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Iraq War in Anbar Province

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Endgame Notes

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In 2002, Saddam moved his intelligence headquarters from Baghdad to Karma.[1]

In May 2006, shortly before his death, Zarqawi outlined a plan to expand AQI's base of operations in Anbar from Ramadi, which would be the capital of his emirate, to the neighboring provinces of Salahuddin and Diyala.[2]

The Iraqi Civil War also created a large pool of Sunni refugees, many of whom fled to Karma.[3]

  • Gordon, Michael R. (2012). The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama. Pantheon. ISBN 978-0307377227. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)

2003 Errata

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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/24/the_iraq_red_team?page=full

As the insurgency began to develop in 2003, for example, a group of officers in the U.S. military's intelligence cell in Baghdad developed a plan to work with the Sunni tribes in the western province of Anbar that was never carried out. Col. Carol Stewart had met with a group of Anbari sheiks and devised a plan to bring them into the fold. The strife-ridden Ramadi and Fallujah areas would be designated a "tribal security zone." Tribal leaders would be authorized to police their own areas and given vehicles, ammunition, and money to pay their men, who would be dubbed the "Anbar Rangers." The entire program would have cost $3 million for six months, a tiny sliver of the multibillion-dollar reconstruction fund for Iraq, officials said.

But when Stewart briefed the idea to an aide at L. Paul Bremer's Coalition Provisional Authority, she was told that CPA did not plan to make the tribes a formal part of Iraq's security structure. Leaving one meeting in frustration, Stewart muttered, "If the United States was not going to be working with the tribes in the new Iraq, where was this new Iraq going to be? On Mars?" Stewart had no more luck with more senior civilian and military officials in Iraq, and the idea was shelved -- only to be revived when the Anbar Awakening emerged three years later.

2004 Errata

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Fallujah as the reign of terror (Awakening 70)[4]

A war of attrition. The armed opposition, determined to force the withdrawal of foreign forces, has opted for a strategy of steady and continuous harassment. The second siege of Falluja in November 2004 appears to have been a turning point, graphically demonstrating the futility of directly confronting U.S. troops or seeking to hold fixed positions. After a short albeit angry debate on this,187 insurgents shifted toward a more fluid and flexible approach that sought to exploit enemy vulnerabilities. Tandhim al-Qa’ida issued an 85-page publication entirely devoted to the battle, with accounts of the siege, testimony on various aspects and practical conclusions. Jami’s first issue, published in September 2005, included a long piece on the battles of Falluja, Karabala and al-Qa’im. U.S. tactics in retaking theses towns was scrutinised and dissected: initial, massive bombardment; entry into the town by elite units backed by tanks and helicopters; forced evacuation of the civilian population, gathered in large and exposed empty lots; completion of a comprehensive blockade, denying access to both civilians and the media; and finally use of incendiary munitions to mop up remaining pockets of resistance.

Before the attack, a split reportedly arose among insurgents controlling the city. Some advocated steadfastness, hoping that they could defeat U.S. forces or die trying. Others were prepared to negotiate or at a minimum redeploy and save the area from destruction. The massive damage inflicted on Falluja was bitterly blamed on those who backed the first approach and held entrenched positions in the city, leading to the U.S. onslaught. Crisis Group interviews, Iraqis from al-Anbar, January 2005.[5]

2005

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http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/01/streetwise/5563/?single_page=true

Make sure opening reflects this section. Fix "Al Qaim".

October–December 2005

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Main article: Operation Steel Curtain

On 5 November, the 2nd Marine Regiment launched Operation Steel Curtain against the border town of Husaybah.[6] The Marines reported that ten Marines and 139 insurgents died in the offensive. Medical workers in Husaybah claimed that 97 civilians were killed.[7][8] On 1 December, ten Marines from 2nd Battalion 7th Marines were killed by a massive IED while on a foot patrol in Fallujah.[7][9]

On 15 October, the people of Anbar went to the polls to decide whether or not to ratify the new constitution. While the turnout (259,919 voters or 32% of eligible voters) was significantly higher than in the January elections, the results were similar: about 97% of the voters rejected the constitution.[Note 1][10][11][12] On 15 December, there was a follow-up election for the Iraqi parliament. Turn-out was even greater: 585,429 voters, or 86% of eligible voters.[13]

Insurgency in 2005

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AQI launched a series of attacks in Jordan in late 2005 that were partially based out of Anbar. The group had already unsuccessfully attacked the Trebil checkpoint along the Jordanian border with Anbar Province in December 2004.[14][15] In August, two US warships in Aqaba, the USS Kearsarge and the USS Ashland, were attacked with rockets; the cell which carried out the attacks then fled into Iraq.[16] On 9 November, three Iraqis from Anbar carried out suicide bombings in Amman, killing 60. A fourth bomber, also from Anbar, was caught.[17]

Most of the votes went to the Iraqi Accord Front, an umbrella group of several smaller Sunni parties.[18]

The elections resulted in an open rift between AQI and other insurgent groups.

AQI denounced the elections, threatened voters, and killed a several politicians shortly before the vote.[12]

Many Sunni Arab clerics in Anbar and elsewhere told their congregations to vote, in order to allow the Sunnis to retake some measure of power in the government.[12] The American and Iraqi officials agreed to allow tribal leaders in Ramadi to guard the polling stations, rather than the Iraqi Army and police.[12] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/15/AR2005121500228_pf.html


Starting in the spring of 2005, the U.S. military began seeing evidence of possible rifts between AQI and the Anbar tribes.[19] The first was in March 2005, when seven AQI operatives were executed by locals in revenge for the murder of one of their tribesman.[20] That same month about fifty shiekhs met with Colonel Joseph Dunford. They asked the U.S. to arm their young men to defend their homes against AQI, but didn't want to work with the Iraqi government. Dunford refused, telling them that the U.S. would not support any militias and they would have to send their men to the Iraqi Army.[21]

While events attendant to the Fallujah Brigade were unwinding in al-Anbar, Talal al-Gaoud was hosting meetings with U.S. Marine officers and officials of the U.S. Department of Defense in Amman, Jordan, in an attempt to negotiate an agreement between the Americans and Anbar’s secular elites.9Talal al-Gaoud was a member of the al-Gaoud subtribe of the Albu Nimr tribe.^e Albu Nimr rebelled against Saddam Hussein in the 1990s, and Talal al-Gaoud’s relative, Fasal Raikan Najris al-Gaoud, was appointed governor of al-Anbar Province not long after the negotiations in Amman ended.While the negotiations did not result in an agreement,the meetings were an early indication that influential Anbaris were interested in engagement.(McWilliams Vol 2. p. 11)

[http://www.comw.org/warreport/fulltext/0709todd.pdf Iraq Tribal Study – Al-Anbar Governorate: The Albu Fahd Tribe, The Albu Mahal Tribe and the Albu Issa Tribe]

In 2005, the Albu Mahals, a tribe that smuggled across the Syrian border, was being forced out of their territory by the Al Salmani tribe allied with Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. The tribe proposed an alliance with the local USMC Battalion under the command of LtCol Dale Alford in November 2005, after being forcibly displaced from their traditional base in Al Qaim, and began receiving weapons and training.[22][23] In September 2006, the leader of the movement, Sheik Abdul Sattar Buzaigh al-Rishawi, formed the Anbar Awakening Council also called "Anbar Awakening" to counter the influence of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.[23]

  • McWilliams (Interview with Abu Mahal Sheikh) pp. 139-147

On November 5, 2005, the Marines conducted another offensive against the towns near Al Qaim. This time they managed to take and hold the towns of Husaybah, Karabilah and Ubaydi, at the cost of 10 Marines killed and 30 wounded. However, Al Qaim itself still remained in insurgent hands.

2-3 December 2005 – Marines with 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, conducted Operation Shank in Ramadi, Iraq. The operation was the fifth in a series of operations by the Iraqi Army and Coalition Forces conducted to disrupt the insurgency.[7]

In November 2005, American commanders held a breakthrough meeting with top Sunni chiefs in Ramadi, hoping to lure them away from the insurgents' fold. The sheiks responded positively, promising cooperation and men for a police force that was then virtually nonexistent. But in January 2006 a suicide bomber attacked a police recruiting drive, killing 70 people. Insurgents killed at least four sheiks for cooperating with the Americans, and many others fled.[24]

McWilliams 2009 53-54

'We don't need al-Qaida'

Al-Zarqawi's forces take over key Iraqi city

REGIONS: WESTERN IRAQ

Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt

Footnotes

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References

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  1. ^ Gordon 2012, p. 57
  2. ^ Gordon 2012, p. 241
  3. ^ Gordon 2012, p. 243
  4. ^ "In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency". Middle East Report N°50. International Crisis Group: 16. 15 February 2006.
  5. ^ "In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency". Middle East Report N°50. International Crisis Group: 23. 15 February 2006.
  6. ^ Cite error: The named reference JWAnderson was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  7. ^ a b c Cite error: The named reference GWOT Chron was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  8. ^ Knickmeyer, Ellen (24 December 2005). "U.S. Airstrikes Take Toll on Civilians". Washington Post. Retrieved 15 December 2011.
  9. ^ Jordan, Karen (3 December 2005). "Two of ten Marines killed in Iraq from Illinois". ABC News. Retrieved 21 February 2012.
  10. ^ Estes 2011, p. 119
  11. ^ Anderson, John Ward (26 October 2005). "Sunnis Failed to Defeat Iraq Constitution". Washington Post. Retrieved 6 April 2012.
  12. ^ a b c d Wong, Edward (22 December 2005). "Turnout in the Iraqi Election Is Reported at 70 Percent". New York Times. Retrieved 6 April 2012.
  13. ^ "Iraq Final Report". Council of Representatives Election Composite Report. International Foundation for Electoral Societies. Retrieved 7 April 2012.
  14. ^ "Saudi pleads innocent to Jordan charge of planning suicide attack". Agence France Presse via Khaleej Times. 7 June 2005. Retrieved 21 February 2012.
  15. ^ "Chapter 5 – Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview". Country Reports on Terrorism (2005). United States State Department. Retrieved 21 February 2012.
  16. ^ "Al Qaeda claims responsibility for rocket attack". Cable News Network (CNN). 23 August 2005. Retrieved 21 February 2012.
  17. ^ Murphy, Dan; Dabu, Sheila M. (14 November 2005). "The Iraqi role in Jordan bombing". Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved 21 February 2012.
  18. ^ "U.N. envoy: Iraq elections a 'success'". Cable News Network (CNN). 16 December 2005. Retrieved 7 April 2012.
  19. ^ "In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency". Middle East Report N°50. International Crisis Group: 10. 15 February 2006.
  20. ^ Anderson, John Ward (19 March 2005). "A Gruesome Find, With a Difference". Washington Post. Retrieved 7 April 2012.
  21. ^ West 2008, pp. 75, 96–97
  22. ^ Cite error: The named reference Seeds was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  23. ^ a b "Iraq's Sunni sheiks join Americans to fight insurgency". SignOnSanDiego. 2007-03-25. Retrieved 2007-12-26.
  24. ^ Pitman, Todd (25 March 2007). "Iraq's Sunni sheiks join Americans to fight insurgency". Associated Press via U-T San Diego. Retrieved 6 April 2012.

Errata

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http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2002289097_iraq26.html New offensive launched against Iraqi insurgents

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/10/AR2005051000221.html 'They Came Here to Die' By Ellen Knickmeyer Washington Post Foreign Service Wednesday, May 11, 2005

By the spring, the Marines had managed to reduce their presence in Fallujah to two battalions, following the arrival of six battalions from the New Iraqi Army, plus two additional Iraqi security battalions.[1]

A Marine from 3rd Battalion 8th Marines breaching a door in Karmah, April 2005.

Al-Awani is Anbar's fourth governor in three years. The first governor, elected in 2003, abruptly resigned in July 2004 after four of his sons were kidnapped. The sons were returned. An interim governor filled in until the Provincial Governing Council appointed Raja Nawaf Farhan al-Mahalawi in January 2005. Al-Mahalawi was kidnapped and died in captivity when his captors engaged in a firefight with U.S. forces.[2]

Insurgents kidnapped Governor Alwani's son on September 6, 2005, but he was later safely returned.[3][4] Similarly, in March 2007, two of Governor Alwani's nieces were killed in improvised explosive device (IED) attacks.[5]

Governor Alwani has survived at least 31 assassination attempts since assuming office in May 2005.[6]

On August 18, 2005, insurgents opened fire on the governor and a group of prominent Sunni Muslim clerics as they were meeting in Ramadi. Witnesses said Governor Alwani was holding talks with members of the Muslim Clerics Association in Ramadi's main Al Dawla al-Kabeer mosque when the gunmen opened fire. The governor and the head of the Muslim Clerics Association in Ramadi, Thamir al-Dulaimi, escaped injury but Dhahir al-Obeidi, head of the Sunni Endowment organisation, was wounded along with his deputy.


3rd Battalion 8th Marines was tasked with retaking the city of Karmah [7]

  • March 24: A suicide car bomb killed 11 Iraqi special police commandos at a checkpoint in Ramadi.[8]

Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna

2006

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January–May 2006

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Firefight in Ramadi, May 2006
Main article: Operation Desert Shield (Iraq)

"The story of what happened in Anbar between January and the summer of 2006 is fairly clear... the security situation fell apart." - Major Alfred Connable, I MEF Senior Intelligence Analyst[9]

Ben Connable: Anbar (Vol 1. Pages 125-133)

Two senior commanders of the 1920 Revolution Brigade, Nasser al-Fahadawi and Mohammed Mahmoud Latif, announced the formation of the Anbar People’s Committee.[10][11]

Ware, Michael (11 June 2008). "Papers give peek inside al Qaeda in Iraq". CNN. Retrieved 5 December 2011.

Insurgency relocates to the Habbaniyah corridor between Ramadi and Fallujah in early 2005.[12]

On January 5, Al Qaeda in Iraq bombed the police recruitment center, killing 80 and wounding 61.[13][14][15]

In Haditha, Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna successfully intimidated anyone who opposed them.[11]

However, the battalion was unable to create a working local police force, due to the overwhelming intimidation by insurgent groups.[16][17] Battalion Commander LtCol Norm Cooling observed, "We didn't have the manpower to control the [main roads] and hold Haditha. The Iraqi Army was as blind as we were. The insurgents killed anyone who spoke to us."[18] One group of 15 police volunteers was murdered by insurgents in Baghdadi in May.[17]

In 2006, Anbar Province was the only province in Iraq not to receive any money from Baghdad for development and reconstruction projects. Four of the 31 members of the Anbar Provincial Council had been murdered by the summer of 2006. MacFarland "trying to take the heat off Baghdad." [19]

In June 2006, Zarqawi was killed by an airstrike and replaced by Abu Ayyub al-Masri.[20]

As late as October, more Americans had been killed in Anbar than anywhere else in Iraq.
his successor, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, called on followers to concentrate attacks. In September, al-Masri urged every insurgent in Iraq to kill at least one American within 15 days.
2006 Ramadan Offensive

Murder of sheikh provokes Sunnis to turn on al-Qaeda. Murder of Sheikh Naser Abdul Karim al-Miklif

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/29/AR2006052901172_pf.html

The insurgents have assassinated 11 tribal leaders in the Ramadi area since the end of last year, when Sunni sheiks in the city began open cooperation with the U.S. military.

The insurgent attacks since then have all but frozen the cooperation between Sunni tribal leaders and U.S. forces in Ramadi, local leaders say.

Last week, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad conceded, in answer to a question about Ramadi in an interview with CNN, that parts of Anbar were under insurgent control.

Violence surged in Ramadi in April and May. In many weeks, Marines in Ramadi have accounted for one-third to half of all American combat deaths in Iraq.

In Ramadi, people describe themselves as under siege. The fighters are moving to enforce the strictest form of Islam on the city, requiring head scarves for women and banning shorts and jeans for men, residents said.

Rumors routinely circulate of a Fallujah-style clearing operation in Ramadi.

Fall 2006

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Following the formation of the Awakening movement, violence in Ramadi continued to increase. On September 29, 2006 an insurgent threw a grenade onto a rooftop where a group of Navy SEALs were positioned. One of them, Master-at-Arms Second Class Michael A. Monsoor, quickly smothered the grenade with his body and was killed. He was later awarded the Medal of Honor. On October 18, AQI's umbrella organization, the Mujahideen Shura Council, formally declared Ramadi as a part of the Islamic State of Iraq.[21]

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Operation Al Majid

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MNF and ISF are no longer capable of militarily defeating the insurgency in al-Anbar.

Colonel Peter Devlin, State of the Insurgency in al-Anbar, August 2006[22]

Even as the Awakening progressed, Anbar continued to be viewed as a lost cause. In mid-August, Colonel Peter Devlin, chief of intelligence for the Marine Corps in Iraq, had given a particularly blunt briefing on the Anbar situation to General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[23] Devlin told Pace that the US could not militarily defeat AQI in Anbar Province, as "AQI has become an integral part of the social fabric of western Iraq." He added that AQI had "eliminated, subsumed, marginalized, or co-opted" all other Sunni insurgents, tribes, or government institutions in the province. Devlin believed that the only way to reestablish control over the province was to deploy an additional division to Anbar, coupled with billions of dollars of aid, or by creating a "sizeable and legally approved paramilitary force". He concluded that all the Marines had accomplished was preventing things from being "far worse".[22] In early September, Colonel Devlin's report was leaked to the Washington Post.[23][24] MEF commander Major General Richard Zilmer responded to press queries about the statement that Anbar Province was lost. Zilmer said that he agreed with the assessment, but added that his mission was only to train Iraqi security forces. He added that if he were asked to achieve a wider objective he would need more forces, but that sending more Americans to Anbar would not pacify the province—that the only path to victory was for the Sunnis to accept the Government of Iraq.[25]

Some of the first offensive operations outside of Ramadi also began in late 2006, with the construction of 8-foot (2.4-meter) high dirt berms around several Iraqi cities in western Anbar: Haditha, Haqlaniyah, Barwanah, Rutbah, and Anah. The berming was part of Operation Al Majid, an American-led operation to clear and hold more than 30,000 square miles (78,000 km2) in western Anbar.[26] Prior to Al Majid, a previous battalion commander had observed that his unit lacked the manpower to control both the main roads and towns of the Haditha Triad, that the Iraqi Army was as blind as they were, and that the insurgents were killing anyone who spoke to Coalition forces.[27] The 2nd Battalion 3rd Marines had lost over 23 Marines in just two months trying to hold the area.[28][29] In addition to the berms and the help of a local strongman known as Colonel Faruq, the Marines set up checkpoints in key locations to regulate entry and exit. By early January, attacks in the Triad had dropped from 10–13 per day to one every few days.[30]

The Iraq Study Group Report, released on 6 December, acknowledged that the Awakening movement had "started to take action", but concluded that "Sunni Arabs have not made the strategic decision to abandon violent insurgency in favor of the political process" and that the overall situation in Anbar was "deteriorating".[31] On the same day, Captain Patriquin was killed by a roadside bomb in Ramadi along with Major Megan McClung, the first female Marine officer to die in Iraq.[32][33][34][35] Following the execution of Saddam Hussein, Saddam's family considered interring him in Ramadi because of the improved security situation.[36] On 30 December, an unknown number of loyalists near Ramadi staged a march carrying pictures of Saddam Hussein and waving Iraqi flags.[37]

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MacFarland's subordinates, including his tribal adviser Travis Patriquin,

On September 17, 2006, a coalition of 25 tribes, led by Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha

"the coalition of 25 tribes sent letters to Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki and other top Iraqi government officials asking for their support. In addition to the government’s blessing, Mr. Rishawi said, the tribes also wanted weapons and equipment to confront the Qaeda-backed insurgents."[38]

In November, a top Sunni leader who heads the Association of Muslim Scholars, Sheikh Harith al-Dhari, described the Anbar Awakening as "thieves and bandits."

Al-Rishawi founded the Anbar Salvation Council in September with dozens of Sunni tribes. Many of the new newly friendly leaders are believed to have at least tacitly supported the insurgency in the past, though al-Rishawi said he never did.

The Most Dangerous Place in Iraq

References

[edit]
  1. ^ Insurgency Is Fading Fast, Top Marine in Iraq Says
  2. ^ Cite error: The named reference USATodayGovernor was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  3. ^ RFE/RL Newsline, 05-09-08
  4. ^ Counterterrorism Blog: May 2006 Archives
  5. ^ Cite error: The named reference wasta was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  6. ^ Bryan/College Station Eagle - [var content_section]
  7. ^ Troops on patrol
  8. ^ MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base
  9. ^ Al-Anbar Awakening, Vol 1., p. 130
  10. ^ Michaels 2010, pp. 99–103
  11. ^ a b Devlin 2006, p. 2
  12. ^ West 2008, pp. 96–97
  13. ^ Hernandez, Nelson; Saad Sarhan (6 January 2006). "Insurgents Kill 140 as Iraq Clashes Escalate". Washington Post. Retrieved 4 December 2011.
  14. ^ Al-Anbar Awakening, Vol 1., p. 129
  15. ^ Michaels 2010, pp. 100–101
  16. ^ Andrew Tilghman (2006-06-05). "U.S. call for Iraqi police in Haditha goes unanswered". Stars and Stripes. Retrieved 2009-12-18.
  17. ^ a b "Hawaii-based Marines, Iraqi soldiers net suspects" (Press release). United States Marine Corps, 1st Marine Division. 9/13/2006. Retrieved 01/01/2010. {{cite press release}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
  18. ^ West, Bing (2008). The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq. New York, NY: Random House. p. 417. ISBN 978-1-4000-6701-5. p. 182
  19. ^ Michaels, Jim (28 August 2006). "In Ramadi, the force isn't huge but the task is". USA Today. Retrieved 3 March 2012.
  20. ^ Knickmeyer, Ellen; Anderson, John Ward (27 October 2006). "October jolt: 92 U.S. soldiers killed in Iraq". The Washington Post via The Seattle Times. Retrieved 24 March 2012.
  21. ^ Karouny, Mariam (18 October 2006). "Gunmen in Iraq's Ramadi announce Sunni emirate". Reuters. Retrieved 6 March 2012.
  22. ^ a b Devlin 2006, p. 1 Cite error: The named reference "ColDevlin" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  23. ^ a b Michaels 2010, pp. 162–165
  24. ^ Ricks, Thomas (11 September 2006). "Situation Called Dire in West Iraq". Washington Post. Retrieved 28 November 2011.
  25. ^ Graff, Peter (12 September 2006). "Marines deny losing Iraq's biggest province". Reuters. Retrieved 12 September 2006.
  26. ^ "Additional Coalition forces, construction of dirt "berms" increase security conditions in Iraq's Haditha Triad region" (Press release). Regimental Combat Team 7, United States Marine Corps. 15 December 2006. Retrieved 20 November 2011.
  27. ^ West 2008, p. 182
  28. ^ Hess, Pamela (5 March 2007). "The Battle For Haditha – Part 1". United Press International (UPI). Retrieved 20 November 2011.
  29. ^ Hess, Pamela (6 March 2007). "The Battle For Haditha – Part 2". United Press International (UPI). Retrieved 20 November 2011.
  30. ^ "US Marines build sand walls in latest Iraq tactic". Breitbart via Marine Corps News Room. 11 January 2007. Retrieved 20 November 2011.
  31. ^ Baker 2006, pp. 11, 20
  32. ^ Cite error: The named reference GWOT Chron was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  33. ^ Cite error: The named reference Raddatz15Dec06 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  34. ^ Cite error: The named reference Anbar Awakens71 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  35. ^ Michaels 2010, pp. 190–192
  36. ^ "Report: Saddam Buried in Hometown Near Tikrit". Associated Press via Fox News. 30 December 2006. Retrieved 23 December 2011.
  37. ^ "Iraqis gather in Saddam hometown after burial". MSNBC. 31 December 2006. Retrieved 4 December 2011.
  38. ^ Paul von Zielbauer; Khalid Al-Ansary; Ali Adeeb (17 September 2006). "Iraqi Tribes to Join Forces to Fight Insurgents". New York Times. Retrieved 26 December 2011.

Errata

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March 10 - A suicide truck bomber detonated his vehicle at a joint Iraqi police and military checkpoint in Falluja on Friday, killing eight people and wounding 11. The bombing was carried out in the eastern part of the city. Police said a number of civilian cars were damaged in the blast.[1]

  • April 17: Two or three suicide car bombers targeted the Government Center in Ramadi, wounding one U.S. Marine.[2][3]
  • May 20: A suicide car bomber attacked a police station in Al-Qaim, killing five people and wounding ten. Victims were both civilians and policemen.[4]
  • July 21: A suicide bomber killed six policemen and wounded 13 others near Falluja. A suicide bomber killed six policemen and wounded 13 others near Falluja.[5][6]
  • September 18: A suicide bomber attacked a police recruitment centre in Ramadi killing 13 people and wounding 10.[7][8]
  • September 25: A suicide bomber attacked a police checkpoint in Ramadi 7 policemen and wounding 7 others.[9]
  • September 25: Walter Bryan Jackson (Service Cross) - For extraordinary heroism in action while serving as a Company Fire Support Officer with Company A, Task Force 1-36 (1st Battalion, 36th Infantry Regiment), Multi-National Corps-Iraq, on 27 September 2006, while engaged in combat operations against an armed insurgent force in Al Anbar Province, Iraq, during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. While recovering a disabled vehicle, Second Lieutenant Jackson's unit came under heavy enemy machine gun fire. Despite the danger, he applied first aid to a severely wounded comrade and was then hit in his thigh with a bullet. Upon regaining consciousness after being shot, Second Lieutenant Jackson alternated between returning fire and administering first aid to the Soldier. Second Lieutenant Jackson was hit again with machine gun fire as he helped carry his wounded comrade to safety, but he never faltered in his aid. Although his own severe wounds required immediate evacuation and surgical care, Second Lieutenant Jackson refused medical assistance until his wounded comrade could be treated. Second Lieutenant Jackson's selfless courage under extreme enemy fire were essential to saving another Soldier's life and are in keeping with the finest traditions of military service, reflecting great credit upon himself, Company A, Task Force 1-36 Infantry, and the United States Army.
  • November 1: Two suicide car bomb attacks on police positions north of Ramadi killed five policemen and wounded three.[10]

A Young Captain and Progress in Al Anbar

His predecessor, Raja Nawaf, was kidnapped and killed. His deputy, Talib al-Dulaimi, was shot to death. Khidr Abdeljabar Abbas, the chairman of the provincial council, was killed in April. Last month, the governor’s secretary was beheaded.[11]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ [1]
  2. ^ "U.S. troops fend off coordinated attacks on sites in Ramadi". USA Today. April 17, 2006. Retrieved May 8, 2010.
  3. ^ CNN http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/04/18/iraq.main/index.html. {{cite news}}: Missing or empty |title= (help) [dead link‍]
  4. ^ MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base
  5. ^ [2][dead link‍]
  6. ^ MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base
  7. ^ [3][dead link‍]
  8. ^ MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base
  9. ^ MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base
  10. ^ Reuters AlertNet - FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 1
  11. ^ Stubborn Man Tries to Govern in Violent Iraq
  1. ^ Voters in Saladin and Nineveh Province also rejected it, but the constitution was ratified because only 56% of the voters in Nineveh rejected it, instead of the required two-thirds majority.
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