1)$. This lemma follows Claim 1 and Claim 2 below.

Claim 1. *If the Assumption X holds, then no PPT adversary can (selectively) distinguish between experiment H_1 and H_2 with non-negligible advantage.*

Proof. The proof is identical to that for Lemma 1.

Claim 2. *If the D3DH and the DLIN hold, then no PPT adversary can distinguish between experiment H_2 and H_3 with non-negligible advantage.*

Proof. The indistinguishability of H_2 and H_3 can be proved using a proof similar to that of Lemma 6.3 in [11], which was used to prove the indistinguishability of similar hybrid experiments for their Augmented Broadcast Encryption (AugBE) scheme. For simplicity, we prove Claim 2 by a reduction from our AugABE scheme to the AugBE scheme in [11].

In particular, Garg et al. [11, Sec. 5.1] proposed an AugBE scheme $\Sigma_{\text{AugBE}} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{AugBE}}, \text{Encrypt}_{\text{AugBE}}, \text{Decrypt}_{\text{AugBE}})$ and proved Σ_{AugBE} is index-hiding. In the proof of index-hiding for Σ_{AugBE} in [11, Lemma 6.3], two hybrid experiments were defined and proven indistinguishable via a sequence of hybrid sub-experiments.

⁹ Here D3DH and DLIN are the abbreviation of the widely accepted Decision 3-Party Diffie Hellman Assumption and Decisional Linear Assumption, respectively. we refer to [11] for the details of these two assumptions.

- H_2^{AugBE} : Encrypt to $(\bar{i}, m+1)$, (i.e. H_2 in [11])
- H_3^{AugBE} : Encrypt to $(\bar{i}+1, 1)$, (i.e. H_5 in [11])

By following [11, Lemma 6.3], *if the D3DH and the DLIN hold, no PPT adversary can distinguish between H_2^{AugBE} and H_3^{AugBE} for Σ_{AugBE} with non-negligible advantage.* Suppose there is a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} that can distinguish between H_2 and H_3 for our AugABE scheme with non-negligible advantage. We can construct a PPT algorithm \mathcal{B} to distinguish between H_2^{AugBE} and H_3^{AugBE} for Σ_{AugBE} with non-negligible advantage.

The game of \mathcal{B} distinguishing between H_2^{AugBE} and H_3^{AugBE} is played in the subgroup \mathbb{G}_{p_1} of order p_1 in a composite order group \mathbb{G}_N of order $N = p_1 p_2 p_3$. \mathcal{B} is given the values of p_1 , p_2 and p_3 , and can choose for itself everything in the subgroup \mathbb{G}_{p_3} .

Setup. The challenger gives \mathcal{B} the public key PK^{AugBE} , and due to $(\bar{i}, m+1) \notin \{(i, j) | 1 \leq i, j \leq m\}$, the challenger gives \mathcal{B} all private keys in the set $\{\text{SK}_{(i,j)}^{\text{AugBE}} | 1 \leq i, j \leq m\}$:¹⁰

$$\begin{aligned} \text{PK}^{\text{AugBE}} &= (g, \{E_i = e(g, g)^{\alpha_i}, G_i = g^{r_i}\}_{i \in [m]}, \{H_j = g^{c_j}, f_j\}_{j \in [m]}), \\ \text{SK}_{(i,j)}^{\text{AugBE}} &= (\tilde{K}_{i,j}, \tilde{K}'_{i,j}, \{\tilde{K}_{i,j,j'}\}_{j' \in [m] \setminus \{j\}}) = (g^{\alpha_i} g^{r_i c_j} f_j^{\sigma_{i,j}}, g^{\sigma_{i,j}}, \{f_{j'}^{\sigma_{i,j}}\}_{j' \in [m] \setminus \{j\}}), \end{aligned}$$

where $g, f_1, \dots, f_m \in \mathbb{G}_{p_1}$, $\{\alpha_i, r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_1}\}_{i \in [m]}$, $\{c_j \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_1}\}_{j \in [m]}$, $\sigma_{i,j} (1 \leq i, j \leq m) \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_1}$ are randomly chosen.

\mathcal{B} picks random $X_3 \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$, runs $(d, d_0) \leftarrow \text{SysParam}(\Gamma)$, and picks random $\beta_2, \dots, \beta_d \in \mathbb{Z}_N$. \mathcal{B} picks random $z_1, \dots, z_m \in \mathbb{Z}_N$. Setting $g^\beta = (\prod_{j=1}^m f_j, g^{\beta_2}, \dots, g^{\beta_d})$, \mathcal{B} gives \mathcal{A} the following public parameter PP:

$$\text{PP} = ((N, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e), g, g^\beta, X_3, \{E_i, G_i, Z_i = g^{z_i}\}_{i \in [m]}, \{H_j\}_{j \in [m]}).$$

Note that \mathcal{B} implicitly picks $\beta_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ such that $g^{\beta_1} = \prod_{j=1}^m f_j$.

Key Query. To respond to \mathcal{A} 's query for $((i, j), X_{(i,j)})$, \mathcal{B} runs $(\phi = (\phi_0, \phi_1, \dots, \phi_{d_k}), d_\delta) \leftarrow \text{KeyParam}(X_{(i,j)}, N)$, and picks random $\delta_2, \dots, \delta_{d_\delta} \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, $\mathbf{R} = (R_0, \dots, R_{d_k}) \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}^{d_k+1}$, and $R'_0 \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$. \mathcal{B} outputs a secret key $\text{SK}_{(i,j), X_{(i,j)}}$ as

$$\begin{aligned} \text{SK}_{(i,j), X_{(i,j)}} &= ((i, j), X_{(i,j)}, (K_0 = \tilde{K}_{i,j} \cdot (\prod_{\tilde{j} \in [m] \setminus \{j\}} \tilde{K}_{i,j,\tilde{j}}) \cdot \prod_{\tilde{d}=2}^{d_0} g^{\beta_{\tilde{d}} \phi_{\tilde{d}}(\beta, \delta)} R_0, K_1 = \tilde{K}'_{i,j} \cdot R_1, \\ &\quad K_2 = g^{\phi_2(\beta, \delta)} \cdot R_2, \dots, K_{d_k} = g^{\phi_{d_k}(\beta, \delta)} \cdot R_{d_k}), \\ &\quad K'_0 = (\tilde{K}'_{i,j})^{z_i} \cdot R'_0). \end{aligned}$$

Note that \mathcal{B} implicitly picks $\delta_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ such that $\delta_1 \equiv \sigma_{i,j} \pmod{p_1}$. Note that for any variables $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, $\beta = (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_d) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^d$, $\delta = (\delta_1, \dots, \delta_{d_\delta}) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{d_\delta}$, each $\phi_z(\beta, \delta) (2 \leq z \leq d_k)$ contains only linear combinations of monomials $\delta_i, \delta_i \beta_j$ and does not contain $\beta_1 \delta_1$. Note that \mathcal{B} knows the values of $g^{\delta_1} = g^{\sigma_{i,j}} = \tilde{K}'_{i,j} \cdot \delta_2, \dots, \delta_{d_\delta}$ and $g^{\beta_1} = \prod_{j=1}^m f_j, \beta_2, \dots, \beta_d$, \mathcal{B} can calculate the values of $g^{\phi_2(\beta, \delta)}, \dots, g^{\phi_{d_k}(\beta, \delta)}$, and then the values of $g^{\beta_{\tilde{d}} \phi_{\tilde{d}}(\beta, \delta)}$ for $\tilde{d} \in \{2, \dots, d_0\}$. Thus, we know \mathcal{B} can produce the above secret key $\text{SK}_{(i,j), X_{(i,j)}}$.

Challenge. \mathcal{A} submits a message M and a ciphertext tag Y^* . Note that $(\bar{i}, m+1) \notin \{(i, j) | 1 \leq i, j \leq m\}$, \mathcal{B} sets the receiver set to be $J = \{(i, j) | 1 \leq i, j \leq m\}$ and submits (M, J) to the challenger. The challenger gives \mathcal{B} the challenge ciphertext $CT^{\text{AugBE}} = \langle (\tilde{\mathbf{R}}_i, \tilde{\mathbf{R}}'_i, \tilde{Q}_i, \tilde{Q}'_i, \tilde{T}_i)_{i=1}^m, (\tilde{\mathbf{C}}_j, \tilde{\mathbf{C}}'_j)_{j=1}^m, J \rangle$, which is encrypted to $(i^*, j^*) \in \{(\bar{i}, m+1), (\bar{i}+1, 1)\}$ and in the form of

1. For each $i \in [m]$:
 - if $i < i^*$: $\tilde{\mathbf{R}}_i = g^{\mathbf{v}_i}$, $\tilde{\mathbf{R}}'_i = g^{\kappa \mathbf{v}_i}$, $\tilde{Q}_i = g^{s_i}$, $\tilde{Q}'_i = (\prod_{j \in J_i} f_j)^{s_i}$, $\tilde{T}_i = E_i^{s_i}$.
 - if $i \geq i^*$: $\tilde{\mathbf{R}}_i = G_i^{s_i \mathbf{v}_i}$, $\tilde{\mathbf{R}}'_i = G_i^{\kappa s_i \mathbf{v}_i}$, $\tilde{Q}_i = g^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}$, $\tilde{Q}'_i = (\prod_{j \in J_i} f_j)^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}$, $\tilde{T}_i = M \cdot E_i^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}$.
2. For each $j \in [m]$:

¹⁰ Note that we slightly changed the variable names in the underlying AugBE scheme to better suit our proof.

- if $j < j^*$: $\tilde{C}_j = H_j^{\tau(\mathbf{v}_c + \mu_j \chi_3)} \cdot g^{\kappa \mathbf{w}_j}$, $\tilde{C}'_j = g^{\mathbf{w}_j}$.
- if $j \geq j^*$: $\tilde{C}_j = H_j^{\tau \mathbf{v}_c} \cdot g^{\kappa \mathbf{w}_j}$, $\tilde{C}'_j = g^{\mathbf{w}_j}$.

where $\kappa, \tau, s_i (1 \leq i \leq m), \hat{s}_i (1 \leq i < i^*), \mu_j (1 \leq j < j^*) \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_1}$, $\mathbf{v}_c, \mathbf{w}_j (1 \leq j \leq m), \mathbf{v}_i (1 \leq i \leq i^*) \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_1}^3$, and $\mathbf{v}_i (i > i^*) \in \text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2\}$ are randomly chosen (where $\chi_1 = (r_x, 0, r_z), \chi_2 = (0, r_y, r_z), \chi_3 = (-r_y r_z, -r_x r_z, r_x r_y)$ are for randomly chosen $r_x, r_y, r_z \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_1}$), and $J_i = \{j | (i, j) \in J\}$.

Note that $J = \{(i, j) | 1 \leq i, j \leq m\}$, we have $J_i = \{1, \dots, m\}$ for all $1 \leq i \leq m$, and then $\tilde{Q}'_i = (\prod_{j \in J_i} f_j)^{s_i} = (g^{\beta_1})^{s_i}$ for $i < i^*$ and $\tilde{Q}'_i = (\prod_{j \in J_i} f_j)^{\tau s_i(\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)} = (g^{\beta_1})^{\tau s_i(\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}$ for $i \geq i^*$.

\mathcal{B} runs $(\psi = (\psi_1, \dots, \psi_{d_c}), d_\pi) \leftarrow \text{CiperParam}(Y^*, N)$ and picks random $\pi = (\pi, \pi_1, \dots, \pi_{d_\pi}) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{d_\pi+1}$, then sets

$$\mathbf{P} = g^{\psi(\beta, \pi)}.$$

Note that \mathbf{P} can be computed from g^β and π since $\psi(\beta, \pi)$ contains only linear combinations of monomials $\pi, \pi_i, \pi \beta_j, \pi_i \beta_j$.

\mathcal{B} picks random $t_1, \dots, t_m \in \mathbb{Z}_N$. \mathcal{B} outputs a challenge ciphertext as $CT_{Y^*} = \langle Y^*, \mathbf{P}, (\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{R}'_i, Q_i, \{Q_{i,\tilde{d}}\}_{\tilde{d}=1}^{d_0}, Q'_i, T_i)_{i=1}^m, (\mathbf{C}_j, \mathbf{C}'_j)_{j=1}^m \rangle$, where

1. For each $i \in [m]$: $\mathbf{R}_i = \tilde{\mathbf{R}}_i$, $\mathbf{R}'_i = \tilde{\mathbf{R}}'_i$, $Q_i = \tilde{Q}_i$, $Q_{i,1} = \tilde{Q}'_i \cdot Z_i^{t_i} (g^{\beta_1})^\pi$, $Q_{i,2} = Q_i^{\beta_2}, \dots, Q_{i,d_0} = Q_i^{\beta_{d_0}}$, $Q'_i = g^{t_i}$, $T_i = \tilde{T}_i$.
2. For each $j \in [m]$: $\mathbf{C}_j = \tilde{\mathbf{C}}_j$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = \tilde{\mathbf{C}}'_j$.

Guess. \mathcal{A} outputs a guess $b' \in \{0, 1\}$ to \mathcal{B} , then \mathcal{B} outputs this b' to the challenger as its answer to distinguish between H_2^{AugBE} and H_3^{AugBE} for scheme Σ_{AugBE} .

As the exponents are applied only to the elements in the subgroup \mathbb{G}_{p_1} , from the view of \mathcal{A} , the distributions of the public parameter, secret keys and challenge ciphertext that \mathcal{B} gives \mathcal{A} are same as the real scheme. Thus \mathcal{B} 's advantage in distinguishing between H_2^{AugBE} and H_3^{AugBE} for scheme Σ_{AugBE} will be exactly equal to \mathcal{A} 's advantage in distinguishing between H_2 and H_3 for scheme $\Sigma_{\mathcal{A}}$.

4 Extension to Prime Order Groups

In Sec. 3, the Non-traceable ABE Template, the transformation from Non-traceable ABE Template to Augmented ABE, and the proofs are all presented on composite order bilinear groups. Note that our generic transformation from Non-traceable ABE Template to Augmented ABE and the security proofs for the transformation do not rely on the composite order bilinear groups, and are only related to the \mathbb{G}_{p_1} subgroup. Actually, the only reason we use composite order bilinear groups in Sec. 3 is that some appealing ABE schemes, e.g. those in [1], are built on the composite order bilinear groups, and we want our Non-Traceable ABE template to cover these appealing ABE schemes. On the other side, as shown below, it is easy to adjust the Sec. 3 contents to prime order bilinear groups, and the resulting generic framework still works well. Roughly speaking, this can be done by replacing the N with the prime order p_1 and removing all the parts related to p_2, p_3 . Below we list the details.

- In Sec. 3.2, define 'Prime Order Bilinear Groups'. Let \mathcal{G} be a group generator, which takes a security parameter λ and outputs $(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$ where p is prime, \mathbb{G} and \mathbb{G}_T are cyclic groups of order p , and $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ is a map such that: (1) (Bilinear) $\forall g, h \in \mathbb{G}, a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p, e(g^a, h^b) = e(g, h)^{ab}$, (2) (Non-Degenerate) $\exists g \in \mathbb{G}$ such that $e(g, g)$ has order p in \mathbb{G}_T . Assume that group operations in \mathbb{G} and \mathbb{G}_T as well as the bilinear map e are computable in polynomial time with respect to λ .
- In Sec. 3.2, redefine the Non-traceable ABE Template by replacing $(N, p_1, p_2, p_3, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(\lambda)$ with $(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(\lambda)$, replacing N with p , replacing p_1 with p , and removing all the parts related to \mathbb{G}_{p_3} :
 - Removing X_3 in Setup_{NT} and PP ,
 - Removing $\mathbf{R} = (R_0, \dots, R_{d_k}) \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}^{d_k+1}$ in $\text{KeyGen}_{\text{NT}}$ and SK_X .

- For Sec. 3.3, similar to Sec. 3.2, modify the transformation from Non-traceable ABE Template to Augmented ABE by replacing $(N, p_1, p_2, p_3, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(\lambda)$ with $(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(\lambda)$, replacing N with p , replacing p_1 with p , and removing all the parts related to \mathbb{G}_{p_3} :
 - Removing X_3 in Setup_A and PP,
 - Removing $\mathbf{R} = (R_0, \dots, R_{d_k}) \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}^{d_k+1}$ and $R'_0 \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$ in KeyGen_A and $\text{SK}_{(i,j),X}$.
- For Sec. 3.4, modify the proofs according to the above modifications for Sec. 3.2 and Sec. 3.3. In particular, replace N with p , replace p_1 with p , and remove all the parts related to \mathbb{G}_{p_3} .

It is easy to see that with the above modifications, the generic transformation framework on prime order bilinear groups also works well. And Later we also give some instantiations on prime order bilinear groups.

5 Instantiations Satisfying the Non-traceable ABE Template

In this section we show that some existing non-traceable ABE schemes with appealing features satisfy the template in Sec. 3.2, and prove the Lemma 1 (the indistinguishability between an encryption to (\bar{i}, \bar{j}) and $(\bar{i}, \bar{j} + 1)$) for the AugABE constructions from these non-traceable ABE instantiations.

These instantiations include three ABE instantiations on composite order bilinear groups, which were proposed by Attrapadung [1,2], and one ABE instantiation on prime order bilinear groups, which was proposed by Rouselakis and Waters [26]. In addition, we also give some other existing ABE schemes that satisfy the template, but omit the construction details.

5.1 Fully Secure Unbounded KP-ABE with Large Universe

Attrapadung [1, Sec. 5.3] proposed a fully secure unbounded KP-ABE scheme with large universe (i.e. the public key size is constant and independent from the size of the attribute universe), here we denote it by $\Sigma_{\text{NT}}^{\text{kpLU}}$. In $\Sigma_{\text{NT}}^{\text{kpLU}}$ the predicate Γ is described by *linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS)* [4], which is used in many ABE schemes (e.g. [13,29,18,19,26]) to express the access policy. Actually, any monotonic boolean formula (resp. monotonic access structure) can be realized by an LSSS [4]. We refer to [19] for more details of LSSS in ABE. Below we review $\Sigma_{\text{NT}}^{\text{kpLU}}$ in terms of Pair Encoding Scheme. Note that we change the variable names in $\Sigma_{\text{NT}}^{\text{kpLU}}$ to better suit our template definitions.

5.1.1 The Pair Encoding Scheme

$\Sigma_{\text{NT}}^{\text{kpLU}}$ satisfies our non-traceable ABE template in Sec. 3.2, with the following Pair Encoding Scheme.

SysParam. Take as input $\Gamma : \mathbb{X} \times \mathbb{Y} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, where the ciphertext tag (here is the attribute set) space is $\mathbb{Y} = \{Y \mid Y \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_N\}$ and the key tag space is $\mathbb{X} = \{\text{LSSS}(A, \rho) \mid A \text{ is a matrix over } \mathbb{Z}_N \text{ and } \rho \text{ maps each row of } A \text{ to an attribute in } \mathbb{Z}_N \text{ (} \rho \text{ does not need to be injective)}\}$, output $d = 6$ and $d_0 = 2$. Denote $\boldsymbol{\beta} = (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_6)$.

KeyParam. Take in N and a key policy $(A, \rho) \in \mathbb{X}$, where A is an $l \times n$ matrix, and $\rho : [1, l] \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_N$ maps each row of A to an attribute in \mathbb{Z}_N , output $d_\delta = l + n + 1$ and $\boldsymbol{\phi} = (\phi_0, \phi_1, \phi_2, \{\phi_{3,k}, \phi_{4,k}, \phi_{5,k}\}_{k \in [l]})$ with $d_k = 2 + 3l$:

$$\begin{aligned} \phi_0 &= \alpha + \beta_1 \delta_1 + \beta_2 \delta_2, & \phi_1 &= \delta_1, & \phi_2 &= \delta_2, \\ \phi_{3,k} &= A_k \cdot \mathbf{u} + \xi_k \beta_4, & \phi_{4,k} &= \xi_k, & \phi_{5,k} &= \xi_k (\beta_5 + \beta_6 \rho(k)), \end{aligned}$$

where $\boldsymbol{\delta} = (\delta_1, \delta_2, \xi_1, \dots, \xi_l, u_2, \dots, u_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{l+n+1}$ and $\mathbf{u} := (u_1 = \beta_3 \delta_1, u_2, \dots, u_n)$.

CiperParam. Take in N and an attribute set $S \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_N$, output $d_\pi = 1 + |S|$ and $\boldsymbol{\psi} = (\psi_1, \psi_2, \psi_3, \psi_4, \{\psi_{5,x}, \psi_{6,x}\}_{x \in S})$ with $d_c = 4 + 2|S|$:

$$\begin{aligned} \psi_1 &= \pi, & \psi_2 &= \beta_2 \pi, & \psi_3 &= \beta_1 \pi + \beta_3 \bar{\pi}, \\ \psi_4 &= \bar{\pi}, & \psi_{5,x} &= \bar{\pi} \beta_4 + \pi_x (\beta_5 + \beta_6 x), & \psi_{6,x} &= \pi_x, \end{aligned}$$

where $\boldsymbol{\pi} = (\pi, \bar{\pi}, \{\pi_x\}_{x \in S}) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{2+|S|}$.

We can see that the outputs of above (SysParam, KeyParam, CiperParam) satisfies our template requirements:

- **KeyParam:**
 1. $d_k \geq d_0$, where $d_k = 2 + 3l$ and $d_0 = 2$.
 2. Each of $\{\phi_0, \phi_1, \phi_2, \{\phi_{3,k}, \phi_{4,k}, \phi_{5,k}\}_{k \in [l]}\}$ is a linear combination of monomials $\alpha, \delta_i, \delta_i \beta_j$.
 3. $\phi_0 = \alpha + \beta_1 \phi_1 + \beta_2 \phi_2$, $\phi_1 = \delta_1$. None of $\{\phi_2, \{\phi_{3,k}, \phi_{4,k}, \phi_{5,k}\}_{k \in [l]}\}$ contains α or $\beta_1 \delta_1$.
- **CiperParam:**
 1. Each of $\{\psi_1, \psi_2, \psi_3, \psi_4, \{\phi_{5,x}, \psi_{6,x}\}_{x \in S}\}$ is a linear combination of monomials $\pi, \pi_i, \pi \beta_j, \pi_i \beta_j$.
 2. $\psi_1 = \pi$, $\psi_2 = \beta_2 \pi$.
- **DecPair:** When S satisfies (A, ρ) , let $I = \{k \in [l] \mid \rho(k) \in S\}$, we have reconstruction coefficients $\{\omega_k\}_{k \in I}$ such that $\sum_{k \in I} \omega_k (A_k \cdot \mathbf{u}) = u_1 = \beta_3 \delta_1$. Therefore, we have the following linear combination of the $\phi_i \psi_j$ terms:

$$\phi_1 \psi_3 - \sum_{k \in I} \omega_k (\phi_{3,k} \psi_4 - \phi_{4,k} \psi_{5,\rho(k)} + \phi_{5,k} \psi_{6,\rho(k)}) = \delta_1 (\beta_1 \pi + \beta_3 \bar{\pi}) - \sum_{k \in I} \omega_k ((A_k \cdot \mathbf{u}) \bar{\pi}) = \beta_1 \delta_1 \pi.$$

5.1.2 Security Analysis of the Resulting Augmented ABE

As shown in Sec. 3.4 and Fig. 3, here we only need to (1) state the security of the underlying conventional non-traceable ABE scheme (since the Type-I message hiding property of the AugABE is reduced to it) and (2) prove the Lemma 1.

(1) *The Section 5.3 of [1] shows that their KP-ABE scheme corresponding to the above Pair Encoding Scheme is a fully secure unbounded KP-ABE scheme with large universe.*

(2) The Lemma 1 instantiation here is: *if the Modified (1, q)-EDHE3 Assumption holds, then for $\bar{j} < m$, no PPT adversary can selectively distinguish between an encryption to (\bar{i}, \bar{j}) and $(\bar{i}, \bar{j} + 1)$ in $\text{Game}_{\text{IH}}^{\text{A}}$ with non-negligible advantage, provided that the size of the challenge attribute set is $\leq q$.*

The Modified (1, q)-EDHE3 Assumption is a special case of the Modified (n, t)-EDHE3 Assumption, which we introduce by modifying the (n, t)-EDHE3 Assumption in [2, Definition 6], i.e., giving the adversary one more element $g^{a^n c/z}$. In Appendix B, we prove that Modified (n, t)-EDHE3 Assumption holds in the generic group.

Definition 6. The Modified (n, t)-EDHE3 Assumption *Given a group generator \mathcal{G} , let $(N = p_1 p_2 p_3, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{G}(\lambda)$, $g \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}_{p_1}$, $g_2 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}_{p_2}$, $g_3 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$, $a, c, z, d_1, \dots, d_t \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_N$. Suppose that an adversary is given*

$$D = \left((N, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e), g, g^a, g^{a^n}, g^c, g^{c/z}, \underline{g^{a^n c/z}}, g_2, g_3, \right. \\ \forall_{j \in [1, t]} g^{d_j}, \\ \forall_{j, j' \in [1, t]} \text{ s.t. } j \neq j' g^{a^n c d_j / d_{j'}}, \\ \forall_{i \in [1, n], j, j' \in [1, t]} \text{ s.t. } j \neq j' g^{a^i d_j / d_{j'}^2}, \\ \forall_{i \in [1, 2n], j \in [1, t]} g^{a^i c d_j}, \\ \forall_{i \in [1, 2n], i \neq n+1, j \in [1, t]} g^{a^i c / d_j}, \\ \forall_{i \in [1, 2n], j, j' \in [1, t]} \text{ s.t. } j \neq j' g^{a^i c d_j / d_{j'}^2}, \\ \forall_{i \in [1, n+1], j \in [1, t]} g^{a^i / d_j^2}, \\ \left. \forall_{i \in [n+1, 2n], j, j' \in [1, t]} g^{a^i c^2 d_j / d_{j'}} \right)$$

and a target element $T \in \mathbb{G}_{p_1}$. The assumption states that it is hard for any polynomial time adversary to distinguish whether $T = g^{a^{n+1} z}$ or $T \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}_{p_1}$.

The proof of the above Lemma 1 instantiation is given in Appendix C.

5.2 Fully Secure KP-ABE with Short Ciphertexts

Attrapadung [1, Sec. 5.3] proposed a fully secure KP-ABE scheme with short ciphertexts (i.e. ciphertext size is constant and independent from the size of the attribute set associated with the ciphertext), here we denote it by $\Sigma_{\text{NT}}^{\text{kpSC}}$. In $\Sigma_{\text{NT}}^{\text{kpSC}}$ the predicate Γ is also described by LSSS. Below we review $\Sigma_{\text{NT}}^{\text{kpSC}}$ in terms of Pair Encoding Scheme. Note that we change the variable names in $\Sigma_{\text{NT}}^{\text{kpSC}}$ to better suit our template definitions.

5.2.1 The Pair Encoding Scheme

$\Sigma_{\text{NT}}^{\text{kpSC}}$ is a bounded ABE where the maximum size for attribute set associated with the ciphertext is bounded by T , while no further restriction is required. $\Sigma_{\text{NT}}^{\text{kpSC}}$ satisfies our non-traceable ABE template in Sec. 3.2, with the following Pair Encoding Scheme.

SysParam. Take as input $\Gamma : \mathbb{X} \times \mathbb{Y} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, where the ciphertext tag (here is the attribute set) space is $\mathbb{Y} = \{Y \mid Y \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_N \wedge |Y| \leq T\}$ and the key tag space is $\mathbb{X} = \{\text{LSSS}(A, \rho) \mid A \text{ is a matrix over } \mathbb{Z}_N \text{ and } \rho \text{ maps each row of } A \text{ to an attribute in } \mathbb{Z}_N \text{ (}\rho \text{ does not need to be injective)}\}$, output $d = T + 6$ and $d_0 = 2$. Denote $\beta = (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_4, \theta_0, \theta_1, \dots, \theta_{T+1})$.

KeyParam. Take in N and a key policy $(A, \rho) \in \mathbb{X}$, where A is an $l \times n$ matrix, and $\rho : [1, l] \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_N$ maps each row of A to an attribute in \mathbb{Z}_N , output $d_\delta = l + n + 1$ and $\phi = (\phi_0, \phi_1, \phi_2, \{\phi_{3,k}, \phi_{4,k}, \phi_{5,k,0}, \{\phi_{5,k,t}\}_{t \in [T]}\}_{k \in [l]})$ with $d_k = 2 + l(T + 3)$:

$$\begin{aligned} \phi_0 &= \alpha + \beta_1 \delta_1 + \beta_2 \delta_2, & \phi_1 &= \delta_1, & \phi_2 &= \delta_2, \\ \phi_{3,k} &= A_k \cdot \mathbf{u} + \xi_k \beta_4, & \phi_{4,k} &= \xi_k, \\ \phi_{5,k,0} &= \xi_k \theta_0, & \{\phi_{5,k,t}\}_{t \in [T]} &= \xi_k (\theta_{t+1} - \theta_1 \rho(k)^t), \end{aligned}$$

where $\delta = (\delta_1, \delta_2, \xi_1, \dots, \xi_l, u_2, \dots, u_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{l+n+1}$ and $\mathbf{u} := (u_1 = \beta_3 \delta_1, u_2, \dots, u_n)$.

CiperParam. Take in N and an attribute set $S \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_N$ such that $|S| \leq T$, let c_t be the coefficient of z^t in $p(z) := \prod_{x \in S} (z - x)$, output $d_\pi = 2$ and $\psi = (\psi_1, \psi_2, \psi_3, \psi_4, \psi_5, \psi_6)$ with $d_c = 6$:

$$\begin{aligned} \psi_1 &= \pi, & \psi_2 &= \beta_2 \pi, & \psi_3 &= \beta_1 \pi + \beta_3 \bar{\pi}, \\ \psi_4 &= \bar{\pi}, & \psi_5 &= \bar{\pi} \beta_4 + \hat{\pi} (\theta_0 + \sum_{t=0}^T c_t \theta_{t+1}), & \psi_6 &= \hat{\pi}, \end{aligned}$$

where $\boldsymbol{\pi} = (\pi, \bar{\pi}, \hat{\pi}) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^3$.

We can see that the outputs of above (SysParam, KeyParam, CiperParam) satisfies our template requirements:

- **KeyParam:**
 1. $d_k \geq d_0$, where $d_k = 2 + l(T + 3)$ and $d_0 = 2$.
 2. Each of $\{\phi_0, \phi_1, \phi_2, \{\phi_{3,k}, \phi_{4,k}, \phi_{5,k,0}, \{\phi_{5,k,t}\}_{t \in [T]}\}_{k \in [l]}\}$ is a linear combination of monomials $\alpha, \delta_i, \delta_i \beta_j$.
 3. $\phi_0 = \alpha + \beta_1 \phi_1 + \beta_2 \phi_2$, $\phi_1 = \delta_1$. None of $\{\phi_2, \{\phi_{3,k}, \phi_{4,k}, \phi_{5,k,0}, \{\phi_{5,k,t}\}_{t \in [T]}\}_{k \in [l]}\}$ contains α or $\beta_1 \delta_1$.
- **CiperParam:**
 1. Each of $\{\psi_1, \psi_2, \psi_3, \psi_4, \psi_5, \psi_6\}$ is a linear combination of monomials $\pi, \pi_i, \pi \beta_j, \pi_i \beta_j$.
 2. $\psi_1 = \pi, \psi_2 = \beta_2 \pi$.
- **DecPair:** When S satisfies (A, ρ) , let $I = \{k \in [l] \mid \rho(k) \in S\}$, we have reconstruction coefficients $\{\omega_k\}_{k \in I}$ such that $\sum_{k \in I} \omega_k (A_k \cdot \mathbf{u}) = u_1 = \beta_3 \delta_1$. Therefore, we have the following linear combination of the $\phi_i \psi_j$ terms:

$$\begin{aligned} & \phi_1 \psi_3 - \sum_{k \in I} \omega_k (\phi_{3,k} \psi_4 - \phi_{4,k} \psi_5 + (\phi_{5,k,0} + \sum_{t=1}^T c_t \phi_{5,k,t}) \psi_6) \\ &= \phi_1 \psi_3 - \sum_{k \in I} \omega_k ((A_k \cdot \mathbf{u} + \xi_k \beta_4) \bar{\pi} - \xi_k (\bar{\pi} \beta_4 + \hat{\pi} (\theta_0 + \sum_{t=0}^T c_t \theta_{t+1})) + \xi_k (\theta_0 + \sum_{t=0}^T c_t \theta_{t+1}) \hat{\pi}) \\ &= \delta_1 (\beta_1 \pi + \beta_3 \bar{\pi}) - \sum_{k \in I} \omega_k (A_k \cdot \mathbf{u}) \bar{\pi} \\ &= \delta_1 \beta_1 \pi. \end{aligned}$$

Note that

$$(\phi_{5,k,0} + \sum_{t=1}^T c_t \phi_{5,k,t}) \psi_6 = \xi_k (\theta_0 + \sum_{t=1}^T c_t \theta_{t+1} - \theta_1 \sum_{t=1}^T c_t \rho(k)^t) \hat{\pi}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= \xi_k \left(\theta_0 + \sum_{t=1}^T c_t \theta_{t+1} - \theta_1 (p(\rho(k)) - c_0) \right) \hat{\pi} \\
&= \xi_k \left(\theta_0 + \sum_{t=1}^T c_t \theta_{t+1} + \theta_1 c_0 \right) \hat{\pi} && \text{since } p(\rho(k)) = 0 \\
&= \xi_k \left(\theta_0 + \sum_{t=0}^T c_t \theta_{t+1} \right) \hat{\pi}.
\end{aligned}$$

5.2.2 Security Analysis of the Resulting Augmented ABE

As shown in Sec. 3.4 and Fig. 3, here we only need to (1) state the security of the underlying conventional non-traceable ABE scheme and (2) prove the Lemma 1.

(1) *The Section 5.3 of [1] shows that their KP-ABE scheme corresponding to the above Pair Encoding Scheme is a fully secure KP-ABE scheme with short ciphertexts.*

(2) The Lemma 1 instantiation here is: *if the Modified $(T + 1, 1)$ -EDHE3 Assumption holds, then for $\bar{j} < m$, no PPT adversary can selectively distinguish between an encryption to (\bar{i}, \bar{j}) and $(\bar{i}, \bar{j} + 1)$ in $\text{Game}_{\text{IH}}^{\text{A}}$ with non-negligible advantage, provided that the size of the challenge attribute set is $\leq T$.*

Note that the Modified $(T + 1, 1)$ -EDHE3 Assumption is a special case of the Modified (n, t) -EDHE3 Assumption in Def. 6.

The proof of the above Lemma 1 instantiation is given in Appendix D.

5.3 Fully Secure ABE with Ciphertexts Associated with DFAs

Attrapadung [2, Sec. 8.2] proposed a fully secure ABE scheme for regular languages¹¹, with ciphertexts associated with *Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA)*. Here we denote it by $\Sigma_{\text{NT}}^{\text{cpDFA}}$. In $\Sigma_{\text{NT}}^{\text{cpDFA}}$ the predicate Γ is described by DFA. In particular, for a DFA \mathbb{M} and a string \mathbf{u} , $\Gamma(\mathbb{M}, \mathbf{u}) = 1$ if the automata \mathbb{M} accepts the string \mathbf{u} . We refer to [30,1] for more details about DFA-based ABE, here we only give the below brief introduction. A DFA \mathbb{M} is a 5-tuple $(Q, \Lambda, \mathcal{T}, q_0, F)$ in which Q is the set of states $Q = \{q_0, q_1, \dots, q_{n-1}\}$, Λ is the alphabet set, \mathcal{T} is the set of transitions, in which each transition is of the form $(q_x, q_y, \sigma) \in Q \times Q \times \Lambda$, q_0 is the start state, and $F \subseteq Q$ is the set of accepted states. We say that \mathbb{M} accepts a string $\mathbf{u} = (u_1, u_2, \dots, u_l) \in \Lambda^*$ if there exists a sequence of states $\rho_0, \rho_1, \dots, \rho_l \in Q$ such that $\rho_0 = q_0$, for $i = 1$ to l we have $(\rho_{i-1}, \rho_i, u_i) \in \mathcal{T}$, and $\rho_l \in F$. Note that, as shown in [1,2], it is wlog if we consider machines such that $|F| = 1$. Below we review $\Sigma_{\text{NT}}^{\text{cpDFA}}$ in terms of Pair Encoding Scheme. Note that we change the variable names in $\Sigma_{\text{NT}}^{\text{cpDFA}}$ to better suit our template definitions.

5.3.1 The Pair Encoding Scheme

$\Sigma_{\text{NT}}^{\text{cpDFA}}$ satisfies our non-traceable ABE template in Sec. 3.2, with the following Pair Encoding Scheme.

SysParam. Take as input $\Gamma : \mathbb{X} \times \mathbb{Y} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, where the ciphertext tag space is $\mathbb{Y} = \{\mathbb{M} \mid \mathbb{M} \text{ is a DFA}\}$ and the key tag space is $\mathbb{X} = \{\mathbf{u} \mid \mathbf{u} \in (\mathbb{Z}_N)^*\}$, output $d = 9$ and $d_0 = 2$. Denote $\beta = (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_9)$.

KeyParam. Take in N and a string $\mathbf{u} \in (\mathbb{Z}_N)^*$, let $l = |\mathbf{u}|$, and parse $\mathbf{u} = (u_1, \dots, u_l)$. Output $d_\delta = 3 + l$ and $\phi = (\phi_0, \phi_1, \phi_2, \phi_3, \phi_4, \phi_{5,0}, \{\phi_{5,k}, \phi_{6,k}\}_{k \in [1,l]})$ with $d_k = 5 + 2l$:

$$\begin{aligned}
\phi_0 &= \alpha + \beta_1 \delta_1 + \beta_2 \delta_2, & \phi_1 &= \delta_1, & \phi_2 &= \delta_2, & \phi_3 &= -\beta_3 \delta_1 + \beta_4 \xi_l, \\
\phi_4 &= \xi_0 \beta_5, & \phi_{5,0} &= \xi_0, & \{\phi_{5,k} &= \xi_k, & \phi_{6,k} &= \xi_{k-1}(\beta_6 + \beta_7 u_k) + \xi_k(\beta_8 + \beta_9 u_k)\}_{k \in [1,l]},
\end{aligned}$$

where $\delta = (\delta_1, \delta_2, \xi_0, \xi_1, \dots, \xi_l) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{3+l}$.

¹¹ Attrapadung [2] refers to the scheme as a ‘Functional Encryption’ scheme. Note that the scheme in [2] is still in ‘All-Or-Nothing’ style and is covered by our ABE definitions, in this paper we refer to it as an ABE scheme.

CiperParam. Take in N and a DFA $\mathbb{M} = (Q, \mathbb{Z}_N, \mathcal{J}, q_0, q_{n-1})$ where $n = |Q|$, let $J = |\mathcal{J}|$, and parse $\mathcal{J} = \{(q_{x_t}, q_{y_t}, \sigma_t) | t \in [1, J]\}$. Output $d_\pi = 1 + J + n$ and $\boldsymbol{\psi} = (\psi_1, \psi_2, \psi_3, \psi_4, \psi_5, \psi_6, \{\psi_{7,t}, \psi_{8,t}, \psi_{9,t}\}_{t \in [1, J]})$ with $d_c = 6 + 3J$:

$$\begin{aligned} \psi_1 &= \pi, & \psi_2 &= \beta_2 \pi, & \psi_3 &= \beta_1 \pi + \beta_3 \bar{\pi}, \\ \psi_4 &= \bar{\pi}, & \psi_5 &= \pi_0, & \psi_6 &= -\nu_0 + \pi_0 \beta_5, \\ \psi_{7,t} &= \pi_t, & \psi_{8,t} &= \nu_{x_t} + \pi_t(\beta_6 + \beta_7 \sigma_t), & \psi_{9,t} &= -\nu_{y_t} + \pi_t(\beta_8 + \beta_9 \sigma_t), \end{aligned}$$

where $\boldsymbol{\pi} = (\pi, \bar{\pi}, \pi_0, \pi_1, \dots, \pi_J, \{\nu_x\}_{q_x \in Q \setminus \{q_{n-1}\}}) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{2+J+n}$ and $\nu_{n-1} := \beta_4 \bar{\pi}$.

We can see that the outputs of above (SysParam, KeyParam, CiperParam) satisfies our template requirements:

- **KeyParam:**
 1. $d_k \geq d_0$, where $d_k = 5 + 2l$ and $d_0 = 2$.
 2. Each of $\{\phi_0, \phi_1, \phi_2, \phi_3, \phi_4, \phi_{5,0}, \{\phi_{5,k}, \phi_{6,k}\}_{k \in [1, l]}\}$ is a linear combination of monomials $\alpha, \delta_i, \delta_i \beta_j$.
 3. $\phi_0 = \alpha + \beta_1 \phi_1 + \beta_2 \phi_2$, $\phi_1 = \delta_1$. None of $\{\phi_2, \phi_3, \phi_4, \phi_{5,0}, \{\phi_{5,k}, \phi_{6,k}\}_{k \in [1, l]}\}$ contains α or $\beta_1 \delta_1$.
- **CiperParam:**
 1. Each of $\{\psi_1, \psi_2, \psi_3, \psi_4, \psi_5, \psi_6, \{\psi_{7,t}, \psi_{8,t}, \psi_{9,t}\}_{t \in [1, J]}\}$ is a linear combination of monomials $\pi, \pi_i, \pi \beta_j, \pi_i \beta_j$.
 2. $\psi_1 = \pi, \psi_2 = \beta_2 \pi$.
- **DecPair:** When \mathbb{M} accepts $\mathbf{u} = (u_1, \dots, u_l)$, we have that there is a sequence of states $\rho_0, \rho_1, \dots, \rho_l \in Q$ such that $\rho_0 = q_0$, for $k = 1$ to l we have $(\rho_{k-1}, \rho_k, u_k) \in \mathcal{J}$, and $\rho_l \in F$. Let $(q_{x_{t_k}}, q_{y_{t_k}}, \sigma_{t_k}) = (\rho_{k-1}, \rho_k, u_k)$. Therefore, we have the following linear combination of the $\phi_i \psi_j$ terms:

$$\begin{aligned} & \phi_1 \psi_3 + \phi_3 \psi_4 - \phi_4 \psi_5 + \phi_{5,0} \psi_6 + \sum_{k \in [1, l]} (-\phi_{6,k} \psi_{7,t_k} + \phi_{5,k-1} \psi_{8,t_k} + \phi_{5,k} \psi_{9,t_k}) \\ &= \delta_1 (\beta_1 \pi + \beta_3 \bar{\pi}) + (-\beta_3 \delta_1 + \beta_4 \xi_l) \bar{\pi} - \xi_0 \beta_5 \pi_0 + \xi_0 (-\nu_0 + \pi_0 \beta_5) + (\xi_0 \nu_0 - \xi_l \nu_{n-1}) \\ &= \delta_1 \beta_1 \pi + \beta_4 \xi_l \bar{\pi} - \xi_l \beta_4 \bar{\pi} \\ &= \beta_1 \delta_1 \pi. \end{aligned}$$

Note that for any $k \in [1, l]$ we have

$$\begin{aligned} & -\phi_{6,k} \psi_{7,t_k} + \phi_{5,k-1} \psi_{8,t_k} + \phi_{5,k} \psi_{9,t_k} \\ &= -(\xi_{k-1} (\beta_6 + \beta_7 u_k) + \xi_k (\beta_8 + \beta_9 u_k)) \pi_{t_k} + \xi_{k-1} (\nu_{x_{t_k}} + \pi_{t_k} (\beta_6 + \beta_7 \sigma_{t_k})) + \xi_k (-\nu_{y_{t_k}} + \pi_{t_k} (\beta_8 + \beta_9 \sigma_{t_k})) \\ &= \xi_{k-1} \nu_{x_{t_k}} - \xi_k \nu_{y_{t_k}} \end{aligned}$$

and for any $k \in [1, l-1]$ we have $y_{y_{t_k}} = x_{t_{k+1}}$. Note that $q_{x_{t_1}} = \rho_0 = q_0$ implies $x_{t_1} = 0$ and $q_{x_{t_l}} = \rho_l = q_{n-1}$ implies $x_{t_l} = n-1$. Thus, we have

$$\sum_{k \in [1, l]} (-\phi_{6,k} \psi_{7,t_k} + \phi_{5,k-1} \psi_{8,t_k} + \phi_{5,k} \psi_{9,t_k}) = \xi_0 \nu_{x_{t_1}} - \xi_l \nu_{y_{t_l}} = \xi_0 \nu_0 - \xi_l \nu_{n-1}.$$

5.3.2 Security Analysis of the Resulting Augmented ABE

As shown in Sec. 3.4 and Fig. 3, here we only need to (1) state the security of the underlying conventional non-traceable ABE scheme and (2) prove the Lemma 1.

(1) *The Section 8.2 of [2] shows that their ABE scheme corresponding to the above Pair Encoding Scheme is a fully secure ABE scheme with Ciphertexts Associated with DFAs.*

(2) The Lemma 1 instantiation here is: *if the Modified (n, J) -EDHE2-Dual assumption holds, then for $\bar{j} < m$, no PPT adversary can selectively distinguish between an encryption to (\bar{i}, \bar{j}) and $(\bar{i}, \bar{j} + 1)$ in $\text{Game}_{\text{IH}}^{\text{A}}$ with non-negligible advantage, provided that the size of the challenge transition set is $\leq J$.*

The Modified (n, J) -EDHE2-Dual Assumption is a special case of the Modified (n, m) -EDHE2-Dual Assumption, which we introduce by modifying the (n, m) -EDHE2-Dual Assumption in [2, Definition 9], i.e., giving the adversary one more element $g^{a^{n-1}bc/z}$. In Appendix B, we prove that Modified (n, m) -EDHE2-Dual Assumption holds in the generic group.

Definition 7. The Modified (n, m) -EDHE2-Dual Assumption Given a group generator \mathcal{G} , let $(N = p_1 p_2 p_3, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{G}(\lambda)$, $g \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}_{p_1}$, $g_2 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}_{p_2}$, $g_3 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$, $a, b, c, z, d_1, \dots, d_m \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_N$. Suppose that an adversary is given

$$D = \left((N, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e), g, g^a, g^b, g^{b/z}, g^{a^{n-1}bc/z}, g_2, g_3, \right. \\ \forall_{i \in [1, n], j, j' \in [1, m], j \neq j'} g^{a^i/d_j^2}, g^{a^i b/d_j}, g^{d_j}, g^{a^i d_j/d_{j'}^2}, g^{a^i b d_j/d_{j'}}, g^{a^i/d_j^6}, g^{a^i d_j/d_{j'}^6}, \\ \forall_{i \in [0, n-1], j \in [1, m]} g^{a^i c}, g^{a^i b c d_j}, \\ \forall_{i \in [0, n], j \in [1, m]} g^{a^i b c d_j^5}, \\ \forall_{i \in [1, 2n-1], j, j' \in [1, m], j \neq j'} g^{a^i b c d_j/d_{j'}^2}, g^{a^i b c d_{j'}^5/d_{j'}^6}, \\ \forall_{i \in [1, 2n-1], i \neq n, j \in [1, m]} g^{a^i b c/d_j}, \\ \left. \forall_{i \in [1, 2n-1], j, j' \in [1, m]} g^{a^i c/d_j^2}, g^{a^i b^2 c d_j/d_{j'}}, g^{a^i b c d_j/d_{j'}^6}, g^{a^i c/d_{j'}^6}, g^{a^i b c d_{j'}^5/d_{j'}^2}, g^{a^i b^2 c d_{j'}^5/d_{j'}} \right)$$

and a target element $T \in \mathbb{G}_{p_1}$. The assumption states that it is hard for any polynomial time adversary to distinguish whether $T = g^{a^n c z}$ or $T \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}_{p_1}$.

The proof of the above Lemma 1 instantiation is given in Appendix E.

5.4 Large Universe CP-ABE on Prime Order Groups

Rouselakis and Waters [26] proposed a large universe CP-ABE scheme which is on prime order groups and consequently more efficient than those on composite order groups. Here we denote it by $\Sigma_{\text{NT}}^{\text{cpLUp}}$. In $\Sigma_{\text{NT}}^{\text{cpLUp}}$ the predicate Γ is described by LSSS. Below we review $\Sigma_{\text{NT}}^{\text{cpLUp}}$ in terms of Pair Encoding Scheme. Note that we change the variable names in $\Sigma_{\text{NT}}^{\text{cpLUp}}$ to better suit our template definitions.

5.4.1 The Pair Encoding Scheme

$\Sigma_{\text{NT}}^{\text{cpLUp}}$ satisfies our non-traceable ABE template in Sec. 3.2, with the following Pair Encoding Scheme.

SysParam. Take as input $\Gamma : \mathbb{X} \times \mathbb{Y} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, where the key tag (here is the attribute set) space is $\mathbb{X} = \{X \mid X \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_p\}$ and the ciphertext tag space is $\mathbb{Y} = \{\text{LSSS}(A, \rho) \mid A \text{ is a matrix over } \mathbb{Z}_p \text{ and } \rho \text{ maps each row of } A \text{ to an attribute in } \mathbb{Z}_p \text{ (}\rho \text{ does not need to be injective)}\}$, output $d = 4$ and $d_0 = 1$. Denote $\beta = (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_4)$.

KeyParam. Take in p and an attribute set $S \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_p$. Output $d_\delta = 1 + |S|$ and $\phi = (\phi_0, \phi_1, \{\phi_{x,2}, \phi_{x,3}\}_{x \in S})$ with $d_k = 1 + 2|S|$:

$$\phi_0 = \alpha + \beta_1 \delta_1, \quad \phi_1 = \delta_1, \quad \{\phi_{x,2} = \theta_x, \quad \phi_{x,3} = (\beta_2 x + \beta_3) \theta_x - \beta_4 \delta_1\}_{x \in S},$$

where $\delta = (\delta_1, \{\theta_x\}_{x \in S}) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{1+|S|}$.

CiperParam. Take in p and a ciphertext policy $(A, \rho) \in \mathbb{Y}$, where A is an $l \times n$ matrix over \mathbb{Z}_p , and $\rho : [1, l] \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ maps each row of A to an attribute in \mathbb{Z}_p . Output $d_\pi = l + n - 1$ and $\psi = (\psi_1, \{\psi_{k,1}, \psi_{k,2}, \psi_{k,3}\}_{k \in [l]})$ with $d_c = 1 + 3l$:

$$\psi_1 = \pi, \quad \{\psi_{k,1} = \beta_1(A_k \cdot \mathbf{u}) + \beta_4 \xi_k, \quad \psi_{k,2} = -(\beta_2 \rho(k) + \beta_3) \xi_k, \quad \psi_{k,3} = \xi_k\}_{k \in [l]},$$

where $\pi = (\pi, u_2, \dots, u_n, \xi_1, \dots, \xi_l) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{l+n}$ and $\mathbf{u} := (u_1 = \pi, u_2, \dots, u_n)$.

We can see that the outputs of above (SysParam, KeyParam, CiperParam) satisfies our template requirements:

- **KeyParam:**
 1. $d_k \geq d_0$, where $d_k = 1 + 2|S|$ and $d_0 = 1$.
 2. Each of $\{\phi_0, \phi_1, \{\phi_{x,2}, \phi_{x,3}\}_{x \in S}\}$ is a linear combination of monomials $\alpha, \delta_i, \delta_i \beta_j$.
 3. $\phi_0 = \alpha + \beta_1 \phi_1$, $\phi_1 = \delta_1$. None of $\{\phi_{x,2}, \phi_{x,3}\}_{x \in S}$ contains α or $\beta_1 \delta_1$. Note that $d_0 = 1$.
- **CiperParam:**

1. Each of $\{\psi_1, \{\psi_{k,1}, \psi_{k,2}, \psi_{k,3}\}_{k \in [l]}\}$ is a linear combination of monomials $\pi, \pi_i, \pi\beta_j, \pi_i\beta_j$.
 2. $\psi_1 = \pi$. Note that $d_0 = 1$, thus there is no requirement on $\psi_{\tilde{d}}$ for $\tilde{d} \geq 2$.
- DecPair: When S satisfies (A, ρ) , let $I = \{k \in [l] \mid \rho(k) \in S\}$, we have reconstruction coefficients $\{\omega_k\}_{k \in I}$ such that $\sum_{k \in I} \omega_k (A_k \cdot \mathbf{u}) = u_1 = \pi$. Therefore, we have the following linear combination of the $\phi_i \psi_j$ terms:

$$\sum_{k \in I} \omega_k (\phi_1 \psi_{k,1} + \phi_{\rho(k),2} \psi_{k,2} + \phi_{\rho(k),3} \psi_{k,3}) = \delta_1 \beta_1 \sum_{k \in I} \omega_k ((A_k \cdot \mathbf{u})) = \beta_1 \delta_1 \pi.$$

5.4.2 Security Analysis of the Resulting Augmented ABE

As shown in Sec. 3.4 and Fig. 3, here we only need to (1) state the security of the underlying conventional non-traceable ABE scheme and (2) prove the Lemma 1.

(1) *The Section 4 of [26] shows that their CP-ABE scheme corresponding to the above Pair Encoding Scheme is a selectively secure CP-ABE scheme with large universe.*

(2) The Lemma 1 instantiation here is: *if the Extended Source Group q -parallel BDHE Assumption [24] holds, then for $\bar{j} < m$, no PPT adversary can selectively distinguish between an encryption to (\bar{i}, \bar{j}) and $(\bar{i}, \bar{j} + 1)$ in $\text{Game}_{\text{IH}}^{\text{A}}$ with non-negligible advantage, provided that the challenge LSSS matrix's size $l \times n$ satisfies $l, n \leq q$.*

The proof of the above Lemma 1 instantiation is given in Appendix F.

5.5 More Instantiations

Besides the instantiations above, some other existing ABE schemes also satisfy our ABE template, such as the ones below, which we omit the details here.

1. The Fully Secure ABE with Keys associated with Regular Languages in [1, Sec. 5.2], with $d_0 = 2$.
2. The Fully Secure CP-ABE in [2, Scheme 11], with $d_0 = 1$.
3. The Fully Secure CP-ABE with large universe in [2, Scheme 13], with $d_0 = 1$.
4. The Fully Secure CP-ABE Scheme in [18, Sec. 2], with $d_0 = 1$.
5. The Fully Secure CP-ABE Scheme in [19], with $d_0 = 2$.

6 Conclusion

In this work, we proposed a generic framework that can transform conventional (non-traceable) ABE schemes to their traceable counterparts, which remain the appealing properties of the original conventional (non-traceable) ABE and achieve additional fully collusion-resistant blackbox traceability at the cost of sublinear overhead. In particular, we proposed a conventional (non-traceable) ABE template, and proposed a generic transformation from the ABE template to Augmented ABE which implies Traceable ABE. This generic framework implies that any ABE schemes satisfying our ABE template can be transformed to a Traceable ABE in a generic manner. And we showed that some existing appealing ABE schemes do satisfy our ABE template. We proved the security of our transformation framework in the standard model.

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A Correctness

Correctness. Suppose that the message is M' and the encryption index is (\bar{i}, \bar{j}) . For $i \geq \bar{i}$ we have

$$\frac{e(K_0, Q_i) \cdot e(K'_0, Q'_i)}{e(K_1, Q_{i,1}) \cdot \prod_{\bar{d}=2}^{d_0} e(K_{\bar{d}}, Q_{i,\bar{d}})} = \frac{e(g^{r_i c_j + \alpha_i} g^{\beta_1 \delta_1} \prod_{\bar{d}=2}^{d_0} g^{\beta_{\bar{d}} \phi_{\bar{d}}(\beta, \delta)}, g^{\tau s_i(\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}) e(Z_i^{\delta_1}, g^{t_i})}{e(g^{\delta_1}, (g^{\beta_1})^{\tau s_i(\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)} Z_i^{t_i} (g^{\beta_1})^\pi) \cdot \prod_{\bar{d}=2}^{d_0} e(g^{\phi_{\bar{d}}(\beta, \delta)}, (g^{\beta_{\bar{d}}})^{\tau s_i(\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)})}$$

$$= \frac{e(g^{r_i c_j + \alpha_i}, g^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)})}{e(g^{\delta_1}, (g^{\beta_1})^\pi)}.$$

If $i \geq \bar{i} \wedge j \geq \bar{j}$: we have

$$\frac{e_3(\mathbf{R}'_i, \mathbf{C}'_j)}{e_3(\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{C}_j)} = \frac{e_3(G_i^{\kappa s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, g^{\mathbf{w}_j})}{e_3(G_i^{s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, H_j^{\tau \mathbf{v}_c} \cdot g^{\kappa \mathbf{w}_j})} = \frac{1}{e_3(g^{r_i s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, g^{c_j \tau \mathbf{v}_c})} = \frac{1}{e(g, g)^{r_i s_i c_j \tau (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}}.$$

If $i > \bar{i} \wedge j < \bar{j}$: note that for $i > \bar{i}$, we have $(\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \boldsymbol{\chi}_3) = 0$ (since $\mathbf{v}_i \in \text{span}\{\boldsymbol{\chi}_1, \boldsymbol{\chi}_2\}$), then we have

$$\frac{e_3(\mathbf{R}'_i, \mathbf{C}'_j)}{e_3(\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{C}_j)} = \frac{e_3(G_i^{\kappa s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, g^{\mathbf{w}_j})}{e_3(G_i^{s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, H_j^{\tau (\mathbf{v}_c + \mu_j \boldsymbol{\chi}_3)} \cdot g^{\kappa \mathbf{w}_j})} = \frac{1}{e_3(g^{r_i s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, g^{c_j \tau (\mathbf{v}_c + \mu_j \boldsymbol{\chi}_3)})} = \frac{1}{e(g, g)^{r_i s_i c_j \tau (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}}.$$

If $i = \bar{i} \wedge j < \bar{j}$: note that for $i = \bar{i}$, we have that $(\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \boldsymbol{\chi}_3) \neq 0$ happens with overwhelming probability (since \mathbf{v}_i is randomly chosen from \mathbb{Z}_N^3), then we have

$$\frac{e_3(\mathbf{R}'_i, \mathbf{C}'_j)}{e_3(\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{C}_j)} = \frac{e_3(G_i^{\kappa s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, g^{\mathbf{w}_j})}{e_3(G_i^{s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, H_j^{\tau (\mathbf{v}_c + \mu_j \boldsymbol{\chi}_3)} \cdot g^{\kappa \mathbf{w}_j})} = \frac{1}{e_3(g^{r_i s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, g^{c_j \tau (\mathbf{v}_c + \mu_j \boldsymbol{\chi}_3)})} = \frac{1}{e(g, g)^{r_i s_i c_j \tau ((\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c) + \mu_j (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \boldsymbol{\chi}_3))}}.$$

Note that $D_P = e(\mathbf{K}^{\mathbf{E}_1}, \mathbf{P}) = e(g, g)^{\phi \mathbf{E}_1 \psi^T} = e(g, g)^{\beta_1 \delta_1 \pi}$. Thus from the values of T_i, D_P and D_I , for $M = T_i / (D_P \cdot D_I)$ we have that: (1) if $(i > \bar{i}) \vee (i = \bar{i} \wedge j \geq \bar{j})$, then $M = M'$; (2) if $i = \bar{i} \wedge j < \bar{j}$, then $M = M' \cdot e(g, g)^{\tau s_i r_i c_j \mu_j (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \boldsymbol{\chi}_3)}$; (3) if $i < \bar{i}$, then M has no relation with M' .

B Generic Security of the Assumptions

As the underlying assumptions in this paper are modified versions of the assumptions in [2], in this section we prove the generic security of these assumptions using the proof framework of [2].

Theorem 6. *The Modified (n, m) -EDHE2-Dual assumption is secure in the generic group model.*

Proof. The Modified (n, m) -EDHE2-Dual assumption could be considered as (M, Y) -EDHE assumption [2, Definition 11] where the matrix M and the vector Y are depicted in Table 2, and where we use variables $a, b, c, d_1, \dots, d_m, z$. The first requirement holds since $n, m = O(\text{poly}(\lambda))$. We now prove the second requirement. We denote by $\mathbf{v}_{x, i, j}$ the row of type x with specified i, j in the range if there is any for that type. We also denote by S_x the set of all row indexes of type x ranged in its specified condition.

We first observe that $2\mathbf{v}_*$ contains 2 in the column z , but for any v, w , $\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w$ contains at most 0 in the z column, hence $2\mathbf{v}_* \neq \mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w$ for any v, w . It remains to prove that $\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_u \neq \mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w$ for any u, v, w . We observe that $\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_u$ for $u \notin \{4, 4^+\}$ contains 1 in the column z . Hence by the same reason, $\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_u \neq \mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w$ for all $u \notin \{4, 4^+\}, v, w$. It remains to prove that $\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_4 = (n, 1, 1, 0, \dots, 0) \neq \mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w$ for all v, w and $\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+} = (2n - 1, 1, 2, 0, \dots, 0) \neq \mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w$ for all v, w . By the proof of the (n, m) -EDHE2-Dual assumption [2, Lemma 46], $\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_4 \neq \mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w$ for all v, w such that $v, w \notin \{4^+\}$. We observe that $\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w$ for $v \in \{4^+\}$ or $w \in \{4^+\}$ contains at most -1 in the z column. Hence $\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_4 \neq \mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w$ for all v, w . Now it remains to prove that $\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+} = (2n - 1, 1, 2, 0, \dots, 0) \neq \mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w$ for all v, w . For a vector X and column q , we denote $[X]_q$ the entry in X at q . We first consider the following five cases.

- $v \in \{4, 4^+\}$ or $w \in \{4, 4^+\}$: $[\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w]_z \leq -1$ but $[\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+}]_z = 0$.
- $v \in S_{20} \cup S_{21}$ or $w \in S_{20} \cup S_{21}$: $[\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w]_b \geq 2$ but $[\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+}]_b = 1$.
- $v \in S_8 \cup S_{11} \cup S_{16} \cup S_{19}$ or $w \in S_8 \cup S_{11} \cup S_{16} \cup S_{19}$: $[\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w]_{d_j} \leq -1$ for some j but $[\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+}]_{d_j} = 0$ for all j . This is since $[\mathbf{v}_v]_{d_j} = -6$ for some j and $[\mathbf{v}_w]_{d_j} \leq 5$ for all j .
- $v \in S_{23}$ or $w \in S_{23}$: $[\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w]_{d_j} \neq 0$ for some j but $[\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+}]_{d_j} = 0$ for all j . This is due to the following. WLOG, we assume $v \in S_{23}$ (and w can be any) and write $v = (23, i, j, j')$. We further categorize as:

Type	Terms	Range	a	b	c	d_1	d_2	\dots	d_m	z
1	g		0	0	0	0	0	\dots	0	0
2	g^a		1	0	0	0	0	\dots	0	0
3	g^b		0	1	0	0	0	\dots	0	0
4	$g^{b/z}$		0	1	0	0	0	\dots	0	-1
4+	$g^{a^{n-1}bc/z}$		$n-1$	1	1	0	0	\dots	0	-1
5	$g^{a^i c}$	$i \in [0, n-1]$	i	0	1	0	0	\dots	0	0
6	g^{d_j}	$j \in [1, m]$	0	0	0			$1_{@j}$		0
7	g^{a^i/d_j^2}	$i \in [1, n], j \in [1, m]$	i	0	0			$-2_{@j}$		0
8	g^{a^i/d_j^6}	$i \in [1, n], j \in [1, m]$	i	0	0			$-6_{@j}$		0
9	$g^{a^i b/d_j}$	$i \in [1, n], j \in [1, m]$	i	1	0			$-1_{@j}$		0
10	$g^{a^i d_j/d_{j'}^2}$	$i \in [1, n], j, j' \in [1, m], j \neq j'$	i	0	0			$1_{@j}, -2_{@j'}$		0
11	$g^{a^i d_j/d_{j'}^6}$	$i \in [1, n], j, j' \in [1, m], j \neq j'$	i	0	0			$1_{@j}, -6_{@j'}$		0
12	$g^{a^i b d_j/d_{j'}}$	$i \in [1, n], j, j' \in [1, m], j \neq j'$	i	1	0			$1_{@j}, -1_{@j'}$		0
13	$g^{a^i b c d_j}$	$i \in [0, n-1], j \in [1, m]$	i	1	1			$1_{@j}$		0
14	$g^{a^i b c d_j^5}$	$i \in [0, n], j \in [1, m]$	i	1	1			$5_{@j}$		0
15	$g^{a^i b c d_j/d_{j'}^2}$	$i \in [1, 2n-1], j, j' \in [1, m], j \neq j'$	i	1	1			$1_{@j}, -2_{@j'}$		0
16	$g^{a^i b c d_j^5/d_{j'}^6}$	$i \in [1, 2n-1], j, j' \in [1, m], j \neq j'$	i	1	1			$5_{@j}, -6_{@j'}$		0
17	$g^{a^i b c/d_j}$	$i \in [1, 2n-1], i \neq n, j \in [1, m]$	i	1	1			$-1_{@j}$		0
18	$g^{a^i c/d_j^2}$	$i \in [1, 2n-1], j \in [1, m]$	i	0	1			$-2_{@j}$		0
19	$g^{a^i c/d_j^6}$	$i \in [1, 2n-1], j \in [1, m]$	i	0	1			$-6_{@j}$		0
20	$g^{a^i b^2 c d_j/d_{j'}}$	$i \in [1, 2n-1], j, j' \in [1, m]$	i	2	1			$1_{@j}, -1_{@j'}$		0
21	$g^{a^i b^2 c d_j^5/d_{j'}}$	$i \in [1, 2n-1], j, j' \in [1, m]$	i	2	1			$5_{@j}, -1_{@j'}$		0
22	$g^{a^i b c d_j/d_{j'}^6}$	$i \in [1, 2n-1], j, j' \in [1, m]$	i	1	1			$1_{@j}, -6_{@j'}$		0
23	$g^{a^i b c d_j^5/d_{j'}^2}$	$i \in [1, 2n-1], j, j' \in [1, m]$	i	1	1			$5_{@j}, -2_{@j'}$		0
	Target									
*	$g^{a^n c z}$		n	0	1	0	0	\dots	0	1

Table 2. The matrix representation of the Modified (n, m) -EDHE2-Dual assumption

- If $j = j'$, $[\mathbf{v}_v]_{d_j} = 3$. But for all j , $[\mathbf{v}_w]_{d_j} \neq -3$.
- If $j \neq j'$, $([\mathbf{v}_v]_{d_j}, [\mathbf{v}_v]_{d_{j'}}) = (5, -2)$. But for all j, j' , $([\mathbf{v}_w]_{d_j}, [\mathbf{v}_w]_{d_{j'}}) \neq (-5, 2)$.
- $v \in S_{14}$ or $w \in S_{14}$: WLOG, we assume $v \in S_{14}$. We further categorize as:
 - $w \in S_{22}$: $[\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w]_b = 2$ but $[\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+}]_b = 1$.
 - $w \notin S_{22}$: $[\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w]_{d_j} \neq 0$ for some j but $[\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+}]_{d_j} = 0$ for all j . This is since $[\mathbf{v}_v]_{d_j} = 5$ for some j and $[\mathbf{v}_w]_{d_j} \neq -5$ for all j .

From now, we can assume $v, w \notin \{4, 4^+\} \cup S_8 \cup S_{11} \cup S_{14} \cup S_{16} \cup S_{19} \cup S_{20} \cup S_{21} \cup S_{23}$. We then consider the following case:

- $v \in S_7 \cup S_{10} \cup S_{15} \cup S_{18} \cup S_{22}$ or $w \in S_7 \cup S_{10} \cup S_{15} \cup S_{18} \cup S_{22}$: $[\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w]_{d_j} \leq -1$ for some j but $[\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+}]_{d_j} = 0$ for all j . This is since $[\mathbf{v}_v]_{d_j} \leq -2$ for some j and $[\mathbf{v}_w]_{d_j} \leq 1$ for all j .

From now, we can assume also $v, w \notin S_7 \cup S_{10} \cup S_{15} \cup S_{18} \cup S_{22}$. We further categorize as:

- $v \notin S_5 \cup S_{13} \cup S_{17}$ and $w \notin S_5 \cup S_{13} \cup S_{17}$: $[\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w]_c = 0$ but $[\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+}]_c = 2$.
- $v \in S_5 \cup S_{13} \cup S_{17}$ and $w \in S_5 \cup S_{13} \cup S_{17}$: we further categorize as:
 - $v \in S_5$ and $w \in S_5$: $[\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w]_b = 0$ but $[\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+}]_b = 1$.
 - $v \in S_5$ and $w \in S_{13} \cup S_{17}$: $[\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w]_{d_j} \neq 0$ for some j but $[\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+}]_{d_j} = 0$ for all j .
 - $v \in S_{13} \cup S_{17}$ and $w \in S_5$: $[\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w]_{d_j} \neq 0$ for some j but $[\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+}]_{d_j} = 0$ for all j .
 - $v \in S_{13} \cup S_{17}$ and $w \in S_{13} \cup S_{17}$: $[\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w]_b = 2$ but $[\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+}]_b = 1$.
- $v \in S_5 \cup S_{13} \cup S_{17}$ and $w \notin S_5 \cup S_{13} \cup S_{17}$: $[\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w]_c = 1$ but $[\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+}]_c = 2$.
- $v \notin S_5 \cup S_{13} \cup S_{17}$ and $w \in S_5 \cup S_{13} \cup S_{17}$: $[\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w]_c = 1$ but $[\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+}]_c = 2$.

This concludes all cases.

Theorem 7. *The Modified (n, t) -EDHE3 assumption is secure in the generic group model.*

Proof. The Modified (n, t) -EDHE3 assumption could be considered as (M, Y) -EDHE assumption [2, Definition 11] where the matrix M and the vector Y are depicted in Table 3, and where we use variables $a, b, c, d_1, \dots, d_t, z$. The first requirement holds since $n, t = O(\text{poly}(\lambda))$. We now prove the second requirement. We denote by $\mathbf{v}_{x,i,j}$ the row of type x with specified i, j in the range if there is any for that type. We also denote by S_x the set of all row indexes of type x ranged in its specified condition.

We first observe that $2\mathbf{v}_*$ contains 2 in the column z , but for any v, w , $\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w$ contains at most 0 in the z column, hence $2\mathbf{v}_* \neq \mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w$ for any v, w . It remains to prove that $\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_u \neq \mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w$ for any u, v, w . We observe that $\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_u$ for $u \notin \{4, 4^+\}$ contains 1 in the column z . Hence by the same reason, $\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_u \neq \mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w$ for all $u \notin \{4, 4^+\}, v, w$. It remains to prove that $\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_4 = (n, 1, 0, \dots, 0) \neq \mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w$ for all v, w and $\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+} = (2n+1, 1, 0, \dots, 0) \neq \mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w$ for all v, w . By the proof of the (n, t) -EDHE3 assumption [2, Lemma 47], $\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_4 \neq \mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w$ for all v, w such that $v, w \notin \{4^+\}$. We observe that $\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w$ for $v \in \{4^+\}$ or $w \in \{4^+\}$ contains at most -1 in the z column. Hence $\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_4 \neq \mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w$ for all v, w . Now it remains to prove that $\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+} = (2n+1, 1, 0, \dots, 0) \neq \mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w$ for all v, w . For a vector X and column q , we denote $[X]_q$ the entry in X at q . We first consider the following five cases.

- $v \in \{4, 4^+\}$ or $w \in \{4, 4^+\}$: $[\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w]_z \leq -1$ but $[\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+}]_z = 0$.
- $v \in S_6 \cup S_7 \cup S_{11}$ or $w \in S_6 \cup S_7 \cup S_{11}$: $[\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w]_{d_j} \leq -1$ for some j but $[\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+}]_{d_j} = 0$ for all j . This is since $[\mathbf{v}_v]_{d_j} = -2$ for some j and $[\mathbf{v}_w]_{d_j} \leq 1$ for all j .
- $v \in S_{12}$ or $w \in S_{12}$: $[\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w]_c \geq 2$ but $[\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+}]_c = 1$.

From now, we can assume $v, w \notin \{4, 4^+\} \cup S_6 \cup S_7 \cup S_{11} \cup S_{12}$. We further categorize as:

- $v \notin \{3\} \cup S_8 \cup S_9 \cup S_{10}$ and $w \notin \{3\} \cup S_8 \cup S_9 \cup S_{10}$: $[\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w]_c = 0$ but $[\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+}]_c = 1$.
- $v \in \{3\} \cup S_8 \cup S_9 \cup S_{10}$ and $w \in \{3\} \cup S_8 \cup S_9 \cup S_{10}$: $[\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w]_c = 2$ but $[\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+}]_c = 1$.
- $v \in \{3\} \cup S_8 \cup S_9 \cup S_{10}$ and $w \notin \{3\} \cup S_8 \cup S_9 \cup S_{10}$: we further categorize as:
 - $v \in \{3\}$ and $w \in \{2, 5, 13\}$: $[\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w]_a \leq n$ but $[\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+}]_a = 2n+1$.
 - $v \in S_8 \cup S_9 \cup S_{10}$ and $w \in \{2, 13\}$: $[\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w]_{d_j} \neq 0$ for some j but $[\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+}]_{d_j} = 0$ for all j .
 - $v \in S_8 \cup S_9 \cup S_{10}$ and $w = 5$: $[\mathbf{v}_v + \mathbf{v}_w]_a \leq 2n$ but $[\mathbf{v}_* + \mathbf{v}_{4^+}]_a = 2n+1$.
- $v \notin \{3\} \cup S_8 \cup S_9 \cup S_{10}$ and $w \in \{3\} \cup S_8 \cup S_9 \cup S_{10}$: this is the same as the previous case for “ $v \in \{3\} \cup S_8 \cup S_9 \cup S_{10}$ and $w \notin \{3\} \cup S_8 \cup S_9 \cup S_{10}$ ” by exchanging v, w .

This concludes all cases.

Type	Terms	Range	a	c	d_1	d_2	\dots	d_t	z
1	g		0	0	0	0	\dots	0	0
2	g^a		1	0	0	0	\dots	0	0
3	g^c		0	1	0	0	\dots	0	0
4	$g^{c/z}$		0	1	0	0	\dots	0	-1
4 ⁺	$g^{a^n c/z}$		n	1	0	0	\dots	0	-1
5	g^{d_j}	$j \in [1, t]$	0	0	$1_{@j}$			0	0
6	g^{a^i/d_j^2}	$i \in [1, n+1], j \in [1, t]$	i	0	$-2_{@j}$			0	0
7	$g^{a^i d_j/d_{j'}^2}$	$i \in [1, n], j, j' \in [1, t], j \neq j'$	i	0	$1_{@j}, -2_{@j'}$			0	0
8	$g^{a^n c d_j/d_{j'}}$	$j, j' \in [1, t], j \neq j'$	n	1	$1_{@j}, -1_{@j'}$			0	0
9	$g^{a^i c d_j}$	$i \in [1, 2n], j \in [1, t]$	i	1	$1_{@j}$			0	0
10	$g^{a^i c/d_j}$	$i \in [1, 2n], i \neq n+1, j \in [1, t]$	i	1	$-1_{@j}$			0	0
11	$g^{a^i c d_j/d_{j'}^2}$	$i \in [1, 2n], j, j' \in [1, t], j \neq j'$	i	1	$1_{@j}, -2_{@j'}$			0	0
12	$g^{a^i c^2 d_j/d_{j'}}$	$i \in [n+1, 2n], j, j' \in [1, t]$	i	2	$1_{@j}, -1_{@j'}$			0	0
13	g^{a^n}		n	0	0	0	\dots	0	0
	Target								
*	$g^{a^{n+1}z}$		$n+1$	0	0	0	\dots	0	1

Table 3. The matrix representation of the Modified (n, t) -EDHE3 assumption

C Proof of the Lemma 1 for the Fully Secure Unbounded KP-ABE with Large Universe

To make the proof easy to follow, we present the details of the resulting AugABE scheme first.

C.1 The Resulting Augmented KP-ABE

$\text{Setup}_A(\lambda, \Gamma, \mathcal{K} = m^2) \rightarrow (\text{PP}, \text{MSK})$. Run $(N, p_1, p_2, p_3, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(\lambda)$. Pick generators $g \in \mathbb{G}_{p_1}$, $X_3 \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$. Set $d = 6, d_0 = 2$. Pick random $\beta = (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_6) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^6$. Pick random $\{\alpha_i, r_i, z_i \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{i \in [m]}$, $\{c_j \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{j \in [m]}$. The public parameter is

$$\text{PP} = \left((N, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e), g, \mathbf{h} = (h_1 = g^{\beta_1}, \dots, h_6 = g^{\beta_6}), X_3, \right. \\ \left. \{E_i = e(g, g)^{\alpha_i}, G_i = g^{r_i}, Z_i = g^{z_i}\}_{i \in [m]}, \{H_j = g^{c_j}\}_{j \in [m]} \right).$$

The master secret key is $\text{MSK} = (\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_m, r_1, \dots, r_m, c_1, \dots, c_m)$.

A counter $ctr = 0$ is implicitly included in MSK .

$\text{KeyGen}_A(\text{PP}, \text{MSK}, (A, \rho)) \rightarrow \text{SK}_{(i,j),(A,\rho)}$. Set $ctr = ctr + 1$ and then compute the corresponding index in the form of (i, j) where $1 \leq i, j \leq m$ and $(i-1) * m + j = ctr$. Let $l \times n$ be the size of A . Pick random $\delta = (\delta_1, \delta_2, \xi_1, \dots, \xi_l, u_2, \dots, u_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{l+n+1}$, $\mathbf{R} = (R_0, R_1, R_2, \{R_{3,k}, R_{4,k}, R_{5,k}\}_{k \in [l]}) \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}^{3+3l}$, and $R'_0 \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$. Implicitly setting $\mathbf{u} = (u_1 = \beta_3 \delta_1, u_2, \dots, u_n)$, output a secret key $\text{SK}_{(i,j),(A,\rho)}$ as

$$\text{SK}_{(i,j),(A,\rho)} = \left((i, j), (A, \rho), \right. \\ K_0 = g^{r_i c_j + \alpha_i} g^{\beta_1 \delta_1} g^{\beta_2 \delta_2} R_0, \quad K_1 = g^{\delta_1} R_1, \quad K_2 = g^{\delta_2} \cdot R_2, \\ \{K_{3,k} = g^{A_k \cdot \mathbf{u}} g^{\beta_4 \xi_k} R_{3,k}, \quad K_{4,k} = g^{\xi_k} R_{4,k}, \quad K_{5,k} = (g^{\beta_5} g^{\beta_6 \rho^{(k)}})^{\xi_k} R_{5,k}\}_{k \in [l]}, \\ \left. K'_0 = Z_i^{\delta_1} R'_0 \right).$$

Note that $K_{3,k} = g^{A_k \cdot \mathbf{u}} g^{\beta_4 \xi_k} R_{3,k}$ can be computed as $K_{3,k} = (g^{\beta_3})^{A_{k,1} \delta_1} g^{\sum_{t=2}^n A_{k,t} u_t} g^{\beta_4 \xi_k} R_{3,k}$, where $A_k = (A_{k,1}, A_{k,2}, \dots, A_{k,n})$ is the k -th row of A .

Encrypt_A(PP, M, S, (\bar{i}, \bar{j})) \rightarrow CT_S.

1. Upon input the attribute set $S \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_N$, pick random $\boldsymbol{\pi} = (\pi, \bar{\pi}, \{\pi_x\}_{x \in S}) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{2+|S|}$. Set

$$\begin{aligned} P_1 &= g^\pi, & P_2 &= g^{\beta^2 \pi}, & P_3 &= g^{\beta_1 \pi} g^{\beta_3 \bar{\pi}}, \\ P_4 &= g^{\bar{\pi}}, & \{P_{5,x}\} &= g^{\beta_4 \bar{\pi}} (g^{\beta_5} g^{\beta_6 x})^{\pi_x}, & P_{6,x} &= g^{\pi_x} \}_{x \in S}. \end{aligned}$$

2. Pick random $\kappa, \tau, s_1, \dots, s_m, t_1, \dots, t_m \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, $\mathbf{v}_c, \mathbf{w}_1, \dots, \mathbf{w}_m \in \mathbb{Z}_N^3$.

Pick random $r_x, r_y, r_z \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and set $\boldsymbol{\chi}_1 = (r_x, 0, r_z)$, $\boldsymbol{\chi}_2 = (0, r_y, r_z)$, $\boldsymbol{\chi}_3 = \boldsymbol{\chi}_1 \times \boldsymbol{\chi}_2 = (-r_y r_z, -r_x r_z, r_x r_y)$.

Pick random $\mathbf{v}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_N^3 \forall i \in \{1, \dots, \bar{i}\}$, $\mathbf{v}_i \in \text{span}\{\boldsymbol{\chi}_1, \boldsymbol{\chi}_2\} \forall i \in \{\bar{i} + 1, \dots, m\}$.

For each row $i \in [m]$:

– if $i < \bar{i}$: randomly choose $\hat{s}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and set

$$\mathbf{R}_i = g^{\mathbf{v}_i}, \mathbf{R}'_i = g^{\kappa \mathbf{v}_i}, Q_i = g^{s_i}, Q_{i,1} = (g^{\beta_1})^{s_i} Z_i^{t_i} (g^{\beta_1})^\pi, Q_{i,2} = (g^{\beta_2})^{s_i}, Q'_i = g^{t_i}, T_i = E_i^{\hat{s}_i}.$$

– if $i \geq \bar{i}$: set

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{R}_i &= G_i^{s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, \mathbf{R}'_i = G_i^{\kappa s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, Q_i = g^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}, Q_{i,1} = (g^{\beta_1})^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)} Z_i^{t_i} (g^{\beta_1})^\pi, Q_{i,2} = (g^{\beta_2})^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}, \\ Q'_i &= g^{t_i}, T_i = M \cdot E_i^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}. \end{aligned}$$

For each column $j \in [m]$:

– if $j < \bar{j}$: randomly choose $\mu_j \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, and set $\mathbf{C}_j = H_j^{\tau(\mathbf{v}_c + \mu_j \boldsymbol{\chi}_3)} \cdot g^{\kappa \mathbf{w}_j}$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = g^{\mathbf{w}_j}$.

– if $j \geq \bar{j}$: set $\mathbf{C}_j = H_j^{\tau \mathbf{v}_c} \cdot g^{\kappa \mathbf{w}_j}$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = g^{\mathbf{w}_j}$.

3. Output the ciphertext CT_S as CT_S = $\langle S, (P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4, \{P_{5,x}, P_{6,x}\}_{x \in S}), (\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{R}'_i, Q_i, Q_{i,1}, Q_{i,2}, Q'_i, T_i)_{i=1}^m, (\mathbf{C}_j, \mathbf{C}'_j)_{j=1}^m \rangle$.

Decrypt_A(PP, CT_S, SK_{(i,j),(A,ρ)}) \rightarrow M or \perp . Parse CT_S to CT_S = $\langle S, (P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4, \{P_{5,x}, P_{6,x}\}_{x \in S}), (\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{R}'_i, Q_i, Q_{i,1}, Q_{i,2}, Q'_i, T_i)_{i=1}^m, (\mathbf{C}_j, \mathbf{C}'_j)_{j=1}^m \rangle$ and SK_{(i,j),(A,ρ)} to SK_{(i,j),(A,ρ)} = $((i, j), (A, \rho), (K_0, K_1, K_2, \{K_{3,k}, K_{4,k}, K_{5,k}\}_{k \in [l]}, K'_0)$. Suppose S satisfies (A, ρ) (if S does not satisfies (A, ρ), output \perp).

1. Compute constants $\{\omega_k\}_{\rho(k) \in S}$ such that $\sum_{\rho(k) \in S} \omega_k A_k = (1, 0, \dots, 0)$. Compute

$$D_P \leftarrow e(K_1, P_3) / \prod_{\rho(k) \in S} \left(\frac{e(K_{3,k}, P_4) \cdot e(K_{5,k}, P_{6,\rho(k)})}{e(K_{4,k}, P_{5,\rho(k)})} \right)^{\omega_k}$$

2. Compute

$$D_I \leftarrow \frac{e(K_0, Q_i) \cdot e(K'_0, Q'_i)}{e(K_1, Q_{i,1}) \cdot e(K_2, Q_{i,2})} \cdot \frac{e_3(\mathbf{R}'_i, \mathbf{C}'_j)}{e_3(\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{C}_j)}.$$

3. Computes $M \leftarrow T_i / (D_P \cdot D_I)$ as the output message.

C.2 Proof of Lemma 1

Proof. Suppose there exists a polynomial time adversary \mathcal{A} that selectively breaks the index-hiding game with advantage ϵ . We build a PPT algorithm \mathcal{B} to solve a Modified (1, q)-EDHE3 problem instance in a subgroup as follows. \mathcal{B} is given

$$\begin{aligned} D &= ((N, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e), g, g^a, g^c, g^{c/z}, g^{ac/z} \text{ (for } g^{ca^n/z} \text{ with } n=1), g_2, g_3, \\ &\quad \forall_{j \in [q]} \quad g^{d_j}, g^{acd_j}, g^{a^2 cd_j}, g^{ac/d_j}, g^{a/d_j^2}, g^{a^2/d_j^2}, \\ \forall_{j, j' \in [q]} \text{ s.t. } j \neq j' &\quad g^{ad_j/d_j^2}, g^{acd_j/d_j'}, g^{acd_j/d_j'^2}, g^{a^2 cd_j/d_j'^2}, \\ &\quad \forall_{j, j' \in [q]} \quad g^{a^2 c^2 d_j/d_j'} \end{aligned}$$

and T, where $(N = p_1 p_2 p_3, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{G}$, $g \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}_{p_1}$, $g_2 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}_{p_2}$, $g_3 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$, $a, c, z, d_1, \dots, d_q \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_N$, and T is either equal to $g^{a^2 z}$ or is a random element from \mathbb{G}_{p_1} . \mathcal{B} 's goal is to determine $T = g^{a^2 z}$ or T is a random element from \mathbb{G}_{p_1} .

Init. \mathcal{A} gives \mathcal{B} the challenge attribute set $S^* = \{a_1^*, \dots, a_{l^*}^*\} \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_N$, where $|S^*| = l^* \leq q$.

Setup. \mathcal{B} randomly chooses $\{\alpha_i \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{i \in [m]}$, $\{r_i, z_i' \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{i \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{i}\}}$, $r_{\bar{i}}, z_{\bar{i}} \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, $\{c_j' \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{j \in [m]}$, and $\beta_1', \beta_2, \beta_3', \beta_4, \beta_5', \beta_6' \in \mathbb{Z}_N$. \mathcal{B} gives \mathcal{A} the public parameter PP:

$$\begin{aligned} & \left(g, h_1 = (g^a)^{\beta_1'}, h_2 = g^{\beta_2}, h_3 = (g^a)^{\beta_3'}, h_4 = (g^a)^{\beta_4'}, \right. \\ & h_5 = g^{\beta_5'} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [l^*]} (g^{a/d_t^2})^{-a_t^*} \right) \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [l^*]} g^{ac/d_t} \right), h_6 = g^{\beta_6'} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [l^*]} g^{a/d_t^2} \right), \\ & \{E_i = e(g, g)^{\alpha_i}\}_{i \in [m]}, \\ & \{G_i = g^{r_i}, Z_i = (g^a)^{z_i'}\}_{i \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{i}\}}, \{H_j = (g^{c/z})^{c_j'}\}_{j \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{j}\}}, \quad G_{\bar{i}} = (g^a)^{r_{\bar{i}}}, Z_{\bar{i}} = g^{z_{\bar{i}}}, H_{\bar{j}} = (g^a)^{c_{\bar{j}}'} \Big). \end{aligned}$$

Note that \mathcal{B} implicitly chooses $r_{\bar{i}}, z_i (i \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{i}\}), c_j (j \in [m]), \beta_1, \beta_3, \beta_4, \beta_5, \beta_6 \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ such that

$$\begin{aligned} ar_{\bar{i}}' &\equiv r_{\bar{i}} \pmod{p_1}, az_i' \equiv z_i \pmod{p_1} \quad \forall i \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{i}\}, \\ ac_j' &\equiv c_j \pmod{p_1}, (c/z)c_j' \equiv c_j \pmod{p_1} \quad \forall j \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{j}\}, \\ a\beta_1' &\equiv \beta_1 \pmod{p_1}, a\beta_3' \equiv \beta_3 \pmod{p_1}, a\beta_4' \equiv \beta_4 \pmod{p_1}, \\ \beta_5' + \sum_{t \in [l^*]} (-a_t^* a/d_t^2) + \sum_{t \in [l^*]} (ac)/d_t &\equiv \beta_5 \pmod{p_1}, \\ \beta_6' + \sum_{t \in [l^*]} a/d_t^2 &\equiv \beta_6 \pmod{p_1}. \end{aligned}$$

Query Phase. To respond to \mathcal{A} 's query for $((i, j), (A, \rho))$, let $l \times n$ be the size of A ,

- if $(i, j) \neq (\bar{i}, \bar{j})$: \mathcal{B} picks random $\delta = (\delta_1, \delta_2, \xi_1, \dots, \xi_l, u_2, \dots, u_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{l+n+1}$, $\mathbf{R} = (R_0, R_1, R_2, \{R_{3,k}, R_{4,k}, R_{5,k}\}_{k \in [l]}) \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}^{3+3l}$, and $R_0' \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$. Implicitly setting $\mathbf{u} = (u_1 = \beta_3 \delta_1, u_2, \dots, u_n)$, \mathcal{B} creates a secret key $\text{SK}_{(i,j),(A,\rho)}$:

$$\begin{aligned} K_0 &= \begin{cases} g^{\alpha_i} (g^{c/z})^{r_i c_j'} \cdot h_1^{\delta_1} h_2^{\delta_2} R_0, & : i \neq \bar{i}, j \neq \bar{j} \\ g^{\alpha_i} (g^{ac/z})^{r_i' c_j'} \cdot h_1^{\delta_1} h_2^{\delta_2} R_0, & : i = \bar{i}, j \neq \bar{j} \\ g^{\alpha_i} (g^a)^{r_i c_j'} \cdot h_1^{\delta_1} h_2^{\delta_2} R_0, & : i \neq \bar{i}, j = \bar{j}. \end{cases} \\ K_1 &= g^{\delta_1} R_1, \quad K_2 = g^{\delta_2} \cdot R_2, \quad K_0' = Z_i^{\delta_1} R_0', \\ \{K_{3,k} &= h_3^{A_{k,1} \delta_1} g^{\sum_{t=2}^n A_{k,t} u_t} h_4^{\xi_k} R_{3,k}, K_{4,k} = g^{\xi_k} R_{4,k}, K_{5,k} = (h_5 h_6^{\rho(k)})^{\xi_k} R_{5,k}\}_{k \in [l]}. \end{aligned}$$

- if $(i, j) = (\bar{i}, \bar{j})$: it implies that \mathcal{A} is querying a secret key with the challenge index (\bar{i}, \bar{j}) , and (A, ρ) is not satisfied by S^* . \mathcal{B} first computes a vector $\bar{\mathbf{u}} = (\bar{u}_1, \dots, \bar{u}_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^n$ that has first entry equal to 1 (i.e. $\bar{u}_1 = 1$) and is orthogonal to all of the rows A_k of A such that $\rho(k) \in S^*$ (i.e. $A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}} = 0 \forall k \in [l] \text{ s.t. } \rho(k) \in S^*$). Note that such a vector must exist since S^* fails to satisfy (A, ρ) , and it is efficiently computable. \mathcal{B} picks random $\delta_1', \delta_2, \{\xi_k\}_{k \in [l]} \text{ s.t. } \rho(k) \in S^*, \{\xi_k'\}_{k \in [l]} \text{ s.t. } \rho(k) \notin S^*, u_2', \dots, u_n' \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, $\mathbf{R} = (R_0, R_1, R_2, \{R_{3,k}, R_{4,k}, R_{5,k}\}_{k \in [l]}) \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}^{3+3l}$, and $R_0' \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$. Let $\mathbf{u}' = (0, u_2', \dots, u_n') \in \mathbb{Z}_N^n$, \mathcal{B} sets the values of $\delta_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, $\mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{Z}_N^n$, $\{\xi_k \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{k \in [l]} \text{ s.t. } \rho(k) \notin S^*$ by implicitly setting

$$\begin{aligned} \delta_1' - ar_{\bar{i}}' c_{\bar{j}}' / \beta_1' &\equiv \delta_1 \pmod{p_1}, \quad \mathbf{u} = \mathbf{u}' + (a\beta_3') \delta_1 \bar{\mathbf{u}}, \\ \xi_k' + \left(a - \sum_{t \in [l^*]} \frac{acd_t}{\rho(k) - a_t^*} \right) \beta_3' r_{\bar{i}}' c_{\bar{j}}' (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta_1' \beta_4') &\equiv \xi_k \pmod{p} \quad \forall k \in [l] \text{ s.t. } \rho(k) \notin S^*. \end{aligned}$$

Note that for $a_t^* \in S^*$ and $\rho(k) \notin S^*$ we have $\rho(k) - a_t^* \neq 0$. \mathcal{B} creates a secret key $\text{SK}_{(\bar{i}, \bar{j}), (A, \rho)}$ as follows:

$$K_0 = g^{\alpha_{\bar{i}}} h_1^{\delta_1'} h_2^{\delta_2} R_0, \quad K_1 = g^{\delta_1'} (g^a)^{-r_{\bar{i}}' c_{\bar{j}}' / \beta_1'} R_1, \quad K_2 = g^{\delta_2} R_2, \quad K_0' = (K_1)^{z_{\bar{i}}} R_0',$$

- for $k \in [l]$ s.t. $\rho(k) \in S^*$,

$$\begin{aligned} K_{3,k} &= g^{(A_k \cdot \mathbf{u})} h_4^{\xi_k} R_{3,k} = g^{(A_k \cdot \mathbf{u}') + a\beta'_3 \delta_1(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}})} h_4^{\xi_k} R_{3,k} = g^{(A_k \cdot \mathbf{u}')} h_4^{\xi_k} R_{3,k}, \\ K_{4,k} &= g^{\xi_k} R_{4,k}, \quad K_{5,k} = (h_5 h_6^{\rho(k)})^{\xi_k} R_{5,k}, \end{aligned}$$

- for $k \in [l]$ s.t. $\rho(k) \notin S^*$,

$$\begin{aligned} K_{3,k} &= g^{(A_k \cdot \mathbf{u})} h_4^{\xi_k} R_{3,k} \\ &= g^{(A_k \cdot \mathbf{u}')} \cdot g^{a\beta'_3(\delta'_1 - ar'_i c'_j / \beta'_1)(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}})} \\ &\quad \cdot h_4^{\xi_k} \cdot (g^{a\beta'_4})^{a\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot (g^{a\beta'_4})^{-\left(\sum_{t \in [l^*]} \frac{acd_t}{\rho(k) - a_t^*}\right) \beta'_3 r'_i c'_j(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} R_{3,k} \\ &= g^{(A_k \cdot \mathbf{u}')} \cdot g^{a\beta'_3 \delta'_1(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}})} \cdot h_4^{\xi_k} \cdot (g^{\sum_{t \in [l^*]} \frac{a^2 cd_t}{\rho(k) - a_t^*}})^{-\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / \beta'_1} R_{3,k} \\ &= g^{(A_k \cdot \mathbf{u}')} \cdot (g^a)^{\beta'_3 \delta'_1(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}})} \cdot h_4^{\xi_k} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [l^*]} (g^{a^2 cd_t})^{\frac{1}{\rho(k) - a_t^*}} \right)^{-\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / \beta'_1} R_{3,k}, \\ K_{4,k} &= g^{\xi_k} R_{4,k} = g^{\xi_k + (a - \sum_{t \in [l^*]} \frac{acd_t}{\rho(k) - a_t^*}) \beta'_3 r'_i c'_j(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} R_{4,k} \\ &= g^{\xi_k} \cdot (g^a)^{\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [l^*]} (g^{acd_t})^{\frac{1}{\rho(k) - a_t^*}} \right)^{-\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} R_{4,k}, \\ K_{5,k} &= (h_5 h_6^{\rho(k)})^{\xi_k} R_{5,k} \\ &= (h_5 h_6^{\rho(k)})^{\xi_k} \cdot (h_5 h_6^{\rho(k)})^{(a - \sum_{t' \in [l^*]} \frac{acd_{t'}}{\rho(k) - a_{t'}^*}) \beta'_3 r'_i c'_j(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} R_{5,k} \\ &= (h_5 h_6^{\rho(k)})^{\xi_k} \\ &\quad \cdot \left(g^{\beta'_5 + \beta'_6 \rho(k)} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [l^*]} (g^{a/d_t^2})^{\rho(k) - a_t^*} \right) \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [l^*]} g^{ac/d_t} \right) \right)^{(a - \sum_{t' \in [l^*]} \frac{acd_{t'}}{\rho(k) - a_{t'}^*}) \beta'_3 r'_i c'_j(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot R_{5,k} \\ &= (h_5 h_6^{\rho(k)})^{\xi_k} \cdot (g^{\beta'_5 + \beta'_6 \rho(k)})^{a\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot (g^{\beta'_5 + \beta'_6 \rho(k)})^{-\left(\sum_{t' \in [l^*]} \frac{acd_{t'}}{\rho(k) - a_{t'}^*}\right) \beta'_3 r'_i c'_j(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\ &\quad \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [l^*]} (g^{a/d_t^2})^{\rho(k) - a_t^*} \right)^{a\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [l^*]} (g^{a/d_t^2})^{\rho(k) - a_t^*} \right)^{-\left(\sum_{t' \in [l^*]} \frac{acd_{t'}}{\rho(k) - a_{t'}^*}\right) \beta'_3 r'_i c'_j(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\ &\quad \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [l^*]} g^{ac/d_t} \right)^{a\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [l^*]} g^{ac/d_t} \right)^{-\left(\sum_{t' \in [l^*]} \frac{acd_{t'}}{\rho(k) - a_{t'}^*}\right) \beta'_3 r'_i c'_j(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot R_{5,k} \\ &= (h_5 h_6^{\rho(k)})^{\xi_k} \cdot (g^a)^{(\beta'_5 + \beta'_6 \rho(k)) \beta'_3 r'_i c'_j(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t' \in [l^*]} (g^{acd_{t'}})^{\frac{1}{\rho(k) - a_{t'}^*}} \right)^{-(\beta'_5 + \beta'_6 \rho(k)) \beta'_3 r'_i c'_j(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_1} \\ &\quad \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [l^*]} (g^{a^2/d_t^2})^{\rho(k) - a_t^*} \right)^{\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [l^*]} \prod_{t' \in [l^*]} (g^{a^2 cd_{t'}/d_t^2})^{\frac{\rho(k) - a_t^*}{\rho(k) - a_{t'}^*}} \right)^{-\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_2} \\ &\quad \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [l^*]} g^{a^2 c/d_t} \right)^{\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [l^*]} \prod_{t' \in [l^*]} (g^{a^2 c^2 d_{t'}/d_t})^{\frac{1}{\rho(k) - a_{t'}^*}} \right)^{-\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_3} \cdot R_{5,k} \\ &= \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [l^*]} \prod_{t' \in [l^*] \setminus \{t\}} (g^{a^2 cd_{t'}/d_t^2})^{\frac{\rho(k) - a_t^*}{\rho(k) - a_{t'}^*}} \right)^{-\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j(A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_4, \text{ for } t' \neq t} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [l^*]} (g^{a^2 c d_t / d_t^2})^{\frac{\rho^{(k)} - a_t^*}{\rho^{(k)} - a_t^*}} \right)^{-\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\text{for } t'=t} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [l^*]} g^{a^2 c / d_t} \right)^{\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \Psi_3 \cdot R_{5,k} \\
& = \Psi \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_4 \cdot \Psi_3 \cdot R_{5,k}.
\end{aligned}$$

Note that \mathcal{B} can calculate the values of $K_0, K_1, K_2, K'_0, \{K_{3,k}, K_{4,k}, K_{5,k}\}_{k \in [l]}$ using the suitable terms of the assumption.

Challenge. \mathcal{A} submits a message M . \mathcal{B} randomly chooses

$$\begin{aligned}
\tau', s_1, \dots, s_{\bar{i}-1}, s'_{\bar{i}}, s_{\bar{i}+1}, \dots, s_m, t'_1, \dots, t'_{\bar{i}-1}, t_{\bar{i}}, t'_{\bar{i}+1}, \dots, t'_m & \in \mathbb{Z}_N, \\
\mathbf{w}_1, \dots, \mathbf{w}_{\bar{j}-1}, \mathbf{w}'_{\bar{j}}, \dots, \mathbf{w}'_m & \in \mathbb{Z}_N^3, \\
\pi', \bar{\pi}', \pi'_{a_1^*}, \dots, \pi'_{a_i^*} & \in \mathbb{Z}_N.
\end{aligned}$$

\mathcal{B} randomly chooses $r_x, r_y, r_z \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and sets $\chi_1 = (r_x, 0, r_z), \chi_2 = (0, r_y, r_z), \chi_3 = \chi_1 \times \chi_2 = (-r_y r_z, -r_x r_z, r_x r_y)$. \mathcal{B} randomly chooses

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{v}_i & \in \mathbb{Z}_p^3 \quad \forall i \in \{1, \dots, \bar{i} - 1\}, \\
\mathbf{v}_i^p & \in \text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2\}, \quad \mathbf{v}_i^q \in \text{span}\{\chi_3\}, \\
\mathbf{v}_i & \in \text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2\} \quad \forall i \in \{\bar{i} + 1, \dots, m\}, \\
\mathbf{v}_c & \in \text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2\}, \quad \mathbf{v}_c^q = \nu_3 \chi_3 \in \text{span}\{\chi_3\}.
\end{aligned}$$

\mathcal{B} sets the value of $\kappa, \tau, s_{\bar{i}}, t_i (i \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{i}\}) \in \mathbb{Z}_N, \mathbf{v}_c, \mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}} \in \mathbb{Z}_N^3, \{\mathbf{w}_j \in \mathbb{Z}_N^3\}_{j=\bar{j}}^m, \pi \in \mathbb{Z}_N, \bar{\pi} \in \mathbb{Z}_N, \{\pi'_{a_i^*} \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{i \in [l^*]}$ by implicitly setting

$$\begin{aligned}
a & \equiv \kappa \pmod{p_1}, \quad a z \tau' \equiv \tau \pmod{p_1}, \quad s'_{\bar{i}} / a \equiv s_{\bar{i}} \pmod{p_1}, \\
t'_i + c \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i (\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / z'_i & \equiv t_i \pmod{p_1} \quad \forall i \in \{1, \dots, \bar{i} - 1\}, \\
t'_i - a \beta'_1 \tau' s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p) / z'_i + c \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i (\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / z'_i & \equiv t_i \pmod{p_1} \quad \forall i \in \{\bar{i} + 1, \dots, m\}, \\
\mathbf{v}_c & = \frac{1}{z} \mathbf{v}_c^p + \mathbf{v}_c^q, \quad \mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}} = \mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^p + \frac{c}{z} \mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q, \\
\mathbf{w}'_{\bar{j}} - a c'_j \tau' \mathbf{v}_c^p & \equiv \mathbf{w}_{\bar{j}} \pmod{p_1}, \\
\mathbf{w}'_j - c c'_j \tau' \mathbf{v}_c^q & \equiv \mathbf{w}_j \pmod{p_1} \quad \forall j \in \{\bar{j} + 1, \dots, m\}, \\
\pi' - c \tau' s'_i (\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) & \equiv \pi \pmod{p_1}, \quad \bar{\pi}' + c \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i (\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3 \equiv \bar{\pi} \pmod{p_1}, \\
\pi'_{a_i^*} - d_t \beta'_1 \beta'_4 \tau' s'_i (\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3 & \equiv \pi_{a_i^*} \pmod{p_1} \quad \forall t \in [l^*].
\end{aligned}$$

It is worth noticing that \mathbf{v}_i and \mathbf{v}_c are random vectors in \mathbb{Z}_N^3 as required, and $(\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}} \cdot \mathbf{v}_c) = \frac{1}{z} (\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^p \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p) + \frac{c}{z} (\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)$, since χ_3 is orthogonal to $\text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2\}$ and $\mathbb{Z}_N^3 = \text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2, \chi_3\}$.

\mathcal{B} creates a ciphertext $\langle S^*, (P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4, \{P_{5,x}, P_{6,x}\}_{x \in S^*}), (\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{R}'_i, Q_i, Q_{i,1}, Q_{i,2}, Q'_i, T_i)_{i=1}^m, (\mathbf{C}_j, \mathbf{C}'_j)_{j=1}^m \rangle$ as follows:

1. $P_1 = g^{\pi'} (g^c)^{-\tau' s'_i (\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)}, P_2 = (P_1)^{\beta_2}, P_3 = h_1^{\pi'} h_3^{\bar{\pi}'}, P_4 = g^{\bar{\pi}'} (g^c)^{\beta'_1 \tau' s'_i (\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3}$, for $t \in [l^*]$,

$$\begin{aligned}
P_{5,a_i^*} & = h_4^{\bar{\pi}'} (h_5 h_6^{a_i^*})^{\pi_{a_i^*}} \\
& = h_4^{\bar{\pi}' + c \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i (\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \cdot (h_5 h_6^{a_i^*})^{\pi_{a_i^*} - d_t \beta'_1 \beta'_4 \tau' s'_i (\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
& = h_4^{\bar{\pi}'} \cdot (g^{a \beta'_4})^{c \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i (\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
& \quad \cdot (h_5 h_6^{a_i^*})^{\pi_{a_i^*}} \cdot \left(g^{\beta'_5} g^{\beta'_6 a_i^*} \cdot \left(\prod_{t' \in [l^*]} (g^{a / d_{t'}})^{a_i^* - a_{t'}} \right) \cdot \left(\prod_{t' \in [l^*]} g^{a c / d_{t'}} \right) \right)^{-d_t \beta'_1 \beta'_4 \tau' s'_i (\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= h_4^{\pi'} \cdot (g^{ac})^{\beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \cdot (h_5 h_6^{a_i^*})^{\pi'_{a_i^*}} \cdot (g^{d_t})^{-(\beta'_5 + \beta'_6 a_i^*) \beta'_1 \beta'_4 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
&\quad \cdot \left(\prod_{t' \in [l^*]} (g^{ad_t / d_{t'}})^{a_i^* - a_{t'}} \right)^{-\beta'_1 \beta'_4 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \cdot \left(\prod_{t' \in [l^*]} g^{acd_t / d_{t'}} \right)^{-\beta'_1 \beta'_4 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
&= \underbrace{h_4^{\pi'}}_{\Psi_1} \cdot \underbrace{(g^{ac})^{\beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3}}_{\Delta} \cdot \underbrace{(h_5 h_6^{a_i^*})^{\pi'_{a_i^*}} \cdot (g^{d_t})^{-(\beta'_5 + \beta'_6 a_i^*) \beta'_1 \beta'_4 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3}}_{\Psi_2} \\
&\quad \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t' \in [l^*] \setminus \{t\}} (g^{ad_t / d_{t'}})^{a_i^* - a_{t'}} \right)^{-\beta'_1 \beta'_4 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3}}_{\Psi_3, \text{ for } t' \neq t} \cdot \underbrace{\left((g^{ad_t / d_t})^{a_i^* - a_t} \right)^{-\beta'_1 \beta'_4 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3}}_{1, \text{ for } t'=t} \\
&\quad \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t' \in [l^*] \setminus \{t\}} g^{acd_t / d_{t'}} \right)^{-\beta'_1 \beta'_4 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3}}_{\Psi_4, \text{ for } t' \neq t} \cdot \underbrace{(g^{acd_t / d_t})^{-\beta'_1 \beta'_4 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3}}_{\Delta^{-1}, \text{ for } t'=t} \\
&= \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3 \cdot \Psi_4, \\
P_{6, a_i^*} &= g^{\pi'_{a_i^*}} = g^{\pi'_{a_i^*} - d_t \beta'_1 \beta'_4 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} = g^{\pi'_{a_i^*}} (g^{d_t})^{-\beta'_1 \beta'_4 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3}.
\end{aligned}$$

Note that the values of Ψ_1, \dots, Ψ_4 can be calculated using the suitable terms of the assumption.

2. For each $i \in [m]$:

– if $i < \bar{i}$: it randomly chooses $\hat{s}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, then sets

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{R}_i &= g^{\mathbf{v}_i}, \quad \mathbf{R}'_i = (g^a)^{\mathbf{v}_i}, \quad Q_i = g^{s_i}, \quad Q_{i,1} = h_1^{s_i} Z_i^{t'_i} h_1^{\pi'}, \\
Q_{i,2} &= (Q_i)^{\beta_2}, \quad Q'_i = g^{t'_i} (g^c)^{\beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / z'_i}, \quad T_i = E_i^{\hat{s}_i}.
\end{aligned}$$

– if $i = \bar{i}$: it sets

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{R}_i &= g^{r'_i s'_i \mathbf{v}_i^p} (g^{c/z})^{r'_i s'_i \mathbf{v}_i^q}, \quad \mathbf{R}'_i = (g^a)^{r'_i s'_i \mathbf{v}_i^p} (g^{ac/z})^{r'_i s'_i \mathbf{v}_i^q}, \quad Q_i = g^{\tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^p \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p)} (g^c)^{\tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)}, \\
Q_{i,1} &= h_1^{\tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^p \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p)} Z_i^{t_i} h_1^{\pi'}, \quad Q_{i,2} = (Q_i)^{\beta_2}, \quad Q'_i = g^{t_i}, \quad T_i = M \cdot e(g^{\alpha_i}, Q_i).
\end{aligned}$$

– if $i > \bar{i}$: it sets

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{R}_i &= g^{r_i s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, \quad \mathbf{R}'_i = (g^a)^{r_i s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, \quad Q_i = (g^a)^{\tau' s_i(\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p)}, \quad Q_{i,1} = Z_i^{t'_i} h_1^{\pi'}, \\
Q_{i,2} &= (Q_i)^{\beta_2}, \quad Q'_i = g^{t'_i} (g^a)^{-\beta'_1 \tau' s_i(\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p) / z'_i} (g^c)^{\beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / z'_i}, \quad T_i = M \cdot e(g^{\alpha_i}, Q_i).
\end{aligned}$$

3. For each $j \in [m]$:

- if $j < \bar{j}$: it randomly chooses $\mu'_j \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and implicitly sets the value of μ_j such that $(ac)^{-1} \mu'_j \nu_3 - \nu_3 \equiv \mu_j \pmod{p_1}$, then sets $\mathbf{C}_j = (g^{(ac)/z})^{c'_j \tau' \mathbf{v}_c^p} \cdot g^{c'_j \tau' \mu'_j \mathbf{v}_c^q} \cdot (g^a)^{\mathbf{w}_j}$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = g^{\mathbf{w}_j}$.
- if $j = \bar{j}$: it sets $\mathbf{C}_j = T^{c'_j \tau' \mathbf{v}_c^q} \cdot (g^a)^{\mathbf{w}'_j}$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = g^{\mathbf{w}'_j} \cdot (g^a)^{-c'_j \tau' \mathbf{v}_c^p}$.
- if $j > \bar{j}$: it sets $\mathbf{C}_j = (g^{(ac)/z})^{c'_j \tau' \mathbf{v}_c^p} \cdot (g^a)^{\mathbf{w}'_j}$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = g^{\mathbf{w}'_j} \cdot (g^c)^{-c'_j \tau' \mathbf{v}_c^q}$.

If $T = g^{a^2 z}$, then the ciphertext is a well-formed encryption to the index (\bar{i}, \bar{j}) . If T is randomly chosen, say $T = g^r$ for some random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_1}$, the ciphertext is a well-formed encryption to the index $(\bar{i}, \bar{j} + 1)$ with implicitly setting $\mu_{\bar{j}}$ such that $(\frac{r}{a^2 z} - 1) \nu_3 \equiv \mu_{\bar{j}} \pmod{p_1}$.

Guess. \mathcal{A} outputs a guess $b' \in \{0, 1\}$ to \mathcal{B} , then \mathcal{B} outputs this b' to the challenger.

The distributions of the public parameters, private keys and challenge ciphertext are the same as that in the real scheme. \mathcal{B} 's advantage in the Modified $(1, q)$ -EDHE3 game will be exactly equal to \mathcal{A} 's advantage in the selective index-hiding game.

D Proof of the Lemma 1 for the Fully Secure KP-ABE with Short Ciphertexts

To make the proof easy to follow, we present the details of the resulting AugABE scheme first.

D.1 The Resulting Augmented KP-ABE

$\text{Setup}_A(\lambda, \mathcal{U}, N = m^2, T) \rightarrow (\text{PP}, \text{MSK})$. Run $\mathcal{G}(\lambda)$ to get $(N, p_1, p_2, p_3, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$. Pick generators $g \in \mathbb{G}_{p_1}$, $X_3 \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$. Set $d = T + 6, d_0 = 2$. Pick random $\beta = (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_4, \theta_0, \theta_1, \dots, \theta_{T+1}) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{T+6}$. Pick random $\{\alpha_i, r_i, z_i \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{i \in [m]}$, $\{c_j \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{j \in [m]}$. The public parameter is

$$\text{PP} = \left((N, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e), g, h_1 = g^{\beta_1}, \dots, h_4 = g^{\beta_4}, f_0 = g^{\theta_0}, f_1 = g^{\theta_1}, \dots, f_{T+1} = g^{\theta_{T+1}}, X_3, \right. \\ \left. \{E_i = e(g, g)^{\alpha_i}, G_i = g^{r_i}, Z_i = g^{z_i}\}_{i \in [m]}, \{H_j = g^{c_j}\}_{j \in [m]} \right).$$

The master secret key is $\text{MSK} = (\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_m, r_1, \dots, r_m, c_1, \dots, c_m)$.

A counter $ctr = 0$ is implicitly included in MSK .

$\text{KeyGen}_A(\text{PP}, \text{MSK}, (A, \rho)) \rightarrow \text{SK}_{(i,j),(A,\rho)}$. Set $ctr = ctr + 1$ and then compute the corresponding index in the form of (i, j) where $1 \leq i, j \leq m$ and $(i-1) * m + j = ctr$. Let $l \times n$ be the size of A . Pick random $\delta = (\delta_1, \delta_2, \xi_1, \dots, \xi_l, u_2, \dots, u_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{l+n+1}$, $\mathbf{R} = (R_0, R_1, R_2, \{R_{3,k}, R_{4,k}, R_{5,k,0}, \{R_{5,k,t}\}_{t \in [T]}\}_{k \in [l]} \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}^{3+(3+T)l}$, and $R'_0 \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$. Implicitly setting $\mathbf{u} = (u_1 = \beta_3 \delta_1, u_2, \dots, u_n)$, output a secret key $\text{SK}_{(i,j),(A,\rho)}$ as

$$\text{SK}_{(i,j),(A,\rho)} = \left((i, j), (A, \rho), \right. \\ K_0 = g^{r_i c_j + \alpha_i} h_1^{\delta_1} h_2^{\delta_2} R_0, \quad K_1 = g^{\delta_1} R_1, \quad K_2 = g^{\delta_2} \cdot R_2, \quad K'_0 = Z_i^{\delta_1} R'_0, \\ \{K_{3,k} = g^{A_k \cdot \mathbf{u}} h_4^{\xi_k} R_{3,k}, \quad K_{4,k} = g^{\xi_k} R_{4,k}, \\ K_{5,k,0} = f_0^{\xi_k}, \quad \{K_{5,k,t} = (f_{t+1} f_1^{-\rho(k)t})^{\xi_k} R_{5,k,t}\}_{t \in [T]}\}_{k \in [l]} \right).$$

Note that $K_{3,k} = g^{A_k \cdot \mathbf{u}} g^{\beta_4 \xi_k} R_{3,k}$ can be computed as

$K_{3,k} = (g^{\beta_3})^{A_{k,1} \delta_1} g^{\sum_{t=2}^n A_{k,t} u_t} g^{\beta_4 \xi_k} R_{3,k} = h_3^{A_{k,1} \delta_1} g^{\sum_{t=2}^n A_{k,t} u_t} h_4^{\xi_k} R_{3,k}$, where $A_k = (A_{k,1}, A_{k,2}, \dots, A_{k,n})$ is the k -th row of A .

$\text{Encrypt}_A(\text{PP}, M, S, (\bar{i}, \bar{j})) \rightarrow CT_S$.

1. Upon input the attribute set $S \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_N$, pick random $\boldsymbol{\pi} = (\pi, \bar{\pi}, \hat{\pi}) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^3$. Let c_t be the coefficient of z^t in $p(z) := \prod_{x \in S} (z - x)$. Set

$$P_1 = g^\pi, \quad P_2 = h_2^{\bar{\pi}}, \quad P_3 = h_1^\pi h_3^{\bar{\pi}}, \\ P_4 = g^{\hat{\pi}}, \quad P_5 = h_4^{\hat{\pi}} (f_0 \prod_{t=0}^T f_{t+1}^{c_t})^{\hat{\pi}}, \quad P_6 = g^{\hat{\pi}}.$$

2. Pick random

$$\kappa, \tau, s_1, \dots, s_m, t_1, \dots, t_m \in \mathbb{Z}_N, \\ \mathbf{v}_c, \mathbf{w}_1, \dots, \mathbf{w}_m \in \mathbb{Z}_N^3.$$

Pick random $r_x, r_y, r_z \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and set $\boldsymbol{\chi}_1 = (r_x, 0, r_z)$, $\boldsymbol{\chi}_2 = (0, r_y, r_z)$, $\boldsymbol{\chi}_3 = \boldsymbol{\chi}_1 \times \boldsymbol{\chi}_2 = (-r_y r_z, -r_x r_z, r_x r_y)$. Pick random

$$\mathbf{v}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_N^3 \quad \forall i \in \{1, \dots, \bar{i}\}, \\ \mathbf{v}_i \in \text{span}\{\boldsymbol{\chi}_1, \boldsymbol{\chi}_2\} \quad \forall i \in \{\bar{i} + 1, \dots, m\}.$$

For each row $i \in [m]$:

– if $i < \bar{i}$: randomly choose $\hat{s}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, and set

$$\mathbf{R}_i = g^{\mathbf{v}_i}, \quad \mathbf{R}'_i = g^{\kappa \mathbf{v}_i}, \quad Q_i = g^{s_i}, \quad Q_{i,1} = (g^{\beta_1})^{s_i} Z_i^{t_i} (g^{\beta_1})^\pi, \quad Q_{i,2} = (g^{\beta_2})^{s_i}, \\ Q'_i = g^{t_i}, \quad T_i = E_i^{\hat{s}_i}.$$

– if $i \geq \bar{i}$: set

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{R}_i &= G_i^{s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, \quad \mathbf{R}'_i = G_i^{\kappa s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, \quad Q_i = g^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}, \quad Q_{i,1} = (g^{\beta_1})^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)} Z_i^{t_i} (g^{\beta_1})^\pi, \\ Q_{i,2} &= (g^{\beta_2})^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}, \\ Q'_i &= g^{t_i}, \quad T_i = M \cdot E_i^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}. \end{aligned}$$

For each column $j \in [m]$:

- if $j < \bar{j}$: randomly choose $\mu_j \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and set $\mathbf{C}_j = H_j^{\tau(\mathbf{v}_c + \mu_j \chi_3)} \cdot g^{\kappa \mathbf{w}_j}$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = g^{\mathbf{w}_j}$.
- if $j \geq \bar{j}$: set $\mathbf{C}_j = H_j^{\tau \mathbf{v}_c} \cdot g^{\kappa \mathbf{w}_j}$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = g^{\mathbf{w}_j}$.

3. Output the ciphertext $CT_S = \langle S, (P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4, P_5, P_6), (\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{R}'_i, Q_i, Q_{i,1}, Q_{i,2}, Q'_i, T_i)_{i=1}^m, (\mathbf{C}_j, \mathbf{C}'_j)_{j=1}^m \rangle$.
 Decrypt $_{\mathbf{A}}$ (PP, CT_S , $\text{SK}_{(i,j),(A,\rho)}$) $\rightarrow M$ or \perp . Parse CT_S to $CT_S = \langle S, (P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4, P_5, P_6), (\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{R}'_i, Q_i, Q_{i,1}, Q_{i,2}, Q'_i, T_i)_{i=1}^m, (\mathbf{C}_j, \mathbf{C}'_j)_{j=1}^m \rangle$ and $\text{SK}_{(i,j),(A,\rho)}$ to $\text{SK}_{(i,j),(A,\rho)} = ((i, j), (A, \rho), (K_0, K_1, K_2, \{K_{3,k}, K_{4,k}, K_{5,k,0}, \{K_{5,k,t}\}_{t \in [T]}\}_{k \in [l]}, K'_0))$. Suppose S satisfies (A, ρ) (if S does not satisfies (A, ρ) , output \perp).

1. Compute constants $\{\omega_k\}_{\rho(k) \in S}$ such that $\sum_{\rho(k) \in S} \omega_k A_k = (1, 0, \dots, 0)$. Let c_t be the coefficient of z^t in $p(z) := \prod_{x \in S} (z - x)$. Compute

$$\begin{aligned} D_P &\leftarrow e(K_1, P_3) / \prod_{\rho(k) \in S} \left(\frac{e(K_{3,k}, P_4) \cdot e(K_{5,k,0} \prod_{t=1}^T K_{5,k,t}^{c_t}, P_6)}{e(K_{4,k}, P_5)} \right)^{\omega_k} \\ &= e(K_1, P_3) / \prod_{\rho(k) \in S} \left(\frac{e(g^{A_k \cdot \mathbf{u}} h_4^{\xi_k}, g^{\bar{\pi}}) \cdot e((f_0 \prod_{t=0}^T f_{t+1}^{c_t})^{\xi_k}, g^{\bar{\pi}})}{e(g^{\xi_k}, h_4^{\bar{\pi}} (f_0 \prod_{t=0}^T f_{t+1}^{c_t})^{\bar{\pi}})} \right)^{\omega_k} \\ &= e(K_1, P_3) / \prod_{\rho(k) \in S} (e(g^{A_k \cdot \mathbf{u}}, g^{\bar{\pi}}))^{\omega_k} = e(g, g)^{a_1 \delta_1 \pi} e(g, g)^{a_3 \delta_1 \bar{\pi}} / e(g, g)^{a_3 \delta_1 \bar{\pi}} \\ &= e(g, g)^{a_1 \delta_1 \pi}. \end{aligned}$$

Note that D_P can be computed using 4 pairing computations, since $\prod_{\rho(k) \in S} (e(K_{3,k}, P_4))^{\omega_k}$ can be compute by $e(\prod_{\rho(k) \in S} K_{3,k}^{\omega_k}, P_4)$, and the same applies to two parts for P_5 and P_6 .

2. Compute

$$D_I \leftarrow \frac{e(K_0, Q_i) \cdot e(K'_0, Q'_i)}{e(K_1, Q_{i,1}) \cdot e(K_2, Q_{i,2})} \cdot \frac{e_3(\mathbf{R}'_i, \mathbf{C}'_j)}{e_3(\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{C}_j)}.$$

3. Computes $M \leftarrow T_i / (D_P \cdot D_I)$ as the output message.

D.2 Proof of Lemma 1

Proof. Suppose there exists a polynomial time adversary \mathcal{A} that selectively breaks the index-hiding game with advantage ϵ . We build a PPT algorithm \mathcal{B} to solve a Modified $(T+1, 1)$ -EDHE3 problem instance in a subgroup as follows. \mathcal{B} is given

$$\begin{aligned} D &= ((N, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e), g, g^a, g^c, g^{c/z}, \underline{g^{ca^{T+1}/z} \text{ (for } g^{ca^n/z} \text{ with } n = T+1)}, g^d, \underline{g^{a^{T+1}}}, \\ &\quad \forall_{i \in [2(T+1)]} \quad g^{a^i c d}, \\ &\quad \forall_{i \in [2(T+1)], i \neq T+2} \quad g^{a^i c / d}, \\ &\quad \quad \forall_{i \in [T+2]} \quad g^{a^i / d^2}, \\ &\quad \forall_{i \in [T+2, 2(T+1)]} \quad g^{a^i c^2}) \end{aligned}$$

and T , where $(N = p_1 p_2 p_3, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{G}$, $g \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}_{p_1}$, $g_2 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}_{p_2}$, $g_3 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$, $a, c, z, d \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_N$, and T is either equal to $g^{a^{T+2}z}$ or is a random element from \mathbb{G}_{p_1} . \mathcal{B} 's goal is to determine $T = g^{a^{T+2}z}$ or T is a random element from \mathbb{G}_{p_1} .

Init. \mathcal{A} gives \mathcal{B} the challenge attribute set $S^* = \{a_1^*, \dots, a_{l^*}^*\} \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_N$, where $|S^*| = l^* \leq T$.

Setup. \mathcal{B} randomly chooses $\{\alpha_i \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{i \in [m]}$, $\{r_i, z'_i \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{i \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{i}\}}$, $r_{\bar{i}}, z_{\bar{i}} \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, $\{c'_j \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{j \in [m]}$, and $\beta'_1, \beta_2, \beta'_3, \beta'_4, \theta'_0, \theta'_1, \dots, \theta'_{T+1} \in \mathbb{Z}_N$. Let c_t^* be the coefficients of z^t in $p(z) = \prod_{x \in S^*} (z - x)$, \mathcal{B} gives \mathcal{A} the public parameter PP:

$$\begin{aligned} & \left(g, h_1 = (g^{a^{T+1}})^{\beta'_1}, h_2 = g^{\beta_2}, h_3 = (g^{a^{T+1}})^{\beta'_3}, h_4 = (g^{a^{T+1}})^{\beta'_4}, \right. \\ & f_0 = g^{\theta'_0} g^{a^{T+1}c/d} \prod_{t=0}^T (g^{a^{t+1}/d^2})^{-c_t^*}, \{f_t = g^{\theta'_t} g^{a^t/d^2}\}_{t=1}^{T+1}, \\ & \{E_i = e(g, g)^{\alpha_i}\}_{i \in [m]}, \\ & \left. \{G_i = g^{r_i}, Z_i = (g^{a^{T+1}})^{z'_i}\}_{i \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{i}\}}, \{H_j = (g^{c/z})^{c'_j}\}_{j \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{j}\}}, G_{\bar{i}} = (g^{a^{T+1}})^{r_{\bar{i}}}, Z_{\bar{i}} = g^{z_{\bar{i}}}, H_{\bar{j}} = (g^a)^{c'_{\bar{j}}}. \right) \end{aligned}$$

Note that \mathcal{B} implicitly chooses $r_{\bar{i}}, z_i (i \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{i}\}), c_j (j \in [m]), \beta_1, \beta_3, \beta_4, \beta_5, \beta_6 \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ such that

$$\begin{aligned} & a^{T+1}r'_{\bar{i}} \equiv r_{\bar{i}} \pmod{p_1}, a^{T+1}z'_i \equiv z_i \pmod{p_1} \quad \forall i \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{i}\}, \\ & ac'_j \equiv c_j \pmod{p_1}, (c/z)c'_j \equiv c_j \pmod{p_1} \quad \forall j \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{j}\}, \\ & a^{T+1}\beta'_1 \equiv \beta_1 \pmod{p_1}, a^{T+1}\beta'_3 \equiv \beta_3 \pmod{p_1}, a^{T+1}\beta'_4 \equiv \beta_4 \pmod{p_1}, \\ & \theta'_0 + a^{T+1}c/d - \sum_{t=0}^T c_t^* (a^{t+1}/d^2) \equiv \theta_0 \pmod{p_1}, \\ & \forall t \in \{1, \dots, T+1\} : \theta'_t + a^t/d^2 \equiv \theta_t \pmod{p_1}, \end{aligned}$$

Query Phase. To respond to \mathcal{A} 's query for $((i, j), (A, \rho))$, let $l \times n$ be the size of A ,

- if $(i, j) \neq (\bar{i}, \bar{j})$: \mathcal{B} picks random $\delta = (\delta_1, \delta_2, \xi_1, \dots, \xi_l, u_2, \dots, u_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{l+n+1}$, $\mathbf{R} = (R_0, R_1, R_2, \{R_{3,k}, R_{4,k}, R_{5,k,0}, \{R_{5,k,t}\}_{t \in T}\}_{k \in [l]}) \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}^{3+l(3+T)}$, and $R'_0 \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$. Implicitly setting $\mathbf{u} = (u_1 = \beta_3 \delta_1, u_2, \dots, u_n)$, \mathcal{B} creates a secret key $\text{SK}_{(i,j),(A,\rho)}$:

$$\begin{aligned} K_0 &= \begin{cases} g^{\alpha_i} (g^{c/z})^{r_i c'_j} \cdot h_1^{\delta_1} h_2^{\delta_2} R_0, & : i \neq \bar{i}, j \neq \bar{j} \\ g^{\alpha_i} (g^{(a^{T+1}c)/z})^{r'_i c'_j} \cdot h_1^{\delta_1} h_2^{\delta_2} R_0, & : i = \bar{i}, j \neq \bar{j} \\ g^{\alpha_i} (g^a)^{r_i c'_j} \cdot h_1^{\delta_1} h_2^{\delta_2} R_0, & : i \neq \bar{i}, j = \bar{j}. \end{cases} \\ K_1 &= g^{\delta_1} R_1, \quad K_2 = g^{\delta_2} \cdot R_2, \quad K'_0 = Z_{\bar{i}}^{\delta_1} R'_0, \\ \{K_{3,k} &= h_3^{A_{k,1} \delta_1} g^{\sum_{t=2}^n A_{k,t} u_t} h_4^{\xi_k} R_{3,k}, \quad K_{4,k} = g^{\xi_k} R_{4,k}, \\ K_{5,k,0} &= f_0^{\xi_k}, \quad \{K_{5,k,t} = (f_{t+1} f_1^{-\rho(k)^t})^{\xi_k} R_{5,k,t}\}_{t \in [T]}\}_{k \in [l]}. \end{aligned}$$

- if $(i, j) = (\bar{i}, \bar{j})$: it implies that \mathcal{A} is querying a secret key with the challenge index (\bar{i}, \bar{j}) , and (A, ρ) is not satisfied by S^* . \mathcal{B} first computes a vector $\bar{\mathbf{u}} = (\bar{u}_1, \dots, \bar{u}_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^n$ that has first entry equal to 1 (i.e. $\bar{u}_1 = 1$) and is orthogonal to all of the rows A_k of A such that $\rho(k) \in S^*$ (i.e. $A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}} = 0 \quad \forall k \in [l] \text{ s.t. } \rho(k) \in S^*$). Note that such a vector must exist since S^* fails to satisfy (A, ρ) , and it is efficiently computable. \mathcal{B} picks random $\delta'_1, \delta_2, \{\xi_k\}_{k \in [l]} \text{ s.t. } \rho(k) \in S^*, \{\xi'_k\}_{k \in [l]} \text{ s.t. } \rho(k) \notin S^*, u'_2, \dots, u'_n \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, $\mathbf{R} = (R_0, R_1, R_2, \{R_{3,k}, R_{4,k}, R_{5,k,0}, \{R_{5,k,t}\}_{t \in T}\}_{k \in [l]}) \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}^{3+l(3+T)}$, and $R'_0 \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$. Let $\mathbf{u}' = (0, u'_2, \dots, u'_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^n$, \mathcal{B} sets the values of $\delta_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, $\mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{Z}_N^n$, $\{\xi_k \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{k \in [l]} \text{ s.t. } \rho(k) \notin S^*$ by implicitly setting

$$\delta'_1 - ar'_{\bar{i}} c'_{\bar{j}} / \beta'_1 \equiv \delta_1 \pmod{p_1}, \quad \mathbf{u} = \mathbf{u}' + (a^{T+1} \beta'_3) \delta_1 \bar{\mathbf{u}},$$

$$\xi'_k + \left(a + \frac{1}{p(\rho(k))} \sum_{t=0}^T \rho(k)^t c d a^{T+1-t} \right) \beta'_3 r'_i c'_j (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4) \equiv \xi_k \pmod{p_1} \quad \forall k \in [l] \text{ s.t. } \rho(k) \notin S^*.$$

Note that for $\rho(k) \notin S^*$ we have $p(\rho(k)) \neq 0$. \mathcal{B} creates a secret key $\text{SK}_{(\bar{i}, \bar{j}), (A, \rho)}$ as follows:

$$K_0 = g^{\alpha_{\bar{i}}} h_1^{\delta_1} h_2^{\delta_2} R_0, \quad K_1 = g^{\delta_1} (g^a)^{-r'_i c'_j / \beta'_1} R_1, \quad K_2 = g^{\delta_2} R_2, \quad K'_0 = (K_1)^{z_i} R'_0,$$

- for $k \in [l]$ s.t. $\rho(k) \in S^*$,

$$K_{3,k} = g^{(A_k \cdot \mathbf{u})} h_4^{\xi_k} R_{3,k} = g^{(A_k \cdot \mathbf{u}') + a^{T+1} \beta'_3 \delta_1 (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}})} h_4^{\xi_k} R_{3,k} = g^{(A_k \cdot \mathbf{u}')} h_4^{\xi_k} R_{3,k},$$

$$K_{4,k} = g^{\xi_k} R_{4,k}, \quad K_{5,k,0} = f_0^{\xi_k}, \quad \{K_{5,k,t} = (f_{t+1} f_1^{-\rho(k)})^{\xi_k} R_{5,k,t}\}_{t \in [T]},$$

- for $k \in [l]$ s.t. $\rho(k) \notin S^*$,

$$K_{3,k} = g^{(A_k \cdot \mathbf{u})} h_4^{\xi_k} R_{3,k}$$

$$= g^{(A_k \cdot \mathbf{u}')} \cdot g^{a^{T+1} \beta'_3 (\delta_1 - a r'_i c'_j / \beta'_1) (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}})}$$

$$\cdot h_4^{\xi_k} \cdot (g^{a^{T+1} \beta'_4})^{a \beta'_3 r'_i c'_j (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot (g^{a^{T+1} \beta'_4})^{(\sum_{t=0}^T \frac{a^{T+1-t} c d \rho(k)^t}{p(\rho(k))}) \beta'_3 r'_i c'_j (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} R_{3,k}$$

$$= g^{(A_k \cdot \mathbf{u}')} \cdot g^{a^{T+1} \beta'_3 \delta_1 (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}})} \cdot h_4^{\xi_k} \cdot (g^{\sum_{t=0}^T \frac{a^{2T+2-t} c d \rho(k)^t}{p(\rho(k))}})^{\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / \beta'_1} R_{3,k}$$

$$= g^{(A_k \cdot \mathbf{u}')} \cdot (g^{a^{T+1}})^{\beta'_3 \delta_1 (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}})} \cdot h_4^{\xi_k} \cdot \left(\prod_{t=0}^T (g^{a^{2T+2-t} c d})^{\frac{\rho(k)^t}{p(\rho(k))}} \right)^{\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / \beta'_1} R_{3,k},$$

$$K_{4,k} = g^{\xi_k} R_{4,k} = g^{\xi_k + \left(a + \frac{1}{p(\rho(k))} \sum_{t=0}^T \rho(k)^t c d a^{T+1-t} \right) \beta'_3 r'_i c'_j (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} R_{4,k}$$

$$= g^{\xi_k} \cdot (g^a)^{\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \left(\prod_{t=0}^T (g^{a^{T+1-t} c d})^{\frac{\rho(k)^t}{p(\rho(k))}} \right)^{\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} R_{4,k},$$

$$K_{5,k,0} = f_0^{\xi_k} R_{5,k,0}$$

$$= f_0^{\xi_k} \cdot (g^{\theta'_0} g^{a^{T+1} c/d} \prod_{i=0}^T (g^{a^{i+1}/d^2})^{-c_i^*})^{a \beta'_3 r'_i c'_j (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}$$

$$\cdot (g^{\theta'_0} g^{a^{T+1} c/d} \prod_{i=0}^T (g^{a^{i+1}/d^2})^{-c_i^*})^{(\sum_{t=0}^T \frac{a^{T+1-t} c d \rho(k)^t}{p(\rho(k))}) \beta'_3 r'_i c'_j (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} R_{5,k,0}$$

$$= \underbrace{f_0^{\xi_k} \cdot ((g^{\theta'_0})^{\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)})}_{\Psi_1} \cdot (g^{a^{T+2} c/d})^{\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{i=0}^T (g^{a^{i+2}/d^2})^{-c_i^*} \right)^{\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_2}$$

$$\cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t=0}^T (g^{a^{T+1-t} c d})^{\frac{\rho(k)^t}{p(\rho(k))}} \right)^{\theta'_0 \beta'_3 r'_i c'_j (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_3}$$

$$\cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t=0}^T (g^{a^{2T+2-t} c^2})^{\frac{\rho(k)^t}{p(\rho(k))}} \right)^{\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_4}$$

$$\cdot \left(\prod_{t=0}^T \prod_{i=0}^T (g^{a^{T+i+2-t} c/d})^{\frac{-c_i^* \rho(k)^t}{p(\rho(k))}} \right)^{\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} R_{5,k,0}$$

$$= \Psi_1 \cdot (g^{a^{T+2} c/d})^{\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3 \cdot \Psi_4$$

$$\cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t=0}^T \prod_{i \in [0, T] \setminus \{t\}} (g^{a^{T+i+2-t} c/d})^{\frac{-c_i^* \rho(k)^t}{p(\rho(k))}} \right)^{\beta'_3 r'_i c'_j (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_5, \text{ for } i \neq t}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t=0}^T (g^{a^{T+t+2-t}c/d})^{\frac{-c_t^* \rho(k)^t}{p(\rho(k))}} \right) \beta_3' r_i' c_j' (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta_1' \beta_4')}_{\text{for } i=t} R_{5,k,0} \\
& = \Psi_1 \cdot \underbrace{\left(g^{a^{T+2}c/d} \right) \beta_3' r_i' c_j' (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta_1' \beta_4')}_{\Delta} \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3 \cdot \Psi_4 \cdot \Psi_5 \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left((g^{a^{T+2}c/d})^{\frac{-\sum_{t=0}^T c_t^* \rho(k)^t}{p(\rho(k))}} \right) \beta_3' r_i' c_j' (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta_1' \beta_4')}_{\Delta^{-1}, \text{ since } \sum_{t=0}^T c_t^* \rho(k)^t = p(\rho(k))} R_{5,k,0} \\
& = \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3 \cdot \Psi_4 \cdot \Psi_5 \cdot R_{5,k,0}, \\
K_{5,k,t} & = (f_{t+1} f_1^{-\rho(k)^t})^{\xi_k} R_{5,k,t} \quad \forall t \in [1, T] \\
& = \underbrace{(f_{t+1} f_1^{-\rho(k)^t})^{\xi_k}}_{\Psi_6} \cdot \left(g^{\theta_{t+1}'} g^{a^{t+1}/d^2} (g^{\theta_1'} g^{a/d^2})^{-\rho(k)^t} \right)^{\left(a + \frac{1}{p(\rho(k))} \sum_{i=0}^T \rho(k)^i c d a^{T+1-i} \right)} \beta_3' r_i' c_j' (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta_1' \beta_4') R_{5,k,t} \\
& = \Psi_6 \cdot \left(g^{\theta_{t+1}' - \theta_1' \rho(k)^t} g^{a^{t+1}/d^2} (g^{a/d^2})^{-\rho(k)^t} \right)^{a \beta_3' r_i' c_j' (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta_1' \beta_4')} \\
& \cdot \left(g^{\theta_{t+1}' - \theta_1' \rho(k)^t} g^{a^{t+1}/d^2} (g^{a/d^2})^{-\rho(k)^t} \right)^{\left(\frac{1}{p(\rho(k))} \sum_{i=0}^T \rho(k)^i c d a^{T+1-i} \right)} \beta_3' r_i' c_j' (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta_1' \beta_4') R_{5,k,t} \\
& = \Psi_6 \cdot \underbrace{\left((g^a)^{\theta_{t+1}' - \theta_1' \rho(k)^t} \cdot g^{a^{t+2}/d^2} \cdot (g^{a^2/d^2})^{-\rho(k)^t} \right) \beta_3' r_i' c_j' (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta_1' \beta_4')}_{\Psi_7} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{i=0}^T (g^{c d a^{T+1-i}} \rho(k)^i) \right)^{\frac{\theta_{t+1}' - \theta_1' \rho(k)^t}{p(\rho(k))}} \beta_3' r_i' c_j' (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta_1' \beta_4')}_{\Psi_8} \\
& \cdot \left(\prod_{i=0}^T (g^{a^{T+2+t-i}c/d} \rho(k)^i) \right)^{\frac{1}{p(\rho(k))}} \beta_3' r_i' c_j' (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta_1' \beta_4') \\
& \cdot \left(\sum_{i=0}^T (g^{a^{T+2-i}c/d})^{-\rho(k)^i} \right)^{\frac{\rho(k)^t}{p(\rho(k))}} \beta_3' r_i' c_j' (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta_1' \beta_4') R_{5,k,t} \\
& = \Psi_6 \cdot \Psi_7 \cdot \Psi_8 \\
& \cdot \left(\prod_{i \in [0, T] \setminus \{t\}} (g^{a^{T+2+t-i}c/d} \rho(k)^i) \right)^{\frac{1}{p(\rho(k))}} \beta_3' r_i' c_j' (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta_1' \beta_4') \cdot \underbrace{\left((g^{a^{T+2+t-t}c/d} \rho(k)^t) \right)^{\frac{1}{p(\rho(k))}} \beta_3' r_i' c_j' (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta_1' \beta_4')}_{\text{for } i=t} \\
& \underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{\Psi_9, \text{ for } i \neq t} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\sum_{i=1}^T (g^{a^{T+2-i}c/d})^{-\rho(k)^i} \right)^{\frac{\rho(k)^t}{p(\rho(k))}} \beta_3' r_i' c_j' (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta_1' \beta_4')}_{\Psi_{10}, \text{ for } i \neq 0} \cdot \underbrace{\left((g^{a^{T+2-0}c/d})^{-\rho(k)^0} \right)^{\frac{\rho(k)^t}{p(\rho(k))}} \beta_3' r_i' c_j' (A_k \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}}) / (\beta_1' \beta_4')}_{\text{for } i=0} R_{5,k,t} \\
& = \Psi_6 \cdot \Psi_7 \cdot \Psi_8 \cdot \Psi_9 \cdot \Psi_{10} \cdot R_{5,k,t}.
\end{aligned}$$

Note that \mathcal{B} can calculate the values of $K_0, K_1, K_2, K'_0, \{K_{3,k}, K_{4,k}, K_{5,k,0}, \{K_{5,k,t}\}_{t \in [T]}\}_{k \in [l]}$ using the suitable terms of the assumption.

Challenge. \mathcal{A} submits a message M . \mathcal{B} randomly chooses

$$\begin{aligned}
\tau', s_1, \dots, s_{\bar{i}-1}, s_{\bar{i}}, s_{\bar{i}+1}, \dots, s_m, t'_1, \dots, t'_{\bar{i}-1}, t'_i, t'_{\bar{i}+1}, \dots, t'_m & \in \mathbb{Z}_N, \\
\mathbf{w}_1, \dots, \mathbf{w}_{\bar{j}-1}, \mathbf{w}'_{\bar{j}}, \dots, \mathbf{w}'_m & \in \mathbb{Z}_N^3, \\
\pi', \bar{\pi}', \pi'_{a_1}, \dots, \pi'_{a_i} & \in \mathbb{Z}_N.
\end{aligned}$$

\mathcal{B} randomly chooses $r_x, r_y, r_z \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and sets $\chi_1 = (r_x, 0, r_z), \chi_2 = (0, r_y, r_z), \chi_3 = \chi_1 \times \chi_2 = (-r_y r_z, -r_x r_z, r_x r_y)$.
 \mathcal{B} randomly chooses

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{v}_i &\in \mathbb{Z}_N^3 \quad \forall i \in \{1, \dots, \bar{i} - 1\}, \\ \mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^p &\in \text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2\}, \quad \mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \in \text{span}\{\chi_3\}, \\ \mathbf{v}_i &\in \text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2\} \quad \forall i \in \{\bar{i} + 1, \dots, m\}, \\ \mathbf{v}_c^p &\in \text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2\}, \quad \mathbf{v}_c^q = \nu_3 \chi_3 \in \text{span}\{\chi_3\}. \end{aligned}$$

\mathcal{B} sets the value of $\kappa, \tau, s_{\bar{i}}, t_i (i \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{i}\}) \in \mathbb{Z}_N, \mathbf{v}_c, \mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}} \in \mathbb{Z}_N^3, \{\mathbf{w}_j \in \mathbb{Z}_N^3\}_{j=\bar{j}}^m, \pi, \bar{\pi}, \hat{\pi}' \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ by implicitly setting

$$\begin{aligned} a^{T+1} &\equiv \kappa \pmod{p_1}, \quad a^{T+1} z \tau' \equiv \tau \pmod{p_1}, \quad s_{\bar{i}}' / a^{T+1} \equiv s_{\bar{i}} \pmod{p_1}, \\ t_i + c \beta_1' \tau' s_i' (\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / z_i' &\equiv t_i \pmod{p_1} \quad \forall i \in \{1, \dots, \bar{i} - 1\}, \\ t_i' - a^{T+1} \beta_1' \tau' s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p) / z_i' + c \beta_1' \tau' s_i' (\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / z_i' &\equiv t_i \pmod{p_1} \quad \forall i \in \{\bar{i} + 1, \dots, m\}, \\ \mathbf{v}_c &= z^{-1} \mathbf{v}_c^p + \mathbf{v}_c^q, \quad \mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}} = \mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^p + \frac{c}{z} \mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q, \\ \mathbf{w}_{\bar{j}}' - a c_{\bar{j}}' \tau' \mathbf{v}_{\bar{j}}^p &\equiv \mathbf{w}_{\bar{j}} \pmod{p_1}, \\ \mathbf{w}_j' - c c_j' \tau' \mathbf{v}_j^q &\equiv \mathbf{w}_j \pmod{p_1} \quad \forall j \in \{\bar{j} + 1, \dots, m\}, \\ \pi' - c \tau' s_{\bar{i}}' (\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) &\equiv \pi \pmod{p_1}, \quad \bar{\pi}' + c \beta_1' \tau' s_{\bar{i}}' (\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta_3' \equiv \bar{\pi} \pmod{p_1}, \\ \hat{\pi}' - d \beta_1' \beta_4' \tau' s_{\bar{i}}' (\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta_3' &\equiv \hat{\pi} \pmod{p_1}. \end{aligned}$$

It is worth noticing that $\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}$ and \mathbf{v}_c are random vectors in \mathbb{Z}_N^3 as required, and $(\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}} \cdot \mathbf{v}_c) = \frac{1}{z} (\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^p \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p) + \frac{c}{z} (\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)$, since χ_3 is orthogonal to $\text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2\}$ and $\mathbb{Z}_N^3 = \text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2, \chi_3\}$.

\mathcal{B} creates a ciphertext $\langle S^*, (P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4, P_5, P_6), (\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{R}_i', Q_i, Q_{i,1}, Q_i', T_i)_{i=1}^m, (\mathbf{C}_j, \mathbf{C}_j')_{j=1}^m \rangle$ as follows:

$$1. P_1 = g^{\pi'} (g^c)^{-\tau' s_{\bar{i}}' (\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)}, \quad P_2 = (P_1)^{\beta_2}, \quad P_3 = h_1^{\pi'} h_3^{\bar{\pi}'}, \quad P_4 = g^{\bar{\pi}'} (g^c)^{\beta_1' \tau' s_{\bar{i}}' (\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta_3'}$$

$$\begin{aligned} P_5 &= h_4^{\bar{\pi}'} (f_0 \prod_{t=0}^T f_{t+1}^{c_t^*})^{\hat{\pi}'} \\ &= h_4^{\bar{\pi}' + c \beta_1' \tau' s_{\bar{i}}' (\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta_3'} \cdot (g^{\theta_0'} g^{a^{T+1} c / d} \prod_{t'=0}^T (g^{a^{t'+1} / d^2})^{-c_{t'}^*} \cdot \prod_{t=0}^T (g^{\theta_{t+1}'} g^{a^{t+1} / d^2})^{c_t^*})^{\hat{\pi}' - d \beta_1' \beta_4' \tau' s_{\bar{i}}' (\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta_3'} \\ &= h_4^{\bar{\pi}'} \cdot (g^{a^{T+1} c / d})^{\beta_1' \tau' s_{\bar{i}}' (\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta_3'} \cdot (g^{\theta_0'} g^{a^{T+1} c / d} \cdot \prod_{t=0}^T (g^{\theta_{t+1}'} c_t^*)^{\hat{\pi}' - d \beta_1' \beta_4' \tau' s_{\bar{i}}' (\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta_3'}) \\ &= h_4^{\bar{\pi}'} \cdot (g^{a^{T+1} c})^{\beta_1' \tau' s_{\bar{i}}' (\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta_3'} \cdot (g^{\theta_0'} \prod_{t=0}^T g^{\theta_{t+1}'} c_t^*)^{\hat{\pi}' - d \beta_1' \beta_4' \tau' s_{\bar{i}}' (\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta_3'} \\ &\quad \cdot (g^{a^{T+1} c / d})^{\hat{\pi}' - d \beta_1' \beta_4' \tau' s_{\bar{i}}' (\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta_3'} \\ &= h_4^{\bar{\pi}'} \cdot (g^{a^{T+1} c})^{\beta_1' \tau' s_{\bar{i}}' (\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta_3'} \cdot (g^{\theta_0'} \prod_{t=0}^T g^{\theta_{t+1}'} c_t^*)^{\hat{\pi}'} \cdot ((g^d)^{\theta_0'} \prod_{t=0}^T (g^d)^{\theta_{t+1}'} c_t^*)^{-\beta_1' \beta_4' \tau' s_{\bar{i}}' (\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta_3'} \\ &\quad \cdot (g^{a^{T+1} c / d})^{\hat{\pi}'} \cdot (g^{a^{T+1} c})^{-\beta_1' \beta_4' \tau' s_{\bar{i}}' (\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta_3'} \\ &= h_4^{\bar{\pi}'} \cdot (g^{\theta_0'} \prod_{t=0}^T g^{\theta_{t+1}'} c_t^*)^{\hat{\pi}'} \cdot ((g^d)^{\theta_0'} \prod_{t=0}^T (g^d)^{\theta_{t+1}'} c_t^*)^{-\beta_1' \beta_4' \tau' s_{\bar{i}}' (\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta_3'} \cdot (g^{a^{T+1} c / d})^{\hat{\pi}'} \\ P_6 &= g^{\hat{\pi}'} = g^{\hat{\pi}' - d \beta_1' \beta_4' \tau' s_{\bar{i}}' (\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta_3'} \\ &= g^{\hat{\pi}'} (g^d)^{-\beta_1' \beta_4' \tau' s_{\bar{i}}' (\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta_3'}. \end{aligned}$$

2. For each $i \in [m]$:
- if $i < \bar{i}$: it randomly chooses $\hat{s}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, then sets

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{R}_i &= g^{\mathbf{v}_i}, \mathbf{R}'_i = (g^{a^{T+1}})^{\mathbf{v}_i}, \quad Q_i = g^{s_i}, \quad Q_{i,1} = h_1^{s_i} Z_i^{t'_i} h_1^{\pi'}, \\ Q_{i,2} &= (Q_i)^{\beta_2}, \quad Q'_i = g^{t'_i} (g^c)^{\beta'_1 \tau' s'_i (\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / z'_i}, \quad T_i = E_i^{\hat{s}_i}. \end{aligned}$$

- if $i = \bar{i}$: it sets

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{R}_i &= g^{r'_i s'_i \mathbf{v}_i^p} (g^{c/z})^{r'_i s'_i \mathbf{v}_i^q}, \quad \mathbf{R}'_i = (g^{a^{T+1}})^{r'_i s'_i \mathbf{v}_i^p} (g^{a^{T+1}c/z})^{r'_i s'_i \mathbf{v}_i^q}, \quad Q_i = g^{\tau' s'_i (\mathbf{v}_i^p \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p)} (g^c)^{\tau' s'_i (\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)}, \\ Q_{i,1} &= h_1^{\tau' s'_i (\mathbf{v}_i^p \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p)} Z_i^{t'_i} h_1^{\pi'}, \quad Q_{i,2} = (Q_i)^{\beta_2}, \quad Q'_i = g^{t'_i}, \quad T_i = M \cdot e(g^{\alpha_i}, Q_i). \end{aligned}$$

- if $i > \bar{i}$: it sets

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{R}_i &= g^{r_i s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, \quad \mathbf{R}'_i = (g^{a^{T+1}})^{r_i s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, \quad Q_i = (g^{a^{T+1}})^{\tau' s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p)}, \quad Q_{i,1} = Z_i^{t'_i} h_1^{\pi'}, \\ Q_{i,2} &= (Q_i)^{\beta_2}, \quad Q'_i = g^{t'_i} (g^{a^{T+1}})^{-\beta'_1 \tau' s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p) / z'_i} (g^c)^{\beta'_1 \tau' s'_i (\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / z'_i}, \quad T_i = M \cdot e(g^{\alpha_i}, Q_i). \end{aligned}$$

3. For each $j \in [m]$:

- if $j < \bar{j}$: it randomly chooses $\mu'_j \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and implicitly sets the value of μ_j such that $(a^{T+1}c)^{-1} \mu'_j \nu_3 - \nu_3 \equiv \mu_j \pmod{p_1}$, then sets $\mathbf{C}_j = (g^{(a^{T+1}c)/z})^{c'_j \tau' \mathbf{v}_c^p} \cdot g^{c'_j \tau' \mu'_j \mathbf{v}_c^q} \cdot (g^{a^{T+1}})^{\mathbf{w}_j}$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = g^{\mathbf{w}_j}$.
- if $j = \bar{j}$: it sets $\mathbf{C}_j = T^{c'_j \tau' \mathbf{v}_c^q} \cdot (g^{a^{T+1}})^{\mathbf{w}'_j}$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = g^{\mathbf{w}'_j} \cdot (g^a)^{-c'_j \tau' \mathbf{v}_c^p}$.
- if $j > \bar{j}$: it sets $\mathbf{C}_j = (g^{(a^{T+1}c)/z})^{c'_j \tau' \mathbf{v}_c^p} \cdot (g^{a^{T+1}})^{\mathbf{w}'_j}$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = g^{\mathbf{w}'_j} \cdot (g^c)^{-c'_j \tau' \mathbf{v}_c^q}$.

If $T = g^{a^{T+2}z}$, then the ciphertext is a well-formed encryption to the index (\bar{i}, \bar{j}) . If T is randomly chosen, say $T = g^r$ for some random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_1}$, the ciphertext is a well-formed encryption to the index $(\bar{i}, \bar{j} + 1)$ with implicitly setting $\mu_{\bar{j}}$ such that $(\frac{r}{a^{T+2}z} - 1) \nu_3 \equiv \mu_{\bar{j}} \pmod{p_1}$.

Guess. \mathcal{A} outputs a guess $b' \in \{0, 1\}$ to \mathcal{B} , then \mathcal{B} outputs this b' to the challenger.

The distributions of the public parameters, secret keys and challenge ciphertext are the same as that in the real scheme. \mathcal{B} 's advantage in the Modified $(T+1, 1)$ -EDHE3 game will be exactly equal to \mathcal{A} 's advantage in the selective index-hiding game.

E Proof of the Lemma 1 for the Fully Secure ABE with Ciphertexts Associated with DFAs

To make the proof easy to follow, we present the details of the resulting AugABE scheme first.

E.1 The Resulting Augmented ABE with Ciphertexts Associated with DFAs

$\text{Setup}_A(\lambda, \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{K} = m^2) \rightarrow (\text{PP}, \text{MSK})$. Run $\mathcal{G}(\lambda)$ to get $(N, p_1, p_2, p_3, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$. Pick generators $g \in \mathbb{G}_{p_1}$, $X_3 \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$. Set $d = 9, d_0 = 2$. Pick random $\beta = (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_9) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^9$. Pick random $\{\alpha_i, r_i, z_i \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{i \in [m]}$, $\{c_j \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{j \in [m]}$. The public parameter is

$$\begin{aligned} \text{PP} &= ((N, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e), g, \mathbf{h} = (h_1 = g^{\beta_1}, \dots, h_9 = g^{\beta_9}), X_3, \\ &\quad \{E_i = e(g, g)^{\alpha_i}, G_i = g^{r_i}, Z_i = g^{z_i}\}_{i \in [m]}, \{H_j = g^{c_j}\}_{j \in [m]}). \end{aligned}$$

The master secret key is $\text{MSK} = (\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_m, r_1, \dots, r_m, c_1, \dots, c_m)$.
A counter $ctr = 0$ is implicitly included in MSK.

$\text{KeyGen}_A(\text{PP}, \text{MSK}, \mathbf{u} \in (\mathbb{Z}_N)^*) \rightarrow \text{SK}_{(i,j),\mathbf{u}}$. Set $\text{ctr} = \text{ctr} + 1$ and compute the corresponding index in the form of (i, j) where $1 \leq i, j \leq m$ and $(i-1) * m + j = \text{ctr}$. Let $l = |\mathbf{u}|$, and parse $\mathbf{u} = (u_1, \dots, u_l)$. Pick random $\boldsymbol{\delta} = (\delta_1, \delta_2, \xi_0, \xi_1, \dots, \xi_l) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{3+l}$, $\mathbf{R} = (R_0, R_1, \dots, R_4, R_{5,0}, \{R_{5,k}, R_{6,k}\}_{k \in [l]}) \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}^{6+2l}$, and $R'_0 \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$. Output a secret key $\text{SK}_{(i,j),\mathbf{u}}$ as

$$\begin{aligned} \text{SK}_{(i,j),\mathbf{u}} = & \left((i, j), \mathbf{u}, \right. \\ & K_0 = g^{r_i c_j + \alpha_i} h_1^{\delta_1} h_2^{\delta_2} \cdot R_0, \quad K_1 = g^{\delta_1} \cdot R_1, \quad K_2 = g^{\delta_2} \cdot R_2, \\ & K_3 = h_3^{-\delta_1} h_4^{\xi_1} \cdot R_3, \quad K_4 = h_5^{\xi_0} \cdot R_4, \quad K_{5,0} = g^{\xi_0} \cdot R_{5,0}, \\ & \{K_{5,k} = g^{\xi_k} \cdot R_{5,k}, \quad K_{6,k} = (h_6 h_7^{u_k})^{\xi_{k-1}} (h_8 h_9^{u_k})^{\xi_k} \cdot R_{6,k}\}_{k \in [l]}, \\ & \left. K'_0 = Z_i^{\delta_1} \cdot R'_0 \right). \end{aligned}$$

$\text{Encrypt}_A(\text{PP}, M, \mathbb{M}, (\bar{i}, \bar{j})) \rightarrow CT_{\mathbb{M}}$.

1. For any DFA $\mathbb{M} = (Q, \mathbb{Z}_N, \mathcal{J}, q_0, F = \{q_{n-1}\})$ where $n = |Q|$, let $J = |\mathcal{J}|$, and parse $\mathcal{J} = \{(q_{x_t}, q_{y_t}, \sigma_t) | t \in [1, J]\}$. Pick random $\boldsymbol{\pi} = (\pi, \bar{\pi}, \pi_0, \pi_1, \dots, \pi_J, \{\nu_x\}_{q_x \in Q \setminus \{q_{n-1}\}}) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{2+J+n}$ and implicitly set $\nu_{n-1} := \beta_4 \bar{\pi}$. Set

$$\begin{aligned} P_1 = g^\pi, \quad P_2 = g^{\beta_2 \pi}, \quad P_3 = g^{\beta_1 \pi} g^{\beta_3 \bar{\pi}}, \\ P_4 = g^{\bar{\pi}}, \quad P_5 = g^{\pi_0}, \quad P_6 = g^{-\nu_0} h_5^{\pi_0}, \\ \{P_{7,t} = g^{\pi_t}, \quad P_{8,t} = g^{\nu_{x_t}} (h_6 h_7^{\sigma_t})^{\pi_t}, \quad P_{9,t} = g^{-\nu_{y_t}} (h_8 h_9^{\sigma_t})^{\pi_t}\}_{t \in [1, J]}. \end{aligned}$$

Note that for $t \in [1, J]$, if $x_t = n-1$, then $P_{8,t}$ is computed as $P_{8,t} = h_4^{\bar{\pi}} (h_6 h_7^{\sigma_t})^{\pi_t}$; if $y_t = n-1$, then $P_{9,t}$ is computed as $P_{9,t} = h_4^{-\bar{\pi}} (h_8 h_9^{\sigma_t})^{\pi_t}$.

2. Pick random

$$\begin{aligned} \kappa, \tau, s_1, \dots, s_m, t_1, \dots, t_m \in \mathbb{Z}_N, \\ \mathbf{v}_c, \mathbf{w}_1, \dots, \mathbf{w}_m \in \mathbb{Z}_N^3. \end{aligned}$$

Pick random $r_x, r_y, r_z \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and set $\boldsymbol{\chi}_1 = (r_x, 0, r_z)$, $\boldsymbol{\chi}_2 = (0, r_y, r_z)$, $\boldsymbol{\chi}_3 = \boldsymbol{\chi}_1 \times \boldsymbol{\chi}_2 = (-r_y r_z, -r_x r_z, r_x r_y)$. Pick random

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{v}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_N^3 \quad \forall i \in \{1, \dots, \bar{i}\}, \\ \mathbf{v}_i \in \text{span}\{\boldsymbol{\chi}_1, \boldsymbol{\chi}_2\} \quad \forall i \in \{\bar{i} + 1, \dots, m\}. \end{aligned}$$

For each row $i \in [m]$:

– if $i < \bar{i}$: randomly choose $\hat{s}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, and set

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{R}_i = g^{\mathbf{v}_i}, \quad \mathbf{R}'_i = g^{\kappa \mathbf{v}_i}, \quad Q_i = g^{s_i}, \quad Q_{i,1} = (g^{\beta_1})^{s_i} Z_i^{t_i} (g^{\beta_1})^\pi, \quad Q_{i,2} = (g^{\beta_2})^{s_i}, \\ Q'_i = g^{t_i}, \quad T_i = E_i^{\hat{s}_i}. \end{aligned}$$

– if $i \geq \bar{i}$: set

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{R}_i = G_i^{s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, \quad \mathbf{R}'_i = G_i^{\kappa s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, \quad Q_i = g^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}, \quad Q_{i,1} = (g^{\beta_1})^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)} Z_i^{t_i} (g^{\beta_1})^\pi, \quad Q_{i,2} = (g^{\beta_2})^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}, \\ Q'_i = g^{t_i}, \quad T_i = M \cdot E_i^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}. \end{aligned}$$

For each column $j \in [m]$:

– if $j < \bar{j}$: randomly choose $\mu_j \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, and set $\mathbf{C}_j = H_j^{\tau(\mathbf{v}_c + \mu_j \boldsymbol{\chi}_3)} \cdot g^{\kappa \mathbf{w}_j}$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = g^{\mathbf{w}_j}$.

– if $j \geq \bar{j}$: set $\mathbf{C}_j = H_j^{\tau \mathbf{v}_c} \cdot g^{\kappa \mathbf{w}_j}$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = g^{\mathbf{w}_j}$.

3. Output the ciphertext $CT_{\mathbb{M}} = \langle \mathbb{M}, (P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4, P_5, P_6, \{P_{7,t}, P_{8,t}, P_{9,t}\}_{t \in [1, J]}), (\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{R}'_i, Q_i, Q_{i,1}, Q_{i,2}, Q'_i, T_i)_{i=1}^m, (\mathbf{C}_j, \mathbf{C}'_j)_{j=1}^m \rangle$.

Decrypt_A(PP, CT_M, SK_{(i,j),u}) → M or ⊥. Parse CT_M to CT_M = (M, (P₁, P₂, P₃, P₄, P₅, P₆, {P_{7,t}, P_{8,t}, P_{9,t}}_{t∈[1,J]}, (R_i, R'_i, Q_i, Q_{i,1}, Q_{i,2}, Q'_i, T_i)^m_{i=1}, (C_j, C'_j)^m_{j=1}) and SK_{(i,j),u} to SK_{(i,j),u} = ((i, j), u, (K₀, K₁, K₂, K₃, K₄, K_{5,0}, {K_{5,k}, K_{6,k}}_{k∈[1,l]}, K'₀), where M = (Q, Z_N, J, q₀, F = {q_{n-1}}) with n = |Q|, J = |J|, J = {q_{x_t}, q_{y_t}, σ_t}_{t∈[1,J]}, and u = (u₁, ..., u_l). Suppose M accepts u (if M does not accept u, output ⊥).

1. Find a sequence of states ρ₀, ρ₁, ..., ρ_l ∈ Q such that ρ₀ = q₀, for k = 1 to l we have (ρ_{k-1}, ρ_k, u_k) ∈ J, and ρ_l ∈ F. Let (q_{x_{t_k}}, q_{y_{t_k}}, σ_{t_k}) = (ρ_{k-1}, ρ_k, u_k). Compute

$$\begin{aligned}
D_T &\leftarrow \prod_{k \in [1,l]} \frac{e(K_{5,k-1}, P_{8,t_k}) \cdot e(K_{5,k}, P_{9,t_k})}{e(K_{6,k}, P_{7,t_k})} \\
&= \prod_{k \in [1,l]} \frac{e(g^{\xi_{k-1}}, g^{\nu_{x_{t_k}}} (h_6 h_7^{\sigma_{t_k}})^{\pi_{t_k}}) \cdot e(g^{\xi_k}, g^{-\nu_{y_{t_k}}} (h_8 h_9^{\sigma_{t_k}})^{\pi_{t_k}})}{e((h_6 h_7^{u_k})^{\xi_{k-1}} (h_8 h_9^{u_k})^{\xi_k}, g^{\pi_{t_k}})} \\
&= \prod_{k \in [1,l]} e(g^{\xi_{k-1}}, g^{\nu_{x_{t_k}}}) \cdot e(g^{\xi_k}, g^{-\nu_{y_{t_k}}}) \quad (\text{since } \sigma_{t_k} = u_k) \\
&= e(g^{\xi_0}, g^{\nu_{x_{t_1}}}) \cdot e(g^{\xi_l}, g^{-\nu_{y_{t_l}}}) \quad (\text{since } y_{t_k} = x_{t_{k+1}} \text{ for } k = 1, \dots, l-1) \\
&= e(g^{\xi_0}, g^{\nu_0}) \cdot e(g^{\xi_l}, g^{-\nu_{n-1}}) \quad (\text{since } x_{t_1} = 0, y_{t_l} = n-1) \\
&= e(g^{\xi_0}, g^{\nu_0}) \cdot e(g^{\xi_l}, h_4^{-\bar{\pi}}).
\end{aligned}$$

Compute

$$\begin{aligned}
D_P &\leftarrow \frac{e(K_1, P_3) \cdot e(K_3, P_4) \cdot e(K_{5,0}, P_6) \cdot D_T}{e(K_4, P_5)} \\
&= \frac{e(g^{\delta_1}, g^{\beta_1 \pi} g^{\beta_3 \bar{\pi}}) \cdot e(h_3^{-\delta_1} h_4^{\xi_l}, g^{\bar{\pi}}) \cdot e(g^{\xi_0}, g^{-\nu_0} h_5^{\pi_0}) \cdot e(g^{\xi_0}, g^{\nu_0}) \cdot e(g^{\xi_l}, h_4^{-\bar{\pi}})}{e(h_5^{\xi_0}, g^{\pi_0})} \\
&= e(g^{\delta_1}, g^{\beta_1 \pi}).
\end{aligned}$$

2. Compute

$$D_I \leftarrow \frac{e(K_0, Q_i) \cdot e(K'_0, Q'_i)}{e(K_1, Q_{i,1}) \cdot e(K_2, Q_{i,2})} \cdot \frac{e_3(\mathbf{R}'_i, \mathbf{C}'_j)}{e_3(\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{C}_j)}.$$

3. Computes M ← T_i/(D_P · D_I) as the output message.

E.2 Proof of Lemma 1

Proof. Suppose there exists a polynomial time adversary \mathcal{A} that selectively breaks the index-hiding game with advantage ϵ . We build a PPT algorithm \mathcal{B} to solve a Modified (n, J)-EDHE2-Dual problem instance in a subgroup as follows. \mathcal{B} is given

$$\begin{aligned}
D = & \left((N, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e), g, g^a, g^b, g^{b/z}, g^{a^{n-1}bc/z}, g_2, g_3, \right. \\
& \forall_{i \in [1,n], j, j' \in [1,J], j \neq j'} \quad g^{a^i/d_j^2}, g^{a^i b/d_j}, g^{d_j}, g^{a^i d_j/d_{j'}^2}, g^{a^i b d_j/d_{j'}}, g^{a^i/d_j^6}, g^{a^i d_j/d_{j'}^6}, \\
& \forall_{i \in [0, n-1], j \in [1,J]} \quad g^{a^i c}, g^{a^i b c d_j}, \\
& \forall_{i \in [0, n], j \in [1,J]} \quad g^{a^i b c d_j^5}, \\
& \forall_{i \in [1, 2n-1], j, j' \in [1,J], j \neq j'} \quad g^{a^i b c d_j/d_{j'}^2}, g^{a^i b c d_j^5/d_{j'}^6}, \\
& \forall_{i \in [1, 2n-1], i \neq n, j \in [1,J]} \quad g^{a^i b c/d_j}, \\
& \left. \forall_{i \in [1, 2n-1], j, j' \in [1,m]} \quad g^{a^i c/d_j^2}, g^{a^i b^2 c d_j/d_{j'}}, g^{a^i b c d_j/d_{j'}^6}, g^{a^i c/d_j^6}, g^{a^i b c d_j^5/d_{j'}^2}, g^{a^i b^2 c d_j^5/d_{j'}} \right)
\end{aligned}$$

and T, where (N = p₁p₂p₃, G, G_T, e) \xleftarrow{R} G, g \xleftarrow{R} G_{p₁}, g₂ \xleftarrow{R} G_{p₂}, g₃ \xleftarrow{R} G_{p₃}, a, b, c, z, d₁, ..., d_J \xleftarrow{R} Z_N, and T is either equal to g^{aⁿcz} or is a random element from G_{p₁}. \mathcal{B} 's goal is to determine T = g^{aⁿcz} or T is a random element from G_{p₁}.

Init. \mathcal{A} gives \mathcal{B} the challenge DFA $\mathbb{M}^* = \{Q^*, \mathbb{Z}_N, \mathcal{J}^*, q_0, q_{n-1}\}$, where $n = |Q^*|$, let $J = |\mathcal{J}^*|$, and parse $\mathcal{J} = \{(q_{x_1}, q_{y_1}, \sigma_1^*), \dots, (q_{x_J}, q_{y_J}, \sigma_J^*)\}$.

Setup. \mathcal{B} randomly chooses $\{\alpha_i \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{i \in [m]}$, $\{r_i, z'_i \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{i \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{i}\}}$, $r'_i, z_i \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, $\{c'_j \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{j \in [m]}$, and $\beta'_1, \beta_2, \beta'_3, \beta'_4, \beta'_5, \beta'_6, \beta'_7, \beta'_8, \beta'_9 \in \mathbb{Z}_N$. \mathcal{B} gives \mathcal{A} the public parameter PP:

$$\begin{aligned} & \left(g, h_1 = (g^a)^{\beta'_1}, h_2 = g^{\beta_2}, h_3 = (g^a)^{\beta'_3}, h_4 = (g^a)^{\beta'_4}, h_5 = g^{\beta'_5} \cdot g^{a^n b/d_1}, \right. \\ & h_6 = g^{\beta'_6} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} g^{\sigma_t^* a^{n-x_t}/d_t^2} g^{-a^{n-x_t} b/d_t} \right), h_7 = g^{\beta'_7} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} g^{-a^{n-x_t}/d_t^2} \right), \\ & h_8 = g^{\beta'_8} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} g^{-\sigma_t^* a^{n-y_t}/d_t^6} g^{a^{n-y_t} b/d_t} \right), h_9 = g^{\beta'_9} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} g^{a^{n-y_t}/d_t^6} \right), \\ & \{E_i = e(g, g)^{\alpha_i}\}_{i \in [m]}, \\ & \{G_i = g^{r_i}, Z_i = (g^a)^{z'_i}\}_{i \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{i}\}}, \{H_j = (g^{b/z})^{c'_j}\}_{j \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{j}\}}, G_{\bar{i}} = (g^{a^{n-1}c})^{r'_i}, Z_{\bar{i}} = g^{z_i}, H_{\bar{j}} = (g^a)^{c'_j} \Big). \end{aligned}$$

Note that \mathcal{B} implicitly chooses $r_{\bar{i}}, z_i (i \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{i}\}), c_j (j \in [m]), \beta_1, \beta_3, \beta_4, \beta_5, \beta_6, \beta_7, \beta_8, \beta_9 \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ such that

$$\begin{aligned} & a^{n-1} c r'_i \equiv r_{\bar{i}} \pmod{p_1}, a z'_i \equiv z_i \pmod{p_1} \quad \forall i \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{i}\}, \\ & a c'_j \equiv c_{\bar{j}} \pmod{p_1}, (b/z) c'_j \equiv c_j \pmod{p_1} \quad \forall j \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{j}\}, \\ & a \beta'_1 \equiv \beta_1 \pmod{p_1}, a \beta'_3 \equiv \beta_3 \pmod{p_1}, a \beta'_4 \equiv \beta_4 \pmod{p_1}, \beta'_5 + a^n b/d_1 \equiv \beta_5 \pmod{p_1}, \\ & \beta'_6 + \sum_{t \in [1, J]} (\sigma_t^* a^{n-x_t}/d_t^2 - a^{n-x_t} b/d_t) \equiv \beta_6 \pmod{p_1}, \beta'_7 + \sum_{t \in [1, J]} (-a^{n-x_t}/d_t^2) \equiv \beta_7 \pmod{p_1}, \\ & \beta'_8 + \sum_{t \in [1, J]} (-\sigma_t^* a^{n-y_t}/d_t^6 + a^{n-y_t} b/d_t) \equiv \beta_8 \pmod{p_1}, \beta'_9 + \sum_{t \in [1, J]} (a^{n-y_t}/d_t^6) \equiv \beta_9 \pmod{p_1}. \end{aligned}$$

Query Phase. To respond to \mathcal{A} 's query for $((i, j), \mathbf{u})$, let $l = |\mathbf{u}|$, and parse $\mathbf{u} = (u_1, \dots, u_l)$,

- if $(i, j) \neq (\bar{i}, \bar{j})$: \mathcal{B} picks random $\delta = (\delta_1, \delta_2, \xi_0, \xi_1, \dots, \xi_l) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{3+l}$, $\mathbf{R} = (R_0, R_1, \dots, R_4, R_{5,0}, \{R_{5,k}, R_{6,k}\}_{k \in [l]}) \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}^{6+2l}$, and $R'_0 \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$. \mathcal{B} creates a secret key $\text{SK}_{(i,j), \mathbf{u}}$:

$$\begin{aligned} K_0 &= \begin{cases} g^{\alpha_i} (g^{b/z})^{r_i c'_j} \cdot h_1^{\delta_1} h_2^{\delta_2} \cdot R_0, & : i \neq \bar{i}, j \neq \bar{j} \\ g^{\alpha_i} (g^{a^{n-1} b c/z})^{r'_i c'_j} \cdot h_1^{\delta_1} h_2^{\delta_2} \cdot R_0, & : i = \bar{i}, j \neq \bar{j} \\ g^{\alpha_i} (g^a)^{r_i c'_j} \cdot h_1^{\delta_1} h_2^{\delta_2} \cdot R_0, & : i \neq \bar{i}, j = \bar{j}. \end{cases} \\ K_1 &= g^{\delta_1} \cdot R_1, \quad K_2 = g^{\delta_2} \cdot R_2, \quad K'_0 = Z_{\bar{i}}^{\delta_1} \cdot R'_0, \\ K_3 &= h_3^{-\delta_1} h_4^{\xi_1} \cdot R_3, \quad K_4 = h_5^{\xi_0} \cdot R_4, \quad K_{5,0} = g^{\xi_0} \cdot R_{5,0}, \\ \{K_{5,k} &= g^{\xi_k} \cdot R_{5,k}, \quad K_{6,k} = (h_6 h_7^{u_k})^{\xi_{k-1}} (h_8 h_9^{u_k})^{\xi_k} \cdot R_{6,k}\}_{k \in [1, l]}. \end{aligned}$$

- if $(i, j) = (\bar{i}, \bar{j})$: it implies that \mathcal{A} is querying a secret key with the challenge index (\bar{i}, \bar{j}) , and \mathbb{M}^* does not accept \mathbf{u} . We denote by \mathbf{u}_k the vector formed by the last $l-k$ symbol of \mathbf{u} . That is $\mathbf{u}_k = (u_{k+1}, \dots, u_l)$. Hence $\mathbf{u}_0 = \mathbf{u}$ and \mathbf{u}_l is the empty string. For $q_i \in \{q_0, \dots, q_{n-1}\} = Q$, let \mathbb{M}_i^* be the same DFA as \mathbb{M}^* except that the start state is set to q_i . Then for each $k \in [0, l]$ we define $U_k = \{i \in [0, n-1] \mid \mathbb{M}_i^* \text{ accepts } \mathbf{u}_k\}$. From this and the query restriction that \mathbb{M}^* does not accept \mathbf{u} , we have $0 \notin U_0$. Due to the WLOG condition, we have $U_l = \{n-1\}$. \mathcal{B} picks random $\delta = (\delta'_1, \delta_2, \xi'_0, \xi'_1, \dots, \xi'_l) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{3+l}$, $\mathbf{R} = (R_0, R_1, \dots, R_4, R_{5,0}, \{R_{5,k}, R_{6,k}\}_{k \in [l]}) \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}^{6+2l}$, and $R'_0 \in \mathbb{G}_{p_3}$.

\mathcal{B} sets the values of $\delta_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, $\mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{Z}_N^n$, $\{\xi_k \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{k \in [l]}$ by implicitly setting

$$\begin{aligned} \delta_1 &= \delta'_1 - a^{n-1} c r'_i c'_j / \beta'_1, \\ \xi_0 &= \xi'_0 - r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4) \left(\sum_{i \in U_0} a^i c \right) \left(1 + (b \sum_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ \text{s.t. } \sigma_t^* \neq u_1}} d_t / (\sigma_t^* - u_1)) \right), \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\forall k \in [1, l-1] : \xi_k &= \xi'_k - r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4) \left(\sum_{i \in U_k} a^i c \right) \left(1 + \left(b \sum_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_{k+1}}} d_t / (\sigma_t^* - u_{k+1}) \right) \right. \\
&\quad \left. + \left(b \sum_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_k}} d_t^5 / (\sigma_t^* - u_k) \right) \right), \\
\xi_l &= \xi'_l - r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4) \left(\sum_{i \in U_l} a^i c \right) \left(1 + \left(b \sum_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_l}} d_t^5 / (\sigma_t^* - u_l) \right) \right),
\end{aligned}$$

\mathcal{B} creates a secret key $\text{SK}_{(\bar{i}, \bar{j}), \mathbf{u}}$ as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
K_0 &= g^{\alpha_i} h_1^{\delta'_1} h_2^{\delta_2} \cdot R_0, \quad K_1 = g^{\delta'_1} (g^{a^{n-1}c})^{-r'_i c'_j / \beta'_1} \cdot R_1, \quad K_2 = g^{\delta_2} \cdot R_2, \quad K'_0 = (K_1)^{z_i} \cdot R'_0, \\
K_3 &= h_3^{-\delta_1} h_4^{\xi_l} \cdot R_3 \\
&= h_3^{-\delta'_1} h_4^{\xi'_l} \cdot (g^{a\beta'_3})^{a^{n-1} r'_i c'_j / \beta'_1} \cdot (g^{a\beta'_4})^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_l} a^i c \right) \left(1 + \left(b \sum_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_l}} d_t^5 / (\sigma_t^* - u_l) \right) \right) \cdot R_3 \\
&= h_3^{-\delta'_1} h_4^{\xi'_l} \cdot (g^{a^n c})^{r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / \beta'_1} \cdot (g^{a\beta'_4})^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4) a^{n-1}} \left(1 + \left(b \sum_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_l}} d_t^5 / (\sigma_t^* - u_l) \right) \right) \cdot R_3 \\
&\quad (\text{since } U_l = \{n-1\}) \\
&= h_3^{-\delta'_1} h_4^{\xi'_l} \cdot (g^{a^n c})^{r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / \beta'_1} \cdot (g^{a^n c})^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / \beta'_1} \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_l}} (g^{a^n b c d_t^5})^{1 / (\sigma_t^* - u_l)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / \beta'_1} \cdot R_3 \\
&= h_3^{-\delta'_1} h_4^{\xi'_l} \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_l}} (g^{a^n b c d_t^5})^{1 / (\sigma_t^* - u_l)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / \beta'_1} \cdot R_3, \\
K_4 &= h_5^{\xi_0} \cdot R_4 \\
&= h_5^{\xi'_0} \cdot (g^{\beta'_5} \cdot g^{a^n b / d_1})^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_0} a^i c \right) \\
&\quad \cdot (g^{\beta'_5} \cdot g^{a^n b / d_1})^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_0} a^i c \right) \left(\left(b \sum_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_1}} d_t / (\sigma_t^* - u_1) \right) \right) \cdot R_4 \\
&= h_5^{\xi'_0} \cdot \left(\prod_{i \in U_0} g^{a^i c} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 \beta'_5 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{i \in U_0} g^{a^{n+i} b c / d_1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\text{note that } 0 \notin U_0} \\
&\quad \cdot \left(\prod_{i \in U_0} \prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_1}} (g^{a^i b c d_t})^{1 / (\sigma_t^* - u_1)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 \beta'_5 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
&\quad \cdot \left(\prod_{i \in U_0} \prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_1}} (g^{a^{n+i} b^2 c d_t / d_1})^{1 / (\sigma_t^* - u_1)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot R_4 \\
K_{5,0} &= g^{\xi_0} \cdot R_{5,0} \\
&= g^{\xi'_0} \cdot g^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_0} a^i c \right) \cdot g^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_0} a^i c \right) \left(\left(b \sum_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_1}} d_t / (\sigma_t^* - u_1) \right) \right) \cdot R_{5,0}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= g^{\xi'_0} \cdot \left(\prod_{i \in U_0} g^{a^i c} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \left(\prod_{i \in U_0} \prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ \text{s.t. } \sigma_t^* \neq u_1}} (g^{a^i b c d_t})^{1/(\sigma_t^* - u_1)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot R_{5,0} \\
K_{5,k} &= g^{\xi_k} \cdot R_{5,k} \quad \text{for } k \in [1, l-1] \\
&= g^{\xi'_k - r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_k} a^i c \right) \left(1 + \left(b \sum_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ \text{s.t. } \sigma_t^* \neq u_{k+1}}} d_t / (\sigma_t^* - u_{k+1}) \right) + \left(b \sum_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ \text{s.t. } \sigma_t^* \neq u_k}} d_t^5 / (\sigma_t^* - u_k) \right) \right) \cdot R_{5,k} \\
&= g^{\xi'_k} \cdot \left(\prod_{i \in U_k} g^{a^i c} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \left(\prod_{i \in U_k} \prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ \text{s.t. } \sigma_t^* \neq u_{k+1}}} (g^{a^i b c d_t})^{1/(\sigma_t^* - u_{k+1})} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
&\quad \cdot \left(\prod_{i \in U_k} \prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ \text{s.t. } \sigma_t^* \neq u_k}} (g^{a^i b c d_t^5})^{1/(\sigma_t^* - u_k)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot R_{5,k}, \\
K_{5,l} &= g^{\xi_l} \cdot R_{5,l} \\
&= g^{\xi'_l - r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_l} a^i c \right) \left(1 + \left(b \sum_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ \text{s.t. } \sigma_t^* \neq u_l}} d_t^5 / (\sigma_t^* - u_l) \right) \right) \cdot R_{5,l} \\
&= g^{\xi'_l} \cdot \left(\prod_{i \in U_l} g^{a^i c} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \left(\prod_{i \in U_l} \prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ \text{s.t. } \sigma_t^* \neq u_l}} (g^{a^i b c d_t^5})^{1/(\sigma_t^* - u_l)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot R_{5,l},
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
K_{6,1} &= (h_6 h_7^{u_1})^{\xi_0} (h_8 h_9^{u_1})^{\xi_1} \cdot R_{6,1} \\
&= \underbrace{(h_6 h_7^{u_1})^{\xi'_0} (h_8 h_9^{u_1})^{\xi'_1}}_{\Psi_1} \\
&\quad \cdot \left(g^{\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 u_1} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} g^{(\sigma_t^* - u_1) a^{n-x_t} / d_t^2} g^{-a^{n-x_t} b / d_t} \right) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_0} a^i c \right) \\
&\quad \cdot \left(g^{\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 u_1} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} g^{(\sigma_t^* - u_1) a^{n-x_t} / d_t^2} g^{-a^{n-x_t} b / d_t} \right) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_0} a^i c \right) \left(\left(b \sum_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ \text{s.t. } \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_1}} d_{t'} / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_1) \right) \right) \\
&\quad \cdot \left(g^{\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 u_1} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} g^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_1) a^{n-y_t} / d_t^6} g^{a^{n-y_t} b / d_t} \right) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_1} a^i c \right) \\
&\quad \cdot \left(g^{\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 u_1} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} g^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_1) a^{n-y_t} / d_t^6} g^{a^{n-y_t} b / d_t} \right) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_1} a^i c \right) \left(\left(b \sum_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ \text{s.t. } \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_2}} d_{t'} / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_2) \right) \right) \\
&\quad \cdot \left(g^{\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 u_1} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} g^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_1) a^{n-y_t} / d_t^6} g^{a^{n-y_t} b / d_t} \right) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_1} a^i c \right) \left(\left(b \sum_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ \text{s.t. } \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_1}} d_{t'}^5 / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_1) \right) \right) \cdot R_{6,1} \\
&= \underbrace{\Psi_1}_{\Psi_2} \cdot \left(\prod_{i \in U_0} g^{a^i c} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 (\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 u_1) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_0} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} c / d_t^2})^{(\sigma_t^* - u_1)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_3} \\
&\quad \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_0} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} b c / d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{i \in U_0} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_1}} (g^{a^i b c d_{t'}})^{1/(\sigma_{t'}^* - u_1)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 (\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 u_1) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_4} \\
& \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_0} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_1}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} b c d_{t'} / d_t^2})^{(\sigma_t^* - u_1) / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_1)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_0} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_1}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} b^2 c d_{t'} / d_t})^{-1/(\sigma_{t'}^* - u_1)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_5} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{i \in U_1} g^{a^i c} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 (\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 u_1) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_6} \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_1} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i} c / d_t^6})^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_1)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_7} \\
& \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_1} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i} b c / d_t}) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{i \in U_1} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_2}} (g^{a^i b c d_{t'}})^{1/(\sigma_{t'}^* - u_2)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 (\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 u_1) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_8} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_1} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_2}} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i} b c d_{t'} / d_t^6})^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_1) / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_2)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_9} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_1} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_2}} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i} b^2 c d_{t'} / d_t})^{1/(\sigma_{t'}^* - u_2)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_{10}} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{i \in U_1} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_1}} (g^{a^i b c d_{t'}^5})^{1/(\sigma_{t'}^* - u_1)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 (\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 u_1) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_{11}} \\
& \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_1} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_1}} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i} b c d_{t'}^5 / d_t^6})^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_1) / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_1)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_1} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_1}} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i} b^2 c d_{t'}^5 / d_t})^{1/(\sigma_{t'}^* - u_1)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_{12}} \cdot R_{6,1} \\
& = \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3 \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_0} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} b c / d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \Psi_4
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_0} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_1}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i}bcd_{t'}/d_t^2})^{(\sigma_t^*-u_1)/(\sigma_{t'}^*-u_1)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \cdot \Psi_5 \cdot \Psi_6 \cdot \Psi_7 \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_1} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i}bc/d_t}) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \Psi_8 \cdot \Psi_9 \cdot \Psi_{10} \cdot \Psi_{11} \\
& \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_1} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_1}} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i}bcd_{t'}^5/d_t^6})^{-(\sigma_t^*-u_1)/(\sigma_{t'}^*-u_1)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \cdot \Psi_{12} \cdot R_{6,1} \\
= & \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3 \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_0} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i}bc/d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \Psi_4 \\
& \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{\substack{i \in U_0 \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_1}} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_1}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i}bcd_{t'}/d_t^2})^{(\sigma_t^*-u_1)/(\sigma_{t'}^*-u_1)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \cdot \Psi_5 \cdot \Psi_6 \cdot \Psi_7 \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_1} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i}bc/d_t}) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \Psi_8 \cdot \Psi_9 \cdot \Psi_{10} \cdot \Psi_{11} \\
& \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{\substack{i \in U_1 \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_1}} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_1}} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i}bcd_{t'}^5/d_t^6})^{-(\sigma_t^*-u_1)/(\sigma_{t'}^*-u_1)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \cdot \Psi_{12} \cdot R_{6,1} \\
= & \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3 \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{\substack{i \in U_0 \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_1}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i}bc/d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Delta_0^{-1}, \text{ for } \sigma_t^* \neq u_1} \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{\substack{i \in U_0 \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_1}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i}bc/d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\text{for } \sigma_t^* = u_1} \cdot \Psi_4 \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{\substack{i \in U_0 \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_1}} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_1, t' \neq t}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i}bcd_{t'}/d_t^2})^{(\sigma_t^*-u_1)/(\sigma_{t'}^*-u_1)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_{13}, \text{ for } t' \neq t} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{\substack{i \in U_0 \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_1}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i}bcd_t/d_t^2})^{(\sigma_t^*-u_1)/(\sigma_t^*-u_1)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Delta_0, \text{ for } t'=t} \\
& \cdot \Psi_5 \cdot \Psi_6 \cdot \Psi_7 \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{\substack{i \in U_1 \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_1}} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i}bc/d_t}) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Delta_1, \text{ for } \sigma_t^* \neq u_1} \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{\substack{i \in U_1 \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_1}} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i}bc/d_t}) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\text{for } \sigma_t^* = u_1} \\
& \cdot \Psi_8 \cdot \Psi_9 \cdot \Psi_{10} \cdot \Psi_{11}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_1}} \prod_{i \in U_1} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_1, t' \neq t}} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i} b c d_t^5 / d_t^6})^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_1) / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_1)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_{14}, \text{ for } t' \neq t} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_1}} \prod_{i \in U_1} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i} b c d_t^5 / d_t^6})^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_1) / (\sigma_t^* - u_1)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Delta_1^{-1}, \text{ for } t'=t} \\
& \cdot \Psi_{12} \cdot R_{6,1} \\
= & \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3 \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_1}} \prod_{\substack{i \in U_0 \\ s.t. i \neq x_t}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} b c / d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_{15}, \text{ for } i \neq x_t} \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_1}} \prod_{\substack{i \in U_0 \\ s.t. i = x_t}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} b c / d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\text{for } i = x_t \text{ (if } x_t \in U_0)} \\
& \cdot \Psi_4 \cdot \Psi_{13} \cdot \Psi_5 \cdot \Psi_6 \cdot \Psi_7 \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_1}} \prod_{\substack{i \in U_1 \\ s.t. i \neq y_t}} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i} b c / d_t}) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_{16}, \text{ for } i \neq y_t} \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_1}} \prod_{\substack{i \in U_1 \\ s.t. i = y_t}} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i} b c / d_t}) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\text{for } i = y_t \text{ (if } y_t \in U_1)} \\
& \cdot \Psi_8 \cdot \Psi_9 \cdot \Psi_{10} \cdot \Psi_{11} \cdot \Psi_{14} \cdot \Psi_{12} \cdot R_{6,1} \\
= & \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3 \cdot \Psi_{15} \cdot \Psi_4 \cdot \Psi_{13} \cdot \Psi_5 \cdot \Psi_6 \cdot \Psi_7 \cdot \Psi_{16} \cdot \Psi_8 \cdot \Psi_9 \cdot \Psi_{10} \cdot \Psi_{11} \cdot \Psi_{14} \cdot \Psi_{12} \cdot R_{6,1} \\
& \text{(since for } t \in [1, J] \text{ such that } \sigma_t^* = u_1, \text{ we have } (x_t \in U_0 \wedge y_t \in U_1) \text{ or } (x_t \notin U_0 \wedge y_t \notin U_1).)
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
K_{6,k} &= (h_6 h_7^{u_k})^{\xi_{k-1}} (h_8 h_9^{u_k})^{\xi_k} \cdot R_{6,k} \quad \text{for } k \in [2, l-1] \\
= & (h_6 h_7^{u_k})^{\xi_{k-1}} (h_8 h_9^{u_k})^{\xi_k} \\
& \cdot \left(g^{\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 u_k} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} g^{(\sigma_t^* - u_k) a^{n-x_t} / d_t^2} g^{-a^{n-x_t} b / d_t} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_{k-1}} a^i c \right) \right) \\
& \cdot \left(g^{\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 u_k} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} g^{(\sigma_t^* - u_k) a^{n-x_t} / d_t^2} g^{-a^{n-x_t} b / d_t} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_{k-1}} a^i c \right) \left(\left(b \sum_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_k}} d_{t'} / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_k) \right) \right) \right) \\
& \cdot \left(g^{\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 u_k} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} g^{(\sigma_t^* - u_k) a^{n-x_t} / d_t^2} g^{-a^{n-x_t} b / d_t} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_{k-1}} a^i c \right) \left(\left(b \sum_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_{k-1}}} d_{t'}^5 / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_{k-1}) \right) \right) \right) \\
& \cdot \left(g^{\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 u_k} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} g^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_k) a^{n-y_t} / d_t^6} g^{a^{n-y_t} b / d_t} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_k} a^i c \right) \right) \\
& \cdot \left(g^{\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 u_k} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} g^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_k) a^{n-y_t} / d_t^6} g^{a^{n-y_t} b / d_t} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_k} a^i c \right) \left(\left(b \sum_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_{k+1}}} d_{t'} / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_{k+1}) \right) \right) \right)
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \cdot \left(g^{\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 u_k} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} g^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_k) a^{n-y_t} / d_t^6} g^{a^{n-y_t} b / d_t} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_k} a^i c \right) \left(\left(b \sum_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_k}} d_{t'}^5 / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_k) \right) \right) \right) \cdot R_{6,k} \\
& = \underbrace{(h_6 h_7^{u_k})^{\xi'_{k-1}} (h_8 h_9^{u_k})^{\xi'_k}}_{\Psi_1} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{i \in U_{k-1}} g^{a^i c} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 (\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 u_k) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_2} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_{k-1}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} c / d_t^2})^{(\sigma_t^* - u_k)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_3} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_{k-1}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} bc / d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_4} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{i \in U_{k-1}} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_k}} (g^{a^i b c d_{t'}})^{1 / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_k)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 (\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 u_k) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_4} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_{k-1}} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_k}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} b c d_{t'}} / d_t^2)^{(\sigma_t^* - u_k) / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_k)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_5} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_{k-1}} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_k}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} b^2 c d_{t'}} / d_t)^{-1 / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_k)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_5} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{i \in U_{k-1}} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_{k-1}}} (g^{a^i b c d_{t'}^5})^{1 / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_{k-1})} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 (\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 u_k) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_6} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_{k-1}} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_{k-1}}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} b c d_{t'}^5 / d_t^2})^{(\sigma_t^* - u_k) / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_{k-1})} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} b^2 c d_{t'}^5 / d_t})^{-1 / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_{k-1})} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_7} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{i \in U_k} g^{a^i c} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 (\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 u_k) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_8} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_k} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i} c / d_t^6})^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_k)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_9} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_k} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i} bc / d_t}) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_9}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{i \in U_k} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_{k+1}}} (g^{a^i b c d_{t'}})^{1/(\sigma_{t'}^* - u_{k+1})} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 (\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 u_k) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_{10}} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_k} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_{k+1}}} (g^{a^{n-yt+i} b c d_{t'}} / d_t^6)^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_k) / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_{k+1})} (g^{a^{n-yt+i} b^2 c d_{t'}} / d_t)^{1/(\sigma_{t'}^* - u_{k+1})} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_{11}} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{i \in U_k} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_k}} (g^{a^i b c d_{t'}^5})^{1/(\sigma_{t'}^* - u_k)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 (\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 u_k) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_{12}} \\
& \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_k} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_k}} (g^{a^{n-yt+i} b c d_{t'}^5} / d_t^6)^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_k) / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_k)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_k} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_k}} (g^{a^{n-yt+i} b^2 c d_{t'}^5} / d_t)^{1/(\sigma_{t'}^* - u_k)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_{13}} \cdot R_{6,k} \\
& = \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3 \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_{k-1}} (g^{a^{n-xt+i} b c / d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \Psi_4 \\
& \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_{k-1}} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_k}} (g^{a^{n-xt+i} b c d_{t'}} / d_t^2)^{(\sigma_t^* - u_k) / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_k)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \cdot \Psi_5 \cdot \Psi_6 \cdot \Psi_7 \cdot \Psi_8 \cdot \Psi_9 \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_k} (g^{a^{n-yt+i} b c / d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \Psi_{10} \cdot \Psi_{11} \cdot \Psi_{12} \\
& \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_k} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_k}} (g^{a^{n-yt+i} b c d_{t'}^5} / d_t^6)^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_k) / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_k)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \cdot \Psi_{13} \cdot R_{6,k} \\
& = \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3 \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{\substack{i \in U_{k-1} \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_k}} (g^{a^{n-xt+i} b c / d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{\substack{i \in U_{k-1} \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_k}} (g^{a^{n-xt+i} b c / d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \Psi_4 \\
& \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_{k-1}} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_k}} (g^{a^{n-xt+i} b c d_{t'}} / d_t^2)^{(\sigma_t^* - u_k) / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_k)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \cdot \Psi_5 \cdot \Psi_6 \cdot \Psi_7 \cdot \Psi_8 \cdot \Psi_9 \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{\substack{i \in U_k \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_k}} (g^{a^{n-yt+i} b c / d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_k}} \prod_{i \in U_k} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i}bc/d_t}) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \Psi_{10} \cdot \Psi_{11} \cdot \Psi_{12} \\
& \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_k}} \prod_{i \in U_k} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_k}} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i}bcd_{t'}^5/d_t^6})^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_k) / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_k)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \cdot \Psi_{13} \cdot R_{6,k} \\
= & \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3 \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_k}} \prod_{i \in U_{k-1}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i}bc/d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Delta_0^{-1}} \\
& \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_k}} \prod_{i \in U_{k-1}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i}bc/d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \Psi_4 \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_k}} \prod_{i \in U_{k-1}} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_k, t' \neq t}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i}bcd_{t'}/d_t^2})^{(\sigma_t^* - u_k) / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_k)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_{14}, \text{ for } t' \neq t} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_k}} \prod_{i \in U_{k-1}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i}bcd_t/d_t^2})^{(\sigma_t^* - u_k) / (\sigma_t^* - u_k)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Delta_0, \text{ for } t'=t} \\
& \cdot \Psi_5 \cdot \Psi_6 \cdot \Psi_7 \cdot \Psi_8 \cdot \Psi_9 \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_k}} \prod_{i \in U_k} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i}bc/d_t}) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Delta_1} \\
& \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_k}} \prod_{i \in U_k} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i}bc/d_t}) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \Psi_{10} \cdot \Psi_{11} \cdot \Psi_{12} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_k}} \prod_{i \in U_k} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_k, t' \neq t}} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i}bcd_{t'}^5/d_t^6})^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_k) / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_k)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_{15}, \text{ for } t' \neq t} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_k}} \prod_{i \in U_k} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i}bcd_t^5/d_t^6})^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_k) / (\sigma_t^* - u_k)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Delta_1^{-1}, \text{ for } t'=t} \\
& \cdot \Psi_{13} \cdot R_{6,k} \\
= & \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3 \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_k}} \prod_{i \in U_{k-1}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i}bc/d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \Psi_4 \cdot \Psi_{14}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \cdot \Psi_5 \cdot \Psi_6 \cdot \Psi_7 \cdot \Psi_8 \cdot \Psi_9 \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_k}} \prod_{i \in U_k} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i}bc/d_t}) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \Psi_{10} \cdot \Psi_{11} \cdot \Psi_{12} \cdot \Psi_{15} \cdot \Psi_{13} \cdot R_{6,k} \\
& = \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3 \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_k}} \prod_{\substack{i \in U_{k-1} \\ s.t. i \neq x_t}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i}bc/d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_{16}, \text{ for } i \neq x_t} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_k}} \prod_{\substack{i \in U_{k-1} \\ s.t. i = x_t}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i}bc/d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\text{for } i = x_t \text{ (if } x_t \in U_{k-1})} \cdot \Psi_4 \cdot \Psi_{14} \\
& \cdot \Psi_5 \cdot \Psi_6 \cdot \Psi_7 \cdot \Psi_8 \cdot \Psi_9 \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_k}} \prod_{\substack{i \in U_k \\ i \neq y_t}} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i}bc/d_t}) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_{17}, \text{ for } i \neq y_t} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_k}} \prod_{\substack{i \in U_k \\ i = y_t}} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i}bc/d_t}) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\text{for } i = y_t \text{ (if } y_t \in U_k)} \\
& \cdot \Psi_{10} \cdot \Psi_{11} \cdot \Psi_{12} \cdot \Psi_{15} \cdot \Psi_{13} \cdot R_{6,k} \\
& = \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3 \cdot \Psi_{16} \cdot \Psi_4 \cdot \Psi_{14} \cdot \Psi_5 \cdot \Psi_6 \cdot \Psi_7 \cdot \Psi_8 \cdot \Psi_9 \cdot \Psi_{17} \cdot \Psi_{10} \cdot \Psi_{11} \cdot \Psi_{12} \cdot \Psi_{15} \cdot \Psi_{13} \cdot R_{6,k}, \\
& \text{(since for } t \in [1, J] \text{ such that } \sigma_t^* = u_k, \text{ we have } (x_t \in U_{k-1} \wedge y_t \in U_k) \text{ or } (x_t \notin U_{k-1} \wedge y_t \notin U_k).)
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
K_{6,l} &= (h_6 h_7^{u_l})^{\xi_{l-1}} (h_8 h_9^{u_l})^{\xi_l} \cdot R_{6,l} \\
&= (h_6 h_7^{u_l})^{\xi'_{l-1}} (h_8 h_9^{u_l})^{\xi'_l} \\
& \cdot \left(g^{\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 u_l} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} g^{(\sigma_t^* - u_l) a^{n-x_t} / d_t^2} g^{-a^{n-x_t} b / d_t} \right) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_{l-1}} a^i c \right) \\
& \cdot \left(g^{\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 u_l} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} g^{(\sigma_t^* - u_l) a^{n-x_t} / d_t^2} g^{-a^{n-x_t} b / d_t} \right) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_{l-1}} a^i c \right) \left(\left(b \sum_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_l}} d_{t'} / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_l) \right) \right) \\
& \cdot \left(g^{\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 u_l} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} g^{(\sigma_t^* - u_l) a^{n-x_t} / d_t^2} g^{-a^{n-x_t} b / d_t} \right) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_{l-1}} a^i c \right) \left(\left(b \sum_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_{l-1}}} d_{t'}^5 / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_{l-1}) \right) \right) \\
& \cdot \left(g^{\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 u_l} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} g^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_l) a^{n-y_t} / d_t^6} g^{a^{n-y_t} b / d_t} \right) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_l} a^i c \right) \\
& \cdot \left(g^{\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 u_l} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} g^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_l) a^{n-y_t} / d_t^6} g^{a^{n-y_t} b / d_t} \right) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \left(\sum_{i \in U_l} a^i c \right) \left(\left(b \sum_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_l}} d_{t'}^5 / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_l) \right) \right) \cdot R_{6,l} \\
& = \underbrace{(h_6 h_7^{u_l})^{\xi'_{l-1}} (h_8 h_9^{u_l})^{\xi'_l}}_{\Psi_1}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{i \in U_{l-1}} g^{a^i c} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 (\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 u_i) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_2} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_{l-1}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} c / d_t^2})^{(\sigma_t^* - u_i)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_3} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_{l-1}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} bc / d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{i \in U_{l-1}} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_i}} (g^{a^i bcd_{t'}})^{1 / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_i)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 (\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 u_i) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_4} \\
& \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_{l-1}} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_i}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} bcd_{t'} / d_t^2})^{(\sigma_t^* - u_i) / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_i)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_{l-1}} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_i}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} b^2 cd_{t'} / d_t})^{-1 / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_i)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_5} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{i \in U_{l-1}} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_{l-1}}} (g^{a^i bcd_{t'}^5})^{1 / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_{l-1})} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 (\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 u_i) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_6} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_{l-1}} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_{l-1}}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} bcd_{t'}^5 / d_t^2})^{(\sigma_t^* - u_i) / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_{l-1})} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} b^2 cd_{t'}^5 / d_t})^{1 / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_{l-1})} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_7} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{i \in U_l} g^{a^i c} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 (\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 u_i) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_8} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_l} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i} c / d_t^6})^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_i)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_9} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_l} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i} bc / d_t}) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{i \in U_l} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_i}} (g^{a^i bcd_{t'}^5})^{1 / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_i)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 (\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 u_i) / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_{10}} \\
& \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_l} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_i}} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i} bcd_{t'}^5 / d_t^6})^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_i) / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_i)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_t} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_t}} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i} b^2 c d_{t'}^5 / d_t})^{1/(\sigma_{t'}^* - u_t)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_{11}} \cdot R_{6,l} \\
& = \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3 \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_{t-1}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} b c / d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \quad \cdot \Psi_4 \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_{t-1}} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_t}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} b c d_{t'} / d_t^2})^{(\sigma_t^* - u_t) / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_t)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \quad \cdot \Psi_5 \cdot \Psi_6 \cdot \Psi_7 \cdot \Psi_8 \cdot \Psi_9 \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_t} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i} b c / d_t}) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \quad \cdot \Psi_{10} \cdot \left(\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{i \in U_t} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_t}} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i} b c d_{t'}^5 / d_t^6})^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_t) / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_t)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \Psi_{11} \cdot R_{6,l} \\
& = \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3 \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_t}} \prod_{i \in U_{t-1}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} b c / d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \quad \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_t}} \prod_{i \in U_{t-1}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} b c / d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \quad \cdot \Psi_4 \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_t}} \prod_{i \in U_{t-1}} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_t}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} b c d_{t'} / d_t^2})^{(\sigma_t^* - u_t) / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_t)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \quad \cdot \Psi_5 \cdot \Psi_6 \cdot \Psi_7 \cdot \Psi_8 \cdot \Psi_9 \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_t}} \prod_{i \in U_t} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i} b c / d_t}) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \quad \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_t}} \prod_{i \in U_t} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i} b c / d_t}) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \quad \cdot \Psi_{10} \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_t}} \prod_{i \in U_t} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_t}} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i} b c d_{t'}^5 / d_t^6})^{-(\sigma_t^* - u_t) / (\sigma_{t'}^* - u_t)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \Psi_{11} \cdot R_{6,l} \\
& = \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3 \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_t}} \prod_{i \in U_{t-1}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} b c / d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Delta_0^{-1}} \\
& \quad \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_t}} \prod_{i \in U_{t-1}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i} b c / d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \cdot \Psi_4 \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_t}} \prod_{i \in U_{t-1}} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_t, t' \neq t}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i}bcd_{t'}/d_t^2})^{(\sigma_t^*-u_t)/(\sigma_{t'}^*-u_t)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_{12}, \text{ for } t' \neq t} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_t}} \prod_{i \in U_{t-1}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i}bcd_t/d_t^2})^{(\sigma_t^*-u_t)/(\sigma_t^*-u_t)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Delta_0, \text{ for } t'=t} \\
& \cdot \Psi_5 \cdot \Psi_6 \cdot \Psi_7 \cdot \Psi_8 \cdot \Psi_9 \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_t}} \prod_{i \in U_t} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i}bc/d_t}) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Delta_1} \\
& \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_t}} \prod_{i \in U_t} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i}bc/d_t}) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \\
& \cdot \Psi_{10} \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_t}} \prod_{i \in U_t} \prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_{t'}^* \neq u_t, t' \neq t}} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i}bcd_{t'}/d_t^6})^{-(\sigma_t^*-u_t)/(\sigma_{t'}^*-u_t)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_{13}, \text{ for } t' \neq t} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* \neq u_t}} \prod_{i \in U_t} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i}bcd_t^5/d_t^6})^{-(\sigma_t^*-u_t)/(\sigma_t^*-u_t)} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Delta_1^{-1}, \text{ for } t'=t} \cdot \Psi_{11} \cdot R_{6,t} \\
& = \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3 \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_t}} \prod_{i \in U_{t-1}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i}bc/d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \Psi_4 \cdot \Psi_{12} \\
& \cdot \Psi_5 \cdot \Psi_6 \cdot \Psi_7 \cdot \Psi_8 \cdot \Psi_9 \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_t}} \prod_{i \in U_t} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i}bc/d_t}) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)} \cdot \Psi_{10} \cdot \Psi_{13} \cdot \Psi_{11} \cdot R_{6,t} \\
& = \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3 \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_t}} \prod_{\substack{i \in U_{t-1} \\ i \neq x_t}} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i}bc/d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_{14}, \text{ for } i \neq x_t} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_t}} \prod_{i=x_t} (g^{a^{n-x_t+i}bc/d_t})^{-1} \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\text{for } i=x_t \text{ (if } x_t \in U_{t-1})} \cdot \Psi_4 \cdot \Psi_{12} \\
& \cdot \Psi_5 \cdot \Psi_6 \cdot \Psi_7 \cdot \Psi_8 \cdot \Psi_9 \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t \in [1, J] \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_t}} \prod_{\substack{i \in U_t \\ i \neq y_t}} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i}bc/d_t}) \right)^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\Psi_{15}, \text{ for } i \neq y_t}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\cdot \left(\underbrace{\prod_{t \in [1, J]} \prod_{\substack{i \in U_t \\ s.t. \sigma_t^* = u_i}} (g^{a^{n-y_t+i}bc/d_t})^{-r'_i c'_j \beta'_3 / (\beta'_1 \beta'_4)}}_{\text{for } i=y_t, (i \neq y_t \in U_t)} \cdot \Psi_{10} \cdot \Psi_{13} \cdot \Psi_{11} \cdot R_{6,l}$$

$$= \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3 \cdot \Psi_{14} \cdot \Psi_4 \cdot \Psi_{12} \cdot \Psi_5 \cdot \Psi_6 \cdot \Psi_7 \cdot \Psi_8 \cdot \Psi_9 \cdot \Psi_{15} \cdot \Psi_{10} \cdot \Psi_{13} \cdot \Psi_{11} \cdot R_{6,l}$$

(since for $t \in [1, J]$ such that $\sigma_t^* = u_l$, we have $(x_t \in U_{l-1} \wedge y_t \in U_l)$ or $(x_t \notin U_{l-1} \wedge y_t \notin U_l)$.)

Note that \mathcal{B} can calculate the values of $K_0, K_1, K_2, K'_0, K_3, K_4, K_{5,0}, \{K_{5,k}, K_{6,k}\}_{k \in [l]}$ using the suitable terms of the assumption.

Challenge. \mathcal{A} submits a message M . \mathcal{B} randomly chooses

$$\begin{aligned} \tau', s_1, \dots, s_{\bar{i}-1}, s'_{\bar{i}}, s_{\bar{i}+1}, \dots, s_m, t'_1, \dots, t'_{\bar{i}-1}, t'_{\bar{i}}, t'_{\bar{i}+1}, \dots, t'_m &\in \mathbb{Z}_N, \\ \mathbf{w}_1, \dots, \mathbf{w}_{\bar{j}-1}, \mathbf{w}'_{\bar{j}}, \dots, \mathbf{w}'_m &\in \mathbb{Z}_N^3, \\ \pi', \bar{\pi}', \pi'_0, \pi'_1, \dots, \pi'_J \in \mathbb{Z}_N, \{\nu'_x \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{q_x \in Q \setminus \{q_{n-1}\}} &\cdot \end{aligned}$$

\mathcal{B} randomly chooses $r_x, r_y, r_z \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and sets $\chi_1 = (r_x, 0, r_z), \chi_2 = (0, r_y, r_z), \chi_3 = \chi_1 \times \chi_2 = (-r_y r_z, -r_x r_z, r_x r_y)$. \mathcal{B} randomly chooses

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{v}_i &\in \mathbb{Z}_N^3 \quad \forall i \in \{1, \dots, \bar{i}-1\}, \\ \mathbf{v}_i^p &\in \text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2\}, \quad \mathbf{v}_i^q \in \text{span}\{\chi_3\}, \\ \mathbf{v}_i &\in \text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2\} \quad \forall i \in \{\bar{i}+1, \dots, m\}, \\ \mathbf{v}_c^p &\in \text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2\}, \quad \mathbf{v}_c^q = \nu_3 \chi_3 \in \text{span}\{\chi_3\}. \end{aligned}$$

\mathcal{B} sets the value of $\kappa, \tau, s_{\bar{i}}, t_{\bar{i}} (i \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{i}\}) \in \mathbb{Z}_N, \mathbf{v}_c, \mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}} \in \mathbb{Z}_N^3, \{\mathbf{w}_j \in \mathbb{Z}_N^3\}_{j=\bar{j}}^m, \pi, \bar{\pi}, \pi_0, \pi_1, \dots, \pi_J \in \mathbb{Z}_N, \{\nu'_x \in \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{q_x \in Q \setminus \{q_{n-1}\}}$ by implicitly setting

$$\begin{aligned} a^{n-1}c &\equiv \kappa \pmod{p_1}, \quad a^{n-1}c\tau' \equiv \tau \pmod{p_1}, \quad s'_{\bar{i}}/(a^{n-1}c) \equiv s_{\bar{i}} \pmod{p_1}, \\ t'_{\bar{i}} + b\beta'_1 \tau' s'_{\bar{i}}(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)/z'_i &\equiv t_{\bar{i}} \pmod{p_1} \quad \forall i \in \{1, \dots, \bar{i}-1\}, \\ t'_i - a^{n-1}c\beta'_1 \tau' s_i(\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p)/z'_i + b\beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)/z'_i &\equiv t_i \pmod{p_1} \quad \forall i \in \{\bar{i}+1, \dots, m\}, \\ \mathbf{v}_c &= \frac{1}{z} \mathbf{v}_c^p + \mathbf{v}_c^q, \quad \mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}} = \mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^p + \frac{b}{z} \mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q, \\ \mathbf{w}'_{\bar{j}} - ac'_j \tau' \mathbf{v}_c^p &\equiv \mathbf{w}_{\bar{j}} \pmod{p_1}, \\ \mathbf{w}'_j - bc'_j \tau' \mathbf{v}_c^q &\equiv \mathbf{w}_j \pmod{p_1} \quad \forall j \in \{\bar{j}+1, \dots, m\}, \\ \pi' - b\tau' s'_{\bar{i}}(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) &\equiv \pi \pmod{p_1}, \quad \bar{\pi}' + b\beta'_1 \tau' s'_{\bar{i}}(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)/\beta'_3 \equiv \bar{\pi} \pmod{p_1}, \\ \pi'_0 + d_1 \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)/\beta'_3 &\equiv \pi_0 \pmod{p_1}, \\ \pi'_t + d_t \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)/\beta'_3 &\equiv \pi_t \pmod{p_1} \quad \forall t \in [1, J], \\ \nu'_x + a^{n-x} b \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)/\beta'_3 &\equiv \nu_x \pmod{p_1} \quad \forall q_x \in Q \setminus \{q_{n-1}\}. \end{aligned}$$

Also, \mathcal{B} implicitly sets $\nu_{n-1} := \beta_4 \bar{\pi} \equiv a\beta'_4 (\bar{\pi}' + b\beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)/\beta'_3) \pmod{p_1}$.

It is worth noticing that $\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}$ and \mathbf{v}_c are random vectors in \mathbb{Z}_N^3 as required, and $(\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}} \cdot \mathbf{v}_c) = \frac{1}{z}(\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^p \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p) + \frac{b}{z}(\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)$, since χ_3 is orthogonal to $\text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2\}$ and $\mathbb{Z}_N^3 = \text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2, \chi_3\}$.

\mathcal{B} creates a ciphertext $\langle \mathbb{M}^*, (P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4, P_5, P_6, \{P_{7,t}, P_{8,t}, P_{9,t}\}_{t \in [J]}), (\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{R}'_i, Q_i, Q_{i,1}, Q_{i,2}, Q'_i, T_i)_{i=1}^m, (\mathbf{C}_j, \mathbf{C}'_j)_{j=1}^m \rangle$ as follows:

1.

$$P_1 = g^\pi = g^{\pi'} (g^b)^{-\tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)}, \quad P_2 = (P_1)^{\beta_2}, \quad P_3 = h_1^\pi h_3^{\bar{\pi}} = h_1^{\pi'} h_3^{\bar{\pi}'},$$

$$\begin{aligned}
P_4 &= g^{\bar{\pi}} = g^{\bar{\pi}'} (g^b)^{\beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3}, \quad P_5 = g^{\pi_0} = g^{\pi'_0} (g^{d_1})^{\beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3}, \\
P_6 &= g^{-\nu_0} h_5^{\pi_0} = g^{-\nu'_0 - a^n b \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \cdot h_5^{\pi'_0} (g^{\beta'_5} \cdot g^{a^n b / d_1})^{d_1 \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
&= g^{-\nu'_0} h_5^{\pi'_0} (g^{d_1})^{\beta'_5 \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3},
\end{aligned}$$

for $t \in [1, J]$,

$$P_{7,t} = g^{\pi_t} = g^{\pi'_t} \cdot (g^{d_t})^{\beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3},$$

if $x_t = n - 1$,

$$\begin{aligned}
P_{8,t} &= g^{\nu_{x_t}} (h_6 h_7^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi_t} \\
&= g^{a \beta'_4 (\bar{\pi}' + b \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3)} (h_6 h_7^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi'_t + d_t \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
&= (g^a)^{\beta'_4 \bar{\pi}'} g^{a \beta'_4 b \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} (h_6 h_7^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi'_t} (g^{\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 \sigma_t^*})^{d_t \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
&\quad \cdot \left(\left(\prod_{t' \in [1, J]} g^{\sigma_{t'}^*} a^{n-x_{t'}} / d_{t'}^2, g^{-a^{n-x_{t'}} b / d_{t'}} \right) \cdot \prod_{t' \in [1, J]} (g^{-a^{n-x_{t'}} / d_{t'}^2})^{\sigma_{t'}^*} \right)^{d_t \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
&= (g^a)^{\beta'_4 \bar{\pi}'} g^{a \beta'_4 b \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} (h_6 h_7^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi'_t} (g^{d_t})^{(\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 \sigma_t^*) \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
&\quad \cdot \left(\prod_{t' \in [1, J]} g^{-a^{n-x_{t'}} b / d_{t'}} \right)^{d_t \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
&= (g^a)^{\beta'_4 \bar{\pi}'} g^{a \beta'_4 b \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} (h_6 h_7^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi'_t} (g^{d_t})^{(\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 \sigma_t^*) \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
&\quad \cdot \left(\prod_{t' \in [1, J]} g^{-a^{n-x_{t'}} b d_t / d_{t'}} \right)^{\beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
&= (g^a)^{\beta'_4 \bar{\pi}'} g^{a \beta'_4 b \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} (h_6 h_7^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi'_t} (g^{d_t})^{(\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 \sigma_t^*) \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
&\quad \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ t' \neq t}} g^{-a^{n-x_{t'}} b d_t / d_{t'}} \right)^{\beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \cdot \underbrace{(g^{-ab})^{\beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3}}_{\text{for } t'=t} \\
&\quad \underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{\text{for } t' \neq t} \\
&= (g^a)^{\beta'_4 \bar{\pi}'} (h_6 h_7^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi'_t} (g^{d_t})^{(\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 \sigma_t^*) \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
&\quad \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ t' \neq t}} g^{a^{n-x_{t'}} b d_t / d_{t'}} \right)^{-\beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3},
\end{aligned}$$

if $x_t \neq n - 1$,

$$\begin{aligned}
P_{8,t} &= g^{\nu_{x_t}} (h_6 h_7^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi_t} \\
&= g^{\nu'_{x_t}} \cdot g^{a^{n-x_t} b \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} (h_6 h_7^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi'_t + d_t \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
&= g^{\nu'_{x_t}} \cdot g^{a^{n-x_t} b \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} (h_6 h_7^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi'_t} (g^{\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 \sigma_t^*})^{d_t \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
&\quad \cdot \left(\left(\prod_{t' \in [1, J]} g^{\sigma_{t'}^*} a^{n-x_{t'}} / d_{t'}^2, g^{-a^{n-x_{t'}} b / d_{t'}} \right) \cdot \prod_{t' \in [1, J]} (g^{-a^{n-x_{t'}} / d_{t'}^2})^{\sigma_{t'}^*} \right)^{d_t \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
&= g^{\nu'_{x_t}} \cdot g^{a^{n-x_t} b \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} (h_6 h_7^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi'_t} (g^{d_t})^{(\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 \sigma_t^*) \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
&\quad \cdot \left(\prod_{t' \in [1, J]} g^{-a^{n-x_{t'}} b / d_{t'}} \right)^{d_t \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
&= g^{\nu'_{x_t}} \cdot g^{a^{n-x_t} b \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} (h_6 h_7^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi'_t} (g^{d_t})^{(\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 \sigma_t^*) \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \cdot \left(\prod_{t' \in [1, J]} g^{-a^{n-x_{t'}} b d_t / d_{t'}} \right)^{\beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
& = g^{\nu'_{x_t}} \cdot g^{a^{n-x_t} b \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} (h_6 h_7^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi'_t} (g^{d_t})^{(\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 \sigma_t^*)} \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3 \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ t' \neq t}} g^{-a^{n-x_{t'}} b d_t / d_{t'}} \right)^{\beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3}}_{\text{for } t' \neq t} \cdot \underbrace{\left(g^{-a^{n-x_t} b} \right)^{\beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3}}_{\text{for } t'=t} \\
& = g^{\nu'_{x_t}} \cdot (h_6 h_7^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi'_t} (g^{d_t})^{(\beta'_6 + \beta'_7 \sigma_t^*)} \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3 \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ t' \neq t}} g^{a^{n-x_{t'}} b d_t / d_{t'}} \right)^{-\beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3},
\end{aligned}$$

if $y_t = n - 1$,

$$\begin{aligned}
P_{9,t} & = g^{-\nu_{y_t}} (h_8 h_9^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi_t} \\
& = g^{-a \beta'_4 (\bar{\pi}' + b \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3)} (h_8 h_9^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi'_t + d_t \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
& = (g^a)^{-\beta'_4 \bar{\pi}'} g^{-a \beta'_4 b \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} (h_8 h_9^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi'_t} (g^{\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 \sigma_t^*})^{d_t \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
& \cdot \left(\left(\prod_{t' \in [1, J]} g^{-\sigma_{t'}^* a^{n-y_{t'}} / d_{t'}^6} g^{a^{n-y_{t'}} b / d_{t'}} \right) \cdot \left(\prod_{t' \in [1, J]} g^{a^{n-y_{t'}} / d_{t'}^6} \sigma_{t'}^* \right)^{d_t \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \right) \\
& = (g^a)^{-\beta'_4 \bar{\pi}'} g^{-a \beta'_4 b \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} (h_8 h_9^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi'_t} (g^{d_t})^{(\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 \sigma_t^*)} \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3 \\
& \cdot \left(\prod_{t' \in [1, J]} g^{a^{n-y_{t'}} b / d_{t'}} \right)^{d_t \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
& = (g^a)^{-\beta'_4 \bar{\pi}'} g^{-a \beta'_4 b \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} (h_8 h_9^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi'_t} (g^{d_t})^{(\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 \sigma_t^*)} \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3 \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ t' \neq t}} g^{a^{n-y_{t'}} b d_t / d_{t'}} \right)^{\beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3}}_{\text{for } t' \neq t} \cdot \underbrace{\left(g^{a b} \right)^{\beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3}}_{\text{for } t'=t} \\
& = (g^a)^{-\beta'_4 \bar{\pi}'} (h_8 h_9^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi'_t} (g^{d_t})^{(\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 \sigma_t^*)} \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3 \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ t' \neq t}} g^{a^{n-y_{t'}} b d_t / d_{t'}} \right)^{\beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3},
\end{aligned}$$

if $y_t \neq n - 1$,

$$\begin{aligned}
P_{8,t} & = g^{-\nu_{y_t}} (h_8 h_9^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi_t} \\
& = g^{-\nu'_{y_t}} \cdot g^{-a^{n-y_t} b \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} (h_8 h_9^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi'_t + d_t \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
& = g^{-\nu'_{y_t}} \cdot g^{-a^{n-y_t} b \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} (h_8 h_9^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi'_t} (g^{\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 \sigma_t^*})^{d_t \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
& \cdot \left(\left(\prod_{t' \in [1, J]} g^{-\sigma_{t'}^* a^{n-y_{t'}} / d_{t'}^6} g^{a^{n-y_{t'}} b / d_{t'}} \right) \cdot \left(\prod_{t' \in [1, J]} g^{a^{n-y_{t'}} / d_{t'}^6} \sigma_{t'}^* \right)^{d_t \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \right) \\
& = g^{-\nu'_{y_t}} \cdot g^{-a^{n-y_t} b \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} (h_8 h_9^{\sigma_t^*})^{\pi'_t} (g^{d_t})^{(\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 \sigma_t^*)} \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3 \\
& \cdot \left(\prod_{t' \in [1, J]} g^{a^{n-y_{t'}} b / d_{t'}} \right)^{d_t \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= g^{-\nu'_{yt}} \cdot g^{-a^{n-yt} b \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3 (h_8 h_9 \sigma_i^*)} \pi'_t(g^{d_t})^{(\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 \sigma_i^*) \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
&\quad \cdot \left(\prod_{t' \in [1, J]} g^{a^{n-yt'} b d_t / d_{t'}} \right)^{\beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
&= g^{-\nu'_{yt}} \cdot g^{-a^{n-yt} b \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3 (h_8 h_9 \sigma_i^*)} \pi'_t(g^{d_t})^{(\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 \sigma_i^*) \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \\
&\quad \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ t' \neq t}} g^{a^{n-yt'} b d_t / d_{t'}} \right)^{\beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3} \cdot \underbrace{(g^{a^{n-yt} b})^{\beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3}}_{\text{for } t'=t} \\
&= g^{-\nu'_{yt}} \cdot \underbrace{(h_8 h_9 \sigma_i^*)^{\pi'_t(g^{d_t})^{(\beta'_8 + \beta'_9 \sigma_i^*) \beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3}}}_{\text{for } t' \neq t} \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{t' \in [1, J] \\ t' \neq t}} g^{a^{n-yt'} b d_t / d_{t'}} \right)^{\beta'_4 \beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / \beta'_3}.
\end{aligned}$$

Note that the values of $(P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4, P_5, P_6, \{P_{7,t}, P_{8,t}, P_{9,t}\}_{t \in [1, J]})$ can be calculated using the suitable terms of the assumption.

2. For each $i \in [m]$:
 - if $i < \bar{i}$: it randomly chooses $\hat{s}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, then sets

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{R}_i &= g^{v_i}, \quad \mathbf{R}'_i = (g^{a^{n-1}c})^{v_i}, \quad Q_i = g^{s_i}, \quad Q_{i,1} = h_1^{s_i} Z_i^{t_i} h_1^{\pi'_i}, \\
Q_{i,2} &= (Q_i)^{\beta_2}, \quad Q'_i = g^{t_i} (g^b)^{\beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / z'_i}, \quad T_i = E_i^{\hat{s}_i}.
\end{aligned}$$

- if $i = \bar{i}$: it sets

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{R}_i &= g^{r'_i s'_i v_i^p} (g^{b/z})^{r'_i s'_i v_i^q}, \quad \mathbf{R}'_i = (g^{a^{n-1}c})^{r'_i s'_i v_i^p} (g^{a^{n-1}bc/z})^{r'_i s'_i v_i^q}, \quad Q_i = g^{\tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^p \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p)} (g^b)^{\tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)}, \\
Q_{i,1} &= h_1^{\tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^p \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p)} Z_i^{t_i} h_1^{\pi'_i}, \quad Q_{i,2} = (Q_i)^{\beta_2}, \quad Q'_i = g^{t_i}, \quad T_i = M \cdot e(g^{\alpha_i}, Q_i).
\end{aligned}$$

- if $i > \bar{i}$: it sets

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{R}_i &= g^{r_i s_i v_i}, \quad \mathbf{R}'_i = (g^{a^{n-1}c})^{r_i s_i v_i}, \quad Q_i = (g^{a^{n-1}c})^{\tau' s_i(\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p)}, \quad Q_{i,1} = Z_i^{t_i} h_1^{\pi'_i}, \\
Q_{i,2} &= (Q_i)^{\beta_2}, \quad Q'_i = g^{t_i} (g^{a^{n-1}c})^{-\beta'_1 \tau' s_i(\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p) / z'_i} (g^b)^{\beta'_1 \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / z'_i}, \quad T_i = M \cdot e(g^{\alpha_i}, Q_i).
\end{aligned}$$

3. For each $j \in [m]$:

- if $j < \bar{j}$: it randomly chooses $\mu'_j \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and implicitly sets the value of μ_j such that $(a^{n-1}bc)^{-1} \mu'_j \nu_3 - \nu_3 \equiv \mu_j \pmod{p_1}$, then sets $\mathbf{C}_j = (g^{a^{n-1}bc/z})^{c'_j \tau' v_c^p} \cdot g^{c'_j \tau' \mu'_j v_c^q} \cdot (g^{a^{n-1}c})^{w_j}$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = g^{w_j}$.
- if $j = \bar{j}$: it sets $\mathbf{C}_j = T^{c'_j \tau' v_c^q} \cdot (g^{a^{n-1}c})^{w'_j}$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = g^{w'_j} \cdot (g^a)^{-c'_j \tau' v_c^p}$.
- if $j > \bar{j}$: it sets $\mathbf{C}_j = (g^{a^{n-1}bc/z})^{c'_j \tau' v_c^p} \cdot (g^{a^{n-1}c})^{w'_j}$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = g^{w'_j} \cdot (g^b)^{-c'_j \tau' v_c^q}$.

If $T = g^{a^{n}cz}$, then the ciphertext is a well-formed encryption to the index (\bar{i}, \bar{j}) . If T is randomly chosen, say $T = g^r$ for some random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_1}$, the ciphertext is a well-formed encryption to the index $(\bar{i}, \bar{j} + 1)$ with implicitly setting $\mu_{\bar{j}}$ such that $(\frac{r}{a^{n}cz} - 1) \nu_3 \equiv \mu_{\bar{j}} \pmod{p_1}$.

Guess. \mathcal{A} outputs a guess $b' \in \{0, 1\}$ to \mathcal{B} , then \mathcal{B} outputs this b' to the challenger.

The distributions of the public parameters, private keys and challenge ciphertext are the same as that in the real scheme. \mathcal{B} 's advantage in the Modified (n, J) -EDHE2-Dual game will be exactly equal to \mathcal{A} 's advantage in the selective index-hiding game.

F Proof of the Lemma 1 for the Large Universe CP-ABE on Prime Order Groups

To make the proof easy to follow, we present the details of the resulting AugABE scheme first.

F.1 The Resulting Augmented CP-ABE

$\text{Setup}_A(\lambda, \Gamma, \mathcal{K} = m^2) \rightarrow (\text{PP}, \text{MSK})$. Run $(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(\lambda)$. Pick a generator $g \in \mathbb{G}$. Set $d = 4, d_0 = 1$.

Pick random $\beta = (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_4) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^4$. Pick random $\{\alpha_i, r_i, z_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p\}_{i \in [m]}$, $\{c_j \in \mathbb{Z}_p\}_{j \in [m]}$. The public parameter is

$$\text{PP} = \left((p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e), g, \mathbf{h} = (h_1 = g^{\beta_1}, \dots, h_4 = g^{\beta_4}), \right. \\ \left. \{E_i = e(g, g)^{\alpha_i}, G_i = g^{r_i}, Z_i = g^{z_i}\}_{i \in [m]}, \{H_j = g^{c_j}\}_{j \in [m]} \right).$$

The master secret key is $\text{MSK} = (\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_m, r_1, \dots, r_m, c_1, \dots, c_m)$.

A counter $ctr = 0$ is implicitly included in MSK .

$\text{KeyGen}_A(\text{PP}, \text{MSK}, S \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_p) \rightarrow \text{SK}_{(i,j),S}$. Set $ctr = ctr + 1$ and then compute the corresponding index in the form of (i, j) where $1 \leq i, j \leq m$ and $(i-1) * m + j = ctr$. Let $l \times n$ be the size of A . Pick random

$\delta = (\delta_1, \{\theta_x\}_{x \in S}) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{1+|S|}$. Output a secret key $\text{SK}_{(i,j),S}$ as

$$\text{SK}_{(i,j),S} = \left((i, j), S, \right. \\ \left. K_0 = g^{r_i c_j + \alpha_i} g^{\beta_1 \delta_1}, K_1 = g^{\delta_1}, \{K_{x,2} = g^{\theta_x}, K_{x,3} = (g^{\beta_2 x} g^{\beta_3})^{\theta_x} (g^{\beta_4})^{-\delta_1}\}_{x \in S}, \right. \\ \left. K'_0 = Z_i^{\delta_1} \right).$$

$\text{Encrypt}_A(\text{PP}, M, (A, \rho), (\bar{i}, \bar{j})) \rightarrow CT_{(A,\rho)}$.

1. Upon input a ciphertext policy $(A, \rho) \in \mathbb{Y}$, where A is an $l \times n$ matrix over \mathbb{Z}_p , and $\rho : [1, l] \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ maps each row of A to an attribute in \mathbb{Z}_p . Pick random $\pi = (\pi, u_2, \dots, u_n, \xi_1, \dots, \xi_l) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{l+n}$ and set $\mathbf{u} := (\pi, u_2, \dots, u_n)$. Set

$$P_1 = g^\pi, \quad \{P_{k,1} = g^{\beta_1(A_k \cdot \mathbf{u})} g^{\beta_4 \xi_k}, P_{k,2} = (g^{\beta_2 \rho(k)} g^{\beta_3})^{-\xi_k}, P_{k,3} = g^{\xi_k}\}_{k \in [l]}.$$

2. Pick random $\kappa, \tau, s_1, \dots, s_m, t_1, \dots, t_m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, $\mathbf{v}_c, \mathbf{w}_1, \dots, \mathbf{w}_m \in \mathbb{Z}_p^3$.

Pick random $r_x, r_y, r_z \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, and set $\chi_1 = (r_x, 0, r_z), \chi_2 = (0, r_y, r_z), \chi_3 = \chi_1 \times \chi_2 = (-r_y r_z, -r_x r_z, r_x r_y)$.

Pick random $\mathbf{v}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p^3 \forall i \in \{1, \dots, \bar{i}\}$, $\mathbf{v}_i \in \text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2\} \forall i \in \{\bar{i} + 1, \dots, m\}$.

For each row $i \in [m]$:

– if $i < \bar{i}$: randomly choose $\hat{s}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, and set

$$\mathbf{R}_i = g^{\mathbf{v}_i}, \mathbf{R}'_i = g^{\kappa \mathbf{v}_i}, Q_i = g^{s_i}, Q_{i,1} = (g^{\beta_1})^{s_i} Z_i^{t_i} (g^{\beta_1})^\pi, Q'_i = g^{t_i}, T_i = E_i^{\hat{s}_i}.$$

– if $i \geq \bar{i}$: set

$$\mathbf{R}_i = G_i^{s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, \mathbf{R}'_i = G_i^{\kappa s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, Q_i = g^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}, Q_{i,1} = (g^{\beta_1})^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)} Z_i^{t_i} (g^{\beta_1})^\pi, \\ Q'_i = g^{t_i}, T_i = M \cdot E_i^{\tau s_i (\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c)}.$$

Note that $d_0 = 1$, thus there is only $Q_{i,1}$.

For each column $j \in [m]$:

– if $j < \bar{j}$: randomly choose $\mu_j \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, and set $\mathbf{C}_j = H_j^{\tau(\mathbf{v}_c + \mu_j \chi_3)} \cdot g^{\kappa \mathbf{w}_j}$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = g^{\mathbf{w}_j}$.

– if $j \geq \bar{j}$: set $\mathbf{C}_j = H_j^{\tau \mathbf{v}_c} \cdot g^{\kappa \mathbf{w}_j}$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = g^{\mathbf{w}_j}$.

3. Output the ciphertext $CT_{(A,\rho)} = \langle (A, \rho), (P_1, \{P_{k,1}, P_{k,2}, P_{k,3}\}_{k \in [l]}), (\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{R}'_i, Q_i, Q_{i,1}, Q'_i, T_i)_{i=1}^m, (\mathbf{C}_j, \mathbf{C}'_j)_{j=1}^m \rangle$.

$\text{Decrypt}_A(\text{PP}, CT_{(A,\rho)}, \text{SK}_{(i,j),S}) \rightarrow M$ or \perp . Parse $CT_{(A,\rho)}$ to $CT_{(A,\rho)} = \langle (A, \rho), (P_1, \{P_{k,1}, P_{k,2}, P_{k,3}\}_{k \in [l]}),$

$(\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{R}'_i, Q_i, Q_{i,1}, Q'_i, T_i)_{i=1}^m, (\mathbf{C}_j, \mathbf{C}'_j)_{j=1}^m \rangle$ and $\text{SK}_{(i,j),S}$ to $\text{SK}_{(i,j),S} = ((i, j), S, (K_0, K_1, \{K_{x,2}, K_{x,3}\}_{x \in S}, K'_0)$.

Suppose S satisfies (A, ρ) (if S does not satisfy (A, ρ) , output \perp).

1. Compute constants $\{\omega_k\}_{\rho(k) \in S}$ such that $\sum_{\rho(k) \in S} \omega_k A_k = (1, 0, \dots, 0)$. Compute

$$D_P \leftarrow \prod_{\rho(k) \in S} (e(K_1, P_{k,1}) \cdot e(K_{\rho(k),2}, P_{k,2}) \cdot e(K_{\rho(k),3}, P_{k,3}))^{\omega_k}$$

2. Compute

$$D_I \leftarrow \frac{e(K_0, Q_i) \cdot e(K'_0, Q'_i)}{e(K_1, Q_{i,1})} \cdot \frac{e_3(\mathbf{R}'_i, \mathbf{C}'_j)}{e_3(\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{C}_j)}.$$

3. Computes $M \leftarrow T_i / (D_P \cdot D_I)$ as the output message.

F.2 Proof of Lemma 1

Proof. Suppose there exists a polynomial time adversary \mathcal{A} that selectively breaks the index-hiding game with advantage ϵ . We build a PPT algorithm \mathcal{B} to solve an Extended Source Group q -parallel BDHE problem as follows. \mathcal{B} is given a problem instance as

$$D = \left((p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e), g, g^a, g^{cd}, g^{da^q}, \right. \\ \left. g^{a^i}, g^{b_j}, g^{a^i b_j}, g^{a^i/b_j^2}, g^{c d b_j} \quad \forall i, j \in [q], \right. \\ \left. g^{a^i/b_j} \quad \forall i \in [2q] \setminus \{q+1\}, j \in [q], \right. \\ \left. g^{a^i b_{j'}/b_j^2} \quad \forall i \in [2q], j, j' \in [q] \text{ s.t. } j' \neq j, \right. \\ \left. g^{c d a^i b_{j'}/b_j}, g^{c d a^i b_{j'}/b_j^2} \quad \forall i \in [q], j, j' \in [q] \text{ s.t. } j \neq j' \right)$$

and T , where $(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{G}$, $g \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}$, $a, c, d, b_1, \dots, b_q \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p$, and T is either equal to $g^{ca^{q+1}}$ or is a random element of \mathbb{G} . \mathcal{B} 's goal is to determine $T = g^{ca^{q+1}}$ or T is a random element from \mathbb{G} .

Init. \mathcal{A} gives \mathcal{B} the challenge LSSS matrix (A^*, ρ^*) , where A^* is an $l \times n$ matrix with $l, n \leq q$.

Setup. \mathcal{B} randomly chooses $\{\alpha_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p\}_{i \in [m]}$, $\{r_i, z'_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p\}_{i \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{i}\}}$, $r'_i, z_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, $\{c'_j \in \mathbb{Z}_p\}_{j \in [m]}$, and $\beta'_2, \beta'_3, \beta'_4 \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. \mathcal{B} gives \mathcal{A} the public parameter PP:

$$\left(g, h_1 = g^a, h_2 = g^{\beta'_2} \cdot \prod_{k \in [l]} \prod_{t \in [n]} (g^{a^t/b_k^2})^{A_{k,t}^*}, \right. \\ \left. h_3 = g^{\beta'_3} \cdot \prod_{k \in [l]} \prod_{t \in [n]} (g^{a^t/b_k^2})^{-\rho^*(k)A_{k,t}^*}, h_4 = g^{\beta'_4} \cdot \prod_{k \in [l]} \prod_{t \in [n]} (g^{a^t/b_k})^{A_{k,t}^*}, \right. \\ \left. \{E_i = e(g, g)^{\alpha_i}\}_{i \in [m]}, \right. \\ \left. \{G_i = g^{r_i}, Z_i = (g^a)^{z'_i}\}_{i \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{i}\}}, \{H_j = (g^d)^{c'_j}\}_{j \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{j}\}}, G_{\bar{i}} = (g^{a^q})^{r'_i}, Z_{\bar{i}} = g^{z_i}, H_{\bar{j}} = (g^a)^{c'_j} \right).$$

Note that \mathcal{B} implicitly chooses $r_{\bar{i}}, z_i (i \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{i}\}), c_j (j \in [m])$, $\beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3, \beta_4 \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ such that

$$\begin{aligned} a^q r_{\bar{i}} &\equiv r_{\bar{i}} \pmod{p}, a z'_i \equiv z_i \pmod{p} \quad \forall i \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{i}\}, \\ d c'_j &\equiv c_j \pmod{p} \quad \forall j \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{j}\}, a c'_j \equiv c_j \pmod{p}, \\ a &\equiv \beta_1 \pmod{p}, \beta'_2 + \sum_{k \in [l]} \sum_{t \in [n]} (a^t/b_k^2)(A_{k,t}^*) \equiv \beta_2 \pmod{p}, \\ \beta'_3 + \sum_{k \in [l]} \sum_{t \in [n]} (a^t/b_k^2)(-\rho^*(k)A_{k,t}^*) &\equiv \beta_3 \pmod{p}, \\ \beta'_4 + \sum_{k \in [l]} \sum_{t \in [n]} (a^t/b_k)(A_{k,t}^*) &\equiv \beta_4 \pmod{p}, \end{aligned}$$

Query Phase. To respond to \mathcal{A} 's query for $((i, j), S)$,

- if $(i, j) \neq (\bar{i}, \bar{j})$: \mathcal{B} picks random $\delta = (\delta_1, \{\theta_x\}_{x \in S}) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{1+|S|}$, then creates a secret key $\text{SK}_{(i,j),S}$:

$$K_0 = \begin{cases} g^{\alpha_i} (g^d)^{r_i c'_j} h_1^{\delta_1}, & : i \neq \bar{i}, j \neq \bar{j} \\ g^{\alpha_i} (g^{da^q})^{r'_i c'_j} h_1^{\delta_1}, & : i = \bar{i}, j \neq \bar{j} \\ g^{\alpha_i} (g^a)^{r_i c'_j} h_1^{\delta_1}, & : i \neq \bar{i}, j = \bar{j} \end{cases} \\ K_1 = g^{\delta_1}, K'_0 = Z_i^{\delta_1}, \\ \{K_{x,2} = g^{\theta_x}, K_{x,3} = (h_2^x h_3)^{\theta_x} h_4^{-\delta_1}\}_{x \in S}.$$

- if $(i, j) = (\bar{i}, \bar{j})$: it implies that \mathcal{A} is querying a secret key with the challenge index (\bar{i}, \bar{j}) , and S does not satisfy (A^*, ρ^*) . \mathcal{B} first computes a vector $\bar{u} = (\bar{u}_1, \dots, \bar{u}_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$ that has first entry equal to $-r'_{\bar{i}} c'_{\bar{j}}$

(i.e. $\bar{u}_1 = -r'_i c'_j$) and is orthogonal to all of the rows A_k^* of A^* such that $\rho^*(k) \in S$ (i.e. $A_k^* \cdot \bar{\mathbf{u}} = 0 \forall k \in [l]$ s.t. $\rho^*(k) \in S$). Note that such a vector must exist since S fails to satisfy (A^*, ρ^*) , and it is efficiently computable. Then \mathcal{B} randomly chooses $(\delta'_1, \{\theta'_x\}_{x \in S}) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{1+|S|}$ and sets the values of δ_1 and $\{\theta_x\}_{x \in S}$ by implicitly setting

$$\delta_1 = \delta'_1 + \sum_{t \in [n]} \bar{u}_t a^{q+1-t}, \quad (1)$$

$$\theta_x = \theta'_x + \delta'_1 \cdot \sum_{\substack{k' \in [l] \\ \rho^*(k') \notin S}} \frac{b_{k'}}{x - \rho^*(k')} + \sum_{\substack{k' \in [l] \\ \rho^*(k') \notin S}} \sum_{t \in [n]} \frac{\bar{u}_t b_{k'} a^{q+1-t}}{x - \rho^*(k')}. \quad (2)$$

Note that for $x \in S$ and $\rho^*(k') \notin S$ we have $x - \rho^*(k') \neq 0$.

\mathcal{B} creates a secret key $\text{SK}_{(\bar{i}, \bar{j}), S}$ as follows:

$$K_0 = g^{\alpha_{\bar{i}}} h_1^{\delta'_1} \left(\prod_{t=2}^n (g^{a^{q+2-t}})^{\bar{u}_t} \right), \quad K_1 = g^{\delta'_1} \prod_{t=1}^n (g^{a^{q+1-t}})^{\bar{u}_t}, \quad K'_0 = (K_1)^{z_{\bar{i}}},$$

For $x \in S$, we have

$$K_{x,2} = g^{\theta_x} = g^{\theta'_x} \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{k' \in [l] \\ \rho^*(k') \notin S}} (g^{b_{k'}})^{\delta'_1 / (x - \rho^*(k'))} \right) \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{k' \in [l] \\ \rho^*(k') \notin S}} \prod_{t \in [n]} (g^{b_{k'} a^{q+1-t}})^{\bar{u}_t / (x - \rho^*(k'))} \right),$$

Note that for $x \in S$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} (h_2^x h_3)^{\theta_x} &= \underbrace{(h_2^x h_3)^{\theta'_x}}_{\Psi_{1,1}} \cdot (h_2^x h_3)^{\delta'_1 \cdot \sum_{k' \in [l], \rho^*(k') \notin S} \frac{b_{k'}}{x - \rho^*(k')}} \cdot (h_2^x h_3)^{\sum_{k' \in [l], \rho^*(k') \notin S} \sum_{t' \in [n]} \frac{\bar{u}_{t'} b_{k'} a^{q+1-t'}}{x - \rho^*(k')}} \\ &= \Psi_{1,1} \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{k' \in [l] \\ \rho^*(k') \notin S}} (g^{\beta'_2 x + \beta'_3} \prod_{k \in [l]} \prod_{t \in [n]} (g^{a^t / b_k^2})^{(x - \rho^*(k)) A_{k,t}^*})^{\frac{\delta'_1 b_{k'}}{x - \rho^*(k')}} \right) \\ &\quad \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{k' \in [l] \\ \rho^*(k') \notin S}} \prod_{t' \in [n]} (g^{\beta'_2 x + \beta'_3} \prod_{k \in [l]} \prod_{t \in [n]} (g^{a^t / b_k^2})^{(x - \rho^*(k)) A_{k,t}^*})^{\frac{\bar{u}_{t'} b_{k'} a^{q+1-t'}}{x - \rho^*(k')}} \right) \\ &= \Psi_{1,1} \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{k' \in [l] \\ \rho^*(k') \notin S}} (g^{b_{k'}})^{\sigma'_1 \cdot (\beta'_2 x + \beta'_3) / (x - \rho^*(k'))} \right)}_{\Psi_{1,2}} \cdot \left(\prod_{k \in [l]} \prod_{t \in [n]} \prod_{\substack{k' \in [l] \\ \rho^*(k') \notin S}} (g^{a^t b_{k'} / b_k^2})^{\delta'_1 A_{k,t}^* \frac{x - \rho^*(k)}{x - \rho^*(k')}} \right) \\ &\quad \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{k' \in [l] \\ \rho^*(k') \notin S}} \prod_{t' \in [n]} (g^{b_{k'} a^{q+1-t'}})^{\bar{u}_{t'} (\beta'_2 x + \beta'_3) / (x - \rho^*(k'))} \right)}_{\Psi_{1,3}} \\ &\quad \cdot \left(\prod_{k \in [l]} \prod_{t \in [n]} \prod_{\substack{k' \in [l] \\ \rho^*(k') \notin S}} (g^{a^{q+1-t'+t} b_{k'} / b_k^2})^{A_{k,t}^* \bar{u}_{t'} \frac{x - \rho^*(k)}{x - \rho^*(k')}} \right) \\ &= \Psi_{1,1} \cdot \Psi_{1,2} \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{k \in [l] \\ \rho^*(k) \in S}} \prod_{t \in [n]} \prod_{\substack{k' \in [l] \\ \rho^*(k') \notin S}} (g^{a^t b_{k'} / b_k^2})^{\delta'_1 A_{k,t}^* \frac{x - \rho^*(k)}{x - \rho^*(k')}} \right)}_{\Psi_{1,4} \text{ (for } \rho^*(k) \in S)} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{k \in [l] \\ \rho^*(k) \notin S}} \prod_{t \in [n]} \prod_{\substack{k' \in [l] \setminus \{k\} \\ \rho^*(k') \notin S}} (g^{a^t b_{k'}/b_k^2})^{\delta'_1 A_{k,t}^* \frac{x-\rho^*(k)}{x-\rho^*(k')}} \right)}_{\Psi_{1,5} \text{ (for } \rho^*(k) \notin S, k' \neq k)} \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{k \in [l] \\ \rho^*(k) \notin S}} \prod_{t \in [n]} (g^{a^t/b_k})^{\delta'_1 A_{k,t}^*} \right)}_{\Psi_{1,6} \text{ (for } \rho^*(k) \notin S, k' = k)} \cdot \Psi_{1,3} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{k \in [l] \\ \rho^*(k) \in S}} \prod_{t \in [n]} \prod_{\substack{k' \in [l] \\ \rho^*(k') \notin S}} \prod_{t' \in [n]} (g^{a^{q+1-t'+t} b_{k'}/b_k^2})^{A_{k,t}^* \bar{u}_{t'} \frac{x-\rho^*(k)}{x-\rho^*(k')}} \right)}_{\Psi_{1,7} \text{ (for } \rho^*(k) \in S)} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{k \in [l] \\ \rho^*(k) \notin S}} \prod_{t \in [n]} \prod_{\substack{k' \in [l] \setminus \{k\} \\ \rho^*(k') \notin S}} \prod_{t' \in [n]} (g^{a^{q+1-t'+t} b_{k'}/b_k^2})^{A_{k,t}^* \bar{u}_{t'} \frac{x-\rho^*(k)}{x-\rho^*(k')}} \right)}_{\Psi_{1,8} \text{ (for } \rho^*(k) \notin S, k' \neq k)} \\
& \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{k \in [l] \\ \rho^*(k) \notin S}} \prod_{t \in [n]} \prod_{t' \in [n]} (g^{a^{q+1-t'+t}/b_k})^{A_{k,t}^* \bar{u}_{t'}} \right)}_{\text{(for } \rho^*(k) \notin S, k' = k)} \\
& = \underbrace{\Psi_{1,1} \cdot \Psi_{1,2} \cdot \Psi_{1,4} \cdot \Psi_{1,5} \cdot \Psi_{1,6} \cdot \Psi_{1,3} \cdot \Psi_{1,7} \cdot \Psi_{1,8}}_{\Psi_1} \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{k \in [l] \\ \rho(k) \notin S}} \prod_{t \in [n]} \prod_{t' \in [n]} (g^{a^{q+1-t'+t}/b_k})^{A_{k,t}^* \bar{u}_{t'}} \right),
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
h_4^{-\delta_1} &= h_4^{-\delta'_1} (g^{\beta'_4} \prod_{k \in [l]} \prod_{t \in [n]} (g^{a^t/b_k})^{A_{k,t}^*})^{-\sum_{t' \in [n]} \bar{u}_{t'} a^{q+1-t'}} \\
&= h_4^{-\delta'_1} \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t' \in [n]} (g^{a^{q+1-t'}})^{-\beta'_4 \bar{u}_{t'}} \right)}_{\Psi_2} \cdot \left(\prod_{k \in [l]} \prod_{t \in [n]} \prod_{t' \in [n]} (g^{a^{q+1-t'+t}/b_k})^{-A_{k,t}^* \bar{u}_{t'}} \right) \\
&= \Psi_2 \cdot \left(\prod_{k \in [l]} \prod_{t \in [n]} \prod_{t' \in [n]} (g^{a^{q+1-t'+t}/b_k})^{-A_{k,t}^* \bar{u}_{t'}} \right),
\end{aligned}$$

where $\Psi_1 = \Psi_{1,1} \cdot \Psi_{1,2} \cdots \Psi_{1,8}$ and Ψ_2 can be calculated using the suitable terms of the assumption. Thus, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
K_{x,3} &= (h_2^x h_3)^{\theta_x} h_4^{-\delta_1} \\
&= \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{k \in [l] \\ \rho^*(k) \in S}} \prod_{t \in [n]} \prod_{t' \in [n]} (g^{a^{q+1-t'+t}/b_k})^{-A_{k,t}^* \bar{u}_{t'}} \right) \\
&= \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{k \in [l] \\ \rho^*(k) \in S}} \prod_{t \in [n]} \prod_{t' \in [n] \setminus \{t\}} (g^{a^{q+1-t'+t}/b_k})^{-A_{k,t}^* \bar{u}_{t'}} \right)}_{\Psi_3 \text{ (for } t' \neq t)} \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{\substack{k \in [l] \\ \rho^*(k) \in S}} \prod_{t \in [n]} (g^{a^{q+1}/b_k})^{-A_{k,t}^* \bar{u}_t} \right)}_{\text{for } t' = t} \\
&= \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3 \cdot \left(\prod_{\substack{k \in [l] \\ \rho^*(k) \in S}} (g^{a^{q+1}/b_k})^{-(A_k^* \cdot \bar{u})} \right) \\
&= \Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \cdot \Psi_3, \quad (\text{since } A_k^* \cdot \bar{u} = 0 \ \forall k \in [l] \text{ s.t. } \rho^*(k) \in S)
\end{aligned}$$

Note that Ψ_1 , Ψ_2 and Ψ_3 can be calculated using the suitable terms of the assumption, \mathcal{B} can calculate $K_{x,3}$.

Challenge. \mathcal{A} submits a message M . \mathcal{B} randomly chooses

$$\begin{aligned}\tau', s_1, \dots, s_{\bar{i}-1}, s'_{\bar{i}}, s_{\bar{i}+1}, \dots, s_m &\in \mathbb{Z}_p, \\ t'_1, \dots, t'_{\bar{i}-1}, t_{\bar{i}}, t'_{\bar{i}+1}, \dots, t'_m &\in \mathbb{Z}_p, \\ \mathbf{w}_1, \dots, \mathbf{w}_{\bar{j}-1}, \mathbf{w}'_{\bar{j}}, \dots, \mathbf{w}'_m &\in \mathbb{Z}_p^3, \\ \xi'_1, \dots, \xi'_l, \pi' \in \mathbb{Z}_p, \mathbf{u}' = (0, u'_2, \dots, u'_n) &\in \mathbb{Z}_p^n.\end{aligned}$$

\mathcal{B} randomly chooses $r_x, r_y, r_z \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, and sets $\chi_1 = (r_x, 0, r_z)$, $\chi_2 = (0, r_y, r_z)$, $\chi_3 = \chi_1 \times \chi_2 = (-r_y r_z, -r_x r_z, r_x r_y)$, then randomly chooses

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{v}_i &\in \mathbb{Z}_p^3 \forall i \in \{1, \dots, \bar{i} - 1\}, \\ \mathbf{v}_i^p &\in \text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2\}, \mathbf{v}_i^q \in \text{span}\{\chi_3\}, \\ \mathbf{v}_i &\in \text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2\} \forall i \in \{\bar{i} + 1, \dots, m\}, \\ \mathbf{v}_c &\in \text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2\}, \mathbf{v}_c^q = \nu_c \chi_3 \in \text{span}\{\chi_3\}.\end{aligned}$$

\mathcal{B} sets the values of $\kappa, \tau, s_{\bar{i}}, t_i (i \in [m] \setminus \{\bar{i}\}) \in \mathbb{Z}_p, \mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}, \mathbf{v}_c, \mathbf{w}_j (j \in \{\bar{j}, \dots, m\}) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^3, \pi \in \mathbb{Z}_p, \mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$, and $\{\xi_k \in \mathbb{Z}_p\}_{k \in [l]}$ by implicitly setting

$$\begin{aligned}a^q &\equiv \kappa \pmod p, \quad ca^q \tau' \equiv \tau \pmod p, \quad s'_{\bar{i}}/a^q \equiv s_{\bar{i}} \pmod p, \\ \forall i \in \{1, \dots, \bar{i} - 1\} : \quad t'_i + cd\tau' s'_{\bar{i}}(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)/z'_i &\equiv t_i \pmod p, \\ \forall i \in \{\bar{i} + 1, \dots, m\} : \quad t'_i - a^q \tau' s_i(\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p)/z'_i + cd\tau' s'_{\bar{i}}(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)/z'_i &\equiv t_i \pmod p, \\ \mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}} &= \mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^p + d\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q, \quad \mathbf{v}_c = c^{-1}\mathbf{v}_c^p + \mathbf{v}_c^q, \\ \mathbf{w}'_{\bar{j}} - ac'_{\bar{j}}\tau' \mathbf{v}_c^p &\equiv \mathbf{w}_{\bar{j}} \pmod p, \\ \forall j \in \{\bar{j} + 1, \dots, m\} : \quad \mathbf{w}'_j - cdc'_j\tau' \mathbf{v}_c^q &\equiv \mathbf{w}_j \pmod p, \\ \pi' - cd\tau' s'_{\bar{i}}(\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) &\equiv \pi \pmod p, \quad \mathbf{u} = \pi(1, a, a^2, \dots, a^{n-1}) + \mathbf{u}', \\ \forall k \in [l] : \quad \xi'_k + cdb_k\tau' s'_{\bar{i}}(\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) &\equiv \xi_k \pmod p.\end{aligned}$$

It is worth noticing that $\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}$ and \mathbf{v}_c are chosen from \mathbb{Z}_p^3 at random as required, and $(\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}} \cdot \mathbf{v}_c) = \frac{1}{c}(\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^p \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p) + d(\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)$, since χ_3 is orthogonal to $\text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2\}$ and $\mathbb{Z}_p^3 = \text{span}\{\chi_1, \chi_2, \chi_3\}$. \mathcal{B} creates a ciphertext $\langle (A^*, \rho^*), (P_1, \{P_{k,1}, P_{k,2}, P_{k,3}\}_{k \in [l]}), (\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{R}'_i, Q_i, Q_{i,1}, Q'_i, T_i)_{i=1}^m, (C_j, C'_j)_{j=1}^m \rangle$ as follows:

1. $P_1 = g^{\pi'}(g^{cd})^{-\tau' s'_{\bar{i}}(\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)}$,
For each $k \in [l]$: we have

$$\begin{aligned}P_{k,1} &= (h_1)^{A_k^* \cdot \mathbf{u}} h_4^{\xi_k} = (h_1^{A_k^* \cdot (1, a, \dots, a^{n-1})})^\pi \cdot \underbrace{h_1^{A_k^* \cdot \mathbf{u}'}}_{\Phi_1} \cdot h_4^{\xi_k} \cdot (g^{\beta'_4} \prod_{k' \in [l]} \prod_{t \in [n]} (g^{a^t/b_{k'}})^{A_{k',t}^*})^{cdb_k \tau' s'_{\bar{i}}(\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)} \\ &= \left(\prod_{t \in [n]} (g^{a^t})^{A_{k,t}^*} \right)^{\pi' - cd\tau' s'_{\bar{i}}(\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)} \cdot \Phi_1 \cdot \underbrace{(g^{cdb_k})^{\beta'_4 \tau' s'_{\bar{i}}(\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)}}_{\Phi_2} \cdot \left(\prod_{k' \in [l]} \prod_{t \in [n]} (g^{cda^t b_k/b_{k'}})^{A_{k',t}^*} \right)^{\tau' s'_{\bar{i}}(\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)} \\ &= \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [n]} (g^{a^t})^{A_{k,t}^*} \right)^{\pi'}}_{\Phi_3} \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [n]} (g^{cda^t})^{A_{k,t}^*} \right)^{-\tau' s'_{\bar{i}}(\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)}}_{\Delta} \cdot \Phi_1 \cdot \Phi_2 \\ &\quad \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{k' \in [l] \setminus \{k\}} \prod_{t \in [n]} (g^{cda^t b_k/b_{k'}})^{A_{k',t}^*} \right)^{\tau' s'_{\bar{i}}(\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)}}_{\Phi_4 \text{ (for } k' \neq k)} \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [n]} (g^{cda^t})^{A_{k,t}^*} \right)^{\tau' s'_{\bar{i}}(\mathbf{v}_{\bar{i}}^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)}}_{\Delta^{-1} \text{ (for } k' = k)} \\ &= \Phi_3 \cdot \Phi_1 \cdot \Phi_2 \cdot \Phi_4,\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
P_{k,2} &= (h_2^{\rho^*(k)} h_3)^{-\xi_k} \\
&= (h_2^{\rho^*(k)} h_3)^{-\xi'_k} \cdot (g^{\beta'_2 \rho^*(k) + \beta'_3})^{-cdb_k \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)} \cdot \left(\prod_{k' \in [l]} \prod_{t \in [n]} (g^{a^t / b_{k'}^2})^{(\rho^*(k) - \rho^*(k')) A_{k',t}^*} \right)^{-cdb_k \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)} \\
&= \underbrace{(h_2^{\rho^*(k)} h_3)^{-\xi'_k} \cdot (g^{cdb_k})^{-(\beta'_2 \rho^*(k) + \beta'_3) \tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)}}_{\Phi_5} \cdot \left(\prod_{k' \in [l]} \prod_{t \in [n]} (g^{cda^t b_k / b_{k'}^2})^{(\rho^*(k') - \rho^*(k)) A_{k',t}^*} \right)^{\tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)} \\
&= \Phi_5 \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{k' \in [l] \setminus \{k\}} \prod_{t \in [n]} (g^{cda^t b_k / b_{k'}^2})^{(\rho^*(k') - \rho^*(k)) A_{k',t}^*} \right)^{\tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)}}_{\Phi_6 \text{ (for } k' \neq k)} \\
&\quad \cdot \underbrace{\left(\prod_{t \in [n]} (g^{cda^t b_k / b_k^2})^{(\rho^*(k) - \rho^*(k)) A_{k,t}^*} \right)^{\tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)}}_1 \text{ (for } k'=k) \\
&= \Phi_5 \cdot \Phi_6, \\
P_{k,3} &= g^{\xi_k} = g^{\xi'_k} (g^{cdb_k})^{\tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)}.
\end{aligned}$$

Note that Φ_1, \dots, Φ_6 can be calculated using the suitable terms of the assumption, \mathcal{B} can calculate $P_{k,1}, P_{k,2}, P_{k,3}$.

2. For each $i \in [m]$:

– if $i < \bar{i}$: randomly chooses $\hat{s}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, and sets

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{R}_i &= g^{\mathbf{v}_i}, \quad \mathbf{R}'_i = (g^{a^q})^{\mathbf{v}_i}, \\
Q_i &= g^{s_i}, \quad Q_{i,1} = (g^a)^{s_i} Z_i^{t'_i} (g^a)^{\pi'}, \quad Q'_i = g^{t'_i} (g^{cd})^{\tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / z'_i}, \quad T_i = E_i^{\hat{s}_i}.
\end{aligned}$$

– if $i = \bar{i}$: sets

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{R}_i &= g^{r'_i s'_i \mathbf{v}_i^p} \cdot (g^d)^{r'_i s'_i \mathbf{v}_i^q}, \quad \mathbf{R}'_i = (g^{a^q})^{r'_i s'_i \mathbf{v}_i^p} \cdot (g^{da^q})^{r'_i s'_i \mathbf{v}_i^q}, \\
Q_i &= g^{\tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^p \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p)} (g^{cd})^{\tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q)}, \quad Q_{i,1} = (g^a)^{\tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^p \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p)} Z_i^{t_{\bar{i}}}, \quad Q'_i = g^{t_{\bar{i}}}, \\
T_i &= M \cdot e(g^{\alpha_i}, Q_i).
\end{aligned}$$

– if $i > \bar{i}$: sets

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{R}_i &= g^{r_i s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, \quad \mathbf{R}'_i = (g^{a^q})^{r_i s_i \mathbf{v}_i}, \\
Q_i &= (g^{a^q})^{\tau' s_i(\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p)}, \quad Q_{i,1} = Z_i^{t'_i} (g^a)^{\pi'}, \quad Q'_i = g^{t'_i} (g^{a^q})^{-\tau' s_i(\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^p) / z'_i} (g^{cd})^{\tau' s'_i(\mathbf{v}_i^q \cdot \mathbf{v}_c^q) / z'_i}, \\
T_i &= M \cdot e(g^{\alpha_i}, Q_i).
\end{aligned}$$

3. For each $j \in [m]$:

- if $j < \bar{j}$: randomly chooses $\mu'_j \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and implicitly sets the value of μ_j such that $(\mu'_j / (cda^q) - 1) \nu_c \equiv \mu_j \pmod p$, then sets: $\mathbf{C}_j = (g^{da^q})^{c'_j \tau' \mathbf{v}_c^p} \cdot g^{c'_j \tau' \mu'_j \mathbf{v}_c^q} \cdot (g^{a^q})^{\mathbf{w}_j}$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = g^{\mathbf{w}_j}$.
- if $j = \bar{j}$: sets $\mathbf{C}_j = T^{c'_j \tau' \mathbf{v}_c^q} \cdot (g^{a^q})^{\mathbf{w}'_j}$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = g^{\mathbf{w}'_j} \cdot (g^a)^{-c'_j \tau' \mathbf{v}_c^p}$.
- if $j > \bar{j}$: sets $\mathbf{C}_j = (g^{da^q})^{c'_j \tau' \mathbf{v}_c^p} \cdot (g^{a^q})^{\mathbf{w}_j}$, $\mathbf{C}'_j = g^{\mathbf{w}'_j} \cdot (g^{cd})^{-c'_j \tau' \mathbf{v}_c^q}$.

If $T = g^{ca^{q+1}}$, the ciphertext is a well-formed encryption to the index (\bar{i}, \bar{j}) . If T is randomly chosen, say $T = g^r$ for some random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, the ciphertext is a well-formed encryption to the index $(\bar{i}, \bar{j} + 1)$ with implicit setting $\mu_{\bar{j}}$ such that $(\frac{r}{ca^{q+1}} - 1) \nu_c \equiv \mu_{\bar{j}} \pmod p$.

Guess. \mathcal{A} outputs a guess $b' \in \{0, 1\}$ to \mathcal{B} , then \mathcal{B} outputs this b' to the challenger.

The distributions of the public parameters, private keys and challenge ciphertext are the same as that in the real scheme. \mathcal{B} 's advantage in solving the Extended Source Group q -parallel BDHE problem will be exactly equal to \mathcal{A} 's advantage in the selective index-hiding game.