Talk:Seymour Expedition

Spelling

Please help the spelling on this page. Thanks. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 160.93.154.156 (talk) 14:54, 23 November 2010 (UTC)

Has anyone read this article? It's dreadful. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.177.147.128 (talk) 22:58, 4 April 2011 (UTC)

Telling the story

This short article has a nice flow to it, but it is strangely interrupted by incoherent remarks, not related to the timeline, vague and emotionally loaded rather than presenting facts.

Specifically paragraphs 2, 3, 4 of Section "The Retreat":

"The Muslim troops led by Dong Fuxiang defeated Seymour." Presumably that means on the 18th, which is dealt with in the previous section.

"The westerners decided to abandon the railway, and withdraw to Tianjin. " This has been said in the previous paragraph.

"The Chinese Muslims put up stubborn resistance, and poured rifle fire at the western forces. They began bombarding the westerners with shells on June 17." Now we are clearly back in time.

"The other Han Chinese forces then began to attack the Allied force after their initial uncertainty. " Again, does this refer to the retreat, or to the 18th?

"The London Times noted that "10,000 European troops were held in check by 15,000 Chinese braves". " What has this to do with anything, apart from ego inflation? The rest of the article says 2,000 western troops; is this sentence denying this ? (why not, but facts please)

"The Chinese won a major victory, and forced Seymour to retreat back to Tianjin by June 26, and Seymour's western army suffered heavy casualties." This speaks both of the 18th (a major victory against a 2,000-strong "army") and of the arrival in Tianjin; but the narration should still be about the retreat; and both these points are covered in the rest of the article.

Speaking about casualties: 374 is quoted for the battle, and later on we have "Seymour's casualties were 62 dead and 232 wounded." Would that second figure apply to the retreat only?

"The Chinese military victories shattered the western claim that a foreign army could occupy China without opposition from the Chinese." What does this sentence say exactly?

• that the western powers at the time felt their claims were shattered, and changed their attitude? hmmm.....
• that we, in this age, have to recognize the strength of the Chinese army? That is one person's opinion, and doesn't fit too well with subsequent events.

81.57.148.99 (talk) 21:33, 29 January 2011 (UTC)

Source

http://books.google.com/books?id=ORBmFSFcJKoC&pg=PA219#v=onepage&q&f=false

Retreat from langfang and bombardment on the railroad and in tianjin by krupp artillery

http://books.google.com/books?id=aYurP94WFrUC&pg=PA45#v=onepage&q&f=false

http://books.google.com/books?id=wkHyjjbv-yEC&pg=PA75#v=onepage&q&f=false

http://books.google.com/books?id=R5tPAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA127#v=onepage&q&f=false

Rajmaan (talk) 23:08, 28 November 2012 (UTC)

june 14 engagement

http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=oBNCAAAAIBAJ&sjid=6LgMAAAAIBAJ&pg=2754,1474186&hl==en

http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/latimes/access/348764842.html?dids=348764842:348764842&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:AI&type=historic&date=Jun 16, 1900&author=&pub=Los Angeles Times&desc=AN ELEMENT OF DANGER.&pqatl=google

http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=nRNCAAAAIBAJ&sjid=6LgMAAAAIBAJ&pg=4288,1130404&hl=en

Rajmaan (talk) 07:49, 1 December 2012 (UTC)

Xigu fort battles

_{Seymour's 2,000 soldiers might have perished along the river except for good luck. On June 23, six miles from Tianjin, Seymour came across the Chinese army's Xigu fort and arsenal which, inexplicably, was nearly undefended.}

According to Jean de Ruffi de Pontevès's Souvenirs de la colonne Seymour: les marins en Chine, the Xigu fort was not "inexplicably nearly undefended", but was a trap. When the expedition reached the dirt wall/mound that was the fort's outer wall, and separating the fort and the river, two Chinese soldiers smiled and waved at the members of the expedition, encouraging them to move on and assuring them that there was no danger, and that the foreign concessions in Tientsin were safe and peaceful. Once the bulk of the troops was at the level of the fort, unnumbered Chinese troops fired on the expedition with rifles and cannons, pinning down the foreign troops along the river and on the Chinese junks that had been commandeered. They expedition survived only because British troops flanked the fort and attacked from behind.

_{The sailors, perhaps more comfortable near water, chose to follow the river, although the railroad route was shorter and ran through open country.}

Still according to the same source, there were several reasons for choosing the river: sailors were not trained to march with heavy equipment in the heat, and fight as well. Commandeered junks were used to transport munitions and cannons and the wounded. Rations were running very low, and the presence of numerous villages meant that there was a possibility that wells could be found, and food pillaged.

The book, although not always accurate, does provide very good information on actual troop movements and decisions, and skirmishes and battles of the Seymour Expedition, mainly from the French point of view. If there are no comments, I'll add a few paragraphs to the article.

One further point regarding the assessment and failure of the expedition (although the entire article doesn't seem to be very fairly balanced): yes, it did fail, in part due to the underestimation of Chinese forces, but that wasn't the only reason. Lack of strategic support, and above all the lack of information regarding the fate of the concessions in Tientsin were very crucial elements. The expedition received no information regarding the intentions of Chinese troops, particularly Nie Shisheng's troops, and had to calculate odds as opposed to relying on accurate information. Scotchorama (talk) 11:56, 7 January 2013 (UTC)

The expedition knew very well that Nie Shicheng was fighting the Boxers and had no intentions of attacking the eight nation alliance. The reason why Nie turned hostile was because of the unprovoked allied attack on Dagu forts. It was Dong Fuxiang's troops they were afraid of. The two Chinese soldiers which smiled and waved were General Nie's soldiers before they turned hostile. There was absolutely no trap. The first hostilities the Expedition has with the imperial army was when Dong Fuxiang's Gansu army ambushed them at Langfang in response to Dagu forts. Once Nie got word of Dagu forts, he ordered his troops to shell the concessions in Tianjin and attack the Expedition since the attack was regarded as a declaration of war.Rajmaan (talk) 17:17, 27 January 2013 (UTC)

The event about the two Chinese soldiers is documented in several publications; it was during the retreat along the Pei-Ho river, when the troops reached the Xigu Fort. The Xigu Fort's northern wall ran along the banks of the river. When the column and the junks that had been commandeered reached the wall, two Chinese soldiers standing guard waved them on, telling them that all was well. When the column proceeded down the river, Chinese troops hiding behind the wall fired on them, inflicting much damage and pinning down the naval troops on the junks. American and British troops had to cross the river and flank the fort to relieve the pressure. So yes, it was in effect a trap; there is nothing wrong with that and it certainly isn't a judgement of value. If anything, it was an astute tactic. This is a different episode from when Nie Shicheng's troops waved at the column on 10 June 1900. I merely wanted to add some objective details to the accounts. By the time the Xigu Fort had been reached, there had already been many battles. Scotchorama (talk) 11:34, 29 January 2013 (UTC)

Source on the retreat

http://books.google.com/books?id=wWvl9O4Gn1UC&pg=PA520#v=onepage&q&f=false

http://books.google.com/books?id=wWvl9O4Gn1UC&pg=PA521#v=onepage&q&f=false

Rajmaan (talk) 02:17, 5 February 2013 (UTC)

Related subject matter

Paintings or direct primary sources related to the expedition. Not to be used as sources

http://www.china.org.cn/living_in_china/expat_tales/2008-03/11/content_12293212.htm

http://www.chinaposters.com.au/?artwork=34-the-great-victory-at-langfang

http://www.dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php/Boxer_Rebellion_Despatches_(Royal_Navy)

http://books.google.com/books?id=waUjAQAAIAAJ&pg=PA206&lpg=PA206&dq=battle of langfang&source=bl&ots=WRlPtWCoUb&sig=W_-68DYeh9v1W64tm-sAhu8SWCo&hl=en&sa=X&ei=7YKuUYjWBYW34AP9uoCwBA&ved=0CEIQ6AEwCQ#v=onepage&q=battle of langfang&f=false

http://books.google.com/books?id=lAxresT12ogC&pg=PA264&lpg=PA264&dq=battle of langfang&source=bl&ots=M1yfyWEy1a&sig=5UIcAjWw_h5Yb5ZZxqSMmQKe8ZY&hl=en&sa=X&ei=7YKuUYjWBYW34AP9uoCwBA&ved=0CD8Q6AEwCA#v=onepage&q=battle of langfang&f=false

Sources

http://books.google.com/books?id=fTkPLTQbxi0C&pg=PA222&lpg=PA222&dq=battle of langfang&source=bl&ots=EJhCIelUxR&sig=ZcaYcVle2MAL5MVU_lfMg2folSw&hl=en&sa=X&ei=b4OuUdCTD_O70QGouoGQCA&ved=0CEIQ6AEwCTgK#v=onepage&q=battle of langfang&f=false

http://books.google.com/books?id=Dh6jydKXikoC&pg=PA568&lpg=PA568&dq=battle of langfang&source=bl&ots=nIG8rQp-G8&sig=v-ojdMiS97erZwhiURGvTsXGtcE&hl=en&sa=X&ei=b4OuUdCTD_O70QGouoGQCA&ved=0CCgQ6AEwADgK#v=onepage&q=battle of langfang&f=false

http://books.google.com/books?id=0lIg-lGwqBoC&pg=PA75&lpg=PA75&dq=battle of langfang&source=bl&ots=WMTEDaQrMA&sig=LCDzGLpIfeP72kL7V4ddxAvvRsw&hl=en&sa=X&ei=b4OuUdCTD_O70QGouoGQCA&ved=0CDgQ6AEwBTgK#v=onepage&q=battle of langfang&f=false

Rajmaan (talk) 02:14, 5 June 2013 (UTC)

Des noms qui se terminaient phonétiquement en gui ( g i ) .

Au XIème siècle , vers 1070 , il existait des noms de familles ou des prénoms féminins qui se terminaient avec la phonétique GUI comme la plante , ( GI en alphabet international ) .

Vincent Thouvenot

Our Sailors; Gallant Deeds of the British Navy during Victoria's Reign

by William H. G. Kingston

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:5MSKJ39yYuoJ:www.readbookonline.net/read/41512/85755/ &cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

FIRST ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE THE LEGATIONS AT PEKIN.

On the 30th of May Sir E.H. Seymour, the British admiral on the China station, received a telegram from Sir Claude Macdonald, the British minister at Pekin, stating that the situation there had become very grave, the China soldiers mutinous, the people very excited, and that European life and property were in danger. Guards were immediately despatched by train to Pekin, and these, numbering 337 of all nations, among them 79 men and 3 officers of the British Marines, arrived unopposed on the 31st. The position of the legations, however, soon became extremely difficult, and on the 9th of June another telegram was received by the admiral, stating that if relief did not reach the Europeans in Pekin very soon, it would be too late.

The admiral at once put in motion all his available men, and the foreign naval officers commanding on the station co-operated with him. By the 11th, four trains had reached Lofa station, some distance out of Tientsin, containing over 2000 men, namely, 915 British (62 officers, 640 bluejackets, and 213 marines), 25 Austrians, 40 Italian, 100 French, 450 German, 54 Japanese, 112 Russians, and 112 Americans, all under the command of the British admiral.

From this time onward there was continuous fighting. About six p.m., three miles outside Langfang, Boxers attacked Number 1 train, but were repulsed. The next day, after repairing the line, the force advanced to Langfang, but beyond this the line was found to be cut up and bridges destroyed; and, as the necessary repairs would occupy some time, Lieutenant Smith, RN, of HMS _Aurora_, was sent forward with 3 officers and 44 men to prevent further damage if possible. He occupied a village on the line next morning, and was at once attacked by Boxers. After being driven off three times, they made a final and determined attack, and about 450 charged in line with great bravery, but were again repulsed with heavy loss; this fighting, however, had so reduced the ammunition of his party that Lieutenant Smith was compelled to return to the main body.

The next day, 14th June, the outposts came running in, closely followed by Boxers, who made a determined attack upon the first train, with so much courage that some of them, notwithstanding a tremendous fire, actually reached the train before they were killed. An unfortunate picket of five Italians on outpost duty were cut off and killed by this party.

Meantime the Boxers were also gathering in the rear and damaging the line from Tientsin, and attacked the guard left to protect the line at Lofa. These succeeded in beating them off, and on the arrival of reinforcements, sent back to their assistance, cut them up as they retreated. All was of no avail, for while the force remained at Langfang repairing the road forward, the enemy was busy in the rear breaking up the line, and so cutting off communication with Tientsin, and it now became clear that the attempt to reach Pekin must fail, as provisions and ammunition were running short and it became necessary to protect the rear.

The expedition was, in fact, now in a very critical position. All attempts to send couriers back to Tientsin had failed, and it was cut off from all communication with the outer world, the lines were broken up in front and rear, the whole country was overawed by Boxers, and no supplies could be obtained from the inhabitants.

It was therefore decided to desert the trains and march by the left bank of the river to Tientsin, putting the wounded on board of some junks which had been captured by the Germans. The latter had been unexpectedly attacked on the 18th at Langfang by some 5000 of the enemy, some of whom were undoubtedly imperial troops acting with the Boxers, thus exploding the idea that the Chinese Government would assist the Europeans against the latter. The Chinese on this occasion, though armed with the latest type of magazine rifle, were driven off with a loss of 400 killed, the allies losing only 6 killed and 48 wounded.

The retreat commenced on the afternoon of the 19th June, and it was necessarily slow, as the junks could not be got along very fast, our men not being accustomed to the craft, and the river shoals making the passage in places difficult. The Chinese harassed and obstructed the advance of the column on shore as much as possible, and villages _en route_ had to be taken by the bayonet, and so persistent was the resistance that on the 21st the column did not advance more than six miles, and was brought to a dead stop at a place called Peitang, where the enemy were in such a strong position that by the evening they had not been dislodged from it.

It now appeared to be becoming doubtful whether the column, embarrassed with the wounded, and with no reserves of ammunition, would succeed in getting through to Tientsin; it was therefore determined, after a rest, to make a night march, and, wearied with a continuous day's battle, the column started again at one a.m. on the 22nd.

After it had gone about one and a half miles, the column was heavily attacked from a village, but the bayonets of the marines soon cleared this, not, however, without a serious loss. The junk which carried the field-guns was sunk by a shot, and all but the Maxim guns lost.

This disaster was, however, destined to be retrieved in a very unexpected manner. At four a.m. the force found itself opposite the Imperial Chinese Armoury, near Hsiku; the allies were not at war with the Imperial Government, by whom officially the Boxers were called rebels, nevertheless the guns from the armoury opened fire upon them. Major Johnstone, Royal Marines, with a party of bluejackets and marines, crossed the river at a point where they were under cover of a village, then, appearing suddenly with a cheer and with the sheen of glittering bayonets, put the Chinese to flight, and captured two Krupp guns. At the same time the Germans crossed over lower down, with similar results, and the Armoury was taken. The Chinese, recovering from their panic, made a determined attempt to retake the position by assault, under cover of artillery fire, but were driven off with loss; but at the same time the allies suffered severely also.

The force now settled down in the Armoury, which could easily be defended and was well supplied with guns and ammunition, and the sick and wounded were now in quarters which, compared with the holds of the junks, must have seemed luxurious; and, but for the question of rations, the force was now safe, but of these latter only enough for three days and that at half allowances remained. Anxiety on this last account was happily set at rest the next day, 23rd June, when, besides immense stores of ammunition, which included war material of the newest pattern, 15 tons of rice were discovered.

All danger was now past. Several efforts had been made to communicate with Tientsin, only five miles distant, but none of the native runners had got through, till the 24th, when a force at once set out under the Russian Colonel Shrinsky, who led a force of 1000 Russians; 600 British, under Captain Bayly, and 300 of other nationalities then arrived at daylight on the 25th. The arsenal, said to contain three million pounds worth of military stores, was set on fire, and the united forces returned to Tientsin the next day without further incident.

So ended the first expedition to relieve the legations in Pekin. The failure was owing to the destruction of the railway and the fact that the Imperial Chinese army, so far from assisting or even standing neutral, took the side of the Boxers and opposed the expedition. That it was not a disaster was owing to the wonderful manner in which officers of no less than eight nationalities worked together, and the courage and endurance of their men. The thought of the Chinese habit of torturing their captives must have added to the natural anxiety of depression on board the junks and to the terrible strain upon the commander.

This thesis source by Smith is very wrong in several parts. It says that General Nie attacked at Langfang when it was in fact General Dong's Muslim Gansu Army which attacked at Langfang.

http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-01282004-104948/unrestricted/Smith_thesis.pdf