Hwasong-5
| Hwasong-5 | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Type | Short range ballistic missile |
| Place of origin | North Korea |
| Service history | |
| In service | 1987−Present |
| Used by | See operators |
| Wars | Iran-Iraq war Yemeni civil war (2014–present) |
| Production history | |
| Manufacturer | 125th Machine Factory[1] |
| Produced | 1986[1]−1992[2] |
| No. built | 300[2] |
| Variants | See variants |
| Specifications | |
| Mass | 5,860 kg (12,920 lb)[2] |
| Length | 10.94 m (35.9 ft)[2] |
| Diameter | 88 cm (35 in)[2] |
| Maximum firing range | 300 kilometres (190 mi)[3] |
| Warhead | HE or Cluster munition[3] |
| Warhead weight | 1,000 kg (2,200 lb)[3] |
| Propellant | TM-185 (20% gasoline 80% kerosene) / AK-27I (27% N 2O 4 73% NHO 3)[4] |
| Accuracy | 450 m (490 yd) CEP[5] |
Launch platform | MAZ-543 or converted civilian truck TEL[2] |
The Hwasong-5 (Korean: 화성 5; Hanja: 火星 5; lit. Mars 5)[6] is a North Korean short range ballistic missile (SRBM)[5] derived from the Soviet R-17 Elbrus missile.[7] It is one of several missiles with the NATO reporting name Scud-B.[3]
History
[edit]North Korea received rocket artillery, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and anti-ship missiles from the Soviet Union in the 1960s and then from China in the 1970s.[8] The range and accuracy of the 2K6 Luna were unsatisfactory, but the Soviets refused to supply ballistic missiles to limit tensions in Korea.[7] North Korea sought a domestic missile production capability by 1965, and began making military and industrial preparations shortly afterward.[8]
A joint development program with China of the DF-61 missile began in 1977, but was cancelled in 1978 due to Chinese domestic politics.[9] North Korea received R-17s from Egypt in the late 1970s or early 1980s. North Korea supported Egypt during the Yom Kippur War and the countries had friendly relations.[7][10]
The R-17s were reverse engineered to develop multiple derivatives starting with the Hwasong-5.[7] The Hwasong-5 may have slightly better range than the R-17 due to improved engines.[11] There were up to six test launches from April to September 1984 with three successes.[3][11] The missile entered production in 1985. Serial production began in 1986. It entered North Korean service in 1987.[3]
Hwasong-series missiles are reportedly manufactured by the No. 125 Factory in Pyongyang.[12] It is estimated that about 300 missiles were produced between 1986 until 1991 or 1992.[2] The Hwasong-5 is mounted on a North Korean copy of the MAZ-543 transporter erector launcher vehicle or a converted civilian truck.[2] The missile can carry high explosive (HE) or cluster munition warheads.[3] Reportedly, the North Koreans are working on the development of chemical and biological warheads for their Hwasong missile program.[4]
Export
[edit]Iran used the Hwasong-5 during the War of the Cities, with eight launch failures. North Korea received operational data from Iran. Iran first requested missiles from North Korea in 1985, and a 1985 cooperation agreement between the countries may have included Iranian funds for ballistic missile development.[11]
Following the end of production of Scud missiles in the Soviet Union, Syria turned to North Korea and China to support and strengthen its existing Scud battalions. Syria purchased an unknown number of Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6 missiles and TELs from North Korea.[13]
In 1989, the United Arab Emirates purchased Hwasong-5 missiles.[14] The missiles were decommissioned, allegedly due to unsatisfactory quality.[15]
Besides confirmed exports to Iran, Syria, and the UAE,[16] the North Koreans reportedly attempted to export the Hwasong-5 to the Republic of Congo, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Yemen; according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies.[2]
Variants
[edit]Iran
[edit]- Shahab-1
North Korea
[edit]- Hwasong-6
- KN-21
- A variant with terminal maneuverability and tested on August 26, 2017.[17] Not seen after August 2017 and likely abandoned. KN-21 is the U.S. designation.[18][19]
Operators
[edit]Current
[edit]
Iran[1] − Produced locally as the Shahab-1.[2] According to a 2024 report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, their service status is "uncertain"[20]
North Korea − 30 Hwasong-5/6 launchers in service as of 2024[21]
Syria[13]
Former
[edit]
United Arab Emirates[1] − Reportedly decommissioned.[15] According to the IISS, the UAE still have 6 launchers and up to 20 missiles in its inventories as of 2024[22]
Yemen − Pre-war stocks depleted during the Yemeni civil war (2014–present). Most were converted into Burkan missiles by the Houthis[23]
References
[edit]Citations
[edit]- ^ a b c d Zaloga 2013, p. 96.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j "Hwasong-5". Missile Threat. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 23 April 2024. Retrieved 19 November 2024.
- ^ a b c d e f g Center for Energy and Security Studies & The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021, p. 48.
- ^ a b "Hwasong 5 / Scud-B - North Korea". Federation of American Scientists. 25 March 2024. Retrieved 19 November 2024.
- ^ a b Center for Energy and Security Studies & The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021, p. 46.
- ^ Center for Energy and Security Studies & The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021, p. 45.
- ^ a b c d Center for Energy and Security Studies & The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021, p. 47.
- ^ a b Pinkston 2008, p. 14.
- ^ Pinkston 2008, pp. 14–15.
- ^ Pinkston 2008, pp. 15–16.
- ^ a b c Pinkston 2008, p. 16.
- ^ Pinkston 2008, p. 45.
- ^ a b Zaloga 2013, p. 78.
- ^ Ramani, Samuel. "Why Did the UAE Purchase Weapons From North Korea?". Thediplomat.com. Retrieved 21 November 2021.
- ^ a b United States, Congress. House. Committee on International Relations (2000). U.S. Policy Toward North Korea: Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, Part 2. U.S. Government Printing Office. pp. 91–92. ISBN 9780160607646.
- ^ Zaloga 2013, pp. 78, 96.
- ^ Panda, Ankit. "Introducing the KN21, North Korea's New Take on Its Oldest Ballistic Missile". Thediplomat.com. Retrieved 21 November 2021.
- ^ North Korea’s New Short-Range Missiles: A Technical Evaluation. 38 North. 9 October 2019.
- ^ KN-21. Missile Defense Advocacy.
- ^ International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024a, p. 354.
- ^ International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024, p. 282.
- ^ International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024a, p. 391.
- ^ Mitzer, Stijn; Oliemans, Joost (4 September 2022). "Houthi Drone And Missile Handbook". Oryx. Retrieved 20 November 2024.
Sources
[edit]- Center for Energy and Security Studies; The International Institute for Strategic Studies (14 July 2021). DPRK Strategic Capabilities and Security on the Korean Peninsula: Looking Ahead.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies (12 February 2024). "Chapter Five: Asia". The Military Balance. 124 (1). Taylor & Francis: 218–327. doi:10.1080/04597222.2024.2298593. ISSN 0459-7222. Retrieved 19 November 2024.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies (12 February 2024a). "Chapter Six: Middle East and North Africa". The Military Balance. 124 (1). Taylor & Francis: 328–395. doi:10.1080/04597222.2024.2298863. ISSN 0459-7222. Retrieved 19 November 2024.
- Pinkston, Daniel A. (February 2008). The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program (PDF). Strategic Studies Institute, US Army. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2014-08-26.
- Zaloga, Steven J. (2013). Scud Ballistic Missile and Launch Systems 1955–2005. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4728-0306-1.
