- Darity and Goldsmith (1996) – Thayer Doyle
- Frey and Stutzer (2002) – Jumur Jamal
- Di Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald (2003) – Tuong Van
- Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) – Jacob Richardson
- Borgschulte and Martorell (2018) – Gaspard Avat
- Hussam, Kelley, Lane, and Zahra (2022) – Oscar Lin Tan
- Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) – Jumur Jamal
- Elsby, Michaels, and Ratner (2015) – This survey reviews the empirical properties of the Beveridge curve and possible theoretical foundations for it.
- Barnichon (2010) – Casey Orton
- Petrosky-Nadeau and Zhang (2021) – Matthew Choi
- Shimer (2012) – Thayer Doyle
- Michaillat and Saez (2024) – Amishi Chokshi
- Kuhn (1957, chapters 1 and 5) – Amishi Chokshi
- Pissarides (2001, chapter 1) – This chapter introduces the canonical version of the matching model of the labor market (the DMP model).
- Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005) – This survey reviews a range of search and matching models.
- Pissarides (2011) – Charles Simons
- Mortensen (2011) – Thayer Doyle
- Michaillat (2024) – Matt Ramos
- Bewley (2005) – Gaspard Avat
- Haefke, Sonntag, and Van Rens (2013) – Matt Ramos
- Akerlof (1984) – Amishi Chokshi
- Jacoby (1984) – Oscar Lin Tan
- Raff and Summers (1987) – Casey Orton
- Mas (2006) – Matthew Choi
- Shimer (2005) – Jumur Jamal
- Hall (2005) – Matt Ramos
- Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) – Bodi Dallas
- Hall and Milgrom (2008) – This paper proposes a form of wage bargaining that produces somewhat-rigid wages. With such wage rigidity, the matching model generates realistic fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies.
- Blanchard and Gali (2010) – This paper blends the matching model of the labor market with a New Keynesian model of the product market. It then shows that under wage bargaining, unemployment and vacancies do not fluctuate at all in the model. This is a strong form of the Shimer puzzle. By contrast, when the real wage is a subproportional function of labor productivity, the model generates realistic fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies.
- Eliaz and Spiegler (2013) – This paper insert reference-dependent preferences into a matching model. Because of these preferences, wage cuts relative to a reference point make workers feel that they have been treated unfairly, which dampens their intrinsic motivation and reduces their output. As a result, firms avoid cutting wages. Because wages are rigid downward, unemployment and vacancies respond more to shocks than under Nash bargaining.
- Michaillat (2012) – Matthew Choi
- Crepon, Duflo, Gurgand, Rathelot, and Zamora (2013) – This paper reports the results from a randomized experiment designed to evaluate the direct and indirect effects of job-placement assistance on the labor market outcomes of young educated jobseekers in France. It finds that jobseekers who are given job-placement assistance find jobs more rapidly, while jobseekers in the same labor market who are not assisted take longer to find a job. This finding suggests that jobs are somewhat rationed, and that assisted jobseekers move ahead of non-assisted jobseekers in job queues. The spillovers of job-placement assistance are particularly strong in bad times, when jobs are scarcer.
- Akerlof, Rose, and Yellen (1988) – Bodi Dallas
- Michaillat and Saez (2015) – This paper adds aggregate demand to the model in Michaillat (2012). This is done by adding a product market to the labor market with a similar matching structure. Aggregate demand shocks generate fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies along the Beveridge curve. In that model, unemployment can be decomposed into three components: Keynesian unemployment (due to insufficient aggregate demand), classical unemployment (due to high real wages), and frictional unemployment (due to matching frictions).
- Michaillat and Saez (2022) – This paper builds a dynamic version of the model in Michaillat and Saez (2015), which is static. In this model the central bank can influence aggregate demand and unemployment through interest rates.
- Michaillat and Saez (2024) – This paper uses the dynamic model in Michaillat and Saez (2022) and generates a Phillips curve by introducing price competition through directed search. To ensure that unemployment fluctuates, the model assumes price rigidity through quadratic price-adjustment costs. The Phillips curve produced by the model guarantees divine coincidence: inflation is on target when unemployment is efficient.
- Michaillat and Saez (2021) – Jacob Richardson
- Michaillat and Saez (2024) – Casey Orton
- Hosios (1990) – This paper shows that in a DMP model, unemployment is efficient when workers" bargaining power equals the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment.
- Chetty (2009) – Charles Simons
- Robinson (1946) – Tuong Van
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Gokten, Heimberger, and Lichtenberger (2024) – This paper uses the formula
$u^\ast = \sqrt{uv}$ to compute the FERUs in selected European countries (Germany, Sweden, Austria, Finland, UK) between 1970 and 2022. It compares the FERUs and unemployment gaps in Europe to those in the United States.
- Michaillat (2014) – Bodi Dallas
- Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) – Gaspard Avat
- Crepon and van den Berg (2016) – Tuong Van
- Neumark and Shirley (2022) – Oscar Lin Tan
- Neumann, Fishback, and Kantor (2010) – Jacob Richardson
- Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) – Charles Simons