This is the official post to ask about this project:

• https://www.driverentry.com/node/104

An awesome article about the project by Daniel Brooks (better explained than this post):

• https://www.driverentry.com/article/112

Please, consider make a donation: https://github.com/sponsors/therealdreg

DM via Twitter @therealdreg https://twitter.com/therealdreg

WARNING: this is a DIY-POC just for fun and the code is pure crap x-), btw my english sucks and I am a hardware noob. btw, CORSAIR KEYBOARD can cause problems with ATMEL ICE, put the keyboard in BIOS MODE

my roapt v1 board

The objective of this project is to create an USB device to exfiltrate data from an isolated environment via radio frequency using 433MHz ASK, this allows us to exfiltrate small amounts of information such as digital certificates without the need for an internet connection and at a considerable distance with great penetration unlike 2.4GHz.

In a physically isolated environment such as a Faraday cage we can use an alternative version which exfiltrates the information (crypted-first) to a micro SD. It's important to understand that this is very different from a rubber ducky, while the rubber ducky acts as a fake keyboard the evil mass storage its composed of keyboard radio frequency exfiltration system mass storage, this gives us a very versatile tool.

Now let's see it in a more detailed way:

• infect a target machine without internet
• hardware: at90usb1287 atmega328p ts3usb221 mosfet sd card reader (SPI) rf 433MHz ASK …
• multi-stage malware: only visible when connected to target
• exfiltrate info via:
  • mass storage: crypts/decrypts & hides sectors (only crap-XOR, its an AVR-8 bit!)
  • radio: RF 433MHz ASK (crap-XOR encryption)
• Firmware: keyboard mass storage (USB composite device). LUFA FatFs Dreg adaptation “USB Mass storage SD card for Teensy2/ATMEGA32U4 by Mathieu Sonet”
• Dynamic: serial, VID, PID, USB Descriptor, decrypt/delete sectors…

All the source code its available in my github:

• https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/evilmass_at90usbkey2

WARNING: This is not a rubber ducky! xD

if you want to play with this kind of stuff the prototype board is: AT90USBKEY2 (at90usb1287)

• http://aem-origin.microchip.com/en-us/development-tool/AT90USBKEY2

• at90usb1287
• USB software interface for Device Firmware Upgrade (DFU bootloader) 
• Power supply flagged by “VCC-ON” LED:
  • regulated 3.3V
  • from an external battery connector (for reduced host or OTG operation) 
  • from the USB interface (USB device bus powered application)
• JTAG interface (connector not mounted):
  • for on-chip ISP
  • for on-chip debugging using JTAG ICE
• Serial interfaces: 1 USB full/low speed device/host/OTG interface
• On-board resources:
  • 4 1-ways joystick
  • 2 Bi-Color LEDs – temperature sensor
  • serial dataflash memories
  • all microcontroller I/O ports access on 2x8pin headers (not mounted)
• On-board RESET button
• On-board HWB button to force bootloader section execution at reset.
• System clock: 8 MHz

If you dont like AT90USBKEY2 (at90usb1287) and you know what are you doing, you can port my code easily to Teensy 2.0 Development Board (AT90USB1286):

• https://www.pjrc.com/store/teensypp.html

I developed a private version of evil mass storage using Teensy 2.0. This version will never be public (dont worry, its pure crap xD). Btw, Teensy 2.0 board (16 MHz) is faster than AT90USBKEY2 (8 MHz).

USB can be a little pain in the ass. I recommend to read two essentials books by Jan Axelson:

• USB Mass Storage: Designing and Programming Devices and Embedded Hosts: https://amzn.to/3EqCynZ
• USB Complete: The Developer's Guide (Complete Guides series), Fifth edition: https://amzn.to/3tUe8OT

The book's code its not for AVR-8 bit, but its very well explained.

The first prototype was this chaos:

Well, wtf is this then?

The POC is very simple, it has a SD card with the malware encrypted (a crap-XOR, remember this is an AVR-8 mic).

If you connect the USB N times, the microcontroller removes the malware from the SD. To do this, the usb device only needs POWER. Then, if the researcher plugs some times the device ... bad luck xD 

The idea of the POC is only to infects one target machine. If you connect the USB to other PC the device will work as a normal mass storage (btw very slow because SPI for SD).

Demo video (in Spanish): https://youtu.be/-K6MMVyKEv0?t=346

1. The victim connects the USB device.  

2. To make forensic work more difficult the device can randomize the VID/PID, serial disk and all relevant forensic-USB-data in each connection (the uploaded POC only changes this info in some stages):

   • https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/evilmass_at90usbkey2/blob/master/evilmass/evilmass/Descriptors.c#L112
   • https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/evilmass_at90usbkey2/blob/master/evilmass/evilmass/Lib/SCSI.c#L88
   • https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/evilmass_at90usbkey2/blob/master/evilmass/evilmass/Lib/SDCardManager.c#L150

3. The USB device its an USB composite device (not an USB HUB, again... read the books!!). Windows will detect it as a new keyboard and a new mass storage device.

   • https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/evilmass_at90usbkey2/blob/master/evilmass/evilmass/Descriptors.c#L193

4. The keyboard-device opens a run window (WIN R) and starts to bruteforce the asigned letter for mass storage in order to execute the stored .exe in our mass storage. This exe its not the malware, its the first stage. It retrieves useful information like user name and writes it into the mass storage.

   • https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/evilmass_at90usbkey2/blob/master/evilmass/evilmass/MassStorageKeyboard.c#L342
   • https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/evilmass_at90usbkey2/blob/master/stage1/stage1/main.c#L90

5. The microcontroller gets the SCSI command and if the info it's correct it resets the USB connection, at this moment the malware is at the mass storage. This malware its decrypted (the POC uploaded its only a crap-XOR) using the information written in the mass storage... if evil mass storage it's not connected to the target computer, malware won't be in it. 

   • https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/evilmass_at90usbkey2/blob/master/evilmass/evilmass/MassStorageKeyboard.c#L317
   • https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/evilmass_at90usbkey2/blob/master/evilmass/evilmass/Lib/SDCardManager.c#L381
   • https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/evilmass_at90usbkey2/blob/master/evilmass/evilmass/Lib/SCSI.c#L370
   • https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/evilmass_at90usbkey2/blob/master/evilmass/evilmass/Lib/SDCardManager.c#L587

6. The malware is executed and the microcontroller removes all sectors of the malware from the SD.

   • https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/evilmass_at90usbkey2/blob/master/evilmass/evilmass/Lib/SDCardManager.c#L163
   • https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/evilmass_at90usbkey2/blob/master/evilmass/evilmass/MassStorageKeyboard.c#L125

7. From this moment, the USB device will only work as a regular USB mass storage (keyboard part is removed). The VID-PID other USB info gets changed again.

   • https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/evilmass_at90usbkey2/blob/master/evilmass/evilmass/Descriptors.c#L97
   • https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/evilmass_at90usbkey2/blob/master/evilmass/evilmass/Descriptors.c#L288

8. The malware exfiltrates data writting the mass storage and the microcontroller resends the information via rf 433MHz ASK (helped by an atmega328p). It also supports the exfiltration via the SD card (encrypting the information first).

   • https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/evilmass_at90usbkey2/blob/master/evilmass/evilmass/Lib/SDCardManager.c#L438
   • https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/evilmass_at90usbkey2/blob/master/evilard/evilard.ino#L176
   • https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/evilmass_at90usbkey2/blob/master/stage2/stage2/main.c#L183

NOTE: This attack its only useful to steal little info because SPI slow, RF 433MHz bandwich..

Currently experimenting with two ARM Cortex-M4 32 bit boards: FRDM-K66F MK66FN2M0VMD18 and Teensy 3.6 MK66FX1M0VMD18 (Paul J Stoffregen an awesome community pjrc a lot of code).

What I am looking for:

• Fast microcontroller ARM Cortex-M4 at 180 MHz
• A real SDIO interface (fast SD access)
• Cryptographic Acceleration & Random Number Generator (I want to use AES to encrypt/decrypt sectors...).

NOTE: ARM Cortex-M4 its very very complex compared to AVR-8 bit, you should read this (hard) book:

• The Definitive Guide to ARM Cortex-M3 and Cortex-M4 Processors Third Edition by Joseph Yiu. ARM Ltd., Cambridge, UK: https://amzn.to/3tMbfzC

Teensy 3.6 ARM Cortex-M4 (NXP Kinetis MK66FX1M0VMD18) 180MHz:

• ARM Cortex-M4 at 180 MHz

• Float point math unit, 32 bits only

• 1024 Flash, 256K RAM, 4K EEPROM

• USB device 12 Mbit/sec, USB host 480 Mbit/sec

• 64 digital input/output pins, 22 PWM output pins

• 25 analog input pins, 2 analog output pins, 11 capacitive sense pins

• 6 serial, 3 SPI, 4 I2C ports

• 1 I2S/TDM digital audio port

• 2 CAN bus

• 1 SDIO (4 bit) native SD Card port

• 32 general purpose DMA channels

• Cryptographic Acceleration & Random Number Generator

• RTC for date/time

  • https://www.pjrc.com/store/teensy36.html

FRDM-K66F (NXP Kinetis MK66FN2M0VMD18):

• Performance

  • Up to 180 MHz ARM Cortex-M4 based core with DSP instructions and Single Precision Floating Point unit

• System and Clocks

  • Multiple low-power modes to provide power optimization based on application requirements
  • Memory protection unit with multi-master protection
  • 3 to 32 MHz main crystal oscillator
  • 32 kHz low power crystal oscillator
  • 48 MHz internal reference

• Security

  • Hardware random-number generator
  • Supports DES, AES, SHA accelerator (CAU)
  • Multiple levels of embedded flash security

• Timers

  • Four Periodic interrupt timers
  • 16-bit low-power timer
  • Two 16-bit low-power timer PWM modules
  • Two 8-channel motor control/general purpose/PWM timers
  • Two 2-ch quad decoder/general purpose timers
  • Real-time clock

• Human-machine interface

  • Low-power hardware touch sensor interface (TSI)
  • General-purpose input/output

• Memories and memory expansion

  • Up to 2 MB program flash memory on nonFlexMemory devices with 256 KB RAM
  • Up to 1 MB program flash memory and 256 KB of FlexNVM on FlexMemory devices
  • 4 KB FlexRAM on FlexMemory devices
  • FlexBus external bus interface and SDRAM controller

• Analog modules

  • Two 16-bit SAR ADCs and two 12-bit DAC
  • Four analog comparators (CMP) containing a 6-bit DAC and programmable reference input
  • Voltage reference 1.2V

• Communication interfaces

  • Ethernet controller with MII and RMII interface to external PHY and hardware IEEE 1588 capability
  • USB high-/full-/low-speed On-the-Go with on-chip high speed transceiver
  • USB full-/low-speed OTG with on-chip transceiver
  • Two CAN, three SPI and four I2C modules
  • Low Power Universal Asynchronous Receiver/ Transmitter 0 (LPUART0) and five standard UARTs
  • Secure Digital Host Controller (SDHC)
  • I2S module

• https://www.nxp.com/docs/en/data-sheet/K66P144M180SF5V2.pdf
• https://www.nxp.com/design/development-boards/freedom-development-boards/mcu-boards/freedom-development-platform-for-kinetis-k66-k65-and-k26-mcus:FRDM-K66F

my pull request adding new ClassDriver MassStorageSDKeyboard Demo for LUFA - the Lightweight USB Framework for AVRs:

• abcminiuser/lufa#158

Original sources and programs for AT90USBKEY2 own code & patches:

• https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/AT90USBKEY2

my talk in english (translated by who knows):

• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5-ly4IyrD1Q

just my own adaptation for mass storage sd card and keyboard for AT90USBKEY2:

• https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/lufa-sdcard-mass-storagekeyboard-fatfs-AT90USBKEY2

presentation: 

• https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/evilmass_at90usbkey2/blob/master/Roapt evil mass storage.pdf

Backup article by Daniel Brooks (better explained than this post):

• https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/evilmass_at90usbkey2/blob/master/Evil Mass Storage - DriverEntry - article by Daniel Brooks.pdf

FatFS TTL UART MICRO SD ATMEL ICE JTAG DEBUGGING:

NOTE: I have no plans to make/sell more roapt v1 boards. I don't want to spend money on this xD.

ARM POC version is coming