Talk:Sampit conflict

Joint Dayak and Malay violence against Madurese

Dayaks and Muslim Malays joined together to massacre and rape 3,000 Muslim Madurese in 1999

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/asia-pacific/1186401.stm

http://www.culturalsurvival.org/ourpublications/csq/article/violence-indonesian-borneo-spurs-relocation-ethnic-madurese

http://indahnesia.com/indonesia/SAMPEO/people.php

http://books.google.com/books?id=OrdM8X7CBTAC&pg=PA299&lpg=PA299&dq=dayaks malay madurese&source=bl&ots=uZeyxBWjTh&sig=HJgReO2XzQEeybz5g8k2mMqTKXk&hl=en&sa=X&ei=e8_vUpXQJqvJsQTvt4GYDA&ved=0CCsQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=dayaks malay madurese&f=false

http://books.google.com/books?id=EUDii8kvQYAC&pg=PA73#v=onepage&q&f=false

http://books.google.com/books?id=IUet7tl_j90C&pg=PA90&dq=Afu Chinese Dayaks Malays senasib&hl=en&sa=X&ei=tN0KU_yOF8buyAHTzIHwCw&ved=0CCsQ6wEwAA#v=onepage&q=Afu Chinese Dayaks Malays senasib&f=false

http://books.google.com/books?id=mk-nXY3HQfoC&pg=PA83&dq=sambas riots&hl=en&sa=X&ei=01YWU6nOMK3I0gHosIDwDg&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=sambas riots&f=false

http://books.google.com/books?id=wJ0pCgm5xS8C&pg=PA186&dq=through anti-Madurese violence, Malay proves indigeneity part politicized field ethnicity&hl=en&sa=X&ei=EVkWU8fHF8qU0QHGt4CoBg&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=through anti-Madurese violence, Malay proves indigeneity part politicized field ethnicity&f=false

http://books.google.com/books?id=wpJGooepEMYC&pg=PA143&dq=Sambas 1999 violence Malay claim indigeneity Koebillah&hl=en&sa=X&ei=0VgWU-7ABsWf0QGTzYHACg&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Sambas 1999 violence Malay claim indigeneity Koebillah&f=false

http://books.google.com/books?id=mPLgeU6K6pMC&pg=PA138&dq=through anti-Madurese violence, Malay proves indigeneity part politicized field ethnicity&hl=en&sa=X&ei=EVkWU8fHF8qU0QHGt4CoBg&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=through anti-Madurese violence, Malay proves indigeneity part politicized field ethnicity&f=false

http://www.library.ohiou.edu/indopubs/1999/03/24/0128.html

http://www.library.ohiou.edu/indopubs/1999/03/21/0047.html

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/1999/04/20/the-solution-sambas-riots.html

The 1999 massacres of Malays and Dayaks against Madurese is called the Sambas conflict.

http://books.google.com/books?id=JWQqTQUrHTwC&pg=PT24&dq=chinese peaceful dayak&hl=en&sa=X&ei=OtsKU6eFNOeayAGK5oHABg&ved=0CFAQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=chinese peaceful dayak&f=false

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1191865.stm

http://books.google.com/books?id=gZU0jbXt5MkC&pg=PA62#v=onepage&q&f=false

http://books.google.com/books?id=Gr3IAVnqmvQC&pg=PA34&dq=Since 1950 in west kalimantan there have been thirteen conflicts&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Wd0KU7HeAqLCyQGTqoDoDQ&ved=0CDYQ6wEwAg#v=onepage&q=Since 1950 in west kalimantan there have been thirteen conflicts&f=false

22:54, 4 March 2014 (UTC)

http://books.google.com/books?id=EUDii8kvQYAC&pg=PA82&lpg=PA82&dq=sambas conflict&source=bl&ots=YDwHDFTcps&sig=iyOr1QcH_GvuWp4KA6VJe1bmvgU&hl=en&sa=X&ei=YGJAU-WiLZW_sQT8qoKYDQ&ved=0CDMQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=sambas conflict&f=false

http://books.google.com/books?id=EUDii8kvQYAC&pg=PA80&dq=Pontianak incident&hl=en&sa=X&ei=MCBDU6emFsa02AWru4DABA&ved=0CDwQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=Pontianak incident&f=false

http://books.google.com/books?id=wpJGooepEMYC&pg=PA151&dq=Pontianak incident&hl=en&sa=X&ei=MCBDU6emFsa02AWru4DABA&ved=0CFsQ6AEwCQ#v=onepage&q=Pontianak incident&f=false

http://videongeri.mywapblog.com/dayak-vs-madura.xhtml

https://books.google.com/books?id=x6Wf1vjz-PYC&pg=PR1&lpg=PR1&dq=By adopting a contentious politics approach that examines the sociological processes of communal violence, the book details six episodes including ethnic fighting in West and Central Kalimantan, and Muslim–Christian violence in Central Sulawesi, Maluku (Ambon) and North Maluku&source=bl&ots=lw_yUkfsAa&sig=--7gvVOjGb4bptUvU60MyI1UPlY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB4Q6AEwAGoVChMIzJmn0fzMyAIVQhw-Ch0VCg7M#v=onepage&q=By adopting a contentious politics approach that examines the sociological processes of communal violence, the book details six episodes including ethnic fighting in West and Central Kalimantan, and Muslim–Christian violence in Central Sulawesi, Maluku (Ambon) and North Maluku&f=false

https://books.google.com/books?id=x6Wf1vjz-PYC&pg=PR1&dq=By adopting a contentious politics approach that examines the sociological processes of communal violence, the book details six episodes including ethnic fighting in West and Central Kalimantan, and Muslim–Christian violence in Central Sulawesi, Maluku (Ambon) and North Maluku&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB8Q6AEwAGoVChMI_5e44fzMyAIViMo-Ch1iqgDB#v=onepage&q=By adopting a contentious politics approach that examines the sociological processes of communal violence, the book details six episodes including ethnic fighting in West and Central Kalimantan, and Muslim–Christian violence in Central Sulawesi, Maluku (Ambon) and North Maluku&f=false

Page i

https://books.google.com/books?id=QbBwAAAAMAAJ&q=By adopting a contentious politics approach that examines the sociological processes of communal violence, the book details six episodes including ethnic fighting in West and Central Kalimantan, and Muslim–Christian violence in Central Sulawesi, Maluku (Ambon) and North Maluku&dq=By adopting a contentious politics approach that examines the sociological processes of communal violence, the book details six episodes including ethnic fighting in West and Central Kalimantan, and Muslim–Christian violence in Central Sulawesi, Maluku (Ambon) and North Maluku&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCUQ6AEwAWoVChMI_5e44fzMyAIViMo-Ch1iqgDB

https://books.google.com/books?id=x6Wf1vjz-PYC&pg=PA54&dq=West Kalimantan experienced two major episodes of communal violence, one in early 1997, and one 2 years later in 1999. The first left about 500 dead and 20,000 internally displaced Madurese migrants (Human Rights Watch 1997).2 The second left fewer dead but an even greater number of displaced Madurese – approximately 35,000, which swelled to 60,000 following another pogrom in 2000 (Norwegian Refugee Council 2002). News reports made the two episodes look similar. Both took place in the same north-western district of the province; both targeted the unpopular Madurese immigrant community with house burning, wholesale expulsion and murder by decapitation and both militant movements described themselves as indigenous cultural protests against immigrants. But the differences were great as well, and we can learn from them. The first played out&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CBwQ6AEwAGoVChMItICNjP3MyAIVCGg-Ch0N-A7w#v=onepage&q=West Kalimantan experienced two major episodes of communal violence, one in early 1997, and one 2 years later in 1999. The first left about 500 dead and 20,000 internally displaced Madurese migrants (Human Rights Watch 1997).2 The second left fewer dead but an even greater number of displaced Madurese – approximately 35,000, which swelled to 60,000 following another pogrom in 2000 (Norwegian Refugee Council 2002). News reports made the two episodes look similar. Both took place in the same north-western district of the province; both targeted the unpopular Madurese immigrant community with house burning, wholesale expulsion and murder by decapitation and both militant movements described themselves as indigenous cultural protests against immigrants. But the differences were great as well, and we can learn from them. The first played out&f=false

https://books.google.com/books?id=QbBwAAAAMAAJ&q=West Kalimantan experienced two major episodes of communal violence, one in early 1997, and one 2 years later in 1999. The first left about 500 dead and 20,000 internally displaced Madurese migrants (Human Rights Watch 1997).2 The second left fewer dead but an even greater number of displaced Madurese – approximately 35,000, which swelled to 60,000 following another pogrom in 2000 (Norwegian Refugee Council 2002). News reports made the two episodes look similar. Both took place in the same north-western district of the province; both targeted the unpopular Madurese immigrant community with house burning, wholesale expulsion and murder by decapitation and both militant movements described themselves as indigenous cultural protests against immigrants. But the differences were great as well, and we can learn from them. The first played out&dq=West Kalimantan experienced two major episodes of communal violence, one in early 1997, and one 2 years later in 1999. The first left about 500 dead and 20,000 internally displaced Madurese migrants (Human Rights Watch 1997).2 The second left fewer dead but an even greater number of displaced Madurese – approximately 35,000, which swelled to 60,000 following another pogrom in 2000 (Norwegian Refugee Council 2002). News reports made the two episodes look similar. Both took place in the same north-western district of the province; both targeted the unpopular Madurese immigrant community with house burning, wholesale expulsion and murder by decapitation and both militant movements described themselves as indigenous cultural protests against immigrants. But the differences were great as well, and we can learn from them. The first played out&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCIQ6AEwAWoVChMItICNjP3MyAIVCGg-Ch0N-A7w

https://books.google.com/books?id=x6Wf1vjz-PYC&pg=PA55&dq=under the banner of Dayak ethnic identity and was driven from a confusing multiplicity of organizing centres. The second was Malay, centrally organized, and looked like a conscious imitation of the first. Dayaks and Malays make up about equal numbers in West Kalimantan – around 40 per cent each (give or take a few percentage points, as the ethnic controversy ensured the 2000 census data was never released for this province). Madurese were a small minority of less than 3 per cent even before the troubles. The largest remaining group is ethnic Chinese, who have a long history in this part of the archipelago but who stayed out of trouble in this period (Human Rights Watch 1997). How did the claims about the identity of Dayaks and Malays shape the violence that occurred in both these episodes? This deceptively simple question conceals a number of conceptual problems, which must be solved before it can be answered satisfactorily. However, before broaching the theoretical discussion – and this chapter must broach it more than most others in this book – it is best to begin with the story of communal violence in West Kalimantan&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CBwQ6AEwAGoVChMIhbmLm_3MyAIVQzY-Ch2UyQcn#v=onepage&q=under the banner of Dayak ethnic identity and was driven from a confusing multiplicity of organizing centres. The second was Malay, centrally organized, and looked like a conscious imitation of the first. Dayaks and Malays make up about equal numbers in West Kalimantan – around 40 per cent each (give or take a few percentage points, as the ethnic controversy ensured the 2000 census data was never released for this province). Madurese were a small minority of less than 3 per cent even before the troubles. The largest remaining group is ethnic Chinese, who have a long history in this part of the archipelago but who stayed out of trouble in this period (Human Rights Watch 1997). How did the claims about the identity of Dayaks and Malays shape the violence that occurred in both these episodes? This deceptively simple question conceals a number of conceptual problems, which must be solved before it can be answered satisfactorily. However, before broaching the theoretical discussion – and this chapter must broach it more than most others in this book – it is best to begin with the story of communal violence in West Kalimantan&f=false

https://books.google.com/books?id=QbBwAAAAMAAJ&q=under the banner of Dayak ethnic identity and was driven from a confusing multiplicity of organizing centres. The second was Malay, centrally organized, and looked like a conscious imitation of the first. Dayaks and Malays make up about equal numbers in West Kalimantan – around 40 per cent each (give or take a few percentage points, as the ethnic controversy ensured the 2000 census data was never released for this province). Madurese were a small minority of less than 3 per cent even before the troubles. The largest remaining group is ethnic Chinese, who have a long history in this part of the archipelago but who stayed out of trouble in this period (Human Rights Watch 1997). How did the claims about the identity of Dayaks and Malays shape the violence that occurred in both these episodes? This deceptively simple question conceals a number of conceptual problems, which must be solved before it can be answered satisfactorily. However, before broaching the theoretical discussion – and this chapter must broach it more than most others in this book – it is best to begin with the story of communal violence in West Kalimantan&dq=under the banner of Dayak ethnic identity and was driven from a confusing multiplicity of organizing centres. The second was Malay, centrally organized, and looked like a conscious imitation of the first. Dayaks and Malays make up about equal numbers in West Kalimantan – around 40 per cent each (give or take a few percentage points, as the ethnic controversy ensured the 2000 census data was never released for this province). Madurese were a small minority of less than 3 per cent even before the troubles. The largest remaining group is ethnic Chinese, who have a long history in this part of the archipelago but who stayed out of trouble in this period (Human Rights Watch 1997). How did the claims about the identity of Dayaks and Malays shape the violence that occurred in both these episodes? This deceptively simple question conceals a number of conceptual problems, which must be solved before it can be answered satisfactorily. However, before broaching the theoretical discussion – and this chapter must broach it more than most others in this book – it is best to begin with the story of communal violence in West Kalimantan&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCIQ6AEwAWoVChMIhbmLm_3MyAIVQzY-Ch2UyQcn

https://books.google.com/books?id=x6Wf1vjz-PYC&pg=PA124&dq=On the evening of 20 February 2001, Dayak fighters attacked the riverside timber harbour of Sampit. They sought out Madurese settlers in the town. Those whom they found, they beheaded. By the next evening the fighters were driving around town in trucks, holding up dripping heads in triumph. Thousands of panicked Madurese survivors fled to government offices, from whence they were shipped out of Central Kalimantan to the island of Madura near Java where their ethnic roots lay. On 25 February more Dayak fighters burned down Madurese homes in the provincial capital of Palangkaraya – their occupants having already fled the province. One hundred and eighteen Madurese were killed the same day in the small town of Parenggean north of Sampit. The men, women and children in this group had come out of hiding in the jungle with promises of safe passage. More Madurese were massacred at the port town of Samuda south of Sampit. Within a few weeks, Dayak fighters had pushed their campaign of ethnic cleansing to the extremities of the main trans-Kalimantan road through Central Kalimantan – to Kuala Kapuas in the south-east, and to Pangkalanbun in the west. Nearly 90 per cent of the provincial Madurese population of 120–130,000 had left (International Crisis Group 2001a: 1, 5). Only in Pangkalanbun, with a substantial Madurese population, did most stay. A large proportion of those who left never returned to Central Kalimantan. Credible estimates of the number of dead range from 500 to nearly 1,300, most of them Madurese.&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAGoVChMI3KTnz_3MyAIVCHs-Ch01hQD7#v=onepage&q=On the evening of 20 February 2001, Dayak fighters attacked the riverside timber harbour of Sampit. They sought out Madurese settlers in the town. Those whom they found, they beheaded. By the next evening the fighters were driving around town in trucks, holding up dripping heads in triumph. Thousands of panicked Madurese survivors fled to government offices, from whence they were shipped out of Central Kalimantan to the island of Madura near Java where their ethnic roots lay. On 25 February more Dayak fighters burned down Madurese homes in the provincial capital of Palangkaraya – their occupants having already fled the province. One hundred and eighteen Madurese were killed the same day in the small town of Parenggean north of Sampit. The men, women and children in this group had come out of hiding in the jungle with promises of safe passage. More Madurese were massacred at the port town of Samuda south of Sampit. Within a few weeks, Dayak fighters had pushed their campaign of ethnic cleansing to the extremities of the main trans-Kalimantan road through Central Kalimantan – to Kuala Kapuas in the south-east, and to Pangkalanbun in the west. Nearly 90 per cent of the provincial Madurese population of 120–130,000 had left (International Crisis Group 2001a: 1, 5). Only in Pangkalanbun, with a substantial Madurese population, did most stay. A large proportion of those who left never returned to Central Kalimantan. Credible estimates of the number of dead range from 500 to nearly 1,300, most of them Madurese.&f=false

https://books.google.com/books?id=QbBwAAAAMAAJ&q=On the evening of 20 February 2001, Dayak fighters attacked the riverside timber harbour of Sampit. They sought out Madurese settlers in the town. Those whom they found, they beheaded. By the next evening the fighters were driving around town in trucks, holding up dripping heads in triumph. Thousands of panicked Madurese survivors fled to government offices, from whence they were shipped out of Central Kalimantan to the island of Madura near Java where their ethnic roots lay. On 25 February more Dayak fighters burned down Madurese homes in the provincial capital of Palangkaraya – their occupants having already fled the province. One hundred and eighteen Madurese were killed the same day in the small town of Parenggean north of Sampit. The men, women and children in this group had come out of hiding in the jungle with promises of safe passage. More Madurese were massacred at the port town of Samuda south of Sampit. Within a few weeks, Dayak fighters had pushed their campaign of ethnic cleansing to the extremities of the main trans-Kalimantan road through Central Kalimantan – to Kuala Kapuas in the south-east, and to Pangkalanbun in the west. Nearly 90 per cent of the provincial Madurese population of 120–130,000 had left (International Crisis Group 2001a: 1, 5). Only in Pangkalanbun, with a substantial Madurese population, did most stay. A large proportion of those who left never returned to Central Kalimantan. Credible estimates of the number of dead range from 500 to nearly 1,300, most of them Madurese.&dq=On the evening of 20 February 2001, Dayak fighters attacked the riverside timber harbour of Sampit. They sought out Madurese settlers in the town. Those whom they found, they beheaded. By the next evening the fighters were driving around town in trucks, holding up dripping heads in triumph. Thousands of panicked Madurese survivors fled to government offices, from whence they were shipped out of Central Kalimantan to the island of Madura near Java where their ethnic roots lay. On 25 February more Dayak fighters burned down Madurese homes in the provincial capital of Palangkaraya – their occupants having already fled the province. One hundred and eighteen Madurese were killed the same day in the small town of Parenggean north of Sampit. The men, women and children in this group had come out of hiding in the jungle with promises of safe passage. More Madurese were massacred at the port town of Samuda south of Sampit. Within a few weeks, Dayak fighters had pushed their campaign of ethnic cleansing to the extremities of the main trans-Kalimantan road through Central Kalimantan – to Kuala Kapuas in the south-east, and to Pangkalanbun in the west. Nearly 90 per cent of the provincial Madurese population of 120–130,000 had left (International Crisis Group 2001a: 1, 5). Only in Pangkalanbun, with a substantial Madurese population, did most stay. A large proportion of those who left never returned to Central Kalimantan. Credible estimates of the number of dead range from 500 to nearly 1,300, most of them Madurese.&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCMQ6AEwAWoVChMI3KTnz_3MyAIVCHs-Ch01hQD7

http://samples.sainsburysebooks.co.uk/9781134115334_sample_819507.pdf

http://dare.uva.nl/document/2/92011

http://www.oapen.org/download?type=document&docid=421239

more photos of the riots

http://www.forumbebas.com/thread-878.html

http://topicstock.pantip.com/chalermthai/topicstock/A3050773/A3050773.html

http://www.artsmen.net/content/show.php?Category=mythboard&No=1333

http://topicstock.pantip.com/chalermthai/topicstock/A3050773/A3050773.html http://www.artsmen.net/content/show.php?Category=mythboard&No=1333 http://www.forumbebas.com/thread-878.html

http://content.time.com/time/covers/asia/0,16641,20010312,00.html

http://www.fica.org/hr/Sanggauledo.html

http://www.fica.org/hr/Sanggauledo.html http://www.fica.org/hr/Banyuwangi.html

http://www.fica.org/hr http://www.fica.org,

http://www.fica.org/hr/Sanggauledo.html http://www.fica.org/hr/Banyuwangi.html

http://www.fica.org/hr/Sanggauledo.html http://www.fica.org/hr/Banyuwangi.html

http://dhuwix.tripod.com/adm/interstitial/remote.jpg

http://dhuwix.tripod.com/gallery/tragedi/sampit/index_sampit.htm

Rajmaan (talk) 22:07, 7 April 2014 (UTC)

External links modified

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Decapitation photos removed

Removed decapitation photos, and added link to Wikipedia decapitation page. The article is about an ethnic conflict, not about decapitation. If the reader wants more details on decapitation, then the Wikipedia link can be followed. On that page, however, they will find that all decapitation photos have been removed (the discussion is archived on that Talk page. Summary of rationale for removal: "the inclusion of this image detracts from the article by adding an unnecessary shock value. Its inclusion will offend some, but its exclusion will offend none" ). It should be clear that since decapitation photos have been deemed inappropriate for the decapitation page, they are certainly inappropriate for a page that is NOT about decapitation. --Zahzuhzaz (talk) 14:11, 30 March 2016 (UTC)