R-principle
In the Neo-Gricean approach to semantics and pragmatics advanced by Yale linguist Laurence Horn, the R-principle ("R" for "Relation") is a reformulation of Paul Grice's maxim of relation (see Gricean maxims) combining with the second sub-maxim of quantity and the third and fourth sub-maxims of manner.[1] The R-principle states: "Say no more than you must (given Q)." As such it interacts with the Q-principle, which states: "Say as much as you can (given R)."[2][3]
According to the R-principle, there is no reason to make a stronger statement (say more) if the extra information can be contributed by implicature. For instance, the inference from "He broke a finger" to "He broke a finger of his own" is an R-based inference, i.e. deriving from the R-principle, since the economy of expression implies that a more informative statement was not needed.[2]
References
[edit]- ^ Horn, Laurence (1989). A Natural History of Negation. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago press. pp. 193–203.193-203&rft.pub=The University of Chicago press&rft.date=1989&rft.aulast=Horn&rft.aufirst=Laurence&rfr_id=info:sid/en.wikipedia.org:R-principle" class="Z3988">
- ^ a b "Implicature" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- ^ "The Gricean Model" in the Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science.