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Hwasong-11A

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Hwasong-11A
Diagram of Hwasong-11A, also known as KN-23
TypeShort-range ballistic missile
Place of originNorth Korea
Service history
Used byNorth Korea (Korean People"s Army Strategic Force)
Russia
WarsRussian invasion of Ukraine
Production history
Designed2018
ManufacturerFebruary 11 Plant
Specifications
Mass3,415 kg (7,529 lb)
Length8.7 m (29 ft)
Diameter1.1 m (3 ft 7 in)[1]
Warhead500 kg (1,100 lb), nuclear and conventional[2]
EngineSolid composite propellant
Operational
range
900 km (560 mi)[3]
Guidance
system
Inertial navigation system (INS), possible satellite navigation
Accuracy35 m[4]
Launch
platform
8×8 wheeled TEL
10×10 wheeled TEL
Tracked launcher
Railway car

The Hwasong-11A[a] (Korean: 《화성-11가》형; lit. Mars Type 11A;[b] KN-23 under United States’s naming convention)[8] is a North Korean single-stage, solid-fueled short-range ballistic missile.

Design

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The Hwasong-11A bears an external resemblance to the Russian Iskander-M and South Korean Hyunmoo-2B short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), being distinguished by its elongated cable raceway, different jet vane actuators and smooth base. Like the Iskander-M, it flies in a quasi-ballistic trajectory, flattening out below an altitude of about 50 km (160,000 ft) where the atmosphere is dense enough so the missile"s fins can change course along its flight path.[8][9][10]

It is believed to have a range of some 450 km with a 500 kg warhead, putting all of South Korea within range. It is possible to extend the range out to 690 km with a reduced payload. The warhead can be conventional, likely unitary or submunition, or nuclear. Its active steering capability could make it accurate to within 100 meters CEP with satellite guidance, or within 200 meters using INS alone. It is launched from a wheeled transporter-erector-launcher (TEL).[8][9][10]

It is significantly larger than the Iskander, with it using likely the same 1.1 meter diameter motor as the Pukguksong-1. The motor is somewhat lengthened, having only one stage, compared to the Pukguksong-1. The motor has a very different structure, compared to the Iskander. Its TEL has more space for the missile, as it lacks the structure immediately after the cab.[11]

The missile is likely to replace older liquid-fueled North Korean SRBMs, like the Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6. Being road-mobile and solid-fueled, it can be moved and fired more rapidly, making it more difficult for an opposing force to locate and target before firing. Once launched, the missile"s low apogee, short overall flight time, and ability to conduct a terminal "pull-up" maneuver makes it harder to detect and be intercepted by traditional missile defense systems. Its increased accuracy also reduces the number of missiles that would be needed to destroy a single target.[8][9][10]

The Hwasong-11A is likely to feature some form of foreign involvement such as parts, as when compared to the later developed Hwasong-11B (KN-24), the Korean Central News Agency focuses mainly on the deployment of the missile, with little coverage on its research. While the Hwasong-11B are called "Juche projectiles", it is never mentioned for the Hwasong-11A. The focus on the combat-readiness of the system suggests that it had been deployed for a while but not tested, like the Hwasong-10.[12] It still bears significant differences from the 9K720 Iskander.[13]

Its warhead section has enough space for up to 1,500 kilograms of high explosives compared to 700 kilograms for Hwasong-5 (Scud-B) and 800 kilograms of 9K720 Iskander.[4]

History

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North Korea first displayed the Hwasong-11A publicly in a military parade on 8 February 2018. The first flight test was on 4 May 2019. Five days later, North Korea test-fired another two missiles.[8][9]

On 17 May 2019, the missile was designated by the United States Forces Korea as KN-23. Further test-fires were carried out on 25 July and 6 August 2019, as well as in 2021, 2022 and 2023. Except for two tests on 6 October 2022 and 19 March 2023, which had one missile launched, all tests of Hwasong-11A had two missiles test-fired.[8][9][14]

In July 2023, North Korea revealed the official name of this missile, which was previously known by the United States’s designation (KN-23), during the “Weaponry Exhibition-2023” military exhibition.[15]

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as of 2024, North Korea is possessing more than 17 Hwasong-11A missiles (in road and rail-mobile variants).[16]

Rail launched missile

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On 15 September 2021, North Korea test-fired two missiles from a modified railway car, rather than the typical road-mobile launcher. These missiles appeared to be baseline Hwasong-11A (KN-23) versions. They flew much further than any previous flight of the weapon, and went an even greater distance than the larger variant tested earlier in 2021. Such excess range could indicate it hadn"t previously been tested out to its maximum range, or that the design underwent modifications such as a reduced payload or flight profile improvements. The launch railcar used two side-by-side erector/launcher mechanisms like the side-by-side arrangement used in the TEL.[17][18]

The use of a rail-mobile system is unusual for an SRBM, as road-mobile launchers are easier for deploying and hiding relatively small missiles, while railway missiles are restricted to the rail network. Adding railway launchers may be an effort to further increase and diversify the country"s SRBM missile force, since modifying existing railcars to fire missiles could be a way to supplement a limited number of launch trucks, or possibly to test the concept before applying it to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). A rail-borne ICBM would have advantages over one carried by a wheeled TEL, as such large liquid-fueled missiles carried in railway cars would be able to move more places and be kept in a higher readiness state.[17][18]

On 14 January 2022, North Korea again tested railway-launched Hwasong-11A. The next day, the Korean Central News Agency released photos of the test.[19]

Combat use

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The missile was highly likely first used in combat during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. An unknown number of North Korean ballistic missiles were transferred to Russia in October 2023, according to declassified US intelligence informations. Based on debris left by Russian attacks on Ukrainian targets on 30 December 2023, the ring housing the control vanes have been identified as the characteristics of Hwasong-11A (KN-23) and Hwasong-11B (KN-24) missiles.[20] The barometer on the missile was found to have a Hangul character, and various parts of the missile were stamped with the possible factory name.[1]

According to the Conflict Armament Research, 75% of components in the guidance control system for the Hwasong-11A (KN-23) fired at Kharkiv are based on American parts.[21] They also indicated that some of the missiles were newly produced.[22]

During the Kharkiv strikes of 2 January 2024, Ukrainian authorities noted that the missiles used were of North Korean origin, noting that the shape and design were different than that of Iskander missiles. On 29 April 2024, the UNSC confirmed that the munitions used during the strike were that of Hwasong-11A (KN-23) missiles.[23][24]

On 7 May 2024, Ukrainian sources reported that the missiles have a high failure rate. According to these officials, half of the North Korean missiles lost their programmed trajectories and exploded in the air.[25]

List of tests

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Attempt Date (Pyongyang Standard Time) Location Number of missiles tested Outcome Additional notes
1 4 May 2019 Hodo Peninsula, Kangwon Province[14] or Wonsan[9] 2 Success These missiles reaching an apogee of 60 km and a range of 240 km (150 mi).[8][9] The footage was apparently manipulated, and the missiles were probably fired from two different vehicles.[11] Kim Jong Un oversaw the test.[26]
2 9 May 2019 Baegun, North Pyongan Province[14] or Kusong[9] 2 Success Both missiles achieved 50 km (31 mi) apogee. One had a range of 420 km (260 mi) and the other had 270 km (170 mi).[8][9] At least one missile may have used depressed trajectory.[14] Kim Jong Un supervised the test-fire.[27]
3 25 July 2019 Hodo Peninsula, Kangwon Province[14] 2 Success Both missiles again reaching 50 km (31 mi) in altitude, but demonstrating greater ranges of 430 km (270 mi) and 690 km (430 mi), before landing in the Sea of Japan.[8][9] Kim Jong Un supervised the test-fire.[28]
4 6 August 2019 Kwail Airport, South Hwanghae Province[14] 2 Success Two missiles were launched and overflew the North Korean capital region. These missile achieved an apogee of 37 km (23 mi) out to 450 km (280 mi).[8][9] Kim Jong Un supervised the test-fire.[29]
5 15 September 2021 Yangdok County, South Hamgyong Province[14] 2 Success These missiles, which launched from railcar, travelled 800 km (500 mi), to a maximum altitude of 60 km (37 mi).[14] This is the first time Hwasong-11A has been launched from railcar.
6 14 January 2022 Uiju County, North Pyongan Province[14] 2 Success These missiles, which launched from railcar, flew 430 km (270 mi) and achieved 36 km (22 mi) apogee.[14] This is the second time Hwasong-11A has been launched from railcar.
7 27 January 2022 Hungnam, Hamhung, South Hamgyong Province[14] 2 Success These missiles flew 190 km (120 mi) to a maximum altitude of 20 km (12 mi) and demonstrated depressed trajectory.[14] North Korea stated the test was to confirm the power of an air burst conventional warhead. Taken together, this suggests that the missile is operational.[30]
8 1 October 2022 Sunan District, Pyongyang[14] 2 Success These missiles achieved 50 km (31 mi) apogee. One missile flew 400 km (250 mi), the other flew 350 km (220 mi).[14] Kim Jong Un oversaw the test.[31]
9 6 October 2022 Samsok District, Pyongyang[14] 1 Success The missile achieved 50 km (31 mi) apogee and flew 800 km (500 mi). The missile was launched just about 15 minutes after the launch of a KN-25 (600 mm multiple rocket launcher) missile and may have used an irregular trajectory.[14] Kim Jong Un oversaw the test.[31]
10 Early November 2022 Unknown 2 Success Information based on the images released by Korean Central News Agency.[32]
11 14 March 2023 Jangyon County, South Hwanghae Province[33] 2[14] Success According to North Korea, these missiles hit the target 611.4 km (379.9 mi) away.[33]
12 19 March 2023 Sohae Satellite Launching Station[14] 1 Success The missile was launched from a silo that was constructed for less than two months. It reached 50 km (31 mi) apogee and flew 800 km (500 mi). The missile may have utilized an irregular trajectory.[14] Kim Jong Un and his daughter oversaw the test.[34] This is the first time North Korea has fired Hwasong-11A from silo.
13 27 March 2023 Chunghwa County, North Hwanghae Province[14] or Ryokpho District, Pyongyang[35] 2 Success These missiles achieved 50 km (31 mi) apogee and flew 350 km (220 mi).[14] According to North Korea, the missiles exploded at an altitude of about 500 m above a target near Kimchaek.[35]

Variants

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Along with the base version, Hwasong-11A has some variants:[5]

Larger variant

[edit]
Main article: Hwasong-11C

Hwasong-11C is the larger version of Hwasong-11A, claimed to have a 2.5 tons warhead.[5]

A variant with 4.5 tons warhead, called Hwasong-11C-4.5, was tested on 1 July 2024 and 18 September 2024.[36][37]

Smaller variant

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Main article: Hwasong-11D

Hwasong-11D is the smaller variant of Hwasong-11A, with reduced range.[5]

It was tested on 16 April 2022, 3 November 2022, 9 March 2023 and 17 May 2024.[14]

SLBM variant

[edit]
Main article: Hwasong-11S

Hwasong-11S is the underwater-launched version of Hwasong-11A.[5]

It was tested two times, on 19 October 2021 and 25 September 2022.[14]

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^ Also known without using United States’s designation as Hwasong-11Ga,[5] Hwasongpho-11Ga.[6]
  2. ^ Also written in Korean as 《화성포-11가》형 (Mars Artillery Type 11A).[7]

References

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  1. ^ a b "Documenting a North Korean missile in Ukraine". ArcGIS StoryMaps. Conflict Armament Research. 2024-01-19. Retrieved 2024-01-21.
  2. ^ "Report to Congress on North Korea"s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs". USNI News. U.S. Naval Institute. 26 January 2023.
  3. ^ "【お知らせ：北朝鮮のミサイル等関連情報】".
  4. ^ a b Delory, Stéphane; Bondaz, Antoine; Maire, Christian (2023). "North Korean Short Range Systems: Military consequences of the development of the KN-23, KN-24 and KN-25" (PDF). Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique. Archived (PDF) from the original on 16 January 2023. Retrieved 27 December 2024.
  5. ^ a b c d e "Brief on 27 July 2023 Parade of the DPRK". Open Nuclear Network. Retrieved 2025-01-04.
  6. ^ "Nuclear strategy of the DPRK: Doctrine evolution and future prospects". Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability. Retrieved 2025-01-26.
  7. ^ Lewis, Jeffery. "Jeffery Lewis"s post on X (formerly Twitter)". X (formerly Twitter). Retrieved 2025-01-26.
  8. ^ a b c d e f g h i j "KN-23". Missile Threat - CSIS. Retrieved 2025-01-26.
  9. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k "KN-23". Missile Defense Advocacy. Retrieved 2025-01-26.
  10. ^ a b c "North Korea"s New Short-Range Missiles: A Technical Evaluation". 38 North. 9 October 2019. Retrieved 2025-01-26.
  11. ^ a b "Pukguksong GLBM-2 and GLBM-3". www.b14643.eu. Retrieved 2021-10-25.
  12. ^ "A Tale of Two Missiles: Analysis of KCNA Reports on North Korea"s KN-23 and KN-24 Short-Range Ballistic Missiles". datayo.org. Archived from the original on 2021-01-15. Retrieved 2021-10-13.
  13. ^ "Preliminary Analysis: KN-23 SRBM". James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. 2019-06-05. Retrieved 2021-10-13.
  14. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w "The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database". Nuclear Threat Initiative. Retrieved 2025-01-03.
  15. ^ "KN-23（イスカンデル擬き）は火星11Aである" [KN-23 (Iskander imitator) is Hwasong-11A]. Yahoo News Japan (in Japanese). Retrieved 2024-12-29.
  16. ^ International Institute for Strategic Studies (13 February 2024). The Military Balance 2024 (1st ed.). Routledge. p. 282. ISBN 978-1032780047.
  17. ^ a b "It"s the Launcher, Not the Missile: Initial Evaluation of North Korea"s Rail-Mobile Missile Launches". 38 North. 17 September 2021.
  18. ^ a b "The First DPRK Missile Launch from a Rail-Mobile Launcher" (PDF). Open Nuclear Network. 17 September 2021. Retrieved 2025-01-26.
  19. ^ Shin, Hyonhee. "North Korea tests railway-borne missile in latest launch amid rising tension with U.S." Reuters. Retrieved 2025-01-26.
  20. ^ "White House says Russia used missiles from North Korea to strike Ukraine". Retrieved 5 January 2024.
  21. ^ "North Korea used US parts in ballistic missile Russia fired at Ukraine: Report". NK News. 21 February 2024. Archived from the original on 2024-02-22. Retrieved 2024-02-24.
  22. ^ "Newly made North Korean missile used in Russian strike on Ukraine: Report". NK News. Archived from the original on 2024-11-14. Retrieved 2024-11-14.
  23. ^ "Ukraine shows evidence Russia fired North Korea missile at Kharkiv". Reuters. 6 January 2024. Retrieved 1 May 2024.
  24. ^ Nichols, Michelle (29 April 2024). "Exclusive: UN experts say North Korea missile landed in Ukraine"s Kharkiv". Reuters. Retrieved 1 May 2024.
  25. ^ "Exclusive: Ukraine examines N.Korean missile debris amid fears of Moscow-Pyongyang axis". Reuters. 7 May 2024. Retrieved 7 May 2024.
  26. ^ "Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Strike Drill of Defence Units in Frontline Area and on Eastern Front". Korean Central News Agency (via Kim Il Sung University). 5 May 2019. Retrieved 2025-01-25.
  27. ^ "Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Strike Drill of Defence Units in Forefront Area and on Western Front". Korean Central News Agency (via Kim Il Sung University). 10 May 2019. Retrieved 2025-01-25.
  28. ^ "Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Power Demonstration Fire of New-Type Tactical Guided Weapon". Korean Central News Agency. 26 July 2019. Retrieved 2025-01-25. For images, see 1 and 2.
  29. ^ "Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Watches Demonstration Fire of New-Type Tactical Guided Missiles". Korean Central News Agency. 7 August 2019. Retrieved 2025-01-25. For images, see 1 and 2.
  30. ^ Vann H. Van Diepen (31 January 2022). "North Korea"s Fifth and Sixth Rounds of January Missile Launches". 38 North. The Henry L. Stimson Center. Retrieved 31 January 2022.
  31. ^ a b "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Military Drills of KPA Units for Operation of Tactical Nukes". Korean Central News Agency. 10 October 2022. Retrieved 2025-01-25. For images, see 1, 2, 3, 4.
  32. ^ "Images of two Hwasong-11A missiles launch in early November 2022". Korean Central News Agency (via KCNA Watch). Retrieved 2025-01-24.
  33. ^ a b "Missile Launching Drill Conducted in DPRK". Korean Central News Agency. 15 March 2023. Retrieved 2025-01-24.
  34. ^ "Nuclear Counterattack Simulation Drill Conducted in DPRK". Korean Central News Agency. 20 March 2023. Retrieved 2025-01-25. For images, see 1 and 2.
  35. ^ a b "Army Unit in Charge of Important Operation Task in Central Front Conducts Missile Firing Drill". Korean Central News Agency. 28 March 2023. Retrieved 2025-01-24.
  36. ^ "DPRK Missile Administration Conducts Test-fire of New-type Tactical Ballistic Missile". Korean Central News Agency. 2 July 2024. Retrieved 2025-01-04.
  37. ^ "North Korea tests "explosive power" of new ballistic missile". NK News. 19 September 2024. Retrieved 2025-01-04.
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