Pukguksong-1

Pukguksong-1
Type	Submarine-launched ballistic missile
Place of origin	North Korea
Service history
In service	2016–2017 (South Korean estimates) 2018 (US estimates)
Used by	North Korea
Production history
Manufacturer	North Korea
Produced	2015 (first known test year)
Variants	Land-based mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile (Pukguksong-2)
Specifications
Height	7.05 metres (23.1 ft) 7.4 metres (with grid fins)
Diameter	1.07–1.13 metres (3.7 ft)
Warhead	nuclear, conventional
Engine	Solid fuel rocket
Propellant	Liquid (2015), solid (2016–)
Operational range	500 km (Based on tested, lofted trajectory) 1,250 km (Estimated, based on standard minimum energy trajectory by David Wright, A physicist and co-director of the UCS Global Security Program) 2,000–2,500 km (South Korea estimation of the actual deployed range)
Launch platform	Sinpo-class submarine

Pukguksong-1
Chosŏn'gŭl	북극성1호
Hancha	北極星1号
Revised Romanization	Bukgeukseong-1ho
McCune–Reischauer	Pukkŭksŏng-1ho

The Pukguksong-1 or Pukkŭksŏng-1, Bukgeukseong-1 (Korean: 북극성1호, lit. 'Polaris-1'), alternatively KN-11 in intelligence communities outside North Korea, is a North Korean, two-stage submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) that was successfully flight tested on 24 August 2016.

Pukguksong-1 is officially recognized by North Korea, South Korea and the United States as a missile that went through a complete, successful test on 24 August 2016. North Korea has never announced the actual operational range and payload, as this technical information is probably considered classified.

Design

In 2015, the missile was first launched with a liquid fuel motor, which was later replaced by a solid fuel motor. The earlier launches, conducted from a barge, did not feature grid fins, while the later submarine launched missiles did. The difference between the Pukguksong-1 and the Pukguksong-3 are the missile diameter, with the -1 being about 1.1 m in diameter, while the -3 is about 1.4 m, like the Pukguksong-2, an older model Pukguksong-3 also exist, with a similar pointed nose cone.

Modified variant

On 20 October 2021, North Korea launched a different version of the Pukguksong-1, with a lengthened body and modified cable raceway. It first appeared in the 12 October 'Self-defence 2021' exhibition, where it was shown next to an older model Pukguksong-3. The new missile features improved control, such as 'flank mobility and gliding skip mobility' and is started with a gas dynamic piston. The missile has been also claimed to be a modified KN-23, and the Japanese government still maintains that two missiles were fired despite North Korean state media stating only one was fired.

Solid fuel motor in other missiles

See also: KN-23 and KN-24

The KN-23, which is usually reported as an Iskander clone likely uses a Pukguksong-1 solid fuel motor with a different nozzle. Compared to the Iskander, the KN-23 is noticeably wider and larger; it likely has the same 1.1 metre diameter as the Pukguksong-1 and thus shares the engine. Similarly, while the KN-24 is similar to the MGM-140 ATACMS, it is much larger than it with a 1.1 metre diameter; it is thus likely to be similar to the Pukuksong-1, but having only one stage.

The motors, at around 1.1 m in diameter, used in these missiles likely derive from the solid fuel motors of the Soviet RT-15, possibly originally acquired for scrap. The casing is made of an unknown metal and the nozzle is likely made from carbon fibre composites, which have been displayed on television.

List of tests

Attempt	Date	Location	Pre-launch announcement / detection	Outcome	Additional Notes
1	Late October 2014	Sinpo	None	Success	Land based static ejection test only.
2	November 2014	Sinpo	None	Failure	Land based static ejection test only.
3	21 December 2014	Sinpo	None	Failure (United States & South Korea) / Success (North Korea)	One report claims that this is the first attempt to eject a missile from a Sinpo class submarine, but the submarine suffers damage as a result of launch failure. The Washington Free Beacon concludes that the undated footage from KCNA is from this test. The other report points out that footage from KCNA was manipulated to exaggerate current progress in the Pukguksong-1, that this launch is done by a submersible barge, not a Sinpo-class submarine, and that the missile did not fly far.
4	23 January 2015	Sinpo	None	Success	Launch from a Sea Based Platform (The Washington Free Beacon & United States) or Test of Vertical Missile Launcher in a Coastal Area Without Involving Sea-Based Platform (South Korea).
5	22 April 2015	Sinpo	None	Success	South Korean officials later stated it was an "ejection test" to evaluate ejecting a submerged ballistic missile, rather than a full test of a new missile system, and that the test missile seemed to have been launched from a submerged barge rather than a submarine.
6	9 May 2015	Unknown	None	Success from submarine (North Korea) / Partial Success ONLY by underwater barge (United States & South Korea - Range is only mere 100 meters)	Reported by North Korea's state run television where Kim Jong Un was watching the test. A missile was fired from a submarine with the name Bukkeukseong-1 inscribed on the missile body. However, U.S. and South Korean officials pointed out that the missile was fired from an underwater barge rather than a submarine, and that it flew only 100 meters above the water.
7	28 November 2015	Sea of Japan	None	Failure	Reportedly, the missile was fired from a Sinpo-class submarine and did not successfully eject, resulting in damage to the conning tower of the submarine. Sources further claimed that the cover of the capsule where the missile was placed has been found (by the South Korea authorities). Within a month, satellite photos of a shipyard at the east coast site of Sinpo suggested that the submarine used in the test remains seaworthy and that development and testing activity of the SLBM may continue. The imagery also showed construction of facilities that could accommodate the building of larger submarines.
8	21 December 2015	Sinpo	None	Partial Success (North Korea in terms of ejection of missile from 'submarine' when it is from a launch tube) / Failure (South Korea)	Further analysis of the published video suggested that while the missile was successfully ejected from the launch tube, it exploded upon ignition. North Korea released footage of the launch in January 2016, which South Korea claimed was manipulated to show a successful test that didn't occur. This test was from a submerged barge, likely so as not to risk damaging the launch submarine again. Video showed the 10-ton missile firing directly vertical out of the water, unlike the first test that emerged at a distinct angle. The first stage of the engine ignited, but the rest of the footage was inconsistently spliced to give the appearance of continued flight.
9	23 April 2016	Sinpo	None	Success (North Korea, in terms of demonstrating Cold Launch capability) / Partial Success (South Korea, due to its range to be less than 'expected of' 300 km or more)	"Cold Launch" technology and ability to ignite the rocket engine only after the missile was ejected from a submarine to a certain height. However, the missile flew only for a few minutes and the missile was estimated to have flown for about 30 km instead. The missile range fell short of the expected 300 km range as SLBM minimum. Worldwide media have quickly reported on this new development. North Korea media claimed success, citing the fact that "the missile was launched from its maximum underwater depth and that its "cold launch" ejection mechanism and high performance engine using solid fuel worked without a hitch, along with its flight controls and warhead release systems." South Korea military sources reckoned that North Korea is trying to build a new 3,000 ton submarine capable of arming 3 such missiles. The same source also claims that the current Sinpo-class submarine can only launch at about 10 to 15 meters below water's surface, which is much shallower than other, bigger submarines that can launch at around 50 meters and therefore that the Sinpo-class submarines will face higher risk of detection by anti-submarine forces. The United States sources did not make any acknowledgement of or denies this report's credibility.
10	9 July 2016, about 11:30 am Pyongyang Standard Time	Sinpo	None	Partial Failure (Ejection successfully, but exploded within short flight)	South Korea claims that the SLBM confirms the missile ejected from the Sinpo-class submarine successfully, but it appeared to have exploded "at an altitude of some 10 kilometers and a distance of merely a few kilometers" after the missile was fired and hence the initial flight was likely a failure. The same report cited the South Korea military, which has also confirmed that North Korea has made progress with the initial undersea ejection stage of the SLBM technology and the Pukguksong-1 is currently in the flight test stage. South Korea military believes that North Korea might be able to deploy the Pukguksong-1 by 2019. The U.S. Strategic Command concluded that the missile from this test fell onto the Sea of Japan. North Korea is likely to use this test as a way to protest against the United States for 2 decisions made within the previous day. The 2 decisions by the United States, on 8 July 2016, are: 1) Imposition of additional sanctions against the nation's leader Kim Jong Un for alleged human rights abuse. 2) The decision to install THAAD in South Korea despite strong objections from China and Russia. However, North Korea was silent about the test.
11	24 August 2016, about 5:30 am Pyongyang Standard Time	Sinpo	None	Success (First full range SLBM test that shows success)	The missile flew about 500 km and reached Japan's air defense identification zone. A report noted that this launch comes the same day as foreign ministers of China, Japan and South Korea are scheduled to meet in Tokyo and also two days after arch-rival South Korea and the United States began Ulchi-Freedom Guardian exercise in the South. As a sidenote, North Korea routinely condemns the biannual military exercises (specifically the annual Ulchi-Freedom Guardian military exercise held every August and the Foal Eagle / Key Resolve joint military exercise held every February to April) as a preparation for invasion and has threatened retaliation. The experts acknowledged that North Korea's repeated tests shows considerable progress that has raised the possibility of a missile launched in lofted trajectory. The South Korea military later confirmed the launch was indeed in lofted trajectory, without specifying exact apogee, unlike the recent Musudan success flight test.
12	11 February 2017, about 8:00 am Pyongyang Standard Time	North Pyongan	None	Success (Pukguksong-2)	The report stated that United States and South Korea military were initially trying to determine whether the missile was a Rodong-1 or a modified Musudan missile, with some analysis by Jeffrey Lewis of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies suggesting this test be treated as North Korean's test of an ICBM first stage. However, North Korea announced less than a day later that this is a successful land-based variant, named Pukguksong-2, a new Korean's nuclear capable strategic weapon that uses high-angle trajectory with due consideration of the safety of neighboring countries. KCNA also announced that this test is the upgraded, extended-range version of its submarine-launched ballistic missile (see above), which also uses a solid fuel engine, that this allows them to verify a "feature of evading interception," and that this represents "the mobility and operation of the new type missile launching truck". Military sources from South Korea note that this missile reached an altitude of 550 km (340 miles) and flew a distance of about 500 km, landing off its east coast, towards Japan. Kim Jong Un recently announced during his New Year's that his country is in the final stages of testing its ICBM. This launch occurred during a state visit by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the golf resort of President Trump in Florida and also the first missile test under Trump's administration. The two heads of state presented a united front in response. At the White House on Friday, Shinzo Abe called the test absolutely intolerable and said that Trump 'assured me the United States will always stand with Japan 100 percent.' Donald Trump did not mentioned South Korea at all.

As of 2019, there have been no further flight tests.

Strategic implications

The Pukguksong-1 is the first sign of a North Korean sea-based nuclear deterrent, which complicates the U.S. and South Korean ability to preemptively destroy the country's nuclear capabilities by threatening a second strike. While there is a chance to take out land-based nuclear sites, ballistic missile submarines ensure that a retaliatory strike could still be launched before it can be found and neutralized.

North Korea's unique circumstances limit the ways such a capability could be employed. It is thought that the country needs more time to develop submarines for reliably deploying weapons like the Pukguksong-1 missile.

Given their submarines' insufficient power to outrun U.S. Navy nuclear attack submarines and lack of aerial and surface coverage to protect them out to long distances, they cannot venture far out to sea, although a scenario where a missile-equipped sub travels into the Sea of Japan on a "suicide mission" to fire the Pukguksong-1 before it expects to inevitably get destroyed is not implausible given the loyalty of the elite crewmen of the submarine force.

A more likely scenario would be deployment along the Korean coastline within North Korean local air and surface cover and silent movement into or out of various hiding spots like bays, inlets, and outer isles before achievement of a pre-designated position, with quiet submerged operation on battery power; because of its finite power capacity, the sub would have to surface or snorkel for air to recharge its batteries if it remains hiding for an extended period, making it vulnerable to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts.

A land based, mobile derivative of the Pukguksong-1 would significantly complicate U.S, Japan and South Korean defenses. Unlike the liquid fueled Rodong or SCUD derivatives, the solid fueled Pukguksong-1 can be fired at a much shorter notification time. The North Korean have since achieved this Pukguksong-2 land-based, mobile derivative of the Pukguksong-1 milestone in their 12th test of the missile on 12 February 2017.

First completely successful test

On 24 August 2016 at around 5:30 am (Pyongyang Standard Time), North Korea successfully tested the Pukguksong-1 as the missile flew 500 km into Japan's ADIZ without issue. Unlike the recent successful Musudan flight, KCNA did not officially announce the test until a day later, calling it a great success on the part of Kim Jong Un. The entire development has since been published worldwide.

In light of recent development of the Pukguksong-1, South Korean military sources concluded that the first successful Pukguksong-1 test was in fact launched in lofted trajectory. This is without confirmation of the actual apogee, and therefore the range could have been at least 1,000 km or more had the missile launched in normal trajectory and could be operationally deployed as early as 2017. Hawkish forces in South Korea have renewed calls for South Korea to construct nuclear submarines to counter North Korea's 'provocation'.

However, the US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University rejected South Korean claims that the Pukguksong-1 could be operationally deployed before 2017, suggesting its initial operational capability will not be achieved before June 2018. Specifically, North Korea still faces significant technological challenges, including building a new class of submarine to carry 3 such missiles at once.

On 30 August 2016, David Wright, a missile expert and co-director of the Union of Concerned Scientists' Global Security Program, suggested that the apogee achieved by this test was 550 km and the range would have been 1,250 km, assuming the same payload on standard trajectory.

On the same day, the South Korean media reported that Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), since recommends that South Korea deploy 2 batteries of THAAD instead of 1 in order to counter the possibility of North Korea's firing a Pukguksong-1 outside its 120-degree field of vision.

However, Lewis also stressed that it does little to address the possibility of lofted attack, because the missile's reentry in lofted trajectory will be at very high speeds and at a very steep angle, the ability of THAAD interception depending on the missile range. He also noted that THAAD was never field tested against an intermediate-range target or on an unusual angle of attack. With this in mind, he ended by suggesting it is time to use diplomatic measures for dissuading North Korea from enhancing such capabilities and defense measures. This is a very ineffective strategy, since North Korea has the ability to use numerous counter-measures for every measures the US and South Korea have.

Suspected Chinese involvement in the proliferation of SLBM technologies of North Korea

On 3 September 2016, US expert Bruce Bechtol, a North Korea expert at Angelo State University, and another South Korean national security researcher, Shin Jong-woo, claimed that China must have provided North Korea with the relevant SLBM technologies, since it took a mere 4 months from the first successful cold launch Test (23 April 2016) to the first complete test (24 August 2016) and further claimed that the Pukguksong-1 is a carbon-copy of first China's first SLBM, JL-1. In comparison, China took 15 years to develop JL-1. Bruce Bechtol also stated his analysis is supported by space program expert Tal Inbar of Israel's Fisher Institute. However, Dave Schmerler of the James Martin Center of Non Proliferation Studies noted that the North Korean missile used a single engine design (the JL-1 used 4 engines) and grid fins for flight stability, features not found on the Chinese JL-1, and urged caution in jumping to conclusions. He added that the single-engine design had more in common with the Iranian Sejjil MRBM than the JL-1.

Response from China to alleged proliferation activities

On 5 September 2016, the Chinese media refuted the report by citing that the People's Republic of China as a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory state and stating that one of the permanent members of United Nations Security Council would never proliferate by providing or selling nuclear and missile-related technologies to North Korea (The actual excerpts are as follows: 作为联合国安理会常任理事国、《核不扩散条约》缔约国，中国绝对不会向朝鲜提供或者出售与核武器和弹道导弹相关的装备和技术。.

This report also states that some US experts and think-tanks have all along been irresponsible in making defamatory statements about China, as they unreasonably link North Korea's nuclear capability to China and have sought to use media influence to pressure China. This report does not contain actual evidence of supposed proliferation on China's part. (The actual excerpts read as follows: 一些美国媒体和智库一向很擅长将朝鲜的涉核问题与中国进行无端挂钩，就是希望通过这种方式向中国施压，而这些说法通常没有任何证据，是很不负责任的。)

See also

• R-29 Vysota
• R-29RM Shtil
• R-29RMU Sineva
• R-29RMU2 Layner
• RSM-56 Bulava
• UGM-133 Trident II
• M45 (missile)
• M51 (missile)
• JL-1
• JL-2
• K Missile family
• R-39 Rif
• R-39M

External links

• CSIS Missile Threat - Pukguksong-1 (KN-11)
• Estimating KN-11 range and reliability, applying Bayesian model)