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Draft:US Military and Economic Interests in the Arctic

US Military and Economic Interests in the Arctic

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For most of its history, the Arctic Region has been a desolate, inhospitable climate for human activity. However, with the opening up of new naval routes and access to underwater resources due to the onset of global warming, different states have diverted their attention towards the Arctic.[1]

As competing states like Russia and China encroach upon the Arctic, it has raised concerns over how the U.S. will strategically ensure its own military and economic interests in the region. Together, the U.S’ military and economic interests have helped form the nexus of the U.S. strategic outlook on the region and its Arctic Security Policy.[2]

The U.S' historic and strategic role in the Arctic

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Before World War 2

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According to the existing literature, the earliest historical accounts of the U.S as an “Arctic nation” goes back to its purchase of the territory of Alaska from the Russian Empire in 1867.[3] Then US Secretary of State, William H. Seward, saw the purchase as justified, arguing that as a rising global power, the U.S. should involve itself more in free trade, global communication network and financial integration.[4] Seward claimed further that Alaska was rich in ressources, and that the incorporation of the territory into the United States would ensure American economic interests in the territory through military protection by the U.S. government as a guarantor of free trade.[5]

Other American endeavours of expanding its territory into the Arctic have been attempted on multiple occasions, e.g. its proposal to purchase Greenland (and sometimes Iceland) in 1868, 1910, 1946, 2019 and suggested as recently as of 2024 by Donald J. Trump, but these proposals were all rejected.[6][7][8][9]

During World War 2

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Historically, external threats from other states have helped fuel U.S. interests in the Arctic. For instance, U.S. military prescence increased in the Arctic during WW2 when the Danish ambassador in Washington D.C. allowed the placement of American troops on Greenland following the German occupation of Denmark.[7] The Alaskan territory also became an important strategic point in the Pacific Theater of WW2.[6] Concurrent with these external threats, technological improvements in aviation and naval capacity during the first half of the 20th century made American ambitions in the Arctic seem more obtainable.[7]

The Cold War

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During the Cold War, the U.S. involved itself further in the Arctic due to the fear of Soviet influence expanding into the region.[10]

Post Cold War period

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American interests in the Arctic drastically declined, however, following the end of the Cold War.[3] Associate professor from the Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary, Rob Huebert, describes the U.S. as a “reluctant Arctic power” that showed little interest in the Arctic after the end of the Cold War[3]. Other Institutes of International Affairs emphasises this further, noting how, in the decades following the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has spent little ressources on Arctic Affairs, apart from submarine patrols to deter Russian encroachment in the region.[11] The U.S. also closed most of its bases in the Greenland and Alaska around the same time.[3] It is only in recent years that the U.S. have begun to revamp its Arctic Strategy, but it remains unclear when exactly these changes will be put into effect[12].

Due to Alaska’s geographic proximity, fifteen percent of current U.S. territory extends into the Arctic Circle, giving the U.S. the status as Arctic Nation to this day[13].

Revamping of the U.S. Arctic Strategy

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According to the German Institute of International Affairs and Security, with the onset of global warming, the U.S. no longer considers the Arctic region as the geographic barrier it once was. This, coupled with new external threats like Russian and Chinese aggression in the region, have made the Trump and later Biden Administration reassess their military stance and remove the U.S. from its state of complacency in the Arctic, now focusing more on military aspects and less on cooperative means of Arctic governance.[13]

Unlike previous administrations, U.S. president Donald J. Trump described the Arctic region as a “relative priority” during his first term as POTUS. This became apparent through a more aggressive Arctic Policy during his first presidential term.[14] While former U.S Administrations sought to achieve governance of the Arctic through more peaceful and diplomatic cooperation, the Trump Administration emphasised a stronger focus on military and strategic involvement in the Arctic.[13][6]

Robert W. Orttung, professor at the Elliot School of International Affairs from the University of George Washington, notes how this shift in American Arctic security policy became apparent on the international stage in 2018 when the Trump administration used the Arctic Council, a non-military institution, as a platform to express its concerns over China and Russia’s military encroachment in the region.[14]

According to most sources, the Trump administration’s proposal to buy Greenland from Denmark in the following year of 2019 served as a clear signal to Russia and China that the U.S. still has a say in Arctic affairs.[15]

Political Scientists like Heurlin at the University of Copenhagen attributes this sudden change through a neorealist perspective. According to Heurlin, this new, aggressive change in American Arctic Security Policy came as a response to Xi Jiping’s declaration of China as “Polar Great Power” back in 2017. In our current unipolar world with one sole superpower, Heurlin explains that only the U.S. alone could change the Arctic Region from a more cooperative environment to increasingly becoming more competitive, “practically overnight”. As such, according to Heurlin, this rather quick transition to a more competitive region should be viewed as a part of a larger, global context, in which the U.S. is trying to enforce its hegemony. According to Heurlin, this would explain why the Trump's Administration Arctic Policy differs so greatly compared to its predecessors.[16]

According to the Stockholm Institute of Environment, the economic prospects and resources that Alaska holds like oil is also a big motivating factor for recent U.S. interest in the Arctic, for instance how Trump issued an executive order during his first presidential term that started the process of opening Alaska’s Arctic waters for drilling.[6] Additionally, the German Institute of International Affairs and Security adds that the Biden Administration enacted the U.S. newest Arctic Strategy, released in October of 2022 and updated in October of 2023, which is based on a dual-strategy. On one side, it aims to contain aggressive behavior by Russia and China. At the same time, it also tries to maintain stability in the Arctic in hopes of returning to a more cooperative environment in the future.[2][13]

The German Institute of International Affairs and Security has examined this Arctic Strategy, arguing that with the ongoing war in Ukraine, along with Russia’s closer ties to China, it has been difficult to maintain this current dual-strategy.[13]

Despite successful cooperation in the past through institutional engagement like the Arctic Council, it would seem that discourse on military power still plays a vital role in Arctic governance.

Current U.S. Military presence and strategic objectives in the Arctic

U.S. Coast Guard

As the U.S. has shifted more of its focus back to the Arctic, signs of its complacency in the region have started to become apparent.[11] Compared to Russia and China alone, the U.S. seems to have fallen behind in Arctic military affairs.[11] the German Institute of International Affairs and Security elaborates on this further, detailing how the U.S. often depends on its NATO Allies for icebreaking capabilities as well as for surveillance and intelligence sharing of the Arctic.[13]

Former Commandant Admiral of the USCG, Paul Zukunft, warned further that there were “considerable gaps in the region’s reconnaissance capabilities”, indicating a clear lack of domain awareness in the region.[13] Following a rather sudden detection of seven Russian and Chinese warships in the Bering Sea within the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone in September of 2022, USCG Vice Admiral, Kevin Lunday, hinted at the fact that the U.S. does not have enough ships at its disposal to protect U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic Ocean.[13] The latest U.S. Arctic Strategy addresses these concerns by promising to invest more in reconnaissance, maritime domain awareness and more icebreakers, scheduled to arrive by 2026-2027.[2][17] A three ship icebreaker fleet would enable the U.S. to catch up with China by 2027, but would still fall significantly behind Russia’s amount of icebreakers.[13] This reliance on its European allies is also indicated in the U.S. Arctic Strategy document, in which “unity of effort” with its allies is stated as a goal.[2]

U.S. Navy

In 2009, the U.S. Navy issued its first Arctic Strategic document, with a heavy emphasis of close coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard.[18] In 2018, the U.S. Navy declared free navigation in the Arctic Sea as a justification for exercising its legal navigational rights. As professor Orttung points out, this declaration hasn’t been without its problems as it directly contradicted with Canada’s claims of the Northwest passage as territory belonging to Canada and not international waters.[14]

Additionally, the U.S. mobilised its 6th navy fleet in the High North in October of 2018 for the first time since 1991.[13] Since May of 2020, the 2nd U.S. navy has maintained a presence in the Arctic and has conducted multiple military exercises with NATO allies.[13] In response to Russian submarines, armed with nuclear ballistic missiles, being able to stay undetected on ice sheets in the Arctic, U.S. submarines have practiced its ability to detect and track these submarines ever since the 1960s.[13]

U.S. Air force

Currently, the most involved branch of the U.S. military in the Arctic is the air force, accounting for around 80 percent of Department of Defense operations and 80 percent of U.S. military assets in the Arctic.[14][19] To boost the air force's capabilities in conducting operations in the Arctic, a total of 54 F-35 fifth-generation fighter jets were stationed at Alaska’s Eielson Air Force Base in 2018.[14] According to Bouffard and Rodman (2021), the U.S. Arctic policy’s focus on the air force stems from the belief that possible attacks on U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic will come mainly from the air.[19]

NORAD

Together with Canadian authorities, the U.S. forms The North American Aerospace Defense Command, NORAD, that serves as a warning system for potential ballistic missile attacks, and which has overseen multiple U.S. radar facilities since 1957.[13] These defense and surveillance systems, however, have been deemed as outdated and in need of replacement in terms of dealing with modern cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons.[13] To counter this, the U.S. began modernizing its radar systems in 2019.[13] Similar to the U.S. Navy’s Arctic policy, cooperation with its ally Canada hasn’t been without its controversies as the U.S. has hesitated sharing all of its satellite-based data with Canada regarding the modernisation of the missile defense system.[13] In order to address this, the current U.S. National Arctic Strategy explicitly emphasises deeper cooperation with Canada in NORAD.[2]

U.S. Arctic Infrastructure

In comparison to other Arctic states like Russia, the U.S. lacks far behind in military infrastructure in the Arctic.[20] Until 2024, the U.S. was the only Arctic state without a deep water port and is still limited in its icebreaking capabilities[11][21]. This lack of infrastructure limits the overall capability of the U.S. military in the Arctic. Although the latest official U.S. Arctic policy addresses these concerns, by investing its largest amount into the U.S. Arctic infrastructure in the 21st century back in 2021, the results of these investments are still to be felt.[21] Other current U.S. military infrastructure that’s outside of U.S. territory, e.g. the Thule Base in Denmark, still depends on the cooperation between the U.S. and its allies.[22]

Future outlook on the region the current existing literature on the topic

Although there is a great amount of literature on the topic, notable scholars and media outlets hold differing views on the existing literature of U.S. military and economic interests in the Arctic. Most of the existing literature agree that although the U.S. has increased its military efforts in the Arctic through more funding and modernisation of its military equipment and infrastructure, years of complacency and neglect still affect the U.S  military interests in the Arctic before their renewed effort can truly take off and leave a greater impact[13][21]. This is especially apparent in the U.S. Arctic infrastructure, which hinders the capacity for the rest of its military efforts in the Arctic.[20] In the existing literature, there is a greater focus on political actors, such as the election of U.S. president Donald J. Trump, as well as a focus on the geopolitical state of the current world order, in which the U.S. tries to enforce its hegemony.[12]

Despite this overall agreement, differing perspectives persist in the existing literature. Critics of the existing literature, like the department of International Relations of Astana, note how very little attention has been directed towards identifying the factors that contribute to the strengthening and weakening of the relationship between the U.S. and its allies, and how this affects the U.S. military and strategic position in the Arctic.[23] Factors that strengthen the US relationship with its allies - such as active military cooperation, joint exercises and intelligence sharing - and factors that weakened it - such as territorial claims, different national policies and domestic politics - all play an important in assessing the U.S’ ability to maintain its military and economic interests in the Arctic.[23]

In regards to domestic policies, the recent reelection of Donald J. Trump, known for distancing NATO allies with his public statements of other NATO allied countries’ overreliance on U.S. aid and demands of increased spending on defense, could in the future potentially weaken U.S. cooperation with its allies in the Arctic, which has already seen a fair share of controversy and disagreements.[24] As such, scholars from the Department of International Relations of Astana have described this as a clear gap in the subject of U.S. Arctic affairs.[23] Their claims, however, have been deemed to be very controversial according to a much bigger part of the existing literature as it has been acknowledged extensively in the past as well as recently that U.S. domestic affairs, specifically the reelection of Donald J. Trump in November of this year, can have negative effects on its relationship with its NATO allies in general and also specifically in the Arctic.[25]

Furthermore, other sources point to one of the U.S.’ closest allies, Canada, and its territorial disputes and problems with intelligence sharing regarding NORAD.[13] Most of the literature agree that large part of the American military’s capacity to operate in the Arctic also depends on its cooperation with its NATO allies, and that cooperation has not been without its controversies.[22][24]

Therefore, it would rather seem that there is an existing contradiction in the current literature between different sources regarding U.S. domestic policies and its affect on U.S. military interests in the Arctic instead of a potential gap.

Furthermore, a less involved United States in European affairs during another Trump presidency doesn’t necessarily mean less American military interests in the Arctic. During Donald J. Trump’s first presidential term, the U.S. still showed interests in the Arctic, even suggesting the purchase of Greenland from Denmark in 2018 and 2019[15][6] and as recently as of late 2024.[9]

Therefore, a less involved U.S. in NATO could also mean that the U.S. has more military ressources, such as naval and air vehicles, at its disposal in Arctic affairs. Although, even with more of its own naval and air vehicle at its disposal in the Arctic, the U.S. still lacks, for example, more icebreakers which it has been relying on its European NATO allies for.[11][21] Although European NATO countries are generally more reliant on the US than vice versa, in the Arctic, European NATO allies could use things, such as the U.S. lack of icebreakers and dependency of its allies in regards to intelligence sharing, to their advantage as a way to counter Trump’s increasing demands in the coming years. There is not much written about how the European countermeasures to Trump’s demands could affect the U.S. military interests in the Arctic in the coming years. Therefore, this warrants a further inquiry into this gap in the existing literature.

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