Multi-purpose cross-platform hybrid cryptography tool for symmetric and asymmetric encryption, cipher-based message authentication code (CMAC|PMAC|GMAC|VMAC), recursive hash digest, hash-based message authentication code (HMAC), HMAC-based key derivation function (HKDF), password-based key derivation function (PBKDF2|Argon2|Lyra2|Scrypt), password-hashing scheme (Bcrypt|Argon2|Lyra2|Makwa), shared key agreement (ECDH|VKO|X25519|X448|ML-KEM), digital signature (RSA|ECDSA|EdDSA|GOST|SLH-DSA|ML-DSA), X.509 CSRs, CRLs and Certificates, and TCP instant server with TLS 1.3 and TLCP encryption layers for small or embedded systems.

Fully OpenSSL/LibreSSL/GmSSL/RHash/Mcrypt compliant

• Public key algorithms:

  Algorithm	256	512	ECDH	Signature	Encryption	PKI
  ECDSA	O	O	O	O	O	O
  EC-GDSA	O	O		O
  EC-KCDSA	O	O		O
  EC-SDSA	O	O	O	O
  ANSSI	O		O	O	O
  Koblitz	O		O	O	O
  BignV1	O	O	O	O
  BIP0340	O	O	O	O
  BLS12-381	O		O	O	O	O
  BN256	O		O	O	O	O
  Curve25519	O		O	O		O
  Curve448			O	O
  GOST2012	O	O	O	O		O
  RSA				O	O	O
  SM2	O		O	O	O	O
  SM9	O		O	O	O
  NUMS	O	O	O	O	O
  ElGamal				O	O
  EC-ElGamal	O				O
  ML-DSA/KEM				O	O	O
  SLH-DSA	O			O		O

• Subjacent Elliptic Curves:

  Curve	ECDSA	EC-S/GDSA	EC-KCDSA	ECKA-EG
  P-224 (secp224r1)	O	O	O
  P-256 (secp256r1)	O	O	O	O
  P-384 (secp384r1)	O	O	O
  P-521 (secp521r1)	O	O	O
  B-283 (sect283r1)			O
  B-409 (sect409r1)			O
  B-571 (sect571r1)			O
  K-283 (sect283k1)			O
  K-409 (sect409k1)			O
  K-571 (sect571k1)			O
  Brainpool (P256r1)		O
  Brainpool (P384r1)		O
  Brainpool (P512r1)		O
  Brainpool (P256t1)		O
  Brainpool (P384t1)		O
  Brainpool (P512t1)		O
  BLS12-381				O
  Ed25519				O
  Pallas				O
  ANSSI (frp256v1)	O	O
  Koblitz (secp256k1)	O	O		O
  SM2 (sm2p256v1)	O

• Supported ParamSets:

  Algorithm	A	B	C	D
  GOST R 34.10-2012 256-bit	O	O	O	O
  GOST R 34.10-2012 512-bit	O	O	O

• Stream ciphers:

  Cipher	Key Size	IV	Modes
  Ascon 1.2	128	128	AEAD Stream Cipher
  Chacha20Poly1305	256	96/192	AEAD Stream Cipher
  Grain128a	128	40-96	AEAD Stream Cipher
  HC-128	128	128	XOR Stream
  HC-256	256	256	XOR Stream
  KCipher-2	128	128	XOR Stream
  Rabbit	128	64	XOR Stream
  RC4 [Obsolete]	40/128	-	XOR Stream
  Salsa20	256	64/192	XOR Stream
  Skein512	Any	Any	MAC XOR Stream
  Spritz	Any	Any	XOR Stream
  Trivium	80	80	XOR Stream
  ZUC-128 Zu Chongzhi	128	128	MAC XOR Stream
  ZUC-256 Zu Chongzhi	256	184	MAC XOR Stream

• Permutation ciphers:

  Cipher	Key	IV	Mode
  Xoodyak	128	128	Lightweight AEAD Permutation Cipher

• 256-bit> block ciphers:

  Cipher	Block Size	Key Size	Modes
  Kalyna256	256	256/512	EAX, SIV, CTR, OFB, IGE
  Kalyna512	512	512	EAX, SIV, CTR, OFB, IGE
  SHACAL-2	256	128 to 512	EAX, SIV, CTR, OFB, IGE
  Threefish256	256	256	EAX, SIV, CTR, OFB, IGE
  Threefish512	512	512	EAX, SIV, CTR, OFB, IGE
  Threefish1024	1024	1024	EAX, SIV, CTR, OFB, IGE

• 128-bit block ciphers:

  Cipher	Block Size	Key Size	Modes
  AES (Rijndael)	128	128/192/256	All modes supported
  Anubis	128	128 to 320	All modes supported
  ARIA	128	128/192/256	All modes supported
  Bel-T	128	128/192/256	All modes supported
  Camellia	128	128/192/256	All modes supported
  CAST256	128	128/192/256	All modes supported
  CLEFIA	128	128/192/256	All modes supported
  CRYPTON	128	128/192/256	All modes supported
  E2	128	128/192/256	All modes supported
  Kalyna128	128	128/256	All modes supported
  Kuznechik	128	256	All modes supported
  LEA	128	128/192/256	All modes supported
  LOKI97	128	128/192/256	All modes supported
  MAGENTA	128	128/192/256	All modes supported
  MARS	128	128 to 448	All modes supported
  NOEKEON	128	128	All modes supported
  RC6	128	128/192/256	All modes supported
  SEED	128	128	All modes supported
  Serpent	128	128/192/256	All modes supported
  SM4	128	128	All modes supported
  Twofish	128	128/192/256	All modes supported

• 96-bit block ciphers:

  Cipher	Block Size	Key Size	Modes
  Curupira	96	96/144/192	EAX, LETTERSOUP, CTR, IGE

• 64-bit block ciphers:

  Cipher	Block Size	Key Size	Modes
  DES [Obsolete]	64	64	EAX, CFB-8, CTR, OFB
  3DES [Obsolete]	64	192	EAX, CFB-8, CTR, OFB
  Blowfish	64	128	EAX, CFB-8, CTR, OFB
  CAST5	64	128	EAX, CFB-8, CTR, OFB
  GOST89 (TC26)	64	256	EAX, MGM, CFB-8, CTR
  HIGHT	64	128	EAX, CFB-8, CTR, OFB
  IDEA [Obsolete]	64	128	EAX, CFB-8, CTR, OFB
  Khazad	64	128	EAX, MGM, CFB-8, CTR
  Magma	64	256	EAX, CFB-8, CTR, OFB
  MISTY1	64	128	EAX, CFB-8, CTR, OFB
  PRESENT	64	80/128	EAX, MGM, CFB-8, CTR
  RC2 [Obsolete]	64	128	EAX, CFB-8, CTR, OFB
  RC5 [Obsolete]	64	128	EAX, CFB-8, CTR, OFB
  SAFER	64	64/128	EAX, CFB-8, CTR, OFB
  TWINE	64	80/128	EAX, MGM, CFB-8, CTR

• Modes of Operation:

  Mode		Blocks	Keys
  EAX	Encrypt-Authenticate-Translate	All	Any
  GCM	Galois/Counter Mode (AEAD)	128	128/192/256
  OCB1	Offset Codebook v1 (AEAD)	128	128/192/256
  OCB3	Offset Codebook v3 (AEAD)	128	128/192/256
  MGM	Multilinear Galois Mode (AEAD)	64/128	Any
  CCM	Counter with CBC-MAC (AEAD)	128	128/192/256
  SIV	Synthetic IV Mode (AEAD)	All	Any
  CBC	Cipher-Block Chaining	All	Any
  CFB	Cipher Feedback Mode	All	Any
  CFB-8	Cipher Feedback Mode 8-bit	All	Any
  CTR	Counter Mode (default)	All	Any
  ECB	Eletronic Codebook Mode	All	Any
  IGE	Infinite Garble Extension	All	Any
  OFB	Output Feedback Mode	All	Any

• Message Digest Algorithms:

  Algorithm	128	160	192	256	512	MAC
  BASH				O	O
  Bel-T				O
  BLAKE-2B				O	O	O
  BLAKE-2S	O			O		O
  BLAKE-3				O		O
  BMW				O	O
  Chaskey	O					O
  CubeHash				O	O
  ECHO				O	O
  ESCH				O
  Fugue				O	O
  GOST94 CryptoPro				O
  Grøstl				O	O
  Hamsi				O	O
  Haraka v2				O
  HAS-160		O
  JH				O	O
  Kupyna				O	O	O
  Legacy Keccak				O	O
  LSH				O	O
  Luffa				O	O
  MD4 [Obsolete]	O
  MD5 [Obsolete]	O
  MD6				O	O
  Poly1305	O					O
  Radio-Gatun				O
  RIPEMD	O	O		O
  SHA1 [Obsolete]		O
  SHA2 (default)				O	O
  SHA3				O	O
  SHAKE				O	O
  SHAvite-3				O	O
  SIMD				O	O
  SipHash	O					O
  Skein				O	O	O
  SM3				O
  Streebog				O	O
  Tiger			O
  Whirlpool					O
  Xoodyak				O		O
  ZUC-256 Zu Chongzhi	O					O

  • MAC refers to keyed hash function, like HMAC.

Authenticated encryption (AE) and authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) are forms of encryption which simultaneously assure the confidentiality and authenticity of data. Provides both authenticated encryption (confidentiality and authentication) and the ability to check the integrity and authentication of additional authenticated data (AAD) that is sent in the clear.

<?php
function encrypt($plaintext, $key, $aad = '') {
    $nonceSize = 12; // Chacha20-Poly1305 standard nonce size

    $nonce = random_bytes($nonceSize);
    $ciphertext = openssl_encrypt(
        $plaintext,
        'chacha20-poly1305',
        $key,
        OPENSSL_RAW_DATA,
        $nonce,
        $tag,
        $aad
    );
    return $nonce . $ciphertext . $tag;
}

function decrypt($ciphertext, $key, $aad = '') {
    $nonceSize = 12; // Chacha20-Poly1305 standard nonce size
    $tagSize = 16;   // Assuming a 16-byte tag

    $nonce = substr($ciphertext, 0, $nonceSize);
    $tag = substr($ciphertext, -$tagSize);
    $ciphertext = substr($ciphertext, $nonceSize, -$tagSize);

    return openssl_decrypt(
        $ciphertext,
        'chacha20-poly1305',
        $key,
        OPENSSL_RAW_DATA,
        $nonce,
        $tag,
        $aad
    );
}

// Example usage:
$keyHex = ''; // Provide your key in hexadecimal format
$key = hex2bin($keyHex);
$plaintext = "Hello, Chacha20-Poly1305!";

// Encrypt
$ciphertext = encrypt($plaintext, $key);
echo "Encrypted: " . bin2hex($ciphertext) . PHP_EOL;

// Decrypt
$decrypted = decrypt($ciphertext, $key);
echo "Decrypted: " . $decrypted . PHP_EOL;
?>

Parameters for the ANSSI FRP256v1 Elliptic curve, Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information. "Publication d'un paramétrage de courbe elliptique visant des applications de passeport électronique et de l'administration électronique française." 21 November 2011.

The Bign algorithm is a Schnorr-type signature scheme adopted as the standard in Belarus (STB 34.101.45). Below are the equations and descriptions associated with the signing and verification phases of Bign.

The BN256 (ISO/IEC 18636-5:2022) is an elliptic curve used in cryptography, particularly for pairing-based cryptographic protocols like identity-based encryption and short signatures. It was introduced by Paulo S. L. M. Barreto and Michael Naehrig as part of their work on constructing efficient elliptic curves for pairings.

Curupira is a 96-bit block cipher, with keys of 96, 144 or 192 bits, and variable number of rounds, an algorithm described at SBRC 2007 by Paulo S. L. M. Barreto and Marcos A. Simplício Jr., from Escola Politécnica da Universidade de São Paulo (USP), São Paulo, Brazil.

$$ \text{Curupira}[K] \equiv \sigma[\kappa(R)] \circ \pi \circ \gamma \circ \left( \prod_{r=1}^{R-1} \sigma[\kappa(r)] \circ \theta \circ \pi \circ \gamma \right) \circ \sigma[\kappa(0)] $$

Here are the main differences between ECDSA, ECGDSA, and ECKCDSA:

$\text{ECDSA: Compute } r = x([k]B); \text{ s must be a root of } H(m)s^{-1} rs^{-1}a - k \text{ modulo } n,$ $\text{ so compute } s \equiv k^{-1} \left( H(m) ra \right) \pmod{n}.$

$\text{EC-GDSA: Compute } r = x([k]B); \text{ s must be a root of } r^{-1}H(m) r^{-1}sa - k \text{ modulo } n,$ $\text{ so compute } s \equiv a^{-1} \left( kr - H(m) \right) \pmod{n}.$

$\text{EC-KCDSA: Compute } r = H(x([k]B)); \text{ s must be a root of } r \oplus H(m,h) sa - k \text{ modulo } n,$ $\text{ so compute } s \equiv a^{-1} \left( k - r \oplus H(m,h) \right) \pmod{n}.$

$\text{BignV1: Compute } R = [k]G; s_0 \text{ must be a root of } h(OID(H) \parallel R \parallel H(X)),$ $\text{ so compute } s_1 \equiv (k - H(X) - (s_0 2^l)d) \mod q.$

$\text{EC-SDSA: Compute } Q = kG, r = Q_x, h = H(M \parallel Q_x), \text{ so compute } s \equiv k - h \cdot d \mod n.$

$\text{EdDSA: Compute } R = [k] G; S \equiv k H(R \parallel m) \cdot d \mod q, \text{where } H \text{ is a hash function and } d \text{ is the private key}.$

1. $H(m)$ represents the hash value of the message.
2. $k^{-1}$ denotes the modular multiplicative inverse of $k$ modulo $(p-1)$.
3. $\equiv$ indicates congruence.
4. $\oplus$ represents the XOR operation.

The ElGamal algorithm is a public-key cryptography system that enables secure communication between two parties, involving asymmetric keypair generation and cryptographic operations. Initially, a large prime number $p$ and a generator $g$ for a finite cyclic group are generated. Each entity possesses a private key $x$, kept secret, and a public key $Y$, derived from $g^x \mod p$. To encrypt a symmetric key, the sender uses the session key, computes two components (a) and (b), and sends $g^k \mod p$ and $Y^k \cdot \text{key} \mod p$ to the recipient. The recipient, using their private key, decrypts the symmetric key. The ElGamal algorithm is known for its security based on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem and provides confidentiality and authentication properties. It was described by Taher A. Elgamal in 1985.

The EC-ElGamal algorithm is a cryptographic scheme based on elliptic curves that enables the encryption of messages between two parties using a shared public key. Is a cryptographic scheme that allows secure message transmission over an insecure channel. The algorithm relies on the mathematical properties of elliptic curves to ensure the confidentiality of messages.

EC-ElGamal encryption using elliptic curves allows secure message transmission by having Alice generate a private key $y$ and a public key $Y = y \cdot G$, while Bob encrypts a message $M$ with a random value $r$, computing $C_1 = r \cdot G$ and $C_2 = r \cdot Y M$, and Alice decrypts using $M = C_2 - y \cdot C_1$.

First, Alice generates a private key $y$ and a public key of:

$Y = y \cdot G$

where $G$ is the base point on the curve. She can share this public key $Y$ with Bob. When Bob wants to encrypt something for Alice, he generates a random value $r$ and the message value $M$, and then computes:

$C_1 = r \cdot G$

$C_2 = r \cdot Y M$

To decrypt, Alice takes her private key $y$ and computes:

$M = C_2 - y \cdot C_1$

This works because:

$M = C_2 - y \cdot C_1 = r \cdot y \cdot G M - y \cdot r \cdot G = M$

Initially, each party generates its private key as a random number $x$ and computes its corresponding public key $Q = x \cdot G$, where $G$ is a base point on the elliptic curve. To encrypt a message $M$, the sender selects a random value $r$ and computes $C1 = r \cdot G$ and $C2 = M \cdot H r \cdot Q$, where $H$ is another point on the elliptic curve. These values are then combined to form the additional authentication data (AAD), which is used along with the message for symmetric encryption. A nonce value is also generated to ensure randomness in the cipher. The receiver uses their private key $x$ to derive $t = x \cdot C1$ and from it, the symmetric key used to decrypt the message. The algorithm also includes a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) mechanism based on Schnorr, allowing the receiver to verify the authenticity of the received message without revealing their private key.

GOST refers to a set of technical standards maintained by the Euro-Asian Council for Standardization, Metrology and Certification (EASC), a regional standards organization operating under the auspices of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

• Bit-length Equivalence

  Symmetric Key Size	RSA and EG Key Size	ECC Key Size
  80	1024	160
  112	2048	224
  128	3072	256
  192	7680	384
  256	15360	512

Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) is a cryptographic scheme that enables users to encrypt and decrypt messages using easily memorable and publicly known information, such as an email address or user identity, as the public key. In IBE, the sender encrypts a message with the recipient's identity, and the recipient, possessing a private key generated by a trusted authority known as Key Generation Authority (KGA), can decrypt the message. Unlike traditional public-key cryptography, IBE eliminates the need for a centralized public key directory, as the user's identity itself serves as the public key. This convenience in key management makes IBE particularly suitable for secure communication in decentralized or large-scale systems, where distributing and managing individual public keys may be impractical.

  --------------------------------------------------------------- 
 |                  IBE Key Management System                    |
 |       ---------------------------    -------------------      |
 |      |  Private Key Generation   |--|                   |     |
 |      |      Center (PKG)         |  |                   |     |
 |       ---------------------------   |                   |     |
 |                  |  Revoke/Update   |                   |     |
 |                  |                  |                   |     |
 |       ---------------------------   |      Public       |     |
 |      |       Registration        |  |     Parameter     |     |
 |      |       Service (RA)        |  |      Service      |     |
 |       ---------------------------   |       (PPS)       |     |
 |                  |  Registration    |                   |     |
 |                  |  Application     |                   |     |
 |       ---------------------------   |                   |     |
 |      |         Terminal          |  |                   |     |
 |      |    Entity (User/Client)   |--|                   |     |
 |       ---------------------------    -------------------      |
  --------------------------------------------------------------- 

Keying material is in general to include things like shared Diffie-Hellman secrets (which are not suitable as symmetric keys), which have more structure than normal keys.

MAC (Message Authentication Code) is a cryptographic function used to ensure the integrity and authenticity of a message. It takes a message and a secret key as inputs and produces a fixed-size authentication tag, which is appended to the message. The receiver can then verify the authenticity of the message by recomputing the MAC using the shared secret key and comparing it to the received tag. If they match, the message is deemed authentic and unaltered.

Module-lattice-based algorithms, such as KEM (Key Encapsulation Mechanism) and DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm), are promising solutions in post-quantum cryptography that provide security against attacks from quantum computers. KEM facilitates secure key exchange by encapsulating a secret key in an object, leveraging complex mathematical problems like the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) or Learning With Errors (LWE) to ensure security and efficiency. Meanwhile, DSA generates and verifies digital signatures, ensuring the authenticity and integrity of messages while also using lattice structures for protection against quantum algorithms. Together, these approaches represent a significant advancement for information security in the future.

Microsoft Nothing Up My Sleeve Elliptic curves
NUMS (Nothing Up My Sleeve) curves, which are supported in the MSRElliptic Curve Cryptography Library (a.k.a. MSR ECCLib).

These curves are elliptic curves over a prime field, just like the NIST or Brainpool curves. However, the domain-parameters are choosen using a VERY TIGHT DESIGN SPACE to ensure, that the introduction of a backdoor is infeasable. For a desired size of $s$ bits the prime $p$ is choosen as $p = 2^s - c$ with the smallest $c$ where $c>0$ and $p$ mod 4 = 3 and $p$ being prime.

PBKDF2 (Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2) is a widely used cryptographic function designed to derive secure cryptographic keys from weak passwords or passphrases. It applies a pseudorandom function, such as HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256, or HMAC-SHA512, multiple times in a loop, with a salt and a user-defined number of iterations, effectively increasing the computational cost of key generation. This technique enhances the resilience against brute-force attacks, making it more difficult and time-consuming for attackers to obtain the original password from the derived key.

Quantum computing is in an early stage of development and faces significant challenges, including the control and correction of quantum errors. Predictions vary, but many experts agree that we are still several years, or even decades, away from having the ability to build a quantum computer large enough to threaten public key cryptography algorithms currently considered secure. Scalable, sufficiently powerful quantum computers have not yet been constructed. Therefore, post-quantum cryptography is more of a precautionary measure, as classical algorithms remain secure for most everyday applications. Understand which algorithms have been compromised with the advent of quantum algorithms like Shor and Grover:

• Security Level

  Name	Function	pre-quantum	post-quantum
  AES-128	block cipher	128	64 (Grover)
  AES-256	block cipher	256	128 (Grover)
  Salsa20	stream cipher	256	128 (Grover)
  GMAC	MAC	128	128
  Poly1305	MAC	128	128
  SHA-256	hash function	256	128 (Grover)
  SHA-3	hash function	256	128 (Grover)
  RSA-3072	encryption	128	broken (Shor)
  RSA-3072	signature	128	broken (Shor)
  256-bit ECDH	key exchange	128	broken (Shor)
  256-bit ECDSA	signature	128	broken (Shor)

SM2 is a public key cryptographic algorithm based on elliptic curves, used for e.g. generation and verification of digital signatures; SM3, a hashing algorithm comparable to SHA-256; and SM4, a block cipher algorithm for symmetric cryptography comparable to AES-128. These standards are becoming widely used in Chinese commercial applications such as banking and telecommunications and are sometimes made mandatory for products procured by Chinese government agencies. SM4 is part of the ARMv8.4-A expansion to the ARM architecture.

Parameters for the sm9p256v1 Elliptic curve

SM9 is a Chinese National Identity Based Cryptography Standard and was originally published using a 256-bit Barreto-Naehrig Curve as its primary example. The new paper suggests that because attacks against some Barreto-Naehrig curves have improved that the SM9 standard should adopt a 384-bit Barreto-Naehrig Curve. The authors go on to suggest that this curve offers roughly 118 bits of security.

XOR (Exclusive OR) is a logical operator that works on bits. Let’s denote it by ^. If the two bits it takes as input are the same, the result is 0, otherwise it is 1. This implements an exclusive or operation, i.e. exactly one argument has to be 1 for the final result to be 1. We can show this using a truth table:

• exclusive or

  x	y	x^y
  0	0	0
  0	1	1
  1	0	1
  1	1	0

The ZUC-256 cipher is a symmetric key encryption algorithm widely used in 5G communication technologies, providing robust and efficient security. The ZUC-256 algorithm is based on the original ZUC cipher, developed by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and adopted by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) standard to ensure data integrity and confidentiality in fifth-generation mobile networks. Its name pays tribute to Zu Chongzhi, a 5th-century Chinese mathematician and astronomer, renowned for his contributions to mathematics, astronomy, and hydraulic engineering. His remarkable approximation of the value of π (pi) enabled more precise calculations in various scientific fields.

• Cryptographic Functions:

  • Asymmetric Encryption
  • Symmetric Encryption AEAD Modes
  • Digital Signature
  • Recursive Hash Digest Check
  • ECDH (Shared Key Agreement)
  • CMAC (Cipher-based message authentication code)
  • HMAC (Hash-based message authentication code)
  • HKDF (HMAC-based key derivation function)
  • PBKDF2 (Password-based key derivation function)
  • PHS (Password-hashing scheme)
  • TLS (Transport Layer Security v1.2 and 1.3)
  • TLCP (Transport Layer Cryptography Protocol v1.1)
  • PKCS12 (Personal Information Exchange Syntax v1.1)
  • X.509 CSRs, CRLs and Certificates

• Non-cryptographic Functions:

  • Hex string encoder/dump/decoder (xxd-like)
  • Base32 encoder/decoder
  • Base64 encoder/decoder
  • Base85 encoder/decoder
  • Privacy-Enhanced Mail (PEM format)
  • RandomArt (OpenSSH-like)

Usage of ./edgetk:
  -algorithm string
    	Public key algorithm: EC, Ed25519, GOST2012, SM2. (default "RSA")
  -base32 string
    	Encode binary string to Base32 format and vice-versa. [enc|dec]
  -base64 string
    	Encode binary string to Base64 format and vice-versa. [enc|dec]
  -base85 string
    	Encode binary string to Base85 format and vice-versa. [enc|dec]
  -bits int
    	Key length. (for keypair generation and symmetric encryption)
  -cacert string
    	CA Certificate path. (for TLCP Protocol)
  -cakey string
    	CA Private key. (for TLCP Protocol)
  -cert string
    	Certificate path.
  -check
    	Check hashsum file. ('-' for STDIN)
  -cipher string
    	Symmetric algorithm: aes, blowfish, magma or sm4. (default "aes")
  -crl string
    	Certificate Revocation List path.
  -crypt string
    	Bulk Encryption with Stream and Block ciphers. [enc|dec|help]
  -curve string
    	Subjacent curve (ECDSA, BLS12381G1 and G2.) (default "ecdsa")
  -days int
    	Defines the validity of the certificate from the date of creation.
  -digest
    	Target file/wildcard to generate hashsum list. ('-' for STDIN)
  -factorp string
    	Makwa private Factor P. (for Makwa Password-hashing Scheme)
  -factorq string
    	Makwa private Factor Q. (for Makwa Password-hashing Scheme)
  -hex string
    	Encode binary string to hex format and vice-versa. [enc|dump|dec]
  -hid uint
    	Hierarchy Identifier. (for SM9 User Private Key) (default 1)
  -id string
    	User Identifier. (for SM9 User Private Key operations)
  -info string
    	Additional info. (for HKDF command and AEAD bulk encryption)
  -ipport string
    	Local Port/remote's side Public IP:Port.
  -iter int
    	Iter. (for Password-based key derivation function) (default 1)
  -iv string
    	Initialization Vector. (for symmetric encryption)
  -kdf string
    	Key derivation function. [pbkdf2|hkdf|scrypt|argon2|lyra2re2]
  -key string
    	Asymmetric key, symmetric key or HMAC key, depending on operation.
  -mac string
    	Compute Hash/Cipher-based message authentication code.
  -master string
    	Master key path. (for sm9 setup) (default "Master.pem")
  -md string
    	Hash algorithm: sha256, sha3-256 or whirlpool. (default "sha256")
  -mode string
    	Mode of operation: GCM, MGM, CBC, CFB8, OCB, OFB. (default "CTR")
  -modulus string
    	Makwa modulus. (Makwa hash Public Parameter)
  -nopad
    	No padding. (for Base64 and Base32 encoding)
  -params string
    	ElGamal Public Parameters path.
  -paramset string
    	Elliptic curve ParamSet: A, B, C, D. (for GOST2012) (default "A")
  -pass string
    	Password/Passphrase. (for Private key PEM encryption)
  -passout string
    	User Password. (for SM9 User Private Key PEM encryption)
  -peerid string
    	Remote's side User Identifier. (for SM9 Key Exchange)
  -pkey string
    	Subcommands: keygen|certgen, sign|verify|derive, text|modulus.
  -prv string
    	Private key path. (for keypair generation) (default "Private.pem")
  -pub string
    	Public key path. (for keypair generation) (default "Public.pem")
  -rand int
    	Generate random cryptographic key with given bit length.
  -recover
    	Recover Passphrase from Makwa hash with Private Parameters.
  -recursive
    	Process directories recursively. (for DIGEST command only)
  -root string
    	Root CA Certificate path.
  -salt string
    	Salt. (for HKDF and PBKDF2 commands)
  -signature string
    	Input signature. (for VERIFY command and MAC verification)
  -subj string
    	Subject: Identity for which a digital certificate.
  -tcp string
    	Encrypted TCP/IP Transfer Protocol. [server|ip|client]
  -tweak string
    	Additional 128-bit parameter input. (for THREEFISH encryption)
  -version
    	Print version info.
  -wrap int
    	Wrap lines after N columns. (for Base64/32 encoding) (default 64)

edgetk -pkey keygen -algorithm [ml-dsa|slh-dsa] -prv Private.pem -pub Public.pem
edgetk -pkey sign -key Private.pem -pass "pass" -signature sign.txt FILE
edgetk -pkey verify -key Public.pem -signature sign.txt FILE

edgetk -pkey keygen -algorithm ml-kem -prv Private.pem -pub Public.pem
edgetk -pkey wrapkey -key Public.pem -cipher cipher.txt
edgetk -pkey unwrapkey -key Private.pem -pass "pass" -cipher cipher.txt

edgetk -pkey keygen -algorithm [ml-dsa|slh-dsa] -prv CAPrivate.pem -pub CAPublic.pem

edgetk -pkey certgen -key CAPrivate.pem -pub CAPublic.pem -cert CACert.crt

edgetk -pkey check -cert CACert.crt -key CAPublic.pem
echo $?

edgetk -pkey req -key Private.pem -pub Public.pem -cert Cert.csr

edgetk -pkey text -cert Cert.csr

edgetk -pkey x509 -key CAPrivate.pem -root CACert.crt -cert Cert.csr Cert.crt

edgetk -pkey text -cert Cert.crt
echo $?

edgetk -pkey check -cert Cert.crt -key CAPublic.pem
echo $?

edgetk -pkey crl -key CAPrivate.pem pub CAPublic.pem -cert CACert.crt serials.txt NewCRL.pem

edgetk -pkey text -crl NewCRL.pem

edgetk -pkey check -crl NewCRL.pem -cert CACert.crt
echo $?

edgetk -pkey validate -cert Cert.crt -crl NewCRL.pem
echo $?

-pass "passphrase"
-days 365
-subj "/CN=Test/OU=/O=/ST=/L=/C=/[email protected]"

./edgetk -pkey setup -algorithm elgamal [-bits 4096] > ElGamalParams.pem
./edgetk -pkey keygen -algorithm elgamal -params ElGamalParams.pem [-pass "passphrase"] [-prv Private.pem] [-pub Public.pem]

./edgetk -pkey sign -algorithm elgamal -key Private.pem [-pass "passphrase"] < file.ext > sign.txt
sign=$(cat sign.txt|awk '{print $2}')
./edgetk -pkey verify -algorithm elgamal -key Public.pem -signature $sign < file.ext
echo $?

./edgetk -pkey wrapkey -algorithm elgamal -key Public.pem > cipher.txt
ciphertext=$(cat cipher.txt|grep "Cipher"|awk '{print $2}')
./edgetk -pkey unwrapkey -algorithm elgamal -key Private.pem [-pass "passphrase"] -cipher $ciphertext

./edgetk -pkey keygen -bits 4096 [-pass "passphrase"] [-prv Private.pem] [-pub Public.pem]

./edgetk -pkey [text|modulus] [-pass "passphrase"] -key Private.pem
./edgetk -pkey [text|modulus|randomart|fingerprint] -key Public.pem

./edgetk -pkey sign -key Private.pem [-pass "passphrase"] < file.ext > sign.txt
sign=$(cat sign.txt|awk '{print $2}')
./edgetk -pkey verify -key Public.pem -signature $sign < file.ext
echo $?

./edgetk -pkey encrypt -key Public.pem < plaintext.ext > ciphertext.ext
./edgetk -pkey decrypt -key Private.pem < ciphertext.ext > plaintext.ext

./edgetk -pkey keygen -bits 256 -algorithm EC [-pass "passphrase"] [-prv Private.pem] [-pub Public.pem]

./edgetk -pkey derive -algorithm EC -key Private.pem -pub Peerkey.pem

./edgetk -pkey certgen -key Private.pem [-pass "passphrase"] [-cert "output.crt"]

./edgetk -pkey req -key Private.pem [-pass "passphrase"] [-cert Certificate.csr]

./edgetk -pkey x509 -key Private.pem -root CACert.pem -cert Certificate.csr > Certificate.crt

./edgetk -pkey [text|modulus] -cert Certificate.pem

./edgetk -pkey crl -cert CACert.pem -key Private.pem -crl old.crl serials.txt > NewCRL.crl

./edgetk -tcp ip > MyExternalIP.txt
./edgetk -tcp server -cert Certificate.pem -key Private.pem [-ipport "8081"]
./edgetk -tcp client -cert Certificate.pem -key Private.pem [-ipport "127.0.0.1:8081"]

./edgetk -rand 256

./edgetk -crypt enc -key $256bitkey < plaintext.ext > ciphertext.ext
./edgetk -crypt dec -key $256bitkey < ciphertext.ext > plaintext.ext

./edgetk -digest [-recursive] "*.*" > hash.txt
./edgetk -check hash.txt
echo $?
or
./edgetk -check hash.txt|grep FAILED^|Not found!

./edgetk -digest -md bcrypt -key "yourkey" [-iter 10] > key.bcrypt
./edgetk -check -md bcrypt -key "yourkey" < key.bcrypt
echo $?

./edgetk -mac hmac -key "secret" < file.ext
./edgetk -mac hmac -key "secret" -signature $256bitmac < file.ext
echo $?

./edgetk -kdf hkdf -bits 128 -key "IKM" [-salt "salt"] [-info "AD"]

• Generate a master key

./edgetk -pkey setup -algorithm <sm9encrypt|sm9sign> [-master "Master.pem"] [-pub "Public.pem"]

• Generate a private key and a UID (User ID) and an HID (Hierarchy ID).

./edgetk -pkey keygen -algorithm <sm9encrypt|sm9sign> [-master "Master.pem"] [-prv "Private.pem"] [-id "uid"] [-hid 1]

• To encrypt a message:
  • Use the master public key.
  • Include the UID and HID associated with the private key.
  • Perform the encryption process.

./edgetk -pkey encrypt -algorithm sm9encrypt [-key "Public.pem"] [-id "uid"] [-hid 1] < FILE

• To decrypt a message:
  • Use the associated private key.
  • Use the corresponding UID.
  • Perform the decryption process.

./edgetk -pkey decrypt -algorithm sm9encrypt [-key "Private.pem"] [-id "uid"] < FILE

• To sign a message:
  • Use the private key (UID and HID are associated).
  • Perform the signature process.

./edgetk -pkey sign -algorithm sm9sign [-key "Private.pem"] < FILE

• To verify the signature of a message:
  • Use the master public key.
  • Use the UID and HID associated with the private key that performed the signature.
  • Perform the signature verification process.

./edgetk -pkey verify -algorithm sm9sign [-key "Public.pem"] [-id "uid"] [-hid 1] [signature "sign"] < FILE

./edgetk -hex enc < file.ext > file.hex
./edgetk -hex dec < file.hex > file.ext
./edgetk -hex dump < file.ext

./edgetk -base32 enc [-wrap 0] [-nopad] < file.ext > file.b32
./edgetk -base32 dec [-nopad] < file.b32 > file.ext

./edgetk -crypt help   // Describes bulk encryption usage and arguments
./edgetk -kdf help     // Describes key derivation function usage
./edgetk -mac help     // Describes message authentication code usage
./edgetk -pkey help    // Describes public key cryptography usage
./edgetk -tcp help     // Describes TLS 1.3 Protocol parameters and usage
./edgetk -help,-h      // Full list of the flags and their defaults
./edgetk -version      // Print version info

• Sergey Matveev (GoGOST Library Author)
• RyuaNerin (go-krypto Library Author)
• Sun Yimin (GMSM Library Author)
• Damian Gryski (Anubis, SipHash, Misty1 Libraries Author)
• Dana Booth (Main Contributor)
• Deatil (go-cryptobin, go-hash Libraries Author)

Use issues for everything

• You can help and get help by:
  • Reporting doubts and questions
• You can contribute by:
  • Reporting issues
  • Suggesting new features or enhancements
  • Improve/fix documentation

This project is licensed under the ISC License.