Raid on Grand Harbour

Raid on Grand Harbour
Part of the Battle of the Mediterranean of the Second World War
Fort St Elmo, site of the attack, with the new bridge at the forefront, replaced in 2012
Date 26 July 1941 Location Grand Harbour, Crown Colony of Malta 35°54′07″N 14°31′08″E Result British victory
Belligerents
United Kingdom	Italy
Commanders and leaders
	Vittorio Moccagatta  † Teseo Tesei  †
Strength
Coastal defences 30 fighter aircraft	1 aviso 2 torpedo boats 9 explosive boats 2 manned torpedoes 2 support boats 10 fighter aircraft
Casualties and losses
1 fighter destroyed	17 killed 18 captured 10 boats destroyed 2 boats captured 1 manned torpedo lost 1 manned torpedo captured 3 fighters destroyed

The Raid on Grand Harbour, also known as Operazione MALTA-2, was an Italian raid against Allied shipping in the harbour of Valletta, Malta on the night of 25/26 July 1941 during the Second World War. Italian Regia Marina commando frogmen from the Decima Flottiglia Motoscafi Armati Siluranti (10th Flotilla Torpedo Armed Motorboats Decima Flottiglia MAS, X-MAS) conducted a raid to penetrate the harbour and attack British shipping. The attackers destroyed the St Elmo Bridge trying to enter the harbour, before being driven off by fire from the coastal defences. The Italian force suffered many casualties and the X-MAS group was killed or captured, the worst defeat it suffered in the war.

Background

Raid on Souda Bay

Further information: Siege of Malta (World War II) and Raid on Souda Bay

In late-March 1941, the Decima Flottiglia Motoscafi Armati Siluranti (10th Flotilla Torpedo Armed Motorboats, Decima Flottiglia MAS/X-MAS) sank the heavy cruiser HMS York and the Norwegian tanker Pericles off Crete during the Raid on Souda Bay using Motoscafo da Turismo (MT, explosive boats). Encouraged by this success, X-MAS was ordered on 26 April to plan a similar attack on Grand Harbour. Night reconnaissance by Motoscafo armato silurante (torpedo-armed motorboat) during the new moon at the end of May got within 4 mi (6.4 km) of the coastal defences apparently without being noticed.

Operazione MALTA-1

The attack was authorised to proceed during the new moon at the end of June as Operazione MALTA-1. MAS reconnaissance on the night of 25/26 June approached to 3 km (1.9 mi) without incident. The first attempt launched from Augusta, Sicily on the afternoon of 27 June with five MAS towing nine MT and a MTS-type torpedo boat; it was forced back by poor weather. Another attempt was made on 29/30 June but it too was aborted after weather delays, problems with tow lines and engines.

Operazione MALTA-2

Human torpedo (Maiale), at the Museo nazionale della scienza e della tecnologia Leonardo da Vinci, Milan.

The attack was postponed to 25/26 July and renamed Operazione MALTA-2. The number of MAS was reduced to two, MAS-451 and MAS-452 and two human torpedoes (Siluro a Lenta Corsa SLC, low speed torpedo) were added, carried by a MTL-type boat. The aviso Diana was to tow the MTL and carry nine MT and a MTS. One SLC was added as a stealthier method of making a hole in the steel anti-torpedo net suspended under the St Elmo Bridge; the net prevented the MT from passing into Grand Harbour. The other SLC would enter Marsamxett Harbour and attack Allied submarines in Lazaretto Creek. The Regia Aeronautica would assist the raiders with three air attacks.

The first two air attacks were to take place at 02:15 and 04:15 as navigational aids for the naval group. The third raid at 04:30 inland of Valletta, would coincide with the opening of the steel net, diverting attention from and masking the noise of the naval group. On the night of 23/24 July, a MAS patrol approached to 2 km (1.2 mi) of the Maltese coast before the British turned on searchlights but the Italians were not seen. Commander Vittorio Moccagatta exercised command from MAS-452, with Lieutenant-Commander Giorgio Giobbe commanding the MTs from the MTS. The SLC attacking the St Elmo Bridge net would be Teseo Tesei, one of the SLC designers; the other SLC was piloted by Franco Costa.

Prelude

Harbour defences

The two main fortifications at the entrance to Grand Harbour were Fort Saint Elmo to the north at the tip of the Valletta peninsula and Fort Ricasoli on the southern shore opposite. The forts were manned by the Royal Malta Artillery and armed with six and three 6-pounder guns respectively. The 1st Battalion of the Cheshire Regiment manned searchlights and machine guns along the Ricasoli shore. In mid-July, the British might have learned through Ultra decodes that the Italian were planning a minor naval raid on "an island". The coincidence with Operation Substance made the British wary of unusual Italian naval activity near Malta. On 24 June, Convoy GM 1 from Substance arrived at Malta and became targets for the Italian raid.

Voyage from Sicily

The Italian force left Augusta with 19 X-MAS and 26 sailors at 18:15 on 25 July in good weather. The Royal Air Force (RAF) radar at Fort Madalena detected the Italian squadron at 22:30 about 72 km (45 mi) north-east of Malta and alerted the island defences. The alert lasted until after 23:00 when the radar echoes faded, although gunners and searchlight crews remained near their stations as a precaution; radar ranges were unusually long that night due to a temperature inversion. Diana detached its boats 32 km (20 mi) north of Valletta between 23:00 and midnight, returning northwards to wait for the raiders off Capo Passero. One MT was damaged during unloading. MAS-451 took over towing the MTL. Almost immediately a propeller of MAS-451 was fouled by the towline and the boats collided. One SLC, later used by Costa, was probably damaged in the accident, making it difficult to control. The propeller could not be freed after an hour and the tow was transferred to MAS-452 and MAS-451 was sent back to Sicily. Speed was increased to make up for lost time, leading to the damaged MT falling behind and being scuttled. Half an hour later MAS-451 rejoined the group having freed the propeller.

Attack

The Italians were 8 km (5.0 mi) north of Valletta shortly after 02:00 on 26 July, instead of the scheduled 01:34. The MAS remained here while the MTL and MT went onward at 5 kn (9.3 km/h; 5.8 mph), the maximum speed of the MTL. The diversions by the Regia Aeronautica did not help navigation; the 01:45 attack did not occur and the 02:45 raid by one aircraft missed Valletta and went unnoticed by the raiders. The MTs arrived 1 km (0.62 mi) off of St Elmo shortly after 03:00 where they would wait for the explosion at the bridge to begin their attack. The MTL launched the SLCs about 200 m (660 ft) closer to shore; the launching took a long time. The Italians did not realise that the westerly sea current was pushing the stationary SLCs and MTs eastward and away from the bridge.

St Elmo Bridge

The collapsed bridge after the attack

The damage to the SLC was discovered but Tesei could not repair it and ordered Costa to return to the MTL and scuttle the torpedo. Costa disobeyed and attempted to carry out the attack. Tesei started his attack at 03:45, about an hour late. He could not reach the bridge or demolish the net using the detachable warhead and a time-delay fuse by 04:30, Tesei told Costa that an instantaneous fuze would be used if necessary. The third raid, by two aircraft at 04:13, was early and only roused the defenders. The MTs moved 500 m (1,600 ft) closer to the shore at 04:12, there was no explosion and at 04:40, Giorgio ordered two MTs forward to destroy the net. The first MT was too slow and snared the net, rather than breaking up and exploding; its pilot abandoned the boat as the attack began and was later captured.

The second pilot set his fuze to instantaneous, stayed aboard to ram the net at full speed and was killed as both MTs exploded at 04:48. A bridge span collapsed and its wreckage was a worse obstacle than the net. The explosion alerted the garrison and shortly after the explosion, a 6-pounder at Fort Saint Elmo fired at a tiny bow wave moving toward the bridge, 600 yd (550 m) away, causing the object to explode, which was probably caused by the warhead of Tesei's SLC, killing him; an Italian breathing mask with hair and skin attached was discovered nearby in the morning.

Withdrawal

The explosion at the bridge was the signal for the MTs to attack. They were quickly illuminated by searchlights near the bridge and came under intense fire from the defences. Two MTs were destroyed, wounding their pilots who were later captured. The remaining four MTs retreated northwards after realising that they could not enter the harbour and tried to rally. The British ceased fire near the bridge at 04:52. A pair of MTs, one with a wounded pilot overboard remained near the edge of the illuminated area and within sight of the British. Initially, the boats were stationary and appeared abandoned but at 05:20 the sudden movement of one toward the other caused the British to fire upon them for a minute. The MT boats were sunk but their pilots reached the shore and were taken prisoner. At about this time Giobbe reached the MAS. MAS-451 set course for Sicily and MAS-452 took the MTS under tow and headed south, likely to rescue survivors.

Shortly after 05:30, thirty RAF Hurricanes from 126 Squadron and 185 Squadron took off to hunt the raiders. A Hurricane strafed MAS-452 and eight attacked the remaining pair of MTs, both of which were scuttled after the attack; one pilot died doing so and the other swam to Malta and surrendered. The RAF fighters were soon directed northwards to meet ten Italian Macchi C.200 Saettas (Lightnings) from 7 Gruppo and a dogfight started around 05:50. Pilot Officer Denis Winton was shot down in his Hurricane and two Saettas were shot down, an Italian pilot was killed and the other was rescued by an Italian boat.

MAS-452 arrived 5 km (3.1 mi) off of St Elmo shortly before 06:00 and was spotted shortly after at dawn and fired on from the fort. The boat was hit by a 6-pounder firing from beyond theoretical maximum range; the shell, fired on a flat trajectory, ricocheted off of the surface of the water and exploded in the wheelhouse. Moccagatta, Giobbe, the rest of the X-MAS leadership, the captain and helmsman were killed. The remaining eleven crew members feared the MAS would sink and evacuated on the MTS; they returned to Sicily.

MAS-452 was attacked by Hurricanes at around 06:20, 36 mi (58 km) north-east of Malta. The boat was immobilised and the fuel tank was hit and set on fire, three crewmen were killed. The nine survivors, including the wounded commander, abandoned the boat, which exploded at 06:40; they were rescued by a civilian Royal Army Service Corps (RASC) launch later in the morning. The MTL had delayed for too long and it was discovered at 06:40 6 mi (9.7 km) north-east of Malta; it was attacked by a Hurricane directed by gunfire from Fort Saint Rocco and sunk, the pilot being wounded and captured. The mechanical difficulties with his SLC prevented Costa from making any progress; he and his crewmate scuttled the torpedo after the controls failed at 08:00 and then swam ashore near St Andrew's and surrendered. Winton paddled toward Malta in his dinghy before finding and boarding the abandoned MAS-452 and eight dead Italians. Enthusiastically waving the Italian flag attracted the attention of the RASC launch that had rescued the crew of MAS-452 but it was ordered to return to base upon reporting the "aggressive" flag waving. The pilot and the flag were rescued around noon by a RAF Fairey Swordfish floatplane. Two Hurricanes sent out to sink MAS-452 found nothing but as they returned, saw that it was being towed into Grand Harbour by the trawler Jade.

Aftermath

Analysis

The remains of St. Elmo Bridge in Valletta, destroyed in the attack of 26 July 1941

In 1957, the British naval official historian, Stephen Roskill, wrote that the harbour defences were alert and that the attacking force was destroyed, having achieved nothing. In the same year, Marcantonio Bragadin wrote that the raid was the worst and most costly defeat of the special assault units in the war but that "defeat though it was, it must certainly be considered a glorious one". In 2002, Greene and Massignani wrote that the attack became known as a 'glorious failure' in Italian writing. The British Ultra code-breakers gave a warning of the attack, the approach of Diana was revealed by radar and mechanical failures blighted the mission.

The destruction of the bridge blocked the harbour more effectively than the nets and the British reaction led to the craft being destroyed or captured. In 2003, Richard Woodman wrote that the "bold Italian plan had entirely and literally misfired: not only had they rendered...the entrance completely impassable but their approach had been detected and monitored by radar" he called the attack an abject failure. In 2009, Vincent O'Hara called the attack a fiasco because the collapsing of the bridge created an obstacle greater than the torpedo nets used to close the channel.

Casualties

Captured Italian equipment at the National War Museum in Valletta.

None of the 19 X-MAS personnel escaped; 10 were killed and nine were captured. Of the 26 MAS crew, six were killed, nine were captured, and 11 escaped to Italy where one later died of wounds. One Regia Aeronautica pilot was killed. All of the boats and torpedoes, except for the MTS and two Saetta fighters were lost. The British lost one Hurricane fighter and captured MAS-452, which was towed in by the trawler Jade, one MT and Costa's SLC. The MAS was renamed X-MAS and used as an RAF rescue launch or a tender. The MT was sent to Britain for evaluation in September 1943.

Subsequent operations

Further X-MAS operations were delayed by the severity of its casualties at Malta. On 24 September and 21 October 1940 and again in May 1941 X-MAS had made attempts on shipping at Gibraltar to no avail. The fourth attempt on 10 September 1941 succeeded, three human torpedoes sinking the tanker Denbydale (8,145 GRT, later refloated), a 2,444 GRT merchant ship and damaging the MV Durham (10,893 GRT). The six crewmen swam ashore and were soon flown to Italy. In December 1941 the Raid on Alexandria took place and sank the battleships HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Valiant at their moorings.

References

• Bragadin, M. (1957) [1948]. Fioravanzo, G. (ed.). The Italian Navy in World War II. Translated by Hoffman, G. (Eng. trans. ed.). Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute. OCLC 602717421.
• Caruana, J. (1991). "Decima Flotilla Decimated". Warship International. 28 (2). Toledo, OH: International Naval Research Organization: 178–186. ISSN 0043-0374. JSTOR 44892205.
• Cull, Brian; Galea, Frederick (2001). Hurricanes over Malta June 1940 – April 1942 (2nd rev. ed.). London: Grub Street. ISBN 1-902304-91-8.
• Greene, Jack; Massignani, Alessandro (2002) [1998]. The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940–1943. Rochester: Chatham. ISBN 978-1-86176-057-9.
• Hinsley, F. H. (Harry); Thomas, E. E.; Ransom, C. F. G.; Knight, R. C. (1981). British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations. History of the Second World War. Vol. II. London: HMSO. ISBN 0-521-242908.
• Nicholson, Arthur (2015). Very Special Ships: Abdiel Class Fast Minelayers of World War Two. Seaforth. ISBN 978-1-84832-235-6.
• O'Hara, Vincent P. (2009). Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean Theater, 1940–1945. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-61251-408-6.
• Playfair, I. S. O.; Flynn, F. C.; Molony, C. J. C.; Toomer, S. E. (2004a) [1956]. Butler, J. R. M. (ed.). The Mediterranean and Middle East: The Germans come to the help of their Ally (1941). History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. II (facs. repr. Naval & Military Press, Uckfield ed.). London: HMSO. ISBN 978-1-84574-066-5.
• Playfair, I. S. O.; Flynn, F. C.; Molony, C. J. C.; Gleave, T. P. (2004) [1960]. Butler, James (ed.). The Mediterranean and Middle East: British Fortunes Reach Their Lowest Ebb (September 1941 to September 1942). History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. III (facs. pbk. Naval & Military Press, Uckfield ed.). London: HMSO. ISBN 978-1-84574-067-2.
• Rohwer, Jürgen; Hümmelchen, Gerhard (2005) [1972]. Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two (3rd rev. ed.). London: Chatham. ISBN 978-1-86176-257-3.
• Roskill, S. W. (1957) [1954]. Butler, J. R. M. (ed.). The War at Sea 1939–1945: The Defensive. History of the Second World War United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. I (4th ed.). London: HMSO. OCLC 881709135.
• Woodman, R. (2003). Malta Convoys 1940–1943 (pbk. ed.). London: John Murray. ISBN 978-0-7195-6408-6.

Further reading

• Stegemann, B.; Schreiber, G.; Vogel, D. (2015) [1995]. Falla, P. S. (ed.). The Mediterranean, South-East Europe and North Africa, 1939–1941: From Italy's Declaration of non-Belligerence to the Entry of the United States into the War. Germany and the Second World War. Vol. III. Translated by McMurry, D. S.; Osers, E.; Willmot, L. (2nd pbk. trans. Oxford University Press, Oxford ed.). Freiburg im Breisgau: Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt. ISBN 978-0-19-873832-9.
• Shores, C. F.; Cull, B.; Malizia, N. (1987). Malta: The Hurricane Years: 1940–41. London: Grub Street. ISBN 0-948817-06-2.