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deontology

From Wiktionary, the free dictionary

English

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Etymology

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    Learned borrowing from Ancient Greek δέον (déon, that which is binding, needful, proper, or right) English -ology (variant of -logy (suffix denoting a branch of learning or a study of a particular subject)). Δέον (Déon) is the neuter present participle of δεῖ (deî, it behoves one to, it is necessary to, one must),[1] from δέω (déō, to bind, tie; to fasten; to fetter), ultimately from Proto-Indo-European *deh₁- (to bind).

    Sense 1 (“synonym of ethics”) was coined by the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) to refer to censorial or dicastic ethics (ethics based on judgment),[2] while sense 2 (“normative ethical theory that the morality of an action should be based on whether the action follows certain obligations or rules”) derives from the use of the word deontological by the English philosopher Charlie Dunbar Broad (1887–1971) in his book Five Types of Ethical Theory (1930).[3]

    Pronunciation

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    Noun

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    deontology (usually uncountable, plural deontologies) (ethics)

    1. Synonym of ethics (the study of principles relating to right and wrong conduct) [from c. 1826]
      Synonym: moral philosophy
      • 1826 October, Jeremy Bentham, “Art. VIII.—Observations on the Actual State of the English Law of Real Property, with the Outlines of a Code. By James Humphreys, Esq. of Lincoln’s Inn, Barrister. 8vo. Murray. London. [book review]”, in The Westminster Review, volume VI, number XII, London: Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, →OCLC, page 448:
        [Matthew Hale] was no reformer: nothing better than an expounder: every thing stated by him was stated as he found it, or conceived it to be: no inquiries as to what it ought to be: in the eyes of lawyers—not to speak of the dupes—that is to say, as yet, the generality of non-lawyers—the is and the ought to be (or, as in Greek it would be so much better—the το ον and the το δεον, from which last, Ethics has received the more expressive name of Deontology), were one and indivisible.
      • a. 1833 (date written), Jeremy Bentham, “Deontology Explained—Term Why Adopted”, in John Bowring, editor, Deontology; or, The Science of Morality: [], volume I, London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Browne, Green, and Longman; Edinburgh: William Tait, published 1834, →OCLC, part I (Theory of Virtue), pages 23–24:
        The principle, then, on which Deontology is grounded, is the principle of Utility; in other words, that every action is right or wrong—worthy or unworthy—deserving approbation or disapprobation, in proportion to its tendency to contribute to, or to diminish the amount of public happiness.
      • 1898, [John Martin Russell], “[Book of Revelation.] Chapter XIII, 11–18. The Second Beast.”, in The Seven Ages of Creation: Or Cosmos and the Mysteries Expounded [], Fort Dodge, Iowa: E. A. Tryon, [], →OCLC, page 231:
        And then she discoursed with voluble blandiloquence on deontologies and morals, and pondered with imposing gravity on ancient lores, and wisdoms, and beatifications, and in all her countenance seemeth as demure as a babe asleep.
    2. (specifically) The normative ethical theory that the morality of an action should be based on whether the action follows certain obligations or rules, rather than on either its inherent goodness or its consequences. [from 1930]
      • 1985, William S. Hamrick, “Kindness”, in William S. Hamrick, editor, Phenomenology in Practice and Theory (Phenomenologica; 92), Dordrecht, South Holland; Boston, Mass.: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, →ISBN, part 3 (Aesthetic, Ethical, and Religious Values), page 204:
        [T]he main concern of the last two hundred and fifty years or so of ethics has been to assess the morality of actions or rules by themselves – act-and-rule utilitarianisms and deontologies – as opposed to an interpretation of actions within a morality of being.
      • 1996, James B. Tubbs, Jr., “Richard McCormick: Ordered Values and Proportionate Reasons”, in Christian Theology and Medical Ethics: Four Contemporary Approaches (Theology and Medicine; 7), Dordrecht, South Holland; Boston, Mass.: Kluwer Academic Publishers, →ISBN, page 36:
        William Frankena has altered [Charlie Dunbar] Broad's distinction slightly to define teleology as making consequences the "one and only … ultimate right-making characteristic" and to define deontology as allowing "that there are other considerations that may make an action or rule right or obligatory besides the goodness or badness of its consequences …" [].
      • 2021, Allan Beever, “Justification”, in Law’s Reality: A Philosophy of Law (Elgar Studies in Legal Theory), Cheltenham, Gloucestershire; Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Publishing, →DOI, →ISBN, part III (Reconstructing the Philosophy of Law), page 301:
        Deontologies that arise from status functions are not morally neutral. This is in part because of familiar issues such as that people are likely to rely on the observance of such deontologies, the wrongfulness of freeriding, and so on.

    Coordinate terms

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    Derived terms

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    Translations

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    References

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    1. ^ deontology, n.”, in OED Online Paid subscription required, Oxford: Oxford University Press, July 2023; deontology, n.”, in Lexico, Dictionary.com; Oxford University Press, 2019–2022.
    2. ^ Jeremy Bentham (written a. 1833) “Deontology Explained—Term Why Adopted”, in John Bowring, editor, Deontology; or, The Science of Morality: [], volume I, London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Browne, Green, and Longman; Edinburgh: William Tait, published 1834, →OCLC, part I (Theory of Virtue), page 21:
      Deontology is derived from the Greek words, το δεον (that which is proper) and λογια, knowledge—meaning the knowledge of what is right or proper; and it is here specifically applied to the subject of morals, or that part of the field of action which is not the object of public legislation. As an art, it is the doing what is fit to be done; as a science, the knowing what is fit to be done on every occasion.
    3. ^ C[harlie] D[unbar] Broad (1930) “Sidgwick”, in Five Types of Ethical Theory, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul [], published 1950, →OCLC, page 162:
      There is another distinction to be drawn between what I call the deontological, the teleological, and the logical application of “ought”. Some people judge that there are certain types of action which ought to be done (or avoided) in all or in certain types of situation, regardless of the goodness or badness of the probable consequences. This is what I call the “deontological” application of “ought”.

    Further reading

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