Tool for exploiting sixnet RTUs

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks and devices are the computational brains behind the nation’s infrastructure. They monitor and control industrial machinery in power plants, oil and gas lines, assembly lines, and etcetera. There exist programmable logic controllers and remote terminal units sitting on these SCADA networks that are critically lacking in some of the most basic security processes and controls. This paper and the corresponding project are meant to highlight such a weakness at the application level of Sixnet SCADA devices. The tool detailed in this project is written in Python and allows an attacker to gain root level access to these Sixnet devices with very little effort.

There are three aspects to a basic SCADA network. The network itself is the medium through which the endpoints communicate with each other. These networks are very similar to corporate local area or wide area networks and may consist of various routing and switching components. Ideally a SCADA network is a completely isolated subnet of a greater corporate network and out of reach of the internet. Another aspect of a SCADA network is the human-machine interface (HMI). This is the vendor-specific monitoring and control software that presents easily readable data from the endpoints of the network to the engineer in charge. For this particular project the HMI used is Sixnet’s I/O toolkit, available free from their website. The final aspect is the endpoints of the network. These are the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) that interface directly with the industrial machinery.

This final aspect is the focus of this paper. There is a very serious lack of system and application security with Sixnet’s PLC and RTU families and this projects sets out to show why. The device used for this project was Sixnet’s VersaTRAK Mini iPm Open RTU/Controller 2 Series. It was running the latest firmware version, 4.3.144, and Linux 2.4 as the base operating system. It had 12 discreet inputs, 4 discreet outputs, 8 analog inputs, 2 analog outputs, an RS232 port, and RS485 port, and two Ethernet ports. For the experiments the device was connected to a small lab network consisting of a switch, a lab computer acting as an Engineer’s computer, a router for DHCP, and a laptop acting as an attacker. All three endpoints were connected to the switch and resided on the same subnet.

Sixnet Tools was created by reverse engineering the Sixnet Universal Protocol. This protocol is a proprietary communication standard supported by most, if not all, of Sixnet’s PLCs and RTUs, including VersaTRAK RTUs, SIXTRAK, RemoteTRAK and EtherTRAK, IOMUX, VERSAMUX RTUs [1]. Depending on the device it can be used over Ethernet, serial, or Modbus communication. The protocol has built-in commands for data acquisition related tasks such as reading and setting I/O and was created as a way to make managing a distributed Sixnet SCADA network easier.

The reversing process entailed generating traffic from the HMI to simulate a live environment and snooping the traffic going across the network using Wireshark. Common tasks like verifying the I/O and configuring network protocols were kicked off using the HMI while monitoring the traffic. Certain patterns arose from this. For instance, all of the traffic between the two points was sent over UDP. Also, even though the port was not detected as open from an Nmap scan all traffic was sent on port 1863. After dissecting and analyzing innumerable packets a specialized driver for the Sixnet Universal Protocol was created. The fields of the protocol are described below as seen for a basic Set Discreet command. A couple notes on the fields: all alphanumeric characters are encoded in ASCII hex values and the destination, source, session, sequence, and CRC fields are left as seen below for every packet sent by Sixnet Tools regardless of command.

This command is used to set the discreet output ports on the device. The command field is set to 0e and the data field is set as follows:

ACK: Other than confirming a 01 in the command field no useful data is returned in the ACK.

A simple no-operation command with command byte 00 that causes the Sixnet device receiving it to reply to the sender with an ACK. The data field is left empty.

ACK: The ACK replying to a NOP contains an empty data field.

This command and its various sub-commands are used to directly interact with the underlying file system of the device. The command field is set to 1a and the data field is set as follows

Returns x characters from the file at the given file path from the given start

ACK: Index 22 of the data field onward contain the next x contents of the file. Returns 02 if the file is not found.

Writes contents to the given file path starting at the given index

ACK: 00 in the data field if successful

Returns the file descriptor of the file located at the given path. [File path] variable Null terminator (00) 1 byte

ACK: The last 5 bytes of the data field contain the file descriptor. Returns 02 if the file is not found.

Returns the file descriptor of a newly created file located at the given file path.

ACK: The last 4 bytes of the data field contain the file descriptor

Returns a 4 byte file size for the given file descriptor

ACK: The first half of the last 10 bytes of the data field contains the file size. Returns 02 if the file is not found.

Moves or renames the file from source to destination

ACK: Unknown, unnecessary to keep track of.

This command runs the contents of the data field much like fork() or exec() would in a C program. A d0 in the command field designates a shell command

Table 9: System Command | Field Length | |--|--| | 1e:01:00 | 3 bytes | | Command string | variable | | Null terminator | 1 byte |

ACK: Starting from index 4 of the data field, the first 245 characters of the output of the command are returned

Sixnet Tools is an organization of these commands into a ready-made reconnaissance and attack program. The arguments for Sixnet_Tools.py are as follows:

Sends a single NOP packet to either the give IP address or to each host on the given network. The network is expressed in CIDR notation. If a properly formatted ACK is returned a Sixnet device has been detected on the network

On the specific device tested the Sixnet rootkit checks the flags in the file /etc/stacfg/general.config to determine if certain services such as FTP, Telnet, and HTTP are enabled or disabled. This option uses the file manipulation commands to read /etc/stacfg/general.config, convert the line enable telnet=0 to enable telnet=1, and writes the result back to /etc/stacfg/general.config. This removes the block the Sixnet software imposes on telnet.

On the specific device tested the Sixnet rootkit checks the flags in the file /etc/stacfg/general.config to determine if certain services such as FTP, Telnet, and HTTP are enabled or disabled. This option uses the file manipulation commands to read /etc/stacfg/general.config, convert the line enable FTP=0 to enable FTP=1, and writes the result back to /etc/stacfg/general.config. This removes the block the Sixnet software imposes on FTP.

Gathers information about the Sixnet device at the given IP address. The firmware version is determined by reading the file located at /etc/sxbuildinfo.txt. The OS version is determined by sending a uname -sr shell command and formatting the result. The hostname is determined by sending the hostname command. The station number is determined by reading /etc/stacfg/general.config and picking out the line “station number=”.

Starts a very dumb pseudo-shell aimed at the given IP address. This is simply a whileloop that encapsulates the user’s input into a Sixnet Universal Protocol shell command packet and prints the contents of the ACK packet (the output of the command) to the console.

Reads a file from a Sixnet device at the given IP and writes it to a local file designated by destination. This uses the file manipulation commands.

Source is a file located on the local machine. This option writes the source to the destination on the remote Sixnet device at the given IP.

Clears the password of the account that the Sixnet software suite is running under on the Sixnet devices at the given IP. This is most likely the root account. This works by sending a passwd command. For some reason just sending passwd runs through the entire password change program setting the password to blank.

Blinks the lights attached to the discreet IO of the specific lab setup used to create this program. This was for proof of concept only and is not intended for use outside of that context.

Sends a command containing the string p(){ p|p& }; p. This fork bombs the remote Sixnet device at the given IP

The goal of this project was to demonstrate the critical lack of security inherent in certain applications on a SCADA network. This goal was soundly reached and the result is an easy to use tool that can gain root-level permissions on a SIXNET PLC or RTU. With the exception of the Blinkenlights option, this tool set was designed to be very general and accommodate just about every device running the Sixnet software suite.

The next logical step for furthering this research would be to develop a method for defending against the attacks used in this tool kit. Perhaps a middle-man device could be created that can perform a deep-packet analysis on incoming packets to determine if they are malicious. It may be possible to reject certain Sixnet Universal Protocol commands based on the content of the data, whether the session and sequence numbers align, or based on some outside criteria like time of day. These are all possibilities for defending a Sixnet Tools type of attack.